/sci/ - Science & Math

Before debating muh consciousness I think it is important to rigorously define what 99% means. Is it 99% of atomic weight? Number of atoms? Moles? Also how do the atoms know they aren't the same.

>>10320069
>But how can he know that he was the same person as before the operation if his brain was almost completely replaced? He would feel no different, right
because what manifests a person is his memories and action, not his physical manifestation brainlet. our body replaces 200-250 billion cells each fucking day, how do you know it's the same person hurr durr

>>10320069
>I have a thought experiment
Do *you*?

>>10320069
Ah, here is where stream of consciousness plays a role. I've already delved into this subject in my studies. Just figure the concept out on your own from there.

>>10320076
>because what manifests a person is his memories and action, not his physical manifestation brainlet. our body replaces 200-250 billion cells each fucking day, how do you know it's the same person hurr durr

You seem to misunderstand the question, but I think I didn't explain the last sentence properly.

Let me ask you this: If YOU went to sleep and someone replaced 5% of your brain, you would wake up and feel the same. But if someone replaced 99% of your brain, how would you feel in the morning?
Your brain structure hasn't changed at all, so you should feel exactly the same. Right?
But how is that possible if your brain has almost completely been replaced. How can you wake up as if it didn't happen?

>>10320075
>I think it is important to rigorously define what 99% means.
Lets just say I mean 99% of everything needed to function. Everything that contributes to a brain's capacity to operate.

>Also how do the atoms know they aren't the same
What do you mean? The question is meant to be about whether the human will feel the same and carry on as if nothing happened at all. He should behave identically on the outside, but how is it possible for him to carry on with his consciousness where he left off before he went to sleep?

>>10320069
>But how can he know
This is the part where the assumption sneaks in that 'he' is thinking.

>>10320098
>>10320069
The person would feel exactly the same, since his brain is not the same as his mind.

I'm not buying it.
If you made an exact clone of me, we wouldn't share the same consciousness. Then take the clone's brain, took mine out, and put the clone's inside my head. Then the clone wakes up in my body and I never should wake up.
But again, what if you only take 99% of the clone's brain and take 1% of mine? Why the fuck would I wake up instead of the clone?
I've read studies that claim that consciousness is a relatively continuous phenomenon and is distributed throughout the brain, so maybe it's some weird amalgamation of our feelings of identity. But I'm mostly just interested in the fact that I can reliably go to sleep each night and expect to open my eyes in the morning feeling like I'm still there, and what it would mean to "mix" me with someone else.

>>10320098
>You seem to misunderstand the question
No, you seem to misunderstand the answer.

>>10320671
Bad answer then, because your various cells get replaced gradually, and most have nothing to do with your stream of consciousness. Replacing 99% of your brain in an operation is very different to your skin replacing its own cells over the course of the day, which will not affect your consciousness

You would need a full 100%, 99% will be incomplete.
But if you charged the electrons in the brain to a full 100% replacement then the previous electrons will be gone and the new will be and feel the same but you might have a slight change to your intelligence.
As in you'll understand one topic to the T but the other...you would need a jog to bring back the charge.

>>10320648
Yes this is exactly what I'm getting at. It's conceivable that you would keep your stream of consciousness when replacing 5% of your brain. But when you replace more and more at a single time, when do you start to lose your stream of consciousness when you wake up?

When does it become a clone, and why does this happen?
Surely your brain matter is what makes up your consciousness. And nothing in your brain's structure was changed, so why does your consciousness change?

>>10320484
But surely the mind depends on the structure of your brain. Maybe structure is the wrong word. By "structure of the brain", I basically mean everything that constitutes a mind. And it should be possible to replace every part of that functioning mind with identical parts from somewhere else, right?

What do you mean the person would feel the same. Would he still consciously be the same or would he be a clone?

>>10321238
>You would need a full 100%, 99% will be incomplete.

