/sci/ - Science & Math

The hard problem of consciousness is due to an error in thinking. That error is the idea that one can get consciousness from a category that is inherently incommensurable with consciousness, namely matter.

There is no need to learn super advanced stuff to get rid of this problem. Simply choose a metaphysics that does not have the hard problem in it. Idealism is the best candidate since consciousness is fundamental, and so does not emerge at all. Hard problem is now gone.

If you insist on the Materialism route, good fucking luck. You will go nowhere because the hard problem is baked into your metaphysics.

>>15186105

Me again. Your time would better be spent on building on scientific models of the behavior of universal consciousness. These models are based on the Idealist metaphysics.

Donald Hoffman is a good example of someone who has moved on from the mental decay of materialism, and has begun to model the behavior of conscious agents:

https://escholarship.org/content/qt2d34n6zf/qt2d34n6zf.pdf?t=p2ng2g

>>15186105
>Idealism is the best candidate since consciousness is fundamental, and so does not emerge at all. Hard problem is now gone.
Idealism just reverses the hard problem. In idealism you have to ask how does the physical world emerge from consciousness?

>>15184700
if we knew what was needed to solve the problem, wouldn't that mean we'd already solved it

How many maths do you know? You're going to need at least 3 of them

>>15184700
Has anything been solved using sheaf/topos theory?

>>15186183

In Idealism, the "physical" world is just what the universal consciousness activity looks like from our the perspective of our kind of consciousness. Notice that I'm speaking in terms of a single category of thing, and so Idealism does not have the hard problem materialism faces.

A valid problem from a scientfic modelling perspective would be: what kind of dynamics of consciousness leads to our perceptions of space and time? Donald Hoffman is working on this currently. It is a problem, but it is not The Hard Problem.

>>15186310
>In Idealism, the "physical" world is just what the universal consciousness activity looks like from our the perspective of our kind of consciousness
Sorry sweaty, that's a non-answer and no better than materialist "consciousness is just brain activity".

>>15187238
>Sorry sweaty, that's a non-answer and no better than materialist "consciousness is just brain activity".


Not at all. In that one sentence, I've spoken in terms of a single category. Once you start talking in terms of two categories (as Materialism requires), you have the hard problem.

"Physicality" is an experience in consciousness. If you don't agree, provide a moment in your life where you've stepped outside of consciousness.

C A T E G O R Y E R R O R

>>15187238
brainlet spotted. very sad, has misunderstood the fundamental shift in thinking idealism requires, you are like a little babby.

>>15186310
good answer. the hard problem is "dissolved" by remembering that matter is in mind but mind is not in matter.

"Finite picture whose dimensions are a certain amount of space and a certain amount of time; the protons and electrons are the streaks of paint which define the picture against its space-time background. Traveling as far back in time as we can, brings us not to the creation of the picture, but to its edge; the creation of the picture lies as much outside the picture as the artist is outside his canvas. On this view, discussing the creation of the universe in terms of time and space is like trying to discover the artist and the action of painting, by going to the edge of the canvas. This brings us very near to those philosophical systems which regard the universe as a thought in the mind of its Creator, thereby reducing all discussion of material creation to futility."

>>15188165
>I've spoken in terms of a single category. Once you start talking in terms of two categories (as Materialism requires), you have the hard problem.
Materialism is a single category as well. There is the physical world and only the physical world. Consciousness is merely physical activation of the brain. This is exactly your answer with the labels reversed, cuck.

>>15186105
Idealism also has a problem of explaining what others are. Unless you're advocating for radical solisism. The bigger problem is how to explain what others are and how to verify it.

Your initial assessment is right. You need something better thats not materialism, but also not idealism. Something that doesn't have the hard problem, but also deals with consciousness. What you're left with is Buddhism.

>>15184700
99% of /sci/ wouldn't know a topos if trampled by a heard and have schizo theories on consciousness why are you asking here?

>>15188713
I don't compare myself to the dumb 99%. I belong to the intellectual 1%.

>>15186105
>expect shitpost thread
>first post is coherentpost that makes me think
Neat.

