/sci/ - Science & Math

>being-in-itself is the same as being-for-itself
Whoever wrote this is missing this important detail

>>10476599
>Reductive Materialism
>Heidegger
pick one

>>10476621
It's actually Hegel, you dumb pseudo-idealist niggerjew.

>>10476635
Here's what your autism fails to pick up:
>The type of reductionism that is currently of most interest in metaphysics and philosophy of mind involves the claim that all sciences are reducible to physics. This is usually taken to entail that all phenomena (including mental phenomena like consciousness) are identical to physical phenomena. The bulk of this article will discuss this latter understanding of reductionism.
Source: https://www.iep.utm.edu/red-ism/

All Premise 1 and Premise 2 are doing is pointing out the implications of reductive materialism and how this fails to come to fruition. Thus, via modus tollens we can validly infer that reductive materialism cannot be true.

>>10476582
>ontological supervenience does not imply epistemological reducibility
t. Hilary Putnam (one of the respectable """chosen ones""")

>>10476582
>officially on suicide watch
justify the premises first

I don't know philosophy but this seems really interesting. What does "to be the subject, for the subject" means ?. I feel like there's more to it.

>>10476659
If you're talking about supervenience the way that I think you do then you're moving towards non-reductive materialism, and the argument in the OP is against reductive materialism.

>>10476676
see: >>10476648

>>10476682
It is quite fascinating. If you'd some more info for intro to philosophy stuff let me know.

To answer your question: the qualitative and subjective aspects of conscious experience—how consciousness “feels” and the fact that it is directly “for me”

>>10476648
There is no logical necessity for a belief in real beings consisting of anything other than matter. It could be said that thoughts, memories, emotions are all physical phenomena that are inherently part of human beings' material composition, even if they are not regarded as such by the mind itself. Despite not being part of what is directly sensed by others, there is no reason to believe that they're separate from living bodies of flesh. Even if I were to declare myself a materialist, I wouldn't necessarily have to adopt naive empiricism.

>>10476699
Your response fails to refute the argument against reductive materialism in the OP.

I'd like to point out that I'm actually not a dualist, but a monist. The difference is that I'm not a materialist, I'm an idealist.

>>10476703
The argument falls apart easily.

All one need to do is state that they are skeptical of premis 2; now to satisfy the argument, OP must provide supportive evidence that material phenomena is not sufficient to do whatever it is he wants it not to do. Of course he won't since, I'm sure, not even he possesses an actionable grasp of the terminology he uses

>>10476582
Prove either of your premises to be true.

>>10476750
Reasonable doubt of premise 2 means you you have reason to believe identifying material phenomena identify what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. The problem is there is negative evidence for such a view: we have identified the brain and we have identified the body, however there is still this asymmetry between a description of the brain/body and a description of what it is like to be the subject. That shouldn't be possible if reductive materialism were true since what it is like to be the subject is supposed to be identical to the material phenomena.

>>10476751
see: >>10476648

>>10476765
Prove those are implications of reductive materialism and prove Premise 2 to be true.

>>10476582

"It be like I want it to do a priori so I'm right by definition."

We are concatenations of stuff, get over yourself. Physicalism is true.

>>10476770
I just did. Reductive materialism means mental phenomena are identical to physical phenomena.

Definition of Identical: “Similar in every detail; exactly alike.” Synonymous with: “exactly the same,indistinguishable, undifferentiated.”

Source: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/identical

If mental phenomena and physical phenomena are identical then by definition once you have identified the material phenomena you have identified the mental phenomena since they are literally the exact same thing. That's premise 1 right there. Premise 2 is seen easily by noting the asymmetry there is between identifying material phenomena and mental phenomena. We can identify the brain and the body all day but this fails to tell us what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. And that's not possible if reductive materialism were true.

>>10476778
do you even modus tollens bro?

>>10476765
I see.

Now that you've clarified your position with respect to premise 2, I can formally disagree with you. I concede that the relationship between brain and body has been identified in near extensive detail. These matters are quantifiable, concrete, and well-understood. "What it's like to be a subject," however, describes aqualitative aspect of the mind-body relationship; essentially an emergent property of the material in question.

Think of a stone: one may identify it's young's modulus, density, mass ,etc. All sorts of interesting quantaties are associated with the ensemble of particles that constitute a stone.

It's jaggedness, smoothness, color, etc are in and of themselves qualities- all of which are determined not only by the fundamental properties of its elemental constituents, but environment as well. They are properties of the stone that emerge if and only if certain conditions are met; for example, marble only assumes the qualities of a tabletop if marble workers make tabletops out of the marble.

Qualities are emergent material aspects characteristic of enviornmental differentiation: not all marble is as perfectly smooth as a tabletop, some marblemust be pressured to be that way. Similarly, "what it's like to be the subject" appears to be an emergent aspect of some particular brain-body relationship which is itself to be identified by both the material properties of the brain-body and selective enviornmental pressures.

That is to say "what it is like to be the subject" is a material quality and can be identified as such.

>>10476785
>I just did. Reductive materialism means mental phenomena are identical to physical phenomena.

Yep.

>If mental phenomena and physical phenomena are identical then by definition once you have identified the material phenomena you have identified the mental phenomena since they are literally the exact same thing.

Uh-huh.

>Premise 2 is seen easily by noting the asymmetry there is between identifying material phenomena and mental phenomena. We can identify the brain and the body all day but this fails to tell us what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. And that's not possible if reductive materialism were true.

Simply not true. What a weird lie to tell.
https://www.biorxiv.org/content/biorxiv/early/2017/12/30/240317.full.pdf

Can you try to troll on a different site now?

>>10476834
>https://www.biorxiv.org/content/biorxiv/early/2017/12/30/240317.full.pdf
This isn't identifying what it is like to be the subject, for the subject at all... fail

>>10476842
>This isn't identifying what it is like to be the subject, for the subject at all... fail

>This vague cope claim made to artificially extend the discussion

It is an observation of the material being used to determine what subjective states are being experienced. What you wanted to be presented is found, so leave the board or accept defeat.

>>10476848
This has always been about identifying what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. You failing to read the OP is no cope nor an extension. Just read the OP next time.

Your study fails to identify the qualitative and subjective aspects of conscious experience—how consciousness “feels” and the fact that it is directly “for me”

>>10476856
>This has always been about identifying what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. You failing to read the OP is no cope nor an extension. Just read the OP next time.
Your study fails to identify the qualitative and subjective aspects of conscious experience—how consciousness “feels” and the fact that it is directly “for me”

Oh boy. Going for the word salad to cope and try to troll for longer now that his Phlogiston argument is dead.

>Your study fails to identify the qualitative

That is exactly what is identified. The qualia of visual imagery is possible to extract from the material.

>and subjective aspects of conscious experience

Consciousness is subjective by definition. This is a tautology.

>and the fact that it is directly “for me”

Meaningless. The “me” is consciousness. It is not “for” “you”

>>10476862
Holy shit you're retarded. What it is like to subjectively experience a visual image is not identical to a visual image. We can both look at the same thing yet we each have our own subjective experience of what it is like for each of us individually to experience that image. So we can see clearly how insufficient the study you are citing is at justifying your claim.

>>10476867
>Holy shit you're retarded.

Ad hom coping now.

>What it is like to subjectively experience a visual image is not identical to a visual image.

Yes it is, because you automatically know what it’s like to see a visual image when you see it.

>We can both look at the same thing yet we each have our own subjective experience of what it is like for each of us individually to experience that image.

They are identical, ignoring practical concerns like angle and health of eyes.

>So we can see clearly how insufficient the study you are citing is at justifying your claim.

It isn’t.

Congrats on abandoning your bizarre tautology though.

>>10476873
>responds to an argument by sayings it's coping
>bitches about ad homs
If you can't handle the heat get out of the kitchen. Nice reddit spacing by the way, newfag.
>Yes it is
This is 100% false and easily proven by showing 2 people the exact same image while they both walk away with completely different experiences. One person finds it funny, the other person finds it lame. What it is like for you to experience it is different than the other, and even if you both find it funny there is what it is like for you to find it funny vs them. If they were identical like you claimed that would be impossible...

>>10476885
>If you can't handle the heat get out of the kitchen. Nice reddit spacing by the way, newfag.

Aw, more ad Homs.

>This is 100% false and easily proven by showing 2 people the exact same image while they both walk away with completely different experiences. One person finds it funny, the other person finds it lame. What it is like for you to experience it is different than the other, and even if you both find it funny there is what it is like for you to find it funny vs them. If they were identical like you claimed that would be impossible...

The visual qualia is identical. Now you’re involving thoughts about the visual qualia, which we can observe going about their business in the brain but are currently unable to reconstruct. Inb4 argument from ignorance.

>>10476897
You seriously don't see the irony of you dishing out ad homs while simultaneously bitching about ad homs...? that cognitive dissonance must be rough
>The visual qualia is identical
You said that already and that statement is contradicted by the very fact that different subjects can have the same visual experience while what it is like for them to have that visual experience wildly varies. Nobody said anything about thoughts, you're putting words in my mouth which is a straw man. I'm talking about "what it is like" to experience the image, which is clearly distinct from just an experience of the image.

Lmao who is the autist that think he can prove anything with wordplay. Our capacity for abstraction is a fascinating mystery but holding that our capacity of thought can generate meaningful concepts that apply to such questions is retarded. Our capacity of argument is limited to our own capacity of abstraction, and what we understand for common sense, but beyond that there's no reason why something should follow because modus tollens.

>>10476907
wtf I hate logic now

philosophy is not science
>>>/lit/
>>>/x/

>>10476914
>philosophy is not science! get out of here!
>now let me make more posts that uncritically assumes materialism is true

>>10476582
pic related see link below.

>>10476907
This. But we must still make some assumptions in order to normally function especially in society. (e.g. not being a solipsist)

https://www.princeton.edu/~graziano/evolution_of_consciousness_2017.pdf

>>10476917
Whom are you quoting?

>>10476922
I'm not seeing how this refutes the argument at all. The argument is valid, which means the conclusion follows logically from the premises. If the premises are true then the conclusion has to be true, the only question is if the premises are true and I've provided reasons to believe they are, while you haven't provided reasons to believe they are not.

>>10476926

I see no reason to believe that premise 2 is true, OP. Care to argue that point?

>>10476927
Read the paper, you might change your mind. In fact, you should regularly read things that challenge your beliefs.
You're looking at consciousness as something metaphysical. This paper says that may not have to be the case.

>>10476936
Ever notice the asymmetry between identifying the brain/body vs identifying mental states? We can identify the basic elements of physics plus structural, dynamical, and functional combinations of those basic elements but this doesn't identify what it's like to be you, or what its like for you to experience hear music from your subjective perspective. If this were the same thing as the material phenomena then that shouldn't be possible.

>>10476940
Give an argument, you just might change my mind. In fact, you should regularly provide arguments for claims you make or when challenging someone's beliefs.

...you don't even know what metaphysics is do you...?

>>10476902
>You seriously don't see the irony of you dishing out ad homs while simultaneously bitching about ad homs...? that cognitive dissonance must be rough

Your coping is getting boring,

>You said that already and that statement is contradicted by the very fact that different subjects can have the same visual experience while what it is like for them to have that visual experience wildly varies.

You just contradicted yourself by admitting it’s the “same visual experience”. The thoughts they have about said visual experience may differ, and thoughts are currently not able to be reconstructed.

>>10476941
>Ever notice the asymmetry between identifying the brain/body vs identifying mental states?
I don't think so. Can you elaborate?

>We can identify the basic elements of physics plus structural, dynamical, and functional combinations of those basic elements but this doesn't identify what it's like to be you, or what its like for you to experience hear music from your subjective perspective.
Sure, but that's because there is still a shitload of details about how the brain works that we don't understand. I expect that we could get much closer to understanding what it's like to be a certain person, once we understand how brains work and how THEIR brain in particular works in detail.

>>10476941
>Ever notice the asymmetry between identifying the brain/body vs identifying mental states?

There isn’t any. We’ve been improving our ability to identify physical brain phenomena with subjective experience for decades.

>>10476941
>If this were the same thing as the material phenomena then that shouldn't be possible.
What if we just suck at translating.

>>10476948
So you really don't see how inconsistent it is of you to throw out ad homs while also complaining about ad homs...? wow...
>You just contradicted yourself by admitting it’s the “same visual experience”.
How illiterate are you? I specifically said there is a distinction between the visual experience and what it is like to have the visual experience.

From the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (a peer-reviewed academic resource):
>Qualia are the subjective or qualitative properties of experiences. What it feels like, experientially, to see a red rose is different from what it feels like to see a yellow rose. Likewise for hearing a musical note played by a piano and hearing the same musical note played by a tuba. The qualia of these experiences are what give each of them its characteristic "feel" and also what distinguish them from one another. ...Qualia are often referred to as the phenomenal properties of experience, and experiences that have qualia are referred to as being phenomenally conscious. Phenomenal consciousness is often contrasted with intentionality (that is, the representational aspects of mental states). Some mental states—for example, perceptual experiences—clearly have both phenomenal and intentional aspects. My visual experience of a peach on the kitchen counter represents the peach and also has an experiential feel. ...From the standpoint of introspection, the existence of qualia seems indisputable. It has, however, proved remarkably difficult to accommodate qualia within a physicalist account of the mind. Many philosophers have argued that qualia cannot be identified with or reduced to anything physical, and that any attempted explanation of the world in solely physicalist terms would leave qualia out.
Source: https://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/

Please stop pretending like you know what you're talking about...

>>10476952
>>10476949
>There isn’t any (asymmetry).
>I don't think so. Can you elaborate?
...so you can read minds....? You know people's mental states directly just as you know your own...? There is an obvious distinction between how you grasp your own mental states as you know directly what it is like for you to experience x, while when it come to others all you do is identify their brains/bodies while trusting their verbal reports correspond to their actual mental states. This is a very obvious and clear asymmetry that any honest inquirer would readily admit.
>Sure, but that's because there is still a shitload of details about how the brain works that we don't understand.
Nope, that won't work since they're supposed to be identical.

Definition of Identical: “Similar in every detail; exactly alike.” Synonymous with: “exactly the same,indistinguishable, undifferentiated.”

Source: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/identical

If they were literally exactly the same and were indistinguishable then there would be no gap for some future scientists to fill in later, but there clearly is a gap, hence reductionism cannot be true.
>>10476958
See my point regarding the definition of identical.

>>10476947
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attention_schema_theory

Well this theory implies it can be pushed from the realm of metaphysics into neuroscience.

The paper does a much better job at presenting the argument than I do.

1. Your brain is capable of abstract modeling. (think of Plato's forms)
2. You never know complete information about something, just an abstract concept of what you think it is. (paper says this a lot better)
__
3. You don't posses an apple in your head, but the idea of an apple.
---

4. To be conscious of something means it must be what your attention is focused on.
5. Given premise 1, your brain is able to model an abstraction of attention.

__
6. You don't posses consciousness in your head, but the idea of consciousness.
---

______________
C. What you perceive as consciousness is simply a more abstract form of attention.


You don't have consciousness in your head
I used to believe in Advaita Vedanta before I read this paper. And it does a better job of explaining attention schema theory than I did here.

>>10476970
>You don't have consciousness in your head
This can be misinterpreted but it just means that consciousness is not what it seems to be.

>>10476970
I'm still not seeing how this refutes the argument in the OP at all.

Here's an undeniable fact: the argument I've presented is valid since it takes the form of modus tollens. This means if the premises are true then it is logically impossible for the conclusion to be false. So the only question is if the premises are true. Do you have reasons to believe they are not true?

>>10476867

>holy shit you're retarded

Not that guy but this is what people commonly bleat on 4chan when they're actually being defeated.

>>10476965
>...so you can read minds....? You know people's mental states directly just as you know your own...?
No, but I don't know the physical details of their bodies and brains either.

The question is not whether I can know another person's mental details as well and as readily as I can know my own. The question is whether I am able to know neuron-by-neuron level details of some other person's brain, and similar details about their body, while STILL not knowing what their subjective experience is like. That is not something we can easily test at the moment, because we don't have that level of knowledge and understanding about anyone's biology.

>while when it come to others all you do is identify their brains/bodies while trusting their verbal reports correspond to their actual mental states.
No I don't, and neither do you. You are NOT able to identify in detail what my brain is like on a physical level. Can you tell me the current proportion of serotonin to dopamine in my amygdala right now? Or the person next to you, for that matter?

>Nope, that won't work since they're supposed to be identical.
Yes, that's the point. I don't understand what your brain is like on a detailed level, and I don't understand what your subjective experience is like on a detailed level either. None of this contradicts your second premise. What's the problem you see?

>>10476987
By your own logic that means the other guy was actually defeated since he launched the first ad hom. He drew first blood, not me, all I did was return the favor.

>>10476960
>How illiterate are you? I specifically said there is a distinction between the visual experience and what it is like to have the visual experience.

>>10476902
>You said that already and that statement is contradicted by the very fact that different subjects can have the SAME VISUAL EXPERIENCE

>>10476965
>so you can read minds....? You know people's mental states directly just as you know your own...? There is an obvious distinction between how you grasp your own mental states as you know directly what it is like for you to experience x, while when it come to others all you do is identify their brains/bodies while trusting their verbal reports correspond to their actual mental states. This is a very obvious and clear asymmetry that any honest inquirer would readily admit.

Hold on while I violate the uncertainty principle via magic and then use godlike intelligence to know exactly how the physical phenomena I see translate to subjective states.

>>10476965
“Nope, that won't work since they're supposed to be identical.”

Wrong. Our lack of knowledge about the physical activity of the brain exactly translates to a lack of knowledge about how said physical activity translates to mental states.

“If they were literally exactly the same and were indistinguishable then there would be no gap for future scientists to fill in later”

Simply doesn’t follow. Physical states and mental states being homologous does not mean that we possess absolute knowledge about how physical states translate to mental states.

