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/sci/ - Science & Math

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4631385 No.4631385 [Reply] [Original]

Free will is just a guess, a theory

>> No.4631388

No, it isn't. It's a fact, because of qualia.

>> No.4631399

agreed, tequila does solidify free will.

>> No.4631400

>>4631388
Qualia don't disprove determinism.

>> No.4631402

>>4631398
Learn to read, fake me. I didn't say qualia disprove anything.

>> No.4631404

>>4631400
But qualia are consciousness and consciousness is non-physicalism and non-physicalism sez FUCK YOU to the determinists. Factual philososcience, my friend.

>> No.4631405

>>4631402
You are the fake fundie. You said free will would be fact because of qualia. Free will being fact means disproving determinism.

>> No.4631406

>>4631404
>non-physicalism sez FUCK YOU to the determinists
Nope. It only sez FUCK YOU to physicalism. Dualism is totally compatible with determinism.

>> No.4631410

>>4631406
Determinism is based on physical cause and effect.

>> No.4631411

>>4631410
Only in the physical world. Determinism is a broader concept that basically only states that all actions are determined. This can be applied to the non-physical as well.

>> No.4631415

>>4631411
>This can be applied to the non-physical as well.
No. One doesn't know how non-physical things behave and interact, both with each other and with the physical. Determinism and a world where things without properties behave in unintelligible ways do not go together at all.

>> No.4631418

>>4631415
Us not understanding their mechanisms is not a reason for determinism not to work. Events can be fully determined without us being able to comprehend how.

>> No.4631425

>>4631418
Well, as I said, determinism presupposes cause and effect. You cannot apply it to a system you don't understand enough to actually know whether cause and effect is in place.

It's nonsensical to insist that determinism and dualism work together until you've actually explained the non-physical elements of dualism and demonstrated that deterministic principles do in fact remain intact. Without this explanation, your claim simply makes no sense.

>> No.4631428

>>4631425
Determinism doesn't need us to understand how it works. It might even be part of this determinism that we're not supposed to know its mechanisms. I think you're confusing determinism with being explicable. These are unrelated and not the same. Determinism only states everything is determined, it doesn't say we can comprehend all chains of causes and effects.

>> No.4631441

>>4631428
>Determinism doesn't need us to understand how it works.
But your claim needs at least some sort of logical support.

>I think you're confusing determinism with being explicable.
I'm not confusing anything. I'm merely pointing out that in order to postulate X, one has to understand X. You don't understand X, therefore, you cannot assume its validity (X being the claim that determinism is compatible with dualism, of course).

>Determinism only states everything is determined, it doesn't say we can comprehend all chains of causes and effects.
That's not what I was saying anyway.

>> No.4631446

>>4631428
Nothing seperates qualia from a functionalist perspective though. The question of why qualia exists, and so on and so forth, and analyzing it from a non-common sense POV isn't unallowed by qualia.

>> No.4631449

>>4631441
I did not make any claims about determinism being the case or not. All I did was correcting a misconception of yours. You said determinism is incompatible with dualism because we don't understand how it works on the non-physical level. I explained why this statement of yours is wrong, i.e. because determinism being true or not is independent of us being able to explain it.

>> No.4631452

>>4631446
Please explain what you mean by a "functionalist" perspective and how this is related to the post you were quoting.

>> No.4631461

>>4631388
>No, it isn't. It's a fact, because of qualia.
I have read most of the arguments on the wikipedo page for the existence of qualia but I am not convinced that it is real.

>> No.4631463

>>4631461
Of course it's nonsense. He's a troll using my tripcode.

>> No.4631471

>>4631449
>I did not make any claims about determinism being the case or not.
See:
>>4631406
>Dualism is totally compatible with determinism.
This is the claim I'm objecting to. You cannot postulate this, because you don't comprehend dualism. No one does.

>All I did was correcting a misconception of yours. You said determinism is incompatible with dualism because we don't understand how it works
Ah, I see. That's not really a genuine misconception as much as I just didn't express myself properly. See:
>Determinism and a world where things without properties behave in unintelligible ways do not go together at all.
As clumsily phrased as it may be, it was intended as an argument against *any* definitive claims regarding the compatibility of determinism and dualism, not as an argument in support of definitive incompatibility.

To make myself clear, my point is that dualism and determinism cannot be assumed to be either compatible or incompatible, because dualism is not a coherently defined proposition. It's like speculating about the color of a Poppeldoof without defining what it even is.

>> No.4631481

>>4631471
I can comprehend dualism without comprehending the non-physical mechanisms of dualism. In the broadest sense dualism postulates nothing more than the existence of physical and non-physical things which somehow interact. And this has no implications that would make it incompatible with determinism. Note that all I say is that they are hypothetically compatible. I don't make any claim about either of them being true or not.

>> No.4631486

According to the authors of the study, previous neuroscientific studies have failed to detect free will because they were looking for causation in the wrong place, or at the wrong level. Most neuroscientific techniques are aimed at detecting patterns of activity at a physical level, whether macro-level, cellular, or atomic. For example, the common fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) technique essentially measures differences in blood flow to various areas of the brain. As a result, previous studies have only been able to detect the physical causes of our thoughts and actions. The group now publishing in Science has developed a new type of scanner called a Metaphysical Field Imager. Using functional metaphysical field imaging (fMFI), the researchers can detect energy patterns as they occur at sub-physical (i.e. metaphysical) levels. When superimposed over a map of the physical brain, fMFI is able to reveal the exact timing and location of flashes of free will in the brain, as people make decisions. The experimenters were able to show that, in their experiments, a flash of free will occurred in the prefrontal cortex immediately before a playing card was freely picked, strongly indicating that the free will there produced the relevant behaviour.

>> No.4631491

>>4631481
do you have any proof of something non physical?

>> No.4631492

>>4631491
Depends on what you accept as "proof". Qualia are an example of something non-physical, but due to their subjective nature only those who experience them can acknowledge their existence.

>> No.4631494

>>4631486

10/10

>> No.4631497

>>4631492
Then if I experience leprechauns running around on my keyboard, do these exist as well in a non physical sense?

>> No.4631499

>>4631497
The difference between qualia and leprechauns is that qualia are said to be experienced by nearly every person, while your leprechauns more likely are only experienced by you.

>> No.4631506

>>4631481
>I can comprehend dualism without comprehending the non-physical mechanisms of dualism.
Let's see.

>In the broadest sense dualism postulates nothing more than the existence of physical and non-physical things which somehow interact.
That's merely a shell of a definition. Aside from the lack of a mechanism, you cannot even define the "non-physical". It has no properties. This just isn't a useful, workable model. It's Jabberwocky's slithy tove; just terms without comprehensible meaning.

