/sci/ - Science & Math

>>14596987

>>14596987
> I have been certain that there is no life, there is no consciousness, and "I" am simply a trapped observer in a mechanical meat-body.
Written like a dualist strawmanning materialism.

Obviously there's life, just not a dualist definition of life.
Obviously there is consciousness, just not a dualist or "soul" definition of it.
Obviously you are your body, not "trapped" in what you are.

Fucking nonsense.

>>14596987
There is no consciousness? Says who?

This is the trump card of dualists and any other non-materialists. Go read about the hard problem of consciousness and understand that, as it is currently, there appears to be ontological significance to non-material phenomenon, specifically consciousness.

>>14597047
Consciousness is material. Non-materialists have nothing.

>>14597047
Actually, to add to this, it sounds like you're more worries about the implications of materialism on free will, which the hard problem is not really concerned with. Sucks, because I don't believe in free will either, and I think any argument free will is a moot point anyway. Even if the future is undecidable and we have a meaningful capacity for choice, what will happen will happen. Free will is a pointless concept. If this still terrifies you, I encourage you to consider the possibility that, assuming free will is not true and we are irreparably bound to whatever fate may be, that this provides an inalienable nobility to the human condition that makes it worth living.

>>14597003
>Obviously there's life, just not a dualist definition of life.

There isn't any such thing as life. It's simply molecules colliding together in certain configurations and making more complex structures.

There is no difference between "life" and an igneous rock

>>14597047
>Says who?
Says me. It's an illusion produced by being both the unwitting actor and the observer. I don't see any scientific way around this.

I don't care about a philosophical way around it

>>14597054
>If this still terrifies you

It doesn't scare me, it just seemingly invalidates any other course of action than committing suicide. I didn't get a good body or a good upbringing. Why bother continuing to go through this if I can't even affect anything?

>>14597052
Consciousness is material? Holy shit, I didn't know we discovered a new element, consciousonium! Have chemists isolated this mysterious substance? Have doctors located its presence within the brain?

If you're still on the level of equating the material processes of the brain with the SUBJECTIVE (i.e. non material) experience of consciousness, then you have misunderstood the hard problem. Go read about it. The issue is in the fact that conscious experience appears to be existentially significant, yet does not appear to be material. You cannot "hold" experience, you cannot point to something and say "that is experience", yet it appears to have meaningful existence by way of our subjective lives, which is in fact the ONLY verifiable thing about reality that is not reliant on the inductive leap like all of science and material knowledge.

>>14597055
There is no scientific way around it because there is no scientific way towards it either. There is no scientific explanation of conscious experience because science or any other empirical method cannot even prove the existence of subjective phenomenon. This is a huge gap with modern science on the same fundamental level as the interpretations of QM, and you'd be an idiot to dismiss it. Furthermore, if it's an "illusion", you've yet to explain who is viewing the illusion. This question is deeper than it first appears. Don't be so certain.

>>14597056
I dont have any silver bullet answers, but again, play around with the idea of free-will-as-moot and with the idea that life might be more noble without it. I am not advocating, but I think questioning first before drastic action is appropriate.

>>14597067
>There is no scientific explanation of conscious experience
I disagree. It's simply an illusion we are beholden to

>>14597073
You can't "disagree", this isn't a matter of opinion. Where is the scientific explanation of consciousness? We have not quantified, observed, or otherwise measured consciousness with empirical methods, and it appears impossible to do so. Saying it "is an illusion" is not scientific. The fact is that consciousness appears to be meaningfully existent but not material, and while it is clearly tied to the material processes of the brain, does not appear synonymous. Any mention of experiential consciousness is philosophical amd not empirical in nature. Science, by definition, cannot assert anything about consciousness until it is empirically proven to exist, which does not appear possible-- this is the essence of the hard problem.

>>14597083
>You can't "disagree", this isn't a matter of opinion

It certainly is, since I researched the hard problem as you instructed, and was presented with solutions and perspectives on it that do not align with yours.

"Consciousness", I believe, is the state of being both the observed and the observer. What you call consciousness I simply call attention- a physical process.

Become Faustian. Double down. Dig into matter at its core. Make your instruments more precise. Find the essence of matter.

you cant be wrong about having experiences, retard. your perception of an external world may be illusory, but its not possible for "you" to simultaneously perceive something and also not exist.

there is an "i" by logical necessity in that regard

>>14597055
>There is no difference between "life" and an igneous rock
It's called a consciousness, dumbass, something that you seem to be lacking.

>>14597083
What about neural correlates of consciousness and the effects of altering it? Why does cutting off my head seem to affect it so severely?

>>14597089
I don't understand this argument. Experience does not play into this at all, at any level to me

>>14597086
Did you understand the important part about not conflating behavioral consciousness with subjective consciousness?

>"Consciousness", I believe, is the state of being both the observed and the observer.
Sounds like a philosophical stance to me.

>What you call consciousness I simply call attention- a physical process.
Attention? What about when you are sleeping? Conscious experience still goes on when you are asleep, as indicated by a) dreams and b) the sensation of time passing upon waking.

Let me try to explain: the hard problem of consciousness is NOT concerned with "behavioral consciousness", i.e. the behaviors that accompany the material/physical processes of the brain that are obvious when an animal or human is "awake" and not "unconscious"-- moving, eating, emotion, etc.

The hard problem is about the accompanying aspect of EXPERIENCE that appears real ONLY from a personal, subjective viewpoint. Anil Seth called it the "movie" that plays in your head while you are living-- it is your EXPERIENCE.

I think we can both agree that experience is existentially meaningful, and has an existential status beyond being a mere epiphenomenon like the abstract idea of "blood pressure" that results from the material motion of blood cells in your vessels-- in fact, from a rigorous logic standpoint, we have known for hundreds of years that experiential consciousness is the ONLY verifiable thing about reality that does not rest on the fallacy of induction, and though our experiences may not be truthful to the outwide world (hallucinations, wrong patterns of reasoning, etc.) we know a priori that this experience as an object itself DOES EXIST, more certainly than we know that atoms exist from a subjective viewpoint.

And yet, science hitherto has NO WAY to empirically verify experience, experiential consciousness, etc. You cannot measure it with a scale, it is not "located" anywhere. This is the hard problem.

>>14597100
Your brain needs oxygen, along with a bunch of other shit, to survive, your brain is somehow tied to your consciousness, my take is that the brain, and in essence our body, is just a translator for our consciousness.

>>14597100
Thanks, that's probably better than whatever argument I was going to use.

But I don't want to argue, I just want to beat this thing

I am 40 years old and I am probably going to kill myself soon.

>>14596987
You're obviously lying... But if you weren't, it's a bad position as you can't reduce all elements of reality to substance. People don't understand this, because they decide that the illusions made by the brain don't exist. Or are unreal... It comes down to the definitions someone chooses.

There is one deep, major commonality between conscious creatures, and unconscious rocks. That is the allegedly unspeakable "is-ness"...

"Mind" and "consciousness" are appalling terms which lead to confusion. You cannot communicate the idea properly with these terms.

Everything is just existence itself. That's it. You are it, rocks are it, the universe is it. That's it... Srs... Nobody and no thing comes with their own little separate packet of existence.

>>14597105
what does 'experience' mean to you

>>14597100
The neural correlates of consciousness are precisely what make the hard problem so interesting. From the scientific perspective, there are no "neural correlates of consciousness", because there is no verifiable evidence that subjective consciousness even exists. An organism may report how it feels in response to material phenomenon, but in no way can it actually communicate that experience in an existentially meaningful way.

AND YET, as a subjective individual with access to your own experiential consciousness, you can influence your consciousness via these material processes in any number of ways. Take drugs, for example, and REALLY see that the subjective experience is intricately tied with the material processes of the brain.

The question remains: where is the experience, materially? What material process of the brain actually generates the experiential sensation of the color red? of a sound? of the sensation of touch? We have centers of the brain that process these sensory inputs, but there is no center (at least found) that "generates" the experience that we perceive as subjective viewpoints. And what would it even mean to "generate" this? Experience does not seem material, and so the brain would have to contain some sort of material link to subjective reality. The questions get weirder and weirder as you go down.

The point is that, currently, this issue is undecidable, not because we have not advanced far enough in study, but because it appears that humanity's most effective way of garnering knowledge (empirical inquiry/science) is utterly impotent when it comes to this. Again, this is on the same level of failure as science's attempts to grapple with the causation of natural constants, or the interpretations of quantum mechanics.

>>14597107
>Sounds like a philosophical stance to me.
I don't think that sounds philosophical at all.

>dreams
this is your brain reorganizing memories. physically. it is observable under fMRI.
>the sensation of time passing upon waking
this doesn't exist, before alarm clocks, etc there were events where bright auroras caused miners and such to wake up in the middle of the night and start working. They had no idea how much time had passed.

I don't understand why you keep referring to experience. Experience is just attention passing through things that filter and modify it, ie. the structural and chemical state of one's brain.

>And yet, science hitherto has NO WAY to empirically verify experience, experiential consciousness, etc
meaningless. people used to think life was inexplicable because they didn't know what a cell was or how things reproduced. our being luddites does not mean anything and is the type of logic used by low-iq persons to dismiss UFOs, theoretical physics, etc

>>14597126
Physical processes of the brain are observable under fMRI, yes. The individual experience of an organism during that state of matter is NOT observable from an outside perspective. You might be able to tell me how you feel in a given moment, but I will never EXPERIENCE how you feel in that given moment.

This is the key difference. If you don't understand that, then you're an NPC I guess. Experience is something that appears existentially significant, and yet does not appear to be material. This illustrates a flaw in materialism that currently appears undecidable to scientific inquiry.

>Despite his new eyes, man was still rooted in matter, his soul spun into it and subordinated to its blind laws. And yet he could see matter as a stranger, compare himself to all phenomena, see through and locate his vital processes. He comes to nature as an unbidden guest, in vain extending his arms to beg conciliation with his maker: Nature answers no more, it performed a miracle with man, but later did not know him. He has lost his right of residence in the universe, has eaten from the Tree of Knowledge and been expelled from Paradise. He is mighty in the near world, but curses his might as purchased with his harmony of soul, his innocence, his inner peace in life’s embrace.

This is a philosophical essay on the disaster that was the development of consciousness. If you like, I encourage you to pursue the works of philosopher Thomas Metzinger and sci-fi author Peter Watts.

They focus on how the development of consciousness was not only accidental but ultimately harmful to the organism.

>>14597122
It doesn't mean anything in this context. I don't understand the focus on it. I really don't. Your experience is what happens to you filtered through your physical brain. What else would it be? It's explicable and simple.

>>14597134
>The individual experience of an organism during that state of matter is NOT observable from an outside perspective.
Not yet, but it will be perfectly observable in a few generations, I anticipate.

>This is the key difference. If you don't understand that, then you're an NPC I guess.
my argument is that we are all NPC's.

>>14597138
Thank you, I will read.

OP. Do you hold no desire to want to engineer consciousness or at least learn more about consciousness so then we can engineer this into an artifact?

>>14597125
The failure lies at the feet of words... "Consciousness" should not be the chosen word. Nor should "mind". There obviously are neural correlates to subjective experience, I've never seen that denied by anyone ever? But it's only a problem if you categorize mind and matter as separate things. Which "consciousness" causes because we then think of conscious entities vs unconscious things like boulders.

There is just reality itself. Reality appearing as many things... As particles, and trees, and dogs, and humans, and dreams, and qualia... All of this, simply reality itself. There's nothing else, and nothing outside of it.

>>14597151
I didn't get the reference, sorry.

>>14597147
>Not yet, but it will be perfectly observable in a few generations, I anticipate.
If you say this, then you are, again, completely misunderstanding the hard problem of consciousness. If science does not know how the brain induces experience, then even if it has the brain mapped down to the last protein channel, it would not be able to build an experience machine. Even if scientists exactly replicated a brain in a given state, atom by atom, they would not be able to verify that it is experiencing the state of consciousness they wish to induce.

Until it is shown that consciousness is a non-subjective phenomenon, empirical methods CANNOT prove anything about consciousness, not even that it exists. Not in 10 years, not in a 1000. This is a fundamental disconnect with the methods of empirical inquiry and the nature of phenomenon it is trying to seek knowledge about.

And still, opening the idea that material processes are all there is to consciousness (which may be true, and still would not necessarily dispel dualist perspectives), when does a physical system become conscious? Are amoeba conscious? What about calculators? Computers? A sufficiently complex AI? What is the difference between bits flipping on a CPU and potassium ions traveling in axon channels? A magnet through an electric field? These questions are not conceivably answerable with a materialist perspective on subjective consciousness (which at its inception does not even make sense).

>>14597147
i cant tell if youre a 4chan bot legitimately lacking subjective experiences, or just really dumb

Pretty simple: if that's true, your existence is baseless and manufactured. Any biological necessity to continue is just a byproduct of your observer mechanical meat-body and has no inherent value. Just kill yourself.

>>14597157
I'm saying science will know, because conscious experience is a reproducible, definable, physical process. That's how I started the thread. Whether or not you believe this doesn't matter- people didn't believe van Leeuwenhoek until he showed them.

>>14597150
Mumbo-jumbo new age pseudo-philosophical word salad. Yes, if subjective experience exists it is obviously a part of reality, that's kind of what "everything" means. No shit.

The problem is whether or not "everything" only contains phenomena reducible to material terms-- of which everything, with the exception of subjective consciousness, appears to.

Neural correlates to subjective experience appear to exist, and yet subjective experience seems to be existentially separate from the material processes in the brain. Blood pressure is not just correlated, but reducible to the material motion of blood cells in the blood vessels. Consciousness does not appear to be reducible to the material processes of the brain, because there is a subjective component to the phenomenon that is unaccounted for.

>>14597169
>conscious experience is a reproducible, definable, physical process
okay... where is your proof? all scientific inquiry is founded on the idea of evidence, and if you have evidence of your claim i expect to see it, and also your nobel prize sometime in the next 5 years when you successfully manage to solve one of the most confounding issues at the intersection of science and philosophy.

>>14597170
>and yet subjective experience seems to be existentially separate from the material processes in the brain

No it doesn't. Brain chemistry and composition extremely strongly predict action. This is especially apparent between subsaharan africans and everyone else.

>>14597155
Ex Machina

>>14597173
>okay... where is your proof?
It lies far in the future.
> all scientific inquiry is founded on the idea of evidence
objectively false. all scientific inquiry is founded on the idea of hypothesis.

I never stated I had evidence. I suggested the evidence will be self-evident to appropriately technologically advanced society.

>>14597186
oh, yeah, I watched that. Good movie.

>>14597169
Consciousness has never been reproduced once in the history of scientific consensus.

>>14597184
Subjective experience is existentially separate in the sense that it is all corollary (assumed to exist because of X). A strong composition of brain chemistry doesn't prove the existence of first hand, intuitive experience.

>>14597184
Behavioral consciousness is not experiential consciousness. You are just showing that you do not understanding the hard problem of consciousness, or are an NPC.

The actions of an organism being predictable by brain chemistry/composition/processes (something probably true) has NOTHING to do with the hard problem of consciousness.

You are conflating behavioral consciousness with subjective consciousness/experience/qualia. These are two separate issues. This is a common misunderstanding that people have about the hard problem of consciousness, so go and read about it until it clicks.

>>14597194
>Consciousness has never been reproduced once in the history of scientific consensus.
Meaningless, we don't have the science. Or do we? By your own argument, how would you know?

>>14597195
We are all NPCs. You are just showing that you do not understand the hard problem of consciousness, which I, a casual reader, have instantly noted divides into three camps of thought.

>>14597187
>It lies far in the future.
it isn't proof then you retard
>objectively false. all scientific inquiry is founded on the idea of hypothesis.
if you want to get retardedly nitpicky, then a) i guess i should have said scientific knowledge is founded upon reproducible evidence and b) testing of hypotheses is not a necessity for scientific inquiry. the "scientific method" you learn about in high school does not encompass entire range of scientific inquiry. you know what i meant, anyway.

>>14597200
Okay, explain the difference between behavioral consciousness and subjective consciousness, and then explain why you're conflating the first for the former when only the former has anything to do with the hard problem, retard.

>>14597170
You're creating unnecessary problems....... When people think "consciousness", they are thinking the human process of experience. They aren't thinking "ground of being".

As you said, it's fucking obvious right? Well actually, there are several people here who say subjective experiences don't exist. And please nobody start with NPC conspiracy copes...

If someone has decided that "abstractions" don't exist or aren't real, for linguistic or practical reasons, then obviously they will say those experiences are reducible to matter. Because they don't see the experiences as part of reality.

>>14596987
Your body knows of your existence, Anon.

>>14597201
>if you want to get retardedly nitpicky

I'm not being nitpicky at all, you were just outright wrong.

>>14597205
I can't explain the difference between things that don't exist. You're disacknowledging other camps of thought, and it's not an effective argument.

>>14597058
>yet does not appear to be material
Everything that interacts with the material world is material itself.

>>14597211
I'm trying to explain that subjective consciousness does not appear to be merely an "abstraction" or epiphenomenon-- people who believe it is do not have evidence.

Again, blood pressure is reducible to an epiphenomenon of material processes-- we know that blood pressure is an abstract idea that is correlated to the flow of blood cells through blood veins-- there is nothing extra, or unexplained about blood flow that this material explanation leaves out.

Subjective experience's entire status as a phenomenon cannot be explained materially, other than an apparent link to its contents with the material processes of consciousness. If someone says that subjective consciousness is a mere epiphenomenon of material processes of the brain, then they have a lot of evidence to provide.

>>14597223
>then they have a lot of evidence to provide.

and provide they shall, in a few hundred years.

