/sci/ - Science & Math

[Anonymous No.12090301]

Hi guys, I had an idea and I hope that with some help his can be formalized.

1) Suppose all possible conscious experiences are known

2) We know not only what are all the conscious experiences but also how they combine. We know which experiences are basic and can't be divided into smaller experiences and which experiences are the result of combining more basic experiences.

3) Therefore we solved the combination problem for basic experiences.

I'm not saying that doing such a thing is practical, I'm just pretending it was done so I can make an argument.

[Anonymous No.12090327]

4) We could, if the above scenario is true, represent the space of possible human experiences as a coordinate space. The coordinate bases are the most basic of sensations(we could call them atomic sensations), all more complex sensations are represented as combinations of those(coordinates).

5) This is in no way practical, but if it was done then what we would have is an abstract mathematical space of possible experiences. Any experience in theory would be able to be decomposed in it's atomic components and then localized in this space.

6) This space would also need to be closed under addition, so if we have two experiences e1 and e2, then (e1 + e2) is also a point in the space. If that was not the case then we could create totally new experiences by combining the previous ones, then the original space would not be a space of all experiences, thus we would run into contradiction.

The idea here is that any conscious experience would be simply a point in such a space. If you hear a dog bark, then there is a point for that. If you hear a dog bark and looks at the sky and see a cloud that looks like a dog, then this weird experience would also be a point.

[Anonymous No.12090352]

7) The definition of this space as closed for addition may be exploited. We could just add the same experience to itself again and again:

"looking at tree" is in the space, therefore "looking at tree" + "looking a tree" is also
you could keep doing that:
"looking at tree" + "looking at tree" + "looking at tree" + "looking at tree" + ...

8) this should not be thought as some sort of weird repetitive experience, but instead as a bunch of different people having the same experience at the same time(like a bunch of people in a cinema watching the same movie for example).

9) If the combination problem for experiences was solved then the above scenario would be realizable.

Let's call this space "experience space". It is just a coordinate space that is closed under addition. I'm not even assuming it has finitely many dimensions. This construction is only for the sake of argument.

[Anonymous No.12090379]

10) Let's then create a formal language to talk about experiences. How would one do that? Well it is just a formal language about the coordinates of the "experience space"(S). It is just the coordinates combined with the basic logical operations:

ex:

I feel x and y therefore I feel x (x,y are in S)
I feel z and w therefore I feel (z or x)

11) This language is also capable of expressing basic arithmetic:
It is possible to feel 1(just some of the sensations)
If it is possible to feel x(meaning x is in S)
So since S is closed for addition we have
It is possible to feel (x+x)
By induction we have:
It is possible to feel 1, 1+1, 1+1+1 and so on.

12) This may feel weird at first, but the "space of possible experiences" is just a simple mathematical construct, so this weird ass language I created is just a combination of coordinates and basic logical operations. It is trivially a language capable of basic arithmetic. The term (It is possible to feel x) just means x is in S. The term (I feel x) just means given x in S.

13) The point is, despite conscious experiences being one of the most mysterious things in science, we are supposing we already solved the combination problem, therefore the weird steps I took were just the formalization of the hypothetical solution. Solving the combination problem is a necessary step for anyone trying to solve any harder problem of consciousness, so I'm assuming it is done for the sake of argument.

[OP No.12090389]

>>12090301
>>12090327
>>12090352
>>12090379
"I HAVE SOCIAL SKILLS!!! OTHER PEOPLE ARE THE PROBLEM BECAUSE THEY DONT DEFINE THEIR EMOTIONS WITH MATH!! IM TO SMART FOR SOCIAL SKILLS"

[Anonymous No.12090409]

14) I'll call this language math-mind and those are the rules:

The theorems are of the format:
I feel/It is possible to feel x(Iff x is in S)
Any combination of the above with first order logic operations(^, v, ¬, ...)

15) It is a very simple language that talks about a simple coordinate space. Also it is able to express Peano Arithmetic(you just substitute some x in S by 1 and by the closure under addition you get our good old arithmetic).