>>10476990
>No, but I don't know the physical details of their bodies and brains either.
Yes you do. We have indeed identified the brain and the human body. We know what neurons are, we know the chemicals in the brain, the electrical impulses, the organs contained within, etc.
>The question is not whether I can know another person's mental details as well and as readily as I can know my own.
This is a straw man. This isn't about a difference in degree of knowledge, like as if one merely knows more than another. It's about an asymmetry, it's about a difference in kind not merely in degree. We know our own mental states directly, but we don't know others directly. If mental states were literally identical to physical phenomena then we should be able to identify those mental states directly once we've identified the physical phenomena since they are supposed to be literally the exact same thing. But we can clearly see that's not the case, which means they can't be the same thing.
>No I don't
Uh, yes you do... You do not enter my mind and experience the world as I do from my perspective, all you can do is experience your own mind and trust that my mind is like yours. To claim otherwise is an outright lie to be quite frank, we both know you don't have magical powers to enter in my consciousness come on man...
>You are NOT able to identify in detail what my brain is like on a physical level.
Yeah now you're just playing word games. We can identify the basic elements of physics plus structural, dynamical, and functional combinations of those basic elements with no problem, but this is not the case when it comes to consciousness.
>Can you tell me the current proportion of serotonin to dopamine in my amygdala right now?
In principles yes I can. In principle you cannot do such a thing when it comes to consciousness.
>What's the problem you see?
I just explained it a moment ago.

>>10476993
Wow you seriously are illiterate... I literally just got done telling you that there's a distinction between the visual experience and what it is like to have the visual experience. 2 subjects can have the same visual experience while what it is like for each subject to have that visual experience can be completely different. Again, from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
>Phenomenal consciousness is often contrasted with intentionality (that is, the representational aspects of mental states). Some mental states—for example, perceptual experiences—clearly have both phenomenal and intentional aspects. My visual experience of a peach on the kitchen counter represents the peach and also has an experiential feel.
Source: https://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/

Learn to read...

>>10476648
wow, he disproves materialism using the material implications

>>10476995
Don't hold your breath
>>10477000
>Our lack of knowledge about the physical activity
We have already identified the brain and the body, you cannot deny this. We've already identified the neurons and other cells in the brain, the chemicals in the brain, and other electrical activities that go on and the structures it has etc. We've already identified the brain, there's nothing magical about neurons that we haven't already described. If consciousness is literally the exact same thing as the brain or the body, then we should already have what it is like to be the subject, for the subject right now. But we clearly don't.
>Simply doesn’t follow.
It absolutely follows, just look at the very definition of the word "identical." If consciousness is identical to physical phenomena then they are EXACTLY alike in EVERY detail, they would be EXACTLY the same, they would be totally indistinguishable and undifferentiated. But there's a clear asymmetry between brain states and mental states, and that's impossible if reductionism were true...

>>10476983
Can you provide an example of premise 1?

I'm not sure I follow it.

A raincloud is reducible to material phenomena. Identifying water droplets identifies what it is like to be the cloud/storm?

What is it like to be YOU?

>>10477001
>Yes you do. We have indeed identified the brain and the human body. We know what neurons are, we know the chemicals in the brain, the electrical impulses, the organs contained within, etc.
It's not enough to know where these parts are and roughly what they do, anon. The reductionist view is that I would be able to understand your subjective experience once I understand the exact function and role of every single neuron in your brain, and possibly some other details as well. It does NOT follow that I can do the same by just understanding some gross anatomy.

>If mental states were literally identical to physical phenomena then we should be able to identify those mental states directly once we've identified the physical phenomena since they are supposed to be literally the exact same thing.
"identify"? Not quite. We should be able to fully understand the mental states, to the last detail, once we fully understand the physical phenomena to the last detail. That does NOT mean that we can identify a shallow part of the mental states once we have identified a shallow part of the physical phenomena.

>But we can clearly see that's not the case, which means they can't be the same thing.
No, we cannot see that, because we do NOT fully understand the physical phenomena to the last detail.

>We can identify the basic elements of physics plus structural, dynamical, and functional combinations of those basic elements with no problem, but this is not the case when it comes to consciousness.
Indeed, because identifying the basic elements is not the level of understanding that matters.

If you FULLY understand the physical level, you can deduce from that the mental level. It you ROUGHLY understand the physical level, you can NOT necessarily deduce the rough mental level. That is the version of Premise 1 that actually holds. If you meant something different with your Premise 1, then your premise 1 is incorrect, and we should start talking about that instead.

>>10477018
See: >>10476648 and >>10476785

>>10477004
>Wow you seriously are illiterate...

Seething.

>I literally just got done telling you that there's a distinction between the visual experience and what it is like to have the visual experience. 2 subjects can have the same visual experience while what it is like for each subject to have that visual experience can be completely different.

That’s called having different brains, yes. And? Their responses to the image can also be discerned from observing the brain, especially if it induces a state like anger or sadness or fear.

>>10477012
>We have already identified the brain and the body, you cannot deny this. We've already identified the neurons and other cells in the brain, the chemicals in the brain, and other electrical activities that go on and the structures it has etc. We've already identified the brain, there's nothing magical about neurons that we haven't already described. If consciousness is literally the exact same thing as the brain or the body, then we should already have what it is like to be the subject, for the subject right now. But we clearly don't.

No, because that’d require violating the uncertainty principle. All information about the states of the particle’s in the brain can NEVER be obtained because of physical laws.

>>10477021
>It's not enough to know where these parts are and roughly what they do, anon.
You don't understand, they're supposed to be identical. In case you missed it the first time:

Definition of Identical: “Similar in every detail; exactly alike.” Synonymous with: “exactly the same,indistinguishable, undifferentiated.”

Source: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/identical

We have identified the brain, we have identified the body. If consciousness is literally the exact same thing as the body/brain then we've already go what we need to identify what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. But here you are telling me we currently do not have enough to identify what it is like to be the subject, for the subject... What you're failing to realize is that this is a contradiction of reductive materialism. A reductive materialists would have to act like there is no gap at all but here you are acknowledging a gap...
>"identify"? Not quite.
Yup, it follows by definition. We can't just change the meaning of words when we feel like it.
>No, we cannot see that
Yeah we can, you and I both know that you can't step into my consciousness to experience the world from my subjective perspective, come on man... You know this...
>Indeed
Then you've admitted I'm right. If they're identical there cannot be such a distinction since identical means they're indistinguishable.

>>10477024
Well individual water droplets don't tell you what it's like to be a raincloud.
A single bird doesn't tell you about flying in a v formation.
You can have materialism in both. Properties emerge from the interaction of the individual units.

>>10477029
>Seething.
The projection is strong in this one, that cognitive dissonance you're experiencing right now must be brutal.
>And?
And so you were completely wrong earlier by trying to equate "visual experience" with "what it is like to have a visual experience." So your study fails to justify your claim.

>>10477032
>We have identified the brain, we have identified the body. If consciousness is literally the exact same thing as the body/brain then we've already go what we need to identify what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. But here you are telling me we currently do not have enough to identify what it is like to be the subject, for the subject... What you're failing to realize is that this is a contradiction of reductive materialism. A reductive materialists would have to act like there is no gap at all but here you are acknowledging a gap...

You seem to have an incredibly bizarre idea that knowledge of the gross anatomy of the brain means that we know exactly how it works, when we don’t, and that we know the momentum and position of every particle in the brain of every person, when that’s physically impossible to attain.

>>10477030
>No
yeah nice try but we have this rule of logic called "law of identity." A=A, A cannot equal not-A. You've already identified the object as "brain" which means you cannot thereby claim it is "not a brain." So we have identified the brain and to claim otherwise is contradictory, the problem is this fails to identify consciousness, which according to modus tollens means reductionism must be false.

>>10477037
>yeah nice try but we have this rule of logic called "law of identity." A=A, A cannot equal not-A. You've already identified the object as "brain" which means you cannot thereby claim it is "not a brain." So we have identified the brain and to claim otherwise is contradictory, the problem is this fails to identify consciousness, which according to modus tollens means reductionism must be false.

Brains are brains. That is irrelevant to the issue of knowing exactly how brains work and the location and momentum of every particle in the brain. This is hilarious.

>>10477036
You seem to have an incredibly bizarre lack of understanding on the meaning of the word "identical." What are you not understanding about the meaning of the phrase: "exactly the same" or "similar in every detail"? What exactly is so incomprehensible about this? If consciousness is literally the exact same thing as the brain, meaning there's nothing more to consciousness than the brain since they're just the same thing, then it follows logically and necessarily that identifying the brain identifies what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. There cannot be a difference between things that are identical...

>>10477032
If you are not going to actually listen to what I'm saying and just keep rolling with definitions that I claim are the root of the disagreement, then this discussion is a waste of time. Go argue with someone else.

>>10477041
>If consciousness is literally the exact same thing as the brain, meaning there's nothing more to consciousness than the brain since they're just the same thing, then it follows logically and necessarily that identifying the brain identifies what it is like to be the subject, for the subject.
No, it doesn't. It follows logically that fully understanding one entails fully understanding the other. It does not follow that partially understanding one entails partially understanding the other. This has been pointed out several times now.

>>10477039
>No
>Brains are brains.
Which is it...? Before you acted like we can't identify what a brain is now you are. Make up your mind (no pun intended). The moment you admit we have identified the brain is the moment you're in check mate if you're reducing consciousness to the brain since they're supposed to be identical yet there is an asymmetry. There cannot be an asymmetry between A and B if A=B...

>>10477043
>definitions are the root of the disagreement
hahahah so you just want to redefine what "identical" means to settle the cognitive dissonance is what I'm getting from you here. You know that given the actual normal definition of "identical" your argument doesn't hold water so you have to create a whole new foreign concept of identity altogether. This is insanity bro

>>10477046
>Which is it...? Before you acted like we can't identify what a brain is now you are. Make up your mind (no pun intended). The moment you admit we have identified the brain is the moment you're in check mate if you're reducing consciousness to the brain since they're supposed to be identical yet there is an asymmetry. There cannot be an asymmetry between A and B if A=B...

Never claimed we can’t identify what a brain is. I stated the fact that we don’t know exactly how they work and that it’s impossible to actually know the momentum and position of every particle that composed any particular brain. Why are you lying?

>>10477045
Yes it does follow, it has to by definition of the word "identical." It follows that identifying one identifies the other since they're both exactly the same thing, exactly the same in EVERY detail.

>>10477041
>You seem to have an incredibly bizarre lack of understanding on the meaning of the word "identical." What are you not understanding about the meaning of the phrase: "exactly the same" or "similar in every detail"? What exactly is so incomprehensible about this? I

Doesn’t matter if they’re identical, since it’s physically impossible to know the state of every particle in the brain.

>If consciousness is literally the exact same thing as the brain, meaning there's nothing more to consciousness than the brain since they're just the same thing, then it follows logically and necessarily that identifying the brain identifies what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. There cannot be a difference between things that are identical...

Only if we possessed total knowledge of the brain, which we do not. Why lie?

>>10477054
>Yes it does follow, it has to by definition of the word "identical."

Nope, because we lack total knowledge of the brain.

>It follows that identifying one identifies the other since they're both exactly the same thing, exactly the same in EVERY detail.

Yep, and we don’t know everything about the brain nor can we.

>>10477052
yeah you did, I said we have identified the brain and the body and you objected to that. The fact of the matter is we have identified the brain and if consciousness is literally the exact same thing as the brain then once we've identified the brain then we've identified consciousness by definition, but we both know that's not the case and for you to claim otherwise is a bold faced lie... Why not just drop reductive physicalism instead of letting go of this lie?

>>10477060
>Nope, because we lack total knowledge of the brain.
What do you not understand about the phrase: "Similar in every detail; exactly alike"...? we don't need a complete description of one in order to have the other, once we have one we already have the other. We've already identified the brain, it then follows necessarily that we have also identified consciousness, but we know that's not true, which simply means reductionism is false.
>Why lie?
Why straw man? Nobody is talking about "total knowledge" we're talking about identifying. Nice try though but you'll have to quit the dishonesty and actually stick with the terminology at hand and stick with "identity" rather than "total knowledge"

>>10477057
>Doesn’t matter if they’re identical
Yes it does because that means they're similar in every detail; exactly alike, which totally refutes your reductionism. There should be no detail where they differ at all, a degree in the amount of knowledge is 100% irrelevant

>>10477062
>yeah you did, I said we have identified the brain and the body and you objected to that.

Nope. I objected to your assumption that this means we know exactly how brains work and the location and momentum of every particle in every brain.

>The fact of the matter is we have identified the brain and if consciousness is literally the exact same thing as the brain then once we’ve identified the brain then we’ve identified consciousness by definition

Nope. Consciousness is brain activity, not the brain. We have identified brain activity, so we’ve identified consciousness.

>but we both know that's not the case and for you to claim otherwise is a bold faced lie...

Nope, it isn’t. We’ve identified brain activity so consciousness is identified. Pretty simple.

>Why not just drop reductive physicalism instead of letting go of this lie?

Why not just stop pretending that knowing a little bit about how brains work means we should be able to perfectly extract subjective experiences from it?

>>10477033
There is no what it is like to be a raincloud, rainclouds aren't conscious so that's false analogy.
A V formation is made up of birds but nobody is reducing a V formation to a single bird so that's a false analogy.
Reductive materialism won't work per the argument in the OP.

>>10477054
No anon, that is not how identity works.

Imagine I tell you today that my car is a gray Ford, and that it has a broken air conditioner, but I never show you my car. And imagine that tomorrow you see my car in the car park, but you don't know that it's my car. You see that the car in the car park is a station wagon.

Then you will know that my car has a broken air conditioner, but you don't know that the car in the car park has a broken air conditioner. And you know that the car in the car park is a station wagon, but you don't know that my car is a station wagon.

My car is identical to the car in the car park. But you don't know that, and so your knowledge about my car, is not equal to your knowledge about the car in the car park. Even though they are identical.

It's the same thing about brains and subjective experiences. The fact that subjective experiences are generated entirely by brains, does not mean that my knowledge about brains must be the same as my knowledge about subjective experience. That holds only if I understand exactly *how* they are equal. Which I don't.

>>10477065
>What do you not understand about the phrase: "Similar in every detail; exactly alike"...? we don't need a complete description of one in order to have the other, once we have one we already have the other.

Right! Knowing a little bit about the brain allows us to know a little bit about subjective experience, and whoop-de-doo, that’s what Shen et al observes.

>We've already identified the brain, it then follows necessarily that we have also identified consciousness

Wrong. We’ve identified brain activity, which means we’ve identified consciousness, which is true.

>but we both know that's not the case and for you to claim otherwise is a bold faced lie...

It isn’t, since identifying brain activity is identifying consciousness.

>Why not just drop reductive physicalism instead of letting go of this lie?

Why not just stop pretending that knowing a little bit about how brains work means we should be able to perfectly extract subjective experiences from it?

>>10477070
>Nope
Yeah you did, your posts are public...
>know exactly
There's that straw man again: I specifically brought up "identity" and "identify." I never once stated anything about "total knowledge" which by the way I would like to know what exactly you mean by that and if we have "total knowledge" of anything...
>Consciousness is brain activity, not the brain
Prove it: if consciousness is literally the same thing as brain activity then show me the exact brain activity and then show me how this identifies what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. I'll wait...
>Pretty simple.
Have you forgotten what qualia is...? You may want to read this quote from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy before you jump the gun: >>10476960

Why not stop with the straw man arguments already and deal directly with my points about identity and identifying? Scared...?

>>10477066
>Yes it does because that means they're similar in every detail; exactly alike, which totally refutes your reductionism. There should be no detail where they differ at all, a degree in the amount of knowledge is 100% irrelevant

Please prove they differ.

>>10477071
>individual water droplets don't tell you what it's like to be a raincloud.

I think this illustrates if you study a water droplet, it won't tell you about the emergent phenomena of a raincloud.

What other example can you give to premise 1?

You're making an argument of 1 thing.
It's like making arguments about the universe, we don't have a universe to compare it to.

>>10477078
>Yeah you did, your posts are public...

Quote me and reply to the post in which I say so. :^)

>There's that straw man again: I specifically brought up "identity" and "identify." I never once stated anything about "total knowledge" which by the way I would like to know what exactly you mean by that and if we have "total knowledge" of anything...

If we’re only talking about identifying it, then that’s done, since brain activity is identifying consciousness.

>Prove it: if consciousness is literally the same thing as brain activity then show me the exact brain activity and then show me how this identifies what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. I'll wait...

Thoughts are not currently able to be reconstructed, only observed as they move about.

>Have you forgotten what qualia is...? You may want to read this quote from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy before you jump the gun:

Subjective experience, which we’ve identified.

>Why not stop with the straw man arguments already and deal directly with my points about identity and identifying? Scared...?

Consciousness is identified. We’ve observed action potentials. Done.

>>10477072
Yeah it kind of is, anon... A=A, and if B is identical to A then that means A and B are exactly the same in every single detail, that they are indistinguishable and undifferentiated.

Your analogy can't work since we're not dealing with 2 different brains and trying to establish who's consciousness belongs where (especially since this assumes a weird kind of dualism that a reductive physicalist would obviously want to avoid). There's the brain, it's right there in your skull, we know it's yours, there's no room for your analogy to fit in here. If your consciousness is literally the same as your brain, then once we've identified the brain that should do it for identifying consciousness.

>>10477079
I've pointed this out many times now, you need to read: >>10476965

>>10477086
Yep. Consciousness is identified since we’ve identified the brain. And?

>>10477089
No, you haven’t. Prove that they differ. Prove subjective experience ever differs from brain activity.

>>10477083
A raincloud is not just a pile of water like how a dune is just a pile of sand. There's much more to a raincloud than just rain. But the physicalist is trying to say there's no more to consciousness than the physical, so this runs up against your analogy.

