/sci/ - Science & Math

>>6643001
Yes. No.

It's about ancient greek paradox: if you replace the ship board by board, when the ship becomes a new one?

>>6643013
Why not though, I don't get it, if your perfect synapse map is replicated isn't that your unique consciousness? Unless you believe in the soul or something I don't think anything in the body is left unexplained by science.

>>6643016
Teleportation have nothing to do with Theseus' ship.
It's Swampman's domain.

>>6643017
It would be a clone, not you.
I don't know how to simplify it further.

>>6643017

There is not some abstract "consciousness". You are in all likelihood a configuration of matter which is capable of awareness. Take it apart and reassemble it correctly, and the system will be as it was. There's no reason to think that something was lost unless you get too caught up in abstractions of "self".

>>6643025

Except you're not really "sure" about what consciousness actually is. For all you know, it could actually depend on some quantum effects that would be disrupted by something as "crude" as a molecular transporter. Just saying "it's matter!" doesn't mean you know shit about its mechanics. The mechanics of consciousness might necessitate some sort of "continuity" that doesn't have a rightful analogue in computer code terms (as a "copy pasteable" thing) nor in building blocks analogies.

>>6643001
You know what would be the most fucken heckly?
Well if the teleportation would be invented and everybody would say they came out fine and so on but then it would be realised that the teleported ones would do like everything not to get teleported ever again and would do it without any whine if told they were being specifically investigated for the effects of multiple teleportations.

>>6643028
That's a pretty good argument. You're perfectly right, we do not now perfectly how the brain works.
But for now, nobody working in the neurosciences has found that conjecture relevant : the hypothesis that a brain and our conscience are juste a pile of good old neurons makes still sense, and if we believe that, we can certainly believe that it can be transported from one place to another without continuity and with our consciousness intact.

>>6643036

To be honest, I'm also adhering to that sense of intuitional uneasiness I get when thinking about consciousness as being a copy+paste matter. Which might just speak badly for my intuition as opposed to the actual concept of teleportation in that matter.

I suppose part of the uneasiness comes from the thought experiment of duplication in the vein of the teleportation thought experiment but without eliminating the "original". What happens to your "consciousness"? Does it also extend to the other body or do you now have another agent who just happens to be a duplicate of certain patterns. If someone shot you in the head, wouldn't it still be an agent being shot in the head? The fact that I have a duplicate wouldn't give this body any consolation to my state. I would think that at best, I've been the template for a child that is exactly like me. But I would still be my own person considering I'd still possess my own neurology. Even if the design of the neurology is the same in the duplicate, I still care about self-preservation. But then again, this might be a stupidity of my intuition and instincts and maybe a world with teleportation of OP's sort is merely a strange world but not a horrifying or invalid one.

>>6643021

blue shirt guy is right though

>>6643001
Yes and yes.

>>6643001
maybe relevant: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus

>>6643044
Well yeah, that's the point.
Dualists someone think that a copy is somehow you.

>>6643048
this is even better once your realize that it applies to the human body, as well.

>>6643064
you miss the point of this comment
>>6643097
which isnt surprising considering you choose to describe the problem using an absolute over-simplification, and leave it at that.

>inb4 everything can be reasonably approximated by non-interacting perfect spheres

>>6643001
Wouldn't use it.
Wouldn't mind upload, too.

>>6643097
it doesn't really apply to the brain tho
brain cells typically last an entire lifetime (neurons in the cerebral cortex, for example, are not replaced when they die)

>>6643001
You die upon entering such a teleport, a clone lives on. It's obvious, what if you skip disintegration and just send the data?
you still exit the teleport. Or What if you send signal to 10 teleports instead of one and you come out of all of them, which one
of the clones are you? Well obv none of them, they're copies of you.

Or what if we save the data in the teleporter, let you exit and then shoot you in the face, then let you exit again and help clean up the mess.
The original is dead, copy1 is dead but copy 2 is alive.

All of our atoms are slowly replaced over time.

>>6643118
Mindboggling how it's not obvious to some people ( as these threads keep popping up ).

>>6643017
You'd presumbly not be copying the electrical signals that were propogating in the brain when the copying occured. I don't know if, all of these disappearing, would have a large effect on the health of the brain.

>>6643018
>Swampman's domain.
the fuck is this? google 404

>>6643001
Unless the exact same atoms are used to reconstruct you, it's a copy. Since the uncertainty principle makes it practically impossible to copy atom by atom, teleportation is evil.

>>6643139
>exact same atoms

Atomic isotopes of a given species are absolutely identical to each other. Furthermore, high resolution spatial tracking of large systems is entirely impossible.

You assume, and quite falsely, that your atoms remain in your body, as you move through space and time.

>>6643136
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swampman

>>6643001
Cells in your body are replaced constantly. Do you effectively die by living? Can semen be transferred from my balls to your mom's throat?

>>6643001
If photocopying works by copying a page, does the original effectively die by being photocopied?

>>6643044
That's the point. SMBC is an engineering fapfest.

>>6643141
They are not absolutely identical. They decay at different times. This is important.

We're talking teleportation, not just moving through space and time. A sudden change in atoms will result in a copy.

>>6643147
There is no dumber argument discussed seriously in philosophy than this. At the heart of the matter is some weird fuzzy definition of what "recognition" means. Of course you're going to get shit results if you work with shit definitions. Garbage in, garbage out.

>>6643189
>They decay at different times. This is important.
This is an insignificant difference, not important. One atom decaying before another when the atoms in question are not distinguished and occupy the same quantum state up to some Lorentz group transformation is unimportant and insufficient information to signify one atom over the others without performing a measurement which destroys the quantum state.

>>6643189
lol wut?

Identical sotopes have identical average decay times. As all atomic processes are stochaistic, it makes no sense whatsoever to speak of 'individual' measurements, one always takes an ensemble measurement as this is the only way to accurately describe the underlying probabalistic characteristics or identifiers.

By your logic, one could argue that different isotopes are in fact the same, simply because one measures a single instance of isotope A decaying in teh same time as a single instance of isotope B.

>>6643193
It's about the difference between the original and the copy. Unless they are the same atoms, one is a copy. When I move through space-time, 99.999% of my atoms remain the same. Teleportation, to be effective, needs to achieve the same thing.

>>6643198
they are the same atoms, they get scrambled for the transportation and need to be reassembled again on exit, which for that brief period of time kills you

>>6643197

Atoms are different because they decay at different times. Atoms do decay individually, no relation to stochastic systems. I don't see how you can conclude this makes two different isotopes identical.

>>6643201
>which for that brief period of time kills you
Then you're not really dead. Just disassembled.

>>6643198
All atoms are the same as any other atom made of the same constituent particles. Any differences arise from measurements which kill off off-diagonal terms of the density matrix. Such a measurement is necessary for quantum teleportation [no-cloning theorem], but the end result is the states at the end of the process are identical to the initial states.

>>6643118
While I agree with most of what you've said, just because it's a copy doesn't mean that we shouldn't consider it as YOU also.

There are a few things one should consider that make this argument more fun.

1) What is the defining attributes you use to determining YOU? If YOU exist as a concrete concept there should be, in theory, some encoding of your attributes that a oracle machine would decide. It can't be your foot or arm else amputation would destroy your YOUNESS. An oracle should still be able to recognize you after you cut your finger off.
2) One might conclude that one's physical brain is the defining attribute for YOU. Clearly we need to work in dynamics and time dependence because we don't want to be classified by the oracle machine as a new person every increment of time.

The attribute defining YOU is physical brain and its evolution? Replacing each neuron with an electrical counterpart and simply the process of cell replication/replacement would destroy that defining attribute - not a robust definition of YOU.
3) So perhaps the defining attribute of you is the abstract brain configuration (which an arbitrary system can produce) and its evolution? If this is the case whats the need to use location as a defining attribute?

Consider creating a deterministic world simulation with some set initial conditions and suppose creating a human like AI (also deterministic, again with certain initial conditions). We can put the AI in the simulated world and run it on two computers with identical initial conditions. Although the computers are running in different locations the AI will have identical brain states and identical evolution of them - they are the same thing in terms of YOUNESS (even though we can distinguish them). What I'm saying is one should define YOU as "the procedure not the instance of it".

>>6643221
See >>6643021

>>6643221
I travelled through time as I age and have very few atoms which are identical to those I had when I was 6 years old. So there are two selves. The 6 years old one and the current one. Same with teleportation. There's the pre-teleportation self and the post-teleportation self.

>What is the defining attributes you use to determining YOU?

Well history. The location of the particle set containing the instance that actually had a unbroken interaction is the original.
The copy isn't me in the same way as I'm not the copy. But for sake of argument let's say I was knocked unconscious, cloned perfectly
and me and my copy wakes up inside a room and we've been switched around so that even the people that put us inside the room no longer knows who's who.
There would be no way for me to tell if I'm the copy or the original. But both of us have access only to our own vantage point determined by the physical structure
of the hardware we're composed of, we have the same memories but we're two distinct entities.

Since we'll think the same from the onset we will immediately duke it out in a game of rock-paper-scissors to see who get's to keep girlfriend and apartment etc.

>>6643256
was supposed to answer >>6643221 of course

>>6643221
when the brain is surgically split accidentally it can have destructively two different personalities (split brained)

then there are those with
dissociative identity disorder

people who believe in spirit relating to NDEs and such or philosophical dualism believe the spirit returns to the original body, since the copy is identical to the original id guess they would belueve this spirit would return to that copy body being fooled into thinking its the original?

for one who doesnt believe in that then it would be impossible and you would have a copy that would not really know its a copy unless it became paranoid and had a breakdown questioning all this..

nigga
theys different atoms
dont matter how identical
a clone a clone

>>6643025
If that's the case, then would concsiousness be shared with a clone that matches atom for atom? Would you know each other's thoughts and movements prior to the other moving?
What does it mean when a consciousness is no longer unique if the teleportation device does in fact preserve a conscious stream?

>>6643001
Can we suspend someone's existence in this manner? Then simply bring them back? It would work for long distance space travel.

>>6643031
>clone says they came out fine because they don't realize they're a clone
>original guy is rotting in a pile of ash back at the original teleporter
I could see this being a big problem

how can we make teleportation faster than light? if it physically sends the atoms to the other place isn't that really inefficient cause it will be really slow?

>>6643001
who cares about this dilemma when such a machine could create and replicate consciousness at will ?

>>6643019
Exactly. There's no way to prove that conscious was not simply copied rather than moved either.

Can't they just be converted to energy, beamed then back into matter all over again?
Shit works with pokemon.

>>6643699

See >>6643692

>>6643705
>>6643692
Isn't consciousness just the active actions of neurons firing at each other and stuff?

>>6643224
I'm not a dualist, I agree that everything about your mind is a product of physical a physical process.

