/sci/ - Science & Math

>>11487656
>qualia
define qualia objectively. oh you can’t? surprise

>>11487659
You... agree with me.
Ok.

>>11487663
That or you're talking to a p-zombie who doesn't believe in qualia.

At what point of evolutionary complexity does the nervous system of a creature magically stop being physical? Do you argue ants have non-physical minds? What about koalas? Monkeys? Dolphins? Non-physicalists are morons.

>>11488277
What is the likelihood we are evolved enough to properly experience a “true” material reality?

>>11487656
>physicalism
>it fails to account for qualia
p sure the physical mechanisms that enable qualia are accounted for.

>>11488277
The way I see it, the nervous system in the functional sense is obviously physical. Physical parts do not ever become non-physical. Instead, there are underlying non-physical properties to our world that has always been there, and they manifest as qualia when matter is organized in a certain way.

>>11488283
bout tree fiddy

>>11488277
Physicalism is for retards.

Materialists are NPC, they lack the ability to think abstractly. They can,t process or conceptualize anything they can't experience with their avatars 5senses. They are how we see assburgers and artists compared to "normal"people. Just like autists can't understand emotions and social norms materialists can't understand abstractions and intuition

>>11489049
Kek 100% objective

>>11487656

I've come to understand, arguing with esteemed materialists, that their claims are only justified if they themselves lack inner subjectivity. To explain cosmic fine-tuning we need 10^500 other universes? Sure. That's not pseudoscience, that's statistical mechanics. What they fail to see is that they are unconsciously extending the domain of particle physics to "outside" a universe that contains particles.

Regarding qualia, it cannot be ruled out that some people just don't experience qualia and are merely complicated physical robots.

Mental phenomenon is not even considered in any science except psychology, where they maintain themselves from defining emotions, because they can't. When we define matter, we are using the same emotions of solidity to define matter. We attribute solidity, which is an emotion, to particles.

Ultimately, we don't know what real is. This is evidenced by the presence of dark matter which is unobservable. There are things we cannot see because human evolution didn't need it. But the question of mental phenomenon remains. If I experience fear, and that is just a movement of dead particles, then what am I being afraid about? Yet, the fear as an emotion is real as a rock.

>>11488283
5%. Which is the amount of normal observable baryonic mass.

>>11487656
What is "physical" and what is "non-physical" about qualia?

>>11487656
How does it fail to account for qualia?

>>11489049
Intuition in the sciences is a funny thing. I have known what the outcome was gonna be countless times in my career but when you express it without having the data often times NPC try to decide and mock you for it. Then when you get the results proving you right there are never around their mouth or apologize. Countless times I knew the results 10,20 steps before anyone else could realize them. I guess they are just jealous is all I
can think of. As you said I intuition, though there is also an element of knowledge and intelligence to it. You aren't just divining the results from the aether you are recognizing patterns and variables and what they mean before they do. It wouldn't surprise me to learn there is a correlation between materialism and pettiness in the least either. There is definitely a "human" component missing from them, some aspect of the Divine spark of higher knowing and recognition. They are technically, literally sub human untermensch

>>11489049

Hi, "physicalist" here, I actually am quite skilled at thinking abstractly and often have "intuitions" about things that lead me to the "right" answer. The difference between you and me is similar to the difference between people who ascribe things they cannot explain to "magic" or "god" and people who say "I don't know, but I'd like to figure it out." I'm in the "I'd like to figure it out" camp, rather than the "God did it" or "it's magic." I have no problem thinking abstractly or experiencing intuition. These aren't mutually exclusive beliefs. In my experience, most "non-physicalists" are ironically taking a literal approach to metaphysics, as in, they "literally" think there are "non-physical" things like numbers. It's ironic because they are using a *physical* intuition to describe something that is metaphysical, but because they don't understand how to describe higher-order systems and non-linear effects, they are simply stuck with the negation of physical, they are basically giving up and saying, "well since I can't figure out what kind of physical category it fits into, I'll just chalk it up to something non-physical even though I can't figure out what that is either." These people are just confused and projecting their own literalist confusion onto other.

>>11489116
Lolz perfect example look how deluded this dude is, he just can't even process it, it is beyond his ability to do so like expecting an ape to be able to learn calculus. Not only that he is combative about it, he is angry he cannot understand or experience it. Hoes mad nigga

>>11489062
>they maintain themselves from defining emotions

You are ignorant. There were many psychologists who have been attempting to use factor analysis to sort out human emotions during the middle of the 20th century. The most successful attempts have revealed you can plot emotions according to their valence (positive or negative), and arousal (intensity). Emotions, like anything else, wouldn't exist if they were not selected for by evolutionary processes. We already know what systems in the brain are involved in emotion, and what bodily systems are involved too. All of these things are material. You are confused because it is complex, not because it is "non-physical" which is an absurdity.

>>11489106

Lmao you been reading mcghilchrist? I agree that there are alot of self-proclaimed materialists who are equally as retarded as "non-materialists" but that doesn't negate the absurdity of "non-physical" concepts. Once again, you're experiencing something you can't explain- this doesn't justify contradictions.