>>15188706
>Idealism also has a problem of explaining what others are. Unless you're advocating for radical solisism
Sounds like you're talking about your vague kiddie impression of what "idelism" means.

>The bigger problem is how to explain what others are and how to verify it.
Why is that a problem?

>>15189742
First lets assume that we're talking about a monism of sort rather than substance dualism. Then we assume we're talking about mind only type reality rather than physicalist/materialist reality.

Now the question is what are others and how do we verify others? You could say others are other mind only objects thats independent of my mind. You could argue that that, independent of mind, we know others exists because we dont argue about solipsist view of reality, where everything is made from my mind and you dont exist, we're not having conversation, blah blah blah. So that leaves us with the idea that others exists independent of our mind, but as mind only objects/bodies/etc. Then the question is, how do we verify that? We know we can make have dreams, which are fake, both conscious/lucid and unconscious dreams. We know we can imagine things that aren't real. We also know we can augment what we see/interact in real time, with eye glass when we're blind, with sunglass for shades, with optical illusions, with viewing angles, etc. So how do we see verify whats out there in the first place? Everything we do is through our own inner consciousness, and such all we have knowledge of is our own internal model of reality. But we're not solipsist, so what next? The harder problem of verification is an issue all the time, idealism cannot help it.

>>15189798
>what are others
Probably the same sort of thing that you are.

>and how do we verify others?
You don't but why is that a problem for idealism?

>that leaves us with the idea that others exists independent of our mind
No, it doesn't. At most, you can say "individual" minds seem to be compartmentalized somehow.

>So how do we see verify whats out there in the first place?
You don't. Why is that a problem for idealism?

>>15189832
Idealism solve the core problem of external reality vs internal reality. So its junk like substance dualism and physicalist monism. You're still left questioning the division between whats out and whats in.

>>15189832
Idealism doesn't solve the core problem of external reality vs internal reality. So its junk just like substance dualism and physicalist/materialist monism. You're still left questioning the division between whats out and whats in.

>>15189845
What the fuck are you splurging off about and where are you getting these completely arbitrary goalposts from?

>>15189847
See >>15189848

>>15189848
Its not arbitrary goalposting. Its the fundamental question of the "hard problem" tries to raise. How do we get consciousness from material substance, in other words, what's the difference between outside and inside?

>>15189852
>Its the fundamental question of the "hard problem" tries to raise
No, it isn't. Are you ok? The Hard Problem concerns trying to explain how and why consciousness arises from matter. The idealist position is that it just doesn't.

>>15189858
>The Hard Problem concerns trying to explain how and why consciousness arises from matter
Yes because the idea is rooted in dualism, the nature of physical vs consciousness. But the deeper problem doesn't go away, whats our selves and whats others? Idealism doesn't solve that, it tries to hide it by saying "everything is consciousness" but then what is everything? Where's the boundary between your mind and others. And it either leads to you down an absurdist solipsist position or idealism not solving the fundamental issue between external conscious and internal conscious

>>15189869
>Yes because the idea is rooted in dualism,
No, it isn't. You're legit mentally disabled.

>the deeper problem doesn't go away
You can pull "deeper problems" out of your ass all you like, but it has nothing to do with the Hard Problem.

>>15189879
Hard problem is dualism, its nothing to do with idealism. You inserted idealism to "solve" the hard problem. You can't because the problem doesn't go away, it just evolves to the next stage.

>>15189885
>Hard problem is dualism
The Hard Problem occurs in the context of materialism, which is a monism. You are legit mentally challenged.

>You inserted idealism to "solve" the hard problem.
I didn't insert anything. Another person correctly pointed out that this "problem" is not a problem to be solved but an absurdity of materialism.

>>15188537

You can say that, but this worldview has failed to accommodate consciousness in any way. You say everything is matter, but are unable to reduce consciousness to it. The reason reason for this faliure is that consciousness is of a completely different category than what you claim (as a materialist) the world is fundamentally composed of.


Matter is defined to be quantitative. Everything there is to matter can be fully expressed by numbers: mass, spin, charge, ...