>>14597213
>I can't explain the difference between things that don't exist. You're disacknowledging other camps of thought, and it's not an effective argument.

If "disacknowledging" means explaining exactly why they are not reasonable things to believe, then yes, I am "disacknowledging" these other camps of thought.

>I can't explain the difference between things that don't exist.
If you can't understand that existential consciousness is the only thing that is a priori known to exist, and thus is extremely likely to have existential significance, then I don't know what to tell you.

But, to be honest, it doesn't sound like that's what you're saying. You're saying that it doesn't exist, at all. That you, you specifically, the person writing these things, does not have any sort of internal experiences. If that's true, then I am sorry to break it to you, but you are an NPC. Just because you don't have any internal experiences does not mean nobody else does, however I don't expect you to understand this if you are really an NPC.

>>14597216
>Everything that interacts with the material world is material itself.
And yet consciousness seems to be a counterexample to this... hmm... Maybe that's the whole reason this issue is so confounding.

And also, no. One of the entry-level thought experiments to the hard problem is to imagine what the world would be like if nobody had an inner experience-- if everybody was a "p-zombie". The typical, almost universal answer is that nothing would change, there would just be no subjective experience of events. Subjective experience does not appear to interact with the material world, it appears to be correlated to material processes, but these material processes themselves appear to explain away all material events without invoking said consciousness. Again, this is why this problem is called "the hard problem".

>>14597227
>That you, you specifically, the person writing these things, does not have any sort of internal experiences
"internal experiences" are entirely explicable by physical, chemical and electrical processes.

>you are an npc! we aren't, just you! my life has meaning!
>god exists! he gives us meaning! you are lost!
same thing.

>>14597223
Sorry, I can't explain myself very well, I may have Down's.

Blood pressure is reducible to material processes if you think material is a substance. If no substance exists, then the very "material" that causes a "material" reaction, is itself not a substance anyway.

I understand what you mean, about subjective experience vs consensus reality, of course. But perhaps that duality is itself causing an issue?

I feel it may be better to explain via the fact that things don't come with a separate little existence. It just all is existence itself. See that's a oneness all people will immediately understand?... It seems an easier task to show people the reality of things from there?????

Because once they understand they and their experiences etc are simply a pattern within existence itself - that what is most fundamentally "them" is just existence itself - it is easier for them to understand that they are essentially a wave in the ocean... When the wave crashes down, the water hasn't gone anywhere... Maybe I'm wrong, but it seems to me that people grasping the obvious unity is the most important part.

>>14597236
We are getting nowhere. I'm asking you to provide proof that internal experiences are a) even observable by empirical of inquiry and b) is indeed entirely explicable by material processes, and you're just saying "wAiT a FeW hUnDrEd YeArS bRo", which is retarded, not even to mention the fact that one of the central concerns with the hard problem is it appears to be undecidable by scientific methods given any quantity of time.

also, subjective consciousness is not concerned with the meaning of life or any religious significance. dualism does not imply anything supernatural, providing of course that non-material phenomenon do meaningfully exist as part of reality. all it means is that there is another dimension of reality that exists alongside material reality, which is a grand idea, but is something that has some weight behind it now with the hard problem of consciousness. this isn't about faith, or a justification for the meaning of life, this is just a particularly tough question about the natural world, one that you don't seem to understand.

>>14597235
>nd yet consciousness seems to be a counterexample to this.

No it doesn't. That's like saying the soul exists.

If you are religious/spiritual please leave the thread because I didn't come to /sci/ to converse with people like that.

>>14597248
>one of the central concerns with the hard problem is it appears to be undecidable by scientific methods given any quantity of time.

Which is meaningless, as luddites have always considered relatively simple problems unsolvable, and the passage of time has always proven them wrong.

>>14597255
>If you are religious/spiritual please leave the thread because I didn't come to /sci/ to converse with people like that.
You are going to be sorely disappointed by just how many people like that troll and/or post constant garbage like that here. Either not enough people report such posts, or the jannies have flown the coop ages ago.

>>14597247
A lot of people spin it in this way, but I'm not arguing that dualism is some sort of "extra-reality" or some weird hippie shit, all I'm saying is that the hard problem indicates a real possibility that phenomenon that are not material or not extensive from material conditions are part of reality/the natural world.

Discussion on existence, whether there are different "types" of existence, whatever, is not relevant here is and is suited to a philosophy board.

The only important things about ontology relevant here is that there appear to be things that exists meaningfully (i.e. atoms, or particles, or whatever small enough scale you want to go), and things that exist merely as abstractions or epiphenomena, contingent on things in the prior category, like blood flow.

The issue is that consciousness, to science, appears to be an epiphenomenon, and yet appears (STRONGLY appears, a priori and without appeal to an inductive leap like the entirety of scientific knowledge) to the individual as a meaningfully existent phenomenon in the same way that an atom or particle exists meaningfully, though consciousness does not appear to be made of atoms or particles (material).

I think we're saying the same thing.

>>14597055
>There is no difference between "life" and an igneous rock
Obviously there is. This deception is transparent. You are clearly showing you have ulterior definitions and ideas at play, contrary to the stated premise.

When being informed your ideas do not follow from that premise, you just reaffirm your mindless strawmanning chant. You're either really this stupid and unaware of your own presuppositions or you're trolling. Either way it amounts to the same thing.

>>14597264
>The issue is that consciousness, to science, appears to be an epiphenomenon, and yet appears (STRONGLY appears, a priori and without appeal to an inductive leap like the entirety of scientific knowledge) to the individual as a meaningfully existent phenomenon in the same way that an atom or particle exists meaningfully, though consciousness does not appear to be made of atoms or particles (material).

I can dramatically alter your consciousness and experience by affecting you with magnetic fields. What say you to this?

>>14597260
It's a major 4chan problem. Some people are rational but want to discuss the "big questions", which are largely outside the scope of "Science & Math". But no rational person would enjoy posting on /x/ where people claim they can perform magick.

Serious topics deserve serious discussion. Not infestation with Christ proclaimers and such.

>>14597268
Okay, you're free not to respond anymore and leave the thread so that you can be released from my "ulterior motives".

Asked a question, got one answer and 60 posts of discussion. Perhaps don't enter into debates when what was requested was a solution.

>>14597270
If someone is genuine in wanting to explore the big questions, then they'd be satisfied with the induction or inference available by the actual evidence.

In every single case, they outright reject said evidence. The problem is a lack of banning such people, frankly, not a problem with the question.
>>14597272
The solution is "stop being dishonest". Whether to yourself or others I don't care.

>>14597255
I am not spiritual or religious. Does the soul exist? The soul is ill-defined. If someone says the soul is the same as subjective consciousness, then I guess it does exist, but if the soul is some ectoplasmic ghost thing that leaves your body upon death and goes to the old man in the sky, then no, I don't believe that kind of bullshit. The uncomfortable truth is that the hard problem of consciousness occupies an intersection between philosophy and science, is incredibly difficult to wrap your head around, and nobody has any good answers.

But your original thought that subjective consciousness must be material because it interacts with the material world is not reasonable for a couple of reasons-- a) because the core implication that all that interacts with the material world is not proven (though I would agree is reasonable) and b) because it is not proven that subjective consciousness interacts with the material world, illustrated hopefully by the thought experiment I mentioned.

There are reasonable ways to attack the dualistic proponents of the hard problem (as much advocating I do for this side, I am still agnostic either way-- the issue appears undecidable). I encourage you to consider how, if subjective consciousness is indeed non-material, we are still able to talk about it in ways that are reducible to the physical processes of the brain (like writing on a basket-weaving forum, for example.)

>>14597259
retard

>>14597269
Why do you think this is an issue or contradictory?

>>14597269
I'm not sure how that's relevant. Are you trying to say that magnetic fields are immaterial? I suppose a definition of material might be relevant-- we know that the magnetic force is composed of discrete, force-carrying particles, which means it is thus a material phenomenon that can affect other material objects.

>>14597280
>But your original thought that subjective consciousness must be material because it interacts with the material world is not reasonable for a couple of reasons-- a) because the core implication that all that interacts with the material world is not proven (though I would agree is reasonable) and b) because it is not proven that subjective consciousness interacts with the material world, illustrated hopefully by the thought experiment I mentioned.

>>>/x/ alert. Proof is for mathematics and pseudoscience. Science does not "prove" things in a formal sense. If you do not accept evidence and induction you do not belong here.

Not having absolute certainty is not warrant to dismiss evidence nor the inference to the best explanation. Fuck right off.

>>14597281
If subjective experience can be altered materially, how is it not purely material?

>>14597276
What's the "actual evidence" in your opinion?

>>14597286
>I'm not sure how that's relevant.

Uhhhh. you problem I guess.

thread not useful anymore, thanks for trying. People are confusing everyone and their arguments and statements now.

>>14597288
>If you do not accept evidence and induction you do not belong here.
That's funny, my entire starting case was based on evidence and induction.

Not being able to anticipate future evidence simply means you aren't intelligent. People who have made things happen in human thought are not those unwilling to stake their reputation.

There is no god, there is no such thing as life, there is no consciousness outside of physical and material machinations that appear to be "consciousness" in the same way a lightning strike appeared to be a god to a caveman. I am staking all on that.

If you were making an earnest argument, you'd agree that we need extremely high resolution brain and body scanning before you could make a decision on your perspective. Because you'd agree that my perspective could be proven, and yours disproven, empirically and scientifically, materially.

>>14597291
What if I told you everything is made of Zeons, and it was genuinely true. Consciousness is Zeons and material is Zeons. There are only Zeons... Right?... So why would the interaction of two Zeons be surprising in any way? It's then the same as a snooker ball hitting another and the second ball moving from the force.

The reason I write that, is because the issue is not that the things are linked completely, but that you think they are fundamentally different things. The proposal is that both things are cut from the same cloth, if you see what I mean?

>>14597288
/soi/ence cringe. also, isn't this a science & MATH board?

the issue is that inductive logic, while extremely powerful as evidenced by what science has given humanity, does not appear infallible. on a philosophical level, the inductive leap is a tragic and damning failure, but on a practical level that is less schizoid-philosophy, we can see the failure of induction when it comes to things like "why do natural constants exist?", or "what is the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics?", and, yes, the hard problem of consciousness.

that is not to say consciousness CANNOT or WILL NOT be explained ever by inductive/empirical means, it is to say that it appears, currently, to be invulnerable to these methods of inquiry. until we get some proof or, yes, even INDUCTIVE EVIDENCE, we have to be satisfied with trying to attack the problem from every angle-- deductive logic, philosophy, scientific inquiry, etc.

none of these methods are superior to the others, do not be so hostile. it is just that this problem is particularly confounding, and though it is entirely possible that it IS illusory, there is still nothing to show that it is.

there is no "best explanation", either. it wouldn't be called the hard problem if there was.

>>14597298
>What's the "actual evidence" in your opinion?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evidence
Given this is a /sci/ board gee I wonder what evidence might be. Maybe it has to do with epistemology? Hmmmmmmm...
>That's funny, my entire starting case was based on evidence and induction.
An argument from ignorance is not valid induction nor is it evidence. "It is not proven therefore something else" is another way of saying "you/I don't know therefore". Everything else you write is like a retarded >>>/x/files anon pulling every strawman of materialism out his ass like always.
>/soi/ence cringe. also, isn't this a science & MATH board?
Yes, and you will note how the anon in question isn't doing math. The user is, instead, committing to invalid inferences or deductions as exampled in this post as well. It's almost like you've made up a narrative in your head that has nothing to do with what I wrote or what was being replied to. You appear to need this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_charity

>>14597303
>thread not useful anymore, thanks for trying. People are confusing everyone and their arguments and statements now.

you hit a nerve-center in /sci/ about the nature of consciousness. you shouldn't be surprised about it all going to hell in a handbasket.

also, saying your starting case is based on "evidence and induction" and then "staking your belief" on zero evidence is contradictory. this question is uncomfortable and important for everybody, you aren't special.

>>14597318
That last greentext reply was for >>14597309 of course. Must've missed it when I clicked.

>>14597318
Is the chance 0 or >0 that things will be explained empirically in the future that are not explicable now?

Thus anticipation of future empiricism is a valid scientific perspective. Stuff it.

>>14597319
Evidence that exists in the future is nonzero, you're simply thinking too linearly.

>>14597318
this might be a science board, but a question concerning the natural world that throws into doubt the efficacy very foundations of science (induction, empiricism, etc.) is going to prompt discussion like this. there is no other way to discuss this problem until someone raises up some real evidence, inductive or otherwise, that points to a solution to the hard problem.

if you're just going to yell and scream and throw a tantrum about people not sticking to these methods that are apparently ineffective (which amounts to throwing a tantrum that this is a very difficult problem for everybody trying to figure it out), then you should just close the thread.

>>14597327
>Evidence that exists in the future is nonzero, you're simply thinking too linearly.
this means nothing.

"i think that there is a giant pink unicorn outside of time and space that rules over everything and is perfect and basically god. there is no current proof, but i am certain that there will be evidence for it in the future. i am simply anticipating future evidence. the evidence that exists for my idea in the future is nonzero, you're simply thinking to linearly" is what this amounts to. you can't form an argument on evidence that doesn't exist yet, retard. you're actually an imbecile.

>>14597333
You don't understand the difference between being a scientist and being a thinker.

Say I posit something is going to happen in the future because I "feel" it is going to. This "feeling" may not be something I can explain in words, but it isn't "intuition" or spirit, it's the culmination of possibly millions of pieces of data being washed around in the brain in ways that you, I, or anyone else do not understand. Yet.

The thing happens. Was my prediction invalid because I could not explain it at the time? Did I "really" predict the event, or not?

>>14597339
>>14597333
Tell me, did this mean nothing?

>>14597318
I meant what do you think the evidence for your viewpoint is? Can you think of any example?

I'm not sure how people think that given time we will be able to solve the alleged problem. Experience is, as the name suggests, an experience. The only way to know an experience is to - obviously - experience it. And that is by definition subjective to the person experiencing it.

There isn't going to be a time where someone born blind sees from hearing how the brain produces the sights. The only way to make a blind person see, is to essentially play the experience of seeing on their brain. Why? Because it can only be found first hand.

>>14597339
your "feeling" (as retarded as it is, anyway) doesn't belong in a discussion where people are trying to involve, i don't know, actual evidence and lines of reasoning. gtfo

>>14597342
>sTaR tReK pReDiCtEd IpAdS

>>14597345
It's my thread, so it's my discussion. You can go make your own if you want to.

>actual reasoning
you just committed to the perspective that not being able to explain something makes it ascientific, rather than a problem approached by someone not yet capable of the solution.

History has proven you wrong, I've no need to argue.

>>14597353
You're too stupid to understand that this is an issue with the epistemological foundation of science. Science does not appear to have the tools to deal with this problem-- if someone hands you a twig from a tree and asks you to measure the voltage of a circuit, you would be in the same conundrum. It doesn't matter how many years you fuck around with a stick, you aren't going to get a voltage reading.

Past scientific disputes were demonstrably different because the different theories could conceivably be discredited by further experimentation. Vitalism was disproved by finding evidence for non-vitalistic explanations of life, the aether was disproved by further developments in physics, Lamarckism was disproved by further observations and discoveries in genetics and in every case it was obvious that evidence could be raised to disprove these things.

With the hard problem of consciousness, science cannot even prove that subjective consciousness exists. There is no experiment you can design to prove the existence of a subjective phenomenon that cannot be interacted with via material means. This is the problem.

Imagine that there is a pink fairy outside the observable universe, with certainty. There is no experiment that could be designed by science to discover the fairy or learn about it, because it is outside the scope of material inquiry-- no possible action can reach the outside universe by the laws of physics. Now, imagine, that you somehow personally knew the fairy exists, with certainty, a priori, without the appeal to empirical methods. How do you go about learning more about the fairy? You can't reach it empirically, and all you know is that it exists, but nothing else. In a billion years you couldn't reach the fairy, because it is simply inaccessible to empirical inquiry by being outside of the observable universe

I'm going to say it again- you are misunderstanding the hard problem of consciousness and do not understand what you are talking about

>>14597368
>Science does not appear to have the tools to deal with this problem

Yet.

>>14597327
>Thus anticipation of future empiricism is a valid scientific perspective. Stuff it.
That... is... literally my position. What? Did you misclick?
>>14597328
>there is no other way to discuss this problem until someone raises up some real evidence, inductive or otherwise, that points to a solution to the hard problem.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness_Explained
https://grazianolab.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/graziano_review_2020.pdf
No hard problem. Just snake oil.
>>14597343
See above links.

>>14597374
>That... is... literally my position. What? Did you misclick?

You were the one who appeared to be disputing me!

This is why 4chan really, really sucks for having any kind of conversation above the level of "lol tranny kys". Nobody can even keep track of who is making what statement or taking what position.

I kinda miss usernames. Anonymous interaction isn't that useful anymore because this site is now 90% people who would've never belonged originally

>>14597382
I apologize if I misunderstood your post. Can you clarify which post it was, so I know which anon? I agree with you as to the naming sometimes. Here, I shall designate myself for now as "e".

Can you point out which post it was and I can re-read the thread to see if I mistook it as someone else's, and misinterpreted the implications?

>>14597391
Honestly, e, I am too depressed to bother.

>>14597374
Yes I see your links. That's what I meant earlier, there's a miscommunication issue in how people define things. And also how people define real and not real.

This is the real problem I think. I steer clear of terms like consciousness or God because there's a lot of interpretations attached to those words. Especially God which is an absolute no-go word.

>>14597394
Well, if it matters, I do apologize for the snafu. Of course I know I can fuck up. All good man, no worries.