>>11489116
You can't even carry on a proper conversation you fucking autist. All you did was write a fucking fan fic to attack a strawmam you manifested out of thin air with your crippling autism

>>11489131

It's funny how instead of responding to any of the various points I made in refuting your argument, you went right to name-calling and projecting, assigning emotion to my response that was absent, calling me "combative." Unless you can actually respond to my points I'm not going to take you seriously.

>>11489143
You are the only person that calims I can't explain it you autistic fucking retard. Where did anyone other than you ever say they couldn't explain it autistic motherfucker

>>11489147
Read my comment anon I nailed him and his kind off jump. They can only run their programming anything outside of their causes them discomfort and makes them feel threatened to crash their operating system and programming so they lash out

>>11489158
>fails to make an argument
>hurr I owned him
Typical quack response.

These are your counter arguments to me saying "meta-physical phenomena are not necessarily non-physical and people often confuse the two ironically."

>>11489146
>look how deluded this dude is
>he can't even process it
>it is beyond his ability to do so
>like expecting an ape to be able to learn calculus
>he is combative
>he is angry
>he cannot understand or experience it
>hoes made nigga

>>11489131
>you can't even carry a proper conversation
>you fucking autist
>all you did was write a fucking fan fic to attack a strawman
>a strawman you manifested out of thin air
>crippling autism

>>11489153
>you autistic fucking retard
>autistic motherfucker

>>11489158
>i nailed him
>anything outside of their causes them discomfort
>makes them feel threatened to crash their operating system
>they lash out

FYI: I am a laborer. I work in construction. I have a girlfriend, I have friends. I know it's fun to think I am an autistic sysadmin but *that* would be an actual strawman.

>>11489162
>>11489165
Subhuman untermensch confirmed

>>11489165
>he uses the word 'ascribe' in place of 'subscribe'
>fails to understand rudimentary English
>taking anything he says as valuable

He's a brainlet who can't even use language effectively. Ignore him.

>>11488309
makes sense

>>11489389
So, nice try, but not quite. Here's why you're still wrong.

My original sentence:
>The difference between you and me is similar to the difference between people who ascribe things they cannot explain to "magic" or "god" and people who say "I don't know, but I'd like to figure it out."

Your counter:
>he uses the word 'ascribe' in place of 'subscribe'
>fails to understand rudimentary English

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ascribe (transitive verb): to refer to a supposed cause, source, or author : to say or think that (something) is caused by, comes from, or is associated with a particular person or thing

Subscribe (transitive verb): to write (one's name) underneath : SIGN
2a: to sign (something, such as a document) with one's own hand in token of consent or obligation
b: to attest by signing
c: to pledge (a gift or contribution) by writing one's name with the amount
3: to assent to : SUPPORT

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ascribe -> caused by, comes from, associated with -> ABSTRACT
Subscribe -> signed by, written by, pledged by -> LITERAL

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Remember how I said it was ironic that you accuse others of failing to think abstractly? You just said I made a mistake by using the literal version of the word in place of the abstract one, on top of the fact that the literal one doesn't make sense in the context of my statement.

>>11488309
If the functional aspects of consciousness are completely physical, then the non-physical doesn't have causal powers and cannot affect our behavior. Therefore even the fact that some people advocate ideas like the non-physicality of qualia doesn't require non-physical qualia to explain that behavior - if they happen to be right it has to be just a bizarre coincidence, since the non-physical qualia isn't what made them advocate that idea.

>>11489423
You're less intelligent than me, so I'm not going to engage with you, rather share a link explaining why you are objectively wrong:

https://grammarist.com/usage/ascribe-vs-subscribe/

Now you can whinge some more or own up to your tenuous grasp of the English language. Your choice, brainlet.

>>11487656
Nice autism. You got no proof of qualia, even the creator of the term qualia turned against the concept later in life.

When you really break down what someone wants from the concept of qualia it inevitably just becomes Soul 2.0 with any attributes normally ascribed to the soul but considered undesirable by the philosopher purged.

The only argument for qualia existing that I have heard of is in the same vein as a the teapot in low earth orbit argument. I'm down to hear someone try to argue against it.

>>11489441
>https://grammarist.com/usage/ascribe-vs-subscribe/
Lol, nice troll. Even went so far as to post a link that supported him.

>>11489433
Sure, I think that's the biggest problem with epiphenomenalism and why it becomes absurd. When I say the nervous system is physical, I don't take that to mean that it's completely causally closed towards any non-physicality. Some sort of interaction between them is needed, otherwise it falls apart. Then we get the question of the mechanism that's facilitating this interaction: is that physical or non-physical? Maybe when we really start to think about it, it makes more sense to think of the world as one kind of stuff, but that's neither fundamentally physical or non-physical, but merely manifests to us in ways we call physical or non-physical, when in reality it's different sides of the same coin.

>>11489469
If you are referring to a non-physical thing in a way where it is interacting directly with a physical thing, then by definition it is physical.

Dark matter is thought to be physical even though we don't have things that can directly interact with it outside of rigidly controlled boundaries.

