/sci/ - Science & Math

Agreed. The only "evidence" of strong emergence is that sometimes it really feels like it exists. A lot like religion, actually.

Most problems are intractable even if theoretically they can be reduced to a small set of simpler laws.

>>10901109
You could make a good argument that the mind is strongly emergent

>>10901109
Probably but that does not mean we will be able to accomplish just that.
>>10902887
You can’t make a good argument that the mind exists at all.

>>10902887
Only if you can prove that it isn't merely the abstraction of an illusion

>>10901117
What's the "evidence" for weak emergence then?

>>10902896
Not the correct question to ask but the correct direction to look in.

>>10902893
>>10902894
Scientists are unironically not intelligent
>refuse to accept any form of argument or modal of thought that isn't empiricism
>the only thing that actually has empirical evidence to show exists
>"B-but you can't even show it exists!"
This is unironically why all scientists should be replaced with mathematicians. Most breakthroughs in science were done by mathematicians anyway, and mathematicians are far more intelligent and philosophically nuanced. Scientists are literally midwits.

>>10903000
>Brainlet who holds on to "i think therefore I am" as a coping mechanism

>>10903008
you're an actual idiot, dunning kruger is really sad.

>>10903000
checked

>>10903013
>dunning kruger
>Probably thinks that shows that only stupid people overestimate their abilities and not that everybody does
>Implying this isn't something that everybody knew already

>>10903032
dunning-kruger isn’t real

>>10903043
Unironically this
All that the study shows is the discrepancy between what a person needs to know and what the testers believe they need to know.

>>10901109
The simple laws leading to the complex phenomenon (that you can again reduce down to those selfsame laws) are in and of themselves a strongly emergent phenomenon.

>>10902894
It cant be an illusion because an illusion needs someone to experience an illusion.

>>10903098
>It cant be an illusion because an illusion needs someone to experience an illusion.
True enough, but perhaps there is only one someone

>>10902896
More than anything, it's out of convenience.

It's a lot easier to say, "I see a red car," than to say, "electromagnetic radiation of blah blah wavelength has entered my pupils, neurons 18273728 and 18283728 fired rapidly"

>>10903498
I meant, what's the evidence that consciousness can be explained simply by weak emergence?

>>10903529
We know that brain activity can be explained in terms of chemical and electrical interactions. We know that our experiences correspond to our brain activity.

If you want to claim that there is some other paranormal component to our experience that is not already established fact, that is on you to prove. You cannot ask someone else to disprove your wild claim when you haven't presented any proof yourself.

>>10903540
>We know that brain activity can be explained in terms of chemical and electrical interactions. We know that our experiences correspond to our brain activity.

Someone who believes in strong emergence is not a Cartesian dualist, he would not deny causal connection or that consciousness comes from the brain. What he would deny is that the connection follows in some kind of reductionist way, the same way a lower level description of a chair in terms of its components results inevitably in the same thing as the high level description of chair, it's not even conceivable that it could result in anything else. I can imagine a purely material description at lower level resulting in a human being in terms of observable behavior, but it's always conceivable that the result could be a p-zombie. Unless we assume consciousness as some kind of fundamental irreducible element.

>>10903540
Id make an argumeny though that the systems of the brain arent directly computable/analyzable in terms of our own metacognitive abilities or self report and so in some crude sense constitute some sort of strong emergence.

>>10901109
Depends what you mean by simpler laws. The standard model can not explain abstract thoughts as they are not a localized phenomenon. Motor controls are conducted in a specific part of the brain, so quantum electro dynamics works to explain that. Non locality is implied by Bell's theorem but quantum electro dynamics ignores this and takes only local interaction into account. Turns out to be very useful, but cannot explain non local phenomena. Perhaps there will be a theory which is non local, but it definitely won't be simple.

>>10905719
>The standard model can not explain abstract thoughts as they are not a localized phenomenon.
But they are localized in the brain.

>>10905730
Local means at a single point, look at a feynman diagram the particles collide at a point. The brain is not a single point. Abstract thoughts in particular occur at points pretty far from each other simultaneously. Those parts of the brain must be entangled in some way.

Nothing in this thread is science or math.

>>10903655
Why in the fuck would it not be

Pzombies cannot exist

>>10906134
Would not be what? You mean why consciousness wouldn't be irreducible? If we assume materialism and that consciousness can be explained by weak emergence only. Which I don't do. As the only alternatives I see either panpsychism or some kind of strong emergence where it's just a brute fact and a natural law of our universe that certain kind of material interactions will poof consciousness into existence. I would consider it strong emergence because it would not get rid of consciousness at the level of fundamental description of reality. The only way I see of getting rid of strong emergence is panpsychism because in that case some kind of proto-consciousness is already present everywhere. At face value these ideas sound very magical and new-agey, but at closer inspection the most seemingly "sciency" idea of monist materialism with weakly emergent consciousness makes even less sense IMO.
There may be some disagreement about the concepts of strong and weak emergence and this whole problem is more metaphysics and philosophy than science though.

>>10906219
Then all weak emergence has strong emergence in it, though it seems that strong emergence is only considered meaningful when self aware

Consider the example from the paper of a glider in conways game of life. The glider is a weakly emergent phenomenon. Consciousness is a fundemental element tied to any emergence, so with the existence of the glider and its behavior, so is there the existence of an experience of what it is like to be a glider. This experience has no intelligence on it though, it doesnt go anywhere or cause anything else to happen, so often its existence isnt even considered. But it ought to be considered in a complete theory, and it necessarily is the case.

>>10906219
You cant even define consciousness though.
You cant even tell me why consciousness cannot be explained with weak emergence.
You are assuming apriori that consciousness is some magic alien substance rather than actually deeply analyzing what it actually is or means.
You act on knee jerk intuition rather than actual philosophical thinking.
Panpsychism is a completely meaningless useless philosophy.

You have alot to learn.

>>10906278
No u

>>10906278
>You cant even define consciousness though.
I didn't define it, doesn't mean I can't. I rather like the definition that X is conscious if there is something that it's like to be X. Inner experience. But like other concepts I'd consider irreducible like time and space and what have you it's not clear that trying to define it makes it any clearer. You can always ask endlessly to define your terms and further define those terms - there's no end to it until we just agree that we both intuitively get what we're talking about. Can YOU define consciousness?

>You are assuming apriori that consciousness is some magic alien substance rather than actually deeply analyzing what it actually is or means.
Aren't you just assuming a priori the opposite? It's not like you have an actual explanation how material interactions give rise to consciousness in a weakly emergent way. If you're >>10903540
all you did was to point out the obvious fact that physical activity in the brain clearly has something to do with consciousness. You didn't actually explain it away.

>You act on knee jerk intuition rather than actual philosophical thinking.
This is just a vague accusation but I hope you don't deny that if you do philosophy at some point to justify anything you have to rely on intuition, or rather some kind of axioms that are simply assumed to be true.

>You have alot to learn.
You have a lot of condescension, very little arguments.

>>10901109
>All phenomena can be reduced to an explanation involving the direct result of simpler laws
true
shame we don't actually understand anything about the laws of the universe we don't even have a TOE

>>10902893
>You can’t make a good argument that the mind exists at all.

>>10906327
>Panpsychism is a completely meaningless useless philosophy
its the only viable explanation of consciousness

>>10903540
>imagine thinking awareness dosent exist like this guy


>we don't even have a TOE
TOE is unverifiable, ie deciding if a given algorithm is a TOE is undecidable. Its possible one can exist, but it can never be confirmed.

>>10906340
>>10906327

>>10906326
Consciousness directly maps onto the neural system of the brain; how is that hard to get, its not magic at all. You say things in a panpsychic world would have protoconsciousness but what does that even mean

>>10906340
Panpsychism is meaningless if you cant define what protoconsciousness is.

>>10906378
>protoconsciousness
no one really uses that term, but essentially potential for consciousness or lower form of consciousness, i can tell you dont understand what panpsychism is.

>>10906396
No i do know what it is but im trying to emphasise that having consciousness or protoconsciousness as some sort of substance is meaningless. Conscious is ENTIRELY defined by the parameters of the brain. Positing some kind of protoconscious adds nothing in terms of explanation because the protoconsciousness of a rock is pretty much identical to the physicalist rock.

>>10906402
>protoconsciousness of a rock is pretty much identical to the physicalist rock
except no, because physical-ism is only concerned with a dogmatic empiricist dualism, and attacks rationalists and people that use free conceptualizations to answer questions about the mind. Basically I'm offering you an explanation, and you are denying it even though it is a priori correct through reason.
Honestly reminds me of the catholic church refusing to allow people to ask/answer questions because they were "mysteries" or "unknowable"

>>10906402
To be precise panpsychist wouldn't say a rock has consciousness any more than a non-panpsychist would say a group of people have a collective consciousness. The individual bits of consciousness would exist on the smallest level. Not that it makes it necessarily any clearer, I have hard time wrapping my mind around what it would actually mean. I find all possible explanations baffling but lean towards strong emergence probably.

>>10906431
>>10906413
My interpretation: all matter has a subjective property to it. Nearby pieces of matter have their subjective properties joined into more complex subject phenomena, same way as electric fields. Different groups of subjective properties have fairly distinct borders because the matter that forms them is separated by mostly void space - there's a lot of air and other not-so-conscious matter between people's brains, that's why they act as separate consciousnesses.

>>10906451
>subject phenomena
subjective phenomena

>>10906413
Your conception is the onr that has mysterious woowoo of an undefinable consciousness substance. How is your view even apriori correct? desu your view has no consequences any different to mine except mine minimises the metaphysical baggage.

>>10906431
This is the thing... individual bits of consciousness. Its meaningless. How are they any different from individual bits
its of "material" in any meaningful sense?

Why do you need to posit strong emergence. Theres absolutely no reason to suggest that.

>>10906451
How can an atom have subjective properties if it doesnt have the functional components to be subjective

>>10906486
>doesnt have the functional components to be subjective
Like what? All matter likely has a level of conscious experience, on a single atom's level it'd be like weak static, two atoms combined it'd be stronger, and so on. This makes a lot more sense than subjective experience exclusively happening in brains.

>>10906494
Subjective experience is about relation to the self. You need a self to do that. To have a self you need the machinery that can represent a self and infer things about a self. I dont see how an atom is remotely complex enough for that.

>>10906479
>Why do you need to posit strong emergence. Theres absolutely no reason to suggest that.

Do you find a p-zombie to be a coherent idea on the level of thought experiment? We can all probably agree that a p-zombie would be a very implausible thing to actually exist, but the question is do you find the idea of a p-zombie not even conceivable, a contradiction in terms somehow?

>>10906517
>Subjective experience is about relation to the self. You need a self to do that.
No. All you need is a perspective where the experience happens. A single isolated atom or rock can have that perspective. Obviously it doesn't have a model of self or experience anything more complex than static.

>>10906557
But then you have to tell me what exactly you mean by perspective because right now it jusst sounds abit incoherent.

>>10906565
>it jusst sounds abit incoherent.
Why?

Perspective is the location where a set of subjective experiences exist. For example, you have a lot of subjective experiences, and all of them as a whole only exist in your perspective.

>>10906583
>>10906565
It's not like I can give you an objective definition though. It will probably remain part mystery forever, but some things about how this stuff works you really can deduce intuitively.

>>10906547
I find the p-zombie concept alien and incoherent as a p-zombie would claim to have experience just as much as you do.

>>10906557
youre not telling me what a perspective is or what it entails. All youve done is defined it as subjective experience when a minute ago you defined subjective experience with perspective... circular. Youre applying human concepts innapropriately.

>>10906594
I honestly people make the mystery wuth themselves through their own thinking.

>>10906625
>youre not telling me what a perspective is or what it entails. All youve done is defined it as subjective experience when a minute ago you defined subjective experience with perspective... circular. Youre applying human concepts innapropriately.
No shit it's a circular definition, but why do you think that invalidates it? You yourself can tell that you're having experiences and that they happen in a given perspective where other people's experiences don't interfere... can't you? One can't exist without the other, and you can convince yourself that either one of those phenomena exist.

Why shouldn't we apply the same principles to things other than our brains? Why, out of all matter, would only they be able to have subjective experience? And where does the line go?

>>10906625
look at it using deductive logic: there is absolutely no a priori logical reason that matter particles with that reflect a certain wavelength of photons should appear "green" to a conscious observer. Why should a certain arrangement of neurons generate the concept "3"? You are pretending its a closed system when its not

>>10906479
>Your conception is the onr that has mysterious woowoo of an undefinable consciousness substance. How is your view even apriori correct? desu your view has no consequences any different to mine except mine minimises the metaphysical baggage.
you cant explain the answer without talking about metaphysics, thats the point. While you are stuck in some shitty physicality reality with half your brain chopped off, im offering answers to questions that you cant even derive meaning from

>>10906625
>I find the p-zombie concept alien and incoherent as a p-zombie would claim to have experience just as much as you do.

Well assuming you sincerely believe that I see how you don't feel the need to posit strong emergence. To me this would imply either that you are a p-zombie yourself (maybe a bit imperfect one that gives hints of itself that it might be one) or a solipsist. I'm sure you'll reject the implications, but to me this is so obvious that trying to argue about it further is a bit like trying to prove that 1+1=2. However in reality I suspect the actual reason for rejecting p-zombies as meaningless is motivated reasoning to eliminate elements from one's worldview that seem magical, supernatural, unscientific etc.

>>10906714
and I'll clarify that I interpreted that I interpreted "incoherent" as "meaningless", in a "married bachelor" kind of way. as there's no controversy about the fact that a p-zombie would be a ridiculously implausible thing to actually exist in our world.

