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/sci/ - Science & Math

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4470919 No.4470919 [Reply] [Original]

If someone offered you a million dollars to destroy all your particles and put them back in the same place in the smallest interval of time possible later, would you do it?

>> No.4470922

ah the old mind body problem
no

>> No.4470927

If by "someone" you mean god, then yes.

>> No.4470931

>>4470919

No thank you. Even if that wasn't quite possibly a very unusual form of suicide, a million dollars isn't sufficient for it to be worth the risk.

>> No.4470943

I thing the possible later throws me off. And I'm hoping a million still has a use and is worth it by then

>> No.4470946

Why wouldn't I?

>> No.4470949

How do you put back a destroyed thing? It's destroyed, I thought.

>> No.4470950

>>4470946
The question is if you believe Qualia is linked to body. IE the mind body problem. If you believe conscience arises only from the neuro-chemical-electronic activity of the brain then you would say yes. If you believe Qualia exists seperate from atomic processes, then you would say no.

>> No.4470962

>not gathering certified witnesses before saying yes so you can solve the mind body problem once and for all.

And I thought you guys did science here.

>> No.4470965

>>4470950

Not necessarily. Just because the neurons/chemicals form a consciousness with the same memory/personality as me does not indicate they are me.

Consciousness is funny like that...

>> No.4470968

>>4470962
It IS the "last hard science problem"

>> No.4470982

>>4470965
yep. The "clone" would have the same thoughts, personality, memories, but I would be dead. A perfectly identical twin of mine would be created.

>> No.4470978

>>4470965
Yeah the question is, why is that? I like to think of qualia as a camera whose lens is on the neural activity of the brain.

>> No.4470992

Conciousness or "selfhood" is a function of consistency, you are only you because you have always been you.

Dissolving and reforming you would break that consistency, delineating two consciousnesses, the first would cease to exist.

>> No.4471010

>>4470982

You do know that under that definition, you die every time you become unconscious?

>> No.4471021

>>4471010

No, you're thinking of being "knocked out", or medically unconscious, i.e. sleeping.

However we're referring to broader version of the word.

When you are asleep, in a coma, etc, there is still a continuity of consciousness, just not "active" consciousness. What we're talking about its a clean break, i.e. for a split second, you do not exist as an entity, let alone a consciousness.

>> No.4471029

Consider the illusion of the continuity of self. Are you the same you as you were two decades ago? How much of your central nervous system is the same particles?

>> No.4471030

>>4471010
Perfectly true. Consciousness is a bit like "fire" from a scientific perspective, or "Mario." That is, an emergent entity which is composed of the sum effects of many, many smaller processes occurring at the same time being perceived as an entity in an of itself, when in reality it is not. Your consciousness is the shadow your brain casts on the world.

>> No.4471032

>>4470992

>Dissolving and reforming you would break that consistency, delineating two consciousnesses, the first would cease to exist.

I honestly don't see the difference.

>> No.4471035

>>4471030

Doesn't that make the term "dying" completely useless?

>> No.4471040

>>4471032
I could wreck a furby and then make an identical furby. It's not the same furby, is it.

>> No.4471042

>>4471021

I replace one cell from your brain instantly.

Are you still you?

>> No.4471045

>>4471040

If you used the materials form the wrecked furby, it would.

>> No.4471056

>>4471042
Yes.

>I replace two, are you still you?
Yes.

>I replace three, are you still you?
Yes.

>I replace them all, are you still you?
No.

Brain cells die all the time. No one of them is key to your identity. When you start replacing sufficiently large numbers of them, that simply losing those cells would make you obviously different, you start fucking with the person's identity.

>> No.4471057

>>4471040
Your body constantly renews itself with nearly identical cells. It doesn't really make you a new person.

>> No.4471059

>>4471045
Well I didn't annihilate it's frickin' atoms if I did it that way. That's just like resetting a bone.

>> No.4471060

>>4471035
Depends on your definition of dying. To me death is when your body ceases being able to fight off the various microorganisms that will decompose it.

>> No.4471064

>>4471042

That already happens. I have none of the same neurons now that I did when I was an infant (even those that have persisted have had all their components changed out by now).