By getting to the coin idea you are just getting at the whole everything is a physical aspect of the universe; but decide to arbitrarily define it in such a way so you can say qualia are not a physical part of our existence.

>>11489480
My idea of physical is something that just has structural and behavioral properties; that is to say that there is a structure to an electron and there is a way it behaves, nothing more. That to me is a physical picture of the universe. For qualia, it doesn't seem like structural and behavioral properties are enough to explain it, because being a subject of phenomenal experience is just something above and beyond the way something is structured or the way it behaves. This extra property is non-physical in the sense that it's completely ignored by physical science.

>>11489480
>If you are referring to a non-physical thing in a way where it is interacting directly with a physical thing, then by definition it is physical.
So Descartes wasn't a dualist?

>>11489503
Define "phenomenal experience", because it is really easy to feed people drugs and make them experience a lot of phenomenal things. Although that is a highly structure and behavior heavy attribute as it is induced by drugs interacting in the brain.

Right now all I got for qualia is, more then just structure and behavior of a thing. If qualia have no structure nor behavior then what is it? If it has both then what difference is saying that qualia is "above" these things and saying that god is unknowable?

>>11489503
All we know about "the physical" is it's ability to bring about observers and observable phenomena. Nothing about that is contrary to subjective experience.

>>11489517
>Define "phenomenal experience"
It's hard to put into words, but since we all (hopefully) have it I just have to hope the words I use makes you think of the correct phenomena.

The simplest way to put it is that something has phenomenal experience when there's something it's like to be that thing. To experience pain, pleasure, colors from a first person perspective, that is having phenomenal experience. Note that we're not talking about the way the brain processes the pain signals, how the visual cortex transcodes the image data from the eyes - we're just talking about what it's like to experience it - that it IS like something to experience it. With structure and behavior you can explain the brain processing the signals, but you can't explain why it feels like anything for a subject to experience it.

The brain has to mush sensory data into a form that is easily dealt with, so it is "compressed"into the shape of what we call qualia, which are ambiguous and often blurry due to that compression. Our awareness has limits to its granularity.

>>11489539
Essentially this. And I personally find many materialist models of reality to be self-refuting, in the fact that they fail to recognize the presence of qualia within objects they claim to precede and produce it. The phenomena of color, for example, is stated to be the interaction of the wavelengths of light, with the system of the eye, and the interpretation of the brain. Namely, that prior to the sensation of colors we recognize as color, there are simply physical frequencies and their interactions with our biological machinery. The issue that I personally have with this model is that our very biological machinery, namely the eye and brain, have only ever been known by us in their colored forms - that is, in the form which already wears the qualia which was argued to be the later product of them. How can one claim that color as a sensation is the product of the eye and brain, if they themselves are colored objects? We're incorporating the product into the process we claimed would create it, which is not coherent in my view.

Let me state it in equation-form:
light frequencies + eye + brain (inputs, which have no qualia)
-> color (output, which has qualia)

But the incoherence is that the eye and brain are already colored, and therefore the inputs contain the output on themselves already.

frequencies + eye (colored, qualia) + brain (colored, qualia) -> color (qualia)

How could one then sensibly argue for said model of color as accurate?

I guess the overall issue is that human beings, in order to investigate reality, are incapable of escaping the biological apparatus they use to do so. This limits the information we can ever come into contact with, to whatever passes through our pre-existing interpretative filter. If we can't leave our physical bodies and still investigate the universe, then the nature of our physical bodies will dictate the universe we can ever come to know.

I'm very open to criticism, so let me know what you think.

>>11488410
Physicalism is an objective fact. Your thought fantasies don't supersede mundane, predictable, highly verifiable laws of physics.

>>11489733
You're out of your depth. Go take philosophy 101 before babbling about things you clearly do not comprehend.

>>11488277
>what is an emergent property

>>11489539
You can explain it in terms of, brain has encoded thoughts and feelings. Those encoded thoughts and feelings activate in the presence of complex stimuli. The reminder of these things cause physiological responses. (ie. seeing a picture of your dead mom makes you cry). Consciousness as an experience is something easily modulated by fucking with the brain.

This goes back to the teapot in space problem. The only evidence you have of qualia is that your feelings are special and that there isn't a way to 100% rule it out from existing. In the same way there is no way to rule out that right now above your head a teapot is traveling a billion miles an hour. Does it make it likely there is a teapot? Would it make sense that there is a teapot? No.

>>11489726
We already "see" things naturally as being upside-down because of the way light works. Our brain compensates for this fact by flipping the resulting image inside of our visual cortex. This can be tested by giving someone glasses that flip their view. After a couple days they feel like it is normal because the brain compensates again.

On to colour, this one is kind of painful for me because I studied colour receptors in the brain as part of my research for awhile. The way this works is that there are three different possible "reactions" with light for a normal human. Based on the wavelength of the light the reaction will proceed with a certain amount of strength. These correspond to the blue, green, and red. The strength of the chemical reaction when that light hits a cell dictates how strongly a neuron fires then that signal gets processed and sent to the brain. The proportion of each chemical reaction that is triggered gives the final result.