>Note that all I say is that they are hypothetically compatible. I don't make any claim about either of them being true or not.
Well, you did earlier. If you weren't actually trying to make that point, then fair enough. I won't harp on it.

>> No.4631507

>>4631499
How do you know qualia is experience by nearly every person? What difference does it make if one is experienced by many and the other by few?

>> No.4631511

>>4631506
>That's merely a shell of a definition
That's why I said "in the broadest sense". Btw I don't think you'll find mathematically rigorous definitions in philosophy.

>> No.4631509

what is a qualia?

>> No.4631518

>>4631507
We need some common basis on what to talk about. Individual hallucinations of leprechauns are less qualified to be seriously discussed than well known experiences of several persons.

>>4631509
"Qualia" is the pluralisation. The singular form is "quale". I suggest you google the term.

>> No.4631521

>>4631452
Determinism can only not be right if qualia implies the brain is a Cartesian dualist system.

If it's proven as merely being a functional aspect of the body, in property dualism, its still nonetheless implies a materialist position.

Materialism cannot not be mathematical/scientific causation.

>> No.4631522

>>4631511
>That's why I said "in the broadest sense".
Yes, you said that, but to me, it seems like your supposedly broad definition is as concrete and specific as definitions of dualism ever go. I've never encountered any dualist proposing an actual mechanism, or a comprehensible definition of the immaterial, the non-physical. It never seems to go beyond "Unknown interacts with known in an unknown way".

>Btw I don't think you'll find mathematically rigorous definitions in philosophy.
I'm not expecting any. Coherent definitions would suffice.

>> No.4631525

>>4631518
Could you answer this question?

>How do you know qualia is experience by nearly every person?

And just to clarify, would the leprechauns exist non physically at least in my subjective experience? Why?

>> No.4631527

>>4631492
Well I have an anecdotal experience that contradicts the anecdotal evidence for quaila.
I have spent several years reducing astronomical images. As a part of this I have often blinked images taken in different bands. Most often I band and V band images blinked. Even though I have only done this maybe a few hundred times I can get some of the "Red Feel" from the grey scale I band image when I blink it with a grey scale V band image.
So how do you explain that the feel I get from a grey scale image is like a primitive "Red Feel". The answer is that my "red feel" is objective.
There we have anecdotal evidence contradicting anecdotal evidence.
It is a wash?
Not for me, I trust my own observations of how my brain works.

>> No.4631529

>>4631521
I agree with the sentences of your post. But did you see what conclusions can be drawn from them?

>Materialism cannot not be mathematical/scientific causation.
Since we have proved qualia to be non-physical, they actually do disprove materialism. That might be a shock for all the materialists here and I'm sure it's gonna get some bad replies, but that's the most important conclusion we arrived at.

>> No.4631532

>>4631522
True. But the most important aspect when talking about dualism is not to show how it is a coherent concept perfectly describing and explaining everything. The main point when talking about dualism is to point out that there are things that science can't explain. Showing that pure physicalism is not the answer to everything.

>> No.4631534

>>4631529
>Since we have proved qualia to be non-physical
Sophistry isn't proof.

>> No.4631536

>>4631529
I found quite a few definitions of qualia on google. Could you tell me how you define qualia so I could have a better understanding of the discussion?

>> No.4631538

>>4631525
>How do you know qualia is experience by nearly every person?
Persons report their subjectivity all the time. And when introduced to the concept of qualia, they usually adopt the term as it accurately describes something they experience. Of course that's only what they say. I can't see their qualia, so they might as well be machines programmed to respond this way.

>> No.4631539

>>4631529
No, you are confusing qualia as a first-person, perceptive thing, and qualia from an outside perspective outside of senses.

You can observe a lightning, and say things about its features and etc. You can also understand what lightning is through abstract, non-accountable theories.

Describing qualia as like a science, is what Nagel attacks when he says you can't understand the subjective coloring and etc. of stuff was when psychology didn't take root in functionalism and neuroscience. But the fact that no-one in the cognitive sciences will ever accept things like philosophical qualia zombies and the like shows a new perspective.

>> No.4631541

>>4631527
How does this contradict qualia? On the contrary it is excellent evidence for qualia. In addition to the physical perception of the colors you experienced some subjective aspect.

>> No.4631542

>>4631538
>Persons report their subjectivity all the time. And when introduced to the concept of qualia, they usually adopt the term as it accurately describes something they experience.

Do you have a source to any of these reports?

And could please answer this?

>And just to clarify, would the leprechauns exist non physically at least in my subjective experience? Why?

>> No.4631543

>>4631534
In philosophy sophistry is the nearest we can come to a proof. We're not dealing with math here.

>> No.4631545

>>4631536
In very simple terms qualia are the purely subjective (and therefor not communicable) aspects of an experience as opposed to the physical (objectively communicable) perceptions.

>> No.4631546

>>4631545
oh ok. So they are non physical and can only be experienced individually as well I assume?

>> No.4631548

>>4631539
>no-one in the cognitive sciences will ever accept things like philosophical qualia zombies and the like shows a new perspective.
That sounds more like horrible ignorance. I mean the only rational way of dealing with qualia in science would be to accept that they are not amenable to science. But completely denying them?

>> No.4631550

>>4631542
>And just to clarify, would the leprechauns exist non physically at least in my subjective experience? Why?
In your subjective experience they would exist, since experienced them.

>> No.4631552

>>4631541
My understanding is limited. but from the wikipedia page
>"Redness" is a commonly used example of a quale.
But I get the same feel of redness from a grey scale image. albeit in what I describe as a more primitive or less intense feel, as I would expect if I had only experienced Redness maybe a few thousand times.
So I can experience redness from a grey image.
It is possible you could do this but I have been at the image thing for years so it may take a few weeks constantly playing with R,G,B -> grey scale R blink grey scale G...

>> No.4631553

>>4631546
Their non-physicality requires another assumption: The axiom that everything physical can be communicated. This axiom is commonly accepted as a basis of science. Science is implicitly based on believing that we can objectively communicate all physical things. From there it follows that qualia cannot be physical, because they cannot be communicated. Notably they are not amenable to science.

>> No.4631555

>>4631550
Once again, got those sources?

And earlier in response to my question:

>What difference does it make if one is experienced by many and the other by few?

you responded with

>We need some common basis on what to talk about.

Does this common basis from which we speak exist? Would it exist more than something experience by only one person (ie. Leprechauns?)

>> No.4631557

>>4631552
If you feel "redness" from a grey scale image, that's a perfect example for qualia. I am pretty sure that I don't feel "redness" when looking at grey scale images, although I can't know what your feeling of "redness" means to you. But we found something in which our subjective experiences are likely to differ.

>> No.4631559

>>4631555
That common basis does exist more for qualia than for leprechauns. A lot more people would agree on the existence of qualia than the existence of leprechauns. Qualia have been an important topic for philosophers for quite some time. Same cannot be said about leprechauns, which never have been taken seriously.