Take a hand for instance. If the 5 fingered thing attached to my arm is identical to my hand, then once i've identified the 5 fingered thing attached to my arm I've identified my hand since they're the same thing.

>>10477095
Not sure where you're going with this.

I'd say the spaces between the fingers are important as well.
A fork with no spaces is effectively a spatula.

>>10477075
>Knowing a little bit about the brain allows us to know a little bit about subjective experience
Again, what do you not understand about the phrase: "Similar in every detail; exactly alike"?? If the subjective and qualitative aspects of conscious experience—how consciousness “feels” and the fact that it is directly “for me,” is literally the same thing as the physical phenomena then we should identify that once we have identified the physical phenomena. Don't forget, they are supposed to be similar in EVERY detail; EXACTLY alike. But notice how the qualities of experience aren't identified when we identify the quantities of the brain... fail
>Wrong.
You simply have no idea what the word "identical" means despite me giving a definition and a reputable source to back it up...
>which means we’ve identified consciousness
We have not identified the qualitative and subjective aspects of consciousness at all, this is hilarious. Identifying the brain doesn't tell me what its like to be you, for you, and you know this, liar... You can cut the shit now, you don't have magical access to anything actual researchers don't have access to...

>>10477085
Right here: >>10477030
You've done so many time since.
>If we’re only talking about identifying it, then that’s done,
Then you've sealed your fate since identifying your brain doesn't identify what it is like to be your, for you. And you know this, liar... Nobody would be able to lie ever if what you were saying were true since we could just experience someone's mind for them and see for ourselves who is lying. Nobody would ever be able to lie in courtroom ever if what you were saying were true since we'd have direct access to people's mental states... you haven't thought about what you're saying at all...
>Thoughts are not currently able to be reconstructed
hahahahah so you don't have jack shit, thanks for admitting you're full of it and can't meet your burden of proof.
>Subjective experience, which we’ve identified.
No we haven't, I can't identify your mental states from your subjective first-person perspective by identifying your brain. To claim otherwise is a total lie. You're done

>>10477090
>>10477092
Nope, see: >>10477115

>>10477104
You're making a false analogy is where I'm going.

I'm not seeing how the 5 fingered thing attached to my arm is distinct from my hand.

>>10477106
>Again, what do you not understand about the phrase: "Similar in every detail; exactly alike"??

Again, what do you not understand that that’s irrelevant when we don’t know everything about the brain’s states? LOL

>If the subjective and qualitative aspects of conscious experience—how consciousness “feels”

The sensations of qualia are extractable as Shen et al demonstrated

>and the fact that it is directly “for me,”

Please explain exactly what this woo speak means to you. There’s no distinction between conscious experience and the “me”.

> is literally the same thing as the physical phenomena then we should identify that once we have identified the physical phenomena.

Yep, and we’ve done that to the extent that our knowledge of the brain allows.

>Don't forget, they are supposed to be similar in EVERY detail; EXACTLY alike.

Yep.

>But notice how the qualities of experience aren't identified when we identify the quantities of the brain... fail

But notice how the qualities of experience are identified when we identify the quantities of the brain, as Shen et al demonstrated. “DUR DATS NOT WHAT I WANT TO SEE OBSERVED” isn’t an argument, unfortunately for you. You don’t get to pick and choose what particular subjective phenomenon’s extraction is sufficient. Any of it being extracted proves reductive materialism.

>You simply have no idea what the word "identical" means despite me giving a definition and a reputable source to back it up...

Nah, I do.

>We have not identified the qualitative and subjective aspects of consciousness at all, this is hilarious.

No, we have. Shen et al did.

>Identifying the brain doesn't tell me what its like to be you, for you, and you know this,

Identifying the brain doesn’t tell me anything about the brain, either. Your trolling is really cute

>>10477115
>Then you've sealed your fate since identifying your brain doesn't identify what it is like to be your, for you. And you know this, liar...

Doesn’t have to. It identifies consciousness.

>Nobody would be able to lie ever if what you were saying were true since we could just experience someone's mind for them

Not possible without violating the uncertainty principle.

>Nobody would ever be able to lie in courtroom ever if what you were saying were true since we'd have direct access to people's mental states... you haven't thought about what you're saying at all...

Not possible without violating the uncertainty principle. I never claimed that possessing total knowledge of your subjective experience was possible, and have repeatedly said it isn’t. Why lie?

>>10476599
Literally is.

>>10477115
>hahahahah so you don't have jack shit, thanks for admitting you're full of it and can't meet your burden of proof.

Never claimed they could be. Thanks for lying yet again. :^)

>No we haven't, I can't identify your mental states from your subjective first-person perspective by identifying your brain. To claim otherwise is a total lie. You're done

Yes, we have. I can identify your mental states from your subjective first person perspective by identifying your brain. To claim otherwise is a total lie. You’re done.

>>10477130
AGAIN, what do you not understand about the phrase: "Similar in every detail; exactly alike"?? This red herring of "knowing everything" is irrelevant since consciousness and physical phenomena are supposed to be similar is literally every single detail, and supposed to be exactly the same. You're fucking retarded dude
>Shen et al demonstrated
I already corrected you on this sooooo many times: there's a distinction between a visual experience and what it is like to have a visual experience. From the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (a peer-reviewed academic resource):
>Phenomenal consciousness is often contrasted with intentionality (that is, the representational aspects of mental states). Some mental states—for example, perceptual experiences—clearly have both phenomenal and intentional aspects. My visual experience of a peach on the kitchen counter represents the peach and also has an experiential feel. ...
Source: https://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/

How many times do the scholars need to smack you down before you learn your lesson...?

>Please explain exactly what this woo speak means to you.
Wow you're retarded: you know how there's a distinction between your experience of an image vs. mine? Yeah it's that simple man, turn down the autism...
>There’s no distinction between conscious experience and the “me”.
Uh yeah there is, the experience can change but you're still you.
>and we’ve done that to the extent that our knowledge of the brain allows.
No we haven't since they're supposed to be the same in every single detail yet identifying the brain fails to tell us what it is like to be the subject, for the subject :/

>>10477136
>Doesn’t have to.
Yes it does, look up the very definition of the word identical you retard
>Not possible without violating the uncertainty principle.
Then you've literally just refuted yourself lmao reductionism implies what it is like is identical to physical phenomena, which means identifying one identifies the other, but you just admitted identifying one doesn't identify the other, hence by your own reasoning reductionism can't be true!

>>10477138
>Never claimed they could be.
So you're just making claims based on faith, classic. I have arguments and scholarly sources for my claims while you have jack shit. absolute fail
>Yes, we have
You've literally just contradicted yourself. You said and I quote directly: "Not possible without violating the uncertainty principle." you're a fucking moron dude...

>>10477146

Please tell me exactly what you think the word “identify” means.

>AGAIN, what do you not understand about the phrase: "Similar in every detail; exactly alike"?? This red herring of "knowing everything" is irrelevant since consciousness and physical phenomena are supposed to be similar is literally every single detail, and supposed to be exactly the same. You're fucking retarded dude

They are exactly the same. And?

>I already corrected you on this sooooo many times: there's a distinction between a visual experience and what it is like to have a visual experience. From the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (a peer-reviewed academic resource):

That’s lovely, yet extracting a visual experience is extracting a visual experience. We can extract the rest later or even never. Either way, reductive materialism is proven by that.

>How many times do the scholars need to smack you down before you learn your lesson?

How many times do I have to smack down the scholars before they learn their lesson?

>Wow you're retarded: you know how there's a distinction between your experience of an image vs. mine? Yeah it's that simple man, turn down the autism...

What distinction is that? Seems quite easily explained by the fact that our brains aren’t connected. They’re separate, so they’re different.

>Uh yeah there is, the experience can change but you're still you.

Uh, no there isn’t. You are conscious experience.

>No we haven't since they're supposed to be the same in every single detail yet identifying the brain fails to tell us what it is like to be the subject, for the subject :/

Doesn’t have to. Reductive materialism proven by Shen.

>>10477137
*isn't.

>>10477119
Okay well I’m not sure I understand you correctly because I’m looking for an analogy for premise 1.
Do you see how a city’s economy is emergent from the individual transactions between people? How would premise 1 show that? You can’t just study a few transactions and gain an understanding of the economy.

>>10477149
>Yes it does, look up the very definition of the word identical you retard

Doesn’t matter if they’re identical. You retard. :^)

>Then you've literally just refuted yourself lmao reductionism implies what it is like is identical to physical phenomena, which means identifying one identifies the other, but you just admitted identifying one doesn't identify the other, hence by your own reasoning reductionism can't be true!

Wrong, silly! It being impossible to know the momentum and position of every particle does not mean that mental states are not homologous to physical states. That’s a non sequitor.

>>10477151
>So you're just making claims based on faith, classic. I have arguments and scholarly sources for my claims while you have jack shit. absolute fail

Never made a faith-based claim, silly. Why did you just lie? FAIL!

>You've literally just contradicted yourself. You said and I quote directly: "Not possible without violating the uncertainty principle." you're a fucking moron dude...

Nope, never said that. You’re a fucking moron dude...

>>10477153
Definition of identify: "Establish or indicate who or what (someone or something) is."

Source: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/identify

>And?
And your point about "total knowledge" is 100% irrelevant. Identifying one identifies the other since they're the exact same thing, so this bullshit excuse of "oh we just don't know enough!" doesn't work since they're supposed to the exact same thing...
> a visual experience is extracting a visual experience
No shit sherlock, the problem is you're failing to extract what it is like to have a visual experience...
>We can extract the rest later or even never.
No you can't idiot, they're supposed to be identical remember? They're supposed to be the same in literally every single detail. If identifying one detail fails to identify the other then they can't be the same thing since them being the same thing means they're exactly the same in every single detail... how are you missing this???
>they learn their lesson?
Dude you're the one who fails to even read what they're saying...
>What distinction is that?
The distinction between an experience and what it is like to have an experience, which you falsely tried to claim there is no distinction.
>Uh, no there isn’t. You are conscious experience.
Uh, no... You are a subject that has conscious experience.
>Doesn’t have to
Yes it does, just open a dictionary for once in your life and learn what the word "identical" means.

>>10477157
I just gave you one with the hand and 5 fingered thing attached to your arm.

Are you talking about weak emergence or strong emergence?

>>10477165
>Doesn’t matter if they’re identical. You retard. :^)
You truly are absolutely retarded, them being identical is exactly what makes it matter...
>Wrong, silly!
Then that means you're wrong big silly since I'm just going off what you said :^)
>to know
You can stop with the dishonest straw man fallacy now. I don't know how many times I have to keep correcting you on this: I'm not talking about degrees of knowledge I'm talking about identity and identifying. Stop with the dishonest misrepresentation of my argument.
>Never made a faith-based claim, silly
Then meet your burden of proof that you admitted you couldn't meet earlier... liar
>Nope, never said that
What do you mean you never said that it's a direct quote you ya fucking idiot

Why is philosophy so masturbatory?
>We can't know what it's like to be someone else! That means there's more to existence than the physical!
...Or we can't know what it's like to be someone else because that would require some kind of information transfer between distant matter for no reason, which would mean physics and the nature of our reality would be completely fucking different in the first place.

>>10477166
>And your point about "total knowledge" is 100% irrelevant. Identifying one identifies the other since they're the exact same thing, so this bullshit excuse of "oh we just don't know enough!" doesn't work since they're supposed to the exact same thing...

By the definition of “identify” given, consciousness is identified, since brain activity is identified.

>No shit sherlock, the problem is you're failing to extract what it is like to have a visual experience...

That’s irrelevant, since a visual experience is nevertheless extracted, proving reductive materialism.

>No you can't idiot, they're supposed to be identical remember? They're supposed to be the same in literally every single detail. If identifying one detail fails to identify the other then they can't be the same thing since them being the same thing means they're exactly the same in every single detail... how are you missing this

Consciousness is identified by the definition given, since we’ve extracted visual experience.

>Dude you're the one who fails to even read what they're saying...

What they say is beyond useless they’re scientists.

>The distinction between an experience and what it is like to have an experience, which you falsely tried to claim there is no distinction.

The experience being extracted proves reductive materialism.

>Uh, no... You are a subject that has conscious experience.

Uh, no. You are conscious experience.

>Yes it does, just open a dictionary for once in your life and learn what the word "identical" means.

Doesn’t matter if they’re identical lol. Go violate the uncertainty principle

>>10477173
Why do you fail to address the argument?
The argument in the OP is valid as it takes the form of modus tollens so there's no denying the conclusion follows logically from the premises. The only question is if the premises are true and I've given reasons to believe they are, while you have fail to give reasons to believe they are not.

>>10477171
>You truly are absolutely retarded, them being identical is exactly what makes it matter...

It doesn’t matter until we figure out the magical method of uncertainty principle violation.

>Then that means you're wrong big silly since I'm just going off what you said :^)

Wrong, silly! :^)

>You can stop with the dishonest straw man fallacy now. I don't know how many times I have to keep correcting you on this: I'm not talking about degrees of knowledge I'm talking about identity and identifying. Stop with the dishonest misrepresentation of my argument.

Consciousness is identified.

>Then meet your burden of proof that you admitted you couldn't meet earlier... liar

For what, liar? ;-)

>What do you mean you never said that it's a direct quote you ya fucking idiot

No it isn’t.

>>10477177
>By the definition of “identify” given, consciousness is identified, since brain activity is identified.
No it isn't, you even said yourself that it's impossible cuz "muh uncertainty principle!" you just can't keep your bullshit story straight...
>That’s irrelevant
It's 100% relevant since they're supposed to be identical remember?? You've just admitted reductive materialism is false by admitting they're not exactly the same in every single detail: it leaves out what it is like to be the subject, for the subject.
>What they say is beyond useless they’re scientists.
...what...?
>The experience being extracted proves reductive materialism.
The qualitative and subjective aspects of conscious experience are not, which means reductionism fails.
>Uh, no. You are conscious experience.
It makes no sense to speak of experience without an experiencer. There is no such thing as pain without a subject that experiences that pain. What you're saying is totally incoherent.
>Doesn’t matter if they’re identical lol.
Yeah actually it does, and it implies your philosophy of mind is fail

This is getting repetitive and I can tell this cognitive dissonance is going to keep you up all night, especially since you have nothing to wake up for anyway so I'm going to pass out. Enjoy the dissonance!

>>10477178
All that humans know is an abstraction
Logic is an abstraction as well, and therefore it will be "lossy" in interpreting reality.
The reason humans can't know what another persons experience is because even if they had the knowledge, even that knowledge is stored as an abstraction in the observers brain. Which means it's inherently NOT a reproduction of the other persons sense of experience.
The closest thing would be to completely and instantly make a copy of a person, and the two instances would almost instantly diverge.
>The only question is if the premises are true and I've given reasons to believe they are
The premises are not true.
What humans refer to as "Identifying material phenomena", the results are and always will be an abstraction. For it to not be an abstraction, and for it to be perfectly replicated would require recreating the entire universe...and then somehow observe it without interacting with it in any way. It's complete nonsense, and masturbatory.

>>10477183
>No it isn't, you even said yourself that it's impossible cuz "muh uncertainty principle!" you just can't keep your bullshit story straight...

No, knowing exactly what’s going on inside is impossible. Doesn’t mean we can’t point at it and go “yep that’s it”.

>It's 100% relevant since they're supposed to be identical remember?? You've just admitted reductive materialism is false by admitting they're not exactly the same in every single detail: it leaves out what it is like to be the subject, for the subject.

Prove it’s impossible to extract.

>The qualitative and subjective aspects of conscious experience are not, which means reductionism fails.

Neither of those exist.

>It makes no sense to speak of experience without an experiencer. There is no such thing as pain without a subject that experiences that pain. What you're saying is totally incoherent.

The subject ceases to exist unless it is experiencing, goofy.

>Yeah actually it does, and it implies your philosophy of mind is fail

No, actually it doesn’t.

>This is getting repetitive and I can tell this cognitive dissonance is going to keep you up all night, especially since you have nothing to wake up for anyway so I'm going to pass out. Enjoy the dissonance!

I win! I realized you were dishonest when you refused to acknowledge that you’re just making an argument from ignorance, and decided to shitpost until you left your thread.

>>10477186
Not the guy you're responding to but you objectively lost the debate. You've contradicted yourself with the uncertainty principal.

>>10477192
Nope. It places a barrier on our knowledge that is not total.

>>10476582
>premise 2
How did you come up with it? How can you prove it?

>>10476582

This retarded playing with words proves nothing.

>>10477228
They all look fine except the fat one

>>10476582
(1) If OP is not a faggot then OP does not post shit threads
(2) OP posts shit threads
(C) OP is a faggot

>>10476907
The "logic and philosophy is just wordplay" position is peak brainlet

>>10477345
The belief that playing with words actually means anything is peak brainlet. Philosophy is dead

>>10477197
We don't need total knowledge
Dude the other guy completely btfo you the entire thread

>>10477352
There is no such thing as "playing with words" and the cliche "philosophy is dead" is bs that is used by empiricist pseudo intellectuals always thinking it somehow serves as an argument.
You ironically attempt to use words in an argument to prove that using words in an argument is meaningless. This is why you and all other "logic and philosophy is worthless" people are retarded

>>10476941
Brains/bodies are different, therefore people experience things differently even though both are experiencing "consciousness." Understanding these differences might require one to understand everything about the brain including countless interactions of different phenomena. How does this contradict materialism? All you're doing is handwaving by pointing to something very complex we don't understand and claiming we can't understand it materially. Even if we can't, this could be a practical issue and not a metaphysical one. Nice argument from ignorance.

>>10477390
different anon
any logical claim pertaining to the real world is invalid, no matter how sound it is, until experimentally verified

>>10476582
A disproof of Premise 1:

1. Assume consciousness is reducible to material phenomena, specifically that the material attributes of each brain is required to create each unique conscious experience.

