/sci/ - Science & Math

As far as we know.

Technically, no, but you're on the right track. A bit more nuance would do well here. Consciousness is the property which emerges from dynamic neural interactions. It is important to note that it is not a 'series' of only 'reactions' and 'pulses'. Neural interactions are more than just action potentials and neurotransmission. Most of neural computation is done post-synaptically, so even before action potentials are elicited. They happen in vast parallel as well.

>>3261470

Thank you.

>>3261480
anytime

thereisnospecialphysicalpropertyofconsciousness.tiff

>>3261445
consciousness (except some derived terms eg states of consciousness) is a useless concept created by dualistic (and therefore (almost) magical) thinking to flatter ourselves and rationalize our perceived superiority to minerals, microbes and maybe even other mammals

there are well understood and useful functions/abilities that are traditionally considered part of consciousness (like self-recognition, theory of mind), but consciousness itself after all these years remains this same undefined yet sadly mostly unchallenged but somehow warm and fuzzy bullshit

>>3261543
feeling mad are we?

>pic
You do know this is from one of the books by rupert sheldrake - one the biggest pseudoscientist around - right?

>>3261445
My take on it is that onsciousness is an emergent property of a neural network. Compare the difference between a single ant and an ant colony. An ant is a basic unit that follows a few very simple rules. However the colony is an amazingly complex and adaptive system which arises from several tens of thousands of ants working in cohesion. There are no rules governing the behaviour of the colony beyond those which govern ants, so this complexity is an emergent property of many ants together, and does not exist at the level of a single ant. This is why I think consciousness has yet to be explained - our scientific paradigm is still very much reductionist and tries to understand consciousness on the level of a neuron.
Fritjof Capra write about this kindof thing in the Web of Life, if you're interested you could look it up (warning: quite a lot of people dismiss him as a crank, and sometimes you have to suspend your belief a little to get to the interesting parts, but he has a lot of good ideas too :-)

Consciousness is a flaw, a wasteful drain on the computational resources of the brain. Imagine what you could achieve without the burden of conscious thought.

>>3261647

About as much as you accomplish in a coma.

>>3261647
It's an emergent property, not a computational end-point. It's what allows us to reflect on- and react to what is going on. It's a huge adaptive advantage.

>>3261661

Just like all of those non-sentient animals and sleepwalkers who are able to conduct conversations, drive and carry out other complex tasks without any conscious awareness.

Possibly also a quantum anomaly.

>>3261673
>implying there is a dichotomy conscious and unconscious processing.
>non-sentient animals
[citation needed]

>>3261673
I guess that's why we all go unconscious for 8 hours a day. So we can get all that work done.

>>3261673

Sleepwalking is an interesting exception.

Do you have any evidence to suggest that sleepwalkers are more efficient or effective at what they do?

And, "non-sentient animals". Assuming that such things are just that, being able to respond to stimuli naturally is not the same thing as doing the complex stuff that we apes do. For that, being conscious helps.

>>3261608
>There are no rules governing the behaviour of the colony beyond those which govern ants
You already got the right answer, yet the fluffiness got you in the end.
Physical and chemical laws are the only thing that governs the brain, there's no magical beyond, or things we are missing.
>and does not exist at the level of a single ant.
Just because the moonbase doesn't exist at the level of a single lego block, doesn't mean the moonbase is anything but a bunch of lego blocks.
Consciousness is the product of a machine that was molded by natural selection to be as good as prediction the macroscopic natural world as possible. Understanding the behavior and motivation of prey and predator is immensely important.
At some point, the brain got so good at predicting the natural world that it started predicting itself, this property of "self-awareness", is what you call consciousness

>>3261706

So now "self awareness" is consciousness?

This is the problem with these threads: you fucks can't even agree on what the word means.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness#Scientific_approaches

>>3261699
>For that, being conscious helps.
There is no such thing as being 'conscious'. That's a term used by folk-psychologists. Consciousness is a continuum. All animals have conscious awareness to a certain extent, but they vary in how far along the gradient they are.