Not that anon but I think:
1: p-zombies can exist in the sense that something can exist that appears to be conscious but actually is not (or very little). This would just be some stupid tricks and not really worth discussing.
2: p-zombies can't exist in the sense that there would be a copy of me with the same kind of brain functionality/information processing that would not actually be conscious. Not even in a simulation or other universe with different laws of physics.

>>10906638
Yes ive had experiences but I also have the complex machinery to have an experience. An atom doesnt. Thats the pointim trying to make. An atom may interact with things but its not complicated enough for it to have what we call experience or perspective. Any kind of "experience" an atom has would be utterly meaningless and contentless which would render the whole "subjectivity" you bestow upon it as rather pointless.

>>10906662
And theres no a priori logical reason for why the universe behaves in accordance to specific laws of physics like it does.

An interesting thought experiment is that a p-zombie supposedly without qualia would say exactly the same thing as you which makes you think that what you say and experience about green isnt necessarily just about the "qualic substance" itself but rather is a quirk due to how your brain was designed.

>>10906714
>>10906728
Youve gone off the rails mate.

>>10906775
>Yes ive had experiences but I also have the complex machinery to have an experience. An atom doesnt. Thats the pointim trying to make. An atom may interact with things but its not complicated enough for it to have what we call experience or perspective. Any kind of "experience" an atom has would be utterly meaningless and contentless which would render the whole "subjectivity" you bestow upon it as rather pointless.
It's just a model to explain how consciousness arises from small building parts. Nothing more really. You could say the same things about electrons - that they don't have any meaningful properties, yet when you take a bunch of them you get electricity.

one of the most pseud OP's I've seen in a while

>>10906785
But then whats the point in your extra metaphysical panpsychist baggage. Literally adds nothing

>>10906797
Really? It adds a consistent non-magical explanation to how consciousness could be formed from matter (and our brains specifically), I think that's pretty good. Who knows, it might also help form a better understanding of the relation between matter and experience - though it may not add much value over analyzing brain patterns and reported experiences. But without panpsychist viewpoints people wouldn't even think that something like plants can have a level of consciousness, which to me seems very plausible.

>>10906827
See I think these views have some metaphysical presuppositions about matter and mind which should be kept silent

>>10906858
Mind if I ask you what?

>>10906862
you what?

>>10906866
>metaphysical presuppositions about matter and mind which should be kept silent

>>10906797
>>10906858
Nigga I think it's time for you to acknowledge that not everyone's intuition about this sort of thing is the same. What you consider metaphysocal baggage can seem the most natural position for someone else, and whatever you think is a good alternative without any metaphysical baggage will look to someone else as completely pants on head stuffed with extra metaphysical baggage.
But mostly I think these semantic differences would just collapse if there was an agreed-upon model and terminology of consciousness. E.g. it seems to me like panpsychism and emergentism are basically the same solution with different wording.

>>10906880
>But mostly I think these semantic differences would just collapse if there was an agreed-upon model and terminology of consciousness. E.g. it seems to me like panpsychism and emergentism are basically the same solution with different wording.
That's so true, half of the argument is always just people using different definitions of terms. The other half is retarded physicalists claiming there's no consciousness or that it's an "illusion"

There's a minor difference between panpsychism and emergence though - panpsychism doesn't want to accept emergence as a factor
http://consc.net/event/reef/colemancombination.pdf

>>10906893
Interesting paper. Only read up to paragraph one so far, but I disagree with the opposition of panpsychism and emergentism. The argument to separate the two seems to rest entirely on the conceivability of zombies, while indeed I regard zombies as inconceivable.

What reason is there to have this extra idea of "consciousness" as opposed to just saying that some actions are observed to have the quality of "conscious"?

>>10907030
If you have to ask, you're a p-zombie.

>>10907040
That's not what p-zombie means you fuckhead.

Consciousness is not the most interesting form of purported emergence and the hyper focus on this one topic does a disservice to both advocates of its substantiality and validity in the sciences as well as opponents of the entire notion wishing to convince the aforementioned of their position. You would need to spend time studying the mathematics and physical theory of the concept to have a deep discussion about it so of course consciousness which is philosofag accessible naturally takes over the discourse.

>>10907046
How so? Because p-zombie by definition must not have anything about its behavior that gives away it's a p-zombie? Well let me rephrase it then: If you are sincerely asking that question, you must lack inner experience.

>>10907055
So you're just a dumbo who doesn't consider thinking to be an action.

>>10907055
>If you are sincerely asking that question, you must lack inner experience.

You dont have inner experience lol

>>10907008
Youre taking shit and the criticism of the paper is that pansychists resort to emergentism.

>>10907055
P-zombies are biologically identical to humans so they would profess to having conscious experience and so wouldnt approach these ideas any different from a normal human like us.

>>10903540
That is not as meaningful as you think. We know that humans change their faces when they have different emotions that doesn't mean the changing face is the emotion itself.

P zombies don't exist

>>10907047
Emergence is retarded. What actually happens is the tiny details are abstracted away and the focus is drawn to higher level concepts which can then be used to model the physical process. That is what General Relativity is, it is a higher level model on physics that ignores the lower level details of physics that quantum mechanics focus on. There I saved you the discussion.

>>10907219
>Youre taking shit and the criticism of the paper is that pansychists resort to emergentism
The paper asserts that the conception of consciousness from non-conscious components is conceptiually different from the conception of liquidity from non-liquid components (which is called emergentism if I'm not mistaken), because of the conceivability of zombies. See the last 3 paragraphs of section 1. If you reject the conceivability of zombies then this conceptual difference disappears. Not much point in accusing panpsychists of resorting to emergentism when the two are the same.

>>10907845
>conceptiually
conceptually

>>10901109
I don't believe in strong emergence. It makes me sad but I accept it

>>10907845
If you read the rest of the paper youll see that the point of the paper is to turn that on its head and argue that panpsychism is emergentism.

>>10907995
Yeah I agree with that.

I don't really get why so much philosophy of mind is so hung up on matter and properties of matter, though. Information and computation seem like they could be linked to consciousness a lot better. Anyone have recs in that direction?

>>10908568
Well then consciousness is pretty mich jist whatever the brain does isnt it

>>10906451
Wrong, nothing to do with the physical material beyond its behavior. Consciousness in the brain is built out of material consciousness. There is something it is like to be a neuron, but it doesnt mean much.

There is something it is like to be the model that emerges from your neurons though. That is what you and I are, mental models of ourselves and world. But those models rely on physical phenomena. Its sort of like the "what its like" to be a neuron is getting forwarded and built upon until its "what its like to be these neurons" except instead of that its "what its like to be the emergent object these neurons create"

>>10906486
But the atom is subjective. There is a specific path it goes on and interactions it has. Its consciousness is expressed by its behavior.

In the same way, the conciousness of the equation 1+1=2 is the + and the =, these define the behavior of the model. The behavior is defined by the consciousness. (Or vice versa)

>>10908720
>>10908726
Is this a convoluted way of saying consciousness is physical? Why then, can't I look at a bat's brain and understand what it feels like to have ultrasonic vision? Where is that physical sensation located?

>>10908568
FOR FUCKS SAKE
YPOU GET IT

NOBODY SEEMS TO GET IT

WHY THE FUCK WOULD CONSCIOUSNESS HAVE FUCK ALL TO DO WITH QUANTUM BULLSHIT? I DONT CARE IF ITS PROVED THAT QUANTUM SHIT IS WJAT THE BRAIN USES. SO WHAT. FUCK OFF. CONSCIOUSNESS IS METAHYSICALLY IMPORTANT AND YOU CANT DO SCIENCE ON IT PHYSICALLY OTHER THAN TO DO EXPERIMENTS BUT UNTIL WE CREATE AI THAT CLAIMS ITS CONSCIOS AND THEN DO EXPERIMENTS ON THAT, ITS KINDA POINTLESS

SERIOUSLY

FUCK

COMPUTER SCIENCE IS LITERALLY METAPHYSICAL SCIENCE HOW DO SO FEW REALIZE THIS

>>10908747
Remember to breathe.

>>10908742
Its metaphysical, and you could look at a bats brain and understand more of what its like to be the bat, if you understood the processes its brain was doing. We dont have any way of understanding brain processes to that level so its hidden for now.

I believe in emergent panpsychism or basically that every objective existing thing has a subjective experience. For simple objects this is practically materialist though. Consider unconscious human. Still alive, and consciousness has been reduced to the individual neuronal and objective experience which is basically nothing but its still there.

>>10908754
Its just annoying how dumb everyone is about that

Even Penrose

Like bro
Maybe youre right maybe the brain does that microtubules shit

But do you really think that research will reach an answer before some kid sets up an NLP neural net with greater world modelling including itself and then asks it about its experience and compares that to the data flowing through?

>>10908763
Isn't that roughly the same as the first post you quoted? Also, unconscious humans still have a lot going on. There's all kinds of hallucinations, weird experiences and shiz - it's even possible that "unconscious" humans are largely conscious, their memory simply isn't working so they don't remember anything when they wake up.

>>10908782
Tiara arguable for anesthesia but not for sleep. Your mental model is dead when in deep sleep.

But the metaphysical aspect that lets you experience everything still exists, just without any intelligence.

The point here is really that we can expect computers to be conscious. Neural networks already probably have consciousness like that of insects or maybe even small rodents. But also there is something it is like to be a desktop environment. It doesnt mean much still,as there is no intelligence to it, or what intelligence there is is specialized and unable to learn.

Really this sort of talk gets easily fucked up by words being imprecise. So to be clear what I really mean is that qualia is universal. Consciousness as we know it, is the result of a specific sort of model that the brain sets up. While computers may have qualia, their experience is likely very different than ours. It may be similar if we construct an AI which has a similar structure to our own brains but otherwise it will likely be very alien, maybe enough so for most to claim it isnt "real" consciousness.

>>10908763
You should believe in neutral monism instead. far far more reasonable theory

Things arent conscious. They just LOOK conscious, following from Fristons' work on computational biology. Dont really agree with tononis approach though.

>>10903655
>Someone who believes in strong emergence is not a Cartesian dualist, he would not deny causal connection or that consciousness comes from the brain.
Nicely put

>>10908881
you aren't conscious alright

"Something it is like" is a stupid meaningless red herring and I wish everyone would just stop using that phrase.

>>10908944
simile?? on MY /sci/???
outrageous

>>10908956
What are you talking about? No ones used a simile here

>>10901109
This is some John Searle tier no true scotsman wordgame shit.

>>10908568
>Information and computation seem like they could be linked to consciousness a lot better
No they can't unless you believe in magical emergence which if you believe in that then believing in a soul isn't wrong either.

>>10908840
That sounds like just one way of wording what I believe in. Panpsychism is the closist generally understood term I find but I guess maybe others are actually thinking it means some idea that all material is self aware which is silly. Its just that the existence of any thing requires the existence of a reality of what it is like to be that thing, and that reality is "conscious reality" except it isnt related to consciousness as in the waking state we experience but the perception of anything at all.

>>10901109
>Strong emergence does not exist
true
>All phenomena can be reduced to an explanation involving the direct result of simpler laws
true
>even consciousness
false. Consciousness is irreducible and strong emergence does not exist. This means consciousness is fundamental and all phenomena must be reducible to mental phenomena. Any alternative will lapse into dualism that will contradict your commitment to reductionism, or will lapse into an eliminativism about consciousness.

>>10909769
If all is mind, then why do we distinguish mind from matter? An thought or action is considered a "conscious" thought or action by something if they perceive an "integral presence" as part of that thought or action.

>>10909781
Because matter exists seperate from mind in the illusory incomplete model

What looks like matter is just other parts of the mind seen from a seperated perspective. Its all the same stuff just parts of it act differently.

>>10909781
The same reason we distinguish mind from thought.

>>10909794
And how does this tie into extra sensory perception?

>>10909781
As an idealist I don't distinguish mind from matter. Dualists endlessly suffer from the mind-body problem in one form or another.

>>10909797
It doesnt thats retarded

>>10909805
Then your model means nothing. If there are no measurable consequences, it's not science.

>>10909807
Science is fucking gay.

>>10909818
>gay
Why the homophobia?

eliminative materialists are pure evil

>>10909833
I was complementing it

>>10909769
Pretty based

>>10901109
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/8QzZKw9WHRxjR4948/the-futility-of-emergence

>>10909807
what? no. I'm not the one who said science is fucking gay. but they're right btw. (not the scientific method but how science is practiced today is gay)
but thats not the point
I'm just saying, my model doesn't mean people have magic powers. it just means color is not something that you can ever record or accurately describe. It's ineffable. Nigger.

>>10902887
>You could make a good argument that the mind is strongly emergent
go ahead, make the argument.
... oh, you mean you could _claim_ the mind is strongly emergent.

>>10905719
>The standard model can not explain abstract thoughts as they are not a localized phenomenon
you sure you can distinguish between 'can not' and 'has not'?

strong emergence: car is going west while all its components are moving towards south. yes, it's that stupid, it's just that its proponents choose less obvious examples.

>>10909946
It's more like
>we can't explain this
>so it's completely different

Ergo vis a vis: Creationism, dualism, et cetera.

>>10909928
Why would a rationalist necessarily have something against emergence? I guess this isn't philosophical rationalism, but more of a IFLS version.

>>10909769
Give me one fuckingnon bullshit reason that the mind is irreducible

>>10909769
This, finally someone posted it
>>10910338
If speaking subjectively from the point of one's own existence, your mind\experience\awareness\consciousness call it as you want, is a single concept that required for existence to be at all, then everything else can be build on top of it.
The problem is that you are trying to define fundamentally subjective phenomena such as consciousness with objective empirical information.