2. Understanding is done via the brain.

3. You can understand how the brain creates consciousness but not what someone else's consciousness feels like because that understanding is done via your brain and not the required unique brain of another.

Thus consciousness being reducible to material phenomena does not mean you can experience someone else's consciousness.

>I don't understand something
>therefore it's magic

>>10476948
>Quite
What a retarded word. You need to go back now

>>10476582
I feel this is like Maxwell's demon.

I am sceptical it is ever possible to fully know material phenomena in full detail in the first place.

>>10477915
Didn’t use it. What?

>>10477380
Yes you do, or you’re unable to reconstruct the experience of others as it is actually experienced. You must be literally God.

>>10477390
>There is no such thing as "playing with words"

Literally all rationalism is.

>and the cliche "philosophy is dead" is bs that is used by empiricist pseudo intellectuals always thinking it somehow serves as an argument

Empiricism works. Rationalism does not. Sorry!
Refer to the other anon. Conclusions reached by rationalism are utterly worthless until they are empirically verified.

>You ironically attempt to use words in an argument to prove that using words in an argument is meaningless.

Nope. I state the fact that playing with words does not allow you to make conclusions about reality.

>This is why you and all other "logic and philosophy is worthless" people are retarded

Salty ad Homs. Tastes like jerky.

>>10478257
>Yes you do, or you’re unable to reconstruct the experience of others as it is actually experienced.
there is absolutely no need for absolute knowledge
having enough, is enough

physics is an approximation game, there is no such thing as 100% accurate in physics
there is no such thing as absolute knowledge in physics

>>10476582
>what is circle logic

>>10479506
This whole thread is an example of why you shouldn't waste your time arguing with dualists. The whole "I can point at a brain and therefore I should be able to point at how a brain works and produces consciousness" idea is sad and only works in a worldview that equates what a thing is with how it works.

In other words, dualism is always trash because it assumes magic is more likely than us just not knowing everything.

The sad thing is that this could be such an interesting thread if OP would actually respond to the points people make, instead of wielding his ignorance like a bludgeon whenever a disagreement becomes evident.

>>10479506
The argument clearly takes the form of modus tollens which is a is a valid argument form and a rule of inference that is definitely not circular.
>>10479536
I'm not a dualist I'm a monistic idealist. I never said anything about how a brain works or produces consciousness, I pointed out how identifying material phenomena should identify what it is like to be the subject, for the subject since they're supposed to be identical. But this is not the case, hence reductive materialism cannot be true.
>>10479558
I've been responding to as many posts as I can and have engaged in lengthy debates with people. What are some important points you think I have missed? I'm not seeing how I'm wielding ignorance when I constantly bring forth arguments as well as scholarly sources to back me up...

>>10478257
holy shit you are really not intelligent
You're the same loser in that other thread

>>10476582
how about I reduce you to pulp WITH A HAMMER!

>>10476582
>several posters write well-worded responses clarifying the position of reductive materialism and pointing out that OP's premises are dubious
>OP refuses to acknowledge any of these, and instead gets autistic about rules of inference and the fucking Oxford dictionary definition of identical, as if anyone is disagreeing with him on those grounds
So this is the power of idealism...

>>10476582

material phenomena are by definition the only sort we can observe, interact with, predict, and understand. the null hypothesis should be that our qualia are driven by material processes, and it's pretty hard to argue the contrary.

>>10480372
Seems like OP had acknowledged all of them. The point about the rules of inference is a refutation that the argument is circular and the definition of reductionism from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy as well as the definition of identical from Oxford is to show where premise 1 came from.
>>10480570
Actually all we come into contact with is experience and matter is supposed to transcend experience. The idealist sticks with experience while the materialist goes beyond experience.

>>10476941
But thats wrong you FUCking idiot

Images you see are reflected in the neural structure. If you see a checkerboard, there will be a checkerboard pattern in V1 iirc.

Just because we don't know how to read and correlate mental physical states to mental perelceptual states doesn't mean they are not correlated

>>10476582
>to be the subject

literally meaningless

>>10478257
Can you give me a title of Shen et al? I'm interested, and ignore these "rational" retards.

>>10480884
The Shen paper does not prove what he's claiming it proves

>>10480893
Ok faggot? I just want to learn more about visualizing stuff in others' brains. I don't really care for philosophical implications beyond that he's obviously smarter than rationalist brainlets.

>>10480896
>beyond that he's obviously smarter than rationalist brainlets.
He's been btfo every time by us, his whole "argument" (ignoring the fact that all argument is rationalist) is just "n-no empiricism is better"

>>10480904
you observe your epic btfoing with your sense data. sorry, but you're the chicken in denial.

>>10480907
I observe that you still haven't countered the fact that empiricism can only exist when predicated on a rationalist a priori. I never claimed we can't get information from sensory data, retardo.
This was already settled hundreds of years ago anyway this isn't even a debate among us, it's already an argument that has been concluded.

>>10476582
The mind is not reducible to matter because it's Immaterial .since the mind has the property of existing in possible solipcist worlds while matter does not exist in possible solipcist worlds .Not to mention "aboutness" and fuzzy logic .To be a materialist requires some highly ad hoc explanations about these phenomena .This is where people like dennet just throw out the self all together but such reasoning is self defeating

>>10480916
>The mind is not reducible to matter because it's Immaterial
lol

Everything we know about the mind and all of its functions is material. Even knowing itself is based and dependent on matter.

>>10481791
What exactly is this stuff you call "material?" I know what experience is, I'm directly aware of consciousness. But apparently matter is beyond experience, somehow it's more than experience, so what exactly is it...?

>>10480260
Premise 1 was disproved here >>10477685

>>10476582
Premise 2 is false.

>>10476582
P2 needs support.

>>10477685
>>10483427
This is only a misunderstanding of premise 1, not a refutation. This isn't about "understanding" nor is it about "creating consciousness," it's about identity. If consciousness is reducible to material phenomena then by definition that means identifying material phenomena identifies consciousness since they're literally the exact same thing. If they're identical then they're interchangeable, undifferentiated, and exactly the same. Hence it's contradictory to claim identifying the brain does not identify consciousness because that would be like saying I can identify the president of the United States but I can't identify Donald Trump. The president=Donal Trump, so there's no way I can identify one but not the other.
>>10483838
>>10483862
see: >>10476965

>>10484599
“Muh identity”

Not science.

>>10484605
Your response isn't science so you just sawed off the branch you sit on.

Identity has everything to do with what we're talking about since we're trying to establish what is what.

>>10484599
stop assuming your position is right when you try to defend it
youve only said circular bullshit this entire thread

>>10484684
Notice how you had nothing to say about you sawing off the branch you sit on...
How am I being circular? What can asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence. I've proven already that the form of my argument is not circular by proving it takes the form of Modus Tollens. So where's all these circular arguments you're claiming I'm making all over this thread?

Definition of identify: "Establish or indicate who or what (someone or something) is."

Source: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/identify

The very definition of establishing what something is, is to identify. How is using the correct terminology circular...?

>>10476582
Proof of premise 1? Proof of premise 2?

Define reducible? Define identify? Define "what it is like"? Define "to be"? Define subject?

>>10484723
>The very definition of establishing what something is, is to identify.
Great, surely you can then identify the material phenomena that consciousness reduces to?

>>10484772
The reductive materialist usually identifies consciousness with the brain. But the argument applies to whatever material phenomena the reductive materialist chooses. Identify any material object you like and the argument holds.
>>10484757
For premise 1 and a definition of reduction>>10476648, For premise 2: >>10476941, >>10476965
For "What it is like" a.k.a. qualia: >>10476960

Definition of identify: "Establish or indicate who or what (someone or something) is."

Source: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/identify

Definition of subject: "A thinking or feeling entity; the conscious mind; the ego, especially as opposed to anything external to the mind."

Source: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/subject

>he still doesn't see a flaw in his "proof" of 2

>>10484834
>he still hasn't provided any support for the claim that there is a flaw with premise 2

identifying material phenomena absolutely identifies what it is like for me to be me what the hell are you talking about that's all this is

>>10484841
>"we dont understand how the brain works 100% today"
>therefore my random claim about how the brain works is substantiated

>>10484853
>how the brain works
Nice straw man. The argument isn't about "how does x work" it's about "what is x." The reductive materialist claims consciousness is identical to the brain. We have identified the brain, have we not? We've identified matter, right? If we have done so, and consciousness is identical to such, then once we've identified the brain that should give us what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. But that's clearly not the case.
>>10484850
Not at all. You know your own mental states directly, yet you don't know the mental states of others directly. If those very mental states that are known directly are actually identical to the brain (or whatever material phenomena you reduce consciousness to) then once you've identified that you should have identified those mental states, but this is not the case.

>>10484811
>identifies consciousness with the brain
So you're saying consciousness IS the brain? Except that's wrong.

Is the fact that we can physically identify a piece of writing in a foreign language, but not decipher what it means, also proof to you that physical reductionism is false?

The post you linked doesn't have anything close to a proof of premise 1. Still waiting.

>>10484876
>So you're saying consciousness IS the brain? Except that's wrong.
I agree. I don't believe that consciousness is the brain that's just what most reductive materialists believe and the conclusion of my argument negates that belief.
>piece of writing/what it means
There's a distinction between syntax and semantics. If you want to draw analogy to this and reductionism then you'd have to reduce all of semantics to syntax and I'm not sure how meaningful that is.
>Still waiting.
What exactly do you not understand about the meaning of the word "identical?" Here's the definition again in case you missed it:

Definition of Identical: “Similar in every detail; exactly alike.” Synonymous with: “exactly the same,indistinguishable, undifferentiated.”

Source: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/identical

>>10484872
>We have identified the brain, have we not?
No we fucking haven't you idiot
thats the point of the post
You're acting as if we know the brain

Giving it a name and "identifying" it doesn't make our lack of understanding go away

>>10484902
>No we fucking haven't you idiot
So you're telling me you cannot identify what this is a picture of right here...? You just shrug at it and go "that could be anything, who knows what that is"? You and I both know that pic related is a fucking brain... Ever heard of the Law of Identity? Do you even logic, bro? You have identified the brain and you are identifying the brain as a material phenomenon. To deny this you'd have to say you have absolutely no fucking clue as to what pic related is, that you can't even name it, and you can't even call it a material object...

>>10484872
>The reductive materialist claims consciousness is identical to the brain.
You are describing a straw reductive materialist. The actual reductionist view is that consciousness is a process implemented by the brain, not that consciousness IS the brain. That's like saying my Intel processer is multiplication, as opposed to it being an artifact that implements multiplication (among other things).

>>10476582
https://youtube.com/watch?v=uXX-_G_9kww

>>10484919
>You are describing a straw reductive materialist
Not at all, there's authors I can cite as examples but that's unnecessary. If you go back to the OP you'll see the argument merely states "material phenomena" which is not limited to just the brain. The argument holds for whatever material phenomena you are trying to reduce consciousness to, including a process of the brain. Unless you are saying consciousness is somehow a process of the brain while also not being reducible to any material phenomena but I'm not sure how coherent that would be.

>>10484893
>that's just what most reductive materialists believe and the conclusion of my argument negates that belief.
You clearly don't understand my point. Saying consciousness is the brain is just like saying the message is the letter, no one believe that.

>then you'd have to reduce all of semantics to syntax
Well, you could certainly reduce your whole argument to semantics. The difference between syntax and semantics is not relevant here. We don't understand the message=we can't understand the message is the sum of your whole argument.

This >>10484902 is really all you need

Our knowledge of the brain is little more than that of a cavemen getting dizzy when he gets hit in the head then pointing at his head saying "ooga booga. this where me think" and the fact that you think this gives sufficient evidence that science or math can't explain consciousness is indescribably laughable. I mean just look at this post >>10484918

It's actually pathetic how fast your argument falls apart with even a common sense level understanding of information theory.

>>10484938
>that's unnecessary
It's completely necessary because you've just been called out on it. A source will be required as well.

>>10476582
Is this shit still up

>>10484936
As usual, idealism is left out as an alternative. Idealism has all the advantages of dualism without any of the weaknesses since it sticks with monism.

>The Introspective Argument
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4l1lQMCOguw

>>10484942
Way to completely ignore my refutation, you know I got you on that and the OP is proof of this. My argument is not limited to making it about the brain and you know this... The argument in the OP states clearly that it's about "material phenomena" so technically I'm not required to do a damn thing.

Anyway, here's a source you can check out:
>We Are Our Brains: A Neurobiography of the Brain, from the Womb to Alzheimer's
https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/215440/we-are-our-brains-by-d-f-swaab/9780812992960/

It's by D.F. Swaab (MD PhD), a physician and neurobiologist (brain researcher). He is a professor of neurobiology at the University of Amsterdam and was until 2005 Director of the Netherlands Institute for Brain Research of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dick_Swaab

>>10484958
Fucking chad name.

Dick Swaab

>>10484958
>h-haha you know you're wrong look at the OP
when you still haven't defined reducible, the central qualification of your OP argument, I'm not sure how you could be wrong. You haven't said anything yet.

Not reading that but you can check out my dick swab

>>10484938
>Not at all, there's authors I can cite as examples but that's unnecessary.
Please do.

>If you go back to the OP you'll see the argument merely states "material phenomena" which is not limited to just the brain.
I'm not talking about the argument in OP. I'm saying that
>>The reductive materialist claims consciousness is identical to the brain.<<
is not true for any actual reductive materialist. Can you provide a quote of a reductionist claiming this?

>https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/215440/we-are-our-brains-by-d-f-swaab/9780812992960/
Can you find a specific quote or passage? I'm not going to dig through the entire book to try to find a passage I don't expect to encounter.

>>10484983
>when you still haven't defined reducible
I did this a long time ago: >>10476648
What do you not understand about the word "identical"?
>>10484986
You already saw my post with that book from Dick Swaab, the very title claims we are our brains. Ever heard of Francis Crick...? He's well known for the quote in pic related.
>quote
I'm not digging through that right now either, I'm merely working as a sign post here.

>>10484986
meant to post this picwhen I made this post: >>10485010

>>10485010
>>10485012
>He's well known for the quote in pic related.
Okay, but that is clearly a soundbite that simplifies a complex point until it fits on a T-shirt. Likewise the book title. If you take a seven-word memorable quote for a *literal* serious position, you are being very silly.

I believe you if you claim that there are people who are willing to simplify their position to >>10484919 in pop science depictions of their position. But I maintain that no reductionist ACTUALLY believes the statement as you wrote it in >>10484872, pop science soundbites notwithstanding.

>>10484947
Idealism is almost as equally retarded. Idealists still need to explain why it is that what we perceive seems consistent with there being an objective reality independent of consciousness. For instance, if you leave your house and no longer perceive it, it stops existing by idealist logic. Yet you can return to it, as if it were there the entire time independent of your perception.

>>10485024
You're the one being silly right now, I've not only given you 2 authors but 2 highly credible authors both explicitly stating you are the brain. Your equivocation of brevity with a lack of seriousness is simply fallacious.

As I already stated, and you suspiciously and continuously ignore, the argument as clearly formulated in the OP is not limited to claims about reducing consciousness to the brain specifically. You can tone down the autism now, I've already told you a long time ago that the argument is not distracted by such trivialities. Regardless of whatever material phenomenon you're reducing consciousness to, my argument holds.
>>10485029
See pic related

>>10484599
>If consciousness is reducible to material phenomena then by definition that means identifying material phenomena identifies consciousness since they're literally the exact same thing.
The key claim you made is that you would be able to identify *what it's like to be the subject, for the subject.* So you're admitting that your argument boils down to a language game. If by "identify what it's like to be the subject" you mean identify what consciousness is (via material understanding), then Premise 2 is false. If by "identify what it's like to be the subject" you mean use your brain to have the conscious experience of a different brain, then Premise 1 is false. You can't use two different meanings in the same argument. Pick one.

>>10485070
I'm not seeing any justification for your claim that this boils down to a language game.
Nobody is using any different meanings here, the argument is very straight forward: if "what its like to be the subject" is the exact same thing as say the brain, then identifying the brain must identify "what it's like to be the subject." There's no asymmetry between identifying the neurons for your brain vs. the neurons in someone else's brain, so why the asymmetry between identifying your consciousness vs. someone's else's? This is contradictory since they're supposed to be identical.

>>10485010
>what do I not understand about reducible meaning identical

>>10485088
We've been over this... From the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (a peer-reviewed academic resource):
>The type of reductionism that is currently of most interest in metaphysics and philosophy of mind involves the claim that all sciences are reducible to physics. This is usually taken to entail that all phenomena (including mental phenomena like consciousness) are identical to physical phenomena.
Source: https://www.iep.utm.edu/red-ism/

Again, what do you fail to understand about the meaning of the word "identical"?

>>10485040
>you suspiciously and continuously ignore
You mean like this post?
>>10484940

You still have done nothing to address the distinction between an encryption and a code. You are treating qualia as if it must be written on the brain in plain english, for it to be written in the brain. We know what it's coded as, we just don't know the code.

>>10485092
>The type of reductionism that is currently of most interest in metaphysics and philosophy of mind involves the claim that all sciences are reducible to physics
>reducible to physics
>reducible

Yes, you intend to go over things a few times when you include the term in the definition.
>I promise guys, it's not circular reasoning at all!

>>10485099
tend*

>>10485079
>I'm not seeing any justification for your claim that this boils down to a language game.
I just explained it. You are trying to use two different meanings of the same phrase. In P1 you use the meaning of identifying consciousness via material understanding. In P2 you use the meaning of experiencing someone else's consciousness. These premises are only true using these respective meanings, but using one contradicts the other.

>if "what its like to be the subject" is the exact same thing as say the brain, then identifying the brain must identify "what it's like to be the subject."
"What it's like to be the subject" in plain English is an experience that is materially dependent on a specific brain's behavior. Understanding how the brain creates that behavior does not give you that experience, because the brain doing that understanding is not the same as the brain required for the experience.