>>3261717

I don't really disagree, I'm just not being ultra picky about the wording since I don't see how it benefits the discussion.

>>3261724
It's fuel for trolls, for one thing. Anyway, it can't hurt to formulate your stand point clearly.

>>3261731

Was clear enough for my purposes at the time, I'm not going to explain every nuance of each word I use, for the sake of not writing huge tedious posts.

>>3261736
Fair enough.

>So now "self awareness" is consciousness?
They are not that different after all.
really, the main thing differencing humans from most(!) animals, is this self-awareness

>>3261699

A sleepwalker will probably not be more efficient or effective simply because they are an anomaly of the subconscious. It does serve to illustrate that complex tasks normally believed to require self-awareness in fact do not.

The only evidence would come if you could somehow create a human in which the parts of the brain devoted to consciousness were instead devoted to more subconscious processes. I suspect that such a person would be more effective and efficient at a great many things. Until that happens though it's obviously just a dumb idea.

But consider:

The oldest complex problem solving trick in the book, stop thinking about it, do something else/get some rest and it'll come to you.

When a high degree of skill is reached in any complex endeavour the bulk of the work occurs unconciously, concert pianists dont think of each and every key as they play it. The same applies across a very broad field of intelligent activity.

>>3261752
my favorite example for this is language
"observe" yourself speaking (or thinking in words)
it pretty much spurts out on its own, except for the occasional "wait, that's not what i meant"

>>3261470
>Most of neural computation is done post-synaptically, so even before action potentials are elicited.
>They happen in vast parallel as well.

Could you explain this more? What does the computation if it's not action potentia/neurotransmitter and it's post-synaptic?

How do many parallel networks synchonise themselves without one having an error?

>>3261777

I reckon that is what consciousness is, an observer of sorts.

iirc there was a series of MRI based experiments that determined that the conscious mind is in fact not the source of decisions, by the time the mind had 'decided' the appropriate nervous signals had been sent as much as a half second earlier.

Seems to me that alot of our understanding of the conscious mind as a decision making agent has been mistaking correlation for causation.

>>3261804
its an awfully loaded term for something that simple (and relatively unimportant)

that's why i don't like it

>>3261752
>The only evidence would come if you could somehow create a human in which the parts of the brain devoted to consciousness were instead devoted to more subconscious processes
It does not work like that. Parts of the cortex only contribute to conscious awareness because they show a specific pattern of firing (reentrant, or recurrent processing), which does not have the sole purpose of giving rise to conscious awareness. It's simply a more effective way of processing. People with specific lesions to a part of the brain called the extra-striate cortex can no longer engage in reentrant processing, which means for all intents and purposes they are blind. They are not visually aware of what they see*. Yet, if you show them a line segment, they can guess which way it is oriented above chance level, even though they are certain they cannot see the line. They are severely debilitated, because they cannot function without their visual awareness.


*Note: this does not mean this part of the cortex is responsible for consciousness, it is simply a link in the chain

>>3261800
Computation is also summation of excitatory- and inhibitory postsynaptic potentials. When a postsynaptic cell gets stimulated via neurotransmitters, this does not necessarily elicit an action potential. All the incoming signals from different dendrites are integrated, and summated in the soma.

I'll just leave this here.

>>3261846
But why do neurons delay transmitting an action potential after they have been electrically stimulated? Does that means that neurons make their own decisions when to effect an action potential?

Does that mean that we don't really know how neurons really work to produce action potentials in a predictable way?

Btw, what do you mean by "computation"? What "computes" what? We usually use the word with referrence to calculations with numbers in analog systems. The neurons don't seem to behave la analogue cybernetic systems.

