/sci/ - Science & Math

>>10888911
>patiently waiting for any evidence to be provided on claims of consciousness

>>10888911
>There's no physical mechanism behind consciousness
>Quantum mechanics of microtubules interfaces with consciousness

Pick one. I mean really, come on

>>10888911
>Consciousness just is
Except at night when you fall asleep.

>>10888920
The funny thing is, it's not about evidence. Those who are able to see it, do. Those who cannot see it never will.

>>10888922
This is not a refutation. The brain is an interface. Consciousness is interacting with the brain somehow. Do some research on microtubules.

consciousness is a collection of theoretical variables and material variables, silly billy.

>>10888942
fine, then this thread belongs on /x/

>>10888946
If consciousness interacts with the brain, then there is a physical mechanism there and consciousness should be considered a physical entity.

As far as microtubules go, you've been reading too much Penrose. Microtubules are structural elements that act as scaffolding to transport vesicles around cells. There's no evidence or reason that they should have such a critical role in neuron signalling.

>>10888949
Where did that conclusion come from?

>If consciousness interacts with the brain, then there is a physical mechanism there and consciousness should be considered a physical entity.

There is no weight to this claim. There is a genuinely bi-directional connection between the outside and the spacetime reality taking place in a very small, localized region of the brain. We don't know what consciousness is or why we are here. The means by which consciousness is "hooked up" to the brain in are unknowable to us in this life, but that doesn't mean we can't make scientific discoveries about the spacetime end of the bi-directional interface.

>>10888973
>Microtubules are structural elements that act as scaffolding to transport vesicles around cells. There's no evidence or reason that they should have such a critical role in neuron signalling.
There's no reason neurons would have anything to do with consciousness. People take it for granted because apparently they are involved but microtubular vesicle transport producing consciousness makes as much sense as membrane ion transport doing it.

>>10889024
>There's no reason neurons would have anything to do with consciousness.
Yes there is: neurons gather and process the sensory information and memories which you are consciously aware of. How would the microtubules be affected by or affect this information?

>>10888994
How ironic that you follow

>There is no weight to this claim.

with this utter nonsense:

>There is a genuinely bi-directional connection between the outside and the spacetime reality taking place in a very small, localized region of the brain.

>>10889037
>sensory information and memories which you are consciously aware of
That consciousness is senses and memories is part of taking it for granted. Why should our consciousness be of the eye organs and the associated neuronal electrical signals instead of say the liver and its vesicular activity?

>>10888911
way to directly contradict yourself in one paragraph, retard

>>10889063
>That consciousness is senses and memories is part of taking it for granted.
Taking what for granted? I don't know what you mean with this sentence

>Why should our consciousness be of the eye organs and the associated neuronal electrical signals instead of say the liver and its vesicular activity?
Because everything we experience, and everything we can consciously control, is directly associated with neuron activity. A paraplegic can no longer consciously feel or control their legs because the nerve activity is disrupted, despite the remaining biological activity working fine.

>>10889083
>Taking what for granted
That consciousness has to be like it is. It is like what my eyes and neurons are doing and not like what my liver and microtubules are doing.
>everything we can consciously control, is directly associated with neuron activity
Right but WHY is that association with brain neurons and not liver microtubules?
There isn't a rule that says to have consciousness you need neurons and can't use microtubules, or that neurons have to be conscious.

>>10888954
you just, like, don't see it man

>>10888911
>not up for debate
>not material
>not an epiphenomenon
>no space, no time, no causality, no logic, no process
Writing the words "not" and "no" that often indicates denial, rather than assertion.

>>10888942
>The funny thing is, it's not about evidence.
That is indeed funny -- more funny than you seem to understand, Anon.

pastebin related guys

https://pastebin.com/SS1APZPw

>>10889340
>mutual mind fractal
Should be expected from belief that an idea created you.
>playable dream world
Transition states are not well understood and it should not be unsurprising to find yourself in a state of mind where this seems markedly vivid.
>consciousness makes magic
This is literally the definition of magic. When you influence the world with your hands and feet, that is known as physics. The fact that your mind is able to influence your body isn't considered magical because there's a known physical link between your mind and body. To be able to influence the world with your mind without relying on the conduit of your body is precisely what it means to fantasize about magic.