I'm curious what exactly people here find inconceivable about p-zombies - would even physiologically distinguishable (some kind of very advanced human-like AI) but a behavioral p-zombie be inconceivable to you?

>>10910530
p-zombie is pretty conceivable concept, that arises from understanding that fundamentally experience and consciousness is a subjective phenomena.

>>10910530
However I reject solipsism, and i think the healthy point of view is that other humans have consciousness and actually experience things, and not just perform actions.

>>10910530
It is only inconceivable in the case that the zombie has the same information processing going on, yet is supposedly not conscious.

>>10901109
>All phenomena can be reduced to an explanation involving the direct result of simpler laws, even consciousness
The massive fucking assumption you're making here is that we've identified all the simpler laws we would need in order to reduce more complex ideas, which we already know that we absolutely haven't, and the even bigger assumption that it's possible for human beings to identify every axiom and law that governs existence.
This is more brainlet tear treating-science-like-god stupidity.

>>10901109
Panpsychism is implied. The question is which fundamental operationality is the thing we can point to and say "qualia happens there"
From a phenomenological perspective, it's clear that qualia must be related to the physical concept of information. The flaw however is assuming that information is qualia.
Why, if all things have experience do we only witness our own from the perspective of our meat-shells? I have been only able to find one model which fits. Qualia do have an effect on reality, simply due to the fact that we are discussing it, and discussion is a physical activity. Therefore the information carrying physical process which is or is a superset of qualia is causally identifiable. I also posit that our language about qualia is necessarily tied to our memories of them, and that our memories of them are not them as they were, but abstract metadata of the quality of the scene as a whole.
So, we need a physical process. One that is deep at an informational level. One that our brain that can keep track of.
I suggest this is entropy. Qualia is the information lost in every causal action. We the experiencer is that which is every second dying, and that which does not experience is propagating its causality.

There is an experiment to prove this model. Test if the brain has mechanisms to keep track of the existence of information which was there, but was lost.
It can be done phenomenologically quite easily. When we've forgotten a word, but know that word existed is the same as when we've forgotten the exquisite detail of a moment, but remember the moment existed.
Qualia is that which was not recorded and we can only talk about it as we can talk about forgotten words.

>>10910429
If you cant define something objectively then how can it be integrated into a model of the world. At the endbof the day human subjective cognition and behaviour is explainable by neurons. Therefore it naturally emerges. Our cognition is purely a sum of neural behaviour... its weakly emergent and reducible.

>>10910530
An anatomically identical p-zombie would still act like it has qualia which draws an inconsistency/paradox because even though we claim qualia is some inexplicable irreducible thing, our belief and even "perception" of qualia can be explained entirely biologically, making the concept redundant.

>>10910622
>t. retard

>>10910622
>Panpsychism is implied. The question is which fundamental operationality is the thing we can point to and say "qualia happens there"
Yes, ok
>From a phenomenological perspective, it's clear that qualia must be related to the physical concept of information. The flaw however is assuming that information is qualia.
Hmm, interesting, ok
>Why, if all things have experience do we only witness our own from the perspective of our meat-shells?
Excuse me what. Why would we not? We are just the information within our brains. Qualia exists in every bit of information, but unless its part of a self aware system it seems to be discarded.
>I have been only able to find one model which fits. Qualia do have an effect on reality, simply due to the fact that we are discussing it, and discussion is a physical activity. Therefore the information carrying physical process which is or is a superset of qualia is causally identifiable. I also posit that our language about qualia is necessarily tied to our memories of them, and that our memories of them are not them as they were, but abstract metadata of the quality of the scene as a whole.
>So, we need a physical process. One that is deep at an informational level. One that our brain that can keep track of.
>I suggest this is entropy. Qualia is the information lost in every causal action. We the experiencer is that which is every second dying, and that which does not experience is propagating its causality.
>There is an experiment to prove this model. Test if the brain has mechanisms to keep track of the existence of information which was there, but was lost.
>It can be done phenomenologically quite easily. When we've forgotten a word, but know that word existed is the same as when we've forgotten the exquisite detail of a moment, but remember the moment existed.
>Qualia is that which was not recorded and we can only talk about it as we can talk about forgotten words.

>>10906336
>>You can’t make a good argument that the mind exists at all.
You only think "you" are alive because there's continuity

>>10910338
>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kdbs-HUAxC8

God existing basically ruins this entire idea.

Daniel 2 predicting the world empires in order and with details of how they'd come to power thousands of years in advance proves Jesus is legit.

God is basically non-reductable and until the next life where we "know as we are known" I think he completely breaks this model, as does humans being created, women being made out of ribs, all the other stuff that I never would have guessed was true, etc.

From an atheist perspective I'd figure you're right though.

>>10912285
The "subject" doesn't exist. Have you never heard of the p-zombie problem?

>>10912358
Are you claiming you dont exist?

Sounds gay

>>10912443
>playing the semantics game
Don't be a retard.

>>10912443
>gay
Why the homophobia?

>>10912285
But sweety, the material has a mapping with subjective consciousness so it is reducible.

Dumb cunt.

>>10912358
There is no "p-zombie problem." P-zombies are used as an argument against physicalism. Denying the subject is self-refuting.
>>10913001
that only means the material is reducible to the mental, not that the mental is reducible to the material.

>>10913244
Have you ever considered that the "irreducibility" is an epistemic and not an ontological problem

>>10913296
Yes I have and the problem with that is if reductive materialism were true then there would be no epistemic gap because the mind is supposed to be identical to the brain (or whatever material phenomena you're reducing the mind to).

>>10913306
No because the mind doesnt model neural activity or neurons so it would be impossible for a subjective observer to relate their mind to the neurons underlying it. You cant tell what "material" is used to make a picture from looking at the picture can you?

>>10905719
>>10905759
What the fuck are you on about? Just because there are a lot of moving parts does not suddenly imply that it is only explainable with quantum mechanics. Brains are very complex biochemical machines, it honestly insults their complexity by essentially implying that there is no way such a complex thing could be explained empirically.

>>10913383
Yes it does model such activity.
>the neurons underlying it.
How is this not dualism? You're not reducing the mind to neurons or neural activity, you're talking as if the mind is some strongly emergent phenomenon from the brain.
>You cant tell what "material" is used to make a picture from looking at the picture can you?
If that's true then we can't even tell what the "material world" is. There's your experience of the world but the material world would be beyond experience in your worldview.

>>10913437
Life must be difficult at this level of retardation.

>>10913437
>yes it does model activity
How.. all it models is sensory inputs from pur sensory receptors. The brain doesnt model its own internal composition. It doesnt model proton pumps or calcium channels or dendrites.

>dualism
no because im talking about the difference between global activity (the mind) and local activity (neurons)

>cant tell what the material world is
yes and this is actually a relatively normal view. Science doesnt tell us about the intrinsic nature of the world, just these relations, these mathematical predictions. Go ask Bertrand Russell.

>>10913416
computer hardware has very little to do with computer software.

All a computer does is execute fetch execute add compare jump instructions. Knowing this and other hardware details tells you next to nothing about the software - say, imageboards (which is software)

Yes, its true that computer hardware is necessary for computer software to "run". But you don't need computer hardware to understand what a program does and how it does it (read the listing, for example)

Similar for consciousness - a brain (or other hardware) is necessary for consciousness to "run" but understanding the brain and its hardware will NOT help you to understand what consciousness is or what it does or anything else useful.

Sure you determine is there is a problem with the hardware that is causing the software to no function as specified. But that's it.

Consciousness is fundamentally social, though relies on the brain (which is not social) to function. By "social" I mean: we people ourselves and others beings within a social context - not a biological, chemical or physics context. The Turing Test is a test of social ability - not a biology test.

There - I just proved Leibniz's metaphysics of consciousness.

>>10913493
>to intelligent to give a counter argument
>>10913506
What you are calling the brain is the image of the mind and is nothing more than the mind. A whirlpool is nothing over and above water, it's just an activity of water. So is the brain an activity of the mind.
>activity
Either you're reducing consciousness to neural activity or not. Which is it? If consciousness is something more than the brain and neural activity then you have abandoned reductionism and lapsed into a full blown dualism.
>yes
Then you have admitted idealism is more theoretically virtuous. Your worldview is more problematic and tries to ground all of existence in something that is not even comprehensible while the idealist overs us a parsimonious and comprehensible metaphysics.
>Russell
Already did, turns out his worldview lapses into idealism/phenomenalism and neo-Russellians agree.

>>10913244
>Denying the subject is self-refuting.
Keep playing those semantic games, you retard.

>>10913556
All Im talking about your claim that if reductionism was true then there would be no epistemic gap which is not true because there is no information in the brain activity we call the mind which explicitely suggests anything about the mechanisms about how the mind works.

Just like how the information on a picture doesnt explicitely tell you about the medium upon which the image has been imprinted.
If we imagine a camera filming a scene and then projecting the film onto a screen, we can imagine that image to be the mind. The information in the mind is all from the the scene being filmed via the camera. There is nothing there about the screen or the internal workings of the camera even though the mind relies on those things to exist. I think the analogy of the comouter hardware and software from anon above is not so different.

>brain is image of the mind
going to ignore this because i dont think you havent explained or justified yourself properly

>Either reducing consciousness to neural activity or not
I am but I understand what kind of error you think ive made in my prior comment when you greentexted ">activity".

>Re: Yes
Never said anything about idealism, what ive said doesnt necessitate idealism and i dont think idealism is particularly less problematic than materialistic reductionism.

>Re: Russell
Phenomenalism isnt necessarily opposed to materialism at all. Far from it. I like phenomenalism. His idea was neutral monism which isnt really the same as idealism at all. At the same time, acknowledging that science doesnt talk about any sort of intrinsicness doesnt necessitate russels view on the world either.

>>10901109
>>10901117
Once we get into the theoretical basics of reality, doesn't it kinda wined back into philosophy and basic rules of logic and statistics? Not Eastern mysticism shit, but plato, Descarte, kant, hegel etc?
And at that point we've had the same answer. No it does not. We can only be a percentage accurate based on only a few factors that seem to hold true.

>>10903000
Very true. the split between philosophy and science was a mistake when scientists are expected to study things concerning reality. Its fine when they work with things when math isnt a noticable factor, like making a tasty snake or whatever.

>>10903008
Except from a standpoint of pure logic it is.

>>10913696
If they were identical then you wouldn't need to worry about anything suggesting anything since identifying one identifies the other. That's what it means to be identical: they are indistinguishable.
>picture
we get it, you're a dualist. You make this distinction between the real world and the picture of the world while the idealist sees these as united.
>ignore
I provided a picture that gave more detail and referenced a peer-reviewed academic article that delves into more detail. If you simply don't understand you can just say so...
>I am
You are what? Reducing consciousness to neural activity?
>Never said anything about idealism
You seem to have misread what I've stated. I'm telling you that I'M the idealist and that what you've conceded gives ground to idealism. You posit this mystery matter stuff that you admit you don't know the intrinsic nature of, while the idealist grounds reality in what we know most intimately: consciousness. This gives idealism the epistemic higher ground over your materialism. A good metaphysical detective solves problems, not create them, and you're creating more problems than the idealist.
>Phenomenalism isnt necessarily opposed to materialism at all
1. I'd like to see support for this.
2. Russell wasn't a materialist and wanted to formulate a neutral monism, but per the mentalism suspicion his monism is far from neutral and lapses into a kind of idealism/phenomenalism. Read this link from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on the mentalism suspicion:
>https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/#MentSusp

>>10909769
Based and Hermes-pilled.

>mystery matter
>>10913896
>RE: first paragraph
Dont get you here.

>dualist
Not a dualist. Theres the physical activity in your brain and the physical world outside the brain that activity mirrors.

>RE: ignore
Dont remember you sent me anything. Dont get you here.

>RE: I am
Yes

>Gives grounds to idealism
Probably gives grounds to any number of positions that arent idealist depending on how one argues.

>mystery matter
Never said anything about matter. Physicalism isnt necessarily about matter.

>know most intimitely
Disagree. Experiences are obviously immediate but Im not sure we have any special knowledge per say. Experience or qualia often stands out more for its unintelligibility. Its just as mysterious as mystery matter.

>higher epistemic ground/idealism
No misreading just was never arguing in the context that youre an idealist. There are alot of good arguments that can be levelled against idealism such as the causes of regularities in experience which are more easily explained by a world extrinsic to us affecting our mind as opposed to the world being intrinsically mental. I dont think the fact that perception is subjective and mind-dependent means the entire world should be reduced to the mental. I really dont think arguments for idealism are as strong as you think they are. If they were, it would probably be a more popular position in philosophy.


>RE: 1.
Well I think regardless of an idealistic or physicalist world view, there is onky one way we can get experience. I think also one issue is that phenomenalism has evolved largely devoid of a neural context.

>RE: 2.
Possibly, possibly not, I think it semantics but then again im not arguing for Bertrand Russell. It was rather circumstantial that either russel or monism came into this conversation desu.

>>10913696
I like you analogy of brain as photograph and mind as the image in the photo. Yes, it corresponds to my computer hardware/software analogy.

My question is why is this view so strongly resisted - why do people insist on reducing the image to the photograph?

I find your/my understanding to philosophically correspond to Leibniz's pre-establish harmony between the mind and body - that is, the two worlds have their own independent rules, yet track each other. NOT an isomorphism.
>>brain is image of the mind
>going to ignore this because i dont think you >havent explained or justified yourself properly

This is a coherent view if you realize that all of our understanding of the physical are mental constructs - exist in the mind and not the physical universe. This does not preclude that our mental image of the brain isn't accurate to some degree - just that it is mental not physical.

