Terrible plato translations

[Anonymous No.21535298]

Plato is simplistic and to the point, the language is embellished but not wasteful, its not cartoonishly eloquent like an anglo movie villain; which translation of plato is most to-the-point?

[Anonymous No.21535308]

>>21535298
just get the regular complete works edition. retarded anons here shit on it all the time for having simplistic language.

[Gok No.21535323]

>>21535308
Platos language is like entry-level attic greek, if its simple it must be good

[Anonymous No.21535327]

>>21535298
Focus Philosophical Library, plus Bloom's Republic

[Anonymous No.21535330]

>>21535323
Forgot to remove namefag

[Anonymous No.21535371]

>>21535308
This or Jowett should do the trick. I read Jowett's first but then bought the Grube version cause I wanted something complete and also more colloquial.

[Anonymous No.21535403]

>>21535308
>regular complete works edition
there are multiple complete works editions?

>>21535371
>Jowett
his intros are almost like a companion book, sometimes longer than the piece itself. I am not sure how I feel about it. Sometimes the information is very good but other times he is just listing line by line what will be said in the coming dialogue or other dialogues.

[Anonymous No.21535412]

>>21535403
He means the cooper one

[Anonymous No.21535531]

>>21535403
He means the one still in print, not the Greek text only versions that sold 10 copies in 1890.

[Anonymous No.21535533]

>>21535403
Also about Jowett I have never read his intros. the Great Books of the Western World does not include them. That edition is a quick compilation of all the major dialogues.

[Anonymous No.21535667]

>>21535531
>Greek text only versions that sold 10 copies
to my understanding he made them the standard for over a century

>>21535533
>Also about Jowett I have never read his intros
They are long but they but they do hold valuable information. He compares some to biblical passages, which he may be doing to connect to his audience or he may be doing to show the influence Hellenism had on Christianity.

[Anonymous No.21535784]

>>21535667
> to my understanding he made them the standard for over a century

I’m not talking about Jowett since Jowett never translated the entire corpus of what is attributed to Plato. I am talking about the other minuscule attempts. The Hackett Plato is the ONLY complete translation of his texts in English in the past 100 something years.

[Anonymous No.21535859]

>>21535784
>Jowett never translated the entire corpus of what is attributed to Plato
>Hackett Plato is the ONLY complete translation
is there something his translations or intros are lacking in particular? Have journal publications moved on? I am a bit hesitant if it is pure endorsement of the "end dead white men" philosophy era.

[Anonymous No.21535967]

>>21535859
I've read Hackett and I have no complaints whatsoever. Maybe other anons prefer bitching and whining about inexact levels of eloquence in their translations over reading. The Hackett translation was extremely clear and transparent.

[Anonymous No.21535971]

>>21535859
> I am a bit hesitant if it is pure endorsement of the "end dead white men" philosophy era.

Dude wtf? Stfu. There is no point talking to someone like you bringing this shit up out of nowhere.

[Anonymous No.21536033]

>>21535971
>no point talking to someone like you bringing this shit up out of nowhere
a product of the era of academia I was introducted into. Some generations, the professors want to look at everything in terms of Social Darwinism others in Materialism others in Feminist critique. The latest of my schooling was lambasting western philosophy as the ramblings of "dead white men" and so I want to make sure I know if a popular contemporary critique/rec is coming from that crowds dogma or a place or seeking truth.

[Anonymous No.21536051]

>>21536033
No. it's fucking NOT. It's a collection of translations of Plato's texts as well as all the spurious stuff. It is only colloquial in that it's easy to read language for the modern eye and not archaic 19th century idioms. Get a fucking grip please.

