/sci/ - Science & Math

>>9677880
>What is a stream of consciousness

>>9677885
Something that is interrupted every 12 hours. If you go under anesthesia do you think you wake up an entirely different person? Experiencing discontinuation in consciousness is something that happens to everyone, you don't stop being you.

>>9677887
>unconscious
>means endofstreamofconscious

>>9677888
theseus' ship dat shit
NOW whats your counterargument

>>9677887
Partially interrupted, but never shut down completely (death).

>teleported person wouldn't be "you" because there is something ephemeral about your consciousness that cannot be replicated purely by recreating the physical brain exactly
>But then they backtrack and claim there's actually something super special and non-physical about the mind that cannot be duplicated even if you reconstruct your brain perfectly atom by atom?
It's not anything ephemeral or non-physical you brainlet, it's a matter of functional continuity of a integral complex system that is a singular brain.
Just because you could make an exact physical copy of some brain and then neutralize the original doesn't mean the new copy is the same person with the same continuation of consciousness. They'd be identical, sure, but not the same consciousness.

>>9677892
>indeterminant thought problem

>>9677895
that doesn't refute anything

>>9677893
>two identical objects are not the same

>>9677896
then neither does bringing up the ship of theseus

>>9677897
Again
>What is a stream of consciousness

>>9677897
>if i make a copy of something they are the same physical object
bruh wtf

>>9677901
see
>>9677892
replace one neuron in your brain with a computerized part. are you the same person?
now two. now three. etc.

>>9677893
"Continuity" is a non-physical concept. You're arguing out two sides of your mouth. Out one side you claim the physical brain is the be all end all of subjective experience, on the other you claim that you are unique and cannot be copied even if you exactly reconstruct all of your physical attributes because of some mystical and vital importance that continuity makes to the existence of "you". That's contradictory.

>>9677902
They have the same properties. You think that subjective experience is nothing more than a property of the physical brain, correct?

>>9677892
>>9677905
Oh that idea could work, yes. But that is incompatible with the "teleportation" thought experiment. There it wouldn't be "replace one neuron with another", instead it would be "fry one neuron after another while some place 500km from you an identical pattern is being built".
You'd still die, and it wouldn't be comparable to the Ship of Theseus in any way.

>>9677910
>replace neurons until your brain is completely digital
>transfer dat shit via cable
>reconstruct new person on other planet meanwhile
>upload brain into new person
done

>>9677908
I'm sorry, it took me a while to realize you're bating. You're good.

There's a trivial way to disprove the "continuity is important" argument and that's to say that if you were frozen in time for an indeterminate amount of time would the person who gets unfrozen be you? You experienced a discontinuity in consciousness but your physical body is still the same. Seems quite simple to say that it is indeed you, thus continuity of consciousness is not important at all.

People have been revived from brain death, are they completely different individuals? The continuity argument is a way of dodging something that seems unintuitive

>>9677912
Brilliant.

>>9677887
>>9677880
The error is to consider that YOU are the same person as you were in the past.

Yes, teleportation machines kill you and create another you.
So does time.
All the time.

Only the present exist, the past is dead.

>>9677914
>O-Oh shit, I'm getting BTFO, better accuse him of "baiting" so I'm absolved from having to defend my completely untenable position

>>9677917
>>9677887

>All forms of unconscious states are identical
Being frozen in time for an indeterminate amount or being in anesthesia is still not physically the same as literal neuron death.

>>9677920
Yeah all would be swell if you actually read and considered whatever counter-argument was thrown at you instead of repeatedly parroting the same shit over and over.

>>9677923
>Being frozen in time for an indeterminate amount or being in anesthesia is still not physically the same as literal neuron death.
Why? No neuronal activity means no consciousness.

>>9677927
You're already moving into a more metaphysical realm by saying that "continuity" is more important that the actual physical structure of the brain so you're actually moving closer towards my position rather than refuting it. If metaphysical concepts like "continuity" matter then physicalism is simply debunked entirely.

>>9677908
>>9677920
OK, let me try to clear up a few things, we are obviously throwing punches but completely missing a foundation.
What I'm saying is that consciousness is nothing magical but a summation of the physical processes in a single brain, and as a continual general process it can be described as a self-contained unit and ends upon physical termination of the system - regardless of whether there is an exact physical copy / pattern outside of the system itself.
What I'm saying is that there is a distinction between unique consciousness streams and physical properties of two separate self-contained systems (such as two separate, but physically identical brains).
In terms of characteristics and as conscious beings, they would be identical, but as I said that doesn't mean that they're the same because there is a another determinant at play - namely the stream.
In other words, a singular consciousness = physical properties of system + stream of functionality until termination.
A singular consciousness is NOT determined purely by physical properties, like you claim.

>>9677940
In my second paragraph I forgot to add the importance of the continuous stream when defining consciousness, but yeah.

>>9677940
so what do you say to
>>9677928

>>9677952
I say what I've said multiple times ITT:
It's not a binary distinction - Lights off or Lights on. There is a nuance, a "spectrum" if you want, of different degrees of neuronal activity. Anesthesia does NOT imply no neuronal activity, nor does sleep, and I'm sure the same applies for being frozen. What on Earth makes you think that? The nervous system is not an I/O switch, but an extremely complex and flexible biological structure.
Are you telling be that a subconscious person has the same neural activity pattern of a one day old corpse?
You are obviously trying to push a conclusion without even possessing basic understanding of physical/biological systems and their functionality. You think like a second-tier philosopher, trying to tackle challenging ideas without a detailed, foundational, even technical understanding.

>>9677971
Cont.
What I'm trying to say is that your idea of anesthesia, sleep etc. being cut off points in the consciousness stream is absolutely idiotic. They are not, they are states of minimal neural activity but not ones of complete cessation - thus they do not represent a break in the consciousness stream. Actual death does, on the other hand.

>>9677971
>and I'm sure the same applies for being frozen
are you unironically saying if you freeze someone cryogenically his brain keeps working?

>>9677980
Seems like a big stretch on your part to be honest. What about people who have been revived from states of no neuronal activity? Are they different people? Or is your next claim going to be that there needs to be a minimum time period of disruption needed?

>>9677971
And that's completely irrelevant.

A teleport-copied brain inherits what seems like a historic state despite having no history of its own, including the ongoing thought streams and processes.

>>9677928
>>9677931
>>9677952
>>9677981
>>9677986
>>9677987
Actually desu after I wrote those last two responses I started thinking about what you said, and I concede that the topic is much more tangled than I previously assumed.
I don't have sufficient knowledge or understanding to give a proper answer.

>>9677880
No cloning theorem

You guys know there's a difference between 'congruent', 'identical' and 'the same', right?

>>9678011
yes. there is none

Why is everybody so afraid of """""dying""""" to a teleporter anyways

>>9678053
because people think their identity is something special and unique

>>9678053
Death being scary is a natural consequence of evolution.

>hard
>determinism
when will you all see the light?

>>9677880
Who are you quoting?

say you have a "teleporter"
vaporizes you on one end, builds you on the other.
now say you just let it rebuild you?

>>9677880
Would be cool to have a teleporter and a device that could make things from matter. I would use it for getting supplies, but I would never use it on my self

>>9678053
They're not.

It's just trolls trolling trolls, playing off the fact that an argument can be logically valid, yet not sound.

>>9677880
>>If your physical structure is teleported by reconstructing your body precisely at a molecular level the teleported person wouldn't be "you" because there is something ephemeral about your consciousness that cannot be replicated purely by recreating the physical brain exactly
No, that person wouldn't be "you" because there is no objective "you." There is only the subject's feeling or memory of being a certain consciousness. In that respect, there is something "ephemeral" about consciousness, but only in the sense that it's illusory. The perspective of the teleported copy is that he is the same consciousness. The perspective of the person who went into the teleporter but a glitch prevented him from being destroyed is that the copy is not the same consciousness. That is all there is to be said, neither is objectively correct.

>>9677880
a) quantum states cannot be perfectly cloned
and more importantly
b) there is no "you" that is preserved/not preserved

>>9678161
>The perspective of the person who went into the teleporter but a glitch prevented him from being destroyed is that the copy is not the same consciousness
wut
are you one of those "muh brain continuity" tards like the posters above?

>>9678134
It would basically be the same, unless you imply that we are keeping the original.
In that case their streams of consciousness would be definitely different from the split onwards due to their inmediate experiences being different. That's talkin outta my ass tho, I hadnt thought of this scenario before.
Knowing where and how exactly memories and experience are stored in the brain would help.

>>9678189
>quantum states cannot be perfectly cloned
This isn't an issue because the original copy is destroyed in teleportation. Also physicalists fight tooth and nail against quantum phenomena playing any role in cognition so I don't see why a quantum state being unable to be replicated would even be an issue from their view

>>9677880
The correct answer is your first sentence is true and continuity of "self" doesn't exist in any context, teleportation or otherwise.
People understand it doesn't exist with the teleportation shit because that situation is unusual enough to make the approach it without their normal preconceived baggage on the topic of "self." But most people stop there and don't realize the reason "self" isn't carried over is because it was never carried over from moment to moment in a normal everyday existence in the first place. It's just a story that helps organize memories and ideas and explains messy things away as the work of a magic "you" that's conveniently responsible for everything your brain does with cognition. There's no actual thing in the brain that glues together activity from moment to moment to make it officially "you" and therefore no actual thing of that sort gets carried over in a teleportation booth either.

>>9677880
So construct an exact copy while you're still awake and "conscious". What happens?
A) You literally are experiencing consciousness in two different bodies and the same time EVEN IF they are not connected to each other
B) there is an exact clone of you that has the exact same memories, personality, etc. but is separate from you and you don't share stimuli

If you think A, you're retarded, and A is what is necessary for what you're talking about.

>>9677887
>Something that is interrupted every 12 hours
your brain never stops working when you're asleep. Youre still conscious when youre asleep or under anesthesia.

>>9679927
>Youre still conscious when youre asleep or under anesthesia
Uh, no you're not. You're UNconcious. Unconscious means not conscious. Consciousness is awareness of self.

>>9679924
What make's the clone you less you than the original you? Seems like nothing to me. At that point the two you's would start to diverge, but they're both still you.

>>9679924
If it isn't A what did you fail to replicate? By what mystical means is your specific consciousness tied to your physical body and why can this consciousness never be replicated? You're essentially arguing the soul exists by stating that your consciousness is 100% unique and cannot be replicated via any means.

>>9679931
See:
>>9679917
It's not replicated because there never was an "it" to begin with.

>>9679933
>It's not replicated because there never was an "it" to begin with.
Cogito ergo sum

I think, I feel, I am.

To think we've gotten to the point that people are so frightened of the big questions that they'll attempt to dodge having to answer them that they'll try to assert they don't actually have a mind. Shameful.