But if you replace 99% and keep the other 1% as it is, what is the difference between that and replacing 100%?

Since the 99% is identical, and the 1% is unchanged it should remain 100% the same, right?

>>10320069
I have a theory that conciousness is actually a meta stable object that exists when certain parameters are met. Being able to manipulate these parameters will allow us to mold and shape conciousness alowing us to do extraordinary things such as existing in multiple places at once and achieve different awareness. But to answer your question no you will continue to be you.

Hey op, this comic is unironically helpful to your question:
http://existentialcomics.com/comic/1

>>10320069
This is similar to the transporter that makes a copy and destroys the old one

>Would he wake up as the same person again? He should, since his brain's structure hasn't changed.

Two distinct hypothetical people can have the same structure. So it doesn't logically follow that he is the same person.

If you want my baseless bullshit opinion on it, I think you would be the same "you" if your atoms were slowly replaced, as does happen as you travel from infancy to your death bed. I have no idea, but I suppose 100% of them might be eventually replaced, and I don't think that's a problem. I think consciousness is passed like fire. If you throw wood on a fire for days, the combusting fuel will quickly comprise completely new material, but it's the same fire.

Your Honor, i'm not guilty of that crime, because 100% of my molecules have been replaced since the day in question.

>>10321243
Well, it's completely possible that consciousness is "stored" in a centralized location in the brain (which would change once replaced). However, this is unlikely according to a number of studies and incidents which show that consciousness is more continuous than that (especially concerning brain injury during which consciousness can lower and fluctuate).
I think all we can say is that consciousness is emergent from a swath of neural processes which come together to form this "self aware" sensation we experience, and that what we suggest (say replacing half of someone's brain with that of a clone's) would result in a sort of mixed consciousness that probably wouldn't even feel too different, and that "both of you" would wake up but now you'd be the same person. And not in some schizophrenic way, but just that you'd actually just wake up and feel like you thought a little differently.
It's tempting to think that "someone has to go away" but if consciousness is as emergent and incidental as it seems to be I think you'd both just wake up like you usually do.
Who knows.
My idea a while ago was to get around the "replacing too much" problem by doing a true theseus' ship, by replacing a small amount of the brain, waking the person, making sure they're still them, then putting them back out and replacing another section, etc.
That way you could, say, transfer someone's consciousness into a machine without having the whole "it's just a copy" problem.

>>10321614
That's a great comic.

>>10320069
You didn’t think of this and this is why engineers and computer scientists need to be kept as a segregated slave caste and banned from politics

>>10321937
The whole site is pretty great. The thing about philosophy that most of /sci/ misses is that they too are mostly overrun by brainlets.

>>10320069
Brainlet OP

>>10321944
OP here, I did come up with it completely on my own. Because I used to believe that humans will always be reincarnated over and over again due to our brain atoms being randomly broken apart and put back together by the universe.
I made this thread about it -> >>10319911

>>10321614
Wow that's exactly what I'm talking about in the OP. Thanks a million for that

>>10321902
>and that what we suggest (say replacing half of someone's brain with that of a clone's) would result in a sort of mixed consciousness

But the replaced section is completely identical to the original section, so how could there be a slight difference in consciousness?

>>10322105
well, if you clone someone, they'll have slightly different memories during the interim. that's all i mean. yes, it does seem like they'd be pretty much the same, so i think the both of you would just wake up as one consciousness.

>>10322081
you didn't come up with applying the ship of theseus to the human brain you stupid fucking dunnin-kruger nigger. Its been mentioned hundreds of times on this board and tens of thousands of times on NRx and other pseud forums and ted talks and in break rooms at neuroscience departments in unis all over the world. Fuck off faggot.

>>10320069
Your cells already naturally die and get replaced right?

>>10321243
This is trivial, even a clone cannot occupy the same space twice. Therefore breaking its stream of conciousness from yours immediatly. Now prepare for a mind fucking. What if this clone was a parallel universes version of yourself?