16) Any experience anyone has, even if is some mystical weird crap is just an element s in S, therefore you can talk about the experience in math-mind.

The point is, since we're supposing the combination problem is solved, we're supposing that even the craziest experiences are explained, including some LSD trip or some higher conscious state achieved by some monk in Tibet. Math-mind is capable of stating theorems about those experiences.

[Anonymous No.12090410]

>mind-created-this
you got it anon

[Anonymous No.12090413]

>>12090389

lol, I'm not doing that. Wait for the punch line. Thanks for the bump tho, also I laughed.

[Anonymous No.12090419]

>>12090410

I'm kinda religious, I know some people think religion is bullshit, but I'm kinda old fashioned. Also, no hard feelings, if you're a hardcore atheist I couldn't care less, you do you.

[Anonymous No.12090453]

>>12090409
go on...

[Anonymous No.12090457]

17) Math-mind is not practical, you could no better by just talking like a normal person. But the point is that it is totally valid. Any experience could be turned into a formal statement in math-mind. In thesis your entire life/feelings could be expressed as a gigantic concatenation x^y^z^... in Math-mind.

18) Now, let's suppose we have a genius neuroscience expert. This guy is so intelligent that he solved the Hard Problem of Consciousness. This means that by only looking at specific data about brain states he can say all the experiences being felt by any person.

19) So, for example, he could know every experience you have by looking at the orange blobs in an MRI scan:

I see "orange blob on frontal lobe" and I see "red blob on amygdala" therefore anon feels "fear of rabid dog"

All the above sensations are elements of S, and we could substitute "I see" for "I feel":

I feel x and y therefore anon feels z.

20) Another way to look at this then is that this genius scientist found a complete axiomatization of Math-mind. So, by having a limited number of sensations(looking at orange blobs on a screen) he can infer theorems about all possible experiences someone might have(all possible theorems in Math-mind).

The thing is, I'm not implying any of this is possible. What I said until now is that solving the Hard Problem implies that one could prove all the Math-mind statements by a limited set of experiences, thus solving this problem is exactly like finding the right axioms for my weird language.

[Anonymous No.12090481]

>>12090457

21) How would the scientist go about then? He found all the orange blobs and what they represent as conscious experiences, how can he prove to us mortals that he actually solved the Hard Problem of Consciousness?

22) He could run a bunch of experiments, but those experiments would need empirical backing, each empirical data could be translated into a sum of experiences and since S is closed for addition we could represent the sum of empirical data as a point in S. Therefore we could translate his proof into Math-mind. So if he goes that route he would be trying to prove the consistency of his axioms using Math-mind itself. Can he do it?

23) Well, he could write a mathematical paper and publish, but again someone would need to read the thing. The act of reading is again a sum of sense-datum, thus just another point in S and again a formal statement in Math-mind. Again the genius dude would be trying to prove the consistency of his axiomatization of Math-mind using a Math-mind theorem. Could he do it?

24) Well, he could try to use a robot. But to check if the robot did not commit any mistake we would need a human. This again we would have the same problem.

25) The scientist, even being a genius, to solve the Hard Problem of consciousness would need to be able to prove the consistency of his axiomatization of Mind-Math by some method. But any method that involves conscious experience can be translated into a formal statement in math-mind, so he is trapped.

But why? Why is the problem so daunting to current neuro-scientists? Those guys are like super smart, I always like to talk to them, but why can't they solve the Hard Problem, even with super cool new technology?

[Anonymous No.12090490]

>>12090481

26) It is because Gödel proved in his second incompleteness theorem that it is impossible for a consistent formal language to prove the consistency of it's own axioms. If the language is rich enough for basic arithmetic.

27) Math-mind his rich enough for basic arithmetic, so the scientist is trapped.

28) The Hard Problem of consciousness thus is simply impossible in a trivial way. You can't prove the consistency of the language you're trapped in, because you can't go outside it. Even cutting edge technology won't do it.