>> No.4631565

>>4631559
Well answer me this. According to our most recent statistics, there are roughly 2-2.2 billion Christians in the world, and roughly 1.9 billion Buddhists.

There are roughly 300 - 500 million irreligious people on Earth.

Hypothetically speaking, if let's say the majority of the world does not believe in physical laws of the universe, but instead believed in religious doctrine relative to their belief, and given that they clearly comprise the majority of people on Earth, would that mean that their religious truths exist more than scientific truth? Are they more valid?

>> No.4631566

>>4631557
But I can show my redness to a colour blind person.
I can explain it and with a series of images that I can blink I can maybe over time get a colour blind person to feel redness.
I do not need to see red to feel red which is what I thought it was about.

>> No.4631571

>>4631566
I doubt you can do this. You can explain to him what wave length the color "red" is (as a physical perception), but you can't explain to him how it feels to see "red".

>> No.4631575

IQ Fundie, do you actually do anything on this board besides post about monism/dualism and qualia?

>> No.4631576

>>4631571
That may have the same philosophical value as explaining why something equals itself.

>> No.4631578

>>4631575
he claims to when not using his trip.

but he only has high school level math and science.

i think he probably read a book by david chalmers, and another one about rigor in math, and maybe some german and some babby philology, and that's the extent of his talents.

>> No.4631579

>>4631571
>wave length the color "red" is (as a physical perception), but you can't explain to him how it feels to see "red".
How do you know those two are not the same thing?

>> No.4631582

>>4631565
Could you please answer this?

>> No.4631583

>>4631579
we don't. but the merest possibility they are not the same thing is enough to disturb the whole universe

>> No.4631589

>>4631575
I post a lot without my trip. For a tripfag it's impossible to be a good science poster AND to participate in philosophy or similar threads. When talking about dualism or other philosophy, my main intention is not to actually talk about them, but to correct incorrectness of others who misunderstood them in the context of science.

>> No.4631591

>>4631589
Any reason for ignoring this post?
>>4631565

>> No.4631593

>>4631576
Not really. There's a difference between the physical perception and how it is subjectively experienced.

>>4631578
Funnily it's exactly the opposite. I'm not even interested in philosophy.

>>4631579
If you have any form of consciousness, they are not the same thing. You perceive something physical, so you can objectively talk about it, but at the same time you get a subjective impression that you can't communicate (assuming you're not a robot).

>> No.4631596

>>4631571
I can show a colour blind person how it feels to see red because I can get the effect from a grey scale image.
I am using the language of feel but what I am meaning is an actual experience.
I can experience red in two ways. The experience I get from a bright Red star when blinking grey scale R and V images is similar to the experience I have off an RGB image.
I can give that experience of red to a person in a room with only a black and white monitor. I can give that experience to a colour blind person.
Because the evidence for qualia is anecdotal (of the personal experience flavour) I can not accept it.

>> No.4631597

>>4631582
>>4631591
I can't read that post. It got automatically filtered. Maybe it contained insults or violations of local rule #2.

>> No.4631599
File: 15 KB, 528x434, 1330534301116.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
4631599

>>4631593
Well your considering you are blatantly disregarding my post I am going to assume that you are doing so because you are unable to reconcile any perceived problem an answer might create.

>> No.4631601

>>4631596
There you are projecting too much. I'd like to see you actually conduct said experiment. It sounds impossible to teach a colorblind to "feel" "redness". You can't assume him to feel the same way as you when looking at gray scale images.

>> No.4631603
File: 54 KB, 1237x166, foryourconvenience.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
4631603

>>4631597
Well, ignore my previous post then, my mistake. Here you go.

>> No.4631605

>>4631599
Are you >>4631603?

>> No.4631609

>>4631605
No. Could you answer the question?

>> No.4631610

what IQ Fundie doesn't accept is that we are robots that do not generally know we are robots.

>> No.4631613

>>4631603
From a philosophical stance no "truth" is more valid than another "truth" (hoever you define that). The problem with your post is that you put belief on the same level with experience. When we individually experience something, we can talk about it and can ask others whether they experience something similar. We give it a name (qualia) and try to explain it. Beliefs like the ones mentioned in your post are on another level. They are not directly experienced, but they serve to explain other things.

>> No.4631615

>>4631610
You might be a robot. I can confirm that I am not a robot.

>> No.4631618

>>4631615
you may be programmed to believe you aren't a robot.

>> No.4631624

>>4631618
Oh ... well shit.

>> No.4631625

>>4631601

Not him, but as someone with Red-Green colorblindness, I know there is at least one possible way to experience the color red: take a bunch of psychedelics. It's quite fascinating to experience a color you've never seen before in your life.

>> No.4631626

>>4631625
Cool. I didn't know that was possible.

>> No.4631627

>>4631613
>From a philosophical stance no "truth" is more valid than another "truth" (hoever you define that).

Then if I were to claim that leprechauns exist and validate the existence based on my qualitative experience, I would be no less correct, and my statement would be no less valid than the statement of millions?

On a side note:

Both Buddhism and Christianity contain the qualitative experience of things such as God, emptiness, enlightenment. etc. Many denominations of Chrstianity specifically focus on the individual connection with God. Buddhism is completely about the individual journey towards experiencing enlightenment. These qualia serve as the foundation for many of their beliefs.

>> No.4631628

>>4631624
if you believe in physicalism it is reasonable that we are all programmed as such

or even that such programming allows things like an impression of qualia

>> No.4631630

Lets not confuse determinism for causality. A chain of events can occur by mere chance, which means it's not deterministic and meaningless. A deterministic relationship is always causal and meaningful.

In terms of freewill, a universe can be equally deterministic or non-deterministic regardless of the status of freewill. For me, freewill is meaningless at least for two reasons. First, it's often described in terms of self-reference and personal experience. Such things are hard to pin to anything meaningful in terms of metaphysics, so freewill can be reduced to a mere epistemic phenomena that is purely subjective. Second, concepts of agency best describe all aspects of what a person may commonly refer to as freewill. The ability to choose, to reflect, and to change in the face of new information or events are all acts of agency which can still occur in a deterministic fashion (strongly causal and meaningful). Freewill makes little sense to be discussed here as it would not explain the why or how of agency, imo.

>> No.4631631

>>4631625
On a second thought: How do you know it was the color "red"?

>> No.4631632
File: 37 KB, 432x575, I+_a7ac5859dc157d941263880a98a42ea5.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
4631632

>make a troll thread
>leave for an hour
>72 posts
>mfw

>> No.4631634

>>4631631
Who are you to say it isn't?

>> No.4631635

>>4631613
>From a philosophical stance no "truth" is more valid than another "truth" (hoever you define that).
Then why do you keep correcting people about their misconceptions?