I'm just trying to point out that the defining attributes of YOU shouldn't be tied to the machinery. In the same way I can run identical programs on different computers.

One can construct two different Universal Turing Machines and then simulate the same conscious Turing Machine on them with same input - I think it would be ugly to say these Turing Machines do not represent the same being conceptually, even though they are not embodied in the same way physically.

>>6643229
ok...That just depends on whether you want to define yourself with some sense of evolution connected to it - this is similar to saying: YOU are a point in the space of possible brain states or YOU are a path in the space of possible brain states. It's up to you - all I'm advocating is we should look at be a space of brain states (where a each point, a brain state, is an equivalence class of isomorphic computational structures) rather than space of physical representations of brain states (where each point is a subset of the physical world containing a brain state).

>>6643256
>Well history. The location of the particle set containing the instance that actually had a unbroken interaction is the original.
I'm just trying to point out that the physical history of all the particles making up you is an ugly definition for a conscious creature and could even be ill defined if we ever created a conscious being using a quantum computer. I'm advocating something a little more platonic as a definition (see above).

Why would you have to disintegrate the original though? Just figure out how to scan nondestructively and the problem is solved.

>>6643874
because instead of removing the person from one place and recreating it on another, you'd be simply copying him and duplicating.
to be teleportation you would have to disappear and reapear

>>6643874

The problem arose from the concept of teleportation, so you don't want a "you" cluttering up the send location.

It's been adapted to talk about what essentially makes up a particular person. So far I think that the best answer has been "A pattern (of neurons) undergoing a process."

The concept of self breaks down when you realize that unless there's some major factor that we don't know about, people could be copied and the copy would be a perfectly valid instance of, say, "Steven." The only difference between the two would be who came first and how they grow apart as they are changed by different stimuli.

People have a hard time thinking of their minds as a process and not a thing. It's also uncomfortable to realize that this version of clone would be every bit as much of Anon as the original Anon unless you include arbitrary factors into the essential description.

>>6643001
This always had me wondering:

If you had the ability to put atoms together in a precise way as to duplicate a being AND have that being be alive(After all, if you died this second, there'd be no difference between the you that was alive a moment ago and the dead corpse you of now), could you do it in such a way that you annihilated half of a person's body and then rebuilt it using the teleporter technology?

Following that, if you proceeded to do it starfish style, separating the person into two halves, even among the parts of the brain and spinal cord responsible for stuff and then using the teleporter to reassemble two full bodies from the halves(and being that you could bring something not alive to life using this technology, there should be no problem keeping the person alive during the process), what would happen to the person's original consciousness? Would it be in just one of the new people?

There's a condition like that too where people get their brains split and parts of their body move with a different will. Makes you wonder if they have two consciousnesses and if they can't interact.

>>6643001

Every time you sleep your soul dies

>>6644098
Which part?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ancient_Egyptian_concept_of_the_soul

>>6643900
I like you. Please continue to propagate your ideas. I feel that we occupy some similar regions of the brain-space.

>>6643982
>(After all, if you died this second, there'd be no difference between the you that was alive a moment ago and the dead corpse you of now)

Uh, that's not true at all.

I think I could get used to dying every time I teleport. Maybe I would get better at enjoying the present if I could leave future worries to another self.

You're telling me if you dropped dead this instant, at this instant you'd suddenly be different from your living self? That's not true even to the point that you could probably be revived.

If all your brain activity just ceased and you collapsed, in that very moment, your body would be completely and irreparably changed?

>>6644251
>You're telling me if you dropped dead this instant, at this instant you'd suddenly be different from your living self?

Yes, obviously.

>>6644251
meant to quote >>6644203
You're still made up of the same shit in the same configuration as when you were alive not even a second ago.

Although, my original argument was implying it's improbable that putting together a human from atoms in a teleporter would have it be anything more than a human corpse.

>>6644181

Philosophical high five, bro.

But what *is* a high five when you really get down to it?

>>6644264
Not the exact same configuration. Otherwise they'd both be dead/alive.

>>6643001
the only way it wouldnt be a copy is if you never cease being conscious the entire time.

>each day your cells replicate, producing identical copies of itself
>you are a doppelganger every day

>>6645216

So every time you go to sleep, you wake up as a copy?

ITT:
"rational" people who believe that teleportation is unethical due to dopplegangers because they cling to the primitive notion of being something more than a collection of cells

>>6645248
>unethical
Last time i checked suicide wasn't unethical.

>>6645252
refer to the latter half of my post instead of remarking upon a trivial aspect of grammar that has neither to due to with the original argument - and is additionally addressed by my statement when viewed as a whole

>>6645255
Are you saying suicide is unethical ?

>>6645234
your brain doesnt shut down when you sleep.

same deal for hypothetical mind uploading too.

>>6643001
What the fuck is a consciousness and how do you destroy it?

>>6645262

So if someone dies and is revived, they're not the same person anymore?

Objectively speaking, a perfect copy is indistinguishable from, and for all purposes IS, the original.
Subjectively speaking, it doesn't matter, since the only subjective viewpoint on the event was disintegrated in the teleporter.

>>6645291
>objectively
You mean subjectively from the viewpoints of everyone else. Except not even that is true because the data of what happened can be known to others.

>>6645296
>You mean subjectively from the viewpoints of everyone else.
No, I mean objectively, from a scientific standpoint.
>Except not even that is true because the data of what happened can be known to others.
Doesn't matter. By every measurable, physical metric, it's the same person.

>>6645301
The original would object.
The copy would object too, if this was me that was "teleported".

If you guys are serious about this, I have bad news for you: you are retarded.
Now, go and be invested by a train, because your atoms could be recreated in the same pattern somewhere, sometime in the universe, so you won't experience death, right? This is not different from the topic being discussed in this cancer thread. The fact that the reconstruction of the pattern happens istantly is absolutely meaningless to your point of view, and if you negate this, you either haven't understood the concept of death, the concept of individual, or the concept of "MUH THESE ARE THE SAME ATOMS" which you keep shouting.

No. They aren't.

>>6645318

While it's possible that my consciousness could be randomly recreated, it's far from likely.

Seeing as you seem believe that the stream of consciousness must be preserved, for you it would be the equivalent to playing Russian Roulette with a chambered semiautomatic and hoping for a misfire. You would actually have much better odds with that, to be honest.

But if it were to happen and I didn't get genie'd (it happens on a planet with no breathable air or food or whatever), then my greatest loss would be the loss of my friends, family and very likely any other human being to interact with. Aside from that I would probably be okay with it. Thrilled, even.

So what do you think are the essential parts of a person? What can't be cut away without Anon not being Anon anymore?

>>6645332
The brain.

>>6645338

What about the brain? The pattern of the neurons? The matter it's made of? The quantum states of the particles that comprise it? It's path in spacetime?

And most importantly, why is that level of specificity essential?

>>6645343
Because we are our brain.
Am i being trolled ?

>>6645248
>notion of being something more than a collection of cells
You are more than a collection of cells. Your cells are more than a collection of atoms. You, a rock, and a PC are all just collections of quarks and leptons, but still very different.

A program isn't just a bunch of memory registers and a processor processing it. It's a browser that lets you transmit your thoughts to people across the world.

Your consciousness isn't even a thing, it's the result of actions of cells rather than the cells themselves. Your cells are just a medium for it. Their actions result in them being able to observe and understand themselves, even control themselves and other lumps of matter.

If you could replicate the actions of the brain that result in awareness in something else, it'd probably be conscious too, regardless of if it's a computer or some primitive machine.

But going back a paragraph, consciousness is already the result of multiple things working together. Assuming you could make an exact clone with your exact memories up to that point, it would probably have the same thoughts as you to the point you'd essentially be able to read each others' mind. If you could work together in sync like that, what's to say you aren't sharing a conscious for whatever a consciousness is worth?

>>6645345

As a thought experiment, let's say I'm omnipotent and want to replace each atom in your brain with an identical one, one at a time over a period of time. Thanks to my godlike powers, it happens instantaneously and you never even notice it.

After how many replacements have you stopped being you?

And no I'm not trolling, I'm trying to figure out where your idea of the line of demarcation is.

>>6645345
A single cell in your brain could die randomly. No matter which cell it was, you would still experience the same level of consciousness, as the brain will find pathways around the dead neuron.
Therefore we can assume that it is not contained in a single cell or a single neuron-neuron connection.

Now kill the whole brain, or reduce it to a vegitative state, your consciousness would clearly dissapear completely.
Consciousness is therefore a process, it emerges from the flow of information in the brain.

You could say that something like an internet community (e.g. 4chan), which is essentially a conduit for information between conscious entities, has a consciousness to some extent (a hivemind).
The only reason you don't feel it that way is because the exchange of ideas on the internet has a considerable latency.

>>6645352
>replace each atom in your brain with an identical one, one at a time over a period of time
No issue.
>Thanks to my godlike powers, it happens instantaneously
Big fucking issue. You just replaced my brain with another.
>>6645359
That's why i said the brain and not neuron n°123456789.


6/10, obvious but still makes me butthurt.

>>6645359
sounds familiar
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sorites_paradox

>>6645362

I meant that each replacement was instantaneous, so that there was no empty gap between taking one out and putting one in.

So doing it all at once would count as death in your eyes. How long should it take to avoid that? Seconds? Years? Why exactly is that time frame acceptable when something shorter isn't?

>>6645365

Even though I agree with his conclusion, his argument is flawed.

But what does either have to with what you posted?

>>6645371
I'm tired and read the first line and thought it was useful and then read the rest and realized I was a dumbass

>>6645376

Fair deal, I think all of the posters in the American continents are feeling a bit taxed at this hour.

>>6645366

different anon but i usually think of it this way:
it would take as long as it would for that atom to become a part of the whole, which could be nanoseconds, but still an amount of time. using the boat analogy, if i were to replace one board of the boat, i would not refer to the boat as "a boat and a board" but the board becomes part of the boat when installed. therefore, if time was allowed to pass between each board placement, it becomes the same boat and never a different one. the same thing applies to the brain in my opinion, in that once the atom, molecule, etc. becomes a part of the whole, the next can be replaced

>>6645400

Why does it take time to become a part of the whole in your opinion? Is there a good reason, or is that just how long it takes you to recognize that it has become a part of the whole?

>>6645309
Only because you're superstitious

>>6645407
i think because, if everything was replaced at the same time, the whole is entirely removed, because essentially you are removing everything that is the brain in one go. however, if a part was replaced, it becomes part of the whole of the brain since it has become integrated into it. basically, i see replacing everything at once as also removing everything at once, so it cannot be the original, and has no way of transferring consciousness but simply coping memories into a new brain to continue as a separate but identical person. (i apologize if this is a bit jumbled, it's like 4:30am here)

>>6645419
Stop responding, that faggot is trolling.