I'll try to give you an analogy. Just because you know a chemical formula does not mean you can perform a reaction. You need a lab with the right ingredients and equipment. But in this case you can't obtain the right ingredients and equipment because the chemical formula is the property of your current lab and cannot be transferred to a different lab with the proper ingredients and equipment.

>There's no asymmetry between identifying the neurons for your brain vs. the neurons in someone else's brain
Identifying neurons does not give you those neurons. The asymmetry between your brain and someone else's will always exist unless you can modify your brain to create a physical copy of the other, in which case it is uncontroversial that you would be able to experience a copy of the consciousness of that brain.

>This is contradictory since they're supposed to be identical.
Materialism does not say that identifying neurons gives you those neurons' experience. This is your language game, a strawman.

>>10485092
>>10485079
youre using reducible in two different fucking ways
>I can reduce the brain down to individual neurons
Either use reducible consistently or realize that
>There's no asymmetry between identifying the neurons for your brain vs. the neurons in someone else's brain
is blatant nonsense
reducible doesnt mean "everything made of atoms should behave identically since protons are the same"

>>10485092
>We've been over this... From the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (a peer-reviewed academic resource):
it doesnt matter if your source is peer reviewed if you cant fucking understand what you read

>>10484940
>no one believe that.
Except Nobel Prize winning scientist Francis Crick and noted physician and neuorbiologist Dr. D.F. Swaab, and these are just guys I'm listing off the top of my head...
>The difference between syntax and semantics is not relevant here.
It's 100% relevant here. You're trying to draw an analogy here between the symbols and the meaning to the brain and consciousness. The reductionist reduces consciousness to the brain, and so a proper analogy would be reducing semantics to syntax, but we both know that's silly.
>all you need
I already responded to that and made clear that my point is about identity regarding what the brain is, not knowledge about what the brain does. You're simply making a category mistake in your assessment of what I'm saying. I think it's laughable that you believe qualities can be reduced or explained in terms of quantities. Quantities plus more quantities just equals more quantities.
>I mean just look at this post
that's a good post that reveals the category mistake that was made. We have clearly identified the object in that picture as the brain, you know this and I know this. To deny this is to basically admit you're retarded...And the moment you admit we've identified the brain, especially identifying it as a material phenomenon, then my argument takes off.
>>10485095
Again, what are you missing regarding the definition of the word "identical"? You can't hold an identity thesis while maintaining a distinction. Either you're saying A=B or that A≠B, you can't have it both ways.
>>10485099
>This is usually taken to entail that all phenomena (including mental phenomena like consciousness) are identical to physical phenomena.
Yeah it helps when you actually read the entirety of what I quote, I leave that shit in there for a reason champ... Looks like you have more mental gymnastics to do to justify your assertion that this is circular reasoning.

>>10485122
>I already responded to that
you respond in the most roundabout, nothing bullshit that ive ever seen
youve gone on for more than a 100 posts, and you have yet to put anything on firm footing

dont link the fucking book again, im not wasting my time until you show theres *something* to be learned
rather than "science cant explain consciousness yet, therefore magic" that you keep going on about

>>10485105
>In P1 you use the meaning of identifying consciousness via material understanding
I never used such wording: "material understanding." You're setting up a straw man right now and this spills over to your statements regarding P2. I'm merely talking about identifying.
>"What it's like to be the subject" in plain English is an experience that is materially dependent on a specific brain's behavior.
Is this reducible to some physical phenomena, yes or no? If yes what is this physical phenomena that you are identifying consciousness with? if no then the argument doesn't apply as you would be a non-reductive materialist and that carries other objections.
>Identifying neurons does not give you those neurons.
You seem to be forgetting the definition of "identify"

Definition of identify: "Establish or indicate who or what (someone or something) is."

Source: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/identify

We are establishing what something is. We've established x is a neuron, and that neurons are material. We've described neurons using science, we know what a neuron is. There's no asymmetry between our brains, you can study my brain and vice versa. It's consciousness that we seem to have this asymmetry for. We can both access each others brains by opening up our skull but we can only access our own mental states directly. If reductionism were true, as I've pointed out long ago, that shouldn't be possible. There shouldn't be this asymmetry.
>>10485108
Holy shit you're retarded I explained my terms explicitly and even provided scholarly sources along with it. I have been 100% crystal clear with my terms and have not been using them in different ways at all, you're delusional. I explain this in more detail above.
>it doesnt matter if your source is peer reviewed if you cant fucking understand what you read
Your illiteracy is not my problem.

>>10485142
>There's no asymmetry between identifying the neurons for your brain vs. the neurons in someone else's brain

>>10485138
How is it roundabout to point out a clear distinction between making about about "what is x" vs. "how x works"? That's a very important distinction to make as those are 2 completely different things and for someone to confuse my claim with another means they're objections are misguided... You say I have no footing but don't really have any argument to back that up.
>"science cant explain consciousness yet, therefore magic"
Nice straw man. If you can't refute my argument without formulating it accurately then even you know deep down that you can't actually refute my argument but only a watered down fictional version of it.

>>10485122
So are you saying consciousness is not just some brain process? Isn't "what its like" knowable by replicating the brain state of someone having an experience?

>>10485146
There isn't an asymmetry though. You can access your own mental states directly but you can't do so for others, that's an asymmetry. When it comes to neurons everyone's neurons can be accessed using instruments to detect them, clearly there's no asymmetry there...

>>10485148
Yes to the first question, no to the second.

>>10485156
you cant know the answer to the second without testing it

>>10485156
Jiminy cricket.

>>10485161
Unless there's a contradiction at hand in which we'd be able to know it's not true since we know contradictions are never true.

>>10485165
your assumptions are weak
and your logic is sloppy

>>10485173
My logic is valid as my arguments takes the form of Modus Tollens.
I'm not so sure what's weak about assuming contradictions cannot be true, that's an axiom of logic known as the law of noncontradiction. It's such a fundamental law that you'd have to rely on it to say I'm wrong. Seems like a safe assumption to me...

I am too lazy to readthe thread also i dont know shit about science
But isnt the issue simply that ops argument only holds true for a "snapshot" of consciousness, wheras if you take the same argument in the context of a stream of consciousness, then what op is saying would actually work right?

>>10484599
>see: >>10476965
That's a sophism, doesn't address premise 2.

>>10485122
>The reductionist reduces consciousness to the brain, and so a proper analogy would be reducing semantics to syntax
The brain is a "material phenomenon." Syntax is most certainly not. How you think this is a better analogy, I have absolutely no clue.

>.And the moment you admit we've identified the brain, especially identifying it as a material phenomenon, then my argument takes off.

based on your extremely faulty premise 1. Which you still have not proven. Consciousness is reducible from the brain, that does not mean identifying the brain we have identified consciousness. There is no fixing this whole in your argument.

>Yeah it helps when you actually read the entirety of what I quote
"usually taken to entail" is not the same as "means".

Refute it all you want, your super-literal reductionist boogey man is nothing but a strawman. Funny how you use a dictionary for your other definitions, but not for reducible. Reducible does not mean identical.

Definition of reducible: capable of being simplified in presentation or analysis.

https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/reducible

Yet somehow you manage to stretch "reducible to" into "holding an identity thesis." And I'm the one doing mental gymnastics...

>>10485186
You're just claiming that it's sophism without any justification that it is sophism. I'm not seeing how this doesn't address premise 2.

>>10485188
>Syntax is most certainly not.
Are you not a materialist? The argument in the OP is explicitly an argument against reductive materialism, I hope you realize that.
>How you think this is a better analogy, I have absolutely no clue.
I literally just explained this to you. If it's about reducing x to y, and you bring semantics/syntax as an analogy for this, then it's about reducing semantics to syntax. It's not hard...
>Which you still have not proven.
I've proven it multiple times now and even provided scholarly literature to back me up. Reduction implies identity, identity implies they're exactly the same, it then follows logically and necessarily that if x=y then identifying x identifies y and vice versa.
>"usually taken to entail" is not the same as "means".
laying the autism on pretty thick there, eh?
>nothing but a strawman
I've cited several scholarly sources back me up now, you're straight up delusional...
>Funny how you use a dictionary for your other definitions, but not for reducible.
That's a technical term used in a particular field, and I cited relevant scholarly literature in that field to define that term and it went over the kind of reduction that is most relevant and discussed in by contemporary scholars.

>>10484841
Premise 2 has structure: Q=IS, you claim ¬I¬S, which is not equal to ¬Q.

>>10485219
Stupid burger board.
Premise 2 has structure: Q=I->S, you claim ¬I->¬S, which is not equal to ¬Q.

>>10485219
The structure of the argument is Modus Tollens, very simple:
P⊃Q
¬Q
∴¬P

>>10485220
Premise 1: If consciousness is reducible to material phenomena (P), then identifying material phenomena identifies what it is like to be the subject, for the subject (Q).

Premise 2: It is not the case that identifying material phenomena identifies what it is like to be the subject, for the subject (¬Q).

Conclusion: Consciousness is reducible to material phenomena (¬P).

Is this more clear now? This is what premise 2 has always been, it's just re-worded such that even those on the spectrum can see premise2 clearly equals ¬Q. Tone down the autism and please practice the principle of charity:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_charity

>>10485249
You don't prove ¬Q, but a similar claim ¬I->¬S.

>>10485202
>If it's about reducing x to y, and you bring semantics/syntax as an analogy for this, then it's about reducing semantics to syntax
Are you ok? You keep repeating this nonsense point like a broken record this with absolutely no logic or arguments behind it whatsoever. Semantics and syntax are neither the "x" nor the "y," they are both part of the "to." Distinguishing between them at all is completely unnecessary and an obvious red herring.

>Reduction implies identity
Don't call philosophy a "field" and don't call anyone who doesn't understand basic information theory a "scholar." If you can't make your point follow in basic english, it doesn't follow.

>>10485249
Except this is actually your point:

Premise 1: If consciousness is identical to material phenomena (P), then identifying material phenomena identifies what it is like to be the subject, for the subject (Q).

Premise 2: It is not the case that identifying material phenomena identifies what it is like to be the subject, for the subject (¬Q).

Conclusion: Consciousness is reducible to material phenomena (¬P).

Which is totally fucking trivial, and doesn't contradict what most materialists believe.

>>10476965
So this is the origin why this goddamn debate started.

>>10485040
>Having to invoke the existence of an all-seeing magic sky daddy that there is no other evidence for in order to defend idealism
>Not just using Occam's razor and realizing that interactionist dualism is the simpler hypotheses

>>10476696
>It is quite fascinating. If you'd some more info for intro to philosophy stuff let me know.
yes, yes, spit it out for fucks sakes!
it's interesting. Go!

>>10485142
>I never used such wording: "material understanding."
You also never used the wording "identifying consciousness." Odd how you have no issue wording your argument differently but when someone else does it you cry foul.

>I'm merely talking about identifying.
Please explain the relevant difference between identifying consciousness via material phenomena and identifying consciousness via material understanding. The meaning is clear from my argument and this tactic is just further proof that you are playing language games.

>Is this reducible to some physical phenomena, yes or no?
Reducible does not mean able to be experienced. You're confusing the two without justification. You can't experience another's consciousness *specifically because it's reducible to unique material phenomena.* This destroys P1 and was my original argument which you haven't even touched.

>You seem to be forgetting the definition of "identify"
The definition agrees perfectly with my response: identification doesn't give you neurons.

>There's no asymmetry between our brains, you can study my brain and vice versa.
>We can both access each others brains by opening up our skull but we can only access our own mental states directly.
Nice contradiction.

>If reductionism were true, as I've pointed out long ago, that shouldn't be possible.
If reductionism is true it *must* be possible, as I've pointed out and you've ignored in every reply. Please explain how reductionism does not allow consciousness to be dependent on specific material phenomena unique to each person.

>>10485153
Clearly there's an asymmetry since you are only thinking with your unique brain and not the brains of others. You've cornered yourself into a ridiculous position.

>this thread is still up
I hate this board's jannies so much.

>>10485258
Yes I do prove ¬Q, see: >>10476941 and >>10476965.

>>10485267
Are YOU ok? You're trying to draw an analogy using semantics/syntax which means if you're going to be accurate then it will have to take the same form as my argument, otherwise you're just pulling nonsense out of our ass and you're not bringing up anything remotely analogous.

>Don't call philosophy a "field"
philosophy is a field of study you autist: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outline_of_academic_disciplines#Philosophy
>don't call anyone who doesn't understand basic information theory a "scholar.
I never did, I only called actual experts in the field scholars. You're making yourself look real stupid right now with this trivial bullshit, pick your battles bro.
>>10485273
*sigh* we've been over this... From the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (a peer-reviewed academic resource):
>The type of reductionism that is currently of most interest in metaphysics and philosophy of mind involves the claim that all sciences are reducible to physics. This is usually taken to entail that all phenomena (including mental phenomena like consciousness) are identical to physical phenomena.
Source: https://www.iep.utm.edu/red-ism/
>Which is totally fucking trivial, and doesn't contradict what most materialists believe.
You literally just quoted a valid argument that concludes reductive materialism is false, are you retarded or something?
>>10485299
>not seeing how consciousness being fundamental entails a single mind being fundamental
>not realizing that monism is simpler than dualism
>>10485641
That doesn't make any sense: we can study neurons using instruments just fine, there's no asymmetry between your neurons and my neurons. But for some reasons I can only access my mental states directly and not yours. If consciousness is literally the same thing as those neurons then it follows logically and necessarily that I should be able to access your consciousness just as I access your neurons.

>>10485606
>You also never used the wording "identifying consciousness."
Yeah I did actually, nice try though. There's a difference between changing some wording around vs. changing some meaning around.
>material understanding
I don't have any burden to explicate what this is because I never made such a claim, that's just a straw man you constructed...
>Reducible does not mean able to be experienced.
Do you or do you not know what the word "identical" means? So you can identify material phenomena but that doesn't identify consciousness? That's like saying I can identify the president of the U.S. but that doesn't identify Donald Trump. President of U.S.=Donald Trump so it makes absolutely 0 sense to claim you can identify one but not the other since they're the same thing. Same goes for material phenomena and consciousness. This destroys your shit rebuttal which is really not a rebuttal but a failure to understand.
>identification doesn't give you neurons.
Yes it does, that's the very definition of identify: to establish or indicate what something is.
>Nice contradiction.
Thanks for admitting reductive materialism is contradictory :) Looks like my job is done here
>If reductionism is true it *must* be possible
Again, what do you not understand about the meaning of the word "identical"? To argue against me you'd have to argue you can identify the president without identifying Donald Trump, that's just retarded since the president=Donald Trump.

>>10485774
>That doesn't make any sense: we can study neurons using instruments just fine, there's no asymmetry between your neurons and my neurons.
That doesn't follow. You only use your neurons to think and not someone else's. This is a clear asymmetry and the source of your confusion.

>If consciousness is literally the same thing as those neurons then it follows logically and necessarily that I should be able to access your consciousness just as I access your neurons.
If you have my neurons, yes. But you don't. Do you seriously not understand this or are you paying dumb?

>>10485792
>There's no asymmetry between our brains, you can study my brain and vice versa.
your brain is different from my brain
theres an asymmetry

Neuron's are your only privacy because they're fast enough to evade other minds. I can sense your heart beyond your word, enough to build a character in my mind. May take more than one trace.

Consciousness is the special effect of beauty, it is literally injected into the baby while in the womb - it isn't created by sperm and egg alone; your energy was selected for your body; you're more your enegy than your body.

Now, what is beauty? It's a confused topic for most this planet, but simply it is 'the sense of you' (not just looks, but feeling; lungs, quality). You are sensed by the greater energy system while a baby in the womb, and you're injected into the vessel.

What is consciousness after this? It's the internal action of external feed, maintained by organic harmony - in our case.

>>10485797
>That doesn't follow
It absolutely follows, just look at the very definition of identical: “Similar in EVER detail; EXACTLY alike.” Synonymous with: “EXACTLY the same, indistinguishable, undifferentiated.”

Source: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/identical

>If you have my neurons, yes
That's like saying I can only study my neurons but I can't study your neurons. That makes 0 sense... If I can identify your neurons, and say consciousness is reducible to neurons, then it follows that I can identify your consciousness (what it is like to be you, for you). Do YOU seriously not understand this? What are you not getting about the meaning of the word "identical" here?
>>10485800
We identify the brain in the same way: opening up our skulls. There's no asymmetry there. This isn't the case when it comes to consciousness though, you know your mind directly while when you crack open another skull you only identify a brain and fail to identify consciousness. That's a clear asymmetry. If reductionism were true that shouldn't be possible.

>>10485827
>We identify the brain in the same way: opening up our skulls.
no
we do not identify every brain as being the same
we have yet to ever properly identify a brain, they are too complex
identifying a brain is mapping all of its neural connections and knowing how they interact
anything less isn't identification, because there would be missing information

brains are not all the fucking same
just because we can say "brains are all behind the eyes and above the neck"
isn't an identification, its a location

Neurons are your only privacy, I can sense your heart through your words, but your neurons are always the next move, unless, I really dominate you mentally.

Consciousness is injected into the baby while in the womb, it is not procreated; it is a nautral phenomenon - like the alignment of stars.

Consciousness is internal action of external feed; like a rolex watch.

Your energy is what you are, you're not your vessel. The vessel you own is the body your energy hijacked.

Your probably confuse consciousness with your energy. Your energy is what makes you, your consciousness as oppose to mine. So, YOU are out of the picture where consciousness is concerned, we are all this one type of consciousness, but there are many energies.

>>10485792
>Yeah I did actually, nice try though. There's a difference between changing some wording around vs. changing some meaning around.
No meaning was changed.