>>what ive said doesnt necessitate idealism

Idealism simply states that there are mental states that are independent of any individual minds, they are social. Examples are language and math and physics.

>>10915706
PART 1
>Dont get you here.
what don't you understand about the definition of the word "identical"?
>Not a dualist.
I know you don't want to be a dualist but you keep lapsing into dualism as I explained before. You want to adopt a monistic philosophy (reductive physicalism) but you insist on a dualism between the brain and the mind (reality and the picture of reality).
>Dont remember you sent me anything.
See pic related here: >>10913556
>Yes
Then why does identifying such neural activity fail to identify what it is like to be the subject, for the subject (consciousness)? If they're identical then it would be impossible to identify the neural activity without identifying consciousness.
>number of positions
There's only so many monistic positions and at this point we're left with idealism, which you surrendered a significant amount of ground towards. Idealism is a more parsimonious form of monism.
>Never said anything about matter
Well yes you did here: >>10913506
You think there is matter and we can only have a picture of it, but we can't reduce what is being pictured to the picture itself. So you ground the entirety of existence in this mystery matter stuff that transcends experience and concepts as noted in pic related here: >>10913437
>Disagree
>Experiences are obviously immediate
You're going to have to pick one of these. Consciousness is what we are directly acquainted with independent of concepts and arguments and evidence, everything else we need concepts arguments and evidence for.
>Im not sure we have any special knowledge per say.
See the distinction between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance: https://www.iep.utm.edu/knowacq/
>Experience or qualia often stands out more for its unintelligibility.
The complete opposite is true. Even non-philosophy students have heard of "I think, therefore I am" and understand the classical skeptical scenario of the matrix where we know for sure that we're conscious but not so sure of matter

>>10915706
PART 2
>the causes of regularities in experience
This is easily explained by the idealist when they posit a single mind as fundamental to reality like George Berkeley did when he held God as the cause of such regularities. See pic related.
>more easily explained by a world extrinsic to us
This doesn't solve problems it creates problems as I explained before. You're opening the door to skepticism about the external world by drawing such a dualistic distinction and opening a path for the mind-body problem to creep in as well. Idealism avoids these problems and thus is a much simpler explanation.
>appeal to popularity.
Purely fallacious. Idealism was the dominant position in the 19th century and was lazily dismissed in the 20th, but is beginning to gain more momentum in the 21st. Idealism is being rediscovered and taken far more seriously by the experts now than ever. The more idealism gets a voice the more you will see it become dominant again.
>RE: 1.
Not sure what you're getting at or how this shows phenomenalism to be compatible with materialism.
> RE: 2.
I understand you're not arguing for Russell per se but monism has everything to do with this conversation. The point at hand is it seems idealism is the best, if not only, monistic alternative to dualism that keeps the existence, irreducibility, and causal efficacy of consciousness. Other monisms will fail in this regard.
> I really dont think arguments for idealism are as strong as you think they are.
Then why aren't your objections as good as you think they are? if the arguments are so bad then what's the problem?

>>10901109
>Prove me wrong
You haven't made a complete argument.

>>10916177
>Then why does identifying such neural activity fail to identify what it is like to be the subject, for the subject (consciousness)?
You don't know that this is actually, even just in principle, not possible.

>>10916677
Yes I do. Definition of the word identical: "similar in every detail; exactly alike" synonymous with: "exactly the same, indistinguishable, interchangeable, undifferentiated" etc.
>https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/identical
If consciousness is literally the exact same thing as neurons and/or their activity then identifying that must necessarily identify what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. But clearly that's not the case when we identify neurons and their activity.

>>10916871
>But clearly that's not the case
Nice assertion but I don't see an argument here.

>>10916904
What I said is empirically demonstrable. We can identify neurons and quantitatively describe their activity but this fails to identify the qualitative and subjective aspects of conscious experience. 3rd person descriptions of the brain fail to give us a 1st person subjective experience which is impossible if reductive materialism were true.

>>10916927
>3rd person descriptions of the brain fail to give us a 1st person subjective experience
They have so far failed to do this, correct. You have not proven that it is in principle impossible to do so.

>>10903000
based anon

>>10916927
Do you really not see the paradox in that image?

>>10916177
>identical
You havent made clear what youre referring to.

>dualism
Referring to minds and brains as different concepts doesnt make you a dualist...
how would the mind and brain be reality and the picture of reality, respectively? Tbh I was more referring to the difference between the information reflected in the global activity of the brain and the actual local circuitry that causes that. Ive already said this but you ignore what i say.

>pic related
nice picture

>neural activity fails to identify "what its like"
Why is "what its like?" completely explainable by neural processes?

>surrendered
Idealism is widely considered the least convincing form of ontology

>matter
I actually neither said or meant anything of what you said just then about pictures. I didnt say anything about mystery matter (noumena?) you did. And like I said, "qualia" is just as unintelligible. I also dont think the idea of noumena is anymore problematic (actually far less so) than the problems of subjective idealism regarding the causes of sensation.

>pick one
yes we are acquainted with experiences but theres no knowledge there other than the ability to distinguish them. Theres nothing to know about them. There is far more knowledge about physical processes than "qualia" which is unintelligible. There is no real knowledge there. Its redundant in how we describe the world or explain it.

>see distinction
asked and answered

>i think therefore i am
not what im talking about. the fact people cant communicate the experience of a colour or a smell shows its unintelligibility.

>>10916224
>berkeley's god
and i have no grounds for skepticism here in regard to this arbitrary explanation?

>opening the door to skepticism
And youre not? (see above). If it was simpler, idealism would be more popular.

>fallacious
lazy? yes. fallacious? no. i just dont want to keep reiterating the same serious problems that idealism has.

>not sure what youre getting at
I think you can still be physicalist whilst accepting that perceptions if the world are constructed and all knowledge comes through experience or phenomena as people would say.

--

Causal efficacy of consciousness?

I dont understand how consciousness isnt reducible if it is contingent on the brain. How does Idealism even explain the relation of mind and brain.

>objections arent as good
im using some standard objections to idealism

>>10916871
Then why is "what its like?" completely determined by physics and biology.

If you had a p-zombie anatomically exactly the same as a normal biological human but with no "qualia", or perhaps you had a man model a human brain and its dynamics exactly as through a normal biological human (perhaps even writing the model out with pencil and paper)

Then the p-zombie and the model should both theoretically claim to be having experiences of this irreducible ineffable nature.

This tells mse that "what is like?" shouldnt be an ontological problem but a problem of how our brain processes and explains the world around it.

>>10916964
>You have not proven that it is in principle impossible to do so.
Yes I have, I did so right here: >>10916871
If they're identical then it's logically impossible for them to fail at all since they're supposed to be exactly the same, indistinguishable, undifferentiated etc.
>>10917013
If you want to claim there's a paradox then the burden of proof is on you to justify your claim.

>>10912285
It doesn't have to identify what it's like. Only that it is isomorphic to quality.

>>10917139
According to those images, there should be no evidence of the effect, but the fact that you're talking about it means there is, so the image isn't valid.

>>10917060
PART 1
>clear
Yes I have and you even stated in the affirmative outright that you are reducing consciousness to neural activity.
>different concepts
if they're the same thing then there's no room for "separate concepts." They're supposed to be exactly the same thing and to conceptually detach them would be to claim they're not exactly the same.
>how would the mind and brain be reality and the picture of reality, respectively?
idealism. pic related may be useful.
>ignore
I didn't ignore anything, I pinned you down as a reductionist and attacked your metaphysics from there.
>nice picture
It's also a nice visualization to make my point and a reference to scholarly literature to give you more detail.
>Why is "what its like?" completely explainable by neural processes?
That's your problem not mine. If they're identical then you shouldn't have this problem, but you do.
>Idealism is widely considered the least convincing form of ontology
Citation needed. And if it's such a bad ontology why do you fail to refute it so badly?
>you did
No you're the one who made the distinction between the picture of reality and reality and that you can't reduce reality to the picture. That was you who said that, not me...
>"qualia" is just as unintelligible.
You can repeat this all day but I already addressed this and made the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Qualia is the last thing that is unintelligible, the reductionist is merely dumbfounded by it because they haven't seen the light of idealism yet.
>the causes of sensation.
I've shown how you noumena puts us in a skeptical scenario and leads to the mind-body problem while you've failed to support this claim of yours. What problem does idealism have regarding the causes of sensations? Justify your claims.
>no real knowledge there
You're just claiming this without support. You've already admitted we experience consciousness immediately so how is this not knowledge?

>>10903098
Nope, illusions are not restricted by cause and effort, therefore it's entirely possible an illusion does not need anything to experience itself, it doesn't even need to exist.

>>10901109
>even consciousness. Prove me wrong.
You're unironically retarded if you aren't an interactionist dualist.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uXX-_G_9kww
http://cogprints.org/6613/1/Dualism0409.pdf

>>10917060
PART 2
>asked and answered
No you didn't, this is your first time encountering this in our discussion and you're literally just ignoring and hand-waiving it right now... This distinction blows your whole epistemology out of the water.
>unintelligibility.
You're not using the word "unintelligibility" correctly at all. All you're doing is affirming that I'm right about reductive materialism: we can't reduce our subjective experiences to something more basic like brains and neurons, these experiences are irreducible. But we clearly understand the experiences of others since we understand our own experiences. This is perfectly intelligible.
>>10917112
>arbitrary explanation
How is this an arbitrary explanation? If experience is fundamental then it makes perfect sense that a single subject is fundamental that grounds this world of experience. Sort of like the architect of the dream world in the movie inception.
>And youre not?
Absolutely not. The world is as it appears to the idealist, no worries about the matrix or brains in vats for me. You on the other hand...
>more ad populum
absolutely fallacious and doesn't warrant further response
>fallacious? no.
Yes it is, you're appealing to popularity as a way to dismiss the argument. That is the epitome of fallacious.
>the same serious problems that idealism has.
Physicalism has the hard problem of consciousness.
Dualism has the mind-body problem.
Panpsychism has the combination problem.
Idealism has the... um.... hmm... there doesn't seem to be an established problem for idealism. I wonder why that is...
>physicalist
that sounds like the phenomenal is fundamental in this case instead of the physical.
>Causal efficacy of consciousness?
Yes, mental causation. Minds cause stuff to happen. This is why we make the distinction between killing with intent and killing without intent.

>>10917112
PART 3
>contingent on the brain
You haven't proven that it is contingent on the brain. This video does a great job of explaining how physicalism fails when it comes to hopes of meeting their burden of proof and how idealism makes more sense of neuroscience: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oBsI_ay8K70
>How does Idealism even explain the relation of mind and brain
That video I just cited goes into detail, with scholarly citations included mind you. The idealist is embracing monism just like the physicalist, but turns the direction of reductionism the other way.
>im using some standard objections to idealism
These aren't very good objections at all. If you want even more detail on refutations of "standard objections" Dr. Bernardo Kastrup has a popular peer-reviewed academic article that refutes the standard and most common objections to idealism: https://philpapers.org/archive/KASOTP-3.pdf

>>10906486
An atoms position in the universe is relative from the perspective of all the other atoms in the universe i.e. it's position is subjective.

>>10917224
Relational does not equate to subjective.

>>10917200
>just be a dualist bro, what could go wr-

>>10917200
>Much worse. Qualia elude not only communication, but observation and experiment as well.
document invalid

>>10917254
I think the universe is fundamentally like the image you posted. There is no problem with it, counter to what you believe it is.

>>10917306
So you're telling me infinite regress makes sense? Your worldview is potentially incoherent or at worst suffers from a severe theoretical vice. If you don't see the problem then see this: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/infinite-regress/

Also, how do you solve the mind-body problem? how does the mental interact with the physical?

>>10917254
If you don't have a problem with having an infinite subconscious then this isn't a problem.

>>10917173
>>10917208
>>10917220
I cant argue like this ideanon this is far too much content and it seems to be going nowhere but Id be interested i your answer about this >>10917138 .

Let's see if we can cut to the chase here.

Suppose you're wearing blue-tinted glasses. At first, you think that the world you see
through them is blue. Then it occurs to you that this need not be true; maybe it's the
glasses. Given this possibility, you realize that you really have no business thinking that the
world is blue at all; indeed, due to Occam's razor, you must assume that the world is
chromatically neutral (i.e., not blue) until proven otherwise! Finally, managing to remove
your glasses, you see that you were right; the world is not blue. This, you conclude, proves
that you can't assume that what is true on your end of perception (the blue tint of your
lenses) is really true of reality.

Fresh from this victory of reason, you turn to the controversial hypothesis that mind is the
essence of reality...that reality is not only material, but mental in character. An obvious
argument for this hypothesis is that since reality is known to us strictly in the form of ideas
and sensations - these, after all, are all that can be directly "known" - reality must be ideic.
But then it naturally occurs to you that the predicate "mental" is like the predicate "blue"; it
may be something that exists solely on your end of the process of perception. And so it
does, you reflect, for the predicate "mental" indeed refers to the mind! Therefore, by
Occam's razor, it must be assumed that reality is not mental until proven otherwise.

>>10917403
However, there is a difference between these two situations. You can remove a pair of blue sunglasses. But you cannot remove your mind, at least when you're using it to consider reality. This means that it can never be proven that the world isn't mental. And if this can never be proven, then you can't make an assumption either way. Indeed, the distinction itself is meaningless; there is no reason to even consider a distinction between that which is mental and that which is not, since nature has conspired to ensure that such a distinction will never, ever be perceived. But without this distinction, the term "mental" can no longer be restrictively defined. "Mental" might as well mean "real" and vice versa. And for all practical purposes, so it does.