>>6645419

But as long as it's an identical copy, why does it matter if it's not the original?

For example, let's say I was perfectly copied but not killed. I could walk up to my copy and have a conversation with him, but we're two different people.

Before I step inside the machine, I know that my consciousness is going to split into two separate consciousnesses. What I don't know is which one I'll end up experiencing. Even though both are me, from my perspective it's my life as a single being. I step inside the machine, then end up as either the original or the copy.

The copy only knows it's a copy because it steps out of the other chamber. From it's perspective it had a fifth birthday party, is awful at making art and enjoys smoking cigars. It, for all intents and purposes, is still me. The only meaningful thing that separates the original and the copy is that they're now experiencing different things and becoming different people.

A good analogy is what if all of your cells underwent a perfect split and split off another you (complete with your cell structures being left completely intact), that way there is no concept of "original" and "copy" to confuse things. Aren't both people valid instances of you, just taking different paths following the split?


>>6645421

No one's try to troll you, man. If it would make you feel more at ease I can call you a faggot and use lel more often.

>>6645419
The "whole" is an illusion

>I'm a materialist, everything is matter!

But what is matter?

>it's particles and energy duh!

What are those?

>waves and quantum conscious super position isotopic spacetime fabric

What is that?

>we don't have a unified theory yet, we don't really know what matter is

Thank you.

>>6645448
thats a valid point, i suppose im just having trouble understanding how consciousness would be able to transfer between two points, and what happens in-between. in your example, i agree that from the outside there is no difference between the original and the copy, but i think that from the point the copy is created, a separate consciousness in created with all the memories of the first, and so in a teleportation machine where the original is destroyed, that steam of consciousness is ended and so has died.

>>6645473

If you accept that consciousness is the result of your neurons interacting, then it's simply a pattern, like a particularly complex bit of software.

It doesn't need to transfer because it isn't a single thing. It's the result of a lot of things working together to create a complex system.

To make this a bit more /v/, it's like savestating a game, transferring the savestate to a usb drive and running it on another computer. The game hasn't ended, it's only moved to a different machine.

>>6645490
hmm.. i think im starting to see your point, now that im recognizing consciousness less as a continuous thing and more as something that is created via, as you say, a pattern of cells. im thinking now about my own life, and what happens when one loses consciousness such as during sleep, and that once my cells begin working together again to supply awareness i feel the same and nothing, as far as i can tell, have been destroyed. anyway, i can't think of a way to refute your argument here, so thank you for teaching me something today!

>>6645490
You dense motherfucker, we aren't just software we're software AND hardware.
Fuck your example is pure rage fuel as it's exactly fucking it while you somehow conclude...
Fuck why do i keep biting the bait.

>>6645504

It was really my pleasure. I love the topic and look forward to teleportation and uploading if/when the technology for them arrives.


>>6645520

Hardware runs the software, and in our case the configuration of the hardware (the cells) is the software (the mind). Probably, anyhow. No one has come up with a credible alternative as far as I know.

Get the composition and the organization of the cells right, and you have both.

And if you're looking for trolling, how's:

>faggot can't even understand an simple analogy
>lel

Better? It's kind of late so I'm really not at the top of my game.

What this question is really about, and what we first have to know to answer it, is if one's consciousness is separate from the physical self or if its simply the product of a specific arrangement of atoms. If you believe the former, you'd say it was a different consciousness, not "you" that came out the other end; it takes something "more" than just the "information" of your physical arrangement to recreate the consciousness from your previous self. But, if you believe that your consciousness is simply the product of a specific arrangement of atoms, you'd have no problem believing that your body and your consciousness could successfully transport from one end to the other. Personally, I think if the teleporter could send both the exact information of your physical self and the matter that produces it, you would feel as if you transported. But if only the information traveled, I'm not sure.

>>6645526
I hate your kind.
Mind uploading is already so much easier and cheaper to achieve than brain synthesis, why do you feel the need to spread such delusions around ?
You'll have your suicide, now shut up.

>>6645535

Seeing as we're on /sci/, I feel compelled to make the point that consciousness being completely separate from the physical aspects of the brain is something that people have been trying to prove for a long time (search for the soul) with no real evidence. If that's your belief, that's cool, but it's based on faith and not evidence.

It could be that there's some aspect of the brain we don't know about that makes copying it create an imperfect replica of consciousness, but there's no evidence for that either. The research into it is still fairly young though, so it's not impossible. Until we find such a flaw, it's a pretty much a moot point though.


>>6645542

I' actually in favor of mind uploading so long as it's done correctly. It'll be really complex to simulate wetware on hardware, but I don't think that it would be impossible. It also allows for the possibility of matrix style virtual reality simulations, which would be freaking awesome. Won't know for sure until we get there, though.

Brain synthesis is just a better tool to explain the concept and the ethical ramifications.

You say suicide, I say functional immortality. Hopefully we'll live long enough to see who's right.

>>6645226
Not your brain cells.
Neurons replicate at such a retarded (as in slowed) rate it was believed they don't do it at all after a certain point in your life. Until recently.

Thankfully, we've had nuclear disasters happen so when they scanned the brain of a woman born before Chernobyl they found an amount of the isotope that was released during that accident in cells in her brain.
So now we now we do grow brain cells. Just not a whole lot. So try not to lose them. Well maybe it's too late for you, but try to not lose more.

>>6643001
>If teleportation works by copying yourt molecular structure do you effectively die by stepping in?

If it breaks your body up for some retarded reason, yeah. Though I don't know why we'd ever make a device like that.

>>6645448
>But as long as it's an identical copy, why does it matter if it's not the original?

It doesn't matter for anyone else but you.
You'd be dead. Which is good. Based on your questions I kinda want you dead.

>>6645542
delusional underage/10

>>6645547
Wait, why are you in favour of teleportation if you would prefer brain synthesis over mind upload ?
Are you an hypocrite, or i didn't get your point-of-view ?

Your point-of-view is the regular "we is the blueprint not the structure :DDDD" one, right ?

>brain uploading
Notto diso shitto agen.

Maybe blink teleportation in which you move at an incredibly fast rate to somewhere will be invented.

>>6645554

Need to get from point A to B quickly and don't want to have another you walking around whenever you use that form of travel, I would imagine.


>>6645557

I prefer mind upload over brain synthesis, but wouldn't turn down either.

And while the blueprint can capture us in a moment in time and let more of us be made, it's not really living. The structure is what allows us to expand and experience, but the particular structure itself isn't essential to consciousness, it just allows it to function. You need both if you want to do anything with moving or replicating consciousness.

Man, I'm not even sure if we're on board topic anymore. 4chan really needs a philosophy board. Then again it would probably be plagued with pretentious /lit/ types.

:DDDD


>>6645566

We're keeping the entire topic to one thread at a time and avoiding making predictions on the actual technology involved. Would you prefer if we asked thinly veiled homework questions or talked about highly specialized fields where only a few people can contribute per thread?

>>6645573
>Need to get from point A to B quickly and don't want to have another you walking around whenever you use that form of travel, I would imagine.

You'd need a pretty good reason for not having a double. Seeing how you'd be killing of the original.

>>6645580

Read the thread or make a point, I really don't feel like repeating myself again.

>>6645584
The point is already made, you are the process of your brain and nervous system working.
You can make as many copies of your body as you want. It won't be you.
The structure is irrelevant. The structure changes consistently throughout your life. Your brain grows and shrinks throughout your life. Are you the same person? Do you die every day? Of course not.

You are not the hardware or the software. You are the process.

You can build 2 computers. Run the same software on them. Are they the same computer? Obviously not, you can see with your eyes there's two.

Why is it so hard for you to comprehend this most basic concept?

So basically again I'd like to make it as simple as possible - scifi teleportation is murder/suicide. And that's a scientific fact.

>>6645570
I think Blizzard labs are working on it now

>>6645597

>Do you die every day?
In a sense, yes. You change and (hopefully) grow, which means some aspects of yourself have to be lost so new ones can take their place. It's structured, organized change, though, which differentiates it from getting brain damaged. It's not really death per say, but it's an important point in this conversation.

>You are not the hardware or the software. You are the process.
Absolutely. I might argue that the process is the software, but that would just be quibbling over semantics.

>You can build 2 computers. Run the same software on them. Are they the same computer? Obviously not, you can see with your eyes there's two.
No, but it's the same program and the same process as long as the input and interpretation (and therefore the output) are the same. Same process, same consciousness. Just because there are two instances of it doesn't mean they aren't the same. If you shut one off, the process is still running and making the exact same progress it was before.

I'm not arguing that there's some sort of hivemind between copies, I'm saying that as long as there's no new input or interpretations of the input, nothing is lost if one of the instances is shut down.

>scifi teleportation is murder/suicide. And that's a scientific fact.
No, it's a philosophical interpretation. Science only tells us about the physical world, not how to judge it or put it through ethics.

>>6645597
>scifi teleportation is murder/suicide
Again, it depends on your definition. As I said earlier, my 6yo self isn't the same as my 30yo self. Aging isn't murder/suicide.

>>6645618
>>6645615
>Again, it depends on your definition.
There is only one definition of dead.

A copy is a copy. Doesn't matter if it's perfect copy.

>>6645622

You're using the word copy to imply a nonessential nature of the instance.

What does the original have that the copy lacks? What actually ends with the death of one or the other so long as they don't diverge? Before you say "the one who dies ends," what specific essential thing about them ends?

>>6643001

Iff the conditions in one local of A are exactly the same as B, consciousness will be transported. If they are very different, you will be unconscious for a period of time directly proportional to the degree of difference. If they are toooooo different, you likely lose consciousness and do not regain it

>>6645632
The original is you, the copy is him.
Having the same DNA and the same memories will not change that fact.

>>6645622
>There is only one definition of dead.

Clearly that's incorrect.

If you learned after the fact that someone "teleported" you while you slept, i.e. you were the clone, would you hold a funeral for the original?

>>6645638
>The original is you, the copy is him.

Based on what?

>>6645638

Yes, and?

>>6645643
Funeral no, because fuck spending money for nothing.
But i, well, he would certainly mourn for a time, and be pissed at whoever responsible.
But after that, i don't really know, thinking about being a clone is way different than knowing you are one, it may affect your psyche quite a lot ( or not at all, dunno ).

>>6645647
Teleportation and mind uploading ( that kill and not simply scan you ) is suicide.
You know, the topic of this whole retarded thread.

>>6645643

Assuming it works like OP's picture, nope.

I might ask them if they can do it again but make some changes to my body this time around, though.


>>6645652

Do you not like funerals in general or just for you clone?

>>6645654

If you just keep repeating yourself, that doesn't make it true. You actually have to actually defend your point and not just dance around the points of others.