[Anonymous No.21536135]

>>21536051
>It is only colloquial in that it's easy to read language for the modern eye and not archaic 19th century idioms.
oh, good

[Anonymous No.21536537]

>>21535298
Comparisons (Apology 17c-18a):

Jowett
>And I must beg of you to grant me a favor: If I defend myself in my accustomed manner, and you hear me using the words which I have been in the habit of using in the agora, at the tables of the money-changers, or anywhere else, I would ask you not to be surprised, and not to interrupt me on this account. For I am more than seventy years of age, and appearing now for the first time in a court of law, I am quite a stranger to the language of the place; and therefore I would have you regard me as if I were really a stranger, whom you would accuse if he spoke in his native tongue, and after the fashion of his country: Am I making an unfair request of you? Never mind the manner, which may or may not be good; but think only of the truth of my words, and give heed to that: let the speaker speak truly and the judge decide justly.

Fowler
>And, men ofAthens, I urgently beg and beseech you if you hear me making my defence with the same words with which I have been accustomed to speak both in the market place at the bankers tables, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, not to be surprised or to make a disturbance on this account. For the fact is that this is the first time I have come before the court, although I am seventy years old; I am therefore an utter foreigner to the manner of speech here. Hence, just as you would, of course, if I were really a foreigner, pardon me if I spoke in that dialect and that manner in which I had been brought up, so now I make this request of you, a fair one, as it seems to me, that you disregard the manner of my speech—for perhaps it might be worse and perhaps better—and observe and pay attention merely to this, whether what I say is just or not; for that is the virtue of a judge, and an orator's virtue is to speak the truth.

[Anonymous No.21536544]

>>21536537
West
>And, men of Athens, I do very much beg and beseech this of you: if you hear me speaking in my defense with the same speeches I am accustomed to speak both in the marketplace at the money-tables, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, do not wonder or make a disturbance because of this. For this is how it is: now is the first time I have come before a law court, at the age of seventy; hence I am simply foreign to the manner of speech here. So just as, if I really did happen to be a foreigner, you would surely sympathize with me if I spoke in the dialect and way in which I was raised, so also I do beg of you now (and it is just, at least, as it seems to me): leave aside the manner of my speech--for perhaps it may be worse, but perhaps better--and instead consider this very thing and apply your mind to this: whether the things I say are just or not. For this is the virtue of a judge, while that of an orator is to speak the truth.

Greek
>καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαικαὶ παρίεμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητέ μου ἀπολογουμένου δι᾽ ὧνπερ εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἄλλοθι, μήτεθαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτου ἕνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὑτωσί. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγονὼς ἑβδομήκοντα· ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὤν, συνεγιγνώσκετε δήπου ἄν μοι εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳἔλεγον ἐν οἷσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὥς γέ μοι δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἐᾶν—ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη—αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή· δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή, ῥήτορος δὲ τἀληθῆ λέγειν.

[Anonymous No.21536561]

>>21536544
>ἀτεχνῶς

what part of the translations does this correspond to?

[Anonymous No.21536587]

>>21536561
Jowett and Fowler don't render it, West translates it as "simply", which is the colloquial meaning, though with Plato there's probably a pun about how he doesn't speak by art like orators or sophists.

[Anonymous No.21537546]

Bump

[Anonymous No.21537556]

Plato should be a light read. Since the translations lose a lot of his meaning, you should rely more on secondary sources. By all means, try to make sense of him directly but know that you aren't going to understand him fully that way

[Anonymous No.21537610]

>>21537556
Do you have any examples in mind to back up your view?

[Anonymous No.21537942]

This could be a really interesting topic, but it doesn't seem to be moving beyond assertions of Plato as having a simple style (Xenophon is much simpler), and asserting Jowett's good. Can we get more comparisons about what's good or bad with translations?

[Anonymous No.21538227]

>>21537942
>Can we get more comparisons about what's good or bad with translations?
>asserting Jowett's good
I unfortunately cannot make that judgement as unlike my previous generations, have never learned Latin or Greek. What I can is give a brief view of the the intros to the sections.


In Gorgias Plato makes the several points to Polus, one being that it is better to suffer for wrong doing than not to suffer. These are how the intros give context for that exchange. Jowett is only an excerpt of addressing point which goes on for more than a page.