TL;DR: DMT reveals unconscious assumptions that we use to construct beliefs with.

>>10889083
>>10889037
>muh neurons
It's just how the brain looks like from the outside, with no more consciousness, experience or information involved than peptide synthesis in a Petri dish.
>>10888911
Microtubules and quantumshit don't have any consciousness either.
>>10888973
>>10889347
>>10888920
>everything real must be physical because I do not feel safe thinking outside materialist dogma
Pic related.

>>10888911
Consciousness occurs in time since it changes, you moron.

>>10888973
The concept of a perfect circle interacts with brains

Yet we have no proof such a concept exists. Why do we imagine it at all then? How?

>>10889488
Confusing a map for a territory. Both are physical but one does not imply the existence of the other.

https://www.mit.edu/people/dpolicar/writing/prose/text/thinkingMeat.html

is information itself considered physical?

what are emergent properties of systems?

Is consciousness an emergent property of neurological systems?

>>10888922
>not knowing the difference between reductive physicalism and interactionist dualism

>>10889675
No.
The territory does not exist.
The map is able to accurately map it though.

Consciousness "doesnt exist" but our minds are able to interact with it anyways, same as they interact with nonexistent eternal concepts like that of a perfect circle.

>>10889890
Perfect circles and consciousness do exist though

>>10889901
oh shit this guy found the end of pi

Consciousness is material, but material isn't what you think it is.

The entire thing, reality, is immaterial. You have to see it from the very top, from that perspective you see it doesn't matter if something has logic to its existence, it's still magic because existence itself is magic. And by that I mean it is unexplainable, it isn't bound by any rules because it IS the rules.

Existence is a dream-like thing and a part of that dream is logic. So even if consciousness is created in the brain that doesn't necessarily mean you lose it when you die.

>>10888911
>Consciousness is not up for debate
Then why are you putting it up for debate?
If you really believe this then shut the fuck up about it. Meanwhile I'll take Nietzsche's approach over your "IT JUST IS AND YOU CAN'T DENY IT" existential autism tantrum.
>The people on their part may think that cognition is knowing all about things, but the philosopher must say to himself:
>"When I analyze the process that is expressed in the sentence, 'I think,' I find a whole series of daring assertions, the argumentative proof of which would be difficult, perhaps impossible: for instance, that it is I who think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an 'ego,' and finally, that it is already determined what is to be designated by thinking—that I KNOW what thinking is.
>For if I had not already decided within myself what it is, by what standard could I determine whether that which is just happening is not perhaps 'willing' or 'feeling'? In short, the assertion 'I think,' assumes that I COMPARE my state at the present moment with other states of myself which I know, in order to determine what it is; on account of this retrospective connection with further 'knowledge,' it has, at any rate, no immediate certainty for me."
>—In place of the "immediate certainty" in which the people may believe in the special case, the philosopher thus finds a series of metaphysical questions presented to him, veritable conscience questions of the intellect, to wit:
>"Whence did I get the notion of 'thinking'? Why do I believe in cause and effect? What gives me the right to speak of an 'ego,' and even of an 'ego' as cause, and finally of an 'ego' as cause of thought?"
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4363/4363-h/4363-h.htm

>>10889462
Materialists are today's devout Christians. The belief doesn't make sense, it's self-contradicting but they hold dear because it enables them to propagate and embrace their egoism and narcissism.
>>10890228
I immediately discard anything written by some guy who cites an philosopher while simultaneously making clear that he actually has never read a single book from him.

>>10890160
There is no end of pi, why would you need an "end" of pi to prove perfect circles exist?

>>10888911
>Leading neuroscientists believe that the direct interface between the brain and consciousness is taking place in the microtubules, which are highly quantum mechanical.

>Consciousness is not material. It is not an epiphenomenon. It is fundamentally different from all spacetime. There is no space, no time, no causality, no logic, no process about consciousness. Consciousness just is.

Do you.....do you think that quantum mechanics is somehow “immaterial”?