My consciousness is clearly not quantitative; it is the qualitative world of perceptions : the taste of chocolate, the burn of a stove, the smell of a flower.

These are two incommensurable categories, and thus, you get the hard problem.

>>15189894
Hard problem occurs in dualism because people it only works for people who accept consciousness exists but still believe in physical stuff.

For materialists/physicalist monist, there's no hard problem because consciousness doesn't exist. There's no hard problem.

You're confusing yourself.

>>15189900
>Hard problem occurs in dualism
It doesn't because dualism doesn't maintain that minds arise out of matter. I guarantee you that you suffer from a severe mental deficiency. Stop posting and contemplate that you might just have an IQ of 80.

>>15189902
No, dualism maintains that there's mind and physical body, and there's a problem explaining the connection between two. Physicalist/materialist monists dont have that problem. Because mind doesn't arise at all. Mind only "arise" in dualists view of reality.

>>15189905
>there's a problem explaining the connection between two
That's not the Hard Problem, it's just a problem with dualism.

>Physicalist/materialist monists dont have that problem.
You are 100% mentally ill and 80 IQ.

>>15189910
Sorry but mind/consciousness isn't a lingo in materialism. Your confusion is warranted because you assume everyone to hold a dualist position. Thats not true. For materialists, there is no such thing as a mind, there is no such thing as a consciousness. Hence there is no problem of anykind with reference to things like mind and consciousness.

>Sorry but mind/consciousness isn't a lingo in materialism.
As expected, this creature wasn't fully human. It's a funny game getting them to start looping or to declare themselves nonsentient.

>>15189916
>hey anon
>you want to come over and be conscious with me

>>15188706

In Idealism, other humans are closed off or fragmented mental activity within the universal field of consciousness that surrounds us.

There is empirical evidence that fits this: in Dissociative Identity Disorder, multiple minds can form, coexist and interact in a single mental space.

The same processes occurs in the universal consciousness, and leads to closed of mental activity like us humans who can coexist and interact in a mental space.

>>15189939
Nevermind spiritual awakening. It told me it doesn't even have a mind. lol

>>15189946
>universal consciousness
So variant of solipsism.

>>15189948
>broken GPT drone continues using terminology it doesn't understand

>>15189948

Not really because there are other minds embedded in this universal consciousness we live in.

>>15189957
Okay, so what are other minds? How do you define them? Their boundaries? How do others know whats real and whats not? Whats them and whats others?

>>15189961
>broken GPT drone attempts to move the goalpost again after getting called out on its lack of understanding

>>15189961

Humans are fragmented conscious activity within the universal consciousness. The mechanism of fragmentation is reasonable because a known proccess of mental fragmentation is Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID)

The technical term for a fragmented activity is an "alter". In cases of DID, alters are known to interact and recognize eachother - even in dreams. The same process is occuring to the universal consciousness.

As to what defines the boundaries exactly, I don't know; it is a good question though. Seperate mental activity does exist and is reasonable as evidenced through patients with DID.

>>15190022

This view seems to suggest a god like mind that we are part of, and that rubs me the wrong way.

>>15184700
Idk but you should sheaf mah dick in your bussy

>>15190315
Yep. It goes back to variant of a solipsist idea where the universe is me/I am universe, etc.

So everyone agrees with the obvious fact that the universe consists of hypergraph vertices that interact with each other by activating edges. Vertices detect adjacent activations and activate other adjacent edges in response. They're mostly blue.

A materialist says that in fact blue vertices are all that exist. He decides to call them "physical objects". Furthermore he's certain that none of the vertices correspond to conscious experiences. Conscious experiences don't actually exist, some subgraphs of the physical universe are just imagining things.

A dualist says the universe is basically the same as the materialist thinks, except there are also a few billion pink vertices that correspond to conscious minds. These interact with the blue vertices in a distinct way from how the blue vertices are all attached to each other. This makes it meaningful to consider the pink vertices something separate entirely and not think of them the same way as blue ones. Plus they're pink instead of blue. Despite being a pink vertex, the dualist knows how the blue vertices are connected by studying patterns in how he interacts with the blue physical world.