Here, as an extreme example:
Having sex is rape.
Rape is having sex.
If you're having sex you're being raped.
If someone has sex with you, they are raping you.
Why can't you get it, it's so obvious. Are you retarded?
Sex is rape and that's a scientific fact.
Repeat ad nauseum.

>>6645661
It may not be true but you >>6645647 seem to think it's true too.

A man is in a room with an entrance pad and an exit pad to a teleporter. He is standing on the entrance pad. You are in the room looking at him, but then you leave for a minute. When you come back he is on the exit pad. Maybe he walked there, maybe he suicided and this is really his clone. Can you conduct a test to determine if the original man is "dead"? If not, and the man told you how he got on the exit pad, would you behave differently depending on the answer?

>>6645663

That was me. I was pointing out how that's an irrelevant statement. Who came first or second is an accidental feature of the person.

It's a bit like saying George is dead because he dyed his hair green.

>>6645667
See >>6643021

>>6645675
Yeah, that does't answer the question I asked.

>>6645675

You should realize that A) no one is debating which one is the clone, just if that actually means anything beyond who came first and B) that that comic is making fun of the over simplistic view of the engineer.

>>6643001
>A teleporter pad the size of an apartment that can freely teleport objects within itself with perfection.

>Two persons enter(Ann and Bob). The teleporter reconstructs Bob in a sweeping fashion with Anns atoms. And the same for Ann with Bob. Neither person is moved and the process is seamless and fast enough to not disrupt neural function.
Did both just die?

>The teleporter reconstruct Bob out of Bobs atoms 1 millimeters in the direction he is facing. It does so 1000 times, making bob glide 1 meter across the floor in a stopmotion fashion.
Did he just die 1000 times?

>Ann, being shocked by Bobs stopmotion glide, drops her glass of wine. The teleporter deconstructs the entire room, with Bob, Ann, the falling wine and glass and all clocks and air and stores it in piles of pure elements for a week, then it instantaneously restores all objects in their original positions.
Did they die now?

>The glass, upon striking the floor, shatters and a fragment cuts the carotid arteries of Ann, she faints from the sight of blood.
Is she dead now?
>She bleeds a bit and is not unconscious due to blood loss
Dead yet?
>The room constructs and intensive care ward and some doctors out of the sofa, TV and Bobs beer belly and some digital processing of a few seasons worth of Dr House. The newly created Intesive Care physicians consults the room, teleports some blood into her veins and she wakes up, She's hysteric so some general anesthesia is teleported into the blood too, [Continued]

>>6645729
[Continuation]... is teleported into the blood too, She's no longer unconscious because of blood loss, she's unconscious because pharmacological effects.
Dead?
>Because the Dr House source material isn't known for applying reasonable treatments when an exciting one is availible, it decides that she need hypothermic surgery. The general anesthetics are teleported out of the bloodstream and she's cooled to 15 centigrades. She's now unconscious due to the metabolic suppression of cold.
Are you more dead from cold than pharmaceutical compounds?
>Becuase it can, it warms her up, says it's going to go even colder and teleports anti-freeze into her tissue and saps all thermal energy from her body, vitrifying her at a temperature which causes oxygen frost to form on her skin.
Clearly, she's dead now atleast because there's no metabolism and she could be stored like this for a thousand years.
>The teleporter repairs her carotids. Thaw her, remove the antifreeze and ask if she feels like a new person. She says no, so it maintains the electrolyte gradient of her brain in a state(by teleporting) where no neural signalling happens. An EEG would say she's braindead, but when the teleporter stops, she'll start thinking again.

So which of these numerous events are fatal and forms a new person, and which do somehow not violate the elusive red thread of consciousness?

I think we have people in this thread which are suffering from severe autism.

>>6645647
>Yes, and?
Well again in the most simple way to put it:
Even if you make a copy, you're still killing one person. Which on top of that is you.

We're not robots, the individual does matter. In fact to the individual in question his being should matter the most.
Saying you're not losing anything by dying just because there's going to be a copy ... uh are you legitimately retarded?

So I'm wondering.
Let's say you make a copy of yourself.
And you kill him an year later.
Is that not murder to you?
If you say no you're a sociopath, congrats. Go take a xanax.

Isnt the butterfly effect version of "you" split into two timelines doing two different things at the same time in synchronicity ? Wouldn't the process that coerced this forking in chaos theorem mode be a higher level natural quantum copying device that constantly copies and splits one into two selves to synchronise opposing or similar yet seemingly dissimilar outcomes even when applied to metadata? So wouldn't teleportation and clones be a redundant concept or debate since the natural chaotic process is a higher level of this example and teleportation or copies could be a lower process?

(Sorry for bad spelling if it comes up, I'm on a mobile device that's forces to share ips)

The metadata used for blueprint of self copied*

forking =bifurcation

>>6645734
>Well again in the most simple way to put it:
>Even if you make a copy, you're still killing one person. Which on top of that is you.
Not if we're the same person when he dies. I mean the exact same person. As in we were separated and he/I died at the exact same time.

>We're not robots, the individual does matter. In fact to the individual in question his being should matter the most.
If I understand you correctly, I don't think it would be anything but voluntary. If you're just implying that getting rid of an identical copy is the same as death, then you're begging the question.

>Saying you're not losing anything by dying just because there's going to be a copy ... uh are you legitimately retarded?
That's exactly what I'm saying. An exact copy that will be run as soon as the original dies, with no differences between the two.

>So I'm wondering.
>Let's say you make a copy of yourself.
>And you kill him an year later.
>Is that not murder to you?
Moving the goalposts, I see. But yes, that would be murder. Because he has a year's worth of life and experience that *isn't* backed up and would be lost. A lot could happen in a year, he would probably be a totally different person by then.

That's why I've prefaced almost every single thought experiment by pointing out that they are the *exact* same configuration.

Now could you please stop harping on "muh murder" and make a single argument as to *why* it's murder in the face of these points? Or are you going to go on and on and on about how you're right and it's so obvious and how anyone that disagrees with you is retarded while you still evade making a single point of your own? If it's that obvious, you should be able to write it down in a logically consistent manner.

>>6643001
Teleportation works by moving an object from one place to another instantly without physically traveling it.
You're talking about duplication.

>>6645734
>Even if you make a copy, you're still killing one person.
Only if you believe in souls or dualism. Otherwise a perfect copy replacing your current body in a nanosecond would be no different from any other nanosecond of your life.

Just try it on prisoners.

>>6643028
It almost certainly depends on quantum effects. Teleportation is death.

>>6643119
That's not true.

>>6646192
>Teleportation is death.
...and rebirth because it is Deconstruction and reconstruction

>>6646192
and this is where it was all leading to, huh
quantum fucking mysticism

>>6643114
yeah, but they atoms do

>>6646192
So now quantum effects give us the new "God in the gaps". Or "consciousness in the gaps" I guess.

>>6643001
It's not really evil, just suicide.

>>6645799
Nigger it's the dualists who are eternally hopeful about living on as a copy.

It's not the same person BECAUSE there's no such thing as a dualistic self that can pass from one body to another.

A perfect clone is still a clone.

>>6646707
>Nigger it's the dualists who are eternally hopeful about living on as a copy.

It clearly isn't.

>It's not the same person BECAUSE there's no such thing as a dualistic self that can pass from one body to another.

It IS the same person BECAUSE there is nothing to "pass." If it is 100% identical then it is the same person. That's the materialist's view.

>>6646707
You don't have to be a dualist, you just have to understand that the concept of an indivisible self is nonsensical.

>>6646711
>That's the materialist's view.
That's the dualist view.
That the body do not matter, only the mind.
I can almost feel the urge of you people to say that word, that you know will reveal yourself for the nutjobs you are. Soul.

>>6646711

You have it back asswards. The materialists think that a person can be copied and replaced with that copy with no meaningful difference. The dualists believe that the person is dead because whatever metaphysical idea they have for consciousness hasn't been "transferred."

>>6646738
the materialists that understands what a copy is wouldn't enter the teleporter. Not because of dualistic thinking, but because of mechanical comprehension.

A materialist that enters the teleporter is the same kind of materialist who would delete his operating system to save disk space because he knows identical ones are installed
on machines elsewhere. A materialist that fail to comprehend the only instance that is relevant to him personally is the one he has access to.

>>6646711
>If it is 100% identical then it is the same person.

Yeah, no.

Identical twins are not the same person. Because they're two people.

Similarly, a copy and an original are two people. You can shove the original into a furnace (or the copy) and let the remaining one take its place but they're still not the same person.

That's the materialist view. You seem to be confusing it with the "I'm too stupid to tell the difference so it doesn't matter to me" view.

>>6646753
>A materialist that enters the teleporter is the same kind of materialist who would delete his operating system to save disk space because he knows identical ones are installed on machines elsewhere. A materialist that fail to comprehend the only instance that is relevant to him personally is the one he has access to.

A materialist can understand that if you replace any or every part of a computer with an identical part (including identical data), the computer hasn't fundamentally changed. The parts may be new, but the process they've been undergoing is exactly the same. It's this process that we're saying is essential, the specific parts are just accidental qualities.

>>6646783
The process of two engines made out of identical parts is the same, but no one would be stupid enough to say an identical engine is the exact same engine.

>>6646792

You can make and destroy copies of data and the parameters to run the program it represents all day long. So long as at least one copy remains, the data hasn't been destroyed, it's simply been moved. The process of an engine requires a specific place in space to fulfill it's purpose.

Closest you can come with that analogy is comparing "Are you alive" to "Is N model of engine running." It's a not exactly apples and oranges, but it's still pretty sloppy.

>>6646808
Hopeless.

>>6646815

Here, let's start from the beginning. What makes Anon Anon?

My view is that it's the memories, personality, the various bits of the psyche, etc. The entirety of the mind. As long as these things exist together, so does Anon. There can be one Anon or many Anons so long as they're not allowed to diverge from each other. Anon lives as long as there's at least one instance of the essential parts of Anon, regardless of where it came from.

What do you define as the essential bits of Anon?

>>6646792

Here, let me try to explain it more clearly. Two engines are physical things, two minds are forms of information.

Ending the process of one clone, what we are calling the mind, does not end the process of the other. The process is what I'm calling essentially Anon, regardless of where it's housed. Because the process is just information, it can exist in anywhere from one to a infinite number of copies, and each and every one is equally as valid as the last. The only way to make a copy non-Anon is to change the process his brain is performing.

I'm not trying to say that the bodies are the same person or the brains are the same brains. Those are physical mediums and totally irrelevant to what I'm talking about. So long as the process is preserved, it could be housed in a clone, a computer or a modded tickle-me-elmo, and all of those are Anon (although they will radically diverge once you allow the process to continue in it's new housing).

Alternatively, you could have a copy and an original. If you rewrote the original's memories to a history that Anon hasn't experienced and left the copy alone, then the copy is the valid Anon and the original is someone else in Anon's body.