This is why consciousness is never taken seriously. Too many schizos.
>neuroscientists think that microtubles are the key
No.

>>10888946
>Consciousness is interacting with the brain somehow

Please cite a peer-reviewed paper that demonstrates this to be the case. You are asserting that a violation of the conservation of energy is ongoing in the human brain.

>>10890253
Materialists like materialism because it rules out lots of woo-y stuff a priori, but there's also an element of pseudo-rugged individualism, it shows how strong-willed, tough and objective they are that they can accept "cold hard facts" and deal with the worst case scenario. It's almost immaterial to them at that point whether or not those cold hard things are actually facts or stiff remains of a dead ideology, they've attached their identity as a rational objective person to it.

>>10890267
The principle of energy conservation is after all just an idea, a concept and according to this thread cannot possibly exist.
Checkmate.

>>10888911
>It is fundamentally different from all spacetime.
/x/

>>10890272
>That avoidance

I asked you to cite a peer-reviewed paper demonstrating your claim to be true. I’m waiting.

>The principle of energy conservation is after all just an idea, a concept and according to this thread cannot possibly exist.

No idea what you’re rambling about. Materialists don’t assert ideas don’t exist.

>>10890270
Most woo-y stuff rules themself out if you are of above average intelligence. Materialism is convenient for the same reasons Newtonian Mechanics is convenient. It gets most of the stuff most of the time right and is a good approximation. Thorougly considerations (without relying on relativity or quantum mechanics) however will soon show the limitations of Materialism even in a deterministic Euclidean spacetime-setting.

>>10890292
Materialism doesn’t have limits because it’s a poorly defined philosophical idea that can’t be tested or verified in any way, just like idealism or whatever retarded shit you believe in.

>>10890292
What is your perspective on these matters? Panpsychist? Idealist? Something else? You're clearly not a materialist.

>>10890298
If you aren't retarded materialism has already been falsified because emergentist explanations of consciousness are an exercise in futility. It has been tested, it failed that test.

>>10890308
>What useless delusion do you hold xD

>>10890291
You're replying to the wrong guy.
Also your attempt at winning this whole thing by using your argument ad verecundiam is quite pathetic. No one gives a shit about peer-reviewed papers because they become obsolete and disproven within 10-15 years. Especially in neurology.

Also considering your second point. Since everything is materialistic, ideas and the consciousness itself must be too. There is thus something called like a consciousness particle because it must be materialistic which lingers around in space. Is oxygen or carbon consciousness? I doubt. But materialists were always very prone to fall victim to such things like category mistakes, ill-defined propositions and non-continuous chains of arguments.

>>10890313
>If you aren't retarded materialism has already been falsified because emergentist explanations of consciousness are an exercise in futility.

Prove it. I anticipate you trying to avoid doing so like some kind of disgusting, oozing hagfish falling out of the hands of a fisherman and back into the tepid waters from whence it came. Where’s the research papers?

>>10890315
Your position has been straight up refuted. What failed project are you utterly convinced will explain something even though it obviously can't? Emergentism? Are you a fucking illusionist? Emergentism and Illusionism are like the biggest comedy duo in Philosophy, what a joke

>>10890298
So if materialism, idealism and any other thing can't be verified, which I am inclined to agree with, why even bother discussing it?
>>10890308
Me not being a materialist doesn't imply that I hold any specific position. I only say that materialism just like idealism has its justifications up to a certain degree.

>>10890321
>Also your attempt at winning this whole thing by using your argument ad verecundiam is quite pathetic. No one gives a shit about peer-reviewed papers because they become obsolete and disproven within 10-15 years.

Prove it. Cite a peer-reviewed paper that proves that all of them “become obsolete and disproven within 10-15 years”. ;-)

>There is thus something called like a consciousness particle because it must be materialistic which lingers around in space

Since everything is materialistic, falling must be too. There is thus something called a “falling particle” because it must be materialistic which lingers around in space. Or is falling merely an event that takes place in the material, or a process performed by the material rather than its own particle...? You know that there’s more to the “material” than particles, yes?

>Is oxygen or carbon consciousness?