>>9679939
The "ego" part was always the weakest part of that argument.
It's really "there are thoughts therefore there are thoughts."
Brain activity exists. Continuity of "self" doesn't.
"Self" is a story used to make thinking and behaving more convenient. It gets assigned credit for basically everything because that's its job, to serve as a thought-terminating non-answer to questions about how cognition works.

>>9678134
Now this is something I don't get about the teleport problem. If the "copy, destroy, transmit, reconstruct" model was really teleportation wouldn't that mean we technically have the capability to teleport some stuff right now? Isn't that literally just a fax machine with an inbuilt shredder? Or a set of 3D printers and an incinerator?

>>9679939
>>9679946
The "sum" part, sorry. But same idea. Ego is Latin for self but it's the implied "ego" of "sum" that we're talking about to be more accurate.

>>9679939
>assert they don't actually have a mind.
You're conflating mind with "self."
Mind exists. Magic glue yoking together one moment to the next doesn't exist. There are memories, sure, but memories don't confer continuity of identity unless a seriously large bullet is bitten and the claim is made that just by gaining access to some organism's memories another organism "becomes" the first organism.
That's all this argument is about really, that the nature of "self" isn't as substantial / grounded in concrete physicality as it might seem.

>>9677880
>But then they backtrack and claim there's actually something super special and non-physical about the mind that cannot be duplicated even if you reconstruct your brain perfectly atom by atom?

Which materialist philosopher does this?

>>9679946
>"Self" is a story used to make thinking and behaving more convenient.
This isn't true and you've been hoodwinked by charlatans who are terribly afraid of the hard problem of consciousness and have decided to ignore it by claiming there's no problem in the first place. The reality is that we do have consciousness, it's not a trick and we do have to explain the hard problem. Those are simple facts and anyone who claims they're not is simply trying to weasel his way out of answering them

>>9679970
This has nothing to do with the "hard problem."
"Self" isn't "qualia."

>>9679965
>That's all this argument is about really, that the nature of "self" isn't as substantial / grounded in concrete physicality as it might seem.
The correct conclusion then is to say that physicality is only part of the picture, not to claim that you actually do not exist. Let's not crawl away into the absurd, all science is predicated on the existence of the self. If the self does not exist then there is simply no way to assert anything else can be true since truth is verified by the self. It's a self defeating argument in every way.

>>9679972
>"Self" isn't "qualia."
Yes it is. Self is the aggregate of qualia

>>9679931
You didn't fail to replicate anything.
This is the problem with you guys. You are claiming that I'M the one making up a mystical thing but YOU are the one doing that.
If I construct an EXACT copy of my brain, down to even the position of every electron (not possible but still) I still wouldn't be experiencing consciousness in both brains/bodies at the same time. What you're claiming is that if this exact copy is made, even on the moon or something, then I'd suddenly "wake up" in both bodies and experience both places and stimuli etc. I.E. that this magical-consciousness-thing can permeate infinite space and connect various unconnected materials under one "mind".
No, absolute fucking bullshit. You need to be a wishful retard to believe such absolute drivel.

>>9679975
>If the self does not exist then there is simply no way to assert anything else can be true since truth is verified by the self.
No, completely wrong, and also inadvertently reveals exactly why "self" is a narrative device and not a real process in itself.
Attempting to assign credit to the act of validating truths to a "self" mechanism is retarded.

>>9679970
The person you're replying to isn't arguing that we don't have minds or don't have conciousness, he's arguing that the concept of self isn't as ironclad or apparent from experience as those other ideas. Basically just Hume's philosphy.

>>9679976
The aggregation of qualia is the aggregation of qualia. There is zero reason to call a collection of sights or sounds "self."

>>9679984
All the things you perceive through the senses create your unique identity. The way those experiences are filtered through and subjectively perceived by you form the basis of your identity. You are you because you had unique experiences that I did not, and vice versa.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-TISVubPMeM

>>9679975
Grab two random objects from nearby. One will probably be heavier than the other.
Did "you" REALLY do the work of deciding which is heavier?
No, of course "you" didn't, near instantaneous brain activity discerned that.
What about thoughts? Did "you" REALLY decide to will each thought into existence from moment to moment?
No, of course "you" didn't, it would lead to an infinite regress of "yous" explaining how "you" thought to have that thought, and how "you" thought to have that thought to have that thought, ad infinitum.
Brain activity underlies thoughts and any "self" involvement is retroactively assigned as a story e.g. "I thought of this great business model we could pursue" or "I think we should go to that Chinese place for dinner this evening."
What about language? Did "you" REALLY decide which words to string together from moment to moment in thoughts or in writing?
No, of course "you" didn't, a stroke in a relevant area of the brain would quickly prove it was brain activity and not "you" pulling the strings there. If some "you" were truly responsible for cobbling together utterances of mouth noise and/or little scribble symbols representing them "you" would collapse into the fetal position overwhelmed by the insane complexity of the task which the brain does such a nice job of handling without "you."
>>9679989
>All the things you perceive through the senses create your unique identity.
If that were true then some person made to perceive the same things another person perceived would magically become that other person. And that's not the case.

>>9680000
>Did "you" REALLY decide to will each thought into existence from moment to moment?
Yes? I can think about anything I want at any time. Are you a p-zombie anon? Real people control their thoughts, even to the point where thoughts alter brain chemistry.

>>9680004
>I can think about anything I want at any time.
Wrong, leads to infinite regress.
>p-zombie
That's not what p-zombie means either.
Qualia != self.

>>9680007
You don't seem to believe you have control of your thoughts, that makes you a p-zombie. An automaton. If that's your experience then fine, but I can assure you, actual humans like myself have complete control over ourselves, we're not automatons. You're basically regurgitating Dennett which is dumb because Dennett gets BTFO regularly for the same view, it's simply empirically untrue.

>>9680016
Way to completely misunderstand the p-zombie argument. The ENTIRE point of it is nobody can distinguish a p-zombie from a non-zombie on the basis of observable behavior or physiological traits. Otherwise the argument is pointless because it's meant to establish all physical factors can be set aside and yet something non-physical remains which is the thing the proposed "hard problem" is meant to refer to.
Also Dennett has nothing to do with this. Stop conflating self with qualia, and stop conflating self with free will for that matter.

>>9680016
Also still haven't addressed the infinite regress problem.
>HURR ME AM DECIDE TO HAVE THOUGHT
>OK ME AM HAVING THOUGHT NOW
>THOUGHT IS TO HAVE THOUGHT
>UH OH, WHERE DID THOUGHT TO HAVE THOUGHT COME FROM?
>ME MUST HAVE THOUGHT TO HAVE THOUGHT TO HAVE THOUGHT TO HAVE THOUGHT TO HAVE THOUGHT TO HAVE THOUGHT
Yeah, no, fuck off.

>>9678206
Are you incapable of reading? Since continuity is an illusion then there is no such thing as "same consciousness" or "you" in the first place.

>>9680034
>infinite regress problem.
We Thomas Aquinas now?

>>9680038
>"same consciousness" or "you" in the first place.
My persistent sense of self says otherwise
>in b4 "IT'S JUST AN ILLUSION BRO YOU CAN'T KNOW NUFFIN!"

>>9680038
>Since continuity is an illusion
You're actually going to have to justify that claim.

>>9680041
Sense of self != self.
Sense of self is an actual thing the brain produces.
Literal continuity of brain activity into a magical unified identity from moment to moment is not.
>can't know nuffin
No one claimed this is unknowable. Where did that even come from as a complaint in this context?

>>9680046
Not him, and also wouldn't use the word "illusion," but the idea is there are moments of brain activity which share in memory content and other sorts of similarity.
Does lining together a bunch of rocks on the beach make those rocks suddenly start sharing a single / unified identity?
Does lining together a bunch of moments of brain activity along the temporal axis make those moments suddenly start sharing a single / unified identity?

>>9680053
>Does lining together a bunch of moments of brain activity along the temporal axis make those moments suddenly start sharing a single / unified identity?
Yes? In fact a human life in spacetime is represented as a line segment, from birth to death. It's absolutely unified.

>>9680053
>Does lining together a bunch of rocks on the beach make those rocks suddenly start sharing a single / unified identity?
Yes, obviously. That line of rocks is a object, which has a distinct identity from any other line of rocks.

>>9680056
>It's absolutely unified.
Unified by what exactly? Been over this already, memories are most of what's actually creating the impression of continuity, and memories don't constitute a literal continuity of identity. If they did then person A could be given access to some memories from person B and that would somehow make person A become person B.
>a human life in spacetime is represented
Total non-argument. People use "self" as a story of convenience, this has already been established. It doesn't make "self" continuity some literal real world object.

>>9680058
>That line of rocks is a object
Oh really? lol, so how close does each rock need to be for the line of rocks object to start existing? Show your work here, is it an inch, a centimeter, what? And if it's just any amount then congratulations, now the concept of identity has been loosened to the point of complete meaninglessness.

>>9679977
>What you're claiming is that if this exact copy is made, even on the moon or something, then I'd suddenly "wake up" in both bodies and experience both places and stimuli etc. I.E. that this magical-consciousness-thing can permeate infinite space and connect various unconnected materials under one "mind".

Who is claiming this? I think what people are claiming is that if a perfect copy of you down to the electron was made it would be you just as much as the original you. It's not like two brains have one mind? They're two mind's, they're just identical (at least until they experience different stimulus, at which point they would start to diverge). It's not like they would be telepathically linked.

Why don't you guys stop arguing and just fucking hop into a teleporter and see what happens already?

>>9680041
The persistent sense of your copy's self says otherwise.

>>9680061
>Unified by what exactly?
Unified by being a part of a line of rocks.

>memories are most of what's actually creating the impression of continuity
Continuity isn't an "impression", it's something that's directly observable in the world.

>>9680065
>Oh really?
Yes. That's what objects are - collections of other objects.

>lol, so how close does each rock need to be for the line of rocks object to start existing?
What? Why does that matter?

>now the concept of identity has been loosened to the point of complete meaninglessness.
It's not meaningless at all.
The important property here is uniqueness. That particularly line was created at one point, destroyed at one point, and contains a particular set of rocks. Any line that differs in any of those three properties is a different line.

>>9680066
No it would be you in every way including your current subjective experience, for an instant at least then the different streams of sensory information would cause the two to diverge.

Any other stance is attributing a mystical, non-physical property to consciousness that doesn't exist.

>>9680046
Your sense continuity is a product of memory, not continuity.

>>9680071
So how close do the rocks need to be?
Answer the question you dishonest piece of shit.

>>9680072
>No it would be you in every way including your current subjective experience, for an instant at least then the different streams of sensory information would cause the two to diverge.
Exactly, for an instant there would be two you's. Two minds that are both legitimately you.