>Cooper/Hackett
Polus is intoxicated with the thought that rhetoric gives the power to do what one pleases even injustices if that suits the situation. Against him, Socrates insists that in fact it is better to suffer injustice than to do it- and, unable to deny this consistently, Polus in his turn falls to Socrates' dialectic.
>Hamilton/Cairns
These statements astonish Polus and dismay him even while Socrates makes them, but he sees that they result inevitably from the argument.
>Jowett (excerpt)
...He is speaking not of the consciousness of happiness, but of the idea of happiness. When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier falls in battle, we do not suppose that death or wounds are without pain, or that their physical suffering is always compensated by a mental satisfaction. Still we regard them as happy, and we would a thousand times rather have their death than a shameful life. Nor is this only because we believe that they will obtain an immortality of fame, or that they will have crowns of glory in another world, when their enemies and persecutors will be proportionably tormented....

[Anonymous No.21538257]

>>21538227
I like Allen Bloom.

[Anonymous No.21538309]

>>21538227
sorry no edit feature on 4channel. the hamilton/cairns quote should be the line before that.
>>Hamilton/Cairns
Slowly his is driven by Socrates to the conclusion that far becuase to do wrong is misery; to suffer wrong is as nothing in comparision. Furthermore, the wrongdoer is not punished, as is the case of the powerful, is more miserable than the one who is.

>>21538257
>Allen Bloom.
>gay jew who died from AIDS by his asian lover
unfortunately don't think he did a complete works so I can't compare him

[Anonymous No.21538340]

>>21538309
Plato is basically Jewish himself so it's a nice compliment. He has to be read with gloves on anyway.

[Anonymous No.21538416]

>>21535298
i got the Rouse ones. are these bad?

[Anonymous No.21538517]

>>21536051
Dude chill. Plato was wrong anyway.

[Anonymous No.21538683]

>>21538227
I can supply a similar passage from the Nichols introduction to his translation of Gorgias.

>Third, near the beginning of the discussion (448d-e), Socrates distinguishes rhetoric from dialectic or conversation. He characterizes Polus's first speech about Gorgias' s art as rhetorical, because it failed to say what the art is and instead said *what kind of* thing it is and praised it as if it had been attacked. Dialectic, we are left to presume, answers the question *what a thing is*. But when Socrates later overturns Polus' s assertion that doing injustice without paying a just penalty is better than suffering injustice, the whole refutation turns on the premise granted by Polus (474c) that doing injustice is baser than suffering injustice; it rests, in other words, on an assertion of *what kind of* thing injustice is without making clear *what* it is. At this crucial point of the discussion, then, Socrates refutes rhetorically rather than investigates dialectically. May we not infer that Socrates is concerned with rhetoric to an exceptional degree in this dialogue?

>>21538309
Why would Bloom have to have done a "complete works" translation, if we're just comparing translations? My only issue with his Republic is that he uses four terms for kalos, beautiful, fine, fair, and noble. I can get translating it as "noble" for moral beauty, but it muddies it up to use variations of "beautiful" when you can just use "beautiful".

[Anonymous No.21539473]

>>21538416
>>21536537
>>21536544
Rouse
>One thing, however, gentlemen, I beg and pray you most earnestly; if you hear me using to defend myself here the same words which I speak with generally, in the market or banker's counter, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, do not be surprised and make a noise on that account. The fact is, this is the first time I ever came up before a court, although I am seventy years old; so I am simply quite strange to the style of this place. If I were really a stranger, a foreigner, I suppose you would not be hard on me if I used the language and manner which I had been brought up to; then I beg you to treat me the same way now, and, as seems fair, to let pass my manner of speaking; perhaps it might be better, and perhaps it might be worse; but please consider only one thing and attend carefully to that--whether my plea is just or not. For that is the merit of the juryman, but the merit of the orator is to speak the truth.