What I'm confused with is why you think something having an attribute disallows it from processing said attribute. Ever heard of a catalyst, their whole point is being a reactant and product. We use tech to see things we can't normally.

>>11489744
That really doesn't work as a response to that question. The poster was asking when that emergent property would appear, it is already obviously assumed to be an emergent property.

>>11489740
cope

>>11489762
Thank you for the input anon. I appreciate it from someone who lacks as much scientific background as the people on this board. I am still confused however, as to how your explanation resolves the question I raised earlier. If color as a subjective phenomena-qualia (as opposed to an objective wavelength-material) is supposed to be the product of the eye and brain, how can that make sense when those two organs already have it? We've therefore never isolated color as a wavelength, and then color as a phenomena. We're speaking of both simultaneously, while also claiming the former produces the latter.

Regarding chemical catalysts, I understand them in the context of chemical reactions, but I don't feel like that's the same concept as what I'm presently describing. In the case of chemistry, we're describing entities of the same class (chemicals), changing forms within that overall class. In our present discussion, we're talking about the difference between an objective phenomena and a subjective phenomena - the former being non-qualia in content, and the latter being qualia in content. The question I'm asking is how we can describe the former as producing the latter, if our explanations of the former already include the latter within themselves. The color receptors of the eye are themselves seen by our eyes, which already contain color on themselves, and seemingly refute the possibility of sensibly claiming them to be the "source of color" itself. If we're using the eye to study the eye, doesn't that investigative ground impose a self-binding limitation on what can be investigated at all? I guess a better phrasing of my question would be: if color is non-essential to matter, and merely an interpretative product of certain biological machinery, what does non-colored matter resemble?

Feel free to correct me again. I'm not trying to bash physicalism or claim it false, I just find certain models self-contradictory and I'd love to be shown otherwise.

Non-materialism is just cope for retards butthurt over the fact that the material world gave them the short end of the stick. Your subconscious desperately tries to make itself content and happy as a self-preservation mechanism, so it starts grasping for delusions.

>>11487659
>objectively
Define objectively objectively. Oh you can't? surprise.

>>11489793
Non-coluored matter is black. In the case of someone who is completely colourblind all matter is non-coloured.

In the context of physicality, a true black is non-coloured matter. All matter gives off colours in a spectrum we only get a fraction of.

We use light to study light in a large number of things, it is part of the basis of spectroscopy. Just because we use a thing to sense a thing, doesn't make the sensation we infer wrong. I can use a rock to test how strong another rock is and that won't be any less valid then using a particularly hard coconut.

In terms of the "source of colour" the course of colour is a physical phenomena. The experience of colour is a mental phenomena as a response to the physical phenomena. This mental phenomena can be tuned by fucking with people's brains and only allowing certain things to get through. such as in blind sight, a condition that can be induced wherein a person is unable to describe anything around them and is functionally blind, but they have the ability to walk through a crowded room because they are still processing things in a different part of the brain then the one responsible for conscious vision. If colour and vision were the result of qualia we couldn't break it apart like that inside of a persons brain. We don't know if our experiences match up perfectly but we have mirror neurons that try to mimic other peoples experience when we do stuff.

Seems like the pragmatic guess is that our conscious experience is another facet of physical reality than to suggest a non-physical reality. Humans evolved from relatively simple physical systems. If you’re going to suggest things randomly became non-physical somewhere along that evolutionary chain, you need to provide extraordinary evidence similar to if you were claiming other nonsense like that god is real or astrology is legitimate or that souls exist.

>>11489793
Basically this
>>11489847

We can't prove that qualia don't exist because that is impossible by the way it is defined. We can infer a lot of truths about the world working in a physicality and there is far more evidence supporting it as the framework of reality then not.

Look up Russell's Teapot

>>11489733
Your delusions and fantasies aren't "objective fact". Sorry.

>>11489868
The world is physical, and it obeys the laws of physics at all times. Fact. Philosophers will disagree, because they want the world to be some deeper mystery than what it really is.

>>11489868
If they can be independently corroborated then yes they are.

>>11489874
brainlet

>>11489852
>We can't prove that qualia don't exist because that is impossible by the way it is defined.
Qualia are sensations. Sensations exist. This is the only thing "we" know for certain.

>>11489874
You don't know what the "laws of physics" are, you stupid orangutan.

>>11489879
cope

>>11489874
define "physical"

>>11489881
Why do sensations have to be non-physical though? I don’t get this jump. They almost certainly are physical since they manifest from entirely physical systems.

>>11489886
>you’re not a moron who believes in souls so you don’t know what the laws of physics are

>>11489881
Qualia in the context of this argument. Yes the strict definition of qualia is conscious experience. But that by itself does not refute materialism as we can just have brains manufacturing consciousness and qualia would be described as how that manufactured consciousness interacts with the world.

The way it is being defined is that there is some ephemeral "other" thing or charecter that makes every sensation received by a brain special. That you couldn't just recreate someones brain and physical state at a given moment and have them come back and experience reality as they were.

The second definition of qualia is something that can't be proven

>>11488277
>>11489733
>>11489874
Your definition of "physical" is something like "that which happens" so your comment is basically devoid of content.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hempel%27s_dilemma

>>11489893
I didn't say they were "non-physical" because you haven't even defined what "physical" is supposed to mean.