>>14597373
no, you fucking idiot, that's not how this works. if science has new tools added that are not founded upon empirical means, then it is no longer science. empiricism is the problem here, because empiricism cannot adequately answer this question. science is applied empiricism, and thus cannot adequately answer this question, unless someone shows that the hard problem is susceptible to empirical inquiry.

>>14597374
anticipation of future empirical knowledge is certainly valid, when the question being investigated can conceivably be answered by empirical means.

also, dennett is a notorious retard on this issue-- does anybody have the link to the webpage of that CS autist that BTFOs dennett? i can't find it.

the paper you linked is, like every single other scientific investigation into the hard problem, investigating phenomenon that only answer questions into behavioral consciousness. Anil Seth is a midwit for the same reason.

>>14597397
There are, I think, pretty clear definitions and explanations in that easy to read PDF I linked. If you don't want to buy what is now a pretty old book, the PDF summarizes much of the same view regarding current models.
>>14597405
>empiricism is the problem here, because empiricism cannot adequately answer this question.
Feel free to give justification for that claim.
>when the question being investigated can conceivably be answered by empirical means.
You know it can't because.... ?
>the paper you linked is, like every single other scientific investigation into the hard problem, investigating phenomenon that only answer questions into behavioral consciousness. Anil Seth is a midwit for the same reason.
Again if you are positing something you cannot demonstrate "beyond the knowable" you belong in >>>/x/

>>14597402
thank you for saying that, I have pretty much given up on this site that i've been on for almost 20 years because everyone is so nasty lately. I need to stop using /v/ and shit like that.

I really appreciate it. You are a better person than many.

>>14597405
We simply aren't going to agree on this. I don't believe in the existence of inexplicable subjective "experience". I believe things will remain materially explicable unless they are somehow influenced by higher dimensions to which we do not belong.

>>14597425
Some of you are a lot better at showing people the door than I am. Well said.

That guy's position appears religious/spiritual in nature to me. After doing extremely rudimentary reading on the hard problem, I believe it does not exist.

>>14597425
Right, but you see that the proposal is built on the definitions chosen? If someone told you that you did not come into the universe, but you arose from it. The universe is what you fundamentally are, all things are. You would find that obvious right? Too obvious to even waste time on, right?

There's a sort of unity people are attempting to communicate, and it's not working using terms like mind or consciousness.

>>14597433
>thank you for saying that, I have pretty much given up on this site that i've been on for almost 20 years because everyone is so nasty lately. I need to stop using /v/ and shit like that.
Whenever the /pol/tards break containment things go south. There's also quite a lot of meddling, I think, people testing bots and so on. Plus your usual trolls of course.
>>14597450
The accuracy or soundness of the definitions as pertain to reality and the nature of it can, of course, be tested. I am not quite sure what difficult you are expressing to be honest.

>>14597425
>Feel free to give justification for that claim.
Okay. Science is applied empiricism, science thus relies on material methods to investigate material phenomenon, and it has never demonstrated the ability to investigate immaterial phenomenon, presumably because immaterial phenomenon did not exist. Now, it appears that subjective consciousness is an immaterial phenomenon, and so it does not appear that science can answer any inquiry as to the nature of subjective consciousness. Again, I ask, where is experience located? What does it look like? What is it made out of?

>You know it can't because.... ?
I don't know it cannot, I am saying it does not appear it cannot. I have tried to be very careful to avoid certainty on either side of the issue, because the hard problem appears currently undecidable. I am agnostic either way, but people on this board are so violent against dualist/non-materialist takes when they have zero evidence.

>Again if you are positing something you cannot demonstrate "beyond the knowable"
Can science ever explain the existence of natural constants? Can science ever find the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics? These issues are valid questions, but appear, in the same way as the hard problem, outside the possibility of scientific inquiry-- how are you going to investigate the underlying parts of quantum mechanics when QM is a black box to scientific knowledge? you have to throw a particle to see a particle. where does the particle touch "experience"? if meta-discussion on the foundations of science and its utility don't belong on /sci/, i don't know where it would.

>I believe things will remain materially explicable unless they are somehow influenced by higher dimensions to which we do not belong.
so you don't believe in the possibility of non-materialist takes on consciousness, but you believe in the possibility of "HiGhEr DiMeNsIoNs"? amazing. this gets better and better.

have you read thus spoke zarasthustra yet

>>14597464
Yeah, I read it when I was like 20.

>>14597235
>One of the entry-level thought experiments to the hard problem is to imagine what the world would be like if nobody had an inner experience-- if everybody was a "p-zombie". The typical, almost universal answer is that nothing would change,
Do brains have a reason to pretend that they have consciousness?

What's with all the weird namefags that pop up in consciousness and epistemology threads?

>>14597473
Quite possibly. Having a "consciousness" might impart some kind of evolutionary advantage.

it's just test reply, i am new in 4chan. forget me

>>14597440
>That guy's position appears religious/spiritual in nature to me. After doing extremely rudimentary reading on the hard problem, I believe it does not exist.

Your extremely rudimentary reading means you probably don't understand the hard problem. It isn't a religious or a spiritual thing-- the fact is that as a subjective organism, your experience of the world is the most real thing to exist, logically, and thus apparently has a meaningful existence despite not being made of material objects. It is correlated with physical processes, but it has an aspect that is unexplained and thus does not appear to be a mere epiphenomenon. This opens the way (does not provide certainty or evidence) for non-materialist explanations for consciousness, which will remain an open question on both sides until someone comes up with a non-materialist or materialist answer to the hard problem.

I don't understand what's so voodoo or magical about non-materalist takes on consciousness anyway, when science already has something so alien and weird to our everyday understanding as quantum mechanics and special relativity, of which there is some weird faith in the qualitative accuracy of these models despite their being essentially a black box with no obvious correct interpretation.

>>14597478
don't use name field unless you have a very specific reason to do so, it's discouraged.

>>14597473
no, they don't, which is why it is so confounding. if everybody was a p-zombie, nothing would change materially. there would just be no experience. and yet, it appears so real. it MAY well be illusory-- but there is no reason to believe this.

>>14597477
i disagree-- selective pressure would have to be exerted in the realm of the immaterial consciousness (assuming it does exist), lol

>>14597483
>but it has an aspect that is unexplained and thus does not appear to be a mere epiphenomenon.

I disagree. You can phrase this however you like, I don't agree with that perspective.

>>14597459
>not quite sure what difficult you are expressing to be honest.

Right, it's just a very difficult idea to communicate. And it doesn't relate to science or math, as science is not affected or changed if all things are most fundamentally made of "consciousness" or "particles" or "wumbadums". It makes no difference.

The best way to explain it would be to play certain shifts in perspective on your brain. The brain is so heavily evolved to craft a certain imaginary representation of the world around us. Dennett is right that the representations aren't accurate to what is "out there". In fact they couldn't be. It's impossible. And you only need a few sentences to show that, not an entire paper.

>>14596987
>trapped observer in a mechanical meat-body
you are the meat-body, the idea that a human is a soul piloting a vehicle is incorrect

>>14597056
>why bother continuing
simulation theory might help you here, the idea that this universe is an experiment from a post-human civilization running different scenarios through unimaginably powerful hardware able to simulate everything we see around us. They wouldn't do that if they didn't need to, so one could assume that information was lost through some cataclysm. In that case, what you do with your time should be what you think you should do, because your purpose for existing is to be yourself, taking up a you-shaped volume of space and making you-flavored decisions about how you interact with the world around you, because a world simulation without you in it is a less accurate simulation, so your existence helps increase the meaning of the existence of the people around you. Look up the simulation theory trilemma for more information.

>>14597491
okay, well you're either a fucking idiot or an NPC, either way I don't care what you say. there are perfectly reasonable ways to attack non-materialist perspectives on the hard problem, denying its existence with no further explanation is not one of them.

>>14597490
>i disagree-- selective pressure would have to be exerted in the realm of the immaterial consciousness (assuming it does exist), lol

Illusion of consciousness is probably correlated to brain volume, for which there are very obvious selective pressures in hypothetical cavemen types.

>>14597498
I am pretty sure these days we live in a simulation, but I think simulation theory considered in a computational manner is silly.

An alien civilization probably influenced our evolution (how did australopithecine brain volume suddenly multiply several times over? the food doesn't appear to be available) and has watched us and guided us.

It's more than likely just an AI.

>>14597235
>The typical, almost universal answer is that nothing would change,
While building an analog of consciousness purely with nerves is, technically, possible, it would greatly increase the required complexity of our nervous system and make it much less reliable.

>>14597477
>Having a "consciousness" might impart some kind of evolutionary advantage
The more we press-on, the more we find the opposite. Look who numbers among the most prolific of reproducers. Would you characterize that group as having an abundance of consciousness?

>>14597504
assuming consciousness is illusory, sure. but whether it is or is not illusory appears undecidable-- especially given its strong apparent existential validity.

honestly, illusionary consciousness might be a moot point anyway. what would it mean for consciousness to be illusory? how would that even work, materially? it would still have to generate the sensation of illusion, yes? i don't see how illusory consciousness is a material explanation anyway.

>>14597499
If you want people to take you seriously, you need to express yourself better than repeating "NPC" over and over. I can ascertain your age from your words, and you're not experienced enough in life to fuck around with insulting me left and right with your hackneyed 4chan parrot words. You appear to be purulent drainage from /pol/.

>>14597509
>The more we press-on, the more we find the opposite. Look who numbers among the most prolific of reproducers. Would you characterize that group as having an abundance of consciousness?

Selective pressures do not apply across aeons. The opposite of what I posited is clearly true today but that's neither here nor there.
>I'm gonna fuck ALL YALLLLL

>>14597517
okay mr "there will be evidence in the future therefore i'm right and will ignore everything you've said that shows that my ideas are unreasonable"

>>14597521
Everything you have said boils down to effectively the same perspective as belief in god.

>>14597517
>The opposite of what I posited is clearly true today
I'm glad you're offering at least that. Sometimes I wonder if consciousness didn't result from severe inbreeding. Maybe a sophisticated hunting and tracking system got its patch cables crossed and then one day, "What the fuck am I?"

However it happened, nature seems to be working overtime to weed it out.

>>14597440
Thank you, but I do feel embarrassed to have honed a skill so impossible to monetize.
>>14597462
>and it has never demonstrated the ability to investigate immaterial phenomenon
And? Are you positing immaterial phenomena? On what grounds? To suppose it "can't demonstrate something" supposes such a thing somehow exists without ability to be demonstrated. That is a contradiction, because you cannot assert something "exists" meaningfully while holding that it is impossible to demonstrate and indistinguishable from not existing. To exist in any meaningful sense means it can, must, have an effect. That effect by definition could thus be measured. All the way through, to propose "immateriality" is to propose a square circle. I reject your justification as invalid and unsound.
> I am agnostic either way, but people on this board are so violent against dualist/non-materialist takes when they have zero evidence.
All the evidence is materialist. Ability to propose ad hoc hypotheses does not make the positions equal, because you have a burden of proof that is unfulfilled. Underdetermination means for any theory other theories can be made to retroactively explain what you currently know. What matters is which theory can explain things you don't yet know, and 100% of all theories with success are materialist. That is a long record to base a solid inductive case on.
>Can science ever explain the existence of natural constants?
This question, and the rest you ask, are one long string of "I/you don't know therefore [something else]". That is called "an argument from ignorance", and is also invalid.

By the way, you forgot to reference the other anon with your last greentext. >>14597433

>>14597526
>I'm glad you're offering at least that.

I mean..why wouldn't I? Selection pressures can only apply to the environment in which an organism lives. Temporality is obviously a factor :)

I think humanity needs strictly controlled reproduction but, good luck with that. That's the line you cross where people will just start killing indiscriminately.

>>14597536
I offer antinatalism as proof that an abundance of conscious awareness was a complete and total accident. I can't think of anything more anti-darwinian than a mechanism that prevents a perfectly healthy animal from passing on its genes.

You can try to control breeding for intelligence, but you may reach a point where those intelligent actors are either so disillusioned that they refuse to breed or kill themselves before breeding age.

Rather elegant solution to the fermi paradox as well.

>>14597529
>And? Are you positing immaterial phenomena? On what grounds?
I am positing that it is possible and I am positing that it does not appear that consciousness is material.

Arguing from the subjective viewpoint outwards, the only thing you can possibly know to exist with certainty is experience itself. We have known this since the Cogito, and everything except this basic fact is founded upon the inductive leap. Now, I'm not a schizoid and I don't believe in Descartes' demon, but this is worth mentioning here because this leads to a strong indication that conscious experience has ontological significance beyond an epiphenomenon AND, crucially, DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE MATERIAL. What is experience? Can you weigh it? Hold it? Does it have a location? Is it mediated by a particle-field? These questions appear non-sensical, and even appeals to "illusion" still need to answer the question of "illusory to who?"

I am not saying it is immaterial with certainty, because I think there are strong arguments and criticisms for both perspectives on the issue, although I do obviously lean somewhat towards the non-materialist perspective. The issue is that materialists refuse to consider the a priori knowledge of the existence of consciousness, its apparent immateriality, and the resultant inadequacy of empirical means to investigate it.

>All the evidence is materialist.
There is no materialist evidence that "experience" as a phenomenon even exists. Sorry. The only evidence for the phenomenon is from the individual, subjective viewpoint-- which is why this issue is both confusing and personal.

>>14597529
>>14597552
(2)
furthermore,
>That is called "an argument from ignorance", and is also invalid.
This is not an argument for ignorance. An argument for ignorance would be something like "The eye cannot be explained via evolution because it is too complex, therefore god must have done it." The phenomenon in question is material, and thus obviously subject and possibly explainable by empirical means.

Here, we have evidence (inconclusive and subjective, but evidence that exists in a vacuum) that experiential consciousness exists meaningfully, and is apparently immaterial, and this immaterial nature leads to the apparent inability of empirical means to investigate it.

Keeping in mind that explaining neural correlates of consciousness will never explain experiential consciousness.

>>14597552
>Now, I'm not a schizoid and I don't believe in Descartes' demon, but this is worth mentioning here because this leads to a strong indication that conscious experience has ontological significance beyond an epiphenomenon AND, crucially, DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE MATERIAL.
You keep making this leap. Do you have that without brains? No. Is there any evidence that it is not material? You keep not mentioning any. You just mention the leap again. Repeating an assertion is not evidence of an assertion.
>There is no materialist evidence that "experience" as a phenomenon even exists.
All of neuroscience and biology disagrees, barring some definition deliberately excluding all known evidence. Which, to me, is a bit suspect just on a sniff test. "How convenient, this thing you posit exists is definitionally outside the bounds of testing".
>This is not an argument for ignorance.
You are positing an thing that is unknown on the claim science cannot come to know it. "You cannot know therefore" is just different words for "you don't know therefore".

>>14597555
>Keeping in mind that explaining neural correlates of consciousness will never explain experiential consciousness.
If I can chime on your frotting for a moment (that when guys rub helmets together for fun).

Why do you rule-out that subjective experience has a material cause? I mean, I know full well why we cannot measure it or live as someone's else subjective self without destroying the concept, but what makes you so certain that, even if an explanation can never be grasped or tendered, it still does not lay in the material?

Its the ruling-out of the material that bugs me and smacks as unscientific.

>>14597564
Why do you think brains are made of material? Or by material do you just mean anything in consensus reality (as opposed to subjective reality)?

>>14597564
>You keep making this leap. Do you have that without brains?
What leap, specifically? Actually not sure. If you mean the inductive leap, it's a core issue w proper induction that means all inductive knowledge is inherently fallacious, and so inductive knowledge rests on the assumption that the inductive hypothesis is correct. Relevant to this convo b/c science, but not worth losing sleep over imo.

>Is there any evidence that it is not material?
It is a priori apparent that consciousness is immaterial. To the subjective viewpoint, experience cannot be weighed, seen, measured, or broken down into its constituent parts. I ask the opposite-- where is the proof that consciousness is material? It might be generated from material processes (the brain), but that does not mean it is material, and it does not appear to be. I am not saying this is strong evidence, I am saying it is the only evidence and there is none to the contrary.

>All of neuroscience and biology disagrees
You are, again, conflating behavioral consciousness with subjective consciousness. Read about the difference, please. We aren't going to get anywhere until you understand the difference. Behavior of an organism resulting from brain activity has nothing to do with the hard problem that concerns the associated "experience" of the organism during these processes.

>"How convenient, this thing you posit exists is definitionally outside the bounds of testing"
This is the opposite of convenient. Nobody wants the hard problem to exist-- there's a reason it's called a problem. This is why it is the hard problem, this is why it is exceptional, this is why it is worth discussing. It absolutely is an edge case, not because I say so because I want to be right, it's because it is the only noteworthy counterpoint to material worldviews.

(1/2)

>>14597541
>I offer antinatalism as proof that an abundance of conscious awareness was a complete and total accident. I can't think of anything more anti-darwinian than a mechanism that prevents a perfectly healthy animal from passing on its genes.

I accept your strong proof as an antinatalist! I am an evolutionary dead end! *air guitar and fist pumping*

>>14597579
Here lies anon. He never scored.

>>14597581
is it the fate of every /sci/ thread to eventually spiral toward beavis & butthead?

>>14597579
>I offer antinatilsm
>I am an antinatalist
/sci/ 2022

>>14597578
>What leap, specifically?
In the post you replied to...
>Do you have that [the subjective experience described] without brains? No. Is there any evidence that it is not material? You keep not mentioning any. You just mention the leap again. Repeating an assertion is not evidence of an assertion.

What about this, explaining that you just repeat the assertion and why that's a problem, was not clear?
>It is a priori apparent that consciousness is immaterial.
Um, no. You have an intuition that it is immaterial. That's all. I do not share your intuition.