Are silicon atoms “falling”, or are both falling and consciousness simply things these atoms DO sometimes?

>But materialists were always very prone to fall victim to such things like category mistakes, ill-defined propositions and non-continuous chains of arguments.

Dunk on whatever a “materialist” is on /his/. This is not a science topic.

>>10890327
>Prove it
There is a categorical distinction between the things that science can describe in the current paradigms, quantities and behaviours, and the things it can't, instrinsic "what's it like to be" qualities. Materialism is currently engaged in a pathetic course of actions vis-a-vis emergentism which is a fucking joke because emergent properties can actually be deduced from their substrate, whereas consciousness obviously can't be deduced from the neural correlates we have already.

It's as absurd as believeing that someone in a colourless room who learns from a computer everything there is to know about the correlates of colour like the wavelengths of light will somehow know what it's like to actually experience red.

The whole thing is a linguistic farce.

>>10890359
>Redditspacing
Absolute pleb. Get the fuck out.

>>10890330
>Your position has been straight up refuted.

What do you think my position is? You have no idea.

>What failed project are you utterly convinced will explain something even though it obviously can't? Emergentism? Are you a fucking illusionist? Emergentism and Illusionism are like the biggest comedy duo in Philosophy, what a joke

Please discuss philosophy topics on the proper board.

You don't need "empirical verification" to know whether or not something is true or false. Not everything falls under the realm of empiricism. Rationalist deduction is in fact more powerful than empirical observation in terms of finding "truth" or validity of an idea.

>>10890370
Materialism, since that's what you're defending. And it's a priori fucking false because it relies on a category mistake.

>>10890336
>So if materialism, idealism and any other thing can't be verified, which I am inclined to agree with, why even bother discussing it?

My point exactly. Don’t. It is as productive as arguing whether or not Captain America could defeat Darth Vader and even less likely to get an actual answer. If people really want to argue about it, they can do it on the board for philosophy, not this one.

>>10888911
> There is no space, no time, no causality, no logic, no process about consciousness.
> Leading neuroscientists....microtubules..
Your first statement contradicts everything else you said after.

You just had to write your first statement and be done with it.

>>10890380
>Can't be verified
That's just speculation at this point, they may well ultimately be testable in the end. As far as I'm concerned at least one of the ideologies (Materialism) is a-priori false.

>>10890374
>Materialism, since that's what you're defending

I am not a materialist. You asserted that it was disproven, so I’m waiting for the relevant research.

>>10890386
>You asserted that it was disproven
Because if you're not a total retard, you'll realise that it's based on a linguistic error. The language of materialism can only account for quantities and behaviours, external things. Expecting that to produce explanations of qualitative phenomena is a category error.

It's the kind of thing you don't need a study to prove, in the same way I don't need to see the working to confirm that something cannot be both a square and a circle at the same time because that would be a contradiction.

>>10890359
>Prove it. Cite a peer-reviewed paper that proves that all of them “become obsolete and disproven within 10-15 years”. ;-)
You're missing the point intentionally. It's not about whether or not all peer-reviewed papers become obsolete in 10-15 years which they do not. It's about whether or not appealing to papers is a sound way of arguing.
>Since everything is materialistic, falling must be too. There is thus something called a “falling particle” because it must be materialistic which lingers around in space. Or is falling merely an event that takes place in the material, or a process performed by the material rather than its own particle...? You know that there’s more to the “material” than particles, yes?
Nice one-to-one copy. You're already abandoning your own position by conceding that falling is a phenomenon which affects particles but isn't itself materialistic. Now, you will argue that this doesn't really disprove your point. But if consciousness consists of the interactions rather than the particles themselves, why even bother calling it materialism. I'm well aware that materialism ought to cover that too but there's really no point in discussing something that by definition is supposed to cover everything once you consider particles to be fundamental. Anything can be derived from this by means of new materials, new interactions, new "emergent properties". I also fully doubt that these interactions are in any way materialistic. Is space and time now materialistic too?

>>10890360
>There is a categorical distinction between the things that science can describe in the current paradigms, quantities and behaviours, and the things it can't, instrinsic "what's it like to be" qualities.

That’s very cool. And?