>>11489886
The inferential process of empiricism must necessarily be inductive, and therefore can never attain certainty. The status of human knowledge about physical behavior is not the same thing as the behaviors themselves. It's still pretty obvious that the world is literally made of atoms and particles, and driven by conserved and exchanged quantities of energy.

>>11489897
>brains manufacturing consciousness
>manufacturing
>consciousness

>>11489895
Nice projection, reddit.

>>11489904
>the world is literally made of atoms and particles
Retard
https://aapt.scitation.org/doi/full/10.1119/1.4789885
https://www.symmetrymagazine.org/article/july-2013/real-talk-everything-is-made-of-fields
https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0103041
>and driven by conserved and exchanged quantities of energy
Double retard
https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2010/02/22/energy-is-not-conserved/
https://www.discovermagazine.com/the-sciences/energy-is-not-conserved

>>11489908
that was your post. You said someone didn’t know the laws of physics because they don’t believe in woo-woo or magic.

>>11489899
Don't be a semantics nigger. A tautology as a matter of sentence structure doesn't seriously undermine basic facts about physical reality, except to coping philosophers putting the rules of propositional and predicate logic statements over physics.

>>11489910
Energy is locally conserved where time-translation-invariance is approximately or exactly true, which is almost all of the time in everyday situations. The questions of global conservation, or conservation under relativistic frames are interesting, but not what I was talking about.

>>11487656
It does, the two are completely chained together, in fact they are actually one. There is merely a minute time delay that tricks you into thinking that you have free will. In fact we are all just reacting upon a logical structure that originates literally at or before the big bang. It's all a compoundment from there. All of everything.

>>11489905
This is what the whole argument boils down to dude.

Either
A. The brain is the seat of consciousness and our conscious experience is the result of the brain doing a bunch of things
or
B. The brain is the control panel of consciousness and our conscious experience is pressing those buttons and looking at the screen the brain puts up.

The second is not provable nor is there a way to prove it because every time someone puts something up showing the evidence for A people can say that's just an effect of the brain on B's ability to interact. Our consciousness is not some inviolable castle, it can be compromised with something as simple as a quick punch and you will never be the same. This is support of A. The support of B is... "A might not be true".

Actually no, I think I got it. Really we are all just projections of the flying spaghetti monsters noodley appendages. Consciousness is truly just his starch flowing through us. Prove to me that is less likely then B.

Consciousness is a time delay

See: >>11489929

>>11489914
Keep projecting, reddit.

>>11489874
physics is just something we do to describe nature. It is not nature itself. Same with math as a language of nature. It is a language we use to describe nature. In truth we don't know what nature is like. We just experience it and make stories about it.

>>11489916
>no answer

>>11489932
>Really we are all just projections of the flying spaghetti monsters noodley appendages
Reddit detected

>>11489932
False dilemma. Both of those are brainlet-tier so I seriously hope you don't subscribe to either.
http://nautil.us/issue/47/consciousness/is-matter-conscious

>>11489970
The theoretical justification for much of physics is compelling. It is minimal and materialistic, and it works quite well for most "ordinary" situations.
>>11489971
No answer to what? "Hurr durr circular reasoning physics isn't real"? That's a dumb argument.

>>11489977
I know you won't believe me but I have never actually been on reddit for more time then it took to browse a link. The flying spaghetti monster is just the response to the religious version of this argument.

>>11489982
>still no answer

>>11489987
>I know you won't believe me but I have never actually been on reddit for more time then it took to browse a link. The flying spaghetti monster is just the response to the religious version of this argument.

>>11489988
Your argument isn't a serious rebuttal of anything.

>>11489994
>still no answer as to what "physical" means
You're really struggling.

>>11489916
did you even read the post you're replying to? because it sure seems like your retarded ass didn't.

>>11489996
"Physical" refers to atoms, particles, fields, and energy. The "stuff" that makes up the universe.

>>11490001
See >>11489910, retard.
>The "stuff" that makes up the universe.
Oh wow, what a nice, totally non-empty ""definition"".

>>11489979
>The brain is the seat of consciousness
>The brain is made of matter
>Matter is conscious
Even your link to a magazine would agree with that. Beyond that it's cute that you ascribe to the idea that all of reality is a byproduct of conscious experiences interaction. It's like a new form of solipsism, pretty but not very useful.

>>11490000
Yes. It was an argument based on propositional logic, essentially claiming that "the world is physical" is merely tautological based on definitions of physical. Semantic arguments don't seriously undermine basic facts of physics, although philosophers will insist they do to continue playing logical voodoo games.
>>11490005
Classic. The philosopher devolves to "your definitions aren't up to my standards" to reject an argument that should actually be relatively obvious what the content of is.

>>11490008
>reads the title
Why don't you read the actual article before replying? Do you have the attention span of a flea?

>>11490027
>still no answer once again
This is getting tiresome. Why don't you just answer the question? You seemed so sure you knew what you were talking about, but the realization seems to be dawning on you that you have no idea what you're talking about. You reflexively spew regurgitated verbiage without pausing and reflecting on its meaning, and you're just becoming aware of that fact.