Let me throw in Mark Kremer's:
>And above everything, Athenian men, I beg and implore this of you. If you hear me defend myself with the very speeches I am accustomed to speak both in the marketplace at the counters, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, neither be amazed nor clamor because of this. For it holds thus: for the first time, before a court of justice I come, at the age of seventy. Therefore, I am simply foreign to the ways of speaking here. If I happened to be a foreigner, you would surely sympathize with me if I spoke in the dialect and way in which I was raised, likewise I also beg it of you now, and it is just as it appears to me. Disregard my way of speaking, for perhaps it is worse, perhaps better, but rather consider this alone and apply your mind to it: whether or not the things I say are just. For this is the virtue of a judge, that of an orator, to speak the truth.

[Anonymous No.21539494]

>>21535298
Get all the Straussian translations. They're the most accurate.

[Anonymous No.21539506]

>>21539494
You only like him cause he's alt-right.

[Anonymous No.21539517]

>>21539506
No, I like them because they're the best translations for someone who can't read Greek. Strauss and his students thought Plato was fucking smart and wrote smart, so they tend to translate accurately. I appreciate that.

[Anonymous No.21539520]

>>21539517
Yeah sure.

[Anonymous No.21539643]

Go Jowett or go home

[Anonymous No.21539704]

>>21539506
>>21539520
Nta, but the West and Kremer translations above are both Straussian, and arguably closer to the Greek.

Let's look at some details.

The Greek line "o andres athenaioi" is moved by Jowett to a sentence preceding (I'm not sure if that means he has a manuscript variant; we'll grant him this without investigating more, since there's other little issues with his renderings). Fowler, West, and Kremer all agree on straightforwardly translating it as "men of Athens". Rouse translates it as "gentlemen"; 1) the Athenian Greek phrase for "gentleman" is "kalos kagathos" (lit. "Someone beautiful and good"), 2) Socrates is actually being disrespectful towards the jurors, who, per existing court cases of the rhetoricians, one calls judges, which Socrates declines to do until talking with his friends at the end of Apology, who he goes out of his way to call his judges.

Jowett and Fowler both ignore the use of the word "atechnos" (lit. "Artlessly") when Socrates first compares himself to a foreigner. West, Rouse, and Kremer all translate it according to its colloquial use, "simply"; West includes a footnote about both uses. Rouse includes a repetition afterwards ("a stranger, a foreigner") not in the Greek (both "stranger" and "foreigner" are acurate enough translations of "xenos"; Greeks from other cities, and so of other customs and dialects, would be counted as "xenoi", so it's not exclusive to non-Greeks).

Following the foreigner passage, Socrates entreats the Athenians to ignore the manner of his speech, but with the aside that such would be just. Fowler, West, Rouse, and Kremer all agree on that reading, though Rouse and Fowler translate "dikaion" as "fair", which isn't necessarily so far off the mark, but which implies "fairness" in the modern sense, when the Greek word Socrates uses is the same that's the theme of the Republic, "justice"; Jowett turns the passage into a rhetorical question by Socrates and renders "dikaion" as "unfair".

Later in the same sentence, Socrates judges how his speaking might come across, "perhaps x, perhaps y"; Socrates uses the words "cheiron" and "beltion", "worse/inferior" and "better" respectively. Jowett reduces the two words to "good" ("may or may not be good"); Rouse switches the order, perhaps to suit more natural English phrasing (no biggie, not compared to Jowett). Fowler, West, and Kremer preserve the order.

(Cont.)

[Anonymous No.21539791]

>>21539704
Following, Socrates exhorts the Athenians what to focus on. There are two verbs, "skopein" (lit. look/watch) and "prosechein" (hold fast); Fowler, West, Rouse, and Kremer all render the verbs just fine, though only West and Kremer preserve Socrates' use of "noun" ("mind") with the second verb. Jowett elides it with the following clause in a curious way. All the translators but Jowett render the Greek such that what Socrates tells the Athenians to attend to is whether his speech is just ("dikaia") or not; Jowett translates "dikaia" as "truth", which covers up the philosophically interesting issue of whether speaking justly is the same as speaking the truth (consider the Republic on medicinal lies).