>Materialism is currently engaged in a pathetic course of actions vis-a-vis emergentism which is a fucking joke because emergent properties can actually be deduced from their substrate, whereas consciousness obviously can't be deduced from the neural correlates we have already.

Prove it.

>It's as absurd as believeing that someone in a colourless room who learns from a computer everything there is to know about the correlates of colour like the wavelengths of light will somehow know what it's like to actually experience red.

Of course they won’t know what it’s like until the relevant photons go into their eyeballs and get translated into ions sent to the brain.

>>10890405
>Prove it.
Equivalent to saying "Prove that squares can't be circles". They can't be.
>Of course they won’t know what it’s like until the relevant photons go into their eyeballs and get translated into ions sent to the brain.
Then you don't get the core of materialism at all. If it was true then by the nature of things correlated with (but not actually) the thing eventually the person in question should be able to simulate red in their mind without having ever actually seen red.

>>10890386
You dont need "scientific research" to disprove a metaphysical position you absolute pseud.
>>10890392
The other pseud isn't a materialist, he's an empiricist, which is not much better. But you should have realized this.
You're both idiots.

>>10890401
>You're missing the point intentionally. It's not about whether or not all peer-reviewed papers become obsolete in 10-15 years which they do not. It's about whether or not appealing to papers is a sound way of arguing.

It is.

>Nice one-to-one copy

Yes that’s the whole point.

>You're already abandoning your own position

Not my position. I don’t hold one aside from “idealism, materialism, monism, and dualism are all retarded ideas that can’t be tested”.

>by conceding that falling is a phenomenon which affects particles but isn't itself materialistic.

Things particles do are defined as materialistic by everyone on the planet but you.

>But if consciousness consists of the interactions rather than the particles themselves, why even bother calling it materialism.

Good point. It’s a poorly defined philosophical idea and like its competitors, is retarded. The more sensical modern word to use is “physicalism”.

>Anything can be derived from this by means of new materials, new interactions, new "emergent properties". I also fully doubt that these interactions are in any way materialistic. Is space and time now materialistic too?

They’re more accurately “physical”. Literal materialism is basically extinct and gets used as a synonym for “physicalism”, which is what I assumed was being done here.

>>10890412
>The other pseud isn't a materialist, he's an empiricist, which is not much better

How goes the rationalist industrial revolution? Figure out how to smelt metal with your imagination yet?

>You dont need "scientific research" to disprove a metaphysical position you absolute pseud

I didn’t use the word “scientific”. I only requested research. You’re making “metaphysical positions” sound like untestable horseshit.

>>10890411
>Equivalent to saying "Prove that squares can't be circles". They can't be.

Prove it’s equivalent to that. Squares only can’t be circles because they’re predefined as such.

>Then you don't get the core of materialism at all. If it was true then by the nature of things correlated with (but not actually) the thing eventually the person in question should be able to simulate red in their mind without having ever actually seen red.

No, that doesn’t follow at all. Knowing how the sensation of “red” arises doesn’t allow you to magically activate the cones of your eyes.

>>10890444
>Prove it’s equivalent to that
At that point it's just about your problems with comprehension. If you can't understand that it's a category error then you never will because you just aren't up to it.
>Squares only can’t be circles because they’re predefined as such.
Just as the quantitative language of materialism (Or what you call Physicalism, which suffers from the exact same problems) is defined in such a way that it literally cannot say anything about the qualitative.
>Knowing how the sensation of “red” arises doesn’t allow you to magically activate the cones of your eyes.
"Red" doesn't even occur in your eyes, it's something that exists in your mind. You could, this instant, imagine red provided you aren't colourblind. Under the assumptions of Materialism you should be able to do that without ever having seen red just by knowing about it's quantitative properties.

>>10890455
In fact, I'll go one further: It should BE those quantiative properties, there should not be any additional essence added that makes it necessary to experience redness first-hand. To a committed materialist, experiencing redness is all about understanding it's quantiative properties in enough detail.

>>10888911
if any of your shit was right, you would be able to cite it
microtubules don't work, by the way:
https://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/brain.html

It isn't possible to understand what creates our understanding because what creates our understanding isn't the sum of our understanding, and only by consequence of this ignorance, is it an emergent property.