>>11487656
How can you support qualia when it doesn't exist?

>>11490040
nothing exists

>>11490033
I read it. They are arguing that physical reality is a substrate of consciousness. The whole software hardware shit.

It's interesting but not exactly useful, they even cite scientists that later on rejected the idea after having worked on it for a long time.

Like cool, consciousness like makes atoms and stuff duuude. Can you prove it? no. Does it change anything? no. It just feels cool and it is neat to re-contextualize experience in.

>>11490038
He answered, you decided you didn't like it and rejected it.

>>11490049
>didn't actually read the article
Ok, that's what I thought. You should do it some time, though.

>>11490050
What's the answer "he" gave?

>>11487656
Mac demarco is overrated

>>11490052
Nice non-argument hippie

>>11490038
An answer to what? What do you want an answer to? "Define physical"? Physical matter and energy. If you don't know what I'm talking about, ram your head into the nearest wall and remind yourself that what's meant by "physical" isn't obvious until it's given a concise definition suitable for arbitrary philosophical arguments. You want a definition that you can try to pick apart and then claim or imply that physicalism is false.

>>11490050
how do you know that's a "he" you dumb incel

>>11490071
>If you don't know what I'm talking about, ram your head into the nearest wall and remind yourself that what's meant by "physical"
So sensation?
>You want a definition that you can try to
I just want a definition, period. Why does that scare you? Who cares what "I would do" with it? Why should that make you uncomfortable?

>>11489844
I think I'm beginning to agree with you. But if black is another shade of color we've seen with our eyes, would that not be different from the sense of a non-colored object, which would be something we've never encountered before, nor could imagine? If I understand correctly, you're describing color here as being the primary colors and beyond them, while something like black is outside of that system - whereas the view that I was entering our qualia discussion with is how color - be it black or white or any other shade inbetween - manifests at all from something which is strictly mechanical and completely unlike to it. I guess that's what my question concerns. Aren't color receptors responsible for our perception of all colors, or is it merely the three primary ones (and their combinations)?

>>11490071
energy isn't a "thing", you dumb retard. fucking read a book for a change
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noether%27s_theorem

>>11490075
I just gave you a definition. You can stop repeatedly asking for the same thing over and over to make yourself seem more rhetorically powerful. Now, remind me why it's an empty and tautological definition so that this useless discussion can continue.

>>11490084
What was your definition?
>Physical is physical matter and energy
Is this it? "X is X [undefined term] and [thing that doesn't even exist]?"

>>11490083
Energy is an "amount of something." The first law of thermodynamics is essentially an assertion that all exchanges of energy are zero sum when the system is isolated. That's enough "thingness" for me to consider it to be a "part" of reality. It's not a "thing" in the same way that literal atoms and particles are, but it does still have readily apparent consequences.

you cant boil it down to one piece it would not be the same. That what you would describe would be something else. You have to see the whole picture, and so far we havent

>>11490071
>>11490095
Energy is about as “real” as caloric, which is to say not at all, except as a bookkeeping device of sorts, if you want to call it that, that is conjured by humans to be used in certain limited situations. It’s not a thing but a kind of fiction or “property” we ascribe to things.

>>11490089
Again, it should be obvious what "physical" actually means. If you don't know what it is, then run a knife blade down your wrists. Remember, this is just "sensation," so your propositional logic argument will remain intact.

>>11490095
atoms and particles aren’t things, they’re fictions >>11489910

>>11490078
We add on colours for every part of perception. I can perceive the stars and the sun and the moon to be in the same plane, but they are not and unless I am alerted to that fact I will continue to think they are. This means that non-colour is just an arbitrary definition as is colour. Physically speaking black is not a colour but an absence. A good example is temperature, there is no such thing as "cold" it is all just relative amounts of heat. But we still have the idea of cold and the idea of hot because our subjective experience results in the creation of useful descriptions.

Black is the lack of stimuli, so if I were to just cut out your eyes it would be "black" that you "see". White is every neuron being on at once in roughly similar amounts. Even if you have only one receptor missing you can still see the other colurs just not as detailed in your discrimination of wave lengths. We also have rods that react to just photons in general, which is why on dark nights it is better to look from the corner of your eye rather then directly at something. Because the cones at the center of your vision don't have as much ability to generally pick up light.

Cones and rods are the tools our brain uses to perceive colour and light. We use our mental frameworks built up over years of learning to ascribe attributes to these inputs. Part of why many colourblind people never realize they are until they are tested. If you give a deaf person hearing they won't be able to understand what sounds are intrinsically. If you give a blind person sight they won't be able to pick apart a cube from a sphere until they touch it and begin to build up a framework.

>>11490095
Energy conservation doesn’t hold in general.

>>11489893
From what we can see, yes. But they are also seemingly beyond detection of scientific investigation, which is where the difficulty comes into play, and brings us to this quandary.