Finally, Socrates makes a claim about what judges and orators do. Fowler, West, and Kremer are close here, bringing out that Socrates speaks of the virtue ("arete") of a judge and the corresponding virtue of an orator; Fowler's minor change is a repetition of "virtue" that isn't in the Greek, but no biggie. Rouse translates it curiously as "merit", which is alright but imprecise in the sense of being good at something (the other accurate translation of "arete" is "excellence"), but it would be wrong if it implied having to earn something, instead of the innate characteristic excellence of a being, as Plato uses it. Jowett doesn't acknowledge the word in his rendering. He turns Socrates statement into something hortatory, "let x do y", switches the order of the judges and orators, and supplies a verb and adverb not present in the Greek ("decide justly"). His choice to translate "rhetoros" ("rhetors/orators") as "speaker" seems poor since Socrates has just made a big effort to show how he's not a skilled speaker like the rhetoricians/orators, who, after all, are represented by one of his three accusers, Lycon.

All in all, West and Kremer, the Straussians, are slavish to the Greek and usually attentive to the order of Greek phrasing. Fowler is very close to them. Rouse takes some liberties here and there, but some might just be differences in the meanings of words from when he translated and now. Jowett takes a bunch of liberties, sometimes eliding clauses, sometimes ignoring important words, sometimes mangling the grammar, for what's admittedly a more readable product, but less philosophically sharp or rewarding (for a close reader) paraphrase.

[Anonymous No.21540406]

>>21536537
>>21536544
>>21539473
A more modern version, by George Theodoridis:

>Don’t be surprised or disturbedin the slightest, gentlemen if, as I go on with my defence speech, I use words which I always use in public, at the tables of the market place,say, or elsewhere in the city, places where many of you would have heard me speak. I repeat, don’t be shocked because, you see, with me, it is like this: I am seventy years old and yet this is the very first time I have ever appeared here, in a court of law and so I am totally unprepared and unacquainted with the ways people speak here.
So, then gentlemen, treat me, please as you would a stranger and be tolerant of the language I use, the language I grew up with and this, I believe, gentlemen that this is a fair request. Do not judge me, gentlemen by the quality of my speech, whether it is good or bad but judge me only by this single thing: whether I am telling the truth or not. This, after all is the judge’s skill and duty, to judge if the speaker speaks the truth. The duty of the speaker is to tell it.

[Anonymous No.21540589]

>>21539643
That says “complete” but it is not the entire corpus as Jowett never translated the Seventh Letter or any of the spurious ones or his poetry.

[Anonymous No.21540595]

>>21535308
>the regular complete works edition
I'd imagine there are like 30 different "complete Plato"s

[Anonymous No.21540611]

>>21540595
See >>21540589
only the Hackett one is actually complete.

[Anonymous No.21540616]

>>21540595
Not really, there's the Cooper-edited Hackett, the collected (but not complete) edition edited by Hamilton and Cairns, and some sketchy edition that might be repackaged public domain translations by someone named Jake Stief.

[Anonymous No.21540617]

>>21540589
Plato wrote poetry?

Also isn't it basically a shitshow as to trying to decipher which of the letters are or aren't fake?

[Anonymous No.21540636]

>>21540617
Nta, but there are epigrams attributed to him.

Everyone butts heads over the letters, and most are dismissed today on grounds of content (as either not befitting things Plato would seem to write about, or not befitting his philosophy on account of this or that interpretation of it). It's notable that the Academy never protested their inclusion in canons like that of Thrasyllus, whereas just about every ancient knew dialogues like Halcyon, Demodocus, Sisyphus, On Virtue and On Justice were spurious, though that doesn't really settle it definitively either. Stylometric tests of the Seventh Letter pretty often end up with solid matches to the style of something late like the Laws. The most notable stylometric test to cast it as spurious was a test from the 70s that I remember having to compare a letter claiming to be from the end of his life with the Apology, a dialogue the testers admit would be an early writing, but which they justified on account of similar length.