>>10888973
>w/e interacts with the physical must be physical

>>10890455
>At that point it's just about your problems with comprehension. If you can't understand that it's a category error then you never will because you just aren't up to it.

Prove it.

>Just as the quantitative language of materialism (Or what you call Physicalism, which suffers from the exact same problems) is defined in such a way that it literally cannot say anything about the qualitative.

Physicalism defines the qualitative as physical.

>Red" doesn't even occur in your eyes

I didn’t say it did, silly.

>it's something that exists in your mind.

Yes, caused by photons hitting your eyeballs and then communicating this to the central nervous system.

>You could, this instant, imagine red provided you aren't colourblind.

Only because I’ve seen red before. If you were more imaginative, you’d have brought up how it’s actually impossible to know whether or not the color we call “red” looks the same to any other human. You could switch them all around and we’d be none the wiser.

>Under the assumptions of Materialism you should be able to do that without ever having seen red just by knowing about it's quantitative properties.

Nope. Materialism does not assert that you should be able to experience the qualia of “red” just because you know how said sensations arise. You appear to believe that every “materialist” also believes in psionic powers that allow one to trigger the neurons that cause the sensation of “red” on a whim. We can’t do that. Why are you strawmanning an idea as dumb as materialism? Here’s how you argue against it. Don’t. It’s Bigfoot-Tier.

>>10890461
>In fact, I'll go one further: It should BE those quantiative properties, there should not be any additional essence added that makes it necessary to experience redness first-hand.

Nope. The sensation of “redness” is triggered by specific nerves sending specific signals. It doesn’t matter how much you know about how that all works, it doesn’t let you magically make those neurons fire. You literally think materialism means psionics exist.

>>10890483
So does the “immaterial”, whatever that nonsense means, interact with the “material”, whatever that nonsense means, with the strong, weak, electromagnetic, or gravitational forces?

>>10890489
>it must interact by some means I know because the sum of what I know is all there can be

>>10890489
>it must interact by some physical means I know because the sum of what I know is all there can be

>>10890485
>Prove it.
Well given that what you just quoted was me calling you an idiot in other words your posts provide excellent evidence.
>Physicalism defines the qualitative as physical.
That's not even meaningful. Physical as in what? As in simply that it's real? As in atoms? As in emergent phenomena? As in Panpsychism? As in processes (I.e. Whiteheadian philosophy?) If your Philosophy explains consciousness as merely a property, or emergent property of material/physical phenomena it struggles with the exact same problems as traditional materialism and it's a distinction without a difference.
>I didn’t say it did, silly.
Where else are the rods and cones? Retard.
>Yes, caused by photons hitting your eyeballs and then communicating this to the central nervous system.
Then the wavelength has absolutely nothing to do with it, the rods and cones have even less, and "red" is a neural phenomena, but you're still trapped in the problem because if our imaginary subject had ALL quantiative phenomena about colour, say, red without experiencing it first hand they should be able to activate that experience in their imagination without walking outside to see red. It's trivial to imagine red without actually having to look at a red object, so saying that the light is somehow necessary to activate the neural phenomena is incorrect.
>Only because I’ve seen red before
You've effectively conceded the argument.
>If you were more imaginative, you’d have brought up how it’s actually impossible to know whether or not the color we call “red” looks the same to any other human
Stay on the point lmao.
>Nope. Materialism does not assert that you should be able to experience the qualia of “red” just because you know how said sensations arise
Yep. Utlimately you should. because to an actually committed materialist that, shall we say neural phenomena, is IDENTICAL to red, it IS red, red is not some additional property.

>>10890496
I’m happy to accept the existence of a fifth force once it’s verified to exist. I’m putting down my vote for the name: Woo Woo Force

>>10890485
>You appear to believe that every “materialist” also believes in psionic powers that allow one to trigger the neurons that cause the sensation of “red” on a whim
We typically call those psionic powers, "imagination"

>>10890501
>i'm happy to accept the immaterial once it's verified to exist. until then, it's unlikely for no reason than my hubris
Kill yourself, idiot. I don't have time for this.