A theory T of physical reality exists as a neural and conceptual pattern in your brain (and/or mind); it's related by isomorphism to its universe U (physical reality). T<--(isomorphism)>U. T consists of abstract ideas; U consists of supposedly concrete objects like photons (perhaps not the best examples of "concrete objects"). But the above argument shows that we have to drop the abstract-concrete distinction (which is just a different way of expressing the mental-real distinction). Sure, we can use these terms to distinguish the domain and range of the perceptual isomorphism, but that's as far as it goes. For all practical purposes, what is mental is real, and vice versa. The T-U isomorphism seamlessly carries one predicate into the other.

>>10917393
This isn't about there being infinite subconscious this about an incoherence with dualism where it tries to explain the relation of mind-body with a sort of homunculus. But a tactic like this is similar to those who argued the world is on the back of turtles and when asked where the turtle stands one replies it's turtles all the way down. There wouldn't be a metaphysical foundation or ground here, it would be a regress.
>>10917396
If you ask me it does seem to be going somewhere. More objections are being brought up and I've been providing responses to each one so far. To the zombie post (>>10917138) I'd point out the first sentence is wrong: what it is like is not completely determined by physics and biology. Then I'd point out how he should be more scared of ghosts than zombies. Zombies are bodies without minds, while ghosts are the converse: being who are minds without bodies, that is, beings who are conscious but whose nature is exhausted by their being conscious. We can call such a ‘purely conscious’ creature a ghost (Goff, 2010). From here you can run a parallel argument that you put forward using a ghost twin instead of an anatomically identical human.

>>10917493
This doesn't impress me because I've literally seen people on /x/ say that they believe it's particles all the way down, with ever-smaller particles making up the larges ones. It's all nonsense, no matter what direction you point the arrow of causality in.

An infinite sensory homunculus makes intuitive sense. That, alone, makes it self-consistent. If something has to regress, and we are conscious, then we should expect conscious to be integral to the regress process itself, because consciousness is the only recursive process questioning its own recursive aspects.

>>10917534
All you've done is admit metaphysical infinitism is nonsense and I agree with that. Whether we're talking about infinite descent or infinite ascent it's all nonsense. That's why I endorse metaphysical foundationalism. There is a ground of being that ends the regress, and I'd argue it's a single mind that is fundamental. This is far superior to an inifinitism which is nonsense by your own admission.

>>10917547
Not all forms of recursion require infinitism. I have a similar term in my metaphysics, but it relates to consciousness being purely representational, and thus portable between reality modules. That is, if consciousness is emergent of structure anywhere then it must be emergent of structure everywhere that the representational structure can occur. But this leads to the possibility of trapped consciousness, which, while unnerving, makes for very interesting sub-consequences.

What I believe is special about the current world is a highly tuned integration framework for representational structures, ie., advanced free will mechanics. I call our current world the material plane, as distinct from other proposed planes of existence such as the astral plane, mental plane, etc. I believe that emergence is a property of any form of interaction, and entanglement is metaphysical under consciousness.

>>10917547
The ascent / descent isn't infinite, though the paths along them are, because it's cyclical, like a circular linked list

>>10917563
There's a distinction between recursion and infinite regress, it's the regress I'm pointing out here. Are you the same guy I've been talking with? Either way I'm curious: are you a dualist? If consciousness is emergent from non-consciousness then this opens up all the more philosophical problems.
>>10917601
So it's an infinite regress and circular reasoning. That's just stacking two fallacies on top of each other, now it's twice as bad. Foundationalism makes way more sense

>>10917645
>opens up all the more philosophical problems
I'm not the same anon. I jumped in at >>10917393

The point, in my mind, is to open up those philosophical problems. The composition of consciousness applies even with foundational consciousness, as we all appear to be distinct to each other, and report this fact when asked. There isn't an easy answer and we shouldn't expect something that seems to give us one to act as an explanatory model. The goal is to explain the problem, not simply presume that it is already solved.

My model is what it is precisely to advance discovery along the information axis most likely to produce a nuanced result that will expand our knowledge horizons once it becomes possible to see past our current models. By saying that interacting consciousness is entangled with matter I'm proposing a deep set of testable hypotheses, that happen to not be easily tested without a better understanding of the model for why. The problem is that there might not be a why, because consciousness doesn't have to make sense. We can imagine anything, regardless of conformance to reality or logic. It's already a complicated mess just from that aspect along, even without composition disknowledge.

>>10917657
>The composition of consciousness
I do not believe consciousness is composite. I do not put the parts as prior to the whole, I put the whole as prior to the parts. Idealism doesn't pretend the problem is solved, idealism dissolves the problem by eliminating that which generates the problem.

So are you a dualist or something?

>>10917663
I don't make a name for my beliefs because they're constantly changing as I explore the bounds of present reality. I don't believe in impossible things.

>>10917681
Not having a name for something because you're not sure is one thing, but if you're obfuscating commitments that's another story altogether. Either you're reducing consciousness or you're not reducing consciousness. Either consciousness is emergent or it's not emergent. If you suspend judgment that's understandable, but you can't hold both simultaneously as that's impossible. Only one must be true per the law of excluded middle.

>>10917745
No, intersecting planes of reality. The representational structures correlating with your mind occur as emergent neural activity in the material plane, while occurring as direct representation in the plane of consciousness. The mechanism for correlation is not without evidence, as a radio antenna can pick up a signal from multiple locations simultaneously. All I'm saying is that where consciousness is concerned, identical representation structures are actually identical. That is, your mind is entangled with every form of reality that represents your current consciousness. So long as the representation is symmetric, you can theoretically commune across time, space, or other reality-like membranes. If you could reconstruct this moment in a dream at a later time, that version of you could theoretically inject information into this past moment, using what now appears to be future knowledge.

My metaphysical models are all constructed irrespective time, so the reason you don't find enough correlation to receive future thoughts is an artifact of the constant changingness of the material plane. The fact that all of our cells are being replaced on a gradual constant basis is precisely why our consciousness moves forward in experiential time. In a universe where our cells were static, we'd have to find a different mechanism to make ourselves experience a similar topology of time.

This means that most consciousness occurs in a decaying universe, because it forces time to move forward in at least one manner.

>>10917493
If a p-zombie is conceivable then the p-zombie would profess its consciousness and the qualities of it as you do now. A p-zombie version of you would also be an idealist. This is my point: your beliefs and deductions of "what its like" are conceivably independent of "what its like".

What is your counterexample with ghosts?

>>10917790
That just sounds like dualism. You're making a distinction between the mental and physical just like the dualist but merely referring to them as planes instead of substances or properties. The radio antenna analogy affirms this dualism all the more, they use that exact analogy all the time. You may be trying to formulate something with a bit more precision then them but you don't seem to be formulating anything that that dissolves the classical concerns of dualism such as the mind-body problem.

>>10917818
I don't believe in planes beyond the material yet. It could be entirely emergent, and I believe it may be possible to create universes intentionally. I've never given up on a possibility for no reason. It's all conditional on the entire rest of reality.

>>10917801
"What it is like" is independent of beliefs and deductions as we are directly acquainted with "what it is like."
>What is your counterexample with ghosts?
The same example you're giving but merely in reverse. The article I cited by Goff goes into more detail but you can get a look at pic related for more info too. Goff goes into how this refutes a posteriori physicalism as well.

>>10917840
So you think the mental plane is the material plane?

>>10917845
I believe reality is modular. I have motivations for believing this, and motivations for believing that belief affects future experiences.

>belief affects future experiences
I have no disagreement with you there. I'm just not sure how saying reality is modular answers my question about the mental plane being the material plane.

>>10917853
meant to tag you here: >>10917859

>>10917859
"Being" is an advanced sort of belief. I don't need it for most things. It's enough for me for anything to exist as a representation. From there, all forms can pivot, without altering their surrounding texture.

>>10917863
being=existence.
You seem to be dodging my questions... I'm asking directly if the material plane is identical to the mental plane and it's just evasion after evasion

>>10917883
It's identical where they intersect, and I currently have no experiences suggesting that anything but the intersection exists, meaning that the more fully interconnected one is the one I believe in, that being the material plane under current evidence. I don't expect current evidence to remain the same for very long after I make this post. Even after, because I've made this post and you've understood it, I expect a sort of merge operation to occur between planes such that it becomes impossible to tell if we're merely expanding the intersection, changing the structure of the material plane, or more fully discovering the actual properties of the mental plane.

I don't believe that intersections are permanent metaphysical objects. I believe reality can evolve at the gestalt level, in structure and compositional characteristics. Me communicating with you isn't a no-op, because you're open to the idea that it's all consciousness anyway. What I'm giving you is the possibility of greater structuring of consciousness, which basically translates down to "the language to better express these concepts later on." Operations you perform, even in a purely mental world, SHOULD, per my beliefs, affect the material plane in a way that preserves the concept of it being a distinct plane. The exact perturbations in the resulting metaphysics are what I'm looking for. I'd like to make a better (more discrete) science out of this some day, but until I can find a way to shift reality in part without shifting the whole, I have to work within the limits of any experiment I conduct being one whose result has potentially permanent effects. What I mean to say is that I can conduct experiments for myself, and get data out of it, but by virtue of the experiment I'm the only one that can verify the consistency or integrity of the data. To build a better experiment such that others can observe the resulting contortions, I need to present terms that we can use to more efficiently commune.

>>10917927
So they're not identical but later on become identical. This sounds like the mind-body problem on crack.

>>10917962
Well yes. Like I said, I pry into those difficulties because they're the metaphysical meat I'm after. I've been working to create as complex a model of reality as I can such that it becomes impossible to NOT test the resulting hypothesis in at least one manner. I'm constantly scanning /x/ and /sci/ for contortions in metaphysics, and the shift in conversations about consciousness on /sci/ was one of the things I'd been waiting for. I've been ready to conduct the experiment implicit in this conversation for years now. It's a huge waiting game, but it produces results faster than the LHC so I'm happy with it for now.

>>10912285
P1 and P2 are unproven.

I am so glad average people are talking about this. Maybe there is hope for this planet after all.

>>10917973
Sounds like your metaphysics is more problematic than idealism. Occam's Razor suggests the simpler theory should be favored so idealism has the high ground.
>>10917976
P1 follows from the very thesis of reductionism. From the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (a peer-reviewed academic resource):
>Reductionists are those who take one theory or phenomenon to be reducible to some other theory or phenomenon. ...The type of reductionism that is currently of most interest in metaphysics and philosophy of mind involves the claim that all sciences are reducible to physics. This is usually taken to entail that all phenomena (including mental phenomena like consciousness) are identical to physical phenomena.
Source: https://www.iep.utm.edu/red-ism/
P2 is affirmed and explained in more detail here: >>10916927

>IF WE ARE HERE NOT TO DO
>WHAT YOU AND I WANT TO DO
>AND GO FOREVER CRAZY WITH IT
>WHY THE HELL WE'RE EVEN HERE

>>10917993
>idealism has the high ground
I would agree, but it's unknowable how many variables compose the structure of reality as we now understand it. We can't throw out any variables because we have no idea which ones are the excess variables. I'm not disagreeing that your model has fewer variables, but that fewer variables is the right way to explain any form of consciousness. We're modeling the thing we use to understand the fact that we use models to understand the structure of our experiences and the things within it that seem to experience the same structure and use their own models (which may or may not be different from our own models) to understand the structure of THEIR experiences such that...

It's a recursive modeling loop. It's the one thing that we absolutely cannot use Occam's razor to explain, because the very system we're trying to model is one that can create new variables on the fly. To model that accurately requires us to be able account for all those variables that occur on the fly, and any new ones that we have yet to observe. We literally can't use Occam's razor on something like that. It's legitimately hard.

>>10918009
The more I see this word salad the more I believe the structure of reality can't be translated into human parlance.

>>10918026
I'm not sure I'd ever disagree with that.

>>10918009
I'm not using Occam's Razor to explain something, rather I'm using it to shave away unnecessary assumptions that generate problems. Chalmers makes a great distinction between easy problems and a hard problem and when a theory has a hard problem it's a metaphysical dead end. Instead of progressing the theory forward into new territory you'll constantly be on the defense from charges of being paradoxical. I

dealism eschews these paradoxes and treads into new ground that physicalists and dualists dare not explore. For instance, in you're interested in /x/ related phenomena there's been scientific studies on the cognitive abilities of dream characters with surprising results that led the researchers to wonder if they may actually be conscious like you or I. Idealism has the ability to not only potentially explain this phenomenon but connect this to ourselves and explain how we came into being and are conscious since we may also be dream characters of sorts grounded in a universal dreamer. Here's the study if you're interested:
>https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2717365

>>10918047
By saying that I explore the bounds, what I mean is, roughly speaking,

I had a dream back on May 3rd, 2017, where I worked as a fairy astronomer in a realm where consciousness was half-formed. We were working on language, and a discovery was made that language is made up of letters, not words. From that moment, rather than waking up like you'd normally expect from a dream, I watched reality expand around me in all directions. A complete metaphysical upgrade to the dream realm, complete with auto-generated memories of an imagined life in this world, all to prep me for insertion into that exact moment on that exact day.

I've lived the things you merely consider. I've watched this expanded reality unfold exactly as I would have predicted it would based on my limited consciousness as a fairy. I deal in paradox, I embrace it. I use it as a compression engine for hyperinformation necessary to regenerate causality as we currently collectively cause it.

That's just one creation model. I've experienced others. Not theorized, experienced. It's literally not something you can wrap your mind around unless you're willing to jump full-factor into the math and see it calculate itself in front of you.