If you had a computer would you transfer everything in it to another computer with the exact same hardware,even if you didn't have access to it?

So if my consciousness is just the perfect mapping of atoms to form my nervous system, does that mean when I die, and given an infinite amount of time with the swirling chaos of our universe, those atoms will once more form again into my consciousness and I will be "reborn?" Will I remember anything? Can this be happening around the universe? Are there multiple "mes'." Will I be a human or will I be in a different body?

>>6643147
Aw shit

Don't the human body replaces all of its cells (except brain cells) every seven years? If so, the atoms that make up you seven years ago are not there. So, isn't the information more important to one's identity than the atoms that compose his/her body?

>>6647238
Well obviously you are not the individual parts but rather the sum of the parts but you are the hardware.
What material is you is irrelevant, what is relevant is that the structure is maintained, you're alive as long as the structure is operational.

The materialists ITT that would enter the teleporter simply fail to understand what a copy is. It's a lot like >>6647178 elegantly put it.

>>6643900
Nobody in this thread has resonated with my current stream of consciousness quite like you have.

>>6645419
6/10

>>6645520
The hardware makes the software
Our behaviors, what we like, who we are, our very consciousness could all be narrowed down to combinations of binary code. The brain responds to stimuli and changes (neuroplasticity), how do you think cognitive behaviora theraphy works? Who we are, how we think, what we do are all variables that can be manipulated and changed and as far as i know when the software changes it's because the hardware also has. New neural connections etc. There are a myriad of explanations as to how our brain can adapt and change so easily which is why the notion that the consciousness which is a result of the brain is it's own entity.

>>6647274
Like it or not, we live in a material universe, not one full of souls and ghosts and "quantum consciousnesses" or whatever other superstitious nonsense you believe in

>>6643025
Even if you extract all of your atoms and put the same atoms back into place you would die/clone yourself.
You die when your brain stops functioning, and that happens when you disassemble yourself.

The fact that we eat and replace every single molecule in our body in several years .

I think consciousness can be transfered .

You people are either retarded or you really are afraid of death and delude yourselves on overdrive.
Clones ain't you m80.

>>6647201
"You" will be reborn and remember all, because the configuration of your atoms would resemble the former body, hence have all the memory encoded into your brain.
But the "you" isn't you.
It's another copy that shares an identical consciousness.

How hard is it to understand that you die the moment you destroy your brain ?

>Can this be happening around the universe? Are there multiple "mes'." Will I be a human or will I be in a different body?
>>>/x/

>>6647349
see >>6647364

>>6643001
Is it a different work of art if it is shown to you on a screen, which is projecting the results of a schematic transmitted electronically?

>>6647326
I count myself among the materialists, whatever this 'ghost in the machine' we experience is
it's obvious to me this is a completely physical process entirely caused by the workings of the brain.

Now, would I destroy my computer and let some anon rebuild it exactly as it was on the other side of the world? No.
Would I enter the teleporter? No.

A copy is of no use to me, in the former case I wouldn't have access to my computer, in the later case I'd be dead.

>>6643021
I had the exact same conversation except flipped.

After establishing that the clone in teleportation is identical, he insisted it was the same. When I explained the conflicting idea of it to him, he just blankly stared at me and said it was obvious that the clone is the original.

And he is right,

>>6647487
>And he is right,
your pretty gud

Conciseness only. Exists for a moment, one decision, and then it is replaced by a new consciousness, with the record of the old one. As such being destroyed and replicated is no different than existing for one second, because the only difference between them, is semantics, since if we just add location in time as part of an objects identity, being destroyed and rebuilt or just existing for any period of time, has the same result of the person being a replicant of the original.

The question of whether the clone is different from the original is irrelevant, since we are always different than the original. "You" don't die, since there is no "you"

>>6647493
My post is a comma nightmare

>>6646781

They're the same person for all practical purposes.

Happy?

If you slowly swapped all the atoms in your body out for new ones, and also built the extracted old ones into another you simultaneously, which one is you?

>>6647505
oh engineers, you crack me up

>>6647506
>joke's on you i'm preteding to be retarded ^^

>>6647508
*dualists

What happens in this scenario?

>>6647527
Their wife will be happy.

>>6645280
If they're revived and still able to do stuff then that means that they didn't have brain death.

>>6647527

Why would you be dying every time you go to sleep? Just because it's a time where the Earth is away from the sun? What's so unique about that point in time? It should be that you should be dying at every smallest interval of time, not some abstract 'night specific time' that is somehow special and unique from any other time.

Throwing in my two cents, can't be asked to read the whole thread:
You will die. Your clone will live. However, practically speaking, nothing will have been lost from the world. That is, your clone is convinced it is the original, and as far as interaction goes, it is you. With the introduction of a little something called a timeline, however, we can conclude that the clone is not you.

>>6647566
>You will die. Your clone will live.

Correct.

>However, practically speaking, nothing will have been lost from the world.

Wrong. You just died. You have been lost from the world.

>That is, your clone is convinced it is the original, and as far as interaction goes, it is you.

No, it is not you.

>With the introduction of a little something called a timeline,

What the fuck does that even mean?

>however, we can conclude that the clone is not you.

No shit. Do you always spout pseudo intellectual nonsense?

>>6647569
>Correct
Correct
>Wrong. You just died. You have been lost from the world.
Hence why I said "practically speaking." The clone, having the same brain as you do (unless you believe in some sort of external consciousness) will behave exactly as you do.
>No, it is not you.
Again, as far as interaction goes, I see no reason as to why it wouldn't be able to pass as you.
>What the fuck does that even mean?
You are not unique from your clone unless we consider the birth,death,etc. of you and the clone.
>No shit. Do you always spout pseudo intellectual nonsense?
You jump from "what the fuck" to "no shit" in the analysis of the same sentence. The sentence has an "if - then" structure, and you just agreed with the "then."
I fail to see why my approach is "pseudo intellectual," arbiter of truth; if you expected something intellectual from an anonymous user on a forum for cute girls who called his short paragraph "two cents," you're an idiot.

Well to transfer conciousness you would have to transfer all of the electrical signals uninterrupted which would be impossible by this theory of reatomization

>>6647569
>No, it is not you.
It is you.

In a double-blind study where you enter a teleporter that may or may not teleport you to the same position in the same room, no one will be able to tell the difference between a teleported you and a non-teleported you.

In fact, you can't even prove that you didn't die a second ago and was replaced by a clone.

The reason for this is that you don't actually exist in the past or future. You just exist in now and everything else is memories or predictions of the future. The idea of an individual coherent consciousness lasting from day 1 to your death is false, the subjective experience is a moment of a symphony, the conductors isn't the music, the musicians isn't the music, the notes aren't the music, the audience aren't the music, the hall, the name of the symphony isn't the symphony itself.
The music only exists in the thinnest slice of now, the progression and development over time is what makes it identifiable. Replacing the orchestra mid-play will neither change the music in the thinnest slice or the total of the play.

>>6647587
>Well to transfer conciousness you would have to transfer all of the electrical signals uninterrupted.
No. Electric signals aren't consciousness, it's just something we can measure because of how neurons propagate a signal down an axon(by flipping voltage-gated ion channels along the length of the axon). Signal substances and ion channels is what triggers the actual depolarization.

The electric profile and signals are also affected by pretty much everything you do, eat and breathe.

>>6647583

>Hence why I said "practically speaking." The clone, having the same brain as you do (unless you believe in some sort of external consciousness) will behave exactly as you do.

Except it's still not you.

>Again, as far as interaction goes, I see no reason as to why it wouldn't be able to pass as you.

If there are two Apple laptops sitting next to each other with the same specifications, does that mean they are the same? No.

>You are not unique from your clone unless we consider the birth,death,etc. of you and the clone.

You are 'unique' from your clone regardless. One atom is 'unique' from another atom. They are not the same. They are two different atoms in different places.

>You jump from "what the fuck" to "no shit" in the analysis of the same sentence. The sentence has an "if - then" structure, and you just agreed with the "then." I fail to see why my approach is "pseudo intellectual," arbiter of truth; if you expected something intellectual from an anonymous user on a forum for cute girls who called his short paragraph "two cents," you're an idiot.

The only idiot here is you.

>>6647614

>citation needed

>>6647657
>Except it's still not you.
Correct.
>If there are two Apple laptops sitting next to each other with the same specifications, does that mean they are the same? No.
Indeed.
>You are 'unique' from your clone regardless. One atom is 'unique' from another atom. They are not the same. They are two different atoms in different places.
Entirely right.
>The only idiot here is you.
Can't argue with that.

>>6647658
>Needs citation for thought experiments and philosophy
Are you literally retarded? Do you ask your mother for citations when she tells you to clean your basement? Can you not think and imagine things but need an authority to do so for you?

>citation needed
here[1]

[1]: >>6647614

>>6647673
>thought experiments and philosophy
>science
>cites his own post

>>6647695
>a thread about teleportation and perfect duplications is about sicence
Confirmed for being literally retarded.

>>6647657
>consciousness is a physical object and not a function of one.

>two Apple laptops sitting next to each other, playing the same track at the same time are playing different music.

>>6647178
>>6647274
>>6647340
>>6647364
>>6647368
>>6647566
>>6647569
>>6647657
>>6647662

Okay, quick question. How many of you would call yourself Dualists and how many of you would call yourself Materialists?

Because a bunch of you seem to like the "Two computers, one I don't have access to." analogy. What place do you take in that analogy? It seems to me you're implying something non-physical that plays an important factor in consciousness would be lost. A soul of sorts. Maybe some sort of important metaphysical timeline.

Also, you might want to consider that we're not talking about physical mediums here, which is why the "Two computers" analogy isn't valid. Physical structures can only exist in one point in spacetime (quantum physics aside), so there can be only one of them. Information can exist in many different places at once, because it's simply a particular pattern of organized matter. >>6647701 put it quite nicely. This really isn't a debatable point, but it seems to be where most people get hung up on the problem of identity.

I'm not saying that my side of the debate is absolutely right and can't be debated, but you guys are (very ineffectively) trying to disprove a basic tenant of the philosophy of information. If you can do it successfully, more power to you, but pointing out that physical objects are inherently separate and then trying to lump information in with them is some first year college student shit.

Before you can claim that teleportation is death, first you have to do three things. Define what life is, define what death is and show how teleportation causes life to die. Bonus points if you know how to actually define things with genus/species structure.

>>6647730
It has nothing to do with a soul. The two computers is a completely materialist viewpoint. Rather than computers, let's look at particles. Two particles have the exact same mass, charge, spin, etc. but different positions. Are they the same particle?

>>6647730
Information only exists as a physical object or objects. Trying to say that physical objects are inherently separate but information is not is a DUALIST position.

>>6647730
>Define what life is, define what death is and show how teleportation causes life to die.