29) All of this is just a corollary of Gödel's result.

30) Therefore the mind in non-reducible.

Thanks for the attention.

[Anonymous No.12090504]

bump

[Anonymous No.12090507]

>>12090409

But how could a scientist be able to find "sums of experiences" as big as you describe? Don't this violate the laws of physics in some way?

[Anonymous No.12090514]

>>12090507

No, because we're supposing that all the possible combinations of experiences are reducible to reach a contradiction. By assuming that there are experiences that are impossible to find you're already supposing that the problem is undecidable in the first place. I'm supposing the problem is decidable to reach a contradiction.

[Anonymous No.12090518]

>>12090514

But what about the coordinate space you did? It's impossible to have this thing. Sounds wrong.

[Anonymous No.12090524]

>>12090518

Nope. If the scientist solved the Hard Problem, then he solved the combination problem. If he solved the combination problem, then I can represent his solution(whatever it may be) as a coordinate space, then I create the Math-mind language and thus we end up reaching a contradiction somewhere.

[Anonymous No.12090530]

>>12090524

ok OP, I agree with you. But I'll never use your autistic dumb language. Who the hell talks like this "I feel red hurr durr I feel blue", sounds retarded

[Anonymous No.12090531]

>>12090530

It is a logical device to prove a theorem, I am not imposing this language on people. I agree with you.

[Anonymous No.12090538]

>>12090301

put me in the screen cap

[Anonymous No.12090540]

>>12090538

put me in the screen-cap and above this guy

[Anonymous No.12090544]

can you explain your main point in a few sentences? it's hard to understand what you are arguing.

[Anonymous No.12090553]

>>12090544

solving The Hard Problem of Consciousness is equivalent to proving the consistency of some axiomatization of a formal language capable of expressing basic arithmetic using the language to do so. Therefore, by the second Gödel incompleteness theorem, the problem is impossible.

[Anonymous No.12090557]

>>12090544

Not an argument tho, it is a proof.

[Anonymous No.12090617]

>>12090490
>>12090481
but none of that is proven

[Anonymous No.12091616]

>>12090457
>solved the Hard Problem of Consciousness. This means that by only looking at specific data about brain states he can say all the experiences being felt
Pedantic but that's not really the hard problem, which is to do with how/why brain states cause experience. Knowing that certain brain states are associated with specific experiences doesn't answer why, and you could conceivably solve the hard problem without knowing anything about which brain states correspond to which experiences.

>>12090481
>to solve the Hard Problem of consciousness would need to be able to prove the consistency of his axiomatization of Mind-Math by some method. But any method that involves conscious experience can be translated into a formal statement in math-mind, so he is trapped.
So I don't think the hard problem is equivalent to the consistency of axioms. You could prove some statements in S, not all true statements if Godel's 2nd incompleteness theorem applies to it, but I don't think the hard problem is necessarily one of the true but unprovable statements. And even if it is, it might be possible to expand S to S2 which has all the properties of S with additional axioms that make the hard problem provable in S2. ie it is possible to 'go outside' the language as you put it.

>>12090301
I have a sort of similar argument for the hard problem. Basically collections of physical states are 'universes', elements/points in a space (like S, I will call P for physical) which is closed under combination since any combination of physical facts is still physical.
How can a universe have mental states? Mental states can't themselves be elements of P because that would allow universes that are only mental states with no physical states. Closure means no combination of physical states is ever a mental state. The only option is a function that maps physical states onto mental states outside P, but the function and outside space are both non-physical so aren't solutions to the hard problem.

[Anonymous No.12093295]

>>12090327
Wouldn't work. LCM for any set of experiences would set two differing experiences equal to eachother. If "seeing a tree" is i experience, and "OP sucking cock" is n, then the nth occurence of i is going to be equivalent to the ith of n. And n is irrevocable.
Continuing, according to your description of this space, there must be a 1 point. This means all of reality is trivially shown to point to n, or whole submitted argument is garbage, and ergo n.
QED