>>10918102
>fairy

>>10918104
Read the study if you don't believe me. I'm sure it says the exact same thing. A realm of dream and minimal consciousness. I'm saying this reality is an expanded version of that, and that I literally experienced being such a dream creature, before the dream unfolded into our current reality.

Unfolded memories, unfolded minds, unfolded personalities, unfolded experiences, everything is expanded here in comparison to there. That literally affirms my beliefs, my memories, my experiences between realms.

>>10918047
>scientific studies on the cognitive abilities of dream characters with surprising results that led the researchers to wonder if they may actually be conscious like you or I.
You don't need idealism to explain this. Almost any theory that purports to explain how consciousness arises from the brain should be just as capable of explaining how multiple consciousnesses could arise from parts of the brain.

>>10917993
>P1 follows from the very thesis of reductionism.
P1 says that if the thesis of reductionism is true then something follows from that thesis. So you just repeated P1 instead of proving it.

>P2 is affirmed and explained in more detail here
That's laughable, it's like saying we should understand everything about any person's anatomy since we understand how DNA works. It's a complete mockery of the complexities of scientific inquiry. Are you going to posit that every macro phenomenon that is not completely understood in terms of micro phenomena implies a separate form of existence? You're not a dualist, you're an infinitist relying on an argument from ignorance.

>>10913688
>I don't have an argument so I say it's "semantics"
Retard.

>>10917841
"What its like" should be independent but our beliefs and deductions about "whats its like" seems to be logically independent of "what its like" in the framework of a p-zombie.

I dont find the ghost argument wholly convincing but it is an interesting thought experiment. I find the zombie argument more intuitive and more effective.

>>10918724
I didn't say idealism was "needed" to explain this, just that idealism can explain this. Maybe those other ones can explain it, but certainly not as simply as idealism. But I'm skeptical of them being able to explain it since views like materialism or dualism fail to explain our own everyday consciousness arising from the brain so I don't see how adding the extra responsibility of explaining the consciousness of dream characters makes it any simpler on them. Seems like those theories would be far more strained than idealism.
>>10918725
>P1 says that if the thesis of reductionism is true then something follows from that thesis
if A=B then identifying A identifies B. That's what P1 says, which is a statement that is true a priori. If you don't grasp this then you don't understand the basic laws of logic...
>DNA
False analogy: DNA is just a set of instructions not the entirety of an organism.
>You're not a dualist
of course not I'm an idealist.
>infinitist
I'm a foundationalist.
>>10918758
I'm not seeing how that follows but the framework of the ghost is what you should be concerned about. The zombie argument is difficult for a physicalist but easily resisted by an idealist such as myself. the ghost puts you in a bind since if ghosts are conceivable then you've given ground to idealism that we can have existence purely of mind.

>>10918895
>dream characters conscious

Sounds like bollocks to me.

But hard problems of consciousness (and resolving such) have no real scientific application. You could study dream characters and be completely metaphysically agnostic as long as you had the correct instruments of observation.


>>10918895
If a zombies' brain anatomy and physiology were identical to a humans then the processes of the brain would result in the same statements about the ineffability of conscious etc and it would act in a way, debate and write philosophical treatise about it in the same way as a non-zombie might. It would functionally have the same beliefs about consciousness and assert it has its own consciousness even though ots a p-zombie? Do you not see how that follows?

I dont find the ghost argument that convincing like I said. I dont see the necessity of turning cartesian skepticism into statements about ontology (especially as not being able to prove something doesnt make it false) and I think doing so results in certain implausibilities.

>>10918895
>if A=B then identifying A identifies B.
No one claimed we identified the material phenomena identical to "what it's like to be the subject" so if P1 posits this how can be P2 be justified?

>False analogy: DNA is just a set of instructions not the entirety of an organism.
But our understanding of the brain is complete? LOL. It's a good analogy for exactly that reason.

>of course not I'm an idealist.
>I'm a foundationalist.
Which essentially means you have decided the truth a priori and will never present justification for them. So there is no point in arguing with you.

>>10916927
>We can identify neurons and quantitatively describe their activity but this fails to identify the qualitative and subjective aspects of conscious experience.
One day people will plug a jack straight into their brains and play back recorded experiences. P2 is false.

>>10918895
>But I'm skeptical of them being able to explain it since views like materialism or dualism fail to explain our own everyday consciousness arising from the brain so I don't see how adding the extra responsibility of explaining the consciousness of dream characters makes it any simpler on them. Seems like those theories would be far more strained than idealism.
On the contrary, if you take the panpsychist or emergentist (or whatever) position that consciousness results from the information and computation in the brain, it's not any strain at all to extend that to certain subsegments of the brain.

>>10916904
>>10916964
>>10919376
Really grasping at straws. So far we know that no matter how exactly we understand the components of our brain we get no closer to understanding what the experiences they contain are like. You can look at an animal brain all day but just by doing that you won't gain any insight into what it feels like to have tentacles or infrared vision. Why would you possibly assume that at some point looking at the brain could make you experience this stuff in first person?

>>10919255
Reductive materialism does make such an equivalence between the mental and physical which is what the argument presented is refuting. If you're not a reductive materialist then the argument doesn't apply to you.

You've misunderstood the point about DNA. If the organism were reducible to DNA then once you've identified the DNA you've identified the organism. This isn't the case with the brain and consciousness. What don't you understand about how if A=B then identify A identifies B?

Your last paragraph makes no sense. Arguments for idealism have been presented and rebuttals have been addressed entirely. This just sounds like a cop out to flee from the debate

>>10919402
It is definitely more of a strain because instead of mind to mind in the case of idealism you'd have non-mind to mind. You have a binary to bridge a gap between while the idealist can simply move up and down a spectrum

>>10919161
You can claim it's bollocks but a scientific article was presented, along with philosophical arguments. And the hard problem is indeed problematic in practice, just look at the state of modern psychiatry and how they throw pills at people with very little success. They think it's all about the brain when really it's more complicated than that.

As I already noted the idealist avoids this issue altogether. If really is all mental then there no fear of zombies. But you should definitely be afraid of ghosts. You fall on your own sword with ghosts since you can't distinguish you from the ghost twin however there is a distinction from you and the zombie. You're conscious and the zombie isn't

>>10917258
>but observation
P-zombie detected

>>10919536
No idea what you're on about here.

>>10919729
sounds like a personal problem mate
>>10919572
kek saved

>>10918895
>if A=B then identifying A identifies B.
In this analogy, we neither fully understand A or B, nor the bijection between them. And if we really want to be fair to reductive materialism, it should really be claiming A ⊆ B.

>>10919528
>Reductive materialism does make such an equivalence between the mental and physical which is what the argument presented is refuting. If you're not a reductive materialist then the argument doesn't apply to you.
This doesn't respond to what I said. I'll repeat: No one claimed we identified the material phenomena identical to "what it's like to be the subject." So how can P2 be justified when its condition has not even been met?

>If the organism were reducible to DNA then once you've identified the DNA you've identified the organism. This isn't the case with the brain and consciousness.
You're avoiding the point. We don't have a complete understanding of the underlying factors that determine anatomy. We don't have a complete understanding of the brain. Neither implies lack of reducibility.

>What don't you understand about how if A=B then identify A identifies B?
What is A exactly?

>Your last paragraph makes no sense. Arguments for idealism have been presented and rebuttals have been addressed entirely.
Where?

>>10919947
The argument isn't about "fully understanding" it's about identifying. Are you suggesting we haven't identified neurons and their activity...? Once you admit we have, since we indeed have, then the argument takes off. As long as the mental is identified with the physical then identifying the physical sufficiently identifies the mental. But we all know it doesn't

>>10920332
All you've done is ignore what I stated. The reductive materialist is indeed claiming what it is like is identical to neurons and their activity. If this position does not appeal to you then reductive materialism does not appeal to you. I already explained P2 in detail.

Again this isn't about a "complete understanding" whatever that is. It's about identifying.

A is supposed to be the physical or neurons and their activities and B is supposed to be the mental or consciousness.

The introspective argument was presented along with an idealist account of neuroscience and many other points about idealist metaphysics all throughout this thread

>>10920757
Given the right technology I certainly think it would be possible to identify the information content of a conscious brain, its relation to that vaguely defined thing we call the subject, intentions, perceptions, emotions etc..., and that after this there would be nothing left to identify.
>But we all know it doesn't
I would really like to finally see some sort of argument for this, instead of you just repeating this claim without justification over and over.

>>10901109
the how did big bang happen lol

>>10919559
Psychiatry has nothing to do with either the study of consciousness nor its hard problem... philosophy of mind will never contribute to psychiatry and cant.
Just because an article was published about dreams (from 1989..) doesnt mean its not bollocks.

Avoids what issue? Sounds like youre begging the question to me if i understand you. And like I said Im not convinced by the ghost argument. Zombies are far better.

>>10920757
>The argument isn't about "fully understanding" it's about identifying. Are you suggesting we haven't identified neurons and their activity...?
If this is what you mean by identifying then pointing at a person's brain is indeed identifying "what it's like to be the subject" and P2 fails. Now you are going to complain that this doesn't identify "what it's like to be the subject" but what you really mean is that this doesn't give us an understanding of "what it's like to be the subject."

>>10920773
>All you've done is ignore what I stated.
You're projecting.

>The reductive materialist is indeed claiming what it is like is identical to neurons and their activity.
You just revealed that "identifying" does not require understanding. This loosens P1 to allow such a vague statement but renders P2 false.

>If this position does not appeal to you then reductive materialism does not appeal to you.
It appeals to me but it was too vague to apply to your argument as I understood it.

>A is supposed to be the physical or neurons and their activities and B is supposed to be the mental or consciousness.
Don't you realize that neurons and their activities includes phenomena unrelated to mental state or consciousness?. They aren't equal. When you talk about something specific like "what it's like to be the subject" you are even further narrowing the relevant material phenomena and even further marring your logic.

>The introspective argument was presented
Where?

>along with an idealist account of neuroscience and many other points about idealist metaphysics all throughout this thread
As I predicted all you will do is preach.

>>10920894
Based materianon btfoing idealists.

>>10920857
You don't have any reason to believe this is true, this is purely a faith based belief on your part. Imagine if a theist said: "well one day we'll be able to prove God exists!" I highly doubt you would just throw your arms up in the air and go "welp, the theist wins! better believe in God now!" you need to meet your burden of proof and to pray that one day a materialist messiah will come to carry this burden for you is just an admission that you fail to meet carry this burden...
>argument
I've already demonstrated how this is true empirically, all you have to do is stop playing dumb. We all know that we can identify the neurons and their activities in people's brains but this fails to identify the qualitative and subjective aspects of conscious experience. All you have to do to prove me wrong is show how one you've identified neurons you've identified subjective experience. The moment you admit you are unable to do this by simply identifying the neurons is the moment you see my point...
>>10920886
>the scientific study of the mind and its clinical applications are irrelevant the mind and its applications!
lol wut
psychiatry is based on philosophy of mind
>an article
actually multiple articles have been published on the topic so this phenomenon has been replicated, which makes it a genuine empirical scientific phenomenon that needs an explanation. You can't just hand-waive it away because it's inconvenient for your materialism.
>zombies
I've already shown how zombies is a problem for materialism not idealism and how the ghost argument is a threat to your materialism. You haven't given a reason to doubt the argument you just fold your arms and say "i'm not convinced!" well that's not an argument...

>>10920894
>pointing at a person's brain is indeed identifying "what it's like to be the subject"
That's what the reductive materialist wants to claim but as we already know P2 is true. We all know that identifying the quantitative behaviors of the brain doesn't identify the subjective and qualitative aspects of conscious experience. Identifying the organs responsible for vision doesn't tell us what it's like for the subject to see the color red or see a beautiful painting. Only someone who is playing dumb would claim otherwise. If I'm so wrong about P2 then by all means please demonstrate to me how you can identify what it is like to be the subject, for the subject by simply identifying neurons and their activities... I'll wait...
>understanding
stop equivocating. I'm talking about identifying not understanding. open a dictionary.
>You're projecting
This is just an ad hom and fails to respond to my argument. Saying "you're projecting" is not an argument.
>It appeals to me
you better get to work on solving the hard problem of consciousness then. good luck with that.
>too vague
I defined my terms a very long time ago. proof: >>10916871
It's not that I'm too vague it's that you don't pay attention.
>They aren't equal.
Then you're not talking about reductive materialism. From the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (a peer-reviewed academic resource):
This is usually taken to entail that all phenomena (including mental phenomena like consciousness) are identical to physical phenomena.
Source: https://www.iep.utm.edu/red-ism/
>Where?
to intelligent to use ctrl-f, eh? It's sad that I have to spoon feed this to you: >>10909769 another interesting video and academic article on idealism is presented here as well: >>10917220
there's other arguments and evidence for idealism that has been presented throughout this thread but if I have to spoon feed you then you're just a lil guy and can only handle so much.
>As I predicted all you will do is preach.
dont you look stupid lol

>>10921183
You're projecting again. You're the one who made the claim that consciousness is separate from material, the burden of proof is on you. Your unfalsifiable and un-evidenced claims are the only thing here comparable to theism. Reductive materialism on the other hand has been proven again and again and again with every achievement of science. You have nothing.

>We all know that we can identify the neurons and their activities in people's brains but this fails to identify the qualitative and subjective aspects of conscious experience.
Under your own definition of "identify" it does! Under any normal definition of identify we have not identified the underlying material phenomena identical to conscious experience. You can't have it both ways, where "identify" is vague enough to include any level of understanding of the brain but specific enough to exclude consciousness.