So you imply disassembling somebody into their fundamental particles wouldn't kill somebody ?
Again, how hard is it to understand that this process kills you.

>hue hue hue, a third person wouldn't know which of the two is you, therefor the clone is you
see >>6647733

These are things a 7 year old could understand ... comon guys

>>6647730
>Before you can claim that teleportation is death, first you have to do three things. Define what life is, define what death is and show how teleportation causes life to die. Bonus points if you know how to actually define things with genus/species structure.
Life is a self-replicating machine created by nature. Death is when that machine ceases to function. Teleportation takes such a machine, destroys it (causing it to cease functioning, aka die), and produces a copy of that machine somewhere else.

It's very simple. Identity implies continuity. Teleportation is a discontinuous process. The output of teleportation is not the same identity as the input.

>>6647742
>Teleportation takes such a machine, destroys it (causing it to cease functioning, aka die), and produces a copy of that machine somewhere else.

This is begging the question, not answering it.

>>6647749
>Identity implies continuity.

Then your existence began when you woke up this morning.

>>6647755

>implying when you go to sleep you cease to exist

nigger what

>>6647753
How is it begging the question? Can you point out something untrue in how I described teleportation?

>>6647755
How? Your body didn't cease to exist when you went to sleep.

>>6647755
>>6647753
>>6647730
>>6647673
>>6647614
>>6647527
>>6647487

>>6647742
>Life is life
>Death is death
>Teleportation is death
I beg your pardon sir but my definition of teleportation is
>not death
Therefor we have a stalemate in this oh so deep internet argument duel.

>>6647772
when you think this can't get any worse ...

>>6647749
>Identity implies continuity
You just made an argument that human consciousness lacks identity because it's positively littered with discontinuities.

>>6647772
You asked for definitions and now you complain that I gave you definitions. All true definitions are tautologies. So what?

We don't have a stalemate until you show a fundamental disagreement with my definitions.

>>6647737
>Information only exists as a physical object or objects.
It exists as a pattern of physical objects.
If I spell the alphabet with fridge magnet letters and replaces a red A with a green A. have I just destroyed the alphabet?

>>6647733
>Two particles have the exact same mass, charge, spin, etc. but different positions. Are they the same particle?
How can something that results from an active and coordinated distributed network be compared to a single particle? Do you believe in a singular self-neuron that have a singular self-particle core?

>>6647775
>You just made an argument that human consciousness lacks identity because it's positively littered with discontinuities.

No, that's just an idiotic interpretation. Identity requires continuity. That doesn't mean ANY KIND of discontinuity invalidates identity. The identity we are dealing with here is an existential identity.

Two particles that are completely the same in all respects except for position (which also implies their histories are different) have two different identities. Would you argue they are the same particle (existentially the same)? Because that would imply that there are only a handful of particles in the universe. In fact there are an incredibly large amount.

>>6647778
>It exists as a pattern of physical objects.
A pattern of physical objects is just certain physical objects occupying certain positions.

>If I spell the alphabet with fridge magnet letters and replaces a red A with a green A. have I just destroyed the alphabet?
No, but you must be completely incapable of basic logical analysis if you think that has anything to do with my argument.

If the As were exactly the same in every respect you would still hold two As in your hand, not one. If you destroyed one A, that doesn't mean the A left is the one you destroyed. You see, position and history matter.

>How can something that results from an active and coordinated distributed network be compared to a single particle?
Because it proves that your argument doesn't make sense. If you hold to your argument, then the two particles should be the same particle right? They are exact copies of each other. If they aren't the same, then clearly you don't believe your own argument.

>>6647761
>How is it begging the question?

Begging the question means assuming the answer you want as a premise for the argument, i.e. circular reasoning. Whether teleportation "kills" you and makes a "copy" that is different is precisely the question at issue.

>>6647780
You assume that consciousness is intrinsically tied to your idea of identity with absolute certainty despite lack of anything suggesting so.

>>6647794
>Begging the question means assuming the answer you want as a premise for the argument, i.e. circular reasoning.
And how did I assume the answer? Do you deny that teleportation destroys the object it copies?

The question is not "does it kill you or copy you?" IT DOES BOTH! The question we arguing is whether that copy is you. And I say it is not. Because you are dead. The copy has no continuance with you. It never occupied the same space at the same time you did.

>>6647796
My idea of identity is whatever I assume it is. Your idea of identity is whatever you assume it is. I don't see how that's a criticism. The only relevant criticism is how my position is wrong or yours right. Pointing out that I have a position is not a criticism.

>>6647761
>How? Your body didn't cease to exist when you went to sleep.

Your mind does. And your body continually changes anyway.

>>6647797
>Do you deny that teleportation destroys the object it copies?

Yes, that's the question. Is it "destruction," or is it simply replacing all the atoms at once? That's not a question about physical reality, it's a question about definitions.

>>6647733

>pointing out that physical objects are inherently separate and then trying to lump information in with them is some first year college student shit.


>>6647737

No, it's really, really not. Look up what Dualism and Materialism are, I think you may be confused.


>>6647741

It always boggles my mind that people can disregard any progress a conversation has made, revert to their initial statement as their supporting argument and then use the simplicity of their statement as a merit of it's truth. You just went full retard.


>>6647742

Okay, so under your definitions: If you were sterilized you would be dead, artificial life is an oxymoron even though it already exists and death is still a vague concept with no clarification.

If those are your honest views, fair deal. I don't think we share enough common assumptions for one to convince the other.


>>6647749

>Identity implies continuity.
If we're assuming that people have an identity, it absolutely does not. That point has already been proven several times in this thread. Shut down a brain and start it back up, that sort of thing.


>>6647769

Trying to teach Philosophy 111 to the internet. It's going about as well as expected.


>>6647777

First, he's not me. Second, I find your definition severely lacking. Would you like an example of my argument condensed into such a form? Third, nice quads.

>>6647805
Your mind doesn't cease to exist either. I assure you, you aren't braindead when you go to sleep. Your mind is more than your waking consciousness. That is only one result of the larger mechanism. When you teleport, that mechanism is destroyed, along with the rest of your body. There is no essential continuity with the copy.

>>6647810
>Yes, that's the question. Is it "destruction," or is it simply replacing all the atoms at once?
Well it isn't replacing, because it's putting the atoms in a different place. Copying is not the same thing as replacing. Regardless, the central point of contention can't be "destruction or copy" because I'm saying it's both. The only one operating as if they are mutually exclusive is you.

>>6647805
>the mind ceases to exist when you go to sleep

That's it, I'm out.

>>6647789
>Because it proves that your argument doesn't make sense.
That's a non-sequitur, not a counterargument.

>If you hold to your argument, then the two particles should be the same particle right?
I'm arguing about consciousness, not particles. Can you please stop making strawmen of what I say.

You seem to argue that consciousness is reducable to an intrinsic property of single particles.
While I argue that consciousness is a higher level concept of information processing that requires many components with coordination and exists on a gradient scale, it's not a simple binary state.

Fuck you guys stop feeding the troll.

And troll, pretending to be retarded is not really a challenging way to troll on /sci/.
In fact, that's probably the easier way to troll, ever.

>>6647824

>be proven wrong
>y-you're all just t-trolls anyway

>>6647811
>pointing out that physical objects are inherently separate and then trying to lump information in with them is some first year college student shit.
Believing that information exists separately from physical objects is baby philosophy.

>No, it's really, really not. Look up what Dualism and Materialism are, I think you may be confused.
Dualism in the sense of philosophy of the mind is the position that the mind is separate from the body. In other words, the mental, informational, conceptual is separate from the physical. A materialist says they're one and the same, or that information only "exists" as a physical representation. I am arguing the latter.

>Okay, so under your definitions: If you were sterilized you would be dead
How so? You don't stop functioning when you are sterilized. Just because the machine is broken doesn't mean the machine isn't on, nor does it mean the machine isn't a machine.

>artificial life is an oxymoron even though it already exists and death is still a vague concept with no clarification.
Of course it's a vague concept. We made these terms to mean certain things but not others. I tried to describe them as those things. But no definition can be complete, just like no model can be complete.

>If we're assuming that people have an identity, it absolutely does not. That point has already been proven several times in this thread. Shut down a brain and start it back up, that sort of thing.
If you shut down a brain and start it up again, that is continuity. You are using a different kind of continuity then what I meant. I'm not talking about the continuity of always being on which is what life and death is about, I'm talking about the continuity of existence and history. The brain was always where the brain was. you just turned the switch off and on. This is not the same thing as copying. When you copy something, you don't use the it isn't in the same space/time as the original. That's discontinuous history or existence.

>>6647811
>Philosophy 111
You mean retarded thought-experiments with a flawed premise process and conclusion ?
Fuck, philosophy is even more worthless than i thought before !

>>6647811
>First, he's not me. Second, I find your definition severely lacking.
Give me a definition and I'll show you how it lacks description. No definition is complete.

>Would you like an example of my argument condensed into such a form?
Yes.

>>6647812
>Your mind doesn't cease to exist either. I assure you, you aren't braindead when you go to sleep.

"Braindead" and "mind" are not the only two options. I would say that there is no mind in someone in a dreamless sleep, even if the lower brain is keeping everything running, so to speak.

But, ok, let's say you have someone frozen, such that all brain activity ceases. Then they are revived. (There are many documented cases of this happening, so it's not just a hypothetical.) Is the revived person not the same person that got frozen? Did that person "die?"

>>6647814
>Well it isn't replacing, because it's putting the atoms in a different place

So what? Your location is an essential part of you? Do you die when you walk across the room?

>>6647823
>That's a non-sequitur, not a counterargument.
It's neither, it's a clarification of the analogy. You asked how a particle can be compared to a an identity and I told you. Two particles are exact copies, but not the same. Two identities are exact copies but not the same. That the identity is more complex than a particle is the only non-sequitur here. How does being MORE complex make them THE SAME?

>I'm arguing about consciousness, not particles. Can you please stop making strawmen of what I say.
It's called an analogy. You are arguing that two completely identical copies should be considered the same object. If that's not true for particles, why is it true for any other object? And if you say consciousness is not an object, then you are a Dualist.

>You seem to argue that consciousness is reducable to an intrinsic property of single particles.
WRONG. I'm arguing that two objects are not the same object just because they are identical in most aspects. It doesn't matter whether it's our brain or anything else. Complexity doesn't make things more similar.

There is no "right" answer to this question. You guys are not arguing about objective reality (unless you are a dualist), you are arguing about whether to DEFINE something as death.

Personally, I don't think it makes sense to define it as death. You are not your atoms, you are a pattern of atoms.