>> No.4631639

>>4631628
Stop making sense. Didn't I already disprove physicalism?

>>4631632
Watch out everybody, we're dealing with a master troll over here. He posts a controversial topic and laughs at our replies.

>> No.4631640

trolling on /sci/ => mad scientists

>> No.4631641

>>4631639
>Didn't I already disprove physicalism?
>>4631534

>> No.4631642

>>4631634
That doesn't anser my question. I would be okay with you saying you experienced a color you've never seen before. But you chose to call it "red". Why?

>> No.4631643

>>4631601
You are happy to accept one type of anecdotal evidence for qualia for which there is only thought experiments but when anecdotal evidence refuting it appears and an actual experiment may be possible you reject it.
I was using the word feel but I now see that is a somewhat loaded term in the context of qualia so I think experience is better. Yes I claim I could get a colour blind person to experience red as I can experience red from a grey scale image.
So given that the evidence for qualia is just as strong as the evidence for any other nonphysical thing I fail to see how it can be used to back up any free will claim.

>> No.4631644

>>4631635
Because science is based on the assumption that if something is wrong, it can be shown to be wrong. After all we're still on a science board here and not on a philosophy board.

>> No.4631646

>>4631642
answer me this first

>>4631627

>> No.4631647

>>4631641
I didn't say "proof", I said "disprove".

>> No.4631648

>>4631639
Maybe, but perhaps your premises weren't valid.

Physicalism means we are all robots going around believing we aren't, believing we have free will, experience qualia, etc.

I have no problem with this, the belief is as good as some idea of "real" free will and qualia as it cannot be mistaken for anything else.

>> No.4631652

>be in philosophy class
>say that there is no evidence for non-deterministic free will and an absolutely baseless theory
>not even metaphysics can save them as metaphysics have little to no room in a contemporary world-view anymore
>"But if you think about being deterministic, is there not a freedom in there?"
>"...no."
>"Why not?"
>"Because I was determined to think about the determination of my thoughts."

There really is no logic in the philosophical justifications of free will. All arguments that supposedly prove it ill define free will. Thinking about free will does in no way necessitate having free will.

>> No.4631655

>>4631643
I'd like to see you actually conduct that experiment. How would you objectively measure whether the colorblind person experienced a color he physically can't perceive?
Qualia have nothing to do with free will btw.

>> No.4631656

>>4631655
Why do you always seem to ignore my posts?

>> No.4631657

>>4631646
Sorry, that one got filtered. Please rephrase it or post a screenshot.

>> No.4631661

>>4631648
Alright. The most important thing we can agree on is that it's a matter of belief and not a scientific fact.

>> No.4631664
File: 19 KB, 1237x216, foryourconvenience2.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
4631664

>>4631657
Here you go sir.

>> No.4631665

>>4631656
I can't read them, when they get filtered. Try to use less insults and less words that trigger my script to think you're violating /sci/'s local rule #2.

>> No.4631667

>>4631665
There has not been a single insult in any of my posts as validated by the screen shots.

>> No.4631668

>>4631665
>Try to use less insults and less words that trigger my script

HAHAHA oh wow.

>I'm sorry that I ignored you, but someone who uses words I don't like is not worth listening to.

>> No.4631672

>>4631664
Philosophically you can argue that your leprechaun exists. Of course you can do this, but you can't expect to be taken serious. Qualia are things people can agree on to exist. So we can discuss them. Those who never experienced qualia of course doubt their existence and can't properly participate in such a discussion.

>>4631667
There has been a lot of vocabulary that deals with violating rule 2 of /sci/.

>> No.4631673

>>4631388
>>4631400

Y'know, before you accuse someone of being fake, you might want to remove the trip code.

>> No.4631676

>>4631668
Some time ago I inserted a list of shitposter vocabulary in the filter section of 4chan X. Those posts are usually not worth reading and don't contribute anything meaningful.

>> No.4631677

>>4631631
>On a second thought: How do you know it was the color "red"?
I have become adept enough that I can identify the image filter band used from the telescopes/filters/cameras I use by blinking two images. It is a matter of experience. I can look at the image headers and confirm it but I rarely need to now.
Someone could take an I band image and a V band image of the same field and I could tell them apart and correctly identify the redder band from the bluer by blinking them probably 99.9% of the time.

>> No.4631678

>>4631673
My tripcode has been posted here. Everyone is free to use it.

>> No.4631680

>>4631677
I'm not sure if you're the poster the question was directed at. What you're telling me now is that you learned to associate certain structures with the color red. I was asking the poster who claimed to never have seen the color red and who reported that after taking psychoactive drugs he saw a new color. I'd like to know how he gets to label that color "red".

>> No.4631681

>>4631672
>There has been a lot of vocabulary that deals with violating rule 2 of /sci/.

Like what?

>Of course you can do this, but you can't expect to be taken serious.
>Qualia are things people can agree on to exist.

But if my truth is no more valid than any other truth, why should I not expect to be taken seriously?

To entertain your axiom, if people agree that there is an anthropomorphic God who created the universe with his powers, and most people agree, then these people and their qualia based beliefs should be taken most seriously? And considering there are less scientific minds in the world than religious, clearly science should be considered of less seriousness and should be considered less in discussion because there are less people who believe in it?

>> No.4631682

>>4631676
Since your script blocked out several posts worth reading, you should consider turning it off. Manually hiding poop posts is not very time consuming. Adding block words to your script is a pretty arrogant thing to do anyway.

>> No.4631685
File: 24 KB, 843x481, foryourconvenience3.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
4631685

>>4631672
Here you go sir.

>> No.4631690

>>4631613
>From a philosophical stance no "truth" is more valid than another "truth" (hoever you define that).

That is wrong. One branch of philosophy concerns itself specifically with what can be considered true and what untrue. Additionally, if any science, be it a natural or a cognitive science, assumed that all statements were equally true, all discussion would be meaningless dribble.
Of course some statements can be truer than others in philosophy.

>> No.4631693

>>4631682
Actually automatically hiding posts is a method of being able to focus more on the serious debators. Replying to shitposts is an even bigger waste of time than reading them. I now read all the screenshots, including >>4631685, and I do not want to talk about god. This is way too far away from the original topic and serves only to derailment. In addition it is against the rules. Please stay on topic.

>> No.4631698

>>4631693
>Actually automatically hiding posts is a method of being able to focus more on the serious debators

I just explained why it isn't worth it at all. Wasting 10 seconds on your life on POSSIBLE shit posts is a bad trade when you block out only one or two good posts a day. Also, you are a pretty big asshole when you say that someone who uses certain words is not worth being listened to.