We can understand the external neurological basis of "pain", for example, but nothing studied there tells us about the actual sensation experienced internally alongside those biological structures. Only the actual host of said system has access to that dimension of data, and the very nature of the information itself seems to be distinct from that of its material vessel, in the language of sheer feeling rather than the material structures which science studies.

Ultimately I'm not claiming such qualia to be immaterial, but it's an unknown variable within the present framework of materialist science. If we're claiming our model to describe reality, it should naturally incorporate all the known dimensions of such. But here we have an outlier, something which appears distinct to our existing conceptual frameworks (i.e matter, and its behavioral properties), and which there is no present scientific theory bridging the worlds between.

There's also the question of consciousness, which is arguably even more difficult to tackle. Where one can argue that nervous-system structures producing pain sensations is an example of a functional system operating under an evolutionary paradigm, regardless of whether we presently understand how the nerve structures produce a sensation itself, the overarching fact of experience altogether is a much broader subject and one that will be far more difficult to unravel. Qualia seemingly have empirical structures attached to them, whereas consciousness or experience itself is of such a general character that it cannot be ascribed to one area like such, nor have I heard evolutionary arguments I consider satisfactory. I think it's valid to ponder areas like panpsychism, asking such questions as whether rocks have some form of experience or not.

>>11490105
“It should be obvious” is not an answer. It’s not even an honest *attempt* at an answer because you know as well as I do that we physicists don’t really know what matter is.

>>11490105
>it’s just sensation
So this is your new definition?

>>11490116
We found the consciousness switch the brain a bit ago. We can turn it on or off by essentially pressing it.

https://newatlas.com/science/consciousness-switch-brain-region/

Do you think a computer can be conscious? Because if we make one that is conscious we can look at it's code and clearly denote the exact transitions of it's "sensations" to it's "conscious" processing. Removing the whole question of pain and the like beyond a curiosity of neuroscience.

>>11490117
It literally should be obvious from everyday experience what "physical" means. Definitions aren't as all-important as you wish they were.

>>11490141
Wow, I guess people in ancient times knew what gravity and electromagnetism were from their everyday experience. Deep insight, bro.
Retard.

>>11490110
The situations in which energy conservation is violated are exotic with respect to human experience. The concept of energy is still enormously useful in explaining what can be personally observed, and still finds a place as part of an understanding of what constitutes reality.

>>11490147
What does the particular state of human knowledge at one time have to do with whether or not the world is principally physical in nature?

>>11490141
>experience
so this is the definition of “physical”?

>>11490104
The relationships between the phenomena we observe in reality will remain as they are, but our conceptual frameworks involving such terms as "energy" are simply mental constructions used to help us dissect them. I agree with you. Energy is merely a concept we use to describe a specific dimension pertaining to material phenomena, of which the concept is not a distinct reality but the underlying dimension it describes is. That's how I view it anyway.

>>11490148
We’re talking about what exists, not what humans experience. Aren’t we?

>>11490150
I ask you that question. You keep bringing up “everyday experience”.

>>11490150
>world is principally physical in nature?
what would a world where this would not be the case be like?

>>11490148
Right. That doesn’t mean it IS reality.

>>11490163
How are you to develop an understanding of how reality actually works if not by relying on your own two eyes and experiences? People believe a lot of nonsense, but the ordinary laws of physics applying to macroscopic phenomena are endlessly testable and uniformly applicable where their assumptions are not violated. I'm not talking about exotic phenomena and all physics that is possible.

>>11487656
This is philosophy and therefore doesn’t belong on /sci/. Kindly go away, and take your silly arguments with you.

>>11490179
Laws of physics aren’t things, bud. There aren’t these mysterious ”laws” out there that lord it over matter, what we experience, or whatever. Don’t reify what are simply DESCRIPTIONS of behavior/phenomena/what we experience.

>>11490154
What do you mean by “material phenomena”? What is experienced? As opposed to what, exactly? What is *not* experienced?

>>11487656
I think even a Ship of Theseus "human," like The Major, would still bring no answer. I can't say her neural processes weren't kept "kindled" when the last neuron was cyberized. A memorial flame isn't eternal, we just mask the process.

>>11490187
In other words, what work is the adjective “material” that you’ve attached to the noun “phenomena” doing?

>>11490187
"Material phenomena", in that context, would designate items observed through the senses, which the scientific term "energy" pertains to the workings of (unlike our thoughts, for example, which despite being an item of experience, does not have the same behaviors or relationships which empirical objects do, and the concept of energy not applying to it in the same way).

>>11490203
Sensory phenomena versus mental phenomena, essentially.

>>11490204
>items observed through the senses
That just sounds like “phenomena” itself. What in the world would *non*-material phenomena be? Things observed through the senses that are not observed through the senses??

>>11490208
But sensory phenomena IS mental phenomena.

>>11490222
What distinguishes mental phenomena from physical phenomena? It’s just an ongoing brain process, silly.

>>11490226
Well you haven’t defined what physical phenomena is. Unless you’re really defining it as experience?

>>11490226
Brain process is a description, not a thing, just like photosynthesis isn’t a thing. It’s a description.

>>11490233
>Well you haven’t defined what physical phenomena is

Stuff involving atoms, energy, and spacetime.