>mfw people don't just link them here: http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/articles/media/2004_09_27_newsweek.html and call it /thread

>>3261859
>But why do neurons delay transmitting an action potential after they have been electrically stimulated?
In order for an action potential form the neuron needs to be stimulated over its threshold. A single molecule of transmitter is not enough to elicit a spike. A single vesicle containing neurotransmitters is not enough. Even if, at a single synapse the neuron is stimulated post-threshold, this does not mean an action potential will form. A neuron is like a leaky garden hose. Only 30% of action potentials reach the end of the axon. They're hugely inefficient.

What I mean by 'computation' is the integration of signals. When action potentials reach the end of the presynaptic neuron they elicit some sort of response on the postsynaptic neuron. This happens at many different dendritic branches, and these signals are integrated into one. For example, a deflection of +10 mV in one dendritic branch + a deflection of +15 mV in another sums to a deflection of +25 mV.

It is important, I feel, to divide consciousness into two things.

On one hand, we have the decisions, the functions of the brain. Every thought, every behavior, everything about the human brain is, as far as I can tell, ultimately explicable by wholly physical, deterministic (or even slightly probabilistic) means. Up to and including why we would claim to be conscious, and why we would accept other people at their word when they claim to be conscious too.

And then you have the unique experience of having a subjective perspective. This we have no answer for. Or even, I would contend, a decent set of questions.

>>3261892
there are inhibiting mechanisms as well, aren't there

if so, how do they work

>>3261904

Neurotransmitters deplete, and must be replenished.

>>3261904
Yup. They don't cause an excitatory postsynaptic potential (a positive deflection in membrane potential), but exactly the opposite. An inhibitory postsynaptic deflection (a negative deflection in membrane potential). They summate as well, so +15mV and -10mV form, you probably got the answer, that's right, +5mV.

>>3261909
Lol, true, but not relevant to the question.

>>3261892
Ive' seen a study which shows something else. It seems sometimes action potentials are produced even in the absence of stimulation, in the unstimulated cells.

Furthermore, they can also be produced in the distal axon, which is contrary to what was commonly accepted until now.

http://www.nature.com/neuro/journal/v14/n2/full/nn.2728.html

>And then you have the unique experience of having a subjective perspective. This we have no answer for. Or even, I would contend, a decent set of questions.

and i would argue that that's reason enough to dismiss it as vacuous crap
especially since there's no reason to to interpret this sensation at all, were it not for some bothersome and anachronistic philosophical traditions

>>3261924
True, but this is more of an exception which confirms the rule. There are cells which have their own mechanisms of generating an intrinsic rhythm.

so now that we live in a society dominated by communication, and information can quickly and easily be transmitted from one person to the next through the use of cellphones, the internet, etc., if we consider these interactions to mimic those of neurons, can we then claim that the world is "conscious" even if it has no meat mech to drive around?

unless we're all meat mechs of the world

I think a large part of consciousness not only comes from the brain but from the brain interacting with the outside world through bodily functions. if you stuck a brain in a jar would that brain be conscious even if it didn't have any way to interact with external stimuli?

>>3261936
Great article by the way, thanks.

>>3261846
It has also been proposed that thalamo-cortico-thalamic circuits contribute to self-awareness, due to the aforementioned allowing the brain to obtain data on its own activity.
Here's an article: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2626162/

>>3261938
Dude, you're awesome.
If you want to talk or something, please mail me: yanncore@gmail.com
This is my troll account so I'll just transfer you to my real one once you contact me.
I'm doing some work on AI and evolution, it might be interesting to you I guess.

>>3261936
Sorry, but I don't understand what you mean by cells generating an intrinsic rhythm and this being an exception. It could, very well be an exception which makes the typical behaviour of the neuron possible.

Secondly, how does consciousness actually emerge from neurons? Which neuron initiates the development of consciousness? How do they actually organise to form the networks which support consciousness if there is no particular neurobiological entity that can initiate this developemnt and coordinate it?

Article - you're welcome.