>>9680075
>So how close do the rocks need to be?
The distance is completely irrelevant.

>>9680078
How close do the rocks need to be?
If there isn't a distance then anything goes and identity has no meaning. It's anything but irrelevant.

>>9680081
>How close do the rocks need to be?
Any distance. The distance doesn't matter.

>If there isn't a distance then anything goes and identity has no meaning.
What? No.
Identity isn't dependant on physical proximity. As an example: The Local Group is an object, and its components are separated by millions of lightyears.

>>9680086
Which means literal continuity of identity doesn't exist and what you're talking about are just labels of convenience.
By admission here there is no objective or concrete standard for what constitutes identity in any real sense of substance.

>>9680092
>Which means literal continuity of identity doesn't exist
No it doesn't.

>what you're talking about are just labels of convenience
As opposed to what, exactly? Of course "objects" are descriptive.

>By admission here
Cut that crap out. Pretending I've said things I didn't say is just obnoxious.

>>9680066
I'm not >>9680072
The people claiming this are the ones saying that you can "copy" your brain into a computer and experience the change. You can't. The 'you' in the computer wont be the 'you' in your body and you won't go anywhere.

>>9677909
>if you cloned yourself you could see out of both sets of eyes simultaneously

>>9680107
>The people claiming this are the ones saying that you can "copy" your brain into a computer and experience the change. You can't.
What if you do it by replacing neurons individually ship of theseus style?

>>9680101
>As opposed to what, exactly?
A label of convenience is just the convention of calling something X, as opposed to something actually being X.
Just because you call the guy fucking your mom "dad" doesn't mean you have half of his genetics.
Why are you having me explain to you the difference between labels and reality?
>Pretending I've said things I didn't say
Except:
>what you're talking about are just labels of convenience
>As opposed to what, exactly? Of course "objects" are descriptive.
There. That's the admission.

>>9680016
>actual humans like myself have complete control over ourselves
adorably naive

>>9680114
I think the crux of the matter is that you can't claim that conscious experience is caused by the physical brain and nothing more and then assert that there will only be one you to ever exist. Either you can be replicated in totality because ALL of your properties are based on the physical arrangement of matter in your body, or you can't because there is a soul that cannot be reproduced. It really is that simple.

>>9680118
>Either you can be replicated in totality because ALL of your properties are based on the physical arrangement of matter in your body, or you can't because there is a soul that cannot be reproduced.
Missing the third option that "you" is a narrative device and not an actual object that could ever be carried over or not carried over in the first place.

>>9680126
That's not actually an option because there is no evidence that supports such an assertion and it flies directly in the face of subjective experience. It's used as a dodge by physicalists who are desperately trying to reconcile reality with their ideology, nothing more.

>>9680131
No, sounds like projection.
The real fear going on here is the fear that continuity of self doesn't exist, hence the refusal to even acknowledge the existentially disturbing truth as an option.

>>9680115
>Why are you having me explain to you the difference between labels and reality?
Because language is always labels and never reality.
An "Object" isn't a objective thing that exists in the universe, it's a name we give to describe something. So when you said they're /just/ labels of convenience I was trying to understand what you though they would otherwise be.

>There. That's the admission.
Jesus Fucking Christ. Stop trying to ram words into my mouth,

I "admitted" that objects are descriptive. What you CLAIM I admitted was that there "is no objective or concrete standard for what constitutes identity". Those are two very different statements.

>>9680131
Also the burden of evidence is on whoever wants to claim there's a literal continuity of "self" mechanism.
Because no such mechanism has been identified as of April 2018. Nobody's even looking for any such mechanism along those lines because it's incoherent nonsense.

>>9680139
>language is always labels and never reality
Oh, it's one of those retards.

>>9680131
Evidence would be necessary to show that "you" is a coherent concept in this context, you're the one making the claim.

>>9680140
>Also the burden of evidence is on whoever wants to claim there's a literal continuity of "self" mechanism.
Unless I'm greatly misunderstanding you, all that would require is demonstrating continuous physical existence and awareness.
"I" (by the standards >>9680126 is using) am materially related to the person "I" was ten seconds ago, and hence am the same person. There's a direct physical connection there, and that doesn't exist if "I" step through a transporter. Whether you want to call that contentious physical existence "I" is subjective, but denying it exists at all seems silly.

>>9680148
Wrong. The evidence is you experience it. It's congruent with how you experience reality, that's all the evidence that is needed. You're the one proposing something that directly goes against human experience and thus you're the one who needs to support your argument.

Again, cogito ergo sum has been an axiom of science for centuries. You're proposing that axiom is false then you're the one who needs to back up your assertion and so far you've provided nothing.

>>9680140
>Nobody's even looking for any such mechanism along those lines because it's incoherent nonsense.
They're not looking because it's trivially true. Persistent sense of self is a given, it's a fundamental reality like if you throw a ball up in the air it comes back down.

ITT: Fags who think they are special darlings of nature in the mody literal sense.
Wake up sheeple, a "stream of consciousness" is only your subjective, derivative feeling. It is literally gone any time you sleep, and if someone were to replace you with your exact copy during your sleep, nobody would notice. You'd have the same memories, same thoughts, same feelings.
So what happens to the other you, you may ask?
It doesnt fucking matter. Even if you literally kill him, it will make absolutely zero difference to the outside world, and to you, actually, since you wont be there to experience your death.
The only reason to use "muh ship of theseus" is just to convince the use of teleportation that his "oh so special" consciousness is technically not dying. Except it is. Every. Fucking. Day.
>But anon, that means murder is okay!
take an apple. clone it. destroy the other one.
will it make a difference for the first apple from its point of view? no. because it doesnt have a consciousness.
same with you, during your sleep. does that mean your consciousness dies every time you lose it? by your own arbitrary definitions of "muh stream" it would. and you're right: it IS technically dying every time you lose your consciousness.
How you handle that fact, I don't care, but it's undeniable.

>>9677971
Nah a frozen brain at the temps associated with cryonics is utterly molecularly inactive. even its atoms are just sort of barely buzzing in place. You are by any sane definition dead as a door-nail. If "you" wake up from that, then i guess you also wake up from being teleported.

>>9680177
>dude you die every night lmao
>you don't experience it though
>but you do remember your previous life
stupid take

>>9680233
im talking about death of consciousness faggot, its almost like you didnt read my post

>>9680034
>I've had a thought, I thought of flowers
>where did that though come from
>I thought it.
I'm failing to see any regression here

>>9680348
mmmyes, but where did the thought that you thought it come from?

>>9680071
What does that matter?
Because without a restriction on the distance between them, any number of random points on the surface of the sphere can be linked together into a single straight line relative to the surface of the sphere, therefore all rocks on earth would already be part of your line of rocks. Which would inevitably mean that you haven't actually created a new, discrete object.

>>9680356
>Because without a restriction on the distance between them, any number of random points on the surface of the sphere can be linked together into a single straight line relative to the surface of the sphere
Okay, so?

>therefore all rocks on earth would already be part of your line of rocks
No, because I chose which rocks to include.

>Which would inevitably mean that you haven't actually created a new, discrete object.
That depends on exactly you mean by "creating an object".
The most intuitive answer is that the line was created when I brought the rocks into a shape that I decided was a line.

>>9680355
That wast a thought, it was a question someone asked of me

>>9680364
In order for you to have decided they are in a line, you would have needed to differentiate them from the already existing line of all rocks on earth. What is that something? How did you choose it? What method differentiates your line of rocks in such a way as to allow that differentiation to be comprehended by a third party?

ok so riddle me this one you nerds:
let's assume that the teleporter, instead of destroying the first "instance" of you, simply makes a copy of it inside the second teleporter booth, so that there are now two instances of your exact consciousness in existence.
if the sole arrangement of matter is responsible for consciousness and not the matter itself, and consciousness itself is not an instrinsic property of matter, can it be said that this second instance of your exact consciousness is "you"? (as in, the first instance - which is you - actually receives every sensory input and mental activity that's occuring in the second instance). or is it just a copy of "you", with its own agency and causal timeline?
if you agree with the latter, what difference does it make to the nature of the second instance whether the first instance is destroyed or not? would the consciousness of the first instance (i.e. you) be magically reabsorbed into the consciousness of the second, through some crazy quantum entanglement principle? surely the first instance of consciousness simply ceases to exist (i.e. you die) and the second one continues living as a "non-you" copy of you?

discuss

>>9680369
>In order for you to have decided they are in a line, you would have needed to differentiate them from the already existing line of all rocks on earth.
Sure.

>How did you choose it?
Why does it matter? I could use any process at all, though some are more likely to agree with what other people would expect.

>What method differentiates your line of rocks in such a way as to allow that differentiation to be comprehended by a third party?
Shared expectations about what a "line of rocks" would look like.

>>9679917
Somewhat correct, but the persistent you still exists as the humean package of momentary yous. If you don't believe it does, it should be of no importance to you what happens next, might as well off yourself.

>>9680114
I'm not >>9680118
What will happen is you slowly start to go fuzzy, and fuzzier, and then you try to call out but find you no longer control yourself, and then you die.

>>9677880
Well, part of consciousness is the relationship between our physical body and the world around it as we perceive it right. So yeah if I got teleported down to the atom but in a completely different place my consciousness might be jolted. Which is Interesting when I think about how many years of my life I've spent pouring my writing,art, opinions, emotions, hopes, worries, dreams, plans, and shitposts onto the internet.

>>9680376
>if the sole arrangement of matter is responsible for consciousness and not the matter itself, and consciousness itself is not an instrinsic property of matter, can it be said that this second instance of your exact consciousness is "you"?
Depends on what you choose to identify as "you" (instance vs properties). I would say yes, but that's completely subjective.

>(as in, the first instance - which is you - actually receives every sensory input and mental activity that's occuring in the second instance).
Of course not. I don't think anyone in this thread is supporting that view.

>or is it just a copy of "you", with its own agency and causal timeline?
Yes.

>if you agree with the latter, what difference does it make to the nature of the second instance whether the first instance is destroyed or not?
None, beyond the obvious loss of convenience.

>>9680400
>Depends on what you choose to identify as "you"
I'd define "you" as the first instance of consciousness. Obviously if you see it from a properties perspective then both instances can be said to be "you", but only one of them can be the consciousness through which you actually experience reality.
You seem to be in the 'teleportation kills you' camp with me. I'd be interested to hear an argument from someone who disagrees.

>>9680391
>Shared expectations
And those shared expectations are...?

>>9680412
>I'd define "you" as the first instance of consciousness. Obviously if you see it from a properties perspective then both instances can be said to be "you", but only one of them can be the consciousness through which you actually experience reality.
Hang on, that's not right. If you choose to identify with the properties (rather than an instance) than both instances of you are consciousnesses which are experiencing reality.

