/sci/ - Science & Math

>>12651541
>Definitions are abstract too.
Applying concreteness to abstractions of physicality is just as erroneous as applying concreteness to the mental itself. Consciousness isn't anything transcendental or mystic, merely a subjective form of intellectual feeling. One can consider mind and brain as the same ontological thing observed from fundamentally different viewpoints, but the subjective viewpoint cannot be reduced to the other.
>Mental is physical
It is as true to say that the mental is physical, as it is to say that the physical is mental.
>All purely physical. Try again.
All processual. Not purely physical, as the mental state is included in organization of the body. The only significance of 'physicality' is denoting it from the abstract and non-physical, since substance is merely a type of process.
>To say that every unit-event [i.e. something that happens to these supposedly experiencing entities]... has a mental aspect means that it has a degree—however slight in the most elementary events—of spontaneity or self-determination. Although the event’s physical pole is given to it, its mentality is its capacity to decide precisely what to make of its given foundation. Its physicality is its relation to past actuality; its mentality involves its prehension of ideality or possibility, through which it escapes total determination by the past
The mental aspect and free will are evidenced by, and to account for, quantum mechanics.

>It’s obvious how a statement such as “Consciousness does not exist” involves a performative contradiction, but a statement such as “Consciousness is merely an epiphenomenon” runs afoul of performative consistency, too. If the uttered statement means what the speaker intended, then it must be conceded that her mind has had an effect on her body. If the statement was affirmed because the speaker thought it was true, then she must have had the freedom to let herself be motivated by an ideal such as truth.