>>10890487
>It doesn’t matter how much you know about how that all works, it doesn’t let you magically make those neurons fire.
You make them fire all the time by imagining things.
What you are suggesting is that some extra ineffable quality exists which must be experienced.

>>10888920
post evidence that we need evidence

>>10888911
>Consciousness is not material. It is not an epiphenomenon. It is fundamentally different from all spacetime. There is no space, no time, no causality, no logic, no process about consciousness.
What is your evidence for these claims?

>>10890500
>That's not even meaningful.

I don’t know ask a physicalist. I don’t think any of the words used in any of these inane ideas are meaningful in the contexts they’re placed in.

>Where else are the rods and cones? Retard.

They’re in the eyes, but them being activated does not cause the sensation of red all on their own.

>Then the wavelength has absolutely nothing to do with it

It has a lot to do with it because certain cones prefer different wavelengths of photon. If none of those photons are being received then those cones won’t send those signals, or they’ll be overpowered by the other colors.

>the rods and cones have even less

Rods and cones are where the action potentials originate from so it’s utterly bizarre that you’d say they have nothing to do with experiencing red.

>and "red" is a neural phenomena,

Caused by action potentials received from the eyes, yes.

>but you're still trapped in the problem because if our imaginary subject had ALL quantiative phenomena about colour, say, red without experiencing it first hand they should be able to activate that experience in their imagination without walking outside to see red.

Nope. Knowing how that sensation works simply does not allow you to fire those neurons on a whim. There is no mechanistic Avenue for that to occur. You could, presumably, activate those neurons surgically and thus experience “red” while bypassing the eyes but someone else would obviously have to do that for you.

>It's trivial to imagine red without actually having to look at a red object

Because we’ve already seen that color. We’ve got memories of it.

>so saying that the light is somehow necessary to activate the neural phenomena is incorrect.

It’s not necessarily because you could conceivably poke the visual cortex directly, but nevertheless the fact that we can see red in our “mind’s eye” is due to the fact that we’ve been seeing it for our whole lives.

>>10890509
>You make them fire all the time by imagining things.

Imagination works off memories. Imagining a new castle is trivial because I’ve seen a shit ton of castles before. Imagine something that bears no resemblance whatsoever to anything you’ve experienced.

>>10890506
>i've done nothing but shitposted all summer and suddenly i'm superbusy

>>10890506
What a bizarre strawman. You’re very angry, and that’s sad. Bye now!

>>10888911
dude consciousness lmao

>>10890505
Imagination doesn’t allow you to experience sensations you haven’t felt before, it can only provide loose homunculus cobbled together from other sensations to approximate whatever you’re trying to think of.

>>10890530
>I don’t think any of the words used in any of these inane ideas are meaningful in the contexts they’re placed in.
Fun way of saying you're a moron who can't even represent the position he's ostensibly defending well.
>They’re in the eyes, but them being activated does not cause the sensation of red all on their own.
When you originally made your point vis-a-vis colours you were talking in terms of eyes and photons, you've been backpedalling ever since. It's you that seems to struggle with premises and definitions lmao. It's fine because every point you retreat to is just as wrong as the last.
>It has a lot to do with it because certain cones prefer different wavelengths of photon
That's not even what I meant and you haven't addressed the point. The argument you've slowly been retreating is "what is red really?". Is red a photon's wavelength? Clearly not because you can imagine it in absentia of light in your eyes, so you can have an experience of red without photons hitting your eyes. Hence it has nothing to do with it because it's not necessary.
>Caused by action potentials received from the eyes, yes.
Why? Prove it. Your response has so far been to posit the existence of an ineffable qualia which is irreducible to wavelength, irreducible to photons, irreducible to brain states. If you're to defend materialism, qualia cannot ultimately be ineffable, it needs to be reducible to one of those things. You need to describe something in terms of brain states that IS red, not just CORRELATED with red, it IS red. Otherwise it's ineffable, and if it's ineffable it's irreducible and if it's irreducible it's an ontological primitive.
>Nope. Knowing how that sensation works simply does not allow you to fire those neurons on a whim
Why not? I can imagine all kinds of objects that I've never seen before, why can I not do that with quales? With red?