>>14597584
A Treatise on Man's Desire to Return
-henceforth, with immediacy-
to Monke

>>14597564
>>14597578
That being said, yes, if consciousness is immaterial it is outside the bounds of testing for science. Science is the objective, empirical study of the outside world, and is mediated via material means. Particles have to hit your eye to see anything at all. "Spooky action at a distance" does not apply to scientific inquiry-- it is material. If a phenomenon exists, is immaterial and subjective, then it cannot be investigated scientifically. Again, this is why the hard problem is a HARD problem.

>You are positing an thing that is unknown on the claim science cannot come to know it.
Yes.
>"You cannot know therefore" is just different words for "you don't know therefore".
No, it's not. Like, literally, it's not. Completely different implication.
(p->q) ~= (r->q).
The premises of your implication are completely different. I'm sorry. If you don't understand why then you need to think about it. Meditate on the difference between "you cannot know therefore" versus "you don't know therefore".

>Why do you rule-out that subjective experience has a material cause?
I don't. Personally, I think it is likely (still do not want to commit entirely to one side) that material phenomenon generate immaterial experience, probably through some sort of complexity of physical systems that happens to be a natural law we have not/cannot discovered. No evidence for that specific idea, but I have never once ruled out that material cannot generate immaterial.

Consider, though, that if material means generates immaterial phenomenon, then materialism is wrong. The very existence of immaterial phenomenon means the natural world is decidedly NOT materialist-- but there is of yet no proof of this. The hard problem just opens up the channel of reasonable doubt.

>>14597596
>That being said, yes, if consciousness is immaterial it is outside the bounds of testing for science.
>if
Do you get the problem yet? I do not accept your notion based on your personal intuition. That's the end of it unless you have something other than "Well I feel this explains it".

You should all watch this excellent presentation.

https://youtu.be/v4uwaw_5Q3I

>>14597588
We only have an intuition that the material world exists. Read about the Cogito. From the subjective (the only viewpoint humans can have), the outside material world is separated from deducible certainty by the inductive leap. Consciousness precedes knowledge of the material in the human mind, although I agree that it is not reasonable to believe the outside world is generated by consciousness or some other schizo tier take. This points to the probable immateriality of consciousness.

The hard problem, still, is a mire of uncertainty and undecidability.

>>14597596
I don't think you are getting anywhere with this, since you are basically arguing for the existence of magic

>>14597602
I get it, you don't accept my premise. I don't accept the premise entirely either. I'm just saying that we have some evidence that the premise (consciousness immaterial) is TRUE, meaning we now have reasonable doubt towards materialism.

If you don't think consciousness appears immaterial (notice how I try to always use 'appears' and not 'is'? it's important...), then why do you think it is material? Have you held consciousness? Have you measured its density? What element is it composed of? Is it mediated by force carrying particles? Please explain the alternative.

Calling it an epiphenomenon is disingenuous-- when consciousness is prior to the material world in the subjective mind, I will permit it may be illusory, but you are violently ignoring the appearance of consciousness as immaterial, as though you MUST be deceived, as though your brain MUST be tricking you. Who is "you", anyway? Not your body-you, but if consciousness is an illusion, then who is being shown the illusion?

>>14596987
Just chemicals?

Impressive they have you on 4chan pondering itself.

A bit more to them i'd say. Science talks of what attributes it has. The ruler measuring a rock can present any measurement standard, 9 inches or 20cm or 200mm. The numbers mean nothing.

The rock being lobbed at your head? You'll feel that without any thought or measurement.

>>14597606
You're starting to annoy me. Yes, I am exceptionally well read and know far more about the cogito argument than would ever be worth anyone knowing. It does not help your case even a little and you aren't helping said case by trying to use it either. Case in point:

This,
>This points to the probable immateriality of consciousness.
Does not follow from this,
> From the subjective (the only viewpoint humans can have), the outside material world is separated from deducible certainty by the inductive leap. Consciousness precedes knowledge of the material in the human mind [...]

The two are completely unrelated statements.

>>14597607
I am arguing that the existence of immaterial phenomenon is possible-- I am not arguing for it's certain existence.

This is no less schizo than a scientist arguing for the copenhagen interpretation of QM over the many-worlds interpretation or vice-versa, only that this argument has a little bit of weight behind it because of how personal the appearance of immaterial phenomenon is.

>>14597617
>then why do you think it is material?
All evidence of consciousness stems from matter. You can alter it, disable it, and so on, all by changing states in the brain. There is nothing about what you think of as consciousness that cannot be changed, or taken away, by changing or removing parts in the brain.

>>14597588
In a thought experiment, say you somehow could isolate qualia and such. In a vacuum, you would identify any material thing as being matter. You would not need in any case for it to come packaged with something else to know it as matter.

Qualia in a vacuum. Hypothetically. What would you call it? Would you still call it matter?

>>14597620
We know that consciousness exists, in some capacity, from the cogito.

To learn about the part of the world that is "certainly" (in an inductive sense) material, we have to take that inductive leap to accept the existence of atoms, particles, etc.

I'm not saying the leap is wrong, just that it is extensive from consciousness.

"I think, therefore I am" has no reliance on atoms or particles or mass or material. It relies on "I", "think", and "am", none of which are demonstrably material prior to the inductive leap. This leads to an appearance-- and you are correct, it may be illusory-- that there is some sort of immaterial phenomenon (thinking/consciousness/self/experience/etc.) that is ontologically meaningful.

If you don't follow, I'm not sure what to tell you. Maybe try and point out where the exact flaw is.

>>14597622
Cogito, ergo sum. Consciousness is correlated with material phenomenon, but science has nothing to say about experience after death, or whether or not it exists.

(I think it's unreasonable to believe in an afterlife, but the point is that the issue is undecidable by science).

>>14597622
Pretty obvious, why does a person feel themselves in their body and not someone elses? Why aren't we accounting for the Steve Jones molecule or the Sarah Smith molecule?

>>14597622
But there unfortunately isn't evidence that matter is any more of a substance than imaginary stuff. You know the matter in your dreams isn't what it appears to be.

Ofc you will say that the dream matter is brain matter. I get that. But apply the same logic further up this chain. Where things appear to be something, but are actually something else.

You haven't been talking to me. But for the record I think consciousness and matter is ultimately made of nothing.

>>14597623
I do not think the concept is coherent. Like proposing "a rock without rocks". That is a violation of the law of identity, such as proposing A = NOTA.

>>14597626
>"I think, therefore I am" has no reliance on atoms or particles or mass or material
You can't have that experience without your brain. Yes, it is reliant on it.
>>14597627
>Consciousness is correlated with material phenomenon
No, you can change consciousness proactively with neural stimulation. That is not "a correlation", that is "a causation". To propose otherwise is to insert an ad hoc hypothesis, "Oh but the real cause is the gremlins behind the neurons we can't see".
>Where things appear to be something, but are actually something else.
Occam's razor. Just because something "could be" does not mean it "is", nor is that warrant nor justification. The assertion has a burden of proof that is not met.

>>14597632
>Like proposing "a rock without rocks"

I actually don't think that's the case, because if it were like that, I could have someone imagine a billion dollars, then cut out the neurons that light up and go spend them.

The "qualia" is not (if hypothetically isolated) the neurons in the same way that a rock is a rock.

>>14597633
>I could have someone imagine a billion dollars, then cut out the neurons that light up and go spend them.
That's patently fucking ridiculous. No, you COULD however get an image from doing so. We've done that, by the way. The imagination is a representation or image of the thing, not the thing. No clue how you reasoned that even a little.

>>14597632
>You can't have that experience without your brain. Yes, it is reliant on it.
Where is your proof? I agree that it is likely we need a brain to experience that, but why is it not conceivable that experience exists independently in some fashion from matter? Such an experience might be inchoate, primordial blackness, but there is no evidence either way.

Science, again, has nothing to say about experience. It cannot prove experience even exists, nor can it prove the neural correlates- though we as subjective individuals can infer from listening people describe verbally (NOT a direct or meaningful communication of experience, btw) or by personally testing, taking drugs or something, etc.

>That is not "a correlation", that is "a causation".
Are you sure? If the brain explodes, how can you be certain consciousness ceases? I, again, do not believe in an afterlife, but this isn't about specific belief, it is about the undecidability of this problem with respect to science. Science cannot say whether there is or is not an afterlife for the same reason it cannot explain experience.

>"Oh but the real cause is the gremlins behind the neurons we can't see".
I am not saying that there is something else causing emotions, feelings, experience, etc. beyond the brain. You are strawmanning my argument. The brain may very well (and probably does) generate all of these things, it is just that it would be generated phenomena that are immaterial.

You are getting off track.

>Occam's razor.
You want to invoke Occam's razor? I think you're doing it backwards. Consciousness appears immaterial, and so it probably is. It appears that the state of the brain alters consciousness, so it is probable that the brain generates immaterial consciousness. That is the simplest explanation.

>>14597632
I don't think it's Occam's Razor. Things coming from things causes a lot of major problems. As an example, say you reach THE bottom material. The absolute most fundamental material, right? What is that made of? Itself? I hope I'm explaining myself well, but I think there's just an inevitable brick wall, because a thing can't explain itself. We always have to dig deeper to find other things to explain the bigger thing.

If there is no such thing as any real substance, there is no such problem. Everything is ultimately not made of anything. It also equalizes qualia and matter, there is no hard problem anymore.

>>14597636
>The imagination is a representation or image of the thing, not the thing.

I reasoned it like this. A rock us not a representation of a rock, it IS a rock. That's why I don't think it's a parallel.

>>14597637
>Where is your proof? I agree that it is likely we need a brain to experience that, but why is it not conceivable that experience exists independently in some fashion from matter? Such an experience might be inchoate, primordial blackness, but there is no evidence either way.
Science deals in evidence, mathematics deals with proof. The evidence is all of neuroscience. You can guess "there may be something else", but the burden of proof is on you to demonstrate a "something else".
>Are you sure?
Knowledge is not about absolute certainty. See "fallibilism". I am justified by the evidence.
> The brain may very well (and probably does) generate all of these things, it is just that it would be generated phenomena that are immaterial.
We can get images from the neurons, motor functions, on and on it goes. At no point has there been something we cannot get out of the brain that is "immaterial" and I don't know what you're proposing is immaterial.
>You want to invoke Occam's razor? I think you're doing it backwards. Consciousness appears immaterial, and so it probably is.
You don't understand occam's razor. Occam's razor is about the simplest explanation, as in the least assumptions, that explains what we see and serves as the best model. We see matter and material stuff, we don't see what you propose. It is not at all about "what I intuitively feel is simpler".
>>14597639
You don't understand Occam's Razor either. See above.
>We always have to dig deeper to find other things to explain the bigger thing.
I don't know how you came to this conclusion. At bedrock, you could easily explain the bedrock based on what that final thing does and its properties. Answering other details such as how it relates to other things or why is an emergent explanation, discoverable via the nature of those interactions as well.
>>14597640
... What

>>14597675
>At bedrock, you could easily explain the bedrock

Sorry, what I meant to say is that the fact it exists at all is not explained by itself. Not that its properties and behavior aren't explainable... When we just dig deeper and deeper into "stuff", we're bound to hit that point at bedrock where the existence of the "stuff" is not explicable.

When things come from nothing, I get excited. My memory is hazy but I think there was something like that and virtual particles, where they came into being from nothing. I read it years ago now and it was POPSCI of course.

>>14597675
I'm saying it's not a parallel, because as you said, qualia is a representation of a thing, and not the thing itself.

Whereas in your example of rocks, the rock is not a representation, it IS the thing itself.

So there's a difference there, not comparable IMO.

>>14597684
>Sorry, what I meant to say is that the fact it exists at all is not explained by itself.
Sure. That simply follows from the fact "the bedrock thing" does not have to involve how bedrock things come to be, as that could be a property of something else. Such as a property of space itself, which in turn could be said to behave in such a way due to the fact space accelerates until that energy is released in the form of matter (such as what we know). This is not "seeking more bedrock" insofar as it is "explaining by adding context". But I don't see the relevance anymore :I
>>14597689
The analogy involved assuming for sake of understanding the analogy that "qualia" is the brain stuff, not a separate thing. That is why I see it as incoherent to posit "thoughts in a vacuum without brains". Your thoughts are your brain.

>>14597697
It's definitely not plausible in the real world, it's just a thought experiment to try and explain what sort of angle I'm coming from.

I'm not looking at the cause of the qualia, I'm looking at the qualia itself... It differs from the material world for the fact that all material things could be in the hypothetical vacuum and still clearly be material things. Whereas the qualia itself, if it was somehow floating in a void, would not be identified as material.

If you think a physical brain produces said qualia that is totally fine, I won't disagree or say you're wrong even, but I'm not looking at that element.

>>14597712
>It differs from the material world for the fact that all material things could be in the hypothetical vacuum and still clearly be material things.
I think you're struggling with what's called a composition or division fallacy. You get one emergent thing, and because it is not the thing it emerges from declare it cannot be from that thing. The usual examples to illustrate this issue is "like saying wetness can't come from water" or "a brick wall can't come from bricks", or "music can't come off a CD".

The analogy drawn there is that it's the same with what people claim is "qualia". This cannot "float in the void" like music cannot "float in the void" or like brick walls cannot "float in the void", because abstract concepts are merely ideas of things not the things themselves. Those ideas, in turn, are how the brain interprets its senses and relates them to itself, and this is very analogous to interpreting burn marks on a CD to make something different like music or video or whatever.

So the point was, remains, that you cannot get "an abstract thing in and of itself" because it is not truly "a thing". It is a representation of a thing. I'll make it even simpler: You cannot get the shadow by itself in a vacuum. You see? Even for something as simple as casting a shadow can produce the same thing.

>>14596987
Nah bro, you matter, everything alive is literally folded plasma.
We should live for the good, improve yourself and show love.

>>14597725
>"float in the void"
What exactly are astral projectors doing then?

>>14597725
>because abstract concepts are merely ideas of things not the things themselves

i mean, your whole spiel is disproven by the fact that you can think about thinking

you either have to conceive that a thought, in that case, is a "thing" that can be thought about, or that you can have a meaningful thought with no referent. either way your position is incoherent.

>>14597753
>conceive
*concede

>>14597725
Yes this is where we simply have a different perspective. Except the brick wall (which is just many bricks). I'd say of course you can't in practice separate those things. But hypothetically I think it would be valid, as a thought experiment, to simply observe one of those things without the other.

So maybe the CD makes music, but I think it's valid to observe what the music itself is. Music itself is qualitative (if you refer to the sound your ears and brain conjure?). A shadow seen without the thing that casts it. Impossible in practice.

Take the shadow. What is a shadow by itself in the totally hypothetical vacuum? When we think of a shadow we are likely thinking of something qualitative (we imagine a dark shape). We rarely think of a shadow in terms of pure math, we are imagining the dark shape. Which is not really out there, since the "dark shape" is reliant upon the sensory organs and brain which renders it.

I know what you are saying, which is of course that properties etc can emerge from physical things. And it is fine if you think qualia emerges from a physical thing. But it is itself not physical, I would say.

And I would also say, regarding things like speed, wetness, hardness: these are explanations of how certain things behave or interact in the world. The production of qualia could be a behavior, but the qualia itself, I don't think could be said to be a behavior or property. It has a tangible form to the subject. It isn't sheer math.

>>14597740
Why hello again. I still enjoy your humor, sadly it does not reduce the mental pain of this process.
>>14597753
>i mean, your whole spiel is disproven by the fact that you can think about thinking
. . . ? Because . . . ?
>>14597763
>But it is itself not physical, I would say.
It is physical the same way shadows are. Just because we can describe some property that arises from a combination of things does not mean the thing is separable. So, too, with consciousness.

So to me, saying "Yes but qualia is different" just elicits... "HOW?" People can assert this eternally, asserting it isn't a demonstration. By all accounts and all the evidence it is just emergent, same as all the other emergent things mentioned. And so we forever have this issue where people say "Yes but the shadow" and I have to keep repeating "You can't HAVE that shadow without the thing to cast it".

>>14597809
Honestly I'm just sloppily trying to communicate something that cannot be easily worded.

It's frustrating only because I know that if I could get into super deep meditation, and replay it on your brain, you would at least understand what I'm trying to communicate. How can I possibly communicate that if you look inwards you will find literal nothingness for example? I'm not sure it's possible at all. The day we can record an experience and replay it on another brain, these things will be easy to show.

It's kind of like trying to describe riding a rollercoaster to someone, and being unable to simply strap them onto the rollercoaster. It's like, fuck, I wish I could just put you on the ride... Words are fail.

"Consciousness" and "Mind" is, I feel, poisoned terms. Both come with much baggage that obfuscates the message. I personally never use them except in these threads because that's the lingo of choice.

>>14597832
>It's frustrating only because I know that if I could get into super deep meditation, and replay it on your brain, you would at least understand what I'm trying to communicate

I am trying to communicate that theories of mind like this can simply be mistaken. Like labeling a sensation as having a cause different from its real cause. That happens all the time, of course it happens with our idea of how our ideas, or our "selves", work.

Meditation or anything like that is not some key or missing element here. I've been a buddhist all my life, if that matters. Theravada tradition is very common here. The issue is not that the terms are poisoned, the issue is the concept grafted onto the experience is just mistaken. Hence, the theory of mind is incorrect.

Funnily enough some notion that the opposite is the case is contradicted in Buddhism as well. Meditation entails the realization that self concepts are mistaken and arise from this "mistaken labeling", all the way down. What you have left are sensations, labels and associations, and so on. We naturally proceed to intuit some association and therefore a "nature" of these things, and that is where this whole debate comes from.

It is my position that people asserting some special status are doing so *because* of a sequence of intuited things like that. Something Buddhism, at least as written in the pali canon, spends quite a lot of time explaining is the cause of quite a lot of problems.