>You seem to be in the 'teleportation kills you' camp with me.
No. I'm happy to call "me" anything that thinks like me. So from my perspective, the person on the far side of the teleporter is still "me".

If you got hit by a car and died, and someone pieced your atoms back together perfectly exactly how you were in the second before you were hit, would you just wake up thinking "woah what just happened", or would it be a different person with all the same traits you had?

What if they pieced together a perfect copy of you before you died?

>>9680452
it would be you.

>>9677919
>>9680392
Consider you now, then consider the you that existed a few secs back. Are they similar? Perhaps even so much that we can say they're both part of the same set of "you"s? The general features of those versions is what persists across time, they can be all considered "the same" by each of the versions. That's about the level of persistence that I find realistic, and even though it's weak it's something, instead of assuming we die every nanosecond. Not persisting at all makes no sense either from the intuitive or the logical perspective of things.

>>9677940
You're saying two selves can be different just because their brains are at different physical locations. But if you consider two clones, they both experience the same things, the same sense of being "the right guy". The clones' experiences clearly aren't concerned with the physical location of their brains. So what then makes these two consciousnesses not identical if the physical locations of the brains don't manifest in their experiences? I don't think you can give a coherent answer, you either have to deny subjective existence altogether or admit that it's clearly not tied to the spacetime coordinates of the physical object that spawns it. Teleportation is the exact same problem as persistence across time.

>>9679953
>>9679946
It's "ergo" you dyslexic

>>9680479
also meant for >>9679917

>>9679984
But there's a reason to call a collection of thoughts, feelings and moods a certain self. If you don't consider different moments of "your" self to be the same self, how do you cope with continuing existence? None of what happens to the other selves should matter, unless you think they're more or less part of the same you.

>>9680007
You can't decide what you decide to decide, but you can still feel being in control of your decisions. That's "free will", people just confuse it with needing to have an infinite control over all of your decisions (that is, metadecisions as well), which clearly makes no sense. But that doesn't invalidate the feeling of control involved with the first level of decision-making, that's what we think of as free will and it clearly exists to us.

>>9680065
It's subjective. The existence of basically anything is subjective, it depends on where the observer draws the lines between things existing and not existing. If you accept a certain set of atoms to constitute an object, say, a ball, then that ball exists to you. But maybe somebody else thinks a slightly different set of atoms constitutes the ball, maybe he even refuses to address the existence of the ball as an emergent property of its atoms and instead only focuses on the existence of a ball pit containing the ball. The existence of things depends on how we're willing to look at it, they don't really exist on their own without subjective interpretation.

>>9677880
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/7DmA3yWwa6AT5jFXt/zombies-redacted

>>9677880
>These are contradictory stances. Why do people who claim consciousness is purely derived from the physical brain hold the exact opposite stance when it comes to teleportation?

Wish fulfillment, probably. Cognitive dissonance.

>>9680520
>lesswrong
into the trash it goes

If you clone me you just create another me. I cant experience what he's experiencing even if he's similar to me. I dont understand what's the issue here.

>>9677880
Make a list of 100 things I want to do in my lifetime. Clone/teleport 100 copies of me. Each randomly chooses a lifetime task. We all meet ever year to discuss how things are.

>>9680968
That would be pretty swell, even though eventually the clones would probably diverge into different people. Still great having 100 versions of you dicking around.

>>9680968
just like Rick and Morty

>>9677880
Consciousness is just one long continuous electrical process. Even when you sleep your brain is still active and you are clinically speaking dead if you have no brain activity. So long as your brain activity is never interrupted, it is you.

>>9680968
Then we all fuck eachother.

>>9680968
So Dr. McNinja, basically.

>>9680968
>all 100 copies just shitpost on 4chan

>>9680494
>You can't decide what you decide to decide, but you can still feel being in control of your decisions
the absolute state of philosophy

Reminder that your brain still fucking works while it's asleep or unconscious, it doesn't fucking shut off

>>9681120
>Reminder that your brain still fucking works while it's asleep or unconscious, it doesn't fucking shut off

But does it change our consciousness?, are you different between before you lose consciousness and after you reawaken.
If no major changes then how is that different shutting off brain.

The materialist view of consciousness is one of the most illogical views you can hold, and it's a symptom of science trying to explain things that it simply cannot.

For example, a materialist must make some kind of distinction between the brain, and consciousness, in order to say that one creates the other. In essence, a materialist will say that both the brain, and consciousness, are physical things.

So all you need to ask is what are the physical properties of the brain, and what are the physical properties of consciousness? The physical properties of the brain can be defined, but how much does consciousness weigh? How big is it? What colour(s) does it have?

These questions cannot be applied to consciousness because consciousness is not a physical thing. It's not a perfect analogy, but if you imagine a radio as the brain, and the radio wave as consciousness, then smashing the radio in some way would affect how the wave is outputted, but the wave itself is unaffected. This where the confusion comes from for materialists, they see a strong correlation between changes in the physical structure of the brain and how consciousness is expressed due to this.

>>9681208
>how is operating while unconscious different than not operating while unconscious
Why is it that you can't seem to uncouple the idea of something working while you don't know it's working?

>>9681306
Man you're dumb. There's no such thing as consciousness apart from as a useful label. The only thing that exists is the brain. Brain injury proves this, evolution proves this, neural plasticity proves this, logic proves this and eventually, demonstrated non-existence of free will will prove this. Don't ever call anything illogical again you clueless dunning-kruger fuckwit.

>>9681314
Because if it works or does not work while unconscious and there is NO difference afterward, then it makes no difference if it is on or off while unconscious.

>>9681208
>If no major changes then how is that different shutting off brain.
Are you an AI?????
One of the major functions of sleep (in a real human) ois to dream, allowing your subconscious to beat you over the head with the realization of jus how stupid you were acting the last time you were awake.
Also, let's not forget you are still aware of your surroundings while you are asleep.

>>9681332
So there IS a difference to a person by sleeping or being unconscious. Is the difference meaningful?

>>9677880
Functionalism is death, brainlet
Read John Searle

>>9681337
>unconscious. Is the difference meaningful?
The real problem here is linguistics.
"consciousness" is almost unrelated to being conscious vs unconscious.
Don't forget the main problem with the "hard problem of consciousness" is being able to define consciousness (the human mind's state of being).
.

>>9681337
Oh, I just realized I didn't actually address your question:
>>9681337
>So there IS a difference to a person by sleeping or being unconscious
Sure, technically you're conscious (aware of your surroundings) while asleep.
Actually being unconscious is an extremely rare condition, but either way, it's unrelated the "consciousness" in the sense of being a self-aware sentient/sapient being.

>>9681321
If the only thing that existed was the brain, then you wouldn't be able to separate yourself from it in the first place.

>>9681348
Is there a test to determine if someone/something is conscious?

When robots start engaging in real conversations are they conscious?

If robots are told to be more human is their goal, then ff a robot asks you for a kitten so it can have a pet, does that mean the robot is conscious or is it just imitating a human to appear more human like?

If a robot says it loves you, does it?

>>9681362
>Is there a test to determine if someone/something is conscious?
We can't even define what the mind is.
https://www.google.com/search?q=hard+problem+of+consciousness

>>9681362
>If a robot says it loves you, does it?
You could ask the same question about a woman.
The answer?
There's no way to answer your question, so just make up whatever answer lets you sleep at night.

>>9681372
The mind is the brain, there is no hard problem of consciousness. Notice how the brain evolved as a purely physical system from other purely physical systems. This is a big hint.

>>9681372

So what would convince YOU that a robot is sentient and conscious?

What if a robot discovers religion? What if they worship humans, what if they all become Buddhist?

>>9681377

Is a robots love less real than a humans love?

>>9681445
A simple Turing test would do. PS: Humans are robots.

>>9677880
The implications being that this would entail fucking magic is at work here...

>>9677880
Ah. I know what is the problem.
No two frequencies are exactly alike in this universe at the quantumn level due to redshift and other expansive forces. Ergo the quantumn effects shatter any machine attempting to link or teleport a conciousness in any way. However in theory of one could skip ahead to a working frequency through trial and error...and sufficient energy... Could one raise the dead?

>>9677880
Human teleportation is SCIENCE FICTION. It literally can't happen and will never happen. Ever. The philosophy behind it is the same baseless philosophy used for religion.

>>9682270
There is nothing impossible about teleportation

>>9682552
tell me how you would do it without violating known physics. Come on, im waiting.

take teleportation out of it. arrange molecules in the same order as a living being. Make it live.
Once you do that we can discuss weather or not it can be done with teleportation. Until then you are simply putting irrationalities on top of fiction.

>>9677880
If you have two cars, a red car and a blue car and you slowly replace all the parts of the red car with the blue car at what point does the blue car become the red car? You won't have, you just switched the parts you haven't fundamentally changed anything. That spirit of the blue car you feel when you accelerate will be preserved. There is a kind of non conscious spiritual element to something as simple as a car. And every holy book tells us there is a conscious spiritual element to beings as complex as ourselves. If the model ain't broke don't fix it humans have a soul which lives beyond space-time. Rematerialization should by all means call your soul to the other side, but you will have to try in order to check.

>>9683545
Tell me what physical law it brokes you brainlet

A person is a designation much like a company of soldiers. This company carries with it a decorated history, although its troops change with casualties and recruitment. Say that the military was disbanded and reformed. A new company of troops is formed up with the same soldiers the company had before disbanding. Would it be the same company? No, as its existence was discontinued. However, this new company can claim succession, but it would not be the same. Likewise the Egyptian Army is not the ancient retinue of the Pharaohs.

>>9683592
Thats because its composed of people and people are different, but atoms and neurons are all the same

>>9681345
>Searle
His arguments never made any sense. I'll include an example here:
>No one supposes that computer simulations of a five-alarm fire will burn the neighborhood down or that a computer simulation of a rainstorm will leave us all drenched.
Which is great except while computer output isn't fire and isn't rain, it clearly can be the same as the sort of output Hawking produced while alive i.e. information / text, sound, navigational directives, etc.
So the analogies to fire and rain are not really applicable. You could try to say it still applies because of his Chinese Room bullshit, but even accepting that bullshit as true for the sake of argument it would still not make any sense to compare output computers clearly can produce like text to output they don't produce like rain. It would just mean the issue isn't output at all because he doesn't consider output from a program that's identical to output from a human typist as being caused by the same sort of process. Simulated rain isn't like this because the output of simulated rain is different than the output of actual rain, whereas the output of computer text isn't just "simulated" text, it's the same sort of text a human would write. What he's really complaining about is the cause of the output, but he's sloppy and mixes up the cause of the output with the output itself when making those faulty analogies to simulated fire and simulated rain. The correct analogies would be to machines that *did* produce actual fire or actual rain but in a way he doesn't count as legitimate because the way the fire and rain is produced by the machine is different from the way they're produced in nature.

