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/sci/ - Science & Math

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9943369 No.9943369 [Reply] [Original]

ITT: prove you're not a p-zombie

>> No.9943375
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9943375

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/fdEWWr8St59bXLbQr/zombies-zombies

>> No.9943381

>>9943369
Fantasies belong on >>>/lit/

>> No.9943382

>>9943375
>lesswrong

>> No.9943413

>>9943382
Can you prove Eliezer wrong?

>> No.9943417

>>9943369
If you believe anything a person could say or do is able to let you know whether or not they're a p-zombie, then you have fundamentally missed the entire point of the p-zombie argument.
It only has any sort of chance at working as an argument for qualia's literal reality if you accept qualia could exist for one person and not exist for an otherwise identical p-zombie person who has absolutely no distinguishable behavioral traits or physical / biological features from the first non-zombie person.
The point is supposed to be that if you can accept this as possible then qualia as a literal phenomenon can't be brushed off in terms of physical reductionist explanations.
If you allow for a p-zombie to be identifiable through how how he writes for example then a physical reductionist can claim the behavioral difference shows what you consider qualia can just be explained in terms of physiology and behavior.

>> No.9943431
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9943431

>dude consciousness is just a really big phase plot lmao
>muh complexity
this is what /sci/ actualy believes

>> No.9943458

>>9943417
you do come up with the paradox though that a p-zombie will profess to having qualia. i feel like this suggests something interesting about the relationship between qualia and the brain but i dont know what. it kind of trivialises qualia abit.

>> No.9943460

>>9943369
P ∝NP

>> No.9943472

>>9943417
That's exactly what a p-zombie would say

>> No.9943563

>>9943417
Our bodies and brains are verifiably identical in structure and function, which means you make several ignorant assumptions about conciousness in order to make this assertion. That its a)something immaterial b) its not related to the physiology of the body c)reality produces fakes for whatever reason

>> No.9943572

>>9943563
immaterialists arent saying that the mind isnt physiologically related to the brain or body, but its saying that the mind has properties which are not identical to physiology. is the thought youre having right now identical to the brain activity concurrently happening in the brain? do they have the same properties? electrochemiistry is a property of the brain and not thoughts.

>> No.9943580

>>9943572
Theres a wholeeeee lot of assertions in that sentence partner.
>identical to the brain activity concurrently happening in the brain?
why wouldnt it
> do they have the same properties?
Define the properties
>electrochemiistry is a property of the brain and not thoughts
DUDEDRUGSLMAO

>> No.9943601

>>9943580
for instance you could compare the physical structure of separate neurons with electric charge sending physical messages in temporal sequences to the irreducible holism that defines a thought. the experience of a thought. what exactly is it that connects the properties of neurons firing in patterns with the experience of a thought. one could even have an interesting thought experiment.

for instance take the sheet of primary auditory cortex that maps sound properties. if you grow a bunch of neurons in a petri dish with same connections identical to that primary auditory cortex and you could get them to fire in the same manner as when the auditory cortex hears the word "thump".. are those petri dish cells identical to the word thump. even if they are grown outside a brain, never contacted one, never even contacted auditory information but fire in the same way. is thump inherent in that cell culture?

>> No.9943606

>>9943563
>That its a)something immaterial
That's the point, anon. I'm trying to explain to you what philosophers like Chalmers use the p-zombie argument for.
And to clarify, I don't personally agree with Chalmers and don't buy into the "hard problem"/ "we need a new science of qualia" meme. I'm just pointing out that of you try to invoke p-zombies and talk about how you could differentiate them from non-zombies on the basis of something physical or behavioral, then you have completely missed the point of how the p-zombie argument is supposed to work.

>> No.9943621

>>9943606
I understand precisely where its coming from, but I think its fundamentally flawed in that its making assumptions in order to construct its argument which immediately puts it in the realm of fantasy. Consciousness is already so poorly defined, and mysterious that a thought exercise like this is just a wild stab in the dark.

>hears the word "thump".. are those petri dish cells identical to the word thump

For one, "thump" is just a label, so this is a total disambiguation of meaning, and second we dont know how neurons come together to produce perception. It might be, and this is something that would need to be tested.

>> No.9943629

>>9943621
I think it's wrong too, but if other people are going to use it I at least want them to not immediately defeat the entire purpose it was built around.

>> No.9943631

>>9943621
thump isnt a label. its a pattern of sound you can analyse with acoustics.

well heres an interesting continuation. What if you took those cells in the petridish connected in that way and implanted them into the visual cortex and they made that same pattern. Would it by definition still be identical to the sound thump or if now recontextualised in our visual apparatus, would it have to be something else?

you may argue we dont really know what happened if this were to happen but surely you would still atleast say that in this situation we certainly wouldnt "hear" this activity would we. we would see it.

>> No.9944075

>>9943431
pretty cool plot

>> No.9944354

>>9943417
>If you believe anything a person could say or do is able to let you know whether or not they're a p-zombie, then you have fundamentally missed the entire point of the p-zombie argument.
I've always had a problem with this idea because how can p-zombies "talk about" phenomenality? How can the noises they utter be accurate descriptions of qualitative subjective consciousness, something they have absolutely no information about? It would have to be pure chance that they make those noises in just the right circumstances, right? But that means a p-zombie is inherently an astronomically improbable entity. Which means that since I know I am not a p-zombie, I know that it's astronomically improbable that anyone I meet who is capable of describing phenomenal consciousness is a p-zombie.
This same argument goes for epiphenomenalism as well; why would our brains produce noises that accurately describe our conscious states if our brains are not receiving any information from our conscious states? It would have to be a hyper-improbable chance event, which means epiphenomenalism (though logically possible) is hyper-improbable.