/sci/ - Science & Math

>>3542520
"Murder is bad" may be falsifiable if your axiomatic framework contains an "ought" axiom. You cannot derive an "ought" axiom from purely "is" axioms.

>>3542518
To continue, the problem with this entire thread is this ambiguity and dual definition-ness of some words, like good and bad.

Good and bad can be measures of factual claims, like the levels of certain chemicals in the brain (as Sam Harris is fond of doing), and good and bad can be obligations.

In fact, people go between these definitions frequently mid-sentence. This lack of clarity, both on paper and in the minds of some people, is the cause of all of this confusion.

>>3542510
Depends on how you define "good" and "bad". If you define good and bad as factual claims, then you have to justify the argument that one ought to do good and one ought not do bad.

If you define "good" and "bad" as descriptions of obligation, then you've given no way to discover these obligations, as obligations are not discoverable via factual evidence.

>>3542503
Total agreement. I've been trying to say more or less that.

>>3542496
>What is the importance of defending it at all?

Some short answers are "Because I like it", "Because I learn from others when I do so", and so on.

The shortest answer is "Because I want to".

>>3542493
Dunno. I'm not trying to make any broader claim than that. I'm just trying to make the claim that morals are not discoverable nor falsifiable.

>>3542479
Perhaps this is what you're trying to ask?

An "is statement" is a factual claim. An "ought statement" is a statement of duty, or obligation. These two kinds of claims are disjoint, that is there is no factual claim which is an ought claim, and there is no ought claim which is a factual claim. They are separated by many things. One such thing is their literal English construction.

"Is" statements come in two kinds, the falsifiable, and the unfalsifiable.

"Ought" statements come in only one kind, the unfalsifiable. Now to be clear, if you accept another ought statement as a premise, then one can deduce another ought statement as true or false, but this is not falsification. This is logical deduction.

>>3542487
I don't know what that means. I'm not sure I particularly care.

>>3542479
I don't understand what you're trying to get at. I have made no such claim. I am merely trying to defend Hume's is-ought separation, and consequently I am attempting to show that morality is not discoverable, and consequently "objective morality" is a practically meaningless idea, just as meaningless as Platonic Ideals

>>3542459
Nope. I cannot justify with rational, logic, argument why inductive reasoning works. It's undefendable. It is.

>>3542452
>"A society where people dont murder each other is an ideal society" is falsiable?

Define ideal. Under some meanings, yes. Under some meanings, no.

Example: An "ideal" society (one of many, aka not in the superlative sense) is one in which a vast supermajority of the human population would like to live. Then it is a falsifiable claim that a society must have a small number of murders to be ideal.

Example: "Ideal" is defined as what ought to be. Then the following claim is unfalsifiable: A society where people don't murder each other is ideal.

>>3542444
Offend? No. Just a pet peeve. It makes it sound all mystical when you say that observing something changes what it does, which carries the implicit connotation "without interference" with some people, especially those who don't know quantum physics.

>>3542442
>Yet you also cannot prove why falsifiability is an important criteria for something without bridging the "is-ought" gap via a value claim.

False.

>Claiming that falsifiability is an important criteria is, ultimately, a value claim. One that I happen to agree with, but a value claim nonetheless.

Indeed.

You are confused though. I never tried to justify science and inductive reasoning. I claim that axiomatically, without justification, at all.

>>3542435
I repeat, the future collapse of the universe seems unlikely given what we currently know.

>>3542432
>As I'm guessing you know, the act of observing a particle in a particular place can cement it there (otherwise known as collapsing its wavefunction).

I've always hated this. It's a pet peeve of mind. There is no such thing as observation on that scale, only interaction.

>>3542413
This conversation is wallowing in ambiguity. I also am having problems following it.

"This bread is an ideal piece of bread" can be a falsifiable claim, and it can be unfalsifiable, depending on the exact meanings of the words. If you define "ideal piece of bread" as a piece of bread ~12 in long, 4 in high, 4 in wide, then this is a measurable property.

"Murders are bad" is not a falsifiable claim. One cannot go out and perform a measurement that demonstrates that one side is right, and one side is wrong.

Oh, don't get me wrong, I'm sure someone's thinking we can go out and demonstrate how this is bad because it negatively affects conscious minds, but in that case we're just moving the problem from "murder is bad" to "negatively affecting conscious minds is bad". We've done nothing to bridge the is-ought gap. To be clear, one can deduce an ought from a set of 'is's and 'ought's, where the set contains at least one ought, but one cannot deduce an ought from a set of purely 'is's.

>>3542388
I'm just arguing in favor of Hume's is-ought distinction, and little more.

>>3542374
Very Platonic Ideal-y in here.

What is an ideal piece of bread. Can you recognize it if you see it? Can you prove that it's not?

If we further refine the concept "ideal" to mean simply measurable concepts, then yes. If you keep "ideal" as this nebulous, ill defined idea, then no.

There is no way to refine "murders are bad" to be simply a sum of measurable concepts.

>>3542341
Seems unlikely given current knowledge of cosmology.

>>3542325
I think we're getting confused. Let me take a step back.

When one talks about the ideal way to make bread, there are implicitly understood measures of "better". This is not discussing "oughts". This is merely discussing efficiency. No one is arguing that one ought to make bread in the fastest way, or most efficient way. It's merely an implicit axiom.

When arguing about objective morality as we are, we are talking about "oughts". We're not discussing what is the most efficient and effective plan to minimize the number of murders, like we are with the bread. We're discussing whether we even ought to minimize murders at all.

>>3542305
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_of_an_expanding_universe

>>3542297
>I dont think its measurable. To say measure, implies that it is adhering to a deeper standard, but thats the morality to begin with. Does that make any sense?
Sorry, no. I don't understand what it might mean for something to be better without a measure of some kind. That's simply what the word "better" means.

>>3542297
>No I meant live.
Well, this is unfortunate. I feared this response.

I think you're wrongly conflating "ideal world" with "morality". Knowing morality in its absolute truth, were such a thing possible, is not the same thing as living in the ideal world.

Let us grant for the moment that we can "know" that murder is simply wrong. This is knowing absolute morality. However, it may be that the physics of the situation simply require that someone is going to be murdered, aka not living in the ideal world.

>>3542297
>There is a hypothetical ideal way of making it, that we certainly wont do the first time we try and make bread.
False analogy. With making bread, there are implicitly understood empirical measures, such as the quality of bread, the efficiency of use of ingredients and time, etc.

If you want to fiat analogous measures for morality, then you've committed the fallacy of begging the question. You argue that we can discover morals by using a measure which is itself morals.