>>10890537
>Imagining a new castle is trivial
But what about the people that design new castles entirely of their own imagining, with shapes hitherto unknown?
>Imagine something that bears no resemblance whatsoever to anything you’ve experienced.
Are you suggesting that there's something ineffable about red? Then how can it be a brain state?

>>10890562
>Fun way of saying you're a moron who can't even represent the position he's ostensibly defending well.

Why so angry? Not my fault materialism is a nonsensical idea.

>When you originally made your point vis-a-vis colours you were talking in terms of eyes and photons, you've been backpedalling ever since.

Nope. All I did was mention that you could probably induce the sensation of “red” by artificially causing action potentials in the visual cortex.

>The argument you've slowly been retreating is "what is red really?".

Nope.

>so you can have an experience of red without photons hitting your eyes

Yes, if you were to artificially stimulate the relevant nerves surgically or have already experienced red, then recalling it from memory wouldn’t be hard.

>Why?

Dunno.

>Prove it.

https://kidshealth.org/en/kids/eyes.html

>Your response has so far been to posit the existence of an ineffable qualia which is irreducible to wavelength, irreducible to photons, irreducible to brain states.

Never said the last one.

>You need to describe something in terms of brain states that IS red, not just CORRELATED with red, it IS red.

There’s more than reductive materialism, you know. Type physicalists posit only a correlation.

>Why not? I can imagine all kinds of objects that I've never seen before

They resemble nothing you have ever experienced at all? Really, do they?

>>10890565
>But what about the people that design new castles entirely of their own imagining, with shapes hitherto unknown?

Who are these Lovecraftian entities you speak of?

>Are you suggesting that there's something ineffable about red? Then how can it be a brain state?

How could it not be? If anything, Brain states should be ineffable.

>>10890562
>Why so angry
Projection
>Nope. All I did was mention that you could probably induce the sensation of “red” by artificially causing action potentials in the visual cortex.
No, this is how you began your case
>Of course they won’t know what it’s like until the relevant photons go into their eyeballs and get translated into ions sent to the brain.
And in order to maintain the "until" portion of your argument you've increasingly admitted that it's ineffable, if it's ineffable it's impossible for it to be a brainstate because that would imply that it's possible to express it in terms other than itself, it would have to be expressible in terms of a code, undermining your case for it being ineffable.

So either it's ineffable and thus an ontological primitive, or it's expressible in terms of brainstates in which case it should ultimately be expressible in terms of language and some kind of code.
>Kidshealth
Glad to know they solved the hard problem of consciousness.
>Never said the last one.
If you argue for qualia's ineffability, if it's reducible to brainstates, it's reducible to the information those brainstates are encoded with. It IS that encoded information. Otherwise you're saying that there's a special extra category involved in conscious perception.
>Type physicalists posit only a correlation.
That's not an ontological position. Under that definition Physicalism could be neutral monism or Panpsychism. If you're going to defend the actual ontological claims of materialism that you started with, and you did, don't shift positions like a coward.
>They resemble nothing you have ever experienced at all? Really, do they?
You can imagine all kinds of abstract objects, I've never physically seen a perfect line but I can imagine such a thing using mathematics, I can mathematically model things I've never physically seen.
>Who are these Lovecraftian entities you speak of?
We call them architects.

nice theory
provide proofs and a valid thesis paper to my desk by the end of this semester kid
nothing personnel

>>10890632
>If anything, Brain states should be ineffable
But they aren't, neural correlates of consciousness are perfectly effable. The ineffable part is the conscious experience.

>>10888911
>Leading neuroscientists believe that the direct interface between the brain and consciousness is taking place in the microtubules

You have to stop visiting /pol/ and /x/, they are truly toxic when you are weak.

>>10890666
Oh you’re that guy, bye.

i feel schizophrenic reading this thread send help

>>10889864
What if the universe is an emergent property of consciousness

>>10890267
>violation of the conservation of energy
That's exactly what's going.

why can i produce the sensation of stopping consciousness with a drug