>>10921215
>You're projecting again
You're failing to make an argument again. Just more ad homs.
>separate from material
Nope, that's dualism. I'm not a dualist. I noted that the mental is not reducible to the physical, yet the physical is reducible to the mental. Big difference.
>your unfalsifiable and un-evidenced claims
this is ironic coming from the guy who completely fails to meet his own burden of proof and prays a future materialist messiah will come to save him as prophesied.
>Reductive materialism on the other hand has been proven
Isn't it funny that you say it's been proven yet completely fail to prove it?
>You have nothing.
You fail to understand the distinction between science, metaphysics, and philosophy of science. The thanks goes to science, not the metaphysical thesis of reductive materialism. All you've provided is the hard problem of consciousness which you've failed to solve.
>Under your own definition of "identify" it does!
No it's the total opposite as I explained in detail. The cognitive scientist and philosopher of mind Dr. David Chalmers explains here as well: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kdbs-HUAxC8
you're just talking out of your ass, you don't know what you're talking about...
>we have not identified the underlying material phenomena
you're telling me you haven't identified neurons and neural activity, but that's contradictory since we're identifying them right as we speak. We know pic related is the neuron and it's activity, for you to claim otherwise is to just straight up deny reality...
>understanding
stop equivocating, it's dishonest. I'm talking about identifying not understanding. All I'm doing is using the literal dictionary definition of the word "identical" which is the total opposite of being vague...

>>10921212
>we already know P2 is true.
>We all know
This is the sign that you've reached the limit of your intellectual ability. As I predicted you can only make assertions without justification. Meanwhile you revealed the contradiction in your argument in the double standard that "identifying neurons" simply means pointing to them while "identifying consciousness" means understanding it.

>Identifying the organs responsible for vision doesn't tell us what it's like for the subject to see the color red or see a beautiful painting.
Again, telling you what it's like to see the color red requires a reduction to specific material phenomena not yet identified. Identifying the organs responsible for vision is much too vague to apply. You can clearly see how your argument fails by looking at the example of a black box. A black box contains a mechanism inside which spits out a 1 or a 0. If you identify the black box does that mean you can tell me whether it will spit out a 1 or a 0? No. Does this imply that there is something immaterial going on inside the black box? No. Yet this is exactly what your argument requires.

>stop equivocating. I'm talking about identifying not understanding.
You're talking about two different things at different times but using the same word to pretend they are the same. That is equivocation. Nice projection.

>This is just an ad hom
It's literally not, since it's talking about what you're saying and not who you are.

>Saying "you're projecting" is not an argument.
Then "all you've done is ignore what I stated" is not an argument. This is funny since in the post immediately before I had to repeat myself twice since you ignored what I said and replied to a strawman. Meanwhile you did not show anything I hadn't already replied to. In other words, you're projecting.

>>10921255
PART 1
>This is the sign that you've reached the limit of your intellectual ability
No this is a sign that you're ignoring the empirical evidence (or lack thereof). I've already cited Dr. Chalmers who broke this down, and I can even cite his rival Dr. Daniel Dennett who agrees on this point as well: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a3a2FFoRpzQ
Note how Dr. Dennett himself notes this is an empirical point, this is a matter of us observing the neurons and their activity and how this fails to give us what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. Dennett goes to the extreme and says we should eliminate the mental since it's not empirically identifiable, those like you wish to say we should keep it but merely reduce it, yet you can't resists Dennett's empirical point.
>means understanding
You're literally just straight up lying right now, I've corrected you multiple times now on how I'm not talking about understanding I'm talking about identifying. Open a freaking dictionary...
>material phenomena not yet identified
We've already identified the eyes and all the other biological, chemical, electrical components around it as well as the brain and the neurons and so forth. You're just denying reality right now OR you're saying there's some mystical matter stuff that science cannot identify which is literally no different than full blown magic and this would mean you have to surrender reducing the mind to the brain since you've already identified the brain and neurons and so forth. Your position has now lapsed from reductionism to mysterianism.
>black box.
False analogy, there's a duality in your example. The reductionist is sticking to a strict monism where there is no distinction between consciousness and the brain (neural activity etc.) they are one in the same. That means necessarily identifying one must identify the other since they're literally the exact same thing. This is why I keep telling you this is true a priori.

>>10921212
>I defined my terms a very long time ago. proof: >>10916871
LOL by your own definition they're not identical as I already explained. Not to mention that I'm talking about your definition of identifying, not identical.

>Then you're not talking about reductive materialism. From the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (a peer-reviewed academic resource):
>This is usually taken to entail that all phenomena (including mental phenomena like consciousness) are identical to physical phenomena.
Here's another example of you completely ignoring the point. I'll repeat: Don't you realize that neurons and their activities includes phenomena unrelated to mental state or consciousness? So saying they are identical to material phenomena (so far unidentified) is not the same as saying they are identical to "neurons and their activity" (only identified in the broad sense).

>to intelligent to use ctrl-f, eh? It's sad that I have to spoon feed this to you: >>10909769
LOL you realize filenames are not searchable on mobile right? Anyway, P2 is just restating the claim which you have failed to justify throughout this thread. As I predicted you will never provide a justification.

>dont you look stupid lol
Projecting again.

>>10921255
PART 2
>You're talking about two different things at different times
You're just lying right now. I have defined my terms explicitly and even cited sources if anyone wants to fact check me. I never even said anything about understanding, that was you not me. You're the one equivocating and trying to equate identifying with understanding. That's fallacious...
>It's literally not
yes it actually is, you're not describing any sort of observable behavior you're trying to read my mind which is a tell for cognitive dissonance.
>Then "all you've done is ignore what I stated" is not an argument.
Of course it's not, it's me reminding you that you failed to address the argument that I did present. Fail.
> I had to repeat myself twice
Yeah I remember that and me having to correct you by citing the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP) to back me up on the definition of reductionism that you failed to rebut. You tried to claim reductive materialism is not about saying the mental is identical to the physical, then I smacked that down using the IEP which states outright that it claims they're identical. You don't even know what reductive materialism is... You are talking out of your ass...

>>10921243
>You're failing to make an argument again.
The argument follows directly after, which you of course ignored, how ironic: You're the one who made the claim that consciousness is separate from material, the burden of proof is on you.

>I noted that the mental is not reducible to the physical, yet the physical is reducible to the mental. Big difference.
You claim with no justification.

>this is ironic coming from the guy who completely fails to meet his own burden of proof
Which is? I'm only waiting for you to justify a single argument. You have spent hundreds of posts failing.

>Isn't it funny that you say it's been proven yet completely fail to prove it?
Then why did you cut off the rest of the sentence? It already has been proven again and again in the only method of proof possible when discussing reality, scientific proof.

>You fail to understand the distinction between science, metaphysics, and philosophy of science.
The difference is that one gives us information about reality, and the others do not.

>The thanks goes to science, not the metaphysical thesis of reductive materialism.
Then tell me when science proves idealism instead of affirming reductive materialism over and over again. Until that happens, shut the fuck up and keep your religion to yourself.

>All you've provided is the hard problem of consciousness which you've failed to solve.
I would take failure to solve a problem any day over making up a solution with no basis in reality. Clearly you don't understand how science works and should leave the board.

>No it's the total opposite as I explained in detail.
That's nice, but the complete lack of a response to the simple fact that neurons do more than produce consciousness tells me that you haven't explained shit.

>you're telling me you haven't identified neurons and neural activity
No I didn't.

>stop equivocating, it's dishonest.
Oh the irony. You fail again to address the double standard I pointed out.

>>10921274
>LOL by your own definition they're not identical as I already explained
Correct: according to the implications of reductive materialism it does show the mental and physical are not identical which means reductive materialism fails. Glad you finally noticed :)
>identifying
did you ever open that dictionary? did you ever happen to notice how identify is not the same as understand? to equate the two, which you are doing, is fallacious and dishonest...
>(so far unidentified)
there's your problem: we have identified the material phenomena: neurons and their activity. We have already identified the brain, it's too late... You can't keep moving the goal post: if consciousness is literally the same as the brain or the neurons and their activity then once you've identified such physical phenomena that's sufficient for identifying what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. If you don't like this and want to hold on to materialism then you need to be a non-reductive materialist but that will only cause more troubles for you.
>being a mobile fag
you newfags are ridiculous. also nice reddit spacing
>P2
I've already given arguments for this and made the empirical point as provided by Dr. Daniel Dennett and Dr. David Chalmers and how our identification of the brain doesn't identify the qualiative and subjective aspects of conscious experience. I challenged you to prove me wrong on this by showing this is possible and all you do is pray for a future materialist messiah to carry this burden for you which is just an admission that you fail to meet your burden of proof...
>Projecting again.
You tried to say I would just preach but I proved how I gave several arguments, empirical evidence, and peer-reviewed academic literature so yeah you're looking pretty retarded right now lol

>>10921311
>You're the one who made the claim that consciousness is separate from material
I already told you I'm not a dualist, you're simply illiterate... I've shown how by the implications of reductive materialism they will lapse into dualism unless they're eliminativists which is just contradictory.
>You claim with no justification.
Yes I did, you're just ignoring it. Remember those arguments and empirical evidences and academic articles I had to spoon feed you here: >>10921212
Nice try liar...
>Which is?
Reducing consciousness to neurons and their activity. Still waiting for you to do so. If you can't just admit you can't.
>Then why did you cut off the rest of the sentence?
cool it with the turbo autism, I'm saving space and haven't ignored what you're saying simply by making quotes shorter. Total non-sequitur on your part.
>the only method of proof possible when discussing reality, scientific proof.
show me the scientific proof for this claim and explain to me why you believe circular reasoning makes sense at all. it's like saying the bible is true because the bible told me so
>and the others do not.
gona need you to somehow square the circle of scientism and justify this
>when science proves idealism
first your self-defeating epistemology needs to be made coherent, second there's those who do claim science proves it via quantum mechanics and the observer effect. But I don't go there, I use deductive arguments from philosophy of mind.
> making up a solution
I'm not "making up a solution" I'm dissolving the unnecessary assumptions that generate the problem in the first place. Thus idealism is more parsimonious than materialism. You don't get how logic works.
>neurons do more than produce consciousness
I thought consciousness was identical to neurons, this sounds like non-reductive materialism in which neurons cause consciousness rather than being reduced to consciousness. get your story straight.
>No I didn't.
so you have identified neurons and their activity?

>>10921183
>RE: psychiatry
Its not based on philosophy of mind... if it supposedly is then tell me how.

>RE: dream studt
Studying lucid dreams and asking characters in your dreams questions maybe a genuine research topic but that doesnt mean the characters are conscious. To say that is a gigantic inferential leap and anon, me saying it was bollocks had nothing to do with my views on the mind body problem.

>RE: Zombies
Yes, I do realise the original zombie argument is designed to be a problem for physicalists. At the same time though the zombie scenario I've put out there is also a problem for mentalists. I think the ghost argument does show a disconnection of experiential and physical states The strength of the zombie argument for me is that it makes it more apparent how the quality of mental experiences dont seem to follow from physical models as opposed to a ghost world which is just you imagining a world of pure sensation minus physical causes (which would be epistemically and perceptually identical to the world the physicalist believes himself to be in). I think what I don't like though is that whilst that type of world is conceivable, to me it seems implausible with regard to things like sollipsism, the regularities that occur over intermittent experiences, the presence of illusions or the fact that in this world, physical laws and things like brains which seem to affect other peoples' signs of consciousness would still be convoluted in that type of world. So I find the zombie argument more convincing as so I dont have to entertain that world. I could agree with the gap between mental experience and physical but not the actual ontological idealism of the ghost world.

>>10921215
>You're projecting again
>the burden of proof is on you
Are you just throwing in phrases that sound cool to you?

>>10921423
That's all anyone can do when faced with a failure to comprehend what makes comprehension comprehensible.

>>10921415
>tell me how.
You need to have a concept of the mind and mental states in general otherwise you can't distinguish psychiatry and psychology and all that stuff from any other discipline like biology or chemistry. This requires metaphysics, so there has to be a metaphysical framework to build on top of.
>that doesnt mean the characters are conscious
We could easily say the same thing about you. Just because we can test your cognitive abilities like we do for dream characters that doesn't mean you're conscious either. If you're not seeing the point at hand: arguments you will make to deny the consciousness of dream characters will applies to people in waking life as well.
>there is also a problem for mentalists
how so?
>the quality of mental experiences dont seem to follow from physical models
I agree, hence I don't reduce the mental to the physical. Rather I reduce the physical to the mental.
>with regard to things like...
all these objections are addressed here in the article I linked: >>10917220
these are old objections to idealism that have been dealt with long ago. I noted before:

Physicalism has the hard problem of consciousness.
Dualism has the mind-body problem.
Panpsychism has the combination problem.
Idealism has the... um.... hmm... there doesn't seem to be an established problem for idealism...

>>10921554
>Idealism has the... um.... hmm... there doesn't seem to be an established problem for idealism...
What about the question of where your existence comes from? Let's say all your experiences just exist and that's it (which is fine in itself) - but where do other people's experiences originate from? We don't want to explain it away by only you being conscious, since that seems unlikely. How then can there be multiple different conscious subjects that share the same world where they operate in? There has to be something shared. But if the shared something exists on the same "plane" as your experiences, why are you seemingly completely separate from other subjects and the shared connection between them?