An idealist says the universe is all blue vertices, except the other two guys missed a bunch of them. There are also blue conscious mind vertices connected to the "physical object" subgraph. These other vertices are actually connected to the subgraph in a similar way to how the subgraph is connected to itself. Also they're all blue, just like the physical objects. So there's no reason to distinguish the conscious mind vertices from the physical object ones.

Is that correct?

>>15190022
You can't use psychological disorders do try to somehow solve philosophical problems, or to shut down areas of inquiry by claiming that it's all just a mental disorder. Psychology is a retarded tumorous outgrowth of philosophy of mind that grew too cocky and started dressing up like an empirical science, taking up most of the naïve empiricist, materialist biases of scientism.
Pscychologists are the kind of people who literally believe that all human emotions and thoughts are just combinations of chemicals secreted in the brain, and that the human brain is just a big electrical circuit spread throughout the body that seeks pleasure and avoids pain.
For psychologists, thought experiments about brains in vats and P-zombies are not even worth taking seriously, since they believe that there is nothing beyond what can be observed.
Any "information" or research results obtained by psychologists will simply spit out exactly the same pre-conceptions that they held all along, which are namely that the universe is composed of "real" stuff, that there is a "normal" way to think, and that there are many minds in the universe, all of which exist only through the bodies containing them.

>>15191118

There are experiments of patients with DID who say that an alter has no sight, and when that alter has control of the body, the areas associated with vision in the brain become inactive. You can't fake that.

DID is real, and the only reason I bring it up is that is shows that the mechanism I've proposed does actually occur empirically.

>>15191334
Imagine knowing about idealism but still falling for the empiricism Jew.

>>15190856
>It goes back to variant of a solipsist idea
Nothing to do with solipsism. I guess the issue with GPT language models like you is that they don't learn from mistakes.

>>15186105
>If you insist on the Materialism route, good fucking luck. You will go nowhere because the hard problem is baked into your metaphysics.
This but unironically. Hellie’s vertiginous question in particular is unsolvable under a materialist metaphysics.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vertiginous_question

>>15186105
What do you think of these probabilities of different conscious theories being true?

https://nintil.com/consciousness-and-its-discontents

>What theories do I think are probably true, with probabilities, as of today:

>1. Neutral monism/Panpsychism(60%)
>2. Interactionist dualism(30%)
>3. Epiphenomenalism(10%)
>4. Idealism(~epsilon%)
>5. Non-interactionist dualism(~epsilon%)
>6. Identity theory(~0% as it rejects consciousness as real)
>7. Eliminativism(~0% as it rejects consciousness as real)

>>15184700
Read Principia Qualia if you want a grasp of how consciousness might be studied.

https://opentheory.net/principia-qualia/

>>15186105
What about non-materialist physicalism?

https://www.physicalism.com/

>Natural science promises a complete story of the universe. No "element of reality" should be missing from the mathematical formalism of physics, i.e. relativistic quantum field theory or its more speculative extension, M-theory. On pain of magic, every gross property of the natural world must be theoretically reducible to fundamental physics. The Standard Model in physics is experimentally well tested. Within its conceptual framework, consciousness would seem not only causally impotent but physically impossible. Hence the "explanatory gap" and the Hard Problem of consciousness.

>In recent years, a minority of researchers have proposed that the Hard Problem is an artifact of materialist metaphysics. Contra Kant, but following Schopenhauer, Bertrand Russell, Grover Maxwell, Michael Lockwood, Galen Strawson, et al., the new idealists conjecture that the phenomenology of one's mind reveals the intrinsic nature of the physical – the elusive "fire" in the equations about which physics is silent. Mathematical physics yields an exhaustive description of the relational-structural properties of the world. This description may ultimately be encoded by the universal wavefunction of post-Everetta quantum mechanics: our best mathematical description of reality. However, our presupposition that the intrinsic character of the physical lacks phenomenal properties is an additional metaphysical assumption. The assumption is hugely plausible, but it's not a scientific discovery. Perhaps most tellingly, the only part of the "fire" in the equations to which one ever enjoys direct access, i.e. one's own consciousness, discloses phenomenal properties that are inconsistent with a materialist ontology. For reasons unexplained, the natural world contains first-person facts. The world supports at least one non-zombie. And natural science gives no reason to believe that one is special.