>> No.4631699

>>4631690
Sure in certain frameworks like science or formal logic we can consider some statements true and others false. But the things we're dealing with ITT are outside of these fields. If we have two unfalsifiable claims without evidence for either side, which one is more true? We can't say.

>> No.4631703

>>4631693

This :>>4631685

Is not me: >>4631682


But if you do not want to talk about God, fine.

>There has been a lot of vocabulary that deals with violating rule 2 of /sci/.

Like what?

>Of course you can do this, but you can't expect to be taken serious.
>Qualia are things people can agree on to exist.

But if my truth is no more valid than any other truth, why should I not expect to be taken seriously?

To entertain your axiom, if people agree that aether constitutes the universe, and most people agree, and this was determined through the qualitative experience of Aether in space, then these people and their qualia based beliefs should be taken most seriously?

And considering there are less scientific of string theory than aether, clearly string theory should be considered of less seriousness and should be considered less in discussion because there are less people who believe in it?

>> No.4631705

>>4631698
I happily accept two or three non-shit posts to be hidden, when it saves me the time I would waste reading thousands of shit posts. For someone who seriously wants to discuss, it should be no problem to avoid shitposter vocabulary. It perfectly worked so far.

>> No.4631706
File: 27 KB, 835x525, foryourconvenience4.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
4631706

>>4631693
Here you go sir.

>> No.4631707

>>4631699
>We can't say.
But you keep saying that one is true.

>> No.4631711

>>4631655
>I'd like to see you actually conduct that experiment. How would you objectively measure whether the colorblind person experienced a color he physically can't perceive?
Well I would start by showing that a person like myself can have a similar brain response to a grey scale image as to a red image. I would show a person some RGB images of stars some with a bright red star and some with a bright blue star dominant. Then after looking at them I would blink the R then the G & B image in grey scale. I would need some sort of brain measuring device (FMRI). Then measure the brain reaction to seeing a red star and measure the brain reaction to seeing the R G B blink. If I am correct then after some training the reaction to the R G B blink will be similar to the RGB image.

>> No.4631712

>>4631699
>If we have two unfalsifiable claims without evidence for either side, which one is more true?

That is a different statement than

>From a philosophical stance no "truth" is more valid than another "truth" (hoever you define that).


Actually, the statement that one unfalsifiable claim is not truer than another is one born by the philosophy of science which stands above, or at the very least outside of natural science. Karl Popper sends his regards.

>> No.4631716
File: 182 KB, 492x177, redgreen1-copy1.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
4631716

>>4631680

Keep in mind that RB colorblindness doesn't mean I see nothing where I should see red, just that the color is not what it should be (compared to what normal individuals see), causing trouble differentiating hues (see img). I'm bad at explaining how this works, but what I essentially did is take the color I had never seen before, and compare it to what I normally experience as "red" and "green". It was closer to what I normally consider "red", therefore it's likely that color was in fact red.

Hopefully that makes sense. I'm very bad at explaining this.

>> No.4631717

>>4631703
>Like what?
If you know what the rule says, you should be able to draw the conclusions.

>But if my truth is no more valid than any other truth, why should I not expect to be taken seriously?
Because people subjectively value things to be more or less important and to be more or less likely to be true. While you can philosphically argue for the truth of something, that doesn't mean many people will agree with you.

To stick with your example: If most people think aether is the physical explanation for certain phenomena, then of course it will be seriously discussed among them. I don't see how you wouldn't get this.

>> No.4631718

>>4631707
No, I don't. I say that one is wrong, when assuming certain axioms.

>> No.4631719

>>4631705
>For someone who seriously wants to discuss, it should be no problem to avoid shitposter vocabulary

Well, no one knows what YOU consider shitposter vocabulary, and since you obviously assume that shitposters can be identified based on a few select words they use, spotting a real shitposter should not take longer than maybe 5 or 10 seconds. You are being an arrogant prick.

>> No.4631722

>>4631711
That's not how it works. You can't read qualia from brain activity. All we can do with brain activity is inferring the physical perceptions.

>> No.4631726

>>4631716
It didn't really make sense. Now you're saying the color is "likely" to be red. Why is it likely? That seems like a non-sequitur from your other sentences.

>> No.4631727

>>4631717
>Because people subjectively value things to be more or less important and to be more or less likely to be true.

But does the subjectively assigned value equate to the truth of the statement?

>To stick with your example: If most people think aether is the physical explanation for certain phenomena, then of course it will be seriously discussed among them. I don't see how you wouldn't get this.

But is that which is being discussed any more valid than anything else? If it is not anymore valid, then what difference does it make?

>> No.4631732

>"shitposters ruin this board"
>uses a trip knowing full well that they are hated almost unanimously by 4chan without any good reason

ten out of ten

Thanks for wasting all of our time.

>> No.4631733

>>4631711
Part B would involve the colour blind person
I would get a base line of brain responses to colour from people with normal vision.
I would have a colour blind person observe the world with R G B flashes for a while maybe with special goggles. Then I would show the colour blind person a colour in R G B flashes and see if the brain response was similar to a normally sighted person.

>> No.4631734
File: 16 KB, 1237x198, foryourconvenience5.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
4631734

>>4631717

>> No.4631735

>>4631719
It takes only a little bit of common sense to know what is inappropriate in an academic debate on a science board. If you want to seriously discuss, present your arguments. If you want to shitpost, then do it, but don't expect me to unhide your posts.

>> No.4631741

>>4631735
Once again

:>>4631719

is not:

>>4631734

>> No.4631743

>>4631727
>But does the subjectively assigned value equate to the truth of the statement?
Of course not.

>But is that which is being discussed any more valid than anything else?
In which framework?

>If it is not anymore valid, then what difference does it make?
The empirical difference is that things more people agree on are more likely to be discussed than things only a few people agree on. Try to make a thread about your leprechaun. I bet it won't hit the bump limit.

>> No.4631745

>>4631722
>That's not how it works. You can't read qualia from brain activity. All we can do with brain activity is inferring the physical perceptions.
So you are saying my experience of red is not in my brain? Or there is no uniformity in brain activity from people when they experience red?
I think I am missing some fundamental concept here which is probably been making me look silly. Sorry.

>> No.4631746

>>4631732
I never intended to induce any form of rage. When I correct others, I do that in order to improve the board's education.

>> No.4631747

>>4631735
>academic debate
>internet board

This is not a university forum. This is people discussing science. There is no reason at all to consider someone's opinion less valuable than anothers because he or she uses bad words, and there definitely isn't any reason whatsoever to avoid bad words on 4chan. Someone could make a highly insighftul comment, but your script blocks it out because it started "damn negro, I figured out this equation!"
Your script only serves to please your inflated sense of self-importance expressed by your pedantic standards of language.

>> No.4631752

>>4631746
>When I correct others

You can't correct someone you ignore. Are you delusional or are you just stupid?