>>14597870
That's interesting, as when you were saying you can't have a shadow without the object that casts it, it reminded me a lot of Buddhist and Daoist ideology.

As I see it, from what I have personally encountered, I would say that when I look inwards I find that where I thought there was a me, there is literally nothing. And when I look outwards I find things... I could not say that I don't exist, even though I am nothing. And I could not say things don't exist either... It's the common thread of all that is important. Which is not a discussion of mind and matter IMO.

To a materialist I prefer to state the obvious that they are an aspect of the universe. Not separate from it. I don't think these "consciousness" debates are productive.

>>14597901
The value of a conversation and how productive it is depends on what you take from it. If you choose to take nothing, it will not have been productive. That is, I warn you, more of a commentary on the frame of mind of those trying to "btfo the materialists" or people proposing ad hoc hypotheses than an issue with the conversation itself.

Having a sense of a thing you wish to remain attached to because you think it has some value it doesn't really have, well, see also "buddhism and suffering due to attachment". I gain plenty from these conversations, that is why I don't complain about them being unproductive.

>>14597056
>Why bother continuing to go through this if I can't even affect anything?
Because you're predetermined to do so :^)
Your reasoning is like that of a naive kid: "I have no free will, so why should I do anything? Wah, I'm gonna kill myself instead!"
It's not like you have the choice to kill yourself anyway. You will only kill yourself if it was predetermined for you to so.
And nobody knows the future, so you can't know in advance what was predetermined for you. You think you have no chance of being successful in anything because of your mediocre body and your mediocre upbringing, but that's just how you've been conditioned to think by /pol/-tier rhetoric. Genetic lottery is not the only game in town; there are many other lotteries you could win if you give it a chance. But there is no point in blaming you since you will only give it a chance if you are predetermined to do so. Maybe you were predetermined to make this thread and these replies were predetermined to persuade you to give life a chance instead of folding early.

>>14597473
>One of the entry-level thought experiments to the hard problem is to imagine what the world would be like if nobody had an inner experience-- if everybody was a "p-zombie". The typical, almost universal answer is that nothing would change,
Maybe if you're fucking retarded. If you believe consciousness is material then clearly is based on interactions and such a statement is tantamount to saying "imagine if everything was exactly the same except hydrogen couldn't bond to oxygen"
It's nonsense. Wordgames. Philosotards need to stop acting like playing with words has any bearing on how reality functions.

>>14596987
Branch out from Materialism to Energism.

>>14596987
The fact that you used snafu non-ironically and implied that it's something desireable is incredibly irritating. Please just kys, since you're convinced it doesn't matter anyway.

>>14596987
There’s a real value to the quietist perspective on philosophy. Formal, folk or subconscious errors of reasoning arise that philosophy can be used to correct.

The materialist perspective falls apart quickly under careful examination. Materialism or physicalism is roughly the belief that non-physical entities don’t exist, but here existence is implicitly understood as physical existence. This choice of definition is informed by 1) the common sense of the word existence in largely physicalist cultures and 2) a lack of obvious examples of meaningful non-physical existence.

Understanding physicalism this way, it’s obviously tautological and the only important question is whether or not there are meaningful non-physical modes of existence. Here we can start by considering the things that we imagine a physicalist belief system denies us. It should become clear that claiming such things don’t exist in a narrow physicalist sense does nothing to affect their role in human life.

>>14598993
For example, conscious experience, personal identity and a purpose in life are clearly non-physical. But then to say that they don’t exist in a physical sense says nothing about them. By its own definition physicalism is restricted to claims about the physical.

>>14596987
>How do I thusly coax myself into a snafu?
If you're stupid enough to find such absurdities credible and logically coherent in the first place, you're too stupid to work your way out of it.

>>14598997
This post, and all posts like it, are a bot-driven controlled opposition designed to reaffirm the vacuous concepts of physicalism. There is no such thing as "non-physical".

>>14596987
>>14598997
After your physicalist claims you move directly into the determinist perspective on free will. Here again, only a small amount of careful reasoning is needed to resolve an apparent problem that many people stumble onto naturally.

The determinist’s error lies in conflating proximate and ultimate causes of his own behavior and failing to recognize that the proximate cause of ones actions being ones intentions or desires is equivalent to the common sense understanding of free will. According to the determinist the ultimate cause of ones actions always lies outside himself in a clockwork universe, so he cannot behave other than as he did. The compatibilist reply is that even if the common sense of free will involves claims about the ability to do otherwise, there’s a perfectly suitable definition of free will that’s functionally identical in real world situations which is compatible with determinism and allows each of us to choose our actions.

>>14599003
>There is no such thing as "non-physical".
Go ahead and defend your claims, then. I’d also like to see you try to make me fail a Turing test if you can manage it while staying on topic.

>>14599026
>defend your claims
I didn't make any claims. I'm pointing out the direct consequence of the fact that "physical" is a shopping list, not an actual category that anyone can define.

>>14599029
I think you could tighten it up into something reasonable. It doesn’t matter, though, because physicalism is pretty obviously bogus. A working definition just allows for a more concrete argument against it.

>>14599034
>you could tighten it up into something reasonable
Maybe if you had knowledge of all the things that exist, and their unifying principle. That probably never going to happen, and "physical" will forever be a provisionary shopping list of known phenomena plus some unstated metaphysical baggage about how the world works.

>physicalism is pretty obviously bogus.
Then why are you reaffirming its concepts and legitimizing it by claiming that things are "non-physical" and looking like a supersitious moron? Because you are controlled opposition whether you know it or not, and your only function is to keep alive the popculture association between sterile materialism and intelligence.

>>14599042
Let me make a first attempt at a sketch of a definition. Start with some set of formal propositions that are agreed upon as representing the kernel of reductive physicalism (I can hear you shouting shopping list in my head. Please be patient.), their logical consequences and a description of how and to what degree these consequences correspond with claims about the real world.

Clearly, one could add anything he likes to the “shopping list” but he’s still responsible for arguing that the items on the shopping list are purely physical in the common sense.

There are some real world phenomena, such as what makes a book good or the meaning or form of language generally; or human values, which will be difficult to plausibly explain on the basis of fundamental physical laws.

You could sneak in fundamental laws of linguistics, but doing so is essentially admitting defeat.

I’m not saying this is fully fleshed out or even correct, but “no, it isn’t and you’re being paid by big physicalism” isn’t a convincing rebuttal.

>>14599056
>some set of formal propositions that are agreed upon as representing the kernel of reductive physicalism
> their logical consequences and a description of how and to what degree these consequences correspond with claims about the real world.
You want to elaborate on that more concretely? Because for now, it's just vague word salad, and the only vegetable in your salad which comes close to capturing something relevant is "reductive".

I drugged myself with toad. There's no way in hell you could guide someone through every single step to realization in a 4chan thread. As you would expect, altering your brain with drugs can cause all sorts of bullshit. Rarely, some non-bullshit, and these things when known, a person does not come back the same.

Apply some critical thinking to the brain and its function. Consider that the only reality you have ever directly known is not an actual external world, but the hallucinated representations conjured in your brain. When your brain and mind begins to shut down, you see its hallucinations begin to disappear.

Post-processing is not natural or default. Any result of post processing is necessarily going to differ from the stimulus which triggered it... Your brain takes an image of the world, it ADDS "qualia" such as colors. Do you think depth is default to sight? Think again. More brain tricks.

I would argue that the closer someone is to zero brain function, the more accurate the worldview. BECAUSE it is not taking the raw input and turning it into something else. I hypothesize that the real way things look, is what the blind see. The real way things sound, is how the deaf hear. It's the sensory organs and mind which give quality to these elements.

>>14599293
>I drugged myself
>I would argue that the closer someone is to zero brain function, the more accurate the worldview. BECAUSE it is not taking the raw input and turning it into something else. I hypothesize that the real way things look, is what the blind see. The real way things sound, is how the deaf hear. It's the sensory organs and mind which give quality to these elements.
What a profoundly braindead and self-contradicting statement. Normies should stay away from drugs.

>>14599296
Think about it carefully............ If what you experience (perception) can only possibly exist via the sense organs and brain of the individual experiencing those things. Then how would it be possible that what you are experiencing is the thing "out there"????

>>14599301
You think about it, groid, because what you're sharting out is babby's broken regurgitation of something babby heard in a 5 minute YT clip.

As much as I'd like to be a dualist, I try to look at anti-dualist arguments or make my own to see what the dualist responds with. Here's my response to a common dualist claim;
>brain damage doesn't actually affect consciousness. It's like if you damage a radio, the waves are still there!
Fair point, but that leaves the question of why do you lose consciousness at all then? Is your consciousness the "radio waves" or the brain? An interaction between the two?

>>14599306
First of all, your "dualism" vs. "anti-dualism" thing is just another false dichotomy designed to constrain your thought to certain terms that actually make no sense, and these concepts only feed each other.

>why do you lose consciousness at all then?
>you
What's a 'you'?

>>14599303
There's no need to be aggressive. I'm interested in how you view that... The objects we know and experience are all a product of the sense organs and brain. Without the sense organs and brain, they would not exist... None of us actually see photons or protons. It doesn't mean they don't exist, but glance over at the WiFi signals in your room. See how without sense input, they are, as "objects", nothing... Certainly, the signals EXIST, but notice that they don't appear "like" anything.

Same for all sensory experience.

>>14599310
Person reading this who isn't myself? Unless you're implying a universal shared consciousness. That or you're implying the "lose consciousness" also means "no you"?

>>14599056
>Clearly, one could add anything he likes to the “shopping list” but he’s still responsible for arguing that the items on the shopping list are purely physical in the common sense.
One does not need to defend literally every single instance of all phenomena. It is sufficient to have justification by induction, and to date all phenomena known have been shown to be physical. You can't get better in epistemology for modeling the real world than a success rate of 100%.
>There are some real world phenomena, such as what makes a book good or the meaning or form of language generally; or human values, which will be difficult to plausibly explain on the basis of fundamental physical laws.
Brains are physical, and subjective opinions are the result of a particular brain. If you wish to declare there is a "something else", the burden of proof is on you to show that is the case. With evidence. Not an argument from ignorance as you are trying to cleverly obscure.

Your whole argument is a non-starter. "You can't show literally everything is physical with a step by step solution therefore [some conclusion". Just more words for "You don't know absolutely therefore". Argument from ignorance.

>>14599312
Even from a regular, analytical perspective, your sense perceptions cannot be anything but direct expressions of reality, as they result from interactions between its parts. The gist of "your" point seems to be that there's no direct mapping between reality and perception, but this is a moot point, because its basic premise is that one half of this mapping is fundamentally unknowable and unspecifiable, robbing the entire concept of such a mapping of any substance. The only thing you're demolishing is your interpretations of sense perceptions, not their realness, or their innate connection to the nature of actual, fundamental reality. Now if you go further and actually take psychedelics as you claim to have done, even that analytical reasoning about interactions between parts of reality flies out of the window, since the concept of reality being made up of parts flies out of the window, and you realize that it all simply is reality, period.

>>14599333
There is no such thing as a material model of reality.

>>14599344
To assert such a thing is either trolling or grotesque abuse of the word "material".

>>14599317
I'm not implying anything. I'm just asking what you think makes up a "you". Your body? Your memories? Your self-concept? Your thoughts? Your feelings? The narrative of your life? The narrative of what you are currently doing? Your sense of continuity between one moment and the next? All of those things are obviously tied to the body, but what happen when you strip all of that away? Will there be nothing left, according to you?

>>14599341
Yeah, I'm saying it's not actually possible for sense perceptions (which is the only thing we ever actually directly know), to be what is out there.

Remove perception from an object, and how does it appear? I think that is the real face of objects.

>>14599364
Those sense perceptions are certainly "out there". Your vague, vacuous idea of "what is out there" is not.

>>14599366
How is that even possible? It's an impossibility. A sense perception only exists in the mind of the person experiencing it. It can only exist when rendered by sense organs and the brain, when a sense vanishes, so do the perceptions.

>>14599371
>How is that even possible?
I've literally just explained to you how it's possible here: >>14599341
Do you disagree with my characterization of what sense expressions are?

>>14597126
>Experience is just attention passing through things that filter and modify it, ie. the structural and chemical state of one's brain.
No, it's not. Structures of the brain are structures of the brain. They are objectively observable. Subjective first person experience is not, by definition, objectively observable. The same with brain chemicals. If they were the same thing, then you would in a one for one way be able to tell everything about subjective experience by observing the brain. You can't. So they in point of fact are not the same thing.

>>14599579
>Subjective first person experience is not, by definition, objectively observable.
These are brain states. Brain states are objectively observable. So are bits on a CD. This is a division fallacy, not evidence they are different things.

The example used earlier was that this kind of attempt at a dichotomy is like claiming shadows don't exist because they aren't observable in isolation. Think about that for a minute. Perhaps a couple of weeks.

>>14599593
>These are brain states.
No, brain states are brain states. And they are in point of fact not subjective experience. At most you can try to claim that they particular ones CORRELATE with particular qualia, but that they are one in the same is false on it's face just by the definition of objective and subjective. If you have an example of even a single brain state that has been demonstrated to cause a particular qualia in a demonstrable and verifiable and repeatable way, I would like to see the study.
>The example used earlier was that this kind of attempt at a dichotomy is like claiming shadows don't exist because they aren't observable in isolation. Think about that for a minute. Perhaps a couple of weeks.
I didn't see that post. I just entered this thread. This sounds like a terrible analogy though. There is no way to analogize consciousness with any material phenominon in the physical world. Quote in pic related.

Consciousness is not in the physical space time world, the physical world is in consciousness. There is some ruleset which gets executed non-locally which places certain constraints on consciousness that can correlate with the virtual physical brain that gets probabilistically rendered to observer's in the physical world. If you want to call that "brain", ok. But the virtual thing you are thinking of that gets rendered in the physical world is not causative of anything. Spacetime is emergent and virtual and nothing in it, including brains, has any causative effects. It's just data that gets processed, organized and structured and rendered to observers in minds. Objectively observed brain phenomena that are asserted to correlate to purported subjective qualia could ever at best be correlative and any purported causational effects could only ever at best be simulated causational effects. See bell type correlations.

>>14599699
>At most you can try to claim that they particular ones CORRELATE with particular qualia
This is an ad hoc hypothesis at best, begging the question otherwise. You have to demonstrate there is a "something else" to assert a "something else", merely arguing "it's identical therefore" is no different from arguing invisible gremlins push electrons around.
>I didn't see that post. I just entered this thread. This sounds like a terrible analogy though. There is no way to analogize consciousness with any material phenominon in the physical world.
So you say. Nothing you've presented justifies that opinion.
>Consciousness is not in the physical space time world, the physical world is in consciousness.
So you say. Nothing you wrote counts as evidence of this but a bunch of assumptions and further assertions as to some fundamental.

What is asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.

>>14596987
>>>/adv/
>>>/lit/
This thread is off topic here.

>>14599722
>This is an ad hoc hypothesis at best, begging the question otherwise.
It's not a hypothesis. It's a fact. That's why neural correlates are could CORRELATES and not CAUSATORS. Correlation does not equal causation, and you don't even have correlations in any substantial amount. Even the article on neural correlates admits that neural correlates don't explain consciousness
>Discovering and characterizing neural correlates does not offer a theory of consciousness that can explain how particular systems experience anything at all, or how and why they are associated with consciousness, the so-called hard problem of consciousness,[ but understanding the NCC may be a step toward such a theory.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neural_correlates_of_consciousness
>So you say. Nothing you've presented justifies that opinion.
Exept the glaring fact that the entire physical world can be objectively observed except consciousness is subjective. Pic related
>So you say. Nothing you wrote counts as evidence of this but a bunch of assumptions and further assertions as to some fundamental.
Prove that it is then. Tell me how to observe someone else's consciousness. I can observe their brain after all.
>What is asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.
True. Like that virtual space time brains have causal power with regard to consciousness. They don't. Like the claim that brain states correlate to particular qualia.

>>14599781
>It's not a hypothesis. It's a fact. That's why neural correlates are could CORRELATES and not CAUSATORS.
To assert this requires asserting some other thing. By all accounts, it is causation, as changing the brain via targeted magnetic stimulation, or direct brain stimulation with probes, alters consciousness. To assert that is mere correlation requires you demonstrate something else as the cause.

NCC's stated purpose was not to offer a theory of consciousness. Graziano, however, does https://grazianolab.princeton.edu/publications
>Exept the glaring fact that the entire physical world can be objectively observed except consciousness is subjective. Pic related
Except you're asking to see a shadow with nothing to cast a shadow. Demanding nonsense is not justification.
>Prove that it is then. Tell me how to observe someone else's consciousness. I can observe their brain after all.
A CD sent back in time 200 years ago has no device to read it. Does that mean it is ontologically distinct? No.

>>14599817
>By all accounts, it is causation, as changing the brain via targeted magnetic stimulation
Yes, consciousnesses can initiate causational effects on virtual brains. I don't deny that.
>as changing the brain via targeted magnetic stimulation, or direct brain stimulation with probes, alters consciousness.
No, it can correlate with changes in consciousness. The causation comes non-locally, from calculations as a cause. Just as if in a video game, I can bonk a guy on the head with a virtual bat and his virtual brain can ooze out and the character can fall down. But the causation for the player falling down was not caused by some 'force' striking the virtual head, or the damage to the virtual brain. The causation was not caused within the spacetime of the virtual world. The causation came from outside (non local) of the reality and the causation was one of processing and computation and calculation. We are talking about CAUSATION, not correlation. So yes, a consciousness can bring about non-local causation on another consciousness by acting on the virtual brain assigned to a particular consciousness, assumedly. This is putting aside the 'problem of other minds' for a second. I can't really verify if things have effects on others consciousness, as erwin stated in quote here
>>14599699
>Graziano, however, does https://grazianolab.princeton.edu/publications
Yeah, I am aware there are various theories, but they can not be verified for the reasons of subjectivity and for other reasons such as the slipperiness of proving causation in itself. I will check it out since you took the time to post it though.