However, they were changed gradually, instead of all at once. If you replace something's parts slowly enough, you maintain continuity of one thing to another. That is what is meant by continuity: A link between what was and what is.

>> No.4471081

>>4471064

there is still continuity in the other scenario.

it's just more abrupt.

>> No.4471085

>>4471064
Silliness. You assert that your consciousness is somehow separate from its environment, which is patently and provably untrue.

>> No.4471090

>>4471081

If you replaced one neuron per second, instantaneously, with an exact replica, you would, apart from taking eons to finish the transition, not be interfering with continuity, no.

However, disintegrating someone entirely into component molecules and then rebuilding them would destroy continuity.

>> No.4471093 [DELETED] 

>>4471090

go on

>> No.4471096

>>4471085

I never said that.

>> No.4471127

>>4471064
>I have none of the same neurons now that I did when I was an infant
False. You have nearly all the same neurons now that you did when you were an infant. They don't die and get replaced like skin cells. If they did, you'd lose your memories.

>(even those that have persisted have had all their components changed out by now).
Also false. Some things in long-lived cells get replaced regularly, like water molecules, other things are part of stable structures and are unlikely to be replaced before the death of the cell.

>> No.4471129

>>4471090
>>4471090

Continuity is destroyed the very moment a change happens.

You're simply arguing that because the change is small, it can be disregarded, thus preserving continuity.

I argue there is no continuity at all, because regardless of the size of the change, it still exists.

We're exist in the instant, and die only to give birth to the next.

>> No.4471148

Yes, absolutely.

Anyone with at least a few brain cells should know that sense of self is illusionary. I would still be the same person when I am reassembled. That's just all there is to it.

>> No.4471159

>>4471129
I'm sure that sounded very deep and meaningful in your head.

>> No.4471169

>>4471127
You DO lose your memories. Like crazy. The important ones are backed up in multiple places.

>> No.4471185

>>4471090
In as much as your consciousness "is" anything, it is the series of neural impulses traveling from neuron to neuron, not the neurons themselves. Your consciousness is composed of entirely new materials multiple times every second.

The entire argument is idiotic since consciousness is a sum of trillions of neuronal interactions. It's like arguing whether the spot of light cast by a flashlight is the same spot when you turn it off and back on, when in reality the spot is made of vast numbers of photons continuously striking the wall and bouncing off, and the photons from when you turn it back on are no more "different" than the photons that strike every subsequent moment.

>> No.4471209

>>4471185

>In as much as your consciousness "is" anything, it is the series of neural impulses traveling from neuron to neuron, not the neurons themselves

^^This

Your consciousness is not contained in individual neurons, it arises as a result of the pathways and interactions between millions of neurons at the same time. What matters is the structure of the neurons, nothing else. Replacing all the neurons will not yield a different consciousness.

What happens is every second of existence, your brain is taking all its sensory information and forming a proper "snapshot" of you and your surroundings in one moment in time. The next second, this "Snapshot" is discarded and replaced with the next one (think of frames in a movie/video game). Sometimes, parts of these snapshots can be recorded and stored as memories. Your sense of self puts all these snapshots together and creates what appears to be continuity of consciousness and self. In reality, your brain is CONSTANTLY changing, and so is your consciousness. Your sense of self keeps you from perceiving these small gradual changes, and the illusion of a permanent "I" takes shape.

>> No.4471220

>>4471209

basically what >>4471129 said, minus the pretentious bullshit.

>> No.4471298

yes

>> No.4471301

Now a better experiment is copy the particles, "destroy them", and have a series of different particles distributed in a different vessel.

But then you'd have to get all philosophical, because perhaps the machine delays, scans you, and makes a second you before killing the first you. Who's the real you at this point?

Any if I took you apart by every particle, and arranged them back the same way, am I the same? Or if I have the same brain, but different parts. Oh the ship of Argos problem, how this shit will bewilder us for awhile.

>> No.4471326

>>4471301

>Any if I took you apart by every particle, and arranged them back the same way, am I the same?

>>4471209

>> No.4471417

if i knew he could actually do it, i'd do it in front of people

>> No.4471421

>>4471040
atom-for-atom identical? it is in every sense that could possibly matter for anything