>>6647834
>But, ok, let's say you have someone frozen, such that all brain activity ceases. Then they are revived. (There are many documented cases of this happening, so it's not just a hypothetical.) Is the revived person not the same person that got frozen? Did that person "die?"
You are getting confused. Dying is not even necessary towards the creation of the copy. You can create the copy without killing the original. Therefore dying is not the essential discontinuity. The essential discontinuity is that the copy never existed in the same space or time as you. The frozen man just had his switch turned off then on. He was always in the same place and time as himself.

>>6647836
>So what? Your location is an essential part of you? Do you die when you walk across the room?
Again, dying is not the essential discontinuity here. walking across the room is a continuous process. The object, the identity, whatever you want to call it, is always in the same place as the object. This is tautological. You can't walk across the room without yourself coming along. When you make a copy you are NOT walking across the room. The copy is separate from you. That's what I mean by discontinuity.

>>6647844
But the people here arguing that the mind can be in two places at once while the body cannot ARE Dualists.

>>6647845

You are just making up ad hoc rules left and right, aren't you?

>>6647850

If you think anyone is arguing that, you haven't understood anything.

>>6647855
I have something very disturbing to tell you my friend: ALL the rules are made up and the points don't matter.

>essential discontinuity

What does this even mean?

>>6647856
That is exactly what is implied by the argument that an original and an exact copy are the same person. That means the same mind exists in two places. Can you point out what part of that is wrong?

>>6647859
It means "the thing that makes a teleported copy different from the original".

>>6647862

(according to an arbitrary and unsupported criterion that I made up specifically for this argument)

>>6647863
All arguments are made up by someone. I love how you people or person thinks pointing out that assumptions are assumptions or that opinions are opinions is somehow a ding against me.

>>6647860
>Can you point out what part of that is wrong?

It seems you believe that the very concept of information implies "dualism." That's at least one place where you are wrong.

>>6647865
>All arguments are made up by someone.

lol, ok, then in that case going to sleep is an essential discontinuity, and you die every night. I don't have to support that assertion because all arguments are made up.

>>6647866
Huh? That's exactly what I'm arguing AGAINST. Information exists only as a physical thing, whether it on a piece of paper, in the air as sound waves, or most importantly, in your brain as the right electrons in the right places at the right time. There is no such thing as information that exists outside of the physical. Even thinking about information outside of the physical is a physical thought in your brain. That is as materialist as you can get.

>>6647870
>That's exactly what I'm arguing AGAINST

Then you are deeply confused.

>>6647869
>lol, ok, then in that case going to sleep is an essential discontinuity, and you die every night.
Again, the essential discontinuity has nothing to do with dying. The original can die or he cannot die, it doesn't change in the slightest the whether the the copy is different or the same. The reason the copy is different is because the copy does not have the same history in space and time as the original. You don't have to support your assertion or respond to my criticism of it, but you aren't convincing anyone when you refuse to argue. You are just making it seem like you have no answer, which you don't.

You can argue that waking up produces a new identity, but that is a completely different argument from the teleportation one.

>>6647873
How? Use your words, I know you can do it. This argument so far is very one sided isn't it?

>>6647874
>the same history in space and time

1) What does this mean?
2) Why does it matter?

>>6647878
When you walk across the room, you are always in the same position as you, right? You don't split into two yous and then meet back up, yes?

If we could see your past measured in space and time, it would look like a continuous function. You never stop existing for a minute or two and you never blink from one part of space to another. Now if we look at the history of you and the teleported copy, is the teleported copy continuous with that line? No.

It's like two particles with identical characteristics except for position. The only reason we don't say the same is because they are in different positions. And they are in different positions because they had different histories.

>>6647876
>How?

Because you are arguing something that you are claiming to argue against, namely that information=dualism.

People who are saying it is the same person are saying that it is not the specific atoms making you up that are "you," it is the arrangement of those atoms, i.e. your information content. You are accusing those people of "dualism," when they are being strictly materialist.

The arrangement of your matter is a PHYSICAL property of your present self. The past history of that particular matter is not. Saying that history matters is a non-materialist view, since it has zero effect on the material.

>>6647859
it's philisophical vomit

>>6647886

What if I were to tell you that space and time are discrete, not continuous?

>>6647888
>Because you are arguing something that you are claiming to argue against, namely that information=dualism.
No I'm not. Show me where I said anything like "information = dualism".

>People who are saying it is the same person are saying that it is not the specific atoms making you up that are "you," it is the arrangement of those atoms, i.e. your information content.
BAHAHAHAHA well if that's their argument then it's even easier to debunk. The arrangement of your atoms changes all the time. So the essential part of you can't be just an arrangement otherwise you are not you 1 planck time ago, it has to be certain physical objects as well to keep the continuity. You are an arrangement of certain physical objects. It's both because they are the same thing.

Physical objects in the same arrangement but in a different space are still different. You can see this is true for basic particles, therefore it must be true for the objects made of those particles.

>You are accusing those people of "dualism," when they are being strictly materialist.
But the argument implies dualism. It implies that the arrangement exists separately from the physical objects. That there is an identity floating around that isn't physical. That is Dualism, and it's quite obvious.

>The arrangement of your matter is a PHYSICAL property of your present self.
Do you understand what physical means? Physical means there is some matter or energy. Therefore the arrangement has to include the specific atoms that make you up. This contradicts "it is not the specific atoms making you up that are 'you'".

>>6647891
It's continuous on the scale we're talking about. You don't pop into and out of existence in space or time when you move through them.

>>6647837
>It's neither
Lies now too?

>You are arguing that two completely identical copies should be considered the same object.
Strawman again.

>if you say consciousness is not an object, then you are a Dualist.
Consciousness is not an object.
I'm not a dualist.
You're a moron.

Ever heard about this thing called concept? Do you think fraud is an object? Is boiling an object? is annihilation an object?

> I'm arguing that two objects are not the same object just because they are identical in most aspects. It doesn't matter whether it's our brain or anything else.

You're arguing for consciousness being equivalent to a particle with mass. You're argument as a formalized example looks something like
>"10 is a massive particle and 10 != 10"

And it's painfully retarded.

>>6647896
>The arrangement of your atoms changes all the time

As does the matter contained within you.

So I guess you are saying that there is no such thing as "you" to begin with, if that is your criterion for "debunked."

>Physical objects in the same arrangement but in a different space are still different.

But the information is the same. Are you your atoms?

Part 1:

I think that because the OP’s thought experiment involves the entire body being deconstructed and replicated, it’s hard to truly get a grasp on what’s going on here.

Perhaps a simpler thought experiment would be this:
Imagine you’re lying on an operating table, deep under the influence of a general anaesthetic. A surgeon with god-like skills removes a single neuron from your visual cortex. He then makes a copy of the removed neuron, identical down to the molecular level and then destroys the original neuron. He takes the copied neuron and reconnects it to your visual cortex. He then wakes you up.

Now I don’t think anyone would argue that the person waking up isn’t you anymore. Throughout the day, neurons die in in your brain. Even anaesthetics are known to kill some brain cells. I’ve personally undergone two surgeries and I still feel like the same person I was. The brain is not a static organ; it cycles matter, exchanges neurotransmitters and all that good stuff. It is constantly under the process of change.

Now let’s imagine that you never underwent the first surgery. This time, you’re still lying on the operating table, unconscious. The god-like surgeon instead decides to replace two neurons instead of one. He removes two neurons, creates copies of them, destroys the original neurons, and then reconnects the copies. He wakes you up.

You’re still going to feel like the same person upon waking up. I think that most people would think you’re insane to argue otherwise.
Now let’s rather do the experiment with three neurons.

How about 5?
How about 100?
How about the entire visual cortex?

What would happen if we replaced your entire visual cortex with a copy, identical down to the molecular level? Would it still be you? My gut instinct says yes, but that’s just my opinion.

>>6647908
Part 2:

But as we scale this up, we can start replacing larger and larger chunks of the brain.
Let’s now imagine that this god-like surgeon decides to replace your entire brain, identical down to the molecular level. He wakes you up.
Are ‘you’ still waking up from the surgery? You get up off the operating table only to notice that there is a fully formed brain placed next to you. The surgeon proceeds to tell you, “That’s your original brain there next to you.”

Now, I don’t know how to resolve this situation. If you are not the person waking up from the operating table, at what point do you ‘stop’ becoming ‘you’? Is that point at 1 neuron, 2 neurons 100 neurons? Where is the line? Is there a line?

I don’t know which side to take on this. If I had to hazard a guess I’d say that our ideas of consciousness and the notion of self are so far away from the reality of the situation or nature of consciousness.

Opinions?

>>6647904
>It's continuous on the scale we're talking about.

lol non-stop No True Scotsman. You lost the argument. Stop.

>We simulate a person in a computer(based on a real person)

>He behaves like a person, says he's a person, and everything like a person.
>He wanders around in a simulated game world, we haven't told him he's actually computer simulated, we did some creative tweaking of his visual cortex and memories so he doesn't notice it either.
>He finds a teleporter in the game word
>It teleports him to the other side of the game word.
>He panics and think he just killed himself.
>In reality, the memory space in the RAM was untouched, we just changed his game word coordinates.
>He wovs to never teleport again.
>The computer needs to run other programs in the background and moves his data to another RAM location, his actual data was just teleported.

Did he die in any of these scenarios? What if we dump the memory data to a harddrive and wipe the ram? What if we boot him up on another computer?

Or is this a case of "simulated people are magically different or can't be conscious?"

>>6647906
>Lies now too?
>Strawman again.
No argument or reasoning. I guess I win these two points.

How is it a strawman? What part of "two completely identical copies should be considered the same object." do you disagree with?

>Consciousness is not an object.
OK, point to consciousness without pointing to an object. Just show me where the consciousness exists outside the physical, Mr. Dualist.

>Ever heard about this thing called concept?
Concept, information, mind, they only exist physically. How do you not realize you are clearly a Dualist?

>Do you think fraud is an object? Is boiling an object? is annihilation an object?
All objects. Fraud, boiling, annhilation only exist as physical objects doing things. That could be water boiling in a pot, or the electrons in your brain forming the sensation of boiling in your brain. But no, fraud doesn't exist outside physical objects. Boiling doesn't, annihilation doesn't. Do you really not get the mind-body problem?

>You're arguing for consciousness being equivalent to a particle with mass.
What do you think your consciousness is if not particles moving around? A magic weightless soul? It's painfully retarded that you keep arguing the Dualist position while claiming you aren't one. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)

>>6647907
>As does the matter contained within you.
Yup, that's why history is important.

>So I guess you are saying that there is no such thing as "you" to begin with, if that is your criterion for "debunked."
No, I'm saying that what we define as "you" always has a thread of continuance to the past "you", otherwise it isn't you. You can replace all the particles in your body but history still shows a continuous path. Replacing piece by piece isn't the same thing as copying. The former is just sticking on bits as you move through space and time, the latter is a complete break from that path.