>I don't have any burden to explicate what this is because I never made such a claim, that's just a straw man you constructed...
You claim this is different from what you said but won't explain the difference... LOL.

>Do you or do you not know what the word "identical" means? So you can identify material phenomena but that doesn't identify consciousness?
If "identifying consciousness" is identical to identifying material phenomena then it's not identical to experiencing someone else's consciousness and vice versa, according to reductive materialism.

>That's like saying I can identify the president of the U.S. but that doesn't identify Donald Trump.
No, it's like saying I can identify the President of the US but that doesn't make me the President.

>Yes it does, that's the very definition of identify: to establish or indicate what something is.
Bahahaha please explain how identifying neurons magically makes puts those physical neurons inside your brain! You must be pretending to be retarded since no once could be this obtuse, but I'll be generous and assume your aren't actively lying in order to preserve your ego and that you're actually this dumb:

1. According to reductive materialism, each person's unique conscious experiences are dependent on specific physical phenomena in the brain.

2. Therefore you cannot experience someone's unique conscious experience without the specific material phenomena of their brain.

3. Identifying these phenomena in their brain does not turn your brain into a copy of theirs

4. Therefore identifying physical phenomena does not give you conscious experience according to reductive materialism.

Now show me where you think this argument is wrong so that I can laugh at you.

>>10485827
>It absolutely follows, just look at the very definition of identical
And how does this show (we can study neurons) -> (no asymmetry between your neurons and my neurons)?

I already explained the asymmetry to you and you ignored it.

>That's like saying I can only study my neurons but I can't study your neurons.
No it's like sayng you don't have my neurons. You don't, no matter how much you study them. You're still studying then with your neurons and not mine. This directly follows from reductive materialism.

>>10485792
Poor OP got destroyed and now can only resort to babble.

>>10485847
>no we do not identify every brain as being the same
*facepalm* I didn't claim we identify every brain as being the same, I didn't say anything even remotely close to that... I specifically said we identify them IN THE SAME WAY. Please read what I write... Everyone's neurons can be put under a microscope, there's symmetry there. I can identify my mental states directly, but I can't for yours, that's an obvious asymmetry.
>we have yet to ever properly identify a brain, they are too complex
I didn't say anything about how it works only what it is, that's what identification is about: establishing what something is. If I show you a picture of a brain you can identify it as a brain because you know what a brain is.
>>10485851
>Neurons are your only privacy
How is that possible if consciousness is identical to neurons? If they're identical then they are similar in every detail; exactly alike which is synonymous with them being exactly the same, indistinguishable, undifferentiated.

>>10485879
I never said it was, this is yours and the other guys bad philosophy attempt.

>>10481791
>Everything we know about the mind is material


You must be trolling faggot .So do you believe that subjective experiences like Qualia or personal beliefs are material .This is the problem with you materialist cucks .You throw out that which we know a priori like the ego Qualia etc but keep with dogmatic certainty matter which we only know exists if we assume naive realism which is naive by nature .

>>10485879
>I can identify my mental states directly, but I can't for yours
>he knows the limits of neuroscience better than the researchers

>If I show you a picture of a brain you can identify it as a brain because you know what a brain is.
you cannot establish it as a particular brain without all of the details
again, just calling something a "brain" doesn't give you significant information about it
you cant put a broad classification on something and claim thats enough to identify it
if i give you "x is an element of a set S"
you havent identified x, you've only determined that its in the set
but theres possibly a ton of other shit in that set that you havent differentiated it from

>>10484947
Based IP poster

>>10485853
>No meaning was changed.
That's exactly my point: I never changed any of the meaning of what I said.
>You claim this is different from what you said but won't explain the difference
All I have to do is point out that I never once said anything about "material explanation" and we can see clearly that you're attacking a straw man...
>according to reductive materialism.
Is what it is like to be the subject, for the subject identical to material phenomena yes or no? Need a straight answer to this question, a simple yes or no will do.
>No
Yes, open a dictionary and look up what the word "identical" means.
>it's like saying I can identify the President of the US but that doesn't make me the President.
You're retarded... The argument is that if you can identify one then you can identify the other since they're the same thing such as the president and Donald Trump. If consciousness is the same as material phenomena then identifying one identifies the other.
>Bahahaha please explain how identifying neurons magically makes puts those physical neurons inside your brain!
Holy shit you're literally retarded... You are so confused beyond belief... Try to keep up: I'm only talking about establishing what something is. Reductive materialists claim neurons, brains, bodies, all that stuff are material phenomena, and that consciousness is reducible to material phenomena. If we can establish what x is, and y is identical to x, then if follows we can establish what y is by establishing x. But we can see clearly this isn't the case with consciousness and material phenomena.
>dependent on specific physical phenomena in the brain.
You need to be careful when you talk like this because there are non-reductive materialists who hold consciousness to be dependent on the physical brain yet they do not reduce consciousness itself to a physical phenomena. My argument is against reductive materialism.

>>10485916
>So do you believe that subjective experiences like Qualia or personal beliefs are material
an experience is an event you faggot
the experience changed the brain of the person involved, *that*, the change in the brain, is certainly fucking material

if personal beliefs aren't material, then why are they genetically heritable?

>>10485864
Because there's no difference in the way we know about them. There is no special epistemological gap when it comes to identifying your neurons vs. when it comes to identifying your neurons. We know them in the same way. This is clearly not the case when it comes to mental states: you know your own mental states directly but do not know the mental states of others directly. Now that is an asymmetry.
>No it's like sayng you don't have my neurons.
Then there's no asymmetry between knowing your neurons and my neurons.
>>10485894
Are you a reductive materialist or not?
>>10485919
>implying I'm not a researcher or not in contact with researchers

>you cannot establish it as a particular brain without all of the details
You and I both know that we can do as much neuroscience as we want and that doesn't tell us what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. If you can do this ground breaking marvelous feat then please demonstrate it. If you cannot do such an action then you must admit the truth that you can identify the brain and it's structures and chemical/electrical activity but this does not identify what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. If reductive materialism were true, that's not possible.

>>10485933
meant to say "There is no special epistemological gap when it comes to identifying your neurons vs. when it comes to identifying my neurons"

>>10485933
>this does not identify what it is like to be the subject, for the subject.
>If reductive materialism were true, that's not possible.

>Assume not A
>If A, then contradiction

>>10476582
Peirce put reductive materialists in the grave, along with the cringe worthy psychologism found in the OP image, well over 100 years ago.
only dilettantes are still hung up on this trivial problem.

>>10485924
>That's exactly my point: I never changed any of the meaning of what I said.
Neither did I.

>All I have to do is point out that I never once said anything about "material explanation" and we can see clearly that you're attacking a straw man...
What's the relevant difference between identifying material phenomena and material explanation? How can it be a strawman when they are the same thing? Do I need to give you the dictionary definition of identical?

>Is what it is like to be the subject, for the subject identical to material phenomena yes or no?
Yes, specific material phenomena you don't possess simply by identifying them.

>Yes, open a dictionary and look up what the word "identical" means.
Identifying the President is not identical to being the President. Please explain how the definition of identical disproves this?

>Holy shit you're literally retarded... You are so confused beyond belief... Try to keep up: I'm only talking about establishing what something is.
And as I've said 1000 times, identifying what something is is not the same as possessing it. In order to have an experience you must possess the material phenomena, not identify it.

>You need to be careful when you talk like this because there are non-reductive materialists who hold consciousness to be dependent on the physical brain yet they do not reduce consciousness itself to a physical phenomena.
I literally said "according to reductive materialism" in the line you quoted from.

>>10485933
>Because there's no difference in the way we know about them.
The difference is between knowing them and experiencing them. Reductive materialism says they are different because the latter requires a unique brain.

>Then there's no asymmetry between knowing your neurons and my neurons.
I never said there was.

>>10485929
>An experience is material

What ? Can you prove this claim please ? How can you say this when mental experiences have properties which matter does not have .Like aboutness and subjectivity . Beliefs are not always inherently gotten retard .Not to mention what does that get you on them being material ? Why couldn't they be immaterialy inherited ?

>>10486031
>Neither did I
>material understanding
pick one
>What's the relevant difference between identifying material phenomena and material explanation?
I'm not the one making claims about "material understanding," you are, so I'm not the one that has to explain this but you do. Personally I've never heard of "material understanding" last I checked there was just "understanding"
> Do I need to give you the dictionary definition of identical?
Apparently you need to give it to yourself.
>Yes
Prove it and settle the blatant contradiction between identifying material phenomena and consciousness. Do I need to give you the dictionary definition of identical...?
>Identifying the President is not identical to being the President.
I never said it was, and I never said identifying material phenomena means you are that phenomena, so your analogy is a false one. I merely noted that identifying one identifies the other if they're the same thing. I couldn't have made this more clear, I don't know how you misread this so badly.
>identifying what something is is not the same as possessing it
wtf do you mean by possessing it? You keep adding in all these terms into my argument that never appeared once anywhere in this thread...
>In order to have an experience you must possess the material phenomena
Do you or do you not understand what the word "identical" means?
>I literally said "according to reductive materialism" in the line you quoted from.
And? What I said is still true: be careful with the terminology you use. Most reductive materialists would speak of consciousness as being constituted of the brain rather than being dependent on the brain, there's a subtle and important distinction there.
>The difference is between knowing them and experiencing them.
Not when it comes to neurons, but it is with consciousness. This is a clear asymmetry with material phenomena and consciousness which shouldn't be possible if reductionism were true.
>>10485970
The illiteracy is strong here.

>>10487312
This thread almost tasted the sweet release of death and you brought it back

>>10487320
Actually that might have been you just now. I didn't see the thread get bumped until this response from you.

>>10476582
So you go through the entire thread without justifying premise 1. Your argument structure is just modus tollens, but your Q statement "identifying material phenomena identifies what it is like to be the subject, for the subject" has no clear meaning whatsoever. It's just gibberish written to sound profound, unless you can explain and expand on it with *much* more clarity than you've offered so far.

>>10487334
No I only noticed it because it was bumped

>>10487358
So you go through the entire thread without reading it, nice. See: >>10476648
>has no clear meaning whatsoever.
Well this would be a point against reductive materialism then. You understand what is meant by "what it is like to be the subject, for the subject"? If not see: >>10476960 and >>10476785
The reductive materialist is claiming that "what it is like to be the subject" a.k.a. qualia is identical to material phenomena and that would mean they're similar in every detail and exactly the same. That would mean once you've established whatever material phenomena you're reducing consciousness to then that right there should establish what it is like to be the subject since they're literally the exact same thing. But this is clearly not the case as we can clearly see the asymmetry between how you identify your own mental states directly vs. how you identify the mental states of others indirectly. It doesn't make sense for x and y to be exactly the same every single detail while also not being exactly the same in every single detail.

>>10487367
Well alright then. If you don't want the thread bumped by your own posts you can always sage if you haven't already.

>>10487312
>pick one
I pick both since they're identical.

>I'm not the one making claims about "material understanding," you are, so I'm not the one that has to explain this but you do.
You made the claim that natural understanding is different from what you said. But you clearly have no idea how they're different. What a puerile excuse for an argument. This is blatant semantics and my argument stands untouched. Thanks for admitting defeat.

>Prove it and settle the blatant contradiction between identifying material phenomena and consciousness.
No such contradiction exists as I've already shown and you've failed to counter.

>I never said it was, and I never said identifying material phenomena means you are that phenomena, so your analogy is a false one.
Then you admit P1 fails.

>wtf do you mean by possessing it?
I mean that identifying consciousness does not mean you can have someone else's experience.

>Do you or do you not understand what the word "identical" means?
Yes, and according to reductive materialism they aren't identical.

>Most reductive materialists would speak of consciousness as being constituted of the brain rather than being dependent on the brain, there's a subtle and important distinction there.
The latter follows from the former.

>Not when it comes to neurons, but it is with consciousness.
Of course when it comes to neurons. Identifying neurons doesn't give you those neurons.

And once again you have failed to find a flaw in my disproof of P1 >>10485853. You lose.

>>10487379
I've read your links and I knew you'd be referring me to that particular post of yours, which is why I specifically pointed out your argument structure. If you were going to take my point in good faith, you wouldn't refer me to something I said myself, so thanks for helping me clarify the direction you're coming from.

Anyway,

"what it is like to be the subject" is the problem, it doesn't mean anything. It sounds good, but it's vacuous. "The same thing" is also too imprecise, be specific about what you're trying to say. At this point premise 1 is just your assertion or presupposition, it's not a premise I'm forced to grant.

This thread is distilled retardation please stop

>>10487412
>I pick both since they're identical.
You seem to be confused yet again. Either you didn't change the meaning of what I said or you're making claims about material understanding, you're making claims about material understanding, so you're changing some meaning up.
>You made the claim that natural understanding-
stop right there, I never said that. You're putting words in my mouth. I never said anything about "material/natural understanding." Stop with the straw men.
>No such contradiction exists
So identifying material phenomena identifies what it is like to be the subject then? You can identify what it is like to be me, for me?
>Then you admit P1 fails.
No you just fail to understand P1. You mistakenly thought P1 means identifying material phenomena means you are that phenomena, but that's pure delusion since no such wording exists anywhere in this entire thread... That's a product of your imagination, pure fantasy. I specifically said that identifying x identifies y since x=y. So if consciousness=material phenomena then identifying such phenomena must also identify consciousness, but we know this isn't the case.
>I mean that identifying consciousness does not mean you can have someone else's experience.
You failed to answer my question: again, wtf do you mean by possessing it?
>Yes, and according to reductive materialism they aren't identical.
You couldn't be more wrong. See: >>10476648
>Of course when it comes to neurons.
If consciousness is literally identical to neurons then that's not possible.

All you've done here pretty much is just misunderstand premise 1 despite me giving much clarification and scholarly literature to explicate it more.

>>10487435
>but we know this isn't the case
This is your conclusion though so your justification for p1 presupposes the argument you're trying to make

>>10487425
If you were going to read this thread in good faith then you should probably start by reading the very first responses to the thread, of which contains the support for premise 1 that you keep pretending does not exist... I didn't cite that post to talk about the structure of my argument but for the support for premise 1.
>so thanks for helping me clarify the direction you're coming from.
could you come off as anymore of a douche?
>"what it is like to be the subject" is the problem, it doesn't mean anything.
As noted in the scholarly source I provided earlier, from the standpoint of introspection "what it is like to be the subject" a.k.a. qualia is undeniable. We can both look at the same picture while you find it funny and I don't. There is what it is like for you to experience the picture, vs. what it s like for me to experience the picture. You see it and there is a certain qualitative feel you have, an experience of humor that is subjective to you that makes you laugh, while I see it I don't have that experience and so I don't laugh. If you want more info see: https://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/
> "The same thing" is also too imprecise
...how...? If I tell you that my hand and the 5 fingered thing attached to my arm is the same thing you're going to sit here and tell me with a straight face that you this is too imprecise for you to understand what I'm saying...?

>>10487448
Wrong, that's not my conclusion, that's premise 2. My justification for premise 1 is here: >>10476648

>>10487456
No, that is your justification. That's how you're presupposing your conclusion, because you still haven't explained how 'we know' beyond just asserting it.

>>10487463
No, this is MY argument. I'm the one who decides what premise is what, and what my support for each premise is, you don't. Otherwise you might as well have this conversation all by yourself since apparently you just get to make up my position for me...

Let's make this more clear for you to dispel your confusion:

From the very post you're trying to quote (>>10487435)
>if consciousness=material phenomena then identifying such phenomena must also identify consciousness (Premise 1)
>but we know this isn't the case (Premise 2).
From here the conclusion is drawn: consciousness≠material phenomena.

I'm not presupposing anything, you're simply confused.

>>10487452
You're off to a bad start with the "No u" come back but I'll just ignore that, I guess...

Okay, does this mean you can coherently reformat your argument using the more precise term Qualia instead of "what it's like to be the subject"? My criticism is that I don't think you can, because intentional or not you're sneaking in an equivocation using that term. It would seem I was right to point to "the same thing", because you're doing exactly this kind of equivocation: hand and 5- fingered-thing being "the same thing" is true because it's by definition and I don't think you feel the same is true about material phenomena and qualia. This is why I'm asking you to be more precise.

>>10487468
You keep reposting a lot of clarification you don't need to make.
>but we know this isn't the case
*This* is what you need to justify. Without justification, this is your assertion/ presupposition.

>>10487488
Kind of a reach to claim there's a "No u" there, and a bit contradictory to claim you're ignoring something you're explicitly addressing...
>reformat
It's possible but qualia is jargon. You could say "what it is like to be the subject" is jargon as well but that's at least explicable in the very phrase. We can all make sense of what it's like for you to smell a rose vs. what its like for me to smell a rose. But not everyone is familiar with this technical term "qualia"
>I don't think you feel the same is true about material phenomena and qualia.
The argument does not assume they are 2 distinct things, there's no equivocation going on here. Premise 1 is an explication of the thesis that qualia is identical to material phenomena. If qualia and material phenomena are similar in every detail; exactly alike, indistinguishable and undifferentiated, then that entails identifying material phenomena identifies qualia. They're supposed to be similar in EVERY detail. But we know that's not the case: I can identify your brain and its activities, and whatever else you're trying to reduce consciousness with, and this doesn't identify qualia.

>>10487493
>don't need to make.
If people would stop misunderstanding my argument then I wouldn't have to make such clarifications.
>*This* is what you need to justify. I've already done so: >>10476941, >>10476965

>>10487503
>We can all make sense of what it's like for you to smell a rose vs. what its like for me to smell a rose.
Actually, no, I don't grant this. This is open to too much interpretation, hence too imprecise. Be precise with what you're trying to say, even if it means drawing on a specific well-defined term.

But at least we're getting closer on the more important bit:
>But we know that's not the case: I can identify your brain and its activities, and whatever else you're trying to reduce consciousness with, and this doesn't identify qualia.
This isn't justifying this premise, it's just restating it with more words. Why doesn't this identify qualia?