>>11490233
>You haven't defined
It's been defined earlier in this thread.

>>11490239
Where?

>>11490242
Earlier in this thread.

>>11490244
Where?

>>11490238
“Stuff”?
And energy isn’t a thing, dummy. It’s not even a conserved quantity, if you want to call abstract objects “things”.

>>11487656
I don't support physicalism. I don't support qualia either. Both are dumb shit. And I'm not an enlightened centrist. Literally both are garbage ideologies that has been killed by philosophers since the before the birth of Jesus Christ.

>>11489874
Sorry you can't hide from this. If you don't define what "physical" means, then physicalism is meaningless junk.

>>11490221
>>11490222
Yes, but in that specific comment I was highlighting the scientific term known as "energy", which strictly applies to sensory phenomena rather than our mental phenomena, which from our internal vantages do not have the same properties as do the sensorial objects of our experience. I'm sorry if these aren't good explanations, I'm writing an assignment at the moment and the only point of my earlier comment was to discuss the fact that there's a difference between the world of our experience, and the world of concepts we project onto it - and that "energy" is an example of a concept we project onto sensory phenomena which has existence within the behaviors of said phenomena, but the concept itself merely a descriptor for those behaviors rather than a distinct substance of its own.

If you're discussing the notion of experience being the ontological substance and constant, and that everything else we speak of is merely an item within experience, then I'd agree with you. I wasn't trying to engage in a discussion of substance ontologies above, though. I wasn't stating that materiality is substantially distinct from experience, or anything of the kind.

>>11490233
This guy >>11490226 is not me btw. My only comment following >>11490208 is >>11490252.

>>11490251
Semantics horseshit doesn't undermine the idea that reality is principally physical. Giving you a definition that's up to your standards is not a prerequisite for something being true or not. Definitions aren't all important.

>>11490263
Nah dude. Reality is principally neroncical, and don’t ask me what “neroncical” means because I don’t have to define it.

>>11490263
what do you mean by “principally physical”? as opposed to “totally physical”? and what would a non-“physical” world be like?

>>11487656
You say that qualia don't exist.
/Thread

>>11490290
Nothing exists.

>>11490290
so there are no sensations?

>>11490245
Do you not understand what earlier means?

How do you even define something non-physical? Honest question. I believe everything ultimately is made of subatomic particles, even accounting to paranormal or still unexplainable phenomena.

>>11490313
So you were lying, because you refuse to say where. Go it.

>>11490263
You're using some arcane words there brah. What the fuck do you mean by "principally physical" or idea of "reality"? If you cannot explain it properly, then you're not only doing a disservice to science, but also you're a fucking retard.

>>11490313
There’s a proof that you’re an idiot in this very thread. Don’t ask me where.

>>11490313
why don’t you just say where it is, you dumb monkey?

>>11490325
>>11490328
>>11490331
Maybe go look up the definition of earlier and come back to this thread.

>>11490343
Why don't you link to the post and sentence? Is it easier to keep evading?

>>11490347
What do you mean by evading?

>>11490326
Reality is... what is.

>>11487659
npcs be like, what is consciousness?

>>11490351
This question >>11490242

>>11487656
take the open individualism pill

>>11490248
> And energy isn’t a thing, dummy

Please return to elementary school science class.

>>11490359
So you're saying that when someone has clearly defined physical phenomena earlier in the thread the people asking where are evading?

>>11490372
>someone has clearly defined physical phenomena
Where?

>>11490366
Do you think temperature is a "thing"?

>>11490394
Why are you evading?

>>11490372
>So you're saying that when someone has clearly defined physical phenomena earlier in the thread the people asking where are evading?
No.

>>11490372
>someone has clearly defined physical phenomena earlier in the thread
link to the post?

>>11487656
Panpsychism

>>11490831
why panpsychism, when you can solve the problem with monism?

>>11489979
> If we were somehow granted knowledge of every physical detail and pattern in the universe, we would not expect these problems to persist. They would dissolve in the same way the problem of heritability dissolved upon the discovery of the physical details of DNA. But the hard problem of consciousness would seem to persist even given knowledge of every imaginable kind of physical detail.

Bullshit. With sufficient information to fully model a brain and all its I/O, cosnciousness should be understandable.

>>11487656

>>11490141
>from everyday experience

Which is built up from a series of sensations.

>>11491316
>cosnciousness should be understandable

Via what methods?

>>11488277
its still physical, but the qualia itself is unaccounted for

>>11488298
yes but what of the qualia?

>>11487659
qualia are sensations. all definitions are in relation to sensations, a word means something as much as it sparks qualia in your qualiaspace. how can you define that which gives rise to definitions?

>>11489543
what of the sensory data itself? that is the root of qualia and is inherently non physical, even if it moves in coordination with physical things. however, i think we're onto something with the idea that there is compression in the universe, what doesn't fit into physical is moved into another realm, one case being qualia

>>11487656
without physical, its easy to see qualia couldn't arise. but without qualia, there would be no perception of the physical, even if passed through functors and algorithmic storage devices like the brain. then the physical would not exist, because existence is a trait of qualia, so both depend on eachother