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/sci/ - Science & Math


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9700689 No.9700689 [Reply] [Original]

Pattern Identity Theory
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http://www.orionsarm.com/eg-article/47bcf671e4c7e

>Pattern Identity theory maintains that human consciousness is a pattern of memories and programs inside the body, mostly but not all in the central nervous system, and like any other collection of programs and memories it can be copied and transmitted. Any human who is successfully uploaded experiences a true transfer of consciousness from the body into the new substrate.


Continuity Identity Theory
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http://www.orionsarm.com/eg-article/463a8c7f7cc4f

>Continuity Identity theory believe that a human consciousness cannot be directly copied. Any attempt to non-destructively upload a human consciousness only produces an entirely new individual which is only a copy of the original consciousness, and no actual transfer of consciousness occurs. In the case of destructive uploading, adherents of Continuity Identity theory consider the destructive scan is in fact an act of murder/suicide.

So which one is it /Sci/?

>> No.9700694

>>9700689
Which one does 'sleeping and waking up the next day' fall under?

>> No.9700700

>>9700689
Both are wrong, since identity is a subjective illusion. From the perspective of the "copy," he is the same consciousness due to his memories giving him the feeling of continuity, like waking up from a night's sleep. From the perspective of the "original," the copy is different since the original does not feel any transfer or experiences from the copy. Deleting the original is simply removing this perspective, not falsifying it.

Continuity is wrong and transferring is wrong, so neither is correct.

>> No.9700704

>>9700700
So if both are wrong, then what happens to me if I was to upload my consciousness. Would I wake up from procedure the same individual? Or would I just die?

>> No.9700705

>>9700704
Well, how much of the 'new you' would you really want to waste on that question?

>> No.9700706

>>9700704
>So if both are wrong, then what happens to me
You weren't reading closely enough. There is really no "me," objectively.

>> No.9700982

>>9700700
^^^This.
The expectation here is completely retarded:
>Any human who is successfully uploaded experiences a true transfer of consciousness from the body into the new substrate.
But also retarded is the idea there actually is some literal "self" to begin with.
It seems like most people can accept the first thing as retarded but it's harder to accept the second concept. Which is unfortunate because then these people make or participate in threads like this and shitpost all day about how there must be some "self" object but it can't be carried over to other bodies for mysterious reasons.
It's like that "trying to fill an already full cup" zen metaphor. Instead of emptying the already filled contents which are their belief in "self," they go the opposite direction and try to pour even more bullshit on top of their "self" conviction.

>> No.9700988

>>9700689
It gets weirder if you make multiple copies of someone. Do all the copies "fork" and become distinct after that point, or somehow have a hive mind with all new experiences being shared? And if a hive mind is created, what is the speed of communication?