>>10487435
>Either you didn't change the meaning of what I said or you're making claims about material understanding, you're making claims about material understanding, so you're changing some meaning up.
What's the difference between what you said and material understanding? Oh you won't tell me because there is no difference and you're lying in order to preserve your argument.

>stop right there, I never said that. You're putting words in my mouth. I never said anything about "material/natural understanding."
Oh so you didn't say that material understanding means something different from what you said? So then you have no objection to my argument. Thanks.

>So identifying material phenomena identifies what it is like to be the subject then?
No, because identifying what it's like to be the subject requires you to be the subject, according to reductive materialism.

>You mistakenly thought P1 means identifying material phenomena means you are that phenomena
No P1 means that identifying material phenomena means identifying what it's like to be the subject, which is factually incorrect according to reductive materialism. Thus P1 fails.

> I specifically said that identifying x identifies y since x=y.
x is not equal to y in this case, as I've already explained and you've consistently ignored.

>So if consciousness=material phenomena then identifying such phenomena must also identify consciousness, but we know this isn't the case.
Neither of these are identifying what it's like to be the subject. If you semantically equate them to identifying what it's like to be the subject then this breaks P2. I said this from the beginning.

>You failed to answer my question: again, wtf do you mean by possessing it?
I mean having the experience of the subject. Stop pretending to be retarded.

>You couldn't be more wrong. See: >>10476648
Where does this explain how they are identical?

>>10487435
>If consciousness is literally identical to neurons then that's not possible.
If consciousness is literally identical to neurons then identifying consciousness is identifying neurons, not having those neurons. Having those neurons is what you need to identify what it's like to be the subject, since what it's like to be the subject is unique to their neurons.

>>10487524
>Actually, no, I don't grant this
First off you need to keep context in mind here, I can already see you losing track. We were talking about the wording of the argument and why I chose "what it is like" vs. the technical term "qualia." I noted we can all make sense of this, and if you couldn't tell this is more of a description of common sense or what your average person can grasp at first blush. You can have your own suspicions about "what it is like" but it's undeniable that to the average person that's not the case. The average person understands full well how for some people the rose smells sweet but others it may smell bitter, and they have no problem saying such things as "what it's like for me to smell the rose is sweet" and the other saying "what it's like for me to smell the rose is bitter." Look man, you can get all turbo skeptic on qualia all day, but this is just a simple point about the average joe. Even the most skeptical of qualia of all, eliminativists, are honest enough to admit qualia is indeed common sense, they just launch attacks on common sense is all. If you want more info on qualia here's an entire encyclopedia entry from a peer-reviewed academic resource: https://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/
>>10487524
>This isn't justifying this premise, it's just restating it with more words
See: >>10476965

part 1
>>10487554
>What's the difference between what you said and material understanding?
How many times do I have to tell you: that's your obligation, not mine. You're the one trying to make this weird distinction between understanding and material understanding. what... the... fuck... is... material... understanding...?
>Oh so you didn't say that material understanding means something different from what you said?
Precisely because I never said anything about material understanding, that's a term you brought up. I keep asking you to define this term of yours and you simply refuse. Why do you refuse to do so? Trying to keep to the shadows where its safe to equivocate or something?
>So then you have no objection to my argument.
You're going to need to bring an argument in the first place for me to object to.
>No, because identifying what it's like to be the subject requires you to be the subject, according to reductive materialism.
That doesn't make any sense since what it's like to be the subject is literally identical to material phenomenon and you don't need to be the material phenomenon to identify the material phenomenon...
>No P1 means that identifying material phenomena means identifying what it's like to be the subject
First off, Yes since you tried to claim my argument is analogous to claiming identifying x means you are x, which is just like claiming identifying the president means you are the president, or identifying anything means you are that thing... this is ludicrous
Second, I'm glad you're formulating the first premise accurately but if you're being consistent that would mean it's more analogous to claim identifying the president identifies trump rather than that silly analogy you brought up about identifying the president identifies you.
>x is not equal to y in this case
Then reductive materialism is not true, which is what the argument is concluding.

>>10487554
part 2
>I've already explained and you've consistently ignored.
I've explained already using peer-reviewed academic resources that reductive materialism claims x=y. If you're claiming that x≠y then you're claiming reductive materialism is false, which is what the very conclusion of my argument is...
>Neither of these are identifying what it's like to be the subject.
They should be if reductive materialism is true, but that's not the case as you just noted here, so reductive materialism is not true.
>I mean having the experience of the subject.
which is reducible to material phenomena, yes...? once you've identified that material phenomena then that should identify "having the experience of the subject"

>>10487582
>How many times do I have to tell you: that's your obligation, not mine.
How many times do you have to lie? Zero, but you keep doing it. You made the claim that they are different, the burden of proof is on you. We both know they are the same, so stop playing language games.

>You're the one trying to make this weird distinction between understanding and material understanding.
Where did I say anything like that?

>what... the... fuck... is... material... understanding...?
It... is... identifying... material... phenomena...

>Precisely because I never said anything about material understanding, that's a term you brought up. I keep asking you to define this term of yours and you simply refuse.
You didn't ask what it meant, you said that it was different from your argument. Now you are backtracking by claiming that it's not necessarily different, you just don't understand what it's saying. But I already explained what it means by saying it's no different from your argument. What a big waste of time you made by making a substance-less objection purely based on semantics. But that's what you do.

>You're going to need to bring an argument in the first place for me to object to.
My argument is clearly stated, you're just ignoring it because you have no counter.

>That doesn't make any sense since what it's like to be the subject is literally identical to material phenomenon and you don't need to be the material phenomenon to identify the material phenomenon...
No, what it's like to be the subject is identical to *having* specific material phenomena. What separates what it's like to be you from what it's like to be me is not the existence of material phenomena, it's that you only have certain material phenomena and I only have certain material phenomena. Identifying material phenomena is not the same as having them.

>>10487604
>You made the claim that they are different,
Dude, you're the one who brought up material understanding as if there's some distinction between that and regular old fashioned understanding.
>Where did I say anything like that?
When you brought up material understanding
>It... is... identifying... material... phenomena...
That's not "material understanding" that's just "identifying."

Definition of identify: "Establish or indicate who or what (someone or something) is."

Source: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/identify

Stop with this weird word game you're trying to play with "material understanding." That is a term of your invention that I don't use. The term at hand is "identify" so stick with it. Look at the OP for yourself and notice that the term at hand is and always has been "identify." There's no backtracking, we can all see the OP for ourselves, this is publicly verifiable...
>My argument is clearly stated
You never made an argument, you merely constructed some weird semantic word game with "material understanding" and declared victory out of nowhere. If you have an argument then let's see it, put it in premise-conclusion format just like I did so we can see if yours is valid. We know mine is valid as it takes the form of modus tollens, can you form a valid argument...?
>No, what it's like to be the subject is identical to *having* specific material phenomena.
Are you suggesting what its like is not identical to material phenomena but instead merely has material phenomena? If it's identical my argument holds, if it's not identical then you're just admitting the conclusion of my argument is true.
>it's that you only have certain material phenomena and I only have certain material phenomena
There's nothing special or magical about your material phenomena vs. mine. It's all matter, we can put both of our neurons under a scope and examine it just fine, there's nothing unique about your matter vs. my matter as it's all just matter.

>>10487582
>First off, Yes since you tried to claim my argument is analogous to claiming identifying x means you are x, which is just like claiming identifying the president means you are the president, or identifying anything means you are that thing... this is ludicrous
Yes what you did is ludicrous as I've already explained.

>Second, I'm glad you're formulating the first premise accurately but if you're being consistent that would mean it's more analogous to claim identifying the president identifies trump rather than that silly analogy you brought up about identifying the president identifies you.
No, because identifying consciousness is not the same as identifying what it's like to be the subject, according to reductive materialism.

>Then reductive materialism is not true, which is what the argument is concluding.
That doesn't follow since reductive materialism implies x is not being equal to y.

>>10487589
>I've explained already using peer-reviewed academic resources that reductive materialism claims x=y.
I don't see any. You pointed me to an article about how reductionist materialism means consciousness is identical to physical phenomena, which is exactly what I've said throughout this discussion and is in fact a premise of my disproof of P1! So you've given a peer reviewed academic source that disproves your own argument. Your confusion stems from your conflation of identifying consciousness with identifying what it's like to be the subject. But I already explained how they are different. You have not EVER explained how my distinction fails.

>They should be if reductive materialism is true, but that's not the case as you just noted here, so reductive materialism is not true.
They shouldn't be if reductive materialism is true, as I've already shown and you have failed to argue against.

>once you've identified that material phenomena then that should identify "having the experience of the subject"
No, because you need to have the material phenomena.

>>10487615
>Yes what you did is ludicrous as I've already explained.
You're the one who just admitted that's precisely what I didn't do. In this post (>>10487554) I pointed out this out:
>You mistakenly thought P1 means identifying material phenomena means you are that phenomena
and you denied this and said:
>No P1 means that identifying material phenomena means identifying what it's like to be the subject
So as we can see, by your own admission, your initial analogy is completely inaccurate...
>No
Yup, by your own admission this is the case, otherwise you're explicitly contradicting yourself. You know for a fact that P1 does not mean identifying x means you are x, you know this so you can cut the shit now...
>That doesn't follow since reductive materialism implies x is not being equal to y.
It implies the total opposite, I even cited a peer-reviewed academic resource that proves you wrong on this here: >>10476648
>I don't see any.
I've cited it multiple times now and I just cited it now. Here it is again: >>10476648
reductive materialism claims x=y. You simply have no idea what reductive materialism is... Your confusion knows no bounds.
>You have not EVER explained how my distinction fails.
Literally just cited a peer-reviewed academic resource proving how you fail...
>failed to argue against.
Except for all that research I just cited proving otherwise...
>have the material phenomena.
Explain what exactly you mean by "have" the material phenomena. what is that?

>>10487558
>their neurons
You're implying there's a sort of dualism between neurons and the subject. The reductionist is claiming the subject is identical to the neurons, not that there is a subject that has neurons. Are you a dualist or reductive materialist? If you're a reductionist there is no "having", there is only identity since material phenomenon and consciousness are identical. They are not properties of one another, one does not have the other, they are supposed to literally be the exact same thing if reductionism is true.

>>10487613
>Dude, you're the one who brought up material understanding as if there's some distinction between that and regular old fashioned understanding.
Where did I say anything like that?

>When you brought up material understanding
When I brought up material understanding I was simply talking about identifying consciousness by identifying material phenomena. I didn't say anything about any other type of understanding or there being distinctions between types. The only one who did that was you just now while desperately trying to continue this pointless semantic game.

>That's not "material understanding" that's just "identifying."
What's the relevant difference here?

>Stop with this weird word game you're trying to play with "material understanding."
You created and perpetuated this game by claiming this phrase constituted a relevant difference from what you were discussing when no such distinction exists. And you know no such distinction exists. Congratulations on losing all credibility by persisting in these disingenuous tactics. I'm not responding to any more of this drivel.

>Are you suggesting what its like is not identical to material phenomena but instead merely has material phenomena?
I'm suggesting that what it's like to be the subject is identical to the subject having specific material phenomena. Material phenomena without connection to the subject cannot have anything to do with what it's like to be the subject.

>if it's not identical then you're just admitting the conclusion of my argument is true.
If it's not identical then P1 fails and your argument is unsound.

>There's nothing special or magical about your material phenomena vs. mine.
Yes there is, only you have your material phenomena and only I have my material phenomena.

>there's nothing unique about your matter vs. my matter as it's all just matter.
You can do the most simple imaging and immediately see our matter is different.

Can this shit die already?

>>10487655
>>10487655
>Where did I say anything like that?
Right here: >>10485070
If by "identify what it's like to be the subject" you mean identify what consciousness is (via material understanding).
Notice how you're the one who introduced the term "material understanding," not me, and notice the implied distinction between identifying something in a general sense vs. identifying something via material understanding.
>this pointless semantic game.
If it's pointless then drop the material understanding bullshit and let's stick to the actual argument which is about "identity." The only way you could object to this right now is if you wish to stay in a word game. Let's cut the bullshit and stick with identity.
>You created and perpetuated this game
That was you buddy, you fucking introduced this term and you're the one insisting on using it. Let's just stick with identity.
>credibility
I don't give a fuck about your personal opinion on what you think is credible, all that matters is if the argument is valid, which it demonstrably is since it takes the form of modus tollens, and if the premises are true, which I've given arguments for. Truth is all that matters, not your stupid word games.
>I'm not responding to any more of this drivel.
Nice way to cover up your embarrassed exit.
>I'm suggesting that what it's like to be the subject is identical to the subject having specific material phenomena
But is that itself material phenomena, yes or no?
>If it's not identical then P1 fails and your argument is unsound
P1 only states that IF they are reducible. If they're not reducible then the argument isn't of concern since it's conclusion is that it's not reducible. The argument applies only to reductive materialism, obviously... Tone down the autism, bud.
>Yes there is,
Your logical fallacy is: special pleading. It's all just matter and thus subject to scientific inquiry. It's special pleading to claim to have this special magical supernatural matter that is beyond science.

>>10487634
>You're the one who just admitted that's precisely what I didn't do.
I said that is precisely what you did:
>>No P1 means that identifying material phenomena means identifying what it's like to be the subject
This is exactly what I said is ludicrous, since conflating identifying material phenomena with identifying what it's like to be the subject is analogous to conflating identifying the President with being the President.

>Yup, by your own admission this is the case, otherwise you're explicitly contradicting yourself. You know for a fact that P1 does not mean identifying x means you are x, you know this so you can cut the shit now...
I know for a fact that P1 means identifying x means you have x. You need to have the material phenomena to experience what it's like to be the subject.

>reductive materialism claims x=y.
You didn't respond to a word I said. I'll repeat it since you apparently passed over it with your eyes: You pointed me to an article about how reductionist materialism means consciousness is identical to physical phenomena, which is exactly what I've said throughout this discussion and is in fact a premise of my disproof of P1!

>Literally just cited a peer-reviewed academic resource proving how you fail...
Literally just explained how it agrees with everything I've said.

>Explain what exactly you mean by "have" the material phenomena. what is that?
It means that you posses a brain. You're doing a good job of convincing me otherwise in your specific case though.

>>10487657

>>10487681
Can you ramble about philosophical nonsense on Reddit or something?

>>10487647
>You're implying there's a sort of dualism between neurons and the subject.
No, the neurons are part of the subject, not separate.

>The reductionist is claiming the subject is identical to the neurons, not that there is a subject that has neurons.
The subject is more material than just the neurons though.

>If you're a reductionist there is no "having", there is only identity since material phenomenon and consciousness are identical.
I don't see how the former follows from the latter. The subject has material phenomena that are identical to consciousness.

>>10487563
Not a shred of this is relevant to my criticism. It's just layer after layer of empty text. This is exactly what you need less of, not more of. Be precise, don't obfuscate.

Okay, so now we've connected your justification to >>10476965. Your asymmetry claim is just an appeal to common sense and poisoning the well by claiming that those that disagree are dishonest. If consciousness is reducible to material phenomena then all subsets and components of consciousness are also necessarily reducible to material phenomena, which includes everything experiential regardless of whether or not we have the vocabulary to fully and uniquely qualify every experience of every person. " My" experience is a brain state down to the position of every last atom, "their" experience is a brain state down to the position of every last atom. There is nothing asymmetrical about that. You can't just appeal to the apparent difference between my experience of self and how I experience others because that's still experience, which is a brain state. You just assert there's a difference in kind and the conclusion you want.

>>10487679
No it's the opposite, here's the direct quote again:
>You mistakenly thought P1 means identifying material phenomena means you are that phenomena
>No P1 means that identifying material phenomena means identifying what it's like to be the subject
See? I'm saying that you thought premise 1 means identifying means you are x, and you're explicitly saying no to that and you even go on to quote premise 1 directly yourself and we can see clearly that it doesn't state identifying x means you are x... you've just shot yourself in the foot.
>since conflating identifying material phenomena with identifying what it's like to be the subject is analogous to conflating identifying the President with being the President.
But it's not analogous by your own admission, you've admitted that premise 1 does not mean identifying x means you are x. So it is your false analogy that is ludicrous.
>I know for a fact that P1 means identifying x means you have x.
Maybe in your imagination, P1 doesn't state this at all. Also, this idea of "having x" is problematic in reductive materialism as I explained here: >>10487647
>You didn't respond to a word I said.
Yes I did because you tried to claim reductive materialism doesn't claim x=y, but I just proved to you that it does. If you want to claim x≠y then you're not a reductive materialist and the argument does not apply to you. I don't know how to make this any simpler for you...
>Literally just explained how it agrees with everything I've said.
The total opposite bud... Reductive materialism is claiming x=y, deal with it.
>It means that you posses a brain.
I asked for a definition not a synonym. Saying "posses a brain" doesn't give me any more information than saying "has a brain" which is exactly what I'm asking about...

>>10487690
>" My" experience is a brain state down to the position of every last atom, "their" experience is a brain state down to the position of every last atom. There is nothing asymmetrical about that.

>If I put a car into a metal grinder I get ground metal
>If I put a plane into a metal grinder I get different ground metal
>but just ignore the differences lmao, planes are cars

>>10487698
>but just ignore the differences lmao, planes are cars
Those are you words, not mine. My point, to use your framing, is that grinding a car gives you a ground-up car, while grinding up a distinct car gives you a distinct ground-up car. You're the one asserting differences still, even when you're being facetious.