>>9677885
Why is dumb wojak depicted with a biker helmet?

>>9680572
Not an argument

>>9677880
Due to the simple fact that a perfect atomic copy of a coke can, is not the original coke can.

There's a temporal connection of cause and effect of every moment of your consciousness and body that can be traced on any spacetime chart from start to finish. Even if it pulls a ship of theseus of most of itself along the way, the line still holds.

This new creation is from another set of energies with no direct causal link to the original. It would appear in an entirely different location on such a graph.

To say nothing as to what happens if they both exist at the same time - do you think your consciousness is going to magically split between them and allow you to experience the world from two perspectives at once?

It's indeed your stance that requires that consciousness magically transfer from one atomically identical copy of yourself to another. That somehow your "soul" be waiting outside of time and space to leap into a series of atoms arranged in just a certain way.

And Roddenberry thought of this - which is why Star Trek teleporters do not cannocially work by destroying your body and building a duplicate elsewhere. They convert your matter to energy, transfer said energy to a new location, and turn it back into matter there. Thus there is a direct causal connection between the teleportation, and thus it can be argued to be a rather extreme, temporary state-change, rather than a copy of you. (Even if some episodes fudge this quite a bit - it addressed this very concern.)

>>9684017
You're actually most likely just missing his point. What I assume he means is that consciousness stems from physical objects, and simulations don't produce the necessary kind of physical objects (circuits, not brains) for a consciousness to emerge. So yes, simulations don't produce fire and rain just like they don't produce brains. I don't think circuits we can interpret as brains would exactly be guaranteed to also spawn a consciousness, in fact that seems very unlikely.

>>9684072
Take the coke can and swap its atoms one by one with an identical coke can. Which one is which now? How are the two different, apart from being at different locations? There's still only one kind of coke can. If those two coke cans aren't the same, apart from location, then how can different temporal versions of a can be the same?

>>9684085
Consciousness isn't an output.

>>9684090
If you graphed the process, the atoms of each coke can have different histories, it's as simple as that.

There are atomically identical objects all over this universe. Every carbon-20 bucky ball, however identical, is a seperate object with a seperate history - otherwise experiments involving buckyballs would get very confusing.

Now, if you break the coke can down and reassemble it into its previous state elsewhere, then you can claim it's the same coke can - but your example isn't any difference than swapping two different coke cans on a desk. I know you put your dirty lips on one of em.

>>9684085
Also I think you're not understanding my complaint.
It's that he's confusing mechanism with output. Stuff like text is the output, not consciousness. Consciousness would be the mechanism possibly causing an output like text. It's not the output itself. That's why the analogies to fire and rain are faulty.

>>9684104
You're gonna have to define "output".

Consciousness a supposed emergent property of materia, more specifically the brain. A simulation doesn't produce a brain as an output, thus it likely doesn't produce consciousness either.

>>9677880
Consciousnesses are Quine atoms. See pict

>>9684105
And who's keeping this universal transcendent "history"? Nobody, only random humans and animals in arbitrary cases. If you mix 2 identical objects, you cant tell them apart later because they are the same, only different instances of the same object in different locations. This is the case with consciousness as well. It's the properties of the specific coke can, not the specific physical instance / location of the can. There's only 1 kind of a certain can, as there's only 1 kind of a certain consciousness, even if it is instantiated by many bodies.

>>9684112
Not hi, but... You're going to have to define "consciousness".

A hypothetically perfect digital simulation of a specific brain will have all the same behavioral responses of that brain, provided it sufficiently simulates its environment as well.

Doesn't mean it is defacto the person so simulated, anymore than a hypothetical perfect simulation of anything else is, but just like that person, you're not going to be able to prove it is or isn't conscious. Though, also just like that person, it'll likely respond in the affirmative, if asked.

>>9684121
You wouldn't need a "universal transcendent history" - just a record that you did it.

Two twins could pretend to be one another, and you might not know it - doesn't mean they aren't pretending, or they are the same person.

>>9684127
>define "consciousness".
Subjective experience.

>>9684135
And what happens when nobody has that history? The objects can be considered exactly the same, it's only that they're in different locations, nothing else.

>>9684136
...and how do you tell if someone is or isn't having a "subjective experience"? (Or something, for that matter.)

>>9684140
One would hope the twins would know.

>>9684141
I can't, was being able to do that the subject of the debate?

>>9684144
If you're contending that a digital brain can't be conscious, yes, it would rather be key.

>>9684143
If they know they aren't exactly identical.

>>9684150
I didn't say that. I said if physical brains are required to spawn consciousness, then it's highly unlikely that circuitry designed to run a simulation would do the same.

>>9684153
Neither are the coke cans, having different histories. If you could trace the quantum history of each atom, that'd be clear, but you'd need magic tech to do it.

You're contending simply because *I* don't know the coke can atomic swap happened, and that the twins are fooling me, it in fact is the same coke can, and the two twins are in fact the same person.

>>9684156
Again, you're defining "consciousness" as something that exists apart from the system that spawns it then, rather than a behavior which the system exhibits.

If the digital brain has all the same responses as the biological one, then so far as you can empirically tell, both are consciousness.

>>9684158
What's this "quantum history" that gives objects mystical identity without being physically observable in any way? If two objects are identical, they are the same, apart from location. And location can be changed. There's only one (kind of) can, with two instances of it. This shouldn't be controversial.

>>9684161
>subjective experience equals behavior
Yeah, I'm done wasting my time with you.

>>9684179
It's how you get entanglement, and the same reason each molecule and atom is its own object, despite being atomically identical. Quantum states cannot be absolutely identical (especially for fermions, due to that pesky Pauli-exclusion principle). Each atom has its own independent history, whether the observer is aware of the difference in their history or not, however identical any two atoms might be.

You'd likely need some magitech to tell the coke cans apart - though maybe not, if they were manufactured in different places or radically different times, and thus could tell the difference between the two via decay. But, due to block universe, if you had the tech, you could rewind the history to see the difference. In any case, on some level, they are objectively different objects, and whoever the observer was who did the borderline magitech atomic swap would certainly know.

>>9684179
Behavior is the only measure you have. If the system produces the behavior of a conscious being, and insists that it is one, how are you going to prove otherwise?

Your assertion is that biological matter is uniquely capable of consciousness, but you have no basis for that. Core problem being that you have no way to prove anything is or isn't consciousness, save for yourself, and even then, you can only prove it to yourself. You just kindly assuming it for everyone else.

>>9684198
>Quantum states cannot be absolutely identical
I see this stated but no actual hard proof. But even if we were to accept this, what difference does it make? The two cans would be so close to each other in any observable way that it really wouldn't make a difference for instance which can we had in hand. They'd be interchangeable with each other.

>>9684202
I'm not saying it's possible to say the system isn't conscious, but at the same time I believe it's likely it isn't. A brain is an incredibly complex pattern, it's nothing alike the physical hardware running a simulation.

>>9684213
But still objectively seperate objects with objectively seperate history.

There's not much consequence with a coke can due to its limited function, but when it comes to the topic at hand, it makes a big difference when two copies of the same person try to decide which one gets to keep dating Sally. Or, to be less facetious, the fact that they are experiencing the world from two separate perspectives, despite being atomically identical, makes them two separate beings. A copy of you is objectively not you anymore than a copy of the coke can is, but for people, the consequences are more obvious.

>>9684225
A copy of me is me as long as both instances are identical and keep experiencing the same stuff. When there's divergence then I would be experiencing stuff from two perspectives, although obviously not simultaneously. It's no different from me being able to experience stuff at different moments.

>>9684215
Well this hypothetical perfect simulation of a human brain is going to be just as complex as that the real brain it's modeled on, if not more so, due to the extra steps that maybe involved in translating that analog system into digital form.

A perfect digital simulation of a car, may obviously not be a real car, since it can't haul physical things, but within that digital world, it has all the same properties of a real car.

If consciousness is merely the result of the system, then it shouldn't matter whether the system is biological or digital, within the context of its own world - or even whether the brain is made out of clockwork parts. In terms of function, there's nothing separating biological mechanisms from non-biological mechanisms, so there's really no basis to say that one system can do something within its domain that the other cannot.

>>9684235
A copy of you does not share your history, it merely thinks it does. It will behave as you, and do everything you would do in its situation until your experiences diverge, but the fact that there are two separate situations to be had, and two seperate history, makes you objectively different objects.

>>9684245
You're still confusing simulation with the physical. The machinery doing the simulation doesn't itself aim to be like a car, just like it doesn't aim to be like a brain. We should be building brain-machines if we wanted to go for something that has a good chance of being conscious, not virtual simulations of said brain machines.

>>9684249
>merely thinks it does
Just like you do. Now tell me, where is the difference? You can't name a tangible separating factor because there is none. If you think identical physical objects aren't instances of the same set of properties (a kind of subjective object) then you can't consider yourself to be the same as the person you remember being 5 secs back.

>>9684252
Well, it's certainly simpler to make baby than to simulate a brain (even if some posts on this board would lead you to believe otherwise), but a device can be aimed towards a particular purpose. If you have a perfect simulation of a brain - or if, just by magic, a perfect simulation of your brain were to manifest, made instead of cogwork parts, there's no reason I can see that it wouldn't be just as conscious, simply because it is made of different materials, if they all perform the same functions.

>>9684260
There's a causal connection between myself now, myself 5 seconds back, and myself decades back. There isn't between me and a copy of me. The fact that we simply think we are the same person does not make it so.

>>9684264
Causal connection seems like another synonym for quantum history, a property that isn't observable in any shape or form without somebody having been there to record it at the time. There's no such mystical label of identity that would separate one consciousness into two just because it's supported by two bodies.

>>9684269
It isn't a mystical quality, it's a mathematically objective one, and one that may be observed by any number of other parties - such as Sally.

>>9684262
I guess the problem is that the simulation itself doesn't spawn a physical brain, just ones and zeroes which we have to interpret for them to mean anything. The machinery itself is very different from anything else conscious? Can it be conscious? Absolutely. But I also think i t's more likely that it's not

>>9684272
And it can be not observed, at which point it stops existing.

>>9684279
>>9684272
For instance, if you mix up the two coke cans, it'll be impossible to tell which one is which. The reason, it doesn't make any difference. Because the cans are the same. The history of two things doesn't matter for determining whether they are the same right here right now. I don't know why you're so hell bent on proving your persistence hinges on such a questionable property.