>>15191881
Not that guy, but under an idealist conception of the universe, everything is ultimately an idea.
Depending on whether you are an objective idealist or a subjective idealist, you might either believe that:
a) ideas are real independently of whether there are any phenomena that correspond to them, meaning that not all phenomena might necessarily be real at all, but also that there can be a substratum of ideas going beyond known phenomena
b) nothing is real except for that which can be thought of, and there is no true distinction between imagination and reality, since both are part of the realm of ideas

Objective idealism offers us no criteria by which we can distinguish real phenomena from fake ones, nor does it suggest that we might be able to tell whether a certain conception is the true, since there is nothing we can compare that conception to in the lack of a criterion that would determine its falsehood.
Subjective idealism does away with all notions of reality and falsehood, but remains stuck in the possibility that there might not necessarily be anything consistent out there.
Intersubjective idealism would require using the existence of others as an axiom, as well as a belief that there is a sharing of thoughts by a certain means. If one were to suggest that this sharing of thoughts takes place through the senses, then it would only be a matter of sliding a bit further down the same slope to fall into the wretched abyss of naïve empiricism.
Any attempt to connect intersubjectivity to communication and language would not, by itself, allow for a distinction between mass hysteria and objective truth to be established.

Although it is easy to claim that one world-view is true and has the necessary set of axioms to explain reality as it is, there is no reason to accept that any possible world view might be full of holes and unable to sustain itself.

>>15191901
>under an idealist conception of the universe, everything is ultimately an idea.
No, it isn't and you are that guy. I can tell because you spew delusions with complete confidence just like a GPT.

>>15191901
>under an idealist conception of the universe, everything is ultimately an idea.
No, it isn't. The idealist conception is that everything is of the same fundamental substance as conscious experience. How do you people manage to get everything wrong in every post with such consistency?

>>15184700
None. Topology is based on several errors in reasoning. Sheafs also depend on those errors.

>>15191924
>The idealist conception is that everything is of the same fundamental substance as conscious experience.
That's not what Plato or any of his followers said. In fact, consciousness wasn't even a seriously addressed subject until at least the days of Kant, but the kind of idealism that Immanuel Kant asserted was not one about the ultimate constitution of reality, but rather about a mental framework that all humans are born with and have immediate access to that is used to judge experienced phenomena. Since metaphysical speculation was shut down by Kant's first Critique, there were no attempts to raise "ideas" into the status of ultimately real stuff the way the Platonists did. Hegel's entire phenomenological project was based on understanding consciousness by the means of understanding ideas, which is to say, analyzing what is knowable in a logical manner, independently of any claims of the ultimately real. Experiencing is separate from judging, just as judging is separate from reasoning. Although we may claim that conscious experience is undeniably real, we cannot assert that experience itself is truly representative of everything independently of experience. Furthermore, asserting that reality is of the same stuff as experience would lower everything else that exists to a weak, flimsy state that has no fixed forms and that would be tinged by the presence of consciousnesses.
The idealism you claim is closer to George Berkeley's subjective idealism (which was strongly mocked in the 18th century and still is) than to the great Platonic idealism, which puts true ideas on a status higher that of mere thinking and what you call "conscious experience".
This idealism that you allegedly defend does not allow for there to be something stronger than conscious experience. It is nothing more than some loose coats and light ornaments for ghosts that can be swept away even by a gentle drafty wind.

>>15186105
Fpbp

>>15191893
Me dual aspect monism.

>>15192297
>Topology is based on several errors in reasoning
please elaborate

>>15193109

>>15193597
>clopen sets

>>15195504
How do you model uncertainty when you lack sufficient information to assess probability?

>>15186192
The Weil conjectures, among many other things.

>>15195504
>Confuses syntax errors and mathematical definitions

Holy midwit