>>14599817
>A CD sent back in time 200 years ago has no device to read it. Does that mean it is ontologically distinct? No.
Bad example. You are begging the question by assuming the premise is true that the two situations are analogous in the first place, IE that consciousness is some thing contained on some physical medium. I deny that it is.

>>14599868
>Yes, consciousnesses can initiate causational effects on virtual brains. I don't deny that.
This is exactly what I've been saying. You are asserting some interstitial additional assumption. You hold a burden of proof on this claim, to evidence your subsequent claims regarding causation.
>Yeah, I am aware there are various theories, but they can not be verified for the reasons of subjectivity and for other reasons such as the slipperiness of proving causation in itself. I will check it out since you took the time to post it though.
Science does not "prove", mathematics does. Pseudoscience claims to "prove". You appear to be doing what a lot of other posters do, and are trying to assert some basis on the grounds it is not "absolutely certain". That is not how epistemology works, as knowledge does not require nor necessitate certainty. It requires justification that a belief is true.

Some resources:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Underdetermination
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hoc_hypothesis
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrumentalism
https://iep.utm.edu/evidenti/ - evidentialism in epistemology
https://iep.utm.edu/simplici/ - simplicity in the philosophy of science and epistemology
As relates to this in particular and the exclusion principle, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenalism

Unfortunately, the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy remains down for now. This is rather annoying as it had much better articles.

You're arguing for a supervening substance relegating brains to correlation. The burden of proof is on you. Asserting it does not demonstrate nor evidence it.

>>14599877
I am not begging the question. All the evidence of neuroscience corroborates the validity of the analogy. Absent assuming some other causal effect, as has been happening, that evidence supports the analogy. You have to assume some other thing to declare otherwise, and the burden of proof is on you.

>>14599817
It's called correlation because the brain states and the experiential quality are completely, and entirely linked. So a change in either would reflect on the other... As they are entirely linked.

You can't move your computer desktop icons without the computer code being altered to match. They are entirely linked. You could alter the icon by altering the codr code, or alter the code by altering the icon.

>>14599914
I do not think you are understanding the problem, so I present the following analogy to highlight it:
Objects cause shadows. Shadows do not exist independent of objects to cause objects.

Similarly, the brain causes consciousness. All the evidence we have only supports this view. Consciousness does not cause brains, nor is demonstrated to be independent of brains.

Therefore, occam's razor and the principle of epistemic simplicity applies. Otherwise you run afoul of the principle of explosion via ad hoc hypothesis proliferation, see again underdetermination. There is zero value whatever in asserting "Gremlins cause electrons to move indistinguishable from current theory". It is equally as ad hoc.

>>14599928
But there isn't any evidence. What do you suppose is the evidence? That my character dies and ceases to experience the world? That anaesthesia knocks me out?

Do you know what consciousness is? How are you defining it in your model.

>>14599899
>This is exactly what I've been saying.
I think you are are arguing that the causation is coming from inside spacetime. I am denying that. I am also denying that the consciousness resides 'in' the virtual brain assigned to the particular consciousness. I deny that as well. The brain would never even be localized or rendered in the entire life of an observer unless measurement were made on the brain, a scan or the like. Otherwise the constraints on a consciousness would be governed non-locally. And so that virtual brain localized in spacetime would just be an output of non-local processing which would be rendered according to what would be probable to be according to the specs of the player's avatar. The rendering is on a render only as needed basis. As explained better here

On testing the simulation theory

'On rendering reality It is now well understood in the emerging science of Uncertainty
Quantification that low complexity computation must be performed with hierarchies
of multi-fidelity models. It is also now well understood, in the domain of game
development, that low computational complexity requires rendering/displaying content
only when observed by a player. Recent games, such as No-Man’s Sky and Boundless,
have shown that vast open universes (potentially including “over 18 quintillion planets
with their own sets of flora and fauna” are made feasable by creating content,
only at the moment the corresponding information becomes available for observation
by a player, through randomized generation techniques (such as procedural generation).
Therefore, to minimize computational complexity in the simulation theory, the system
performing the simulation would render reality only at the moment the corresponding
information becomes available for observation by a conscious observer (a player), and the
resolution/granularity of the rendering would be adjusted to the level of perception of
the observer.'
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.00058.pdf

>>14599939
The model I think is best is the attention schema model. I linked Graziano earlier, who is its author, as it combines all the observations and descriptive theories with an additional attention-simulation component to complete the explanation. I had thought this was obvious many years ago reading theories involving cognition-as-simulation, but apparently not. I am forever going to be upset I missed out on publishing what was apparently not common sense.

>But there isn't any evidence.
All of the evidence only supports the view brains cause consciousness, not the reverse. That is the exact opposite of "no evidence". There remains no evidence of any supervening thing, as asserted here.

So this is the worst possible scenario for competing ideas. All evidence supports physicalist models of consciousness, no evidence at all supports other models. The only way to claim otherwise is adopting utterly ridiculous definitions of evidence or utterly ridiculous epistemic standards.

Sure, you can do that, but zero fucks will be given to anyone who does. "Electric universe is equally likely because you don't know the ontology of the universe" is an utterly ridiculous statement.

>>14599954
Can you just give an example of what you personally think is evidence? I listed two very common pieces of evidence. Do you count those as evidence?

>>14599951
>I think you are are arguing that the causation is coming from inside spacetime. I am denying that. I am also denying that the consciousness resides 'in' the virtual brain assigned to the particular consciousness. I deny that as well.

You seem to think making assertion counts as justification for denying it. However, any epistemology accepting mere assertion as justification does not present a reliable pathway to find truth. Again, principle of explosion.

Your paper proposes an hypothesis for testing. This is, too, another assertion. However, it does not present evidence from testing in support of the idea. We remain at ground zero, unfortunately. I went to check works citing your linked paper to see if any evidence in support of the hypothesis has been published, and I could not find any via researchgate. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319965278_On_Testing_the_Simulation_Theory

You appear to be trying to justify an assertion with more assertions. Hopefully, you see the issue.

>>14599961
The totality of neuroscience. All of it. Every single paper on every single description and experiment involving brains whatever are all evidence in support of physicalism as the explanation. I linked Graziano's home page of publications, all of which are available for free as he, thankfully, lists his own PDF's of his papers. They cite many of the modern works done on modeling the brain extensively in justification for his theory.

>>14599970
Nothing in neuroscience supports physicalism. Do you understand that even rendering someone unconscious by destroying their brain is meaningless, and not evidence?

I don't want links to Dennett or Graziano essays, I'm not talking to them I'm talking to you, I want to know what makes you think there is evidence supporting the claim.

>>14599977
>Nothing in neuroscience supports physicalism.
Occam's razor. To insert a supervening cause carries a burden of proof. Unless and until you meet that burden, yes, all of neuroscience clearly supports physicalism.

>>14599982
What supervening cause is being inserted? Neuroscience has nothing to do with whether reality is made of substance. Do you agree that me being shotgunned and ceasing to experience is not at all evidence that reality consists of substance?

>>14599899
>You are asserting some interstitial additional assumption.
No you are. You are claiming that virtual brains in spacetime cause consciousness as far as I was understanding.
>You're arguing for a supervening substance relegating brains to correlation. The burden of proof is on you. Asserting it does not demonstrate nor evidence it.
I am arguing for one substance. Consciousness. The virtual things such as brains which are rendered in consciousness are made of consciousness. The consciousness is obviously itself made of consciousness. And so I am arguing for consciousness being able to effect consciousness through will. If I look down at the arm which is rendered as my avatar's are in my consciousness, I simply use my consciousness to will my arm to raise and it does.
>The burden of proof is on you.
Now YOU are asking for proof after scolding me. At any rate. I am not trying to prove anything. I am simply elaborating what is in my opinion that best worldview that fits all of the known empirical data.
>I am not begging the question.
You are
>All the evidence of neuroscience corroborates the validity of the analogy
It does not. Neuroscience textbooks are generally very honest about the subject, cont in next post

>>14599993
From pic related
Fundamental Neuroscience (Squire,Fundamental Neuroscience) 3rd Edition

Consciousness is one of the most enigmatic features of the universe. People not only act but feel: they see, hear, smell, recall, plan for the future. These activities are associated with subjective, ineffable, immaterial feelings that are tied in some manner to the material
brain. The exact nature of this relationship—the classical mind-body problem—remains elusive and the subject of heated debate. These first-hand, subjective experiences pose a daunting challenge to the scientific method that, in many other areas, has proven so immensely fruitful. Science can describe events micro-
seconds following the Big Bang, offer an increasingly detailed account of matter and how to manipulate it, and uncover the biophysical and neurophysiological nuts and bolts of the brain and its pathologies. However, this same method has as yet failed to provide
a satisfactory account of how first-hand, subjective experience fits into the objective, physical universe.
The brute fact of consciousness comes as a total surprise; it does not appear to follow from any phenomena in traditional physics or biology.
https://www.hse.ru/data/2013/10/09/1280379806/Fundamental%20Neuroscience%20(3rd%20edition)%202008.pdf

>>14599993
>You are claiming that virtual brains in spacetime cause consciousness as far as I was understanding.
No. I do not accept your premise. Continuing to assume your premise is true when I reject it is a straw man. Doing so further will demonstrate willful dishonesty on your part, by insisting I believe something I have directly stated I do not accept.
>I am arguing for one substance. Consciousness.
You have not met your burden of evidence.
>Now YOU are asking for proof after scolding me. At any rate. I am not trying to prove anything. I am simply elaborating what is in my opinion that best worldview that fits all of the known empirical data.
I am asking for evidence. Sadly the phrase is "burden of proof", but for science or other argument and epistemology that means evidence. To be more clear, you have not met a burden of evidence or demonstration. Underdetermination, again. Anyone can assert an ad hoc hypothesis to fit the known empirical data. This has no truth value whatever. I am asking for justification, which nobody has given me to this very day.
>>14600002
I do not give a single shit what the opinion of a textbook author is. This does not address my case, which was made I remind you with reference to Graziano. Somebody else's opinion is completely irrelevant.

>>14600002
A more direct refutation by analogy: Citing a textbook in contradiction to Einstein, prior to publications by Einstein, does not argue for a case against Einstein.

A textbook prior to Darwin's origin of the species, stating things in contradiction to origin of the species, does not evidence a case against evolution.

On and on it goes. I've no idea why you bothered.

>>14599982
You are postulating the extra entity, which is matter with stand alone observer independent reality. Good luck trying to verify that without a consciousness. Idealism does not need this extra entity.

>>14600016
>You are postulating the extra entity, which is matter with stand alone observer independent reality. Good luck trying to verify that without a consciousness. Idealism does not need this extra entity.
This is a misunderstanding of epistemic simplicity, known more commonly in the limited scope of Occam's Razor. I am postulating what is in evidence and best explains what we know, and by modeling more accurately makes the best predictions.

Occam's Razor is about the simplest explanation that explains, thereby best modeling, thereby best predicting, what a theory purports to explain. If I describe the orbits of Earth as being caused by gremlins, I have made far fewer assertions and claims of entities or devices than modern physics. That, however, is not what epistemic simplicity is.

>>14600008
I would think that, given you have never interacted with anything outside the contents of your own mind, it is a greater leap to assume there is something else out there. Literal Occam's Razor is that nothing exists but you, if you were most bothered about adhering to that.

>>14600024
See >>14600022. This is a misunderstanding of Occam's Razor.

On the contrary, all apparent evidence suggests there are things beyond my mind. To assert I am suffering a delusion requires evidence, and I have no such sufficient evidence.

Solipsism does not evidence idealism either, by the way. So don't bother retreating to feigned "extreme skepticism" like this.

>>14600022
To think neuroscience proves "physicalism" means you don't know what consciousness is. You should probably at least understand what the thing you are discussing is?

>>14600015
Show me the newer textbook that says the mind body problem and the hard problem are solved. Such a text book likely doesn't exist because they are honest enough to admit that they have no idea. This hard problem and mind body problem are only problems if you are trying to rescue the idea of materialism. Which is what physicalism used to be called by the way. They had to change the name after they found so many things that were obviously NOT material, such as information.

>>14600031
Cited paper by Graziano and works by Daniel Dennett comport with my view of consciousness. That is, the "m-consciousness" asserted by people, yourself included in this case, does not exist as asserted. That is, it is not in evidence.
>>14600035
Who cares? Is your epistemic standard textbook summaries now? I am arguing a theory probably not as yet in most textbooks, as experimentation providing evidence of the theory and its predictions have only just been published.

Where, again, is your evidence for your claim? You still have not provided any, and are deflecting by merely attacking. Read Schopenhauer much, have you?

>>14600039
Do you not have the ability to just state a few simple pieces of evidence? Why keep referring people to read long tedious papers if you understand the position and could just give a few examples within seconds?

>>14600042
>Do you not have the ability to just state a few simple pieces of evidence? Why keep referring people to read long tedious papers if you understand the position and could just give a few examples within seconds?
The thing is, I have. Repeatedly. The fact all experiments show causality with changes to the brain in all neurology experiments on the subject. The only argument against this has been to ad hoc propose some other cause, and to date this cause has not been defended with any evidence. Consciousness derives, relies, on our brains. There is no evidence in support of some other thing interposing between the two. That is, I have not been given any.

What other evidence do you desire? I cited further works for further reading. I have explained, in detail, why an ad hoc hypothesis cannot count as justification nor a valid alternative. I have also cited epistemology, and summarized epistemology.

What more do you desire? For that matter, why can none of you evidence your claim of this "something else" (be it fundamental consciousness or whatever else)?

>>14600022
>This is a misunderstanding of epistemic simplicity, known more commonly in the limited scope of Occam's Razor
No, it's not. You can't even demonstrate observer independent matter and on top of that you want to claim consciousness resides within this non existent substance.
> I am postulating what is in evidence and best explains what we know
No. The textbook answer says the experts don't know, see here
>>14600002
And by the way, I am not saying everybody should just look to textbooks as if they are infalible. I use this example because you are trying to come of as if you speak for and carry the authority as the official voice of the neuroscientific community. They don't agree with you. And if you want to say that that textbook is too old, post another one that is newer that supports your claim that all the evidence supports your world view.
>Occam's Razor is about the simplest explanation that explains, thereby best modeling, thereby best predicting, what a theory purports to explain.
Which is the view that postulates consciousness as the fundamental substrate, being that the physical/matter based world is only even observed through consciousness, and being that no matter can ever be observed absent consciousness.
>If I describe the orbits of Earth as being caused by gremlins, I have made far fewer assertions and claims of entities or devices than modern physics. That, however, is not what epistemic simplicity is.
That is something far different that postulating a superfluous ontic substance. In your case, matter with observer independent existence.

>>14600057
Right, so you don't actually know what consciousness means in this context. You also I suppose believe you are an individual who possesses a consciousness and that altering the brain alters it, and so on.

For one thing to start, altering the brain only alters the content which appears in consciousness. But the idea that anything has consciousness at all is already far far removed from Idealist position.

>>14600062
>No, it's not.
You offer no explanation but a "nuh uh". Please explain how my explanation of Occam's Razor, and why you were misusing it, is in error.
>You can't even demonstrate observer independent matter and on top of that you want to claim consciousness resides within this non existent substance.
This was never asked. "Observer" in quantum mechanics means "an interaction" or other particle, not a conscious entity.
>No. The textbook answer says the experts don't know, see here
I'm citing an author with a theory to explain it. A textbook is a non sequitur.
> I use this example because you are trying to come of as if you speak for and carry the authority as the official voice of the neuroscientific community.
You asked what supports physicalism, and I stated "all of neuroscience". You did not ask "does the neuroscience community fully accept this theory of consciousness". You are dishonestly representing the sequence of events by claiming I alleged something I did not.
>Which is the view that postulates consciousness as the fundamental substrate, being that the physical/matter based world is only even observed through consciousness, and being that no matter can ever be observed absent consciousness.
We observe matter absent consciousness. To posit consciousness is always present carries a burden of proof. What is your evidence of this?
>That is something far different that postulating a superfluous ontic substance. In your case, matter with observer independent existence.
Given you refuse to evidence your claim of some fundamental consciousness, the only consciousness we know of is our own. "Observer", in quantum mechanics, does not mean "conscious agent".

>>14600068
>Right, so you don't actually know what consciousness means in this context. You also I suppose believe you are an individual who possesses a consciousness and that altering the brain alters it, and so on.
You offer me no alternative than is covered extensively by Dennett or referenced by Graznio. Nor do you explain, nor show, how it is I am supposedly ignorant.
>For one thing to start, altering the brain only alters the content which appears in consciousness.
This is false. Cranial stimulation can alter everything we measure in relation to measures of consciousness. Alertness level, sensations, perceptions of ourselves as conscious, and so on.

The following are things I have asked you which you are evading:
What other evidence do you desire?
For that matter, why can none of you evidence your claim of this "something else"? Be it fundamental consciousness or whatever else?

As a third party, I just want to say that the quotes from imminent scientists don't really sell anything. Yes, some academics were prone to waxing poetic from time to time, but it makes no grand metaphysical impression on the reader. Its about as effective as quoting scripture.

>>14600075
*eminent, lol I'm dumb

>>14600072
What you are measuring is changes in the content of awareness. There is no such thing as a level of consciousness, it's a fiction to help medical professionals. If that is the definition you care about then that is all you need to consider.