>> No.4631753

>>4631741
I never implied that. All I see is that you have a problem with me filtering shitposts. I don't see a reason for your problem, unless you want not only to shitpost, but also expect me to reply to shitposts. If you want to be recognized and not confused with other posters, I recommend using a tripcode btw.

>> No.4631757

>>4631747
A post starting with the words you mentioned is not worth reading. An educated poster who wants to post actual information knows how to do this properly.

>> No.4631762

>>4631752
Those that are hidden are usually shitposters. Those tend to be resistent to any form of correction. The ones I correct are posts that contain apparently wrong information regarding science. I think it is a common practice to correct those here on /sci/.

>> No.4631759

>>4631743
But the subjectively assigned value of any topic which leads to the empirical amount of those discussing any "x" topic does not equate to the truth.

As you stated here and here:

>>But does the subjectively assigned value equate to the truth of the statement?
>>Of course not.
>>Because people subjectively value things to be more or less important and to be more or less likely to be true...
>>If most people think aether is the physical explanation for certain phenomena, then of course it will be seriously discussed among them.

So in discussing the truth, why should the the popular appeal matter? And if any philosophical truth is no more valid than any other truth as you stated here

>From a philosophical stance no "truth" is more valid than another "truth" (hoever you define that).

Then would that not mean that whatever anyone says to be true is true, if the subjective value assignment determining the discussion quantity is irrelevant in its truthness?

>> No.4631760

>>4631757
>A post starting with the words you mentioned is not worth reading

Okay, now you are 100% confirmed for trolling. gg welcome to my block list.

>> No.4631761
File: 151 KB, 290x290, magicman.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
4631761

>>4631746

>I never intended to induce any form of rage

>> No.4631765
File: 25 KB, 1070x295, foryourconvenience6.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
4631765

>>4631753
>>4631759
Good idea.

>> No.4631766

>>4631762
>post never mentions form of nature of any responses
>"when I correct"

That adresses NOTHING mentioned in the post you responded to. It is completely non-sequitur. It is besides the point. It is meaningless. It is a shitpost.

>> No.4631769

>>4631759
>does not equate to the truth
I never claimed the opposite.

>So in discussing the truth, why should the the popular appeal matter?
It doesn't and I don't see how you got the impression it does. The point is that popular appeal determines the topics which are discussed more frequently. It doesn't say anything about the truth. And as I pointed out there isn't really such a thing as "truth" when dealing with unfalsifiable claims.

>> No.4631773

>>4631760
Feel free to block me. I don't see though why you would notify me of this decision.

>>4631761
;)

>> No.4631777

>>4631769
>there isn't really such a thing as "truth" when dealing with unfalsifiable claims.

Only when you define "truth" strictly as the knowable, which is not the common definition of the word. An unfalsifiable claim can very well be correct or wrong. It simply cannot be proven.

>> No.4631778

>>4631766
It did address the post. Your reply is meaningless, since it contributes nothing to the discussion.

>> No.4631781

>>4631769
But I am not talking about unfalsifiable claims. I am using your explicit statement here:

>From a philosophical stance no "truth" is more valid than another "truth" (hoever you define that).

To conclude that any proclaimed philosophical truth is no more valid than any other, meaning they are all of equal truth, and of the highest possible capacity for truth, and therefore truth. (this part is simply math).

>> No.4631782

>>4631778
>It did address the post

No, it didn't. If it did, I am sure you can prove it with citations. If you cannot do that, you prove yourself to be either dishonest or intellectually incapable. I will take not answering as a reply as well.

>> No.4631783

>>4631777
Actually it could (hypothetically) be proven, it just can't be falsified.
Please tell me what is your definition of "truth"?

>> No.4631789
File: 13 KB, 1234x166, foryourconvenience7.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
4631789

>>4631769

>> No.4631788

>>4631781
>this part is simply math
Not really. It's still philosophy.

>> No.4631793

>>4631782
What's your intention? Sure it is not seriously discussing the topic.

>> No.4631794

>>4631788
That doesn't tell me whether you agree or disagree with my conclusion.

>> No.4631796

>>4631794
>of equal truth
Okay.

>and of the highest possible capacity for truth, and therefore truth
How does this follow? I call non-sequitur.

>> No.4631797
File: 6 KB, 431x167, fyc9.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
4631797

>>4631788

>> No.4631805

>>4631796
Because if all philosophical claims are of the same validity, what else can they be but this? If that is the case, does it not have the highest capacity for truthness? If not, what more could it be?

>> No.4631810

>>4631783
Philosophers argue about what "truth" means all the time and to this day, but the most basic definition is a statement that is correct, irrelevant of evidence. There can only be true statements when there are wrong statements. So of course philosophy will admit that some statements are truer than others. It doesn't matter if you can know if something is false or true. It does not change that they ARE false or true. Unfalsifiable statements therefore can be true or false.

>> No.4631811

>>4631805
You havent' yet told me what you think "truth" means.

>> No.4631814

>>4631796
>of equal truth
Okay.

And if you agree with this, meaning that you agree that all philosophical truths are of the same validity, then is it not essentially the mind that is determining truths? If not, then from where else does the truth come from if not from the proclaimer's mind and self?

>> No.4631815

>>4631810
That's one way to define truth. Another way would be to say things are true / false, if you can prove / disprove them. Otherwise the concept of truth doesn't apply to them.

>> No.4631818

>>4631811
I am not using my definition of truth, I am using yours. As I stated here:

>I am using your explicit statement here:

>From a philosophical stance no "truth" is more valid than another "truth" (hoever you define that).

>To conclude that any proclaimed philosophical truth is no more valid than any other, meaning they are all of equal truth, and of the highest possible capacity for truth, and therefore truth. (this part is simply math).

And you agree here.

>of equal truth
>Okay.

Unless you disagree with either your statement or my conclusion? If so, why?

>> No.4631819

>>4631811
You re-interpret your topics and words the entire time and never actually enlighten anyone as to what you are saying at any point. When someone asks you a question, you most often answer something like "you should be able to figure this out." When you mention all possible statements in one post, you pretend that you said unfalsifiable statements in another.
You are a Quentin tier troll. You are worse than Manlytears.

>> No.4631826
File: 38 KB, 1241x547, foryourconvenience10.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
4631826

last three posts

>> No.4631827

>>4631814
I see some subtle implications of solipsism. This is not the direction I want the discussion to go.

>> No.4631834

>>4631818
I told you that I disagree with this part:
>and of the highest possible capacity for truth, and therefore truth
If the concept of "truth" isn't properly applicable, we can still say they are of "equal truth". Being of equal truth doesn't need to make any of the statements true. Your conclusion is just as arbitrary as defining them to be false. "Equally true" is the same as "equally false".