[Anonymous No.21540663]

>>21535298
https://www.ostarapublications.com/product/the-republic/

Here. All other edition are garbage kike shit

[Anonymous No.21540667]

>>21538517
Kys.

>>21539494
Is Strauss a German Neo-Con?

[Anonymous No.21540674]

>>21540667
Strauss is like a neocon mixed with alt-righter. I remember reading his essay on the Republic and it was filled with lots of political ramblings that were barely relevant to the actual point of the text.

[Anonymous No.21540741]

>>21540667
No, but a solid fourth to fifth of his students are retard neocons. Another fifth are MAGA, another fifth anonymous politico wonks no one has heard of, and two fifths are scholars who are alternately amazing or embarassing.

>>21540674
He literally points to and cites passages of the Republic on about every page of that essay, maybe you just don't know how to read.

[Anonymous No.21541031]

>>21539704
>>21539791
thanks anon. it seems West and Kremer will be the most precise, and avoid the most misunderstandings. however, which ones are the most dutifully annotated? commentary similar to, but not as dense as yours, would go a long way. or maybe instead of commentary, useful secondary literature to keep alongside?

[Anonymous No.21541493]

>>21541031
>however, which ones are the most dutifully annotated?
West's edition has plenty of footnotes explaining historical references and personages, and detailing the Greek in a concise way, and it's preceded by a solid introduction that's helpful without doing all the work for a reader. The edition itself also comes with translations of the Euthyphro, Crito, and Aristophanes' Clouds (collected as Four Texts on Socrates).

Kremer's edition is sparse on notes, though supplies some basic ones on historical references. It's paired with a similarly close translation of Xenophon's version of the Apology, and they're both followed by an interpretive essay that's good, but probably more tendentious than West's.

[Anonymous No.21541507]

>>21541031
As for secondary lit, Burnett's notes are very helpful (they point out, for example, how many rhetorical speeches contemporary with the trial start off the same way as Socrates' speech). Strauss has a lecture course on the Apology and Crito (and I think Xenophon's Apology) that's very detailed and interesting, with lots of good background and comparisons with other dialogues:

https://leostrausscenter.uchicago.edu/plato-apology-and-crito-autumn-1966/

(Pdf link is at bottom of page)

[Anonymous No.21541589]

>>21541493
>>21541507
thank you kindly.

[Anonymous No.21541886]

>>21540667
No, he's an atheist who rejected the claims of divine revelation (e.g. Christianity/Judaism), but respected their ability to avoid refutation by philosophers.
I honestly prefer the work of some of his students. Bruell's book on Socrates is fucking amazing, and his commentary on the Metaphysics hasn't seen seen an equal in probably 800 years.

[Anonymous No.21541900]

>>21540741
>No, but a solid fourth to fifth of his students are retard neocons. Another fifth are MAGA, another fifth anonymous politico wonks no one has heard of, and two fifths are scholars who are alternately amazing or embarassing
Gave me a good chuckle, anon. I studied under some of them in my undergrad (David Bolotin, and he was amazing, very subtle, sensitive thinker). Straussians have a reputation for being conservatives because they tend to reject relativism. Other Straussians grift the Republican Party by pretending to be MAGA or conservative and so get that sweet funding (Pangle is one of these).

All told, they're useful to clue you in that ancient writers communicated their thoughts very differently than we do today, and outright lied or contradicted themselves on purpose, and that these lies/contradictions were useful clues to a deeper understanding of their thoughts, which if promulgated might face repercussions by a censorious society.

[Anonymous No.21541946]

>>21541886
>>21541900
Bruell and Bolotin are examples (along with Benardete and Kennington) of the best of his students who contribute to better understanding of thinkers of the past. What was Bolotin like as a teacher? I hear he and Bruell have been working on something in Santa Fe.

[Anonymous No.21542025]

>>21541946
Bolotin was a short, very kindly man who adored classical music and had taken up the piano later in life. But he was absolutely merciless in the classroom, in debate, and in oral examinations. I've never been more afraid of a 5'5" man before, or respected one moreas a master.