Consciousness is not even a thing, and it isn't something anyone has ever had. It doesn't have a size or position in space, it is not inside of time. Space and time appear within it. The brain produces an illusion that you are positioned inside this body here. Yet your entire visual field is a product of your own mind, it's generating it all. And by illusion, causing you to believe that the awareness of this image is actually constrained to a certain portion of it.

It is the permanent backdrop, being the only element of experienced reality that has never changed since you were a newborn.

The number of hoops it would take you to navigate to go from believing living creatures have consciousness, to knowing consciousness as no-thing, empty, would be a waste of your time. Nobody cares about these things really.

>>14600077
Eminem*

>>14600075
>>14600077
Nah typo's happen. No worries. Honestly I'm not sure why they're doing that, and I just kinda ignored it. You are correct, though.

>>14600088
Its not that it takes away from his argument, its just like "Yup, that's what Schrödinger thought all right, anyway... "

>>14600084
>What you are measuring is changes in the content of awareness. There is no such thing as a level of consciousness, it's a fiction to help medical professionals. If that is the definition you care about then that is all you need to consider.
I presented a case based on the general measures relevant to neuroscience, of which level of awareness for patients is one medical part yes. Do you have something else?
>Consciousness is not even a thing, and it isn't something anyone has ever had. It doesn't have a size or position in space, it is not inside of time. Space and time appear within it. The brain produces an illusion that you are positioned inside this body here. Yet your entire visual field is a product of your own mind, it's generating it all. And by illusion, causing you to believe that the awareness of this image is actually constrained to a certain portion of it.
Brains appear to be inside of space and time. Consciousness only appears to come from brains. Can you define and evidence your claims?
>>14600092
Eh, I get it. Always happy to say hi to a lurker either way.

>>14600095
I'm not attesting to some strength in his arguments. Frankly, I had to give up the whole debate as I developed existential OCD. I threw this all in the box of "unknowable" and stopped having strong opinions either way.

I mean, we're not going to get "The Answer." If we figure out the mechanisms piece by piece, we could always miss something. In all of my models, I cannot get rid of unknown unknowns, and even worse, unknowable unknowns.

>>14600110
Perfectly fine to not wish to engage in a discussion that makes you uncomfortable. I have plenty of people, and topics, I'd rather not bother with.

>>14600095
I do yes, the things you mentioned are irrelevant on this level. The things measured are content. Consciousness is what you are but has no thingness to it. Unlike content which takes on shape and form, or some kind of quality, it is devoid of all. You can verify this first hand I believe.

Your entire existence since you were first born has only existed against the backdrop of a permanent unchanging consciousness. When your character loses consciousness, space and time is no longer perceived, the character ends. The character itself being an appearance within it, and like all things, finite and temporary. Space and time only appear manifest in the presence of awareness. In other words, if no living being had ever been in this universe, its entire existence from start point to end would be experienced in the same way you experience anaesthetic. The end would be immediate with the beginning.

Within that space and time, appear brains. They appear to us according to our sense perceptions. Particularly sight which is the most key sense a human has. So we think of the mass of squiggles. The mass of squiggles is itself a product of your eyes and mind producing an image of the thing you are calling a brain. Which is taking place against the very same backdrop of awareness. Of no-thing.

To begin to understand, you have to start to look first person out, rather than third person. And the road is so ridiculously pointless unless you were simply obsessed about knowing what this is all about.

>>14600118
For the over 9000th time, where's your evidence?

>>14600116
lol, yeah, its been nice really.
I've trimmed my thinking to "how does this help me score, how does this make me money?"
Basically going back to monke. Its amazing how good it feels to feed the monke.

If I start in on philosophy of consciousness, I can basically never stop.

>>14600123
You're not going to understand, and maybe prefer not to. To think neuroscience etc offers any evidence of substance in reality is so far behind. To understand what people are talking about, you would have such a long route.

Along the way would arise common misconceptions. Why can't I read minds? Why can't I change reality like a lucid dream? If you knock me out I lose consciousness, that proves the point? There is a very long list of things which would be confusing. And your prize if you go through all that? There isn't one.

You have not ever known anything outside of awareness. Everything you have ever interacted with has been a hallucination of your own mind. As you know well, your mind takes sense data from the external world (you believe there is such a thing so I will use it for your benefit) and turns it into what you see and interact with. That product of your mind is the only thing you have ever known. Awareness is the sole thing you have ever known.

And if you were to go all the way, you would understand that it is infinite, no-thing, empty, and as such all encompassing.

If you begin to explore reality from first person out, then you will maybe begin to understand. Otherwise it's impossible.

>>14600127
Hey man it's whatever we can do until the end comes all too soon. I keep my little enjoyments and live comfortably. Really, just that minimum avoidance of pain is fine enough for me. Probably being born among buddhists made it more natural to think that way for me, but who knows. Some people need to work to feel sane, some like me would be fine with a stipend of food and someplace to sleep away from bugs. Oh, and books. Got to have diversions sometimes.

>>14600134
I have experienced, that is not experienced, being dead. Literally, and figuratively. I do not see anything you've written that matters or amounts to anything.

All I can conclude is that you don't have evidence, and most people would consider what you've written to be nonsense. To buddhists much of it is cute. Do you think yourself unique or something? Nothing you've written is evidence though.

You can, if you hold back your ego, say "I do not have evidence". In which case, you belong posting in >>>/x/ please.

>>14600141
You wouldn't see... I became obsessed with this topic and went through all this bullshit. A lot of misconceptions. Even panpsychism which is the result of poor understanding. Panpsychism is bullshit entirely, but it is the only thing that initially seems to make sense.

There is evidence for you, that you are conscious. There is evidence that you are aware of forms. You know this for certain.

There has never, will never, be evidence that substance exists. None. None in neuroscience, none in physics, none in any scientific experiment ever performed. Being dead or unconscious does not have any bearing. If you don't understand this, you genuinely don't understand what consciousness is or what people are trying to point out to you.

>>14600152
>There has never, will never, be evidence that substance exists
Induction counts as evidence. You appear to be arguing from a standpoint of absolute certainty. Why?

>>14600157
If a person told you that you do not exist, you are not sentient (or whatever else), would you need to debate that fact to find out whether or not they are right?

There are a small list of things like that which can be realized. As one example, the fact that consciousness is completely void by itself. This is an example of one element which is not mistakeable or debatable. It is exactly as certain as the fact you exist or are sentient or whatever way you put it.

There are more than that, just a few. And if you are obsessed and absolutely must understand what consciousness actually is, you will likely encounter those things first hand.

>>14600165
>If a person told you that you do not exist, you are not sentient (or whatever else), would you need to debate that fact to find out whether or not they are right?
That is not analogous. Explaining your theory of mind is not correct does not mean "you do not exist". Direct experience does not encompass explanation of direct experience, or theory of the nature of that experience. However one does exist, the nature of that existence is not directly apprehended, but subject of inference. You appear to have mistakenly personalized those inferences when you need not have.

Also I'm not sure if I'm talking with a bot spitting platitudes at this point.

>>14600173
Sure. My point is simply that there is one example of a certain fact that you do not need to debate. If a scientist said you are not aware, you would not need to do experiments to find out that you are.

I'm simply suggesting, that there are more tidbits of knowledge which are exactly as sure as that. Are you open to the possibility that there are more discoverable certainties beyond "I exist"? If so and if you really have to know, begin searching.

The good thing about this form of scientific inquiry, is that you have 24/7/365 direct access to the subject of your research.

>>14600189
>I'm simply suggesting, that there are more tidbits of knowledge which are exactly as sure as that.
By definition if I am not aware of it then it is not a part of direct experience. I am, however, suggesting you are making inferences without being aware of having done so. That is entirely possible to do.

It is not, however, possible to have a direct experience you are unaware of. By definition.

>>14600165
>>14600173
>>14600189
>>14600192
You don't exist. You are not conscious.

Ontologically. You are not a cosmic ghost that stole the body or are you any ghost that is created by the body. There's no you that exist, in any ontological sense.

What you feel as "you" is certainly real in a sense that its a feeling. Feelings don't however correspond well with subtle soul thats inside the body. There are awareness/consciousness as they are primarily reflecting the natural state of the environment from the sensory organs our body has developed. The processing of those awareness from our body's sense are automated.

>>14601162
This is just sort of playing with definitions. By some other definition that assumes some other "nature of things" you can say "you don't exist", but by the otherwise sensible definitions in physicalism obviously "we" exist.

Yes, the ordinary theory of mind and consciousness people create may not align to reality, but that's the point. That's the whole point of Graziano's theory too. Our brains are to an extent modeling machines and we model inferences about ourselves, too, and the map is not the territory.

This is where people royally fuck up and assign all kinds of nonsense or ridiculous doomsaying strawmen. Sure, the map is not the territory, but what matters is that the map is a useful way to navigate that territory. Just because your map does not "exist" as territory doesn't make it useful or meaningful. That's stupid. That's where it all goes wrong. People need to stop doing that.

>>14601748
Whether you think our "self" idea is a lump of physical atoms/cells or if some dualistic notion of "self" being an intangible "substance" that is outside of our physics, both of these are obviously bogus definitions.

And lastly, with the map analogy, I'd argue that its not just that maps isn't the territory, its that maps do not exists. Some pathway from our vision doesn't get you to a map. Its a pathway that fades in and out. There is no "map" work that is at play. There are some functions of map like visual path that you see ahead. Or something that you recall from memory or what someone else told you about. This is a sense of a map, sure, but that sense of map isn't a map that believe to exist as a separate thing either as physical form or as mental form.

>>14601809
>both of these are obviously bogus definitions.
Maps are not bogus as maps. You are, in effect, arguing language itself is "bogus". I am not sure how this is important?
>And lastly, with the map analogy, I'd argue that its not just that maps isn't the territory, its that maps do not exists.
Maps are useful and exist as maps. I get you're saying "Well maps don't exist as territories", I just don't see how that matters to you?

Like, what I'm getting at is... what's your argument? You've stated these things but I don't see their relevance to you.

>>14601840
>Maps are useful and exist as maps
Sense of map is useful and exists as sense of maps.

The difference is that there is no map. The distinction is important. If you saw a mirage of a water in a desert, you don't say water exists or that water is useful. Its that a mirage of water exist and a mirage of water maybe useful or not. Because the minute foundational error is very important in build up the world view on top of this core foundation.

>>14601854
I am still trying to figure out your odd framing here. Maps exist, models exist, as maps and models. They allow us to do things, ergo obviously they do exist *as models* and have real world consequences to us.

You seem to be, to pull up that other analogy earlier in the thread, trying to argue shadows don't exist even though we see them. Just because a thing is contingent does not mean it "does not exist", and if that is your definition of "exist" (not contingent) I'd call it a worthless definition.

So what the hell are you trying to get at?

>>14601870
I'm working this in context of the mind. Not maps as maps, but maps as maps inside the mind, as you're trying to do it. Don't confuse the two.

There's google maps and there's physical territory. We know google maps isn't the physical territory, but we also know google maps exists. That's not the argument.

The argument is there's no map inside the mind. There's a sense of a map inside the mind, and we just attribute some functions to this sense of the maps and think this is a map. We know this sense of map isn't the map. We also know a map isn't the territory. We if define map as a model, then our sense of map is not a model. We only think we have a model of the map in the mind.

The definition is very important as its at the heart of the core in what constitutes "escape" and who is escaping, what/who is aware, etc.

In my explanation, there is no self either physical form, nor in supernatural form, nor in any weasel model form in the mind. As such, no one can be aware, no one is aware, no one changes mind, no one writes this post, etc.

Ofcourse, that's not to say the post hasn't been written or that you don't see this post, its just that there's no authorship behind it, in any way/form/shape/model. We only believe in as such because we see the hands move, we have memories that tells us we did and we can recall it, we know what our hands feel like when we type, and so on. The functions do not make a self, only a sense of self.

>>14601904
>We only think we have a model of the map in the mind.
That's clearly not the case. We develop theory of mind, including a theory of mind in relation to ourselves.

I am afraid I am still not understanding you. Case in point,
>its just that there's no authorship behind it, in any way/form/shape/model
That makes no sense either.

You either get it or you don't.

I remember at 16 confidently insisting that a tree falling in a forest makes a sound. I did not even understand that the heard sound differs from the stimulus. Obviously in a world with only the deaf, there are sound waves, but no sound.

>>14601914
>We develop theory of mind, including a theory of mind in relation to ourselves
Any theory that presupposes a self without any critical outlook is weak theory to begin with. A theory of mind should begin with the functions of the mind first and fore most. The relation to our "selves" can then be defined. And ofcourse it needs to define what that self it is talking about. We can realistically rule out that it's talking about a self that is like a ghost, that controls things, owns the body, etc. So if we assume your theory of mind presumes a self as a model based upon the functions of the mind, then then its not talking about the self as people normally think of. A self that owns, a self that authors, a self that narrates, etc. So what would your theory of mind suggest that model of self is? Something that has no power and simply bunch of functions? In that case its a sense of self. Its a sense of self because there's no "self" as a thing and your model would be merely creating a nominal sense of self out of various functions of the mind.

If you're positing an extra "middle man" self is managing the functions of the mind, then that's an entity/soul/ghost model. Whether you believe it exists as the common ghostly self or you're merely suggesting thats how we should look at the self as, then that's a very flawed view of the self and something thats completely baseless as you need extra work to show there's more to your model of this self.

>>14601924
>You either get it or you don't.
I'm fairly confident both parties "get it." That's a lazy way to win. I believe what "e" is arguing is that you can have idealist notions without disregarding all material findings.

Its one thing to posit something beyond, quite another to safely rule out what has been found.

>>14601932
>Any theory that presupposes a self without any critical outlook is weak theory to begin with.
Well, no, the issue stems from assuming the nature of what we label a "self". Like all models, the models are only as good as they capture what's really going on.

However, the issue is in the bizarre denial that our brains making such models are somehow not making models. This is why you make no sense to me.

>If you're positing an extra "middle man" self is managing the functions of the mind, then that's an entity/soul/ghost model. Whether you believe it exists as the common ghostly self or you're merely suggesting thats how we should look at the self as, then that's a very flawed view of the self and something thats completely baseless as you need extra work to show there's more to your model of this self.
I can only point out this is demonstrably incorrect, as shown in psychology, and Graziano's model of attention/consciousness as well. The "middle man" is that "i-consciousness" Graziano points out our brains generate in simulating ourselves, which gives us an impression of that "m-consciousness" or "ghost in the machine".

The problem is you are going one step further, and appear to be arguing that "doesn't exist". By all evidence and account, yes, the model in our heads absolutely does.

>>14601924
This is old hat to me. We do not appear to be talking about that however. If that is what is trying to be explained, it is being explained very poorly. That is, poorly in the sense it seems to contradict itself.

>>14601938
I wouldn't call them idealist. Idealism carries an implied ontology, I'm simply pointing out that it is self evident we construct such models of our natures and this is purely doable physically. Microbes can do it, purely out of selection pressures.

>>14601947
We obviously agree that self model either as a ghost or as having any power is incorrect. So now we move to what the model implies and how the model is derived. So lets close this particular chapter, for now.

The problem at heart is what the model is and how its made and what the model stands for.

My theory of mind does not have a model of self (as ruled out above, aka the ghostly/immaterial/middleman/etc). It has a model of sense of self, that which is built up from functions that our mind does. This sense of self is merely a sense because we personally feel there is a self, whenever we do something/experience/etc. So obviously even without any theories, we feel something. This is the theory my model works with. I don't think anyone could deny this stage. I say "sense of self" here instead of "theory of self" because the "self" that we feel is often justified as having something inside the body, but as physicalists/neuroscience/etc have ruled out, there's no little man trapped inside. It maybe possible some ghost is hiding that we cannot detect, but that's a non-starter. So hence, the "sense of self" is what I'm working with as I believe its an accurate model.

Again, this isn't a denial of models, its a denial of a certain models. So, we have a sense/feeling of self which is affirmed, and a model built around what this feeling is and how this feeling is formed.

Thoughts?

>>14601981
Also in some sense, it also a theory of our feelings.

>>14601938
They don't though. There aren't any Idealist or Materialist findings, the concept of that doesn't actually make sense, by the way.

>>14597125
>there is no verifiable evidence that subjective consciousness even exists
An empiricist never has hard proof of anything, because if he did he would reject sensory experience to the contrary, which contradicts him being an empiricist.

There’s plenty of evidence that subjective consciousness exists and you could probably design an experiment that would produce some in a matter of minutes.

Imagine a scenario likely to induce a certain subjective experience (Experimenter says “Imagine a white bear.”), put several subjects in this scenario and ask them to describe their conscious experience (“I’m imagining a polar bear. It has a big black nose and large white teeth...”). Then summarize the commonalities between subjects’ reports. You will have evidence that you can use to predict some specific properties of conscious experience.

Hopefully it doesn’t need to be pointed out that research has already been done on conscious experience and there’s no reason one couldn’t do more.

You can say that this doesn’t constitute evidence for conscious experience because there are alternative explanations, but there are always alternative explanations. The question is how plausible the alternatives are. In order to ignore conscious experience you need to conclude that although subjects that talk exactly as if they had conscious experience and there’s no evidence that they don’t have conscious experience, nevertheless they’re simply talking this way coincidentally and for no good reason.

>>14601981
To press forward with the sense of self theory, Im of the belief that the sense of self is merely a feeling that is generated as parts of the mind inferences with various consciousness and confuses this inferences as a locust of control. So this sense of self is just a false lead.

>>14597255
Reductionist retard squad rise up

>>14597303
>there is no such thing as life
It’s like you honestly want people to bully you for being retarded

>>14597327
>Is the chance 0 or >0
y’all niggas need measure theory

>>14602018
Your explanation could simply be explained away as relighting similar pattern of images as the eyes project.