>> No.4631835

>>4631827
Then explain to me how the conclusions I drew from your statements would not lead there?

>> No.4631841

>>4631819
I don't know "Quentin" and "Manlytears" are. Were they rational science posters like me? And how do you think I troll? Show me a single troll post of mine. I'm arguing in favor of science all the time and scientifically correct incorrectness of others.

>> No.4631843

>>4631835
In the post I was referencing you didn't draw conclusions from my statements. You made up a lot of new claims about truth originating in the mind etc.

>> No.4631844

>>4631388
>>4631385
samefag

That or IQ fundie spends his entire day waiting around for these threads in order to give his same bullshit spiel about qualia.

>> No.4631848

>>4631844
Neither of these was me. I do not start such inane threads and I made clear right at the beginning that the first reply was an imposter abusing my trip.

>> No.4631851

>>4631843
ANd I asked you to explain from where else these claims would come from. If not from the mind, then from where?

>> No.4631852

>>4631848
>someone has been using my trip, which I of course could not change
Either you are an idiot or a liar.

>> No.4631854

>>4631851
So you're asking where truth comes from? Whether it's man made or we are perceiving objective and independent truth? I'm afraid I can't answer this. Anyway it's way too far away from the original topic.

>> No.4631859

>>4631852
I see no reason to change the trip. The trolls / shitposters abusing my trip are usually quite obvious, so there's no reason to confuse them with my person.

>> No.4631864

>>4631854
Then how do you know it is not solipism? How do you know qualia is subjectively experienced an not a result of some sort of independent object? In fact, if you are agnostic, how do you know anything?

>> No.4631867

>>4631859
>Someone stole my trip.
>I see no reason to change the trip.
Just say idiot.

>> No.4631870

>>4631864
Since we are on a science board here, I assume we at least agree on using the assumptions used by science. Particularly that implies rejecting solipsism.

>> No.4631873

>>4631859
>imposter/shitposter is quite obvious who is
No it isn't because all your post are rants about dualism.

>> No.4631874

>>4631870
Might as well reject dualism along with it, then.

>> No.4631876

>>4631873
The difference is that the imposters usually post bizarre and unsubstantiated claims. I on the other hand post well-thought logical reasoning. Also I don't post to incite a discussion, I just respond to others in order to correct them.

>> No.4631878
File: 166 KB, 350x350, face185.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
4631878

>>4631870
> I assume we at least agree on using the assumptions used by science.
>is a dualist

>> No.4631881

>>4631870
But that is not what I am asking. I am asking, if you are agnostic, how do you know anything? Or do you even claim to know anything?

>> No.4631883

>>4631874
Not really. Dualism or especially qualia show us that scientific understanding is inherently limited and that there are things that can't be explained by science

>> No.4631885

>>4631870
Solipsism is more scientific than your definition of qualia.

>> No.4631886

>>4631878
See >>4631883

>>4631881
This is quite a hard question. Is it even possible to answer it appropriately?

>> No.4631887

>>4631885
With solipsism science wouldn't make sense anymore. Of course the definition of qualia is not scientific. In fact it cannot be scientific, because the term "qualia" is meant to describe something that is beyond scientific understanding.

>> No.4631889

>>4631883
>qualia is A and B
>A exists
>therefore B exists
I could argue with you but you won't listen. You've already been told why you can't define qualia into existence.

>> No.4631892

>>4631886
>This is quite a hard question.

I agree completely. It is a very hard question. In my opinion it is the hardest, and possibly the most important. As I see it, this question should be the one to precede all. However, these are my opinions, I want to know your answer, I already know my own.

>> No.4631893

>>4631889
I do not define them into existence. Their existence is only backed up by us experiencing them.

>> No.4631900

>>4631893
> qualia is consciousness and is non-physical
> consciousness exists
> therefore qualia exists
> therefore something non-physical exists
> therefore science can't explain it
Like I was saying, flawed logic.

>> No.4631902

>>4631892
Well let me try, although the answer is definitely incomplete. First of all there have to be axiomatic assumptions like rejecting solipsism. These of course don't count as "knowledge". From there on I can say that direct observations and experiences are among the things I "know" and by accepting further axioms like the validity of logic I can say that all the things I can infer from my observations and experiences are also among the things I "know". The axiomatic foundation of my "knowledge" does not have to be static. I can dynamically reorganize my knowledge and open the doors to gaining new knowledge by accepting further axioms, based on which I can derive further conclusions.

>> No.4631903
File: 10 KB, 1237x134, foryourconvenience11.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
4631903

>>4631893

>> No.4631906

>>4631900
This is not how I argued. Either you are trolling or you seriously misunderstood me. Anyway I'm gonna post the correct version:

>there are purely subjective aspects of our experience
>we give them the name "qualia"
>obviously they cannot be communicated since they are purely subjective
>now take the axiom "every physical thing can be communicated"
>this axiom is always among the implicit assumptions of science
>from here we can conclude that qualia cannot be physical

>> No.4631912

>>4631893
>backed up by us experiencing them
No, you experience something that seems like qualia.
Let me define "grovity". It is the non-physical force that pulls us towards the center of the earth with strength depending on our mass.
Obviously, we all experience grovity. We don't suddenly fly away.
Grovity is non-physical in nature by definition.

This is seriously your argument. I see qualia the same way you see grovity. Namely, that the is a physical equivalent, which fits nature perfectly.

>> No.4631914

>>4631902
So then would you agree that knowledge or of that that is knowable it is ultimately subjective?

>> No.4631919

>>4631912
>you experience something that seems like qualia.
No, you got it reversed. First there is the experience. Then we give it the name "qualia". See >>4631906. I explained the reasoning there. It's fully linear and non-physicality is the conclusion and nowhere to be found in the definition. If you still insist in posting logically flawed mistintepretations of my posts, I have to assume that you are either mentally deficient or trolling.

>> No.4631922

>>4631906
>every physical thing can be communicated
nope, lrn2chaos
I cannot communicate tomorrows weather, yet weather is completely physical
our brain is complex, like the weather patterns, hence we cannot completely capture the state of the brain at any time, any sufficiently small deviation in the measured state versus the real state can have an arbitrarily large effect

>> No.4631924

>>4631914
This depends on the framework. If we assume the most general framework, where no axiomatic assumption is given, then knowledge is subjective. But if we agree on certain axioms, then within this framework knowledge can be objective, like for example in science or math.

>> No.4631926

So... IQ fundie finally accepts that free will doesn't exist?

>> No.4631929

>>4631906
>"every physical thing can be communicated"...
A) That is not the definition of science. Science would still work even if there was only one conscious mind in existence.
B) Subjective experiences can be communicated, just not directly experienced by others. The reasons why they happen can certainly be explained physically.