I take a physicalist view that consciousness has been "located" in the frontoinsular cortex and the hypothalamus and a 100 dynamic cores in between. I think Thomas Metzinger's theory is the most adequate. Check out his book The Ego Tunnel or Being No One:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-model_theory_of_subjectivity

Basically, consciousness is not special. I have read many convincing arguments of how our sense of subjectivity helps minimize processing necessary to relate action output to homeostatic needs. I also believe Buddhists that engage in a lot of meditation have a lower degree of subjectivity, sense of "I", mineness, and other phenomenal properties attributed to consciousness.

>>3261967
Well, the answer, just as to many other things is: we don't know, yet. I am sure that we will.

Nah, conciousness is philosophically a bit more complex. See, what causes conciousness is the chemical reactions and electrical pulses in the brain, but our experience of being concious, which is what conciousness actually is, is something different - it's not physically quantifiable because it's something we feel.

First, let’s discuss the essential questions that must be answered in order to formulate a cohesive theory of self:

Does consciousness emerge from neural activity alone? Why is there always someone having the experience? Who is the feeler of your feelings and the dreamer of your dreams? Who is the agent doing the doing, and what is the entity thinking your thoughts? Why is your conscious reality your conscious reality? Why is consciousness subjective? Why does our perceived reality have a center: an experiencing self? How exactly, then, does subjectivity, this “I”, emerge? Is the self an operation rather than a thing or repository? How to comprehend subjectivity is the deepest puzzle in consciousness research. The most important of all questions is how do neurons encode meaning and evoke all the semantic associations of an object? Also, before continuing this long rumination: what are the best phenomenal characteristics we may attribute to consciousness? Furthermore, there are still issues all theories of consciousness must address. These include, but are not limited to, binding problem (i.g., how the property of coherence arises in consciousness - how are the processing-domains in the brain distributed to allow this? Wolf Singer claims that the synchronization of oscillatory activity may be the mechanism for the binding of distributed brain processes), QUALIA(this is a very important issue - it leads to some claim there is an "explanatory gap" between the phenomenal aspect of consciousness and the neurological underpinnings), Cartesian Theatre (i.g., how can we create a theory of consciousness without falling into Dennett’s dualism trap), and etc.

>it's not physically quantifiable because it's something we feel.
It totally is

>I also believe Buddhists that engage in a lot of meditation have a lower degree of subjectivity, sense of "I", mineness, and other phenomenal properties attributed to consciousness.

seem plausible
which makes me wonder, if this change alone without the buddhist lifestyle would increase the probability of rape and other impulsive behavior associated with poor delay of gratification etc.

-> does perceived consciousness correlate with such traits

Consciousnesses could be called a sub program of the self-program, at least in normal people under normal circumstances.

To give an analogy, consciousness is a part of a piece of software.

http://www.scientificamerican.com/blog/post.cfm?id=physics-and-the-immortality-of-the-2011-05-23

>If you believe in an immaterial soul that interacts with our bodies, you need to believe that [the dirac equation] is not right, even at everyday energies. There needs to be a new term (at minimum) on the right, representing how the soul interacts with electrons. (If that term doesn't exist, electrons will just go on their way as if there weren't any soul at all, and then what's the point?) So any respectable scientist who took this idea seriously would be asking -- what form does that interaction take? Is it local in spacetime? Does the soul respect gauge invariance and Lorentz invariance? Does the soul have a Hamiltonian? Do the interactions preserve unitarity and conservation of information?

>>3262001
I like self-representational theories of consciousness personally. Antonio Damasio claimed, “Our evolved type of conscious self-model is unique to the human brain, that by representing the process of representation itself, we can catch ourselves – as Antonio Damasio would call it – in the act of knowing” (Metzinger, 2009, p. 5). Basically, as Edelman says, consciousness for human beings is special because the individual has accessibility of their past history and future plans, as well as consciousness of their consciousness. Basically, it is the self-reflective awareness and metacognition that gives us this sense of "I". To quote I believe higher-order representations (of a recursive nature) have a huge role in the origin of subjectivity (as proposed by the likes of Ramachandran and Hostfadter).