We could even test this out in theory(not in principle as that would require immense compute date), we could have thousands of people imagine a red apple. We could have thousands of MRI scans of people seeing a picture of a red apple. Then find out if there is any statistical similarities in brain signals.

So its not such a far fetched idea to suggest the subjective experience is merely a replication or a transformated version of a real image. Neural nets could do transformations of an image, we don't call neural nets as having a subjective experience.

>>14597382
>I kinda miss usernames
Then use one and we can all filter you out automatically

>>14602051
Smh...

>>14602051
>>14602060
Let me restate this, we have a theoretical physical explanation, but even so, it doesn't imply there aren't subjective experiences, nor does it show there is any subjective experience.

The err should be on the side of conservative caution rather than to assume some theatre playing in the mind watched by some fool.

>>14597490
>nothing would change materially
It’s begging the question to claim that nothing material would change.

If we allow that nothing material changed then we’re not considering two different material worlds. The existence or non-existence of consciousness are two explanations for our observations. One explanation is so natural and obvious that nearly everyone shares it. The other explanation is not only completely contrary to common sense and expectation, it requires everyone everywhere to act as if they really do have conscious experience but gives no reason why they should do so or why we should believe try don’t have conscious experience.

This is not the kind of explanation you can give any credence to if you think about the evidence for it.

>>14597740
projecting, obviously

>>14601981
You can deny the model is accurate, as I do, but I still draw the line at claiming "the model doesn't exist". The models do, the territory doesn't, if that's what you've been trying to get at?

I'm just saying you confused the hell out of the topic by trying to say the model does not exist instead.

>>14601981
If you want more standard language and more clear expression, again I have to link the relevant researcher https://grazianolab.princeton.edu/

Reading what others write, and how they write, would help you a lot. See "publications".

>>14602100
Again, as I've said in earlier analogy. Models exists in so far as the analogy of the water existing in a mirage in a desert. In such a way that mirage of water is not a model of water, and water doesn't exist in the desert, mirage of water exists.

The delineation is model of water pointing towards a water vs model of mirage of water pointing towards a mirage.

>>14599333
People can talk reasonably about grammar or mathematics without appealing to physics at all. You haven’t even suggested why such a thing is necessary or how one might do it. There are some domains that simply aren’t about physics or the material world. Some of them are non-trivial. The obvious explanation is that they’re unrelated to physics and nothing is gained by shoehorning physics into it

If you want to offer an alternative, please do. Otherwise please don’t take a victory lap yet.

>>14602127
>People can talk reasonably about grammar or mathematics without appealing to physics at all.
And?
>You haven’t even suggested why such a thing is necessary or how one might do it.
Where did I say it was necessary?
>There are some domains that simply aren’t about physics or the material world.
As abstractions but fundamentally, yes, they are. Whether it be how sound works due to the shape of your mouth or your concept of grammar due to evolved neurology (and aforementioned dentition and whatnot).
>The obvious explanation is that they’re unrelated to physics and nothing is gained by shoehorning physics into it
Uhhh excepting all that linguistics research using physics to do neat shit like reconstruct sounds of dead languages or possible vocalization ranges for extinct species like Neanderthals? Tons of other examples like that? "I don't know of any therefore it's worthless" is all you have?
>If you want to offer an alternative, please do. Otherwise please don’t take a victory lap yet.
I haven't the foggiest what you think you've given me that's difficult. You just seem to be, well, completely ignorant of all of it.

>>14602126
>Again, as I've said in earlier analogy. Models exists in so far as the analogy of the water existing in a mirage in a desert. In such a way that mirage of water is not a model of water, and water doesn't exist in the desert, mirage of water exists.

Well that's, again, just not true. As I've kept mentioning with respect to models of cognition. You are trying to imply, keep trying to imply, there is zero truth content to models. If that were the case they would be useless models, but you're not implying things are useless you're categorizing all models as the same.

We are simply not going to agree. That's some ridiculous special brand of solipsism to arbitrarily declare induction, inferences, testing, and so on, to all be equivalent to a total fiction purely because they are simplifications.

I can think of no other way to interpret claiming models as a whole are analogous to a mirage of water, that is also not a model of water, than this way. Which is utterly absurd. Go walk off a cliff if you think reality don't real, because that's about as much as I care for that.

>>14602406
>there is zero truth content to models
Close, I said that its a mirage. The mirage is the ground truth here. Or in the case of the "self", the self of self is the ground truth. Such that the sense of self is nothing more than a feeling we get.

You've earlier stated that you don't buy into the ghostly "soul" argument people normally point towards as "self." So where does your model of self point to?

Again, I'm not suggesting the feelings aren't there. Everyone feels that we're ourselves, with a mind/body/capability to reason/dreams of having a better body/better mind/etc. I'm certainly not denying any of the physical reality. Not sure where you're getting that from. Unless you're saying that the "self" that your model points to is a physical self tied to the body, in which case, I'd assume you're assuming that I'm denying the physical reality.

My point is certainly not a solipsism, since its an argument against the idea of selfhood in either corporeal/immaterial. In short, the general gist of my point is that the model of self that cannot point to a self is not a model of the self, but a sense of self.

>>14602433
>Unless you're saying that the "self" that your model points to is a physical self tied to the body, in which case, I'd assume you're assuming that I'm denying the physical reality.
That has been the issue, yes, which I thought I had made clear in the prior post here >>14602100.
>In short, the general gist of my point is that the model of self that cannot point to a self is not a model of the self, but a sense of self.
To which I can only point out you're very badly arguing, with poor choice of words and analogy, what Dennett and Graziano and dozens of other academics have argued. Although I caution there's a double meaning to "self" here, one of which you're correct and in the other sense not. As theory of mind models expectations of our own behavior as well, and failing those expectations can cause severe psychiatric trauma (such as retreating or doing nothing when your combat buddies die).

It helps to try to put ones thoughts to paper for criticism, but at the end of this all I can do is point out that you sincerely need to read some other thinkers. At the very least to refine how you try to get your ideas across.

>>14602433
>its an argument against the idea of selfhood in either corporeal/immaterial
Also, as well as an argument against the notion that the model of self is talking about something than the model itself and points towards some deeper ground truth/grounded self

>>14602442
>That has been the issue, yes, which I thought I had made clear in the prior post here >>14602100.
Are you suggesting that your model of self is positing a physical self inside the body, a special part of the brain itself? I'm bit confused by your reply here.

>>14602450
I repeat, you may want to do further reading on things like theory of mind. In effect, yes, a theory of mind often does create that illusion in order to function as a model to explain, narrate, and predict, our behavior in relation to events or things of that sort. Some people have more elaborate models than others.

That is, as Graziano points out, why people are insistent on that kind of idea of a "soul" or a "qualia" separate from the physical in the first place. By mistaking the map for the territory, using my analogy. But all I've been trying to make clear is the fact people *do that* is quite real, even if the claim *about what that is* isn't real. Do you get the difference?

>>14602458
>theory of mind often does create that illusion in order to function as a model to explain, narrate, and predict, our behavior in relation to events or things of that sort
Okay
>why people are insistent on that kind of idea of a "soul" or a "qualia" separate from the physical in the first place
okay
>By mistaking the map for the territory
So if the map is the model of the selfhood, is the territory talking the soul? Is that real? If its not real, the what does the map map to? If its just behaviors/predictions/narrations/etc that the brain does, then is that not like a mirage where your model does not point towards anything but various functions of the mind? As I've been saying it over and over again?

>>14602474
>If its not real, the what does the map map to?
Your experiences, memories, things that amount to personality which functions as the lens people interpret their inner narrative with, stuff like that. Of course not a soul or something ridiculous.

That is a lot more than just functions of the mind, but maybe that is what you meant by "functions of the mind". We're having an ongoing issue of terminology here. I really have been trying to get past it.

>>14596987
Unironically, read the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Skim the more technical parts, but get the gist of it: deductive reasoning is only useful because you aren't smart enough to make the obvious conclusion. `1+1` and `2` are different names for the same thing, and 'proving' something is just finding a bunch of names for it.
Put another way, the only reason deductive reasoning has any purpose at all is because your logical 'field of view' isn't as big as it could be. Everything interesting about a logical proof or whatever is already contained in the axioms, which by definition were not logically reasoned to.
The argument is cleaner in math, but the same applies to scientific thought.

Also:
>"I" do not exist
>I am certain
doesn't sound like it, lmao

>>14602494
Well yeah, those are functions of the mind. We're largely in agreement on that.

>why people are insistent on that kind of idea of a "soul" or a "qualia" separate from the physical in the first place
But I want to raise another deeper/further problem than that. I'm also arguing the problem of people insisting the self/soul/qualia that is separate from the body stems from their sense of self that is innate which they feel is inside the body. Thats why I base the my understanding around the sense/feeling of self side of things. Often this feeling is reinforced by holding on to the physical body. I don't know if you want to hold on this the physical body as the grounds of self either.
Let me go back again, we're both likely in agreement that people have a "sense of self" that which we believe is able to "experience" the world through, as if there really is something there-there. If we agree to this, we can come to some sort of agreement that pointing towards the physical body is not this sense of feeling. So the possible problem of what map/territory appears once again. This time in the form of the physical body which is substituted as the sense of self. So again, I'll take the same stance as before.
>what does the map map to?
Or in other words, does the model of self really map towards a physical body? Is that really the sense of our self? I don't think it is. Its not that I think physical body doesn't exists. Its that I think pointing towards the physical body is not accurate enough in describing the sense of self, that which is a primal feeling. Hence, this primal feeling is much less than the physical body and is merely a fleeting feeling. That which is reinforced over/over again by constant pointing towards the body/the name/the consciousness/mind/memories/etc

Thoughts?

>>14602535
Apologies, got distracted briefly wasting time whacking some antivaxxers. It's like junk food. It's hard to stop.
>I don't know if you want to hold on this the physical body as the grounds of self either.
I mean the model of one's sense of self is based on the body, and when it isn't you tend to get debilitating body dysmorphia or dissociative disorders.
> This time in the form of the physical body which is substituted as the sense of self. So again, I'll take the same stance as before.
I genuinely have trouble tracking. I don't see how this differs from Graziano, still.
>Or in other words, does the model of self really map towards a physical body?
I mean it's "a part of it" but not exclusively. You really seem like you'd find reading into Graziano's research and other research on theory of mind very interesting. I'm not sure a conversation on it has more to offer you, honestly?

>>14597054
free-will is self-evident. the mind is exempt from causal chain. agent causality, the undetermined determiner.

>>14602716
Free will requires a soul, the agency, that which you seek, that which is not found, that which is unjustified from the bottom up and only comes as a necessity from top down. A flawed take.

Steel yourself, find a more coherent path.

Terrible dialogue. 300 posts of links to some outside authority. Consistently wrong. You don't need to debate anything when you actually know the answer.

>>14602717
and said i it did not require? i do not seek, instead of realized it? and has something that has not been yet found disproven? how come something unjustifiable is what separates us from anything else? and is it a necessity for anything if not greatness?

>>14602668
Its more entertaining to do it from a Buddhist perspective imo. Thats why I'm arguing from the Buddhist line of reasoning/understanding. I consider the Buddhist line of reasoning to be the more solid base for understanding consciousness/reality/etc.

>>14596987
>But I am aware that I can trick or fool myself. How do I thusly coax myself into a snafu?

Methamphetamine

>>14596987
There's negative materialism, which is the framework that you're stuck in that reduces and destroys you, and then there is positive materialism, which asserts that, because you are nothing, that you are mere atoms and molecules, you are who you are and everybody else is as well. You are emergent.
You need to ask yourself, is this what I want for myself or do I want to keep going? Positive/negative materialism was only a method, but you are being trapped by the method instead of seeing it as a pathway toward where you want to be.

>>14602716
>the mind is exempt from [the] causal chain
If your mind is "exempt from the causal chain" then your actions aren't caused by it and you don't have free will

Let's suppose instead that you meant that the (state of) the mind isn't caused by anything, but instead causes your actions. What about actions that are dependent on your circumstances? Your mind can't choose to eat an apple when there isn't one in the room.

But whether or not there is an apple is the room is not immediately the result of your mind's choices--at best you can choose to carry an apple into the room, but the apple actually being present afterward is an event with an obvious chain of causation. The apple is there because you did carry it, because nothing prevented you, because there was an apple for you to carry, etc.

So even in this case your mind's ability to choose is being fixed by external, caused facts and it's actually not "exempt from the causal chain".

Suppose instead you meant that states of the mind are both caused and causes in the way we normally think about causation, but that the mind is definitionally exempt from "true causation". That's fine, but then consider "causation*" which is exactly the same as "true causation" except that the mind is no longer exempt. This works out because we've stipulated that the mind interacts causally in a perfectly normal way. Now "causation*" turns out to be what everyone else means by the word "causation", so you're welcome to your personal definition of "true causation", but you should translate your personal definitions in communication to avoid misunderstanding and since you know that the mind is not exempt from "causation*", what you should write is "the mind is not exempt from the causal chain".

>>14602872
>hedonism is the only true path in life
lol you sound like a pleb

>>14603529
The only escape for "free will" without soul, is a rethinking of what causality means and what time means.

If we assume time is eternally static and nothing changes, then causality doesn't exist. I think most people rules that out.
If we assume past doesn't exist and future has yet to exist, then the only relevant force for change is the present time. That would mean discarding causality, if we remove all powers from the past and hand it off to the present.
But what if, instead of removing all powers from the past, but rather it is weakened due the past not existing anymore and the present time having a stronger pull on your mind/conscious/etc.
Think of it like two water pipes. One water pipe from the left is the past force, the other from the present. If we shutoff the water pipe from the past, we'd still be wet, but we're more wet from the present's water pipe flow.
This undermines the notion that absolute notion that past time is the primary driver for which the present/future is a slave.

What is even the purpose of such discussions, once they have been infested with =<110 IQ Redditor children who are already filtered by the ENTRY-LEVEL requirement of understanding the hard problem of consciousness (not merely reading a short description and going like "ah yes, I can follow this". This you can do with any higher level math like abstract algebra Wikipedia article, but that doesn't mean you understand it. Note, I am not saying the hard problem is hard to understand. But we have to consider the average IQ of the detractors of non-materialism)?
The only reason I am not asking what the purpose wholesale is of these threads is that I had many a good discussion, as those threads due to chance were not sufficiently infected for it to be painful.

>>14603643
How long has this been a thing lately? I used to frequent this board and now it seems like there's an influx of people arguing over what consciousness is and what it can do. Is this leakage from /pol/ or /x/?

>>14603611
>The only escape for "free will" without soul, is a rethinking of what causality means and what time means.
Two major conceptions of free will are "ability to have done otherwise" free will (call this free will A) and "ones actions are caused by ones intentions" free will (call this free will B).

Your concerns about determinism make free will A seem unlikely, but at the same time this makes free will B more likely (because a plausible alternative has been eliminated). Common sense conceptions of free will are supported by and compatible with everyday experience, so the evidence for some kind of free will is very strong. Abstract metaphysical concerns on the other hand are far removed from everyday experience, which means that not only is the evidence for them very weak and indirect, they're very unintuitive and one is likely to reason about them incorrectly.

Your comments about time don't seem to exhaust the possibilities. For example, we can still consider causality in a deterministic universe in which the past and future are already "fixed" (although possibly unknown to us).

>>14603643
Are there any threads that aren't mostly posts by idiots? Just filtering out namefags and replies to their posts gets rid of ~80% of the posts in this thread.

>>14603690
There is a science of consciousness and the philosophy of consciousness is an important part of it. This could potentially be a useful and on-topic thread. It largely isn't, but retards have always posted about off-topic garbage. "Is coffee good for you?" "Scientifically speaking..."

>>14603727
What would exactly be productive about it? I've coincidentally had a recent interest in this topic. I've been a materialist for quite a while now (without knowing), but I do find the idea of idealism and other alternatives interesting. The problem I have with them is those arguments and philosophies that go against materialism seem to only hold any ground at all in abstract debate with very little real-world results showing anything other (and that's me being generous with said ground because I'm not a philosopher, I'm just saying what things seem like to me).

An example would be like how dualists progressively have to "reel back" where the "soul" or whatever is located. Is it the heart? The chest? No. Is it the brain? No. Aha! Yes, it's clearly the pituitary gland! Well, not really? And then you get these bizarre cases were consciousness is suddenly some abstract metaphysical thing that seems like a massive stretch compared to other things we've reduced. Occam's razor, from my perspective, really seems to be a bane for people arguing anything outside of materialism/physicalism. I'm open to new ideas, just ones that aren't extraneous and rely on some variation of "god of the gaps".

>>14603768
>What would exactly be productive about it?
I didn't use the term productive. It could be useful to individual posters. That's about the best you can hope for from a thread on 4chan. Nothing posted here is likely to change the world at large.

>I've been a materialist for quite a while now (without knowing)
Another way to describe this is that you've absorbed the biases of the culture that you're in without explicitly questioning them. A thread that introduces you to different ideas and gives reasonable arguments for them could help you with that.

You should be careful with terms like "real-world" because it reintroduces your existing biases about what exists and what doesn't. One big problem with claiming that materialism has some kind of real world consequences is that it's hard to see how materialism makes any claims at all. Absent some groundwork on what it means for something to exist and how we can determine what exists and what doesn't, materialism is nothing more than a definition for existence. It doesn't do any work. It's simply taking the material to be everything that exists and everything that exists to be material.

>where the "soul" or whatever is located
Looking for a physical location for a non-physical soul is already a mistake. Yes, some people have made that mistake, but their errors of reasoning don't constitute evidence for or against the existence of a soul.