>>10320069
So you are asking when does the impulse of thought form a new identity? Always. You are just arguing over neuronal refresh rates.

>>10322465
You're right, the title is a reference to something that already exists. Wasn't aware that its an old meme though

>>10320069
You lost me there. The person that went to sleep doesn’t exist anymore. That’s how it works in real life independent of any molecule-replacing.

>>10322476
Yeah but the point is that if you replace 99% of a brain with identical matter, it should still behave exactly the same. But what would happen to your consciousness? Your intuition would probably tell you that the brain's consciousness would die, and an exact clone would wake up. Right?

>>10322501
I'm asking why the brain would continue functioning identically, but the original owner of the brain would surely die. Since it's not even his brain anymore. Its just a copy

>>10321243
>It's conceivable that you would keep your stream of consciousness when replacing 5% of your brain.

The apparent, not actually real, stream of consciousness ends every time anyone goes unconscious for any reason.

>>10322523
>Your intuition would probably tell you that the brain's consciousness would die, and an exact clone would wake up. Right?

CONSCIOUSNESS DOES “DIE” EVERY TIME ANYONE SLEEPS SLEEP IS UNCONSCIOUSNESS

>>10322505
That's the point of a fucking meme. They are fundamentals of the universe that have infinitely many presentations.

I Am A Meme Linguist

>>10322523
Because you care about the brain as a mechanical process, given your description. Are you instantly replacing all or asking to describe the time delay between removal of old atom and replacement with new?

>>10322522
Alright, but like I said, if you replace only 5% the person will still be himself. Also, it should be noted that the operation is instant. The atoms neurons matter etc is replaced instantly.

If you replace 25% its conceivable that he will still be himself.

But if you replace large amounts like 99%, the brain will function exactly the same...and that should mean that your consciousness will function the same. Because the structure etc of the brain is exactly the same. But how can your consciousness possibly carry on after the operation when so much of the original brain was taken away. Your consciousness SHOULD still function the same, since it is physically identical. But that can't be the case since almost all of the original brain is gone.

>>10322541
Is there any difference? When you wake up the brain matter will still be identical, whether the operation was instant or not

>>10322527
>>10322530
Yes, and when you wake up your consciousness switches on again. And you know that you never died.

But how can you switch on the brain after replacing most of its matter (but keeping it identical) and wake up "safely", still holding on to the real fact that you never died.

>>10322555
>Alright, but like I said, if you replace only 5% the person will still be himself.

No he won’t. No one is the same person that existed before they fell asleep. That person is dead regardless of any supposed molecule replacements.

>Also, it should be noted that the operation is instant. The atoms neurons matter etc is replaced instantly.

That doesn’t matter.

>If you replace 25% its conceivable that he will still be himself.

It’s not conceivable even if you replaced NO atoms, because consciousness temporarily ends when you go to sleep. Whoever wakes up the next day just inherits the memories.

>But if you replace large amounts like 99%, the brain will function exactly the same...and that should mean that your consciousness will function the same.

You can switch out all of the atoms with identical ones and it would make absolutely no difference to how that person behaves because you stipulated that the atoms are identical.

>Because the structure etc of the brain is exactly the same.

Obviously.

>But how can your consciousness possibly carry on after the operation when so much of the original brain was taken away

You don’t understand. No one’s consciousness “carries over” after they fall asleep. Sleep is, by definition, unconscious. There is no continuity between you and the person that went to bed last night.

>Your consciousness SHOULD still function the same, since it is physically identical. But that can't be the case since almost all of the original brain is gone.

It can be the case, since you stipulated that the replacement atoms are IDENTICAL. Therefore, there will be no change whatsoever in the behavior of the person.

>>10322574
>And you know that you never died.

That’s wrong. I am fully aware that the awareness that inhabited my brain before sleep died when sleep began.

>But how can you switch on the brain after replacing most of its matter (but keeping it identical) and wake up "safely", still holding on to the real fact that you never died.