>>10921601
This is easily explained by holding that a single mind is fundamental, and non-fundamental minds such as ourselves are subsumed by this universal mind. Think of that movie inception and how there's the architect who is having the dream and other dreamers are within the mind of the architect. As I noted earlier in this thread I think we may be able to gain further insight into how this happens by examining how dream characters come about since we may ourselves be dream characters of sorts. Pic related and this article in general will give you details on this exact topic you're bringing up: https://philpapers.org/archive/KASTUI.pdf

>>10921601
Other people's experiences just exist.
Everything after that doesn't make sense because you're following a false premise

>>10921614
Thanks, I'll read the paper later. The pic and the explanation you posted seem reasonable though, it would be a sound answer for the shared environment problem. I suppose "one consciousness" might be the only way to explain shared environment on the mental plane, really - how could completely separate consciousnesses share the same perceptions?

One thing that still bums me out though and might be premature to ask before reading the paper - do you think subjects in your dreams are conscious? And how do parts of one consciousness become... well, separate parts?

>>10921624
It wasn't a premise at all. I was asking how separately existing consciousnesses share state.

>>10921638
The paper I cited earlier doesn't really delve into whether dream characters are conscious, but I do suspect they are conscious. I don't think an idealist necessarily needs to believe they are but I think there's good scientific and philosophical grounds for holding them as conscious. I can reference a few scientific articles on the matter if you're curious.
>And how do parts of one consciousness become... well, separate parts?
The paper does delve into this a bit but how precisely this occurs in detail I'm unsure of which is why I think further exploration into dream characters will give us insight into this question. To give a gist so far of what I think and where research goes: there's a dissociation that occurs, almost like when someone has multiple personality disorder. These people in your dreams are what most people would say parts of your subconscious or rather just a more fundamental and simpler form of your own mind that you dissociate from yourself but is not really separate from you per se.

>>10921668
"No true separation" is what consciousness seeks to overcome. The most logical transfer of planes is mental -> material -> dualism. The first transition is a breaking of the mental plane, and the second is a perimeter unification. We should expect that any form of separation from idealism simply adds structure to possibility.

>>10921668
Alright, thanks for the answers. No need to dig out references for me, I believe I can find my own leads once I've read the paper you posted.

The multiple personality example makes a lot of sense. So far I'm getting undecided between idealism and some form of panpsychism and/or emergentism - I think the simplest model to explain everything is also likely the "correct" one, but which one is it?

>>10901109
>Strong emergence does not exist. All phenomena can be reduced to an explanation involving the direct result of simpler laws, even consciousness.
The exponentially increased complexity makes this practically impossible.

>>10905759
>must be entangled in some way.
or just communicate at a sufficiently high rate

>>10921689
The more layers of emergence are added, the more likely the uppermost structure is to possess a recursive gestalt. It's far more than exponential, with each sub-layer limiting the otherwise superexplosive possibility of the emergent layers.

As they say: "Possibilities don't add up; they multiply."

>>10921691
>>10905759
I've read a nice theory that we don't experience instantaneously.

What see and experience is an edited "movie", in frames. sense it allows the phenomena and thoughts we sense at different rates to feel like the same instant.

"Real time "video games in a simplistic way are programmed similarly. The state of the environment is updated on a frame by frame basis. You can't tell that all the calculations for a frame didn't occur simultaneously, nor do they need to because only the update world state matters.

Cognitive frames would simplify the need for managing functions and sense input at different spots in the brain.

>still no proof for P2

>>10921834
Nigger what are you after? There's several posts worth of proof ITT and it's tagged with a (You). Do you have any proof for the contrary, ie being able to gain the experiences a brain holds just by examining a it?

>>10921183
>You don't have any reason to believe this is true, this is purely a faith based belief on your part.
The point is not that someone in the future will actually do it, the point is that it's conceivable that we can identify consciousness by having a complete understanding of the physical brain. You're not going to have to wait for an actual zombie to come along, either, for the zombie argument to work.
>We all know
Here you go again...
>All you have to do to prove me wrong is show how one you've identified neurons you've identified subjective experience.
Let's do a thought experiment. Sometime in the future, a brilliant scientist has invented a machine that lets us make a complete, moving image of all the neurons and signals in someone's brain. We put someone (his name is John) in the machine, and show him something red. On the screen of the machine we see the signals from John's retina travel through his brain, get processed by his visual cortex, then we see John's higher order brain structures become aware that he's seeing something red, memories and sensations triggered by the red object get activated and integrated with his ongoing sense of self and identity, all that stuff.
I will then say that we have identified everything there is to know about John and his seeing of a red object.
You will probably say that we still haven't identified anything close to the essential redness that John experiences, the quale of red.
I have no illusion that we are going to come to anything resembling agreement but I think this is the fundamental difference between your and my view. I think "redness" is only meaningfully defined in relation to John's brain and in relation to his other sensations, there is only seeing red, remembering red, comparing red with blue.., while you will keep looking for an absolute red quale and then take the fact that you can't find it as proof for some magical fairy shit.

>>10921884
Just messing with ya. I like this thread though, I used to mock Dennett but I'm beginning to realize he's right about everything.

>>10921554
>psychiatry requires metaphysics
Well I think doing science probably does require atleast an implicit metaphysics and many people probably generally havr one. But the hard problem has nothing to do with why psychiatry might not be as good as we think it should be. All problems relevant to psychiatry and psychology are easy problems. Furthermore I dont think psychiatry or psychology has ever had a problem distinguishing the mental and neural. Mind and mental states are pretty self evident and theres never been a point in history where one has had to make an explicit disambiguating distinction between them and the brain though in the past we have seen how chemicals and injury affect the mind and how brain states correlate to mental states. The reason that pills are thrown at people is that there has been some evidence they work.

>easily say the same thing about you
I'd agree but for the fact that dream characters clearly dont have their own brains and its much easier to explain it in terms of your brain generating these imaginings from memory.

>RE: problem for mentalists
the zombie problem I suggested: that beliefs about experiences can be shown to be conceivably independent of them.

>RE: objections addressed in article
I disagree. Not convinced. Pretty sure I have a counter to most of these.

I dont see how his theory is simpler or better than a physicalist one since I think it has has its own explanatory gapd.

>>10921923
Idealists BTFO AGAIN!!!#

>>10921923
>You will probably say that we still haven't identified anything close to the essential redness that John experiences, the quale of red.
That's certainly what's being meant, good that that got resolved finally.
>while you will keep looking for an absolute red quale and then take the fact that you can't find it as proof for some magical fairy shit.
You're conflating yourself here. First you way the quale of seeing red exists for John (qualia exist), then you say it exists somewhere other than our physical world (qualia are non-physical)... and then despite seemingly coming out as a dualist, you conclude that qualia is "magical fairy shit". Or are you saying you believe in qualia, but don't care about them - how about I hit your hand with a hammer, would that make you care about qualia?

>while you will keep looking for an absolute red quale
It's been stated that he's indeed not looking for an absolute quale, because it doesn't exist in the physical world (assuming there is one).

lmao materialists absolutely seething and making no arguments ITT

>>10922141
>First you way the quale of seeing red exists for John (qualia exist)
The only way in which I admit the existence of qualia is as a vague and confusing term for certain experiences from the point of view of a subject, not in any ontological capacity.
>then you say it exists somewhere other than our physical world (qualia are non-physical)
Not sure which part of what I said you're interpreting this way, but it's definitely not what I meant.
>how about I hit your hand with a hammer, would that make you care about qualia?
It would make me care about pain, even the subjective form of which is wholly explainable by physical observations ;)

>>10921923
>the point is that it's conceivable
I don't think it is. Reductionism isn't any different than eliminativism here.
>zombie
already addressed this, it's a problem for physicalists not idealists. it's ghosts you gotta worry about
>Here you go again...
I've cited several cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind that go over the empirical evidence I'm talking about, we do indeed know. All you can do is play dumb here to deny what I'm saying.
>Let's do a thought experiment.
I'm not asking for a thought experiment I'm asking for an experiment. I'm asking you to empirically demonstrate that identifying neurons identifies consciousness but you just proved that you can't. fail. thanks for conceding my point.
>>10921999
>But the hard problem has nothing to do with why psychiatry
I just explained how it is and you ignored it.
>brains
you're just assuming the brain produces the mind without any evidence of this.
>zombie
already refuted. you should be worried about ghosts instead
>Pretty sure I have a counter to most of these.
I like how you say that but fail to provide a single one
>I dont see how his theory is simpler
physicalism has the hard problem, idealism doesn't. idealism sticks to experience while physicalism posits an entire reality that transcends experience

>>10922228
>The only way in which I admit the existence of qualia is as a vague and confusing term for certain experiences from the point of view of a subject, not in any ontological capacity.
Things either exist in some sense or not. So what does "not existing in any ontological capacity" mean? And why do you think the existence of qualia is less valid than that of a physical world, when we can experience qualia first hand but the physical world could be merely the product of our senses?
>Not sure which part of what I said you're interpreting this way, but it's definitely not what I meant.
You first admitted it exists (which is very reasonable of you, Daniel Dennett would debate even this), then you said it can't be found in the physical world, ergo it exists somewhere else.

>>10907465
retarded counter example. you can mechanically change someone's facial expression and their emotion won't change.
On the other hand if you artificially effect the chemical activity or structure of the brain with drugs or trauma then their entire personality and sensation of reality and consciousness will change.

>>10917194
>A thing doesn't need to exist
Dumbest thing I've read all year

>>10902887
I don't understand how the mind works therefore it can't be explained.

There, I did it.

>>10922240
>fail. thanks for conceding my point
ok, you win, I'm an idealist now.

>>10922355
Is this the power of materialism?

>>10922240
>RE: psychiatry
You didnt explain anything, all you said was mental concepts need to be differentiated from the brain. I said theres never even been a need to make that distinction explicit. If closing the hard problem is explaining things which, as per the zombie argument, in no way entail particular physical processes then how can that problem be relevant for psychiatry which works as part of the physical universe - We give people drugs where chemicals affect the brain; We give people talking therapy where information as sound or light waves goes into the brain and affects the brain states. Soft problems of consciousness may in some sense be relevant where you are looking at consciousness in terms of brain dynamics and cognitive models etc but not hard problems.

>brains
But brains still exist in the Bernardo Kastrup world and have the same relationship to the behaviour and consciousness (As conceptualised by e.g. Block, Koch or Dehaene) as they do here. I find it difficult to imagine Dream characters being conscious in the same way as we are given the things we both know and dont know about brains.

>RE: zombies already refuted
I dont remember you refuting this at all anon. Im not even convinced you understand the point Im trying to make desu.

>fail to provide a single one
Youre a demanding poster anon. Id rather wait for your response than an even longer premeditated post.

>hard problems idealism doesn't have
Ill get back to you on that.

Ontology: Hard mode.


If we suppose that the mind-body problem is not solvable with out reasoning-from-within, then what is the applied probability that we're in a simulation of some adversarial variety?

>>10922578
Yes I did explain you're simply ignoring it. We have to establish what we're talking about first, that's the question metaphysics answers: "what is?" We can't even identify what a psychiatrist is without metaphysics first. We need a metaphysical thesis to identify the mind first.

Brains exist but they are merely the extrinsic appearance of internal mental processes according to Kastrup. You're simply assuming brains implies consciousness so really you're just denying the antecedent by claiming they're not conscious because there's no brain. Don't forget my point about ghosts undermines this point about brains entirely.

I pointed out how zombies are irrelevant to idealism and how you should be scared of ghosts.

We'll be waiting a very long time then...

>the mind does not exist
>I don't experience consciousness
My God. The cumbrain meme is actually real.

>>10922742
I think they're the "I fucking love science" type of people who lack independent thinking.

Doesn't this universal consciousness with subminds suffer from basically the inverse of panpsychism's combination problem? How can you accept that a single subject gets split into an arbitrary number of them, while denying that multiple subjects could fuse into one?

>>10922707
>RE: psychiatrists
What else did you say other than mental and brains need to he differentiated and pills dont work?
Psychiatrists have a metaphysics i guess but its not really about identifying the mind. It would more be about the status of psychiatric problems e.g. as biological illnesses or what ever else psychoanalysts or behaviourists say. But I dont think solving the hard problem will have a direct effect on psychiatry. Drugs or brain surgery will still continue to work or not work regardless as will cbt or dream analysis or exposure therapy or primal therapy.

>RE: dream people
Yeah but even if it were like you said, the brain still seems to be linked to consciousness. Theres no real evidence for weird shit like that.
The point about ghosts says that experience and physical arent logically connected but that doesnt specify the type of world people live in. It doesnt mean potentially ghost brains dont have a relationship with the empirical indications of ghost consciousness.
Zombies are still relevant if the question isnt begged or if the world still has brains.

>waiting
well ive got 2 things on my to do list.

>>10923421
ooooooo idealists btfo again.

>>10923439
fucking peanut gallery itt lel

>>10901109
A set of weaker emergences combined create a strong emergence.

>>10923454
OP BTFO.

>>10923421
Already addressed this here: >>10921668

>>10923430
>What else did you say
That we have to actually identify what we're talking about first if we're meaningfully going to call anyone a psychiatrist. You don't call someone who studies rocks a psychiatrist because we all know rocks aren't minds. We need to first establish what we mean by mind and this requires metaphysics. How you conceive of mind is what will generate the hard problem so depending on your metaphysics this may or may not be a problem for you. If you're materialist it's a problem, if you're an idealist it's not.
>the brain still seems to be linked to consciousness.
I'd say the brain is the appearance of the mind but either way for you to hold your position requires denying the antecedent which is just invalid reasoning.
>Zombies are still relevant
not really per idealism
>well ive got 2 things on my to do list.
it's going to be awhile, don't hold your breath.

>>10924046
>you have to be an idealist for psychiatrists to be conceivable
nigga you've really gone off the deep end now

>>10925065
wow you are seriously illiterate