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>> No.15503800 [View]
File: 21 KB, 313x500, Suffering-Focused Ethics.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
15503800

>>15496055
Ecocide is a good thing. Nature has a huge amount of suffering, and destroying nature as much as possible will result in reducing wild animal populations, which means less wild animal suffering.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Dp6gObE9eA
https://www.abolitionist.com/wild-animal-suffering.pdf
https://reducing-suffering.org/should-we-intervene-in-nature/

>> No.14593010 [View]
File: 21 KB, 313x500, Suffering-Focused Ethics.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
14593010

>>14592644
What does /sci/ think of Magnus Vinding's attempt to debunk simulation theory? He thinks that advanced aliens would be utilitarians, and that reality would be a utopia if it were a simulation.

http://magnusvinding.blogspot.com/2015/01/why-simulation-hypothesis-is-almost.html

>As a general matter, speculations about a world beyond, or behind, our own are bound to be highly speculative. Because, first, we do not know whether such a world exists, and, second, even if it does, many things we know from the world we observe cannot necessarily be applied to say anything about other worlds. This is one reason to seriously doubt the simulation hypothesis: it rests on the assumption that the world in which the simulation is supposed to take place is much like our own, and given the vast space of possible simulations, this seems fantastically unlikely. So, strangely, if we accept the hypothesis that we are living in a simulation, the purported basis of the simulation hypothesis itself seems of questionable validity, and that is rarely a good sign for a hypothesis – when it seems to pull the rug under its own feet.

>There are better reasons to doubt that we should be living in a simulation, though. For the simulation hypothesis also rests upon the assumption that we will one day be running realistic simulations of our past. Yet just how likely is it that we, ourselves and our descendants, will run such functional, conscious copies of our own past? This is finally a question that does not borderline on the extremely esoteric, as it relates directly, and exclusively, to the world we know and can know, and we should therefore – unlike when it comes to answering the question about whether a world wherein our world is simulated would resemble our world the slightest – at least be able to provide some sort of hint as to what the answer to this question might be.

>> No.14553767 [View]
File: 21 KB, 313x500, Suffering-Focused Ethics.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
14553767

>>14552196
If we live in a simulation, the question becomes why the world we live in seems to suck so much. If the creators of the simulation are utilitarians, the simulated reality they would create would probably be a utopia.

http://magnusvinding.blogspot.com/2015/01/why-simulation-hypothesis-is-almost.html

>> No.14544931 [View]
File: 21 KB, 313x500, Suffering-Focused Ethics.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
14544931

One argument against the simulation hypothesis is that the reality we live in isn't a utopia. If the creators of the simulation are utilitarians, there's no reason they would create a reality that sucks as much as this one.

http://magnusvinding.blogspot.com/2015/01/why-simulation-hypothesis-is-almost.html

>As a general matter, speculations about a world beyond, or behind, our own are bound to be highly speculative. Because, first, we do not know whether such a world exists, and, second, even if it does, many things we know from the world we observe cannot necessarily be applied to say anything about other worlds. This is one reason to seriously doubt the simulation hypothesis: it rests on the assumption that the world in which the simulation is supposed to take place is much like our own, and given the vast space of possible simulations, this seems fantastically unlikely. So, strangely, if we accept the hypothesis that we are living in a simulation, the purported basis of the simulation hypothesis itself seems of questionable validity, and that is rarely a good sign for a hypothesis – when it seems to pull the rug under its own feet.

>There are better reasons to doubt that we should be living in a simulation, though. For the simulation hypothesis also rests upon the assumption that we will one day be running realistic simulations of our past. Yet just how likely is it that we, ourselves and our descendants, will run such functional, conscious copies of our own past? This is finally a question that does not borderline on the extremely esoteric, as it relates directly, and exclusively, to the world we know and can know, and we should therefore – unlike when it comes to answering the question about whether a world wherein our world is simulated would resemble our world the slightest – at least be able to provide some sort of hint as to what the answer to this question might be.

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