You did die.

>>10322558
If the gap is long enough for void mechanics to take place and disrupt the ultimate precision of the replacement, yes.

However again a mechanism is required for phase or state changes. So waking up requires a mechanism or process that can operate without direct consciousness.

>>10322579
Not everyone holds the same interpretation of death or die as you do.

>That's relativity for ya

>>10322591
Their interpretation is simply wrong. Awareness ending is, by definition, termination of that awareness. It died.

>>10322595
Yes. But you are the central distribution point for your perspective, not the center others gravitate to.

If others have a less useful toolset for inspection (i.e. a weak understanding of death, the process) then you may have just figured out that people may be waiting for you in their life.

If you aren't THAT willing to share or understand that your definition WOULD help, then you may not be ready to hold responsibility.

You are right though. Death is the last moment of change, when memory meets a new expression (like you are experiencing right now).

>m3m3

>>10322575
>>10322579
>>10322595
Alright, so what if you hypothetically replace 99% of the atoms in the brain instantaneously. Without the person losing consciousness. The person will continue being conscious, right?

But how is that possible without the person dying, being removed from existence with the 99% of his atoms, and being replaced by a clone that believes he's the original?

>>10322612
>Alright, so what if you hypothetically replace 99% of the atoms in the brain instantaneously. Without the person losing consciousness. The person will continue being conscious, right?

Time is quantized at the Planck time, and that’s way smaller than the speed at which neurons communicate, so nothing would be noticed. Brain activity would continue on uninterrupted and thus the perceived “stream of consciousness”.

>But how is that possible without the person dying, being removed from existence with the 99% of his atoms, and being replaced by a clone that believes he's the original?

I find your line of thought very confusing because this is what I think happens literally every moment for everyone.

>>10322629
That process you just described does happen for everyone, but the universe operates only on 1 degree of abstraction. Meaning you are right but the story or physics behind their process might be like a disney film or whatever.

>>10320069
>It is conceivable that a person could go to sleep, have 5% of his brain atoms replaced, and wake up exactly the same.
[citation needed]

>99%
>since his brain structure is still identical.
you're erroneously conflating "feel the same" with "be the same"
you need to go back

>>10322650
They would “be the same” if all atoms are replaced with identical copies.

>>10320648
>>10321243

re: >>10320648 's sleep thing. How do you know that upon waking from sleep is not actually just your consciousness emerging for the first time already imbued with memories.

on the contrary what of the man who is living a continuous stream of waking consciousness but because of brian damage cannot store memories; consequently he continuously feels he has awoken or become alive for the first time to the extreme of repeatedly mentooning upon meeting someone ; "ive never even seen a human before"

>>10321243
I think another interesting consideration is if you split the brian (e.g. 10% - 90%) and then added each split to the clone of the other so you have two new identical copies of you made using your brian. If you were to split yoir brian, can one part be the "you" and not the other? can they both be?

also wouldnt replacing 20, 48, 99% of your bria be similar to some other conscious entity having n% added to them, spawning a new brian. The clone is immediately brought into existence but he cannot be you.

Another point here is also the assumption that ourselves has some kind of unique brain structure is false. our brians continuously changes structure over our lives.

my intuition is that the essentialistic view of self and stream of self is scientifically illusory. all of your possible brian states are products of the brians functional connective structure and its initial inputs at synapse0. These states can be theoretically recreated by some maxwellian daemon at any point in time and the continuity between them we normally experience is in no way necessary.

>>10320069
identity is in the structure, not in the substrate.

>>10323981
identity isnt in the substrate either lad.

cunt

>>10323981
>>10324616
The point wasn't actually about "identity", it was about how can a consciousness can survive an operation like this. Logic tells me that it should stay the same, since the brain is identical before and after the operation. But logic also tells me that you would die and be replaced by a clone of yourself, instead of surviving the operation