>>9684273
If we leave out the physicality entirely and just focus on the functionality... Say you have two systems, made of whatever, producing the same results - in the case the result is a being insisting it is conscious, how do you tell which is lying to you? I just don't see any mechanism in the biological vs. the mechanical that gives it any objective right to have its claim taken over the other. I mean, maybe by consensus, but what if the mechanical brains outnumber the biological ones - are they then in the right?

>>9684284
If the question is whether or not they are in fact the same object, it's not a questionable property - it's an absolute fact that the two objects have separate histories. Again, otherwise, any two atoms of the same type are de facto the same atom. This is obviously not the case.

>>9684291
Again, what does history matter? Why is such a thing as "history" even important here?

>any two atoms of the same type are de facto the same atom. This is obviously not the case.
That has also to do with their locations. But the point i've been making for tens of posts is that consciousness is not comparable to a specific iron atom, it's the iron-atom-like properties. Those properties can be described by one existing iron atom, the rest is redundancy.

Before you start arguing that, here's why consciousness is separate from the physical object spawning it >>9680479

>>9684302
I'm not saying the two copies aren't both conscious, I'm saying they are objectively separate beings. History is the only thing that makes any two identical objects separate, but it's not something you ignore in any other circumstance, it is indeed the thing you use to define things as separate objects.

>>9677887
you're not completely breaking apart and reconstructing your body every 12 hours though
imagine creating a clone of yourself with your exact dna. That isn't you. You don't experience what it experiences

>>9684317
The only thing that is directly observable from the viewpoint of the conscious being, me, are experiences. Nothing else matters here. Do two bodies spawn something that has the exact same experiences? Then they spawn the same me. Your history speak is irrelevant to this situation.

>>9684332
You do indeed do that every few decades though, for about 95% of your mass - however, the process entangles all the matter you take in to replace your various parts as they evolve with a chronology of causality anyone can follow. You may indeed not be the you of a few decades ago, but you're a direct result of that old self, unlike a copy, which might share all your memories, but have a very different source and history, and from the point of creation on, perspective. It might be conscious, but it wouldn't be the same consciousness, it'd be one experiencing the world from its own window, and overtime, even its nature would diverge from your own, just as those of any two identical twins does.

>>9684349
If you ignore the entire rest of the universe and time, both past and future, I suppose you might have a point in that solipsism.

In this scenario, where the universe consists of something other than yourself, however, Sally might have some objections - lest she's really into DP.

>>9684354
Solipsism is really the only logical answer. Sure there's an objective universe most likely, but who am I to say that for absolute certainty? The only thing that's directly relevant is what I experience, and that's the only thing I can base my identity on. It doesn't matter to _me_ what goes on in the outside physical world, it may exist or not exist for all I care, what matters is what kind of things that makes me experience. And in the 2 bodies problem the supposed outside world can make me experience the exact same things, just supported by 2 bodies.

>>9684354
Even then, there's still two of him in different locations. So far as either of them may know they are the original, but they are experiencing the world from two seperate locations, and thus have that difference, even in consciousness.

Bring other actors into the scene and then, yes, you've got instant confirmation as to the fact. Same if they merely meet one another. They'd know they were seperate beings, and probably start arguing over bank account access right quick.

>>9684363
Well if solipsism is your thing then which one is the dreamer and which one is the dream?

>>9681345
searle is a genuine retard who's been exposed multiple times

>>9684374
Experiences are the dream and the observer is the dreamer, I'd say.

Was nice debating, you seem like a swell guy. I'm heading off to bed now.

>>9683616
>A new company of troops is formed up with the same soldiers the [old] company had before disbanding.
The soldiers represents the components of the human body, and assume that the military disbanded and reformed instantly. Superficially, atoms and neurons are not all the same. Atoms of the same element can differ in the positions of their electrons. Anyways, the point of my analogy is that continuation is important to maintain identity and/or person.

>>9677880
Imagine never seen or measure conciousness and suddenly you create a pseudoscience called psychology to impress humanities peasant niggers

>>9685751
Without psychology you would not have been able to been diagnosed with autism and there would have been no autismbux for you.

>>9684363
>Solipsism is really the only logical answer.
It's a cop-out you can neither prove or disprove, while at the same time requiring a god exists - even if that god is you. It also makes the whole conversation pointless, as in that scenario, you are the only conscious being in the universe, and you can make things work however you want, even if that decision seems to be subconscious.

>>9685751
Psychology doesn't ask fundamental questions about consciousness, it only concerns itself with behavior. Neurology might dance around the consciousness issue, but psychology simply assumes it.

Not that it isn't still a pseudoscience, but learn the difference between psychology and philosophy.

>>9685926
>It's a cop-out
Solipsism is finding the truths we can know, and only those truths. Anything beyond that is probabilities, guesswork and thinking with your feelings.

>god
No, this is the exact thing I was referring to with "thinking with your feelings".

>>9677880
You are not even the pattern of the atoms, which changes. Which implies there can only be one "You" at single moment, since you are at least the sequence of these patterns. The essence in the Ship of Theseus is the Platonic Ship Form, tied to its function, that is, the ship remains the same ship. Your essence is consciousness, the one thing you can be sure of (I think therefore I am). It's ridiculous to see people saying "you" don't exist even though their soulless model leads to the Teletransportation Paradox.

>>9686008
There's no truth to be had - the universe is simply a figment of your imagination. It doesn't have to work by any particular mechanic or follow any logic. Even if it appears to, it's simply one of your making, and in the end, it changes nothing either way.

Granted, I suppose you could ask the psychological question as to why you do this all to yourself, but solipsism more or less precludes science, as science is about verifiable truths, not personal ones. Even in philosophy, it's practically become a logical fallacy specifically because it goes nowhere.

>>9686088
How do you identify any object? How do you differentiate between identical objects? Seems pretty straight forward. Dunno why this suddenly becomes a question when these hypothetical objects are people.

>>9686102
>How do you identify any object?
I have no idea what you are talking about

>>9686088
>It's ridiculous to see people saying "you" don't exist even though their soulless model leads to the Teletransportation Paradox.
It's more of a paradox if you have souls in the mix. I mean, even if you assume your soul hunts around for a glove that fits it, and thus migrates to the teleported body, what if the original isn't deleted? Does this mean there are now two of you, and you have a machine that manufactures souls? Or do you suddenly experience the world from two perspective as your soul is split between them?

Leave the soul out of it and it's a much simpler question - just a matter as to whether the copy of you shares identity as the same object, simply because it has all the same functionality. Don't delete the original and all you got is a copier, and it quickly becomes less of a science question, and more of a legal matter of ownership.

>>9686125
The soul doesn't migrate to the teleported body, the argument is idealist, not materialist.

The point is that teletransportation is either Logically impossible or it creates a new a conscious without your memory, solving the paradox, which leads to the idea that memory is non-local. So you either believe memory is non-local, effectively a soul, or that teletransportation is not only physically impossible, but Logically impossible.

>>9679928
Conscious is still awake in the dream to certain extents. It's ability to store data (memories) during this state is limited unless you are savantical or trained.
Unconscious can also act as its own being so that is a stream of undefined thought.

>natural lucid dreamer here

>>9686219
Don't think you can declare teleportation logically impossible based on the nature of the soul, which you can say nothing objective about. Besides, a lot of religions say the soul has no memory - and given that brain alteration or damage can affect memory, seems their models have more support.

>>9686450
You are conscious while asleep, it's just an altered consciousness, but he's still gotta point of full anesthesia, where you don't even have a sense that the time has passed (which messes up my internal clock for weeks).

I am not convinced of the persistent self in the first place

>>9677880
I know the duplicate is not me for I can't control it. Nothing can be exactly me for to become me their body must submit to my neural commands and their mind must be mine.

>>9688307
Then you must believe a soul exists

>>9677880
from the exact point of its creation the clone would stop being even remotely similar. the most minute changes in stimuli/information being sent to the brain would break physical symmetry, making the clone its own conscious entity.

its only relation to the original would be through its history of, for only the exact moment of its conception/creation/animation, having the same physical composition.

>>9688317
cont'd

the clone would under no circumstances be "you" for the reason i stated. because "you" is just a manifestation of a physical arrangement, and the brain physically changes while receiving stimuli, "you" are a result of all changes brought forth by outside forces up until the present. that also means that "you" changes at a rate which we could likely never even perceive, and although a clone could start as an exact physical replication, it would not be "you" after its brain begins to function

>>9688324
This is dumb because it means you cease to exist every single moment of your existence

>>9677885
Completely unfalsifiable. If you were replaced by an ideal copy of yourself, the copy would have no way of determining it's a different stream of consciousness, since the result is the same arrangement of matter in the same place.

>>9688324
>>9688317
But then you have just redefined "you" in such a way that everyone is constantly ceasing to exist, which means that the teleporter really doesn't do anything special.

>>9688328
Sounds right to me

I would at first glance agree that these are contradictory positions. But there is possibly a way out for the physicalist here, and that has to do with there being two different ways things can be identical. Think of two 3D-printed objects A and B, and imagine the 3D printer was precise to the atom level. A and B are identical in the sense that their composition is the same. But one could still say that they are not identical in a different sense. One can still look at them and see there are two of them; for A and B to be truly identical, anything true of A must be true of B. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_of_indiscernibles Therefore, for A and B to be truly identical, destroying object A would have to also destroy object B. Here the criteria fails.

This would also apply to mental states during teleportation. Since you are A, there is no doubt that B will be identical in the first sense, but since you are mental state A you can never be mental state B in the second sense of identicalness. Consider the classical thought experiment that is brought up to defend teleportation death: Upon teleportation, the machine fails and forgets to destroy you, but still creates the second you in the next room; you can go in and meet him. Are you now okay with him putting a gun to your head and pulling the trigger? You might say that it's not you anymore since your experiences have diverged, but does it really make sense for it to work like that? Is there a magic "moment" in which you are identical, and that's when teleportation is a success? Did that mental state of B change in some way because you weren't destroyed? Surely it's not being identical in the first sense that is important here, but the second sense. Smashing 3D printed object A with a hammer doesn't save it just because B is identical to it.

>>9688328
>This is dumb because it means you cease to exist every single moment of your existence
That's dumb because the obvious conclusion should be that the "self" concept doesn't have any literal reality to it in the first place beyond its use as a label of convenience, not that there are separate selves for every moment. Nothing of that sort ever begins to exist in a way that would make ceasing to exist possible.

>>9688490
>>9680479

>>9688310
>I can't control my twin's body therefore souls exists.
No. Just means there's two different beings involved, regardless of how identical.

>>9688487
Think the problem is there's a fundamental difference between the two objects that everyone just chooses to ignore, simply because they are people.