>>10487689
>No, the neurons are part of the subject, not separate.
That's exactly my point: you're not claiming the subject is the neurons but is somehow over and above the neurons. The reductionist is claiming there's just the neurons, that what you call the subject is simply the neurons, while you're saying there is this subject that HAS neurons. This is a dualism that only leads to the further question of: what is the subject if not the neurons?
>The subject is more material than just the neurons though
Like what?
>I don't see how the former follows from the latter
Does clark kent "have" superman...? No, clark kent is superman. They're the same thing. It's not that one has the other, they're identical.
>>10487690
>Not a shred of this is relevant to my criticism.
Yes it is because you're losing sight of what that post is that you're responding to. It was a discussion about word choice and then you started going off into ontology. Keep context in mind always.
>There is nothing asymmetrical about that.
There shouldn't be, but there is and you know this to be true. You can identify the brain and its chemical and electrical activity but this doesn't tell us what its like to be the subject, for the subject. People lie for instance all the time, and sometimes you can deduce they're lying but many times we take people's word for it since we don' have direct access to their mental states. We don't know what it's like to be them and to identify if their mental states really are what they say they are. There shouldn't be this asymmetry if reductionism were true, but there clearly is this asymmetry. If there isn't then there wouldn't be a problem of other minds, we wouldn't be able to lie, it would imply we'd have direct knowledge of each others mental states which we clearly don't.

>>10487678
>Notice how you're the one who introduced the term "material understanding," not me, and notice the implied distinction between identifying something in a general sense vs. identifying something via material understanding.
I don't see any distinction. The only thing "material distinction" implies is that we are talking about identification of material phenomena. This is uncontroversial since this is what the entire thread is about, materialism. First you claimed this was a "straw man," then you claimed you didn't understand what it meant, and now you claim it makes a distinction between different kinds of understanding. How pointing out this imagined distinction is relevant to disproving my argument I can only guess. I don't think there is any relevance, just a desperate attempt to disagree without substance. Enough of this drivel.

>But is that itself material phenomena, yes or no?
Yes.

>P1 only states that IF they are reducible.
If they are reducible then they are not identical, this has been my argument from the start.

>Your logical fallacy is: special pleading. It's all just matter and thus subject to scientific inquiry. It's special pleading to claim to have this special magical supernatural matter that is beyond science.
I never said it was beyond science. I said early on that it is uncontroversial that if we could modify the brain to make the same material phenomena then we could experience what it's like to be the subject.

>>10487694
>See? I'm saying that you thought premise 1 means identifying means you are x, and you're explicitly saying no to that and you even go on to quote premise 1 directly yourself and we can see clearly that it doesn't state identifying x means you are x... you've just shot yourself in the foot.
Identifying x = identifying consciousness. You have x = identifying what it's like to be the subject.

So yes, that's exactly what you're saying and it's ludicrous.

>But it's not analogous by your own admission, you've admitted that premise 1 does not mean identifying x means you are x.
I said P1 means identifying x means you have x. See the key above.

>Also, this idea of "having x" is problematic in reductive materialism as I explained here:
See my response.

>Yes I did because you tried to claim reductive materialism doesn't claim x=y, but I just proved to you that it does.
You proved that x=z, not x=y. I already proved that reductive materialism means that x≠y.

>The total opposite bud... Reductive materialism is claiming x=y, deal with it.
I already proved the opposite and you failed to respond. Instead of repeating what I've already disproved, try to find a flaw in my proof.

>I asked for a definition not a synonym. Saying "posses a brain" doesn't give me any more information than saying "has a brain" which is exactly what I'm asking about...
That is a definition, deal with it. If you would like to claim that you don't have a brain, you don't need to convince me further.

>>10487704
>There shouldn't be, but there is and you know this to be true.
There's the well poisoning again.
>You can identify the brain and its chemical and electrical activity
Yes...
>but this doesn't tell us what its like to be the subject, for the subject.
There's that meaningless term again.
>People lie for instance all the time, and sometimes you can deduce they're lying but many times we take people's word for it since
All of this is totally irrelevant
>we don' have direct access to their mental states.
Their brain state exists independently of anyone's ability to "access" them, whatever you mean by access. That is sufficient.
>We don't know what it's like to be them
Meaningless
> and to identify if their mental states really are what they say they are
Irrelevant.
>There shouldn't be this asymmetry if reductionism were true, but there clearly is this asymmetry.
Assertion, still unjustified.
> If there isn't then there wouldn't be a problem of other minds, we wouldn't be able to lie,
That doesn't follow, full stop.
>it would imply we'd have direct knowledge of each others mental states which we clearly don't.
That's just plain wrong. No materialist would suggest a brain has any kind of access to another brain without some kind of mechanism to mediate that connection. "Direct" is also a weasel word, because speech is a way for one brain state to affect the another but there's no meaningful sense in which it's direct.

>>10487704
>That's exactly my point: you're not claiming the subject is the neurons but is somehow over and above the neurons.
The subject is the neurons and some additional material. What is your point?

>The reductionist is claiming there's just the neurons
It's not clear what you're talking about. You seem to keep switching between the subject and consciousness. The subject also has the rest of a body, not just neurons.

>Does clark kent "have" superman...?
Does Clark Kent have consciousness? Yes. Does he have a brain? Yes. I don't know what "having Superman" means or how it's relevant.

>>10487706
>I don't see any distinction.
You're the one who said "identifying via material understanding." You're the one who is going to have to explain what exactly that means, and if it means the same thing as "identifying" then that's the epitome of redundancy. Let's stop with the word games and just stick with "identity" and "identifying" as they are clearly defined, sources included, and are what the OP actually states anyway...
>this is what the entire thread is about, materialism
Reductive materialism to be exact.
>my argument
what argument? I asked you to lay out your argument in premise-conclusion format to see if your argument is valid just like I did and you just ignored it... suspicious...
>Yes.
Sweet, then once you've identified that material phenomenon then you have identified what it is like to be the subject, for the subject and thus my argument takes off.
>If they are reducible then they are not identical
Wrong, see: >>10476648
>this has been my argument from the start.
This is not an argument it's just a failure to understand what reductive materialism is.
>I never said it was beyond science
Yes you did, you claimed I have to be you in order to identify what it is like to be you and that means my matter has to be identical to your matter, but science discovers things through observation and experimentation. If I can't identify what it is like to be you, for you, through the scientific method, as we do for all matter, then you're making some special magical exception for your matter vs. the rest of the entirety of matter.

>>10487720
>You have x
It is the coherence of this very statement that is in question so to use this as support for your argument is to beg the question, which is ludicrous.
>I said P1 means identifying x means you have x.
Except it doesn't and I've already noted how this idea of "you have x" does not cohere with reductive materialism.
>See my response.
Already went through it, it's just as incoherent as claiming clark kent "has" superman. It makes no sense.
>You proved that x=z
See here you go introducing completely new words and terminology that was never in the conversation. You're attacking straw men... I literally just proved that reductive materialism is claiming that x (consciousness) is identical to y (material phenomena). Again, cut the shit and stop trying to construct MY argument for me. Let me make my own arguments and bring my own support, otherwise you should just be talking to yourself as that's the equivalent of what you're doing...
>I already proved that reductive materialism means that x≠y.
You've only proven you're either a liar or illiterate. From the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Reductionism: "This is usually taken to entail that all phenomena (including mental phenomena like consciousness) are identical to physical phenomena."
Source: https://www.iep.utm.edu/red-ism/

Reductive materialism claims x=y.
>That is a definition, deal with it.
hahahaha thanks for admitting you don't have jack shit. You don't have a definition, you just have a synonym which gives no more information than the previous word used. You still have yet to meet your burden of proof for the coherence of this concept of "having a brain" while reductionism being true.

this is probably the most autistic thread i've ever seen

>>10487747
>You're the one who said "identifying via material understanding."
Yes, which presents no distinction, except in your desperate imagination. Your gambit lost, get over it.

>what argument? I asked you to lay out your argument in premise-conclusion format to see if your argument is valid just like I did and you just ignored it... suspicious...
I already did so, and you've ignored it ever since: >>10485853

>Sweet, then once you've identified that material phenomenon then you have identified what it is like to be the subject, for the subject and thus my argument takes off.
No, because you have to have the material phenomena to identify what it's like to be the subject. Identifying the subject having material phenomena does not give you those material phenomena.

>Wrong, see
This does not say anything about them being identical.

>This is not an argument it's just a failure to understand what reductive materialism is.
What part about reductive materialism is wrong?

>Yes you did, you claimed I have to be you in order to identify what it is like to be you and that means my matter has to be identical to your matter, but science discovers things through observation and experimentation.
Most observations and experimentation do not require a specific brain. Identifying what it's like to be the subject does.

>If I can't identify what it is like to be you, for you, through the scientific method
You can, by creating specific material phenomena in your brain in order to copy the subject's brain. So there is no special distinction as I specifically gave you a way in which you could scientifically do it. We simply aren't able to do it now.

>>10487731
>>10487731
>There's that meaningless term again.
What is meaningless about the fact that someone can smell a rose and it smells sweet to them while another smells it and it's bitter to them...? Your pseudo-skepticism is quite hollow, you know exactly what I'm talking about... We each have our own subjective experience of the world, that's why we have different tastes in music, why one enjoys Drake while another hates it. If there is no "what its like" then there wouldn't be these unique experiences, we'd all have exactly the same experience or no experience at all.
>All of this is totally irrelevant
Nice attempt at hand-waiving my proof that there is a clear asymmetry.
>Assertion, still unjustified.
I just gave you the proof and your cognitive dissonance led you to hand-waive it by claiming it "irrelevant", a claim that you failed to justify mind you.
>That doesn't follow, full stop.
Yes actually it does, that's the whole reason there is a problem of other minds is the asymmetry. From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry on Other Minds:
>We do not always know directly that we are in the mental state we are in but what is striking is that we never have direct knowledge that other human beings are in whatever mental state they are in. It is this stark asymmetry that generates the epistemological problem of other minds.
Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/other-minds/

You can stop acting like you know what you're talking about now...

>That's just plain wrong.
You don't need instruments to access your own consciousness, why for others? Even if you had to use instruments, if reductive materialism were true you'd still be able to identify what its like to be them, for them directly since those mental states are identical to whatever phenomena you are identifying. But that's obviously not the case.

>tit for tat
no u!

that's how 95% of this thread reads

>>10487735
>The subject is the neurons and some additional material.
What is this additional material stuff?
>What is your point?
Once you've identified this material stuff that should identify what it is like to be the subject, for the subject if reductive materialism were true.
>I don't know what "having Superman" means
That's exactly what the reductive materialist would claim about "having consciousness" :)
This idea of "having superman" is about as coherent as "having a brain" in this framework.
>how it's relevant.
If x=y then it doesn't make sense to claim x has y, because x simply is y. To have something is to imply a distinction between the thing itself vs. what the thing has, but the reductive materialist is claiming x=y, not that x has y. Just like how clark kent doesn't have superman, clark kent simply is superman.

ITT perpetually baked retard misrepresents reductionism in order to show his misrepresentation is contradictory

>>10487775
the point is not that you won or that you feel right or that you've prevailed over your opponent in the "debate" but that you've come upon some truth. something no one in this thread has done

>>10487756
>It is the coherence of this very statement that is in question so to use this as support for your argument is to beg the question, which is ludicrous.
The basis of your questioning is the argument I already disproved, which is ludicrous.

>Except it doesn't and I've already noted how this idea of "you have x" does not cohere with reductive materialism.
It does and your note is wrong.

>Already went through it, it's just as incoherent as claiming clark kent "has" superman. It makes no sense.
Not an argument.

>See here you go introducing completely new words and terminology that was never in the conversation.
Ironic considering you posted an entire article that says nothing you claimed it said.

>You're attacking straw men... I literally just proved that reductive materialism is claiming that x (consciousness) is identical to y (material phenomena).
What you had to show identical were identifying consciousness and identifying what it's like to be the subject. So you just admitted that your peer reviewed paper is irrelevant to your argument.

>hahahaha thanks for admitting you don't have jack shit. You don't have a definition, you just have a synonym which gives no more information than the previous word used.
I don't see how "having a brain" could be any more informative. Once again, you're pretending to be retarded as a debate tactic.

>>10487768
>Yes, which presents no distinction
So then you were saying "identifying via material understanding" what that you were really saying is "identifying via identifying"... So you were just giving a redundant statement with no additional content or meaning... Wow, real intelligent bro...
>I already did so
That's a totally different argument and you know it, nice try. Our discussion has moved forward long ago from that and you made another argument that I asked you to put into premise-conclusion format. Go back and read, it's not my job to spoon-feed you everything. And I did respond to that post you liar, nice try...
>No
Yup, you just admitted they're identical hence the argument takes off. Your only way out is to claim they're not identical.
>the subject having material phenomena
This coherence of this very statement is still in question. You need to stop begging the question.
>This does not say anything about them being identical.
Holy shit you're retarded, it states it right here: "This is usually taken to entail that all phenomena (including mental phenomena like consciousness) are IDENTICAL to physical phenomena."
Source: https://www.iep.utm.edu/red-ism/

Is the cognitive dissonance that strong that it blinds you to what's directly in front of your face???
>What part about reductive materialism is wrong?
See the OP
>Most observations and experimentation do not require a specific brain.
ALL of science is by observation and experimentation, if I can't identify what it is like to be you, for you using the scientific method since I'd have to be you in order to do that, then you're going beyond science by definition. You're saying science cannot identify what it is like to be the subject, for the subject, that only the subject themselves can.
>So there is no special distinction
Yes there obviously is since you're claiming identifying material phenomena doesn't identify what it is like to be the subject for the subject.

>>10487776
>What is this additional material stuff?
I already said.

>Once you've identified this material stuff that should identify what it is like to be the subject, for the subject if reductive materialism were true.
No, because identifying what it's like to be the subject is dependent on having specific physical phenomena, not identifying them. What you are identifying them with is a different brain from the one you need.

>>10487782
I'm the one and only person here that has given an actual definition of reductionism and also used a peer-reviewed academic resource to do so... if anyone is misrepresenting reductionism the last person it would be is me... fail

>>10487771
lol you fucking idiot your whole argument comes from the use of the word identical... it doesn't mean mathematically equal in this context it means logically coincident... obviously the words mean different things but that doesn't mean you can just say qualia aren't reducible to physical phenomena just because they're not literally the same word

>>10487791
>So then you were saying "identifying via material understanding" what that you were really saying is "identifying via identifying"
No, what I meant is identifying consciousness by identifying material phenomena.

>So you were just giving a redundant statement with no additional content or meaning... Wow, real intelligent bro...
My statement was not that phrase though. Your deranged obsession with a single phrase you took out of context, lied about, then changed your story about multiple times, all for no substantive reason except to disagree, is pathetic. Good night.

>>10487785
>The basis of your questioning is the argument I already disproved
This very statement is grammatical nonsense, this is literal gibberish. A question is not an argument... I asked you a question "how does it make sense to claim x has y if x=y?" and your response is to bypass this crucial question and keep using the very claim in question as support... This is circular reasoning, which is ludicrous.
>It does and your note is wrong.
please explain to me how "clark kent having superman" is remotely coherent...
>Not an argument.
Yeah it is actually, I'm pointing out a contradiction in terms here.
>Ironic considering you posted an entire article that says nothing you claimed it said.
From the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Reductionism: "This is usually taken to entail that all phenomena (including mental phenomena like consciousness) are ***IDENTICAL*** to physical phenomena."
Source: https://www.iep.utm.edu/red-ism/

how many times do I need to smack you down with scholarly sources until you finally wake the fuck up?
>What you had to show identical were identifying consciousness and identifying what it's like to be the subject
that's retarded, those are synonyms. I cited an entire section qualia regarding this long ago, you gotta keep up bud. This entire time x has been consciousness/what it is like to be the subject and y has been material phenomena. reductive materialists claim x=y. See what happens when you attack straw men? You get lost in the field of your own bullshit...
>I don't see how "having a brain" could be any more informative.
If you are the brain, then how does it make sense to say you "have a brain"? that's like saying clark kent "has" superman...

>>10487791
>Holy shit you're retarded, it states it right here: "This is usually taken to entail that all phenomena (including mental phenomena like consciousness) are IDENTICAL to physical phenomena."
Which I have agreed with throughout the thread and is in fact necessary to disprove that reductive materialism doesn't say what P1 claims it said. Stop lying already.

>>10487792
>I already said.
No you didn't, show me: what is the exact material phenomena you are reducing consciousness to?
>No
Yup, look up the very definition of the word "identical". They're supposed to be the exactly the same in EVERY detail.
>having specific physical phenomena,
There's that question begging again...

>>10487800
>>10487809
Lmao he even put stars around it this time

>>10487809
>A question is not an argument...
The basis of your question is. Nice illiteracy.

>please explain to me how "clark kent having superman" is remotely coherent...
Where did I say it was coherent? The only thing I have said about this phrase is that I don't know what it means.

It's clear that you've completely devolved into repeating things I've already disproved and lying about what I've said. I'm done.

>>10487800
>your whole argument comes from the use of the word identical.
I know, which is why I keep asking people what they do not understand about the meaning of the word "identical." I've given a clear definition of this term so I'm not equivocating at all.
>it doesn't mean mathematically equal in this context it means logically coincident...
Definition of Identical: “Similar in every detail; exactly alike.” Synonymous with: “exactly the same,indistinguishable, undifferentiated.”

Source: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/identical

>because they're not literally the same word
Good thing that's not my argument.

>>10487806
>No
So you are drawing a distinction between identifying and material understanding, if not then saying "material understanding" is the same thing as saying "identifying." Dude make up your mind already...
>My statement was not that phrase though.
According to what you said earlier they're equivalent, but now they're not, which is it man.

>>10487810
>You: Which I have agreed with throughout the thread
>Also you: This does not say anything about them being identical.
You're a fucking liar and an idiot... It states outright that reductionism takes them to be identical, wow... that must be some incredibly powerful cognitive dissonance you're experiencing to literally be unable to see what is directly in front of your eyes like this...
>reductive materialism doesn't say what P1 claims it said.
What do you not understand about the meaning of the word "identical"?