>> No.4631928

>>4631919
>First there is the experience. Then we give it the name "qualia".
Then it's not non-physical "by definition".
You either define it to be non-physical (but then it's more then just a name), or you don't define it to be non-physical, but then the non-physicalness of qualia must be proven.

Make a pick, and stick to it.

>> No.4631931

>>4631922
You can fully communicate the weather, when it happens. Our current inability to accurately predict tomorrow's weather is completely unrelated. I'd tend to call this a strawman.

>> No.4631936

>>4631926
No, I don't. I can't say anything about free will existing or not. Both sides are unfalsifiable. If you think it doesn't exist, then it's your belief. But please don't incorrectly call it a scientific fact.

>> No.4631938

>>4631928
I define qualia without using non-physicality and then I logically conclude their non-physicality as outlined in >>4631906

>> No.4631940

>>4631938
In a previous thread you said qualia was non-physical by definition. Make up your mind.

>> No.4631944

>>4631929
>That is not the definition of science
I didn't say so. I said it is a fundamental assumption of science. Science deals with the physical world and we assume that everything we are examining can be communicated.

>Subjective experiences can be communicated
They can't. If you think otherwise, please tell me how your blue looks like. And by "your blue" I don't mean the physical perception of a wave length, but how the color subjectively looks to you.

>> No.4631945

>>4631940
I said it logically followed from their definition. Maybe I misworded in saying "by definition", because the conclusion is so simple and trivial that it should be obvious from the definition alone.

>> No.4631948

>>4631944
>the most general framework
This is what I meant as ultimate.

>Subjective experiences can be communicated
>They can't.

In response to both of you, as I now know you understand IQ, neither of you know this for certain. Shouldn't the only proper response be, "I don't know"?

>> No.4631954

>>4631948
I could accept an "I don't know". Yet I would always correct someone again, when he claims the "I don't know" is wrong because "science disproved <insert unfalsifiable claim here>".

>> No.4631957

>>4631954
>Yet I would always correct someone again

I agree that the correction is necessary for those who say they can, but if this is the method of action we are taking, should not one be necessary for yourself as well for saying you can't, if we are claiming we do not know?

But my conclusion to all of this is considering we do not know, why even waste our time talking about it? This is tremendous masturbatory exercise in futility. We can talk for days, years, eternity, and with the information and knowledge we have right now, we still would get nowhere, because we don't know.

>> No.4631964

>>4631931
No, you can't. If you can communicate todays weather with sufficient precision, you can predict tomorrows weather with arbitrary precision. Because all weather processes are deterministic.
The problem is that we, inherently, can't have perfect precision. An arbitrarily small error can have significant effects on tomorrows weather.

The brain is similar. An arbitrarily small change in a brains state can have a significant effect on a persons behaviour. I assume that two people who behave differently do not have the same experiences. Hence, any error in measurement would break the quality of a description of a certain subjective experience.

Anyway, I don't have to explain the mechanism with which this works. All I have to do is counter your statement: "every physical thing can be communicated". Tomorrows weather is a physical thing, it cannot be communicated. Hence your axioms is wrong.

Tl;dr weather is a valid counterexample to your axiom

>> No.4631965

>>4631957
True. Why talk about it? Well there aren't many interesting discussions going on in /sci/ right now. At least this is better than career advice or homework threads.

>> No.4631966

>>4631944
>I didn't say so. I said it is a fundamental assumption of science. Science deals with the physical world and we assume that everything we are examining can be communicated.
It assumes no such thing because its not part of the any definition of science. Like I already said, science would still work even if there was only one person in existence (i.e. communication is moot).

>They can't. If you think otherwise, please tell me how your blue looks like. And by "your blue" I don't mean the physical perception of a wave length, but how the color subjectively looks to you.
I can communicate the experience any number of ways, like by "calibrating" my experience by matching it with defined wavelengths on a color spectrum. Your eyes are like any other instrument and matching colors with pre-defined wavelengths is no different than calibrating a scale.

So, like I was saying, science is not ill suited for explaining consciousness and subjective experiences can be communicated if not directly "re-experienced".

>> No.4631976

>>4631965
My reason would be because I enjoy seeking truth, but when I realize the truth is out of capable grasp, I stop until it becomes possible.

A better question to me would be "At what point could we conclude that the subjective experience is knowable and communicable to more than just myself?"

>> No.4631978

>>4631966
>its not part of the any definition of science
Neither is rejecting solipsism. That's why I said it is an "implicit" assumption.

>science would still work even if there was only one person in existence (i.e. communication is moot).
The point in qualia not being communicable would still persist. If that one person came across the idea of qualia, he would still have to make the distinction between communicable and not communicable and he would have to restrict his science to the former group of phenomena.

>matching colors with pre-defined wavelengths is no different than calibrating a scale.
Did you read what I was asking for? I asked you to not tell me the physical perception, but the subjective experience. Prove to me that the "blue" you see does not look different to me.

>> No.4631982

>>4631976
Subjective experiences are never communicable. That's the nature of subjectivity. Even if you think of terms like "anger" or "fear", i.e. words describing emotions (which you might rightfully call subjective), then you'll have to admit that the meaning of these words is not the subjective experience of the person, but only what we can physically observe in the persons behaviour. We conclude that the person could feel the same as we do in our subjectivity when showing the same symptoms or being in the same situation, but we can't even know if not his "fear" feels like our "happiness".

>> No.4631988

>>4631982
>subjective experience is never communicable
so it seems until this time, but who knows if this will always be the case

but now I have to class. until next time

>> No.4632017

>>4631978
>If that one person came across the idea of qualia, he would still have to make the distinction between communicable and not communicable
No! There is not reason that would be true. An observation is an observation. Said person could never even know of the possibility of other conscious minds existing and yet the scientific method would still be valid.

>I asked you to not tell me the physical perception
There you go again! You would change your trip name to "Tautology fundie". You are arguing that there is no scientific/physical means of explaining subjective experience, but in your arguments you keep using the assumption that it cannot be explained scientifically/physically nor communicated (the latter of which I have been arguing is moot).

>Prove to me that the "blue" you see does not look different to me.
Like I said, both sets of instruments (both our sets of eyes) simply need to be calibrated. You could just as easily switch out eyes with voltometers, "prove to me that these voltmeters are EXPERIENCING the same voltage without calibrating them".

So, in summary: communication is not necessary for science because science can still be done even if there was no means of communication, subjective experience can be communicated if not directly experienced (e.g. calibrating one's instrument). Thus, science has no problem dealing with subjective experience.

>> No.4632181

>>4632017
(continued)
Typical IQ fundie. He talks himself into circles and then leaves, having learned nothing. Can't wait to see him samefag a new thread into existence and drone on and on about qualia using the same flawed logic. *rolls eyes*

>> No.4632349

>>4632017
*high ten*

Thank you for explaining all that in one post.