>>3262005
You're failing to distinguish between our perceptions and what causes them. Can the experience of feeling red be derived from empirical information concerning the neural activity which corresponds to it ?

>>3262038

Yes, mindfulness training has been correlated with huge changes in brain structures:
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/01/110121144007.htm

I believe this may be linked to less association with one's body:
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/02/110228151800.htm

This is so because BODY MAPS have a significant involvement in our consciousness. Looking into recent research of body maps would be very helpful, and I wonder how the changed brain structures of Buddhist alter their body maps...

>>3262060
http://www.amazon.com/review/R1A40A14EEIB0N/ref=cm_cr_dp_cmt?ie=UTF8&ASIN=0812975278&nodeID=
283155
Here is a good discussion of internal body maps. They have a significant involvement in consciousness, I believe.

Even our sense of bodily owner (aka proprioception) is an emergent property of brain processes. Property dualists are fooling themselves. A physicalist theory of consciousness is more adequate and philosophers of mind need to take a backseat while neuroscientists and biologists do all the hard work.

>>3262057
>Can the experience of feeling red be derived from empirical information concerning the neural activity which corresponds to it ?
Yes, in fact, they're identical

>>3262117
>hear.
here

facepalm.jpg

>>3262057
>Can the experience of feeling red be derived from empirical information concerning the neural activity which corresponds to it ?
I'll just leave this hear.
http://www.nature.com/nrn/journal/v7/n7/abs/nrn1931.html
http://www.nature.com/neuro/journal/v8/n5/abs/nn1444.html

>>3262103
Yeah, I find token identity theory of mind much better than eliminative materialism or property dualism:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/

Eliminative materialism is what most neuroscientists ascribe to, but I find it very narrow-minded. They view no bits of the world as mental; they claim there are no mental states at all. Identity theory on the other hand is a symmetric relation and says mental and physical states are identical. I think token identity theory is a more rational route. Eliminativism is actually a bit nihilistic.

>>3262123
>Eliminativism is actually a bit nihilistic.
See, you're doing it wrong
You don't choose a theory based on the evidence or predictive power, you choose it from which fits in your world view and makes you feel happy.
But, reality doesn't confirm to your biases, and if eliminative materialism is real, than it's real, no matter how bad it makes you feel.

Some books I recommend people to read if they're interested in questions pertained to consciousness, perception, and other cool stuff in the cognitive field:
1. The Ego Tunnel by Thomas Metzinger (my favorite - his bigger more complex work Being no One is not worth the trouble, haha)
2. Self comes to Mind by Antonio Damasio
3. Tell-Tale Brain by VS Ramachandran
4. I am a Strange Loop by Hostfadter
5. Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World by Chris Firth

>>3262123
that's not science
that's just a way to somehow "save" some of the old and cherished dualistic ideas form a cold materialistic "reality"

eliminativists do not deny the sensation, they just think its useless to still think in these terms, since it contributed nothing of value to our understanding of the "mind"

>>3262187
>>3262187
Yeah, I like the global workspace theory of consciousness a lot, btw. It is a highly regarded model of human cognition (not that many don't exist):
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Workspace_Theory

By the way, I recommend everyone read this:
http://thebrain.mcgill.ca/flash/a/a_12/a_12_cr/a_12_cr_con/a_12_cr_con.html

It's a very good site. Notice how they give different levels of plausible descriptions for consciousness (e.g., psychological and neurological). They also have different levels of explanation (beginner, intermediate, advanced). I have linked an advanced discussion of the neurological level. Notice, right now we only have plausible theories. Take your pic and don't be a fucking property dualist.

>>3262251
Very good site, thanks.