They are in different locations and source from different materials. In a case of teleportation of object A resulting in creation of object B, object B did not exist until the teleportation occurred, and is in a different location from A. That's a fundamental difference.

Even if it's in the exact same location, it's still an object that didn't previously exist made from different energies.

...and this should all be bloody obvious, if you never delete object A. Not even sure why there's a debate. (Though if you recreate the object in the same location without removing it, you're going to have a nasty explosion.)

This is why, in Star Trek, they use matter-energy transfer beams. If it's the same material/energy, merely rearranged, it's the same object. Otherwise you have a new one. Simple.

>>9688609
consciousness != body

the two bodies are obviously two different objects because one of the properties (location) between them differs, but the consciousness created by them isn't. consciousness isn't exactly concerned with any physical location.

>>9688623
There's no empirical evidence of that. So far as we can tell, consciousness requires a functional body. We can alter it in any number of ways by messing with the system that demonstrates it, and it ceases to function once that system collapses.

Memory, personality, perception, perspective, all can be altered by altering the body, so even if there is such a thing as a soul, there isn't anything left for it to do that the body isn't already doing. P-zombies are indistinguishable from "ensouled" people.

By the same token, the object that is that body exists as a line through time. If you make another one, there's no entanglement between the two objects, so you have two separate identical conscious beings, and yes, deleting either is murder, just as it would be to murder either of two twins.

>>9688667
>empirical evidence
if you deny the way consciousness manifests to us, you might as well deny any empirical evidence it delivers to us through our senses. just because consciousness by definition is subjective doesn't mean it doesn't exist and can't be examined, a ridiculous stance taken by lots of people these days. it's almost as if people were afraid of all things in our existence ultimately being more or less subjective >>9680499. this is the same problem as with special relativity, turns out there really is no "objective" perspective after all.

>>9688689
But that's exactly how consciousness manifests to us. I can alter my consciousness in any number of ways by altering my body in any number of ways. Even by simply going to sleep, or hyperventilating. Both the personal, unverifiable truth, and the external empirical proof point to consciousness being inseparable from the body.

>>9688700
what I meant is that our physical location is not apparent to us through any of our experiences, apart from what our senses tell us about our surroundings. but we can't "sense" our actual physical location. thus spatial location is not property of consciousness. confusing as that may sound to us intuitively, consciousness must be detached from physicality in that way. thus it makes no sense to go looking for the identity of a person's consciousness in the spatial or temporal locations of his physical body. really, if you accept the logical view of solipsism, it makes sense to not prioritize assumedly-existing physical objects over subjective experience at all, they're secondary, they _might_ not even exist, but the subjective experience does. if you feel that you have a body it doesn't mean there actually has to be a physical body behind your senses, there's no irrefutable proof either way.

>>9677880
Teletransportation paradox

What is exactly the paradox?

An inconsistency of physicalism concerning subjective identity. Suppose there is no soul, that you are unique and equal to your physical body in its current state. You are then physically destroyed and rebuilt exactly the same, the question is: is your stream of consciousness unaffected or not? If yes, then you died and there is a new person in your place, which means you are not equal to your physical body or structure, made of interchangeable atoms, in its current state. If not, then you can't be replicated, which clearly goes against the machine ability of putting out more copies of you.

this >>9686088

>>9688723
that ridiculous view was already refuted ITT >>9680479

clearly we aren't constantly blinking in and out of existence every second.

>almost 300 replies
What's so hard to understand, OP.
If I simply instruct the machine to create a 1:1 copy of You, while You are still present, I've just created a separate person with his own fucking mind. You might even have the same thought at the exact same moment when looking at each other, but I take you apart into different environments, or fuck, even opposite sides of a big city, and wait for a decade, and then bring you back together, you WILL be two different people.
You moved nothing. You created copy. The original feels nothing. The copy would think he is the original, up until the moment he is presented with evidence to the contrary. This implies that you could potentially scan someone, kill them, and "resurrect" them on the spot, without them noticing. But we as outside observers thinking about it KNOW, that this is bullshit and you've just killed the poor fuck and then made a copy of him.

And unless it turns out, that there indeed exists a metaphysical strong independent soul that needs no body, and you will simply experience "being" while in two bodies at the same time instead, there is no fucking way you - even as original - can claim ownership of your copy. He is a fully functional person in every legal sense and must be treated as a separate entity. This will also apply to sentient AI BTW.

>>9688733
It seems you agree with me.

>>9688806
>you will be two different people
Then (you) are not your physical body, genius. There is an element that didn't get itself copied in the process.

Ok I've read most of this thread and will continue reading, but it seems to come down to the definition of the self (or being retarded). As one anon pointed out it's properties vs instance. If you define self as the properties of an object, then a clone of you would be as much you as you are. If you define self as the instance, then they are not the same self. I agree with the latter. Still, nothing is contradictory. Conciousness is a physical property of the instance. The instance changes from moment to moment. Am I missing something here?

>>9688717
>if you accept the logical view of solipsism
If you accept solipsism, there is only one conscious being, and it's you. All making copies of you is doing is adding to the population of the dream. Whether or not your perspective shifts to that copy is entirely up to you, because there are no physical laws and everything is your imagination anyways. You can do whatever the fuck you want, cuz you're god, even if you're not aware of it, there's no logic to be had.

>>9688816
What element?

>>9688806
They became different people as soon as the clone's makeup diverged from the original and the 2 became non identical. They were identical at the instant the cloning happened, but as soon as that instant passes, their experience (stored as physical structure inside the brain) become different. It is impossible to have 2 yous at the same time, unless one mirrors the other identically, which is impossible

>>9688816
You are fucking stupid and you need to be slapped repeatedly.
If I replicate you under narcosis and then stand the two of you next to each other and ask who is the original. Both will answer "me!"
Whatever happens afterwards, the two will diverge.
How the fuck is this hard to absorb?

I think people want exactitude from the scientific approach when it deals in infinite approximation. We gather evidence in support or against, but there is always an infinitely small but ever present counterpoint to any hypothesis brought forward. You can never truly "know" anything 100%, but you can gather evidence to reach well beyond a 99% surity, and that approaching-perfect surity is good enough for most.

People want a guarantee rather than a statistical safe bet when it comes to consciousness. As long as there is some sort of unknown, even with a hill of evidence, you'll have people cling to that ant hill of doubt in spite of all the evidence. It is futile to argue with these people.

>>9688808
oops, skimmed your post and was lead on by the quote you made at the end

>>9688824
sounds about it to me

>>9688833
that doesn't refute anything I argued. just because "it doesn't suit me" it's not a faulty view. also, that's a strawman. I never said "the physical world doesn't exist", I said we can't know for sure. I'll sure as hell be taking my chances it exists since it certainly seems like it, but the point is that prioritizing the physical world over our own subjective experience makes no sense. subjective experience comes first, the assumed physical world becomes second, and only because it seems to be correlated with my subjective experience.

>>9688835
Identity of an object is more than its configuration, which only gives you type - there's also the history and origin of each object to consider. There are millions of atomically identical objects in this universe that are all nonetheless seperate objects. A copy of you has a different origin and history, and thus is a different object from the get go - just one of the same type. You are two separate beings, even at the moment of creation, merely configured the same way, until the next infinitesimal moment passes.

>>9688840
Exactly, they are indistinguishable, so which one is the real you?

>>9688835
by that logic, two momentary versions of you aren't the same person either, even though they're clearly almost exactly alike. applying such strict equality to personal identity is dumb.

>>9688846
>I never said "the physical world doesn't exist"
I don't think you know what solipsism is. Under solipsism, the physical world is merely an extension of your god-mind, a dream that you've compartmentalized to make yourself ignorant of.

>>9688851
no, solipsism doesn't imply knowing what's behind your senses, it merely acknowledges the fact that you can never know for certain.

>>9688849
The one that existed before you made the copy. Not that they aren't both equally real, but one has an objective claim on its existence, the other's timeline started at that point.

From their own perspective they are both the original, though even the copy will have to admit it doesn't remember exactly how it got to where it is, assuming we're doing the "teleporter failed to delete original" scenario.

From everyone and everything's else perspective, however (unless your that dipshit that keeps insisting the rest of the damned universe doesn't matter), they only share a history with the original. Should they be aware that the copy is not the original, they will react differently, and every interaction the original has had left an imprint on the universe up until that point and time, unlike the copy.

>>9688860
>the copy will have to admit it doesn't remember exactly how it got to where it is
What are you talking about? The clone will remember how he got to where he is (he remembers that he was cloned)

>>9688860
>The one that existed before you made the copy
Why is this a meaningful distinction for the definition of self?

>>9688860
>make somebody unconscious and clone him
>place both bodies randomly in a room
>the bodies will now magically understand which one is which and behave differently

>>9688865
Well, if he's aware that the teleporter makes clone, then yes, he's aware that he's a clone, which makes a fundamental difference from the get go.

But if he's not, he's just going to remember entering the teleporter, not the transition, while the original will just be wondering why it didn't work.

Either way, there's a difference between the two from moment one.

/sci/ ""philosophy"" is cringelord faggot stupid wannabe deep bullshit

go read a fucking book retards

>>9688869
Are you not >>9688840?
I replied to someone talking about
>If I replicate you under narcosis and then stand the two of you next to each other and ask who is the original. Both will answer "me!"

>>9688868
Even if you kidnap a person, knock him out, and magi-clone him, you and the whole rest of the universe are aware that the clone didn't exist from the get go - even if the clones aren't.

>>9688873
what does that matter? it'll be impossible to tell them apart, they're the same.

We are dealing with a complex problem of people not being able to come to terms with the proposition that they are a hunk of molecules that spent past 100,000 generations absorbing knowledge and experience and organizing itself to alter the world around on a whim, and they are using this mind blowing cosmic coalescence, to shitpost about souls.

>>9688873
Why is that so important for the self? That doesn't seem very important for the definition of self

>>9688875
The guy who did the cloning knows. If he arranges the experiment in such a way that he's blind as to which as which, you've still got two separate beings seeing the world from two different perspectives from that time out, each insisting they are the original.

Ya'd need some weird quantum tomfoolery to figure which is which, but ya'd need some weird quantum tomfoolery to pull it off in the first place, so whatevs. Find a leftover sandwich, and figure out if he's entangled to it or not.

>>9688880
The clones won't care until Sally has to choose between them. I mean, it's fine, if each clone is the only thing in its universe, but otherwise, there's a lotta other stuff out there.

>>9688873
>>9688883
You don't even know what the thread is about, retard

>>9688873
>you and the whole rest of the universe are aware
only you are aware and rest of the universe couldn't give less of a fuck, including the two seemingly identical people in front of you
This is purely ethical matter.
You and I both know that even if we've been brutally raped and murdered every single night of our lives in secrecy and replaced with a perfect copy with all the memories except the ones of the rape and murder, from everyone's perspective excluding the perpetrator, nothing has changed.
This doesn't invalidate unique physical You. In no way.