>But the information is the same. Are you your atoms?
You can't separate the information from the objects. If the objects are in a different position, the information is in a different position. You are your atoms and electrons. Those are the only things you are made of and the only thing the information comes from.

>>6647912
General relativity, look it up. Space is continuous.

http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/33273/is-spacetime-discrete-or-continuous

I applaud all the anons discussing with reason, but this troll is getting so obvious it's painful to watch this thread.

It's either a troll, or some spastic assburger who enjoys himself shitposting all day on /sci/.

>>6647915
>I guess I win these two points.
No.[this answer contains just as much argument as reasoning as yours do]
>How is it a strawman?
How is it not? You explicitly say that my argument is something which I explicitly said it was not.

>Fraud, boiling, annhilation only exist as physical objects doing things.
A process involving objects is not necessarily an object by itself.
You're a total idiot and your desperate attempt at preserving your argument by trying to redefine basic language shows this quite clearly.

>>6647919
>Nothing is an object
>Vacuum is an object
Your brain is not an object because the volume it would normally occupy contains one or both of the above.

>>6647927
>No.[this answer contains just as much argument as reasoning as yours do]
Hmm. which has more argument/reasoning?

This?
>It's neither, it's a clarification of the analogy. You asked how a particle can be compared to a an identity and I told you. Two particles are exact copies, but not the same. Two identities are exact copies but not the same. That the identity is more complex than a particle is the only non-sequitur here. How does being MORE complex make them THE SAME?

Or your reply?
>Lies now too?

>How is it not? You explicitly say that my argument is something which I explicitly said it was not.
OK, see now is the part where you explain HOW it is not what you said. Just give me a specific point you disagree with yes? This is how argument go, we EXPLAIN things.

>A process involving objects is not necessarily an object by itself.
A process involving ONLY objects is necessarily an object by itself. Again, show me the magic massless part of information.

>>6647931
Where did I say nothing is an object? Nothing isn't a thing. It's just not there.

>/sci/ attempting to discuss the nature of consciousness

God damn this entire thread is shameful.

>>6647935
>A process involving ONLY objects is necessarily an object by itself.

Children typically refuse to abandon an argument even when it's proved false and invalid, they often repeat the argument several times too, as if persistence makes right.

>>6647964
Show me a process that doesn't exist physically or gtfo.

>>6647967
>Show me a process that doesn't exist physically or gtfo.

Why do you call it process suddenly? Your terminology just labeled all processes as objects?

Also, you're now using moving goalpost arguments.

>>6647984
Jesus Christ, I haven't said anything different from what I've said all along. Information, concepts, minds, processes, arrangements, data, etc ONLY EXIST AS PHYSICAL OBJECTS. They do not exist in any nonphysical way. Anyone who disagrees is by definition a Dualist and an idiot.

>>6647987

So information is a physical object. Thanks for saying that explicitly, so we all know how ridiculous you are.

>>6648004
All information is a physical object.

>In philosophy of mind, dualism is the position that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical, or that the mind and body are not identical.

>I AM NOT A DUALIST
>INFORMATION IS MORE THAN A PHYSICAL OBJECT
I AM NOT A DUALIST
>INFORMATION IS MORE THAN A PHYSICAL OBJECT
...

dunce.

>>6648012
>All information is a physical object.
No, information is stored by arranging and manipulating physical objects. Information can also be briefly stored in electromagnetic radiation and similar transients that typically wouldn't be referred to as objects.

You might be trying to communicate a sound concept, but the way you're trying to communicate it in sounds retarded.

>dualism
Have little to do with the teleporter problem. The whole debate should be focused on if consciousness is persistent or not.

I say the persistence is an illusion, because it's the simplest answer that avoids all future thought experiments and contradictory issues that otherwise may arise.

It also fits the fact that we only live and act in the now.

>>6647914

It's a bad analogy.

Simulation via electrical logic gate manipulation is just a machine. Like literally just a tool. There's no "sentience" other than abstract cybernetics. Computer simulations are perfect illustrations of the concept of "philosophical zombies".

To my knowledge, we don't have a satisfactory enough account of what consciousness actually is to delimit whether something as relatively "imprecise" as molecular and even atomic scanning and teleportation machines would even create perfect enough duplicates. But that's probably something for actual experimentation with such and such technology and not debates.

In this account of teleportation where it's a matter of scanning and duplication/reconstruction, you're still left with the destruction of a localized neurological agent. You can't really argue around that fact. You can appeal to vague philosophies where we are "just processes" or whatever but at the end of the day, you created a duplicate neurology and destroyed the original. It's clear cut. Does the consciousness embedded or emergent or whatever out of the original neurology magically teleport to the duplicate neurology or is it extinguished?

>>6648105
>No, information is stored by arranging and manipulating physical objects.
Storing information in objects doesn't mean there is this thing called information inside the object, it means the objects form a configuration that is itself an object which we call information. Information is an object.

>Information can also be briefly stored in electromagnetic radiation and similar transients that typically wouldn't be referred to as objects.
Why are photon's not a physical object?

>Have little to do with the teleporter problem. The whole debate should be focused on if consciousness is persistent or not.
It has little to do with the problem, I am merely pointing out that holding these two views:

1. Physical objects that are identical except for position are not the same object

2. The minds of the copy and the original are the same mind in different positions

Entails a contradiction unless dualism is correct.

>>6648107
>There's no "sentience" other than abstract cybernetics. Computer simulations are perfect illustrations of the concept of "philosophical zombies".

You're threading into dualism territory with those statements.

>Does the consciousness embedded or emergent or whatever out of the original neurology magically teleport to the duplicate neurology or is it extinguished?

It's extinguished even if you refuse to teleport. Consciousness isn't a sacred relic tended to by your brain. It's a brief spark of being that your brain creates by being active. You're recreated by a new firing every fractional second.

If you steps into a duplicator that just makes a new you, both will be equally much you. Your sense of individuality is entirely based on your brain being isolated.
If you could stream data between brains, we'd stop thinking of ourself as super isolated unique islands of thought. Just by using VR goggles and some cameras you can distort the sense of position and action a lot.

>>6648161
>If you steps into a duplicator that just makes a new you, both will be equally much you. Your sense of individuality is entirely based on your brain being isolated.
Yup, and a clone's brain is isolated from your brain, hence he is not you.

>>6648161
>>You're threading into dualism territory with those statements.

I thought I was going into quite the opposite. That our consciousness is something dependent on particular electro-chemical properties and mechanics that involve the interaction of neurons.

You can simulate behavioral aspects on a computer but such simulations are literally just logic gate manipulation.

See Searle's Chinese Room.

And you still have an original and a clone man. Without the destruction you have two distinct neurological agents with senses of self-preservation and all that which would compel us to stay the touch of death in response to begs and pleading.

>>6648165
>hence he is not you.
The original is not you either because consciousness is not persistent.

Both will feel like being you though and unless properly labeled might start fighting before having sex with eachother.

>>6648174
>The original is not you either because consciousness is not persistent.
It's persistent ENOUGH. All the things my mind recorded me doing I've actually done, whereas the clone was not and could not have been doing those things in the same space and time as me. That's the only persistence necessary to distinguish the clone from the original.

>>6648170
>but such simulations are literally just logic gate manipulation.
And neurons simulating you are just literally electrochemical signal integrator manipulation.

>See Searle's Chinese Room.
Is a retarded thought experiment, It's impossible for the room constructed as suggested to perform as suggested. If it perform as suggested however, it's either a god awfully complex and humongous expert system, or it's conscious.

>>6648186
Here's why the Chinese Room is stupid:

Searle understands Chinese WITH the program. He doesn't understand Chinese WITHOUT the program.

The computer understands Chinese WITH the program. It doesn't understand Chinese WITHOUT the program.

>>6648179
>It's persistent ENOUGH.
No, it's not persistent at all. The split second your neurons stop firing your consciousness will instantly disappear, pop.

Sure, the structural data and synapses will still remain, but if they don't actively work to create you, you're nothing.

>distinguish the clone from the original.
It's a meaningless distinction. The matter you're constructed off are functional parts, they don't store anything that makes you unique.

How about this scenario instead: The clone is created, the teleporter pinpoints 50% of your neurons on random, and swaps them with those of the clone. What if it takes 75%? 90%? [in case you object to teleportation of single neuron instances, it can opt to knock you out and surgically remove your neurons to ensure the originals make it to your clone]

>>6648186
>And neurons simulating you are just literally electrochemical signal integrator manipulation.

IIRC it's not just that simple. There's quantum effects that could play into consciousness formation and maintenance. Even if it is just "signal integrator manipulation", there's no guarantee that simulation on silicon logic gates will cause the emergence of "consciousness" as opposed to electricity blindly following through gates in a vast complex system that simulates what we think of as intentionality and phenomenology but which becomes the embodiment of philosophical zombies. That's my reservation with the whole computer thing.

Biological brains utilizing machinery to expand data processing capabilities = cool
Machinery merging with biological brains to give emotion and agentic mechanisms = cool
Machinery simulating brains = ehhhhhhhhhhhh

>Searle

I thought his point was that what we experience as "understanding" in our experience isn't something that can be taken for granted in systems which are merely formal in the symbolic manipulation sense. It probably involves other esoteric physical processes that at the very least exist in organic neurology but which haven't been duplicated in other systems (to the same effect at least.).

>>6648248
>There's quantum effects that could play into consciousness formation and maintenance.
Unlikely, not only is most things organic too hot and too large. It's also the fact that neurons do actual calculations and consume a shitton of power. If consciousness is some ultra low energy microtubule quantum phenomenon, then why is the neuronal part of the brain so enormous?

Also, simulated neural network are finally starting to show the intelligent trait we've always wanted out of them, hence why watson exists, hence why google voice recognition is much better, hence why google image search and image recognition is improving. They're still enormous hardware hogs though so it'll probably take a decade before they're starting to become generalized systems instead of specialist ones.

The problem is not that the information is different,from everyone's point of view nothing happened but for you,you die.The clone will be 100% convinced to be you,but you died.If you found a way to alter the mind of a person so the person is convinced it is another person will the person be correct?What if you weren't destroyed?Would the person be you?

>>6648287

>There's quantum effects that could play into consciousness formation and maintenance.
>Unlikely, not only is most things organic too hot and too large. It's also the fact that neurons do actual calculations and consume a shitton of power. If consciousness is some ultra low energy microtubule quantum phenomenon, then why is the neuronal part of the brain so enormous?

It is empirically demonstrated that the quantum vibration of airborne particles influences olfactory perception. Neurons are a level of computation within other levels of computational complexity, why couldn't there be quantum level computations occurring?
Check out spaun.

>>6649703
>Check out spaun.
I've checked it out already. It doesn't use quantum anything and is yet again something that suggest classic computation can and will lead to conscious equivalents.