>>9688880
>>9688867
it's not, it's entirely irrelevant since you don't sense your location or your "history".

> you've still got two separate beings seeing the world from two different perspectives from that time out, each insisting they are the original.
yes, because they're both as much the same person. they're just different versions of him that are happening simultaneously at the same time in different locations, as opposed to happening in any locations over different time periods. there's no problem here. you're only making it into a problem because the answer didn't please you. they're both instances of the same "you" experiencing things. sure they have different perspectives, but you can have that temporally as well. what matters is that the consciousness resembling "you" is experiencing things, even if it happens in different locations simultaneously. there's no further problem. why is this so hard to grasp?

>>9688889
Not an argument.

The instance is that a copy of an object is the same being - it isn't, it's a copy of that being, and that has consequences, especially when you have two of them interacting.

>>9688898
>you're only making it into a problem because the answer didn't please you
What am I making into a problem? What was the answer that didn't please me? Who do you think I am?

>>9688907
the guy grasping for identity from all sorts of things like physical location, continuity, history and social relations.

>>9688852
There are two variants of solipsism. The epistemological one argues that we can never know for sure, while the metaphysical one argues that we are in fact the only mind in the reality we perceive.

Usually the metaphysical version is implied because I reckon most of us are epistemological solipsists.

>>9688918
>Usually the metaphysical version is implied
I thought it was the other way, wikipedia seems to take that stance as well. either way, I think my views on the matter have become clear

>>9688912
Are you not the one saying that the real you is the one that existed before the cloning?

>>9688912
>grasping
not him but if those things don't contribute to identity then I don't know what the fuck does.

>>9688912
Which is all the identity you have.

A duplicate of you will think it is you, experience the world accordingly, but will eventually be hit with the abrupt truth that it is not you and that its existence as you is merely a memory implanted by its creation process.

To which, depending on which sci-fi movie centering on the subject you prefer, it may react violently. In any case, fictional or not, there's gonna be consequences to the fact that it's a copy.

>>9688924
not exactly sure. I'm the solipsist guy and some posts over here >>9680479

>>9688926
see >>9680479. any of the proposed alternatives aren't fundamentally sound as they can all be removed.

>>9688928
> will eventually be hit
there's nothing ensuring that will ever happen.

>>9688935
>there's nothing ensuring that will ever happen.
The fact that it could happen already proves you have two separate beings. Even if you delete the original, and no one knows, you've still objectively committed murder, and the same tech that let you do it will be available to prove it.

>>9688945
>sure they have different perspectives, but you can have that temporally as well. what matters is that the consciousness resembling "you" is experiencing things, even if it happens in different locations simultaneously. there's no further problem.
did you read and understand this?

>>9688953
You can't, so far as am I aware, have two seperate perspectives at the same time. One is you, one isn't, however alike they are.

>>9688969
but the problem is exactly the same as the one of persistence over time. there's only the additional "problem" of having 2 perspectives "at the same time", but what exactly makes it a problem?

>>9688974
That they are two perspectives at the same time, and thus not the same being.

Everyone please answer this dichotomy.
>>9688824
All I am hearing here could be cleared up by it. I keep hearing vague "is that still you" type of stuff. Answer this. Tell me it is a false dichotomy. Whatever you want. As far as I'm concerned this discussion should have ended hundreds of posts before. Prove me wrong. I really don't get it

>>9688928
This is why the ever-so-ethical Enterprise crew didn't kill Tom Riker (Will Riker's duplicate).

Their transporter tech works on a matter-energy transfer beam, so the being that comes out of the transporter has merely undergone an extreme transformation, and is not a copy (despite certain other episodes fuxing with this, it is Roddenberry's canonical solution to the paradox).

In the episode where we end up with the duplicate, the beam stimulated the "strange atmosphere" of the planet to generate a beam of it its own, thus Tom Riker, not being made up of Will Riker's energies, is an objectively separate person, sourced from original energy, and merely an echo of his own.

Years later they find Tom Riker, who believes he is Will (but later changes his name to Tom), stranded on the planet. They don't just go "Oh, we already have a Will Riker, let's off him, cuz what difference does it make, and it'd cause confusion.", they acknowledge they are two separate beings, and attempt to treat him accordingly. The fact that they even have the option to treat them differently proves they are two separate beings, however identical they may be.

>>9688991
but temporal versions of you are also two different perspectives. can they not be the same being? what's this huge difference between spatial and temporal versions?

>>9689004
Cuz different points of your timeline are all entangled together, along with every atom you took in to replace whatever tissues are evolving over that time, they are all interconnected.

You only experience the present from a single perspective even if a copy of you does exist somewhere. Ask any set of twins.

>>9689010
Twins are objectively separate people even if they spend every living second together.
Sometimes they are polar opposites of each other.

>>9689010
you also experience only one moment from a single perspective. get it? you can experience spatial locations from one perspective at a time, but the same thing is going on with your temporal versions all the time. yet you have no problem admitting those temporal versions are all part of the same you. suddenly just because those different versions are able to meet in the spatial variation of the problem you seem to think it becomes somehow more complicated, but it doesn't.

>>9689022
Yes, because however genetically close they may be, they don't share perspectives.

There's no reason to think it'd be any different if they were atomically identical.

>>9689024
We've got some crackhead suggesting they are the same being. They are the same *type* of being, just as any two identical atoms or molecules are, but they are separate objects, each with their own perspective. Ya don't get to nix the time aspect anymore than ya get to nix the space aspect.

>>9689043
I've been trying to hammer the point in for tens of posts, but apparently it's never gonna sink in. you should spend more time trying to internalize what I'm saying instead of quickly coming up with different responses every time. I give up.

Let's sum this shit up then,
Do you agree that memory contributes the lion's share of one's identity, but there are countless other aspects that help shape one's personality, external and internal?
Can we say that person is a sum of their life's experience, as well as whatever fucking itch they may have at the moment?

Is it unreasonable to suggest then, that this "person", this "You" emerging from the physical makeup of your brain and your hormonal levels, is unique and no matter how many clones and mind backups you make, from the first second, they will all go their separate ways, continuing to be shaped by their future experiences?

>>9677880

>tfw normie brainlets not able to reconcile their existence within an MWI cosmology
>the longest lived version of "you" is always "you"
>if you're alive at this point in history, you're therefore already immortal, as "human uploading" is at most thirty years away and we're on the verge of overtaking the longevity escape velocity

>>9689056
Well, if you're the one insisting that any two identical objects are the same object, yeah, you're not gonna get me there. I mean, it's a fun thought and math experiment with one-electron universe, but in any other instance, it'd kinda break everything.

>>9689097
This is where we get the Roko's Basilisk crap from, people thinking that a duplicate (in this case simulation) of themselves is somehow them, simply because it shares their nature. Thus they live in fear of the idea that a simulation of themselves might be tortured by some future angry AI god who wants retribution for not aiding in its creation. Again, back to twins, they can share their natures pretty thoroughly, but do not share perspective. Despite the legend of the Corsican twins, you can torture one and the other may never know.

Thus, so long as it doesn't kill me, I don't care what you do with a simulation of me, so long as it isn't identity theft or something that otherwise interferes with my life. Make all the copies of me ya want, kill them all ya want, no skin off my nose.

This is why this whole last season of Black Mirror fell flat for me. I mean, it is cruel to torture potentially sentient simulations, so I can't say I'm all for that (however many NPCs I may kill in vydia, I'd be more hesitant if I thought they might be conscious). At the same time, I'm not concerned that I'm going to experience the pain that a copy of me is.

While I could see where the ability to torture a simulation of someone you hate might be cathartic, as in Black Mirror, it is in no way administrating justice.

>>9689097
I don't give one sorry fuck about my copy.
From my subjective perspective it doesn't change anything for me. I will die at some point.
There will be another guy who will know what I typed here and understand that even though he carries on as if nothing happened, something DID happen. I ceased to exist. for every outsider and even for by substitute it will make no difference. The only affected party is the one that can no longer protest.

>>9689097
If someone with an anime avatar is making arguments on metaphysics, you can always disregard everything he says.

>>9677912
>>upload brain into new person
You mean dick a thot?

>>9677880
Nice thread, OP.

Let's see, there is a simple explanation.

1.The Unique Observer Principle: you can't observe X and it's logical negation at the same time. That implies you can't see something in front of you and not in front of you through the same eye at the same time. If a copy is made of you then you can only observe from one perspective, instead of both at the same time in parallel. Which implies one of the two isn't you.

2. Since you two are both physically identical, there is no physical parameter that decides which one of you is the original observer.

3. Because teletransportation is at least Logically possible, then there must be a non-physical parameter that determines which one of you is the original observer. And that is the soul.

QED

>>9689336
>3. Because teletransportation is at least Logically possible, then there must be a non-physical parameter that determines which one of you is the original observer. And that is the soul.
Nevermind those decades of entirely physical parameters that exist, assuming you're old enough to post here.

>>9689239

>thinking you're still on tumblr and not an Indonesian shadow puppet site

>>9677880
you are merely the union of your memories and the the way you chemically reacts to the world around you, it doesnt matter if its your original body or just a copy it IS you anyway.

>>9690019
If I made a copy of you, had it say, "Hi", you'd be okay with me murdering you then? I mean, you'd still exist, right?

No? Well that's because, regardless of how identical you are, you each have your own separate consciousness. A copy of you is only you in terms of function, not history, it therefore does not share your stream of consciousness nor perspective. It is its own being, merely left with the delusion it is you, which can be shattered should it become aware of the fact.

>>9690051
i would not be okay because i'm still in my onw body, but if you did murder me i would at least be tranquilized because in a way or another i would still live.
its some altered carbon shit right here, as long as there is a copy of me i would still be alive since there's another me.

>>9690051
my original body would die one day anyway so as long as there a way to keep my mind capable of learning and "running" i would be okay w/ that

>>9677893
>die
>get resurrected by a defibrillator
>some idiot on the internet thinks i'm a different person

>>9690067
Makes ya wonder why twins put up a fight when you try to kill their siblings.

>>9690064
At best you got a duplicate to carry on your will postmortem. Your experience ends when you end, otherwise there'd be no reason not to let me kill you.

Similarly, if I torment the copy, it's not as if you're going to feel it. It ain't you.

>>9690420
Twins aren't identical consciousnesses, brainlet.

>>9690538
Despite having identical DNA, at least to start with, and nearly identical configuration.

Why would it be any different if they were atomically identical?

>>9688371
this reply is sort of nonsensical. "you" is not static. there is no constant other than that "you" will change every time the brain encounters stimuli.