What have you heard about his and Bruell's new project? Last thing Bruell put out was the commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics (and Bolotin's good friend James Carey wrote a masterful criticism of it in the St. John's Review, definitely check it out).

[Anonymous No.21542048]

>>21542025
I just see rumors from people who know them on twitter, but between Bolotin's translations of De Anima and the Parva Natura, and Bruell's theses on Aristotle (in a response to Pangle's take on Aristotle's nature writings), I'm guessing something on how ancient cosmology relates to political philosophy.

Bolotin sounds like a real mensch. Only a handful of SJCA professors seem like they could even approach his skill.

[Anonymous No.21542166]

>>21542048
Kalkavage seemed like a boss to me, from his writings and reputation when I spent a year in Annapolis, but I was far more impressed with the SF faculty. Bolotin, Pagano, Carey, and a couple of the other old fucks made a massive impression on me as a kid.
James Carey and Bolotin in particular. Carey was giving a lecture on pleasure and the good, and Bolotin asked if I was going. I said yes, absolutely, and he said, "Well we're going to have a fight. We won't learn anything, because we've been having this fight for 35 years, but you might" (basically whether or not pleasure is the good).
>Bolotin translated De Anima and Parva Natura
holy SHIT how did I miss this? Buying these IMMEDIATELY when I get home. Thanks anon!

[Anonymous No.21542210]

>>21542048
>I'm guessing something on how ancient cosmology relates to political philosophy.
That sounds probable. https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/57e29a970b8b36a4bf08fbabfa497fbd.pdf is the review of Bruell's Metaphysics book (review begins page 120), and the tl;dr summary seems to be:

>1. There are no separate ousiai, which is to say, there is no God
and there are no gods.
>2. The harmoniously ordered cosmos is not eternal. It is a transient phase, destined to pass away eventually.
>3. The heavenly bodies are not moved by an unmoved mover (or movers). Their apparent, circular motion is caused by what they are, including especially what they are made of, rather than by any mover apart from
them.
>4. The articulation of the given world and the distinctions between things is largely the effect of the human intellect, so much so that one is tempted to infer that the human intellect is the deepest root of things. But that inference would be problematic since the human intellect is mortal. It is hardly the deepest root of itself.
>1/2

[Anonymous No.21542224]

>>21542210
>5. The deepest root of things is, in fact, matter, not just the “materiality” of the four elements, but something coursing beneath these, eternal, moving, not accessible to perception, and not really accessible to the intellect either. The existence of this ultimate matter can be much more plausibly inferred than can the existence of separate ousiai, but only as a kind of limit case of what the human intellect can infer. We know nothing about
it other than that it exists, and that it is some kind of cause. We cannot even be sure that the claims we venture to make about it are governed by the principle of non-contradiction. Since this eternal, moving, and
imperceptible matter is the deepest root of things, it is the deepest root of the human intellect too. The human intellect is no more than a possibility, so to speak, that was always latent in this matter.
>6. On the other hand, the human intellect, as tossed up by this matter and then impinged upon by it, constitutes, somehow, a world, an ordered whole that is more or less knowable, by physics in particular. Physics, and not metaphysics, is the philosophical science—though only if physics is properly conducted, that is to say, modestly conducted, without any
pretense of being able to draw the deepest root of things into the sunlight. The given world is the home of man, and it is the region to which science, including philosophical science, is limited. It is given, not by God or the gods, but by primordial matter acting upon one of its own
potentialities.
>2/2

[Anonymous No.21542569]

>>21542048
>joint project
Please let this be true.....

[Anonymous No.21542606]

>>21542166
>>21542210
>>21542224
>>21542569
Here's the most recent stuff Bruell's been working on; some context: Pangle wrote an article in Interpretation on Aristotle's nature writings and political philosophy, and apparently Bruell noticed a comment aimed at his book on the Metaphysics, s he responded with some theses that Pangle addresses here:

https://www.academia.edu/44304137/T_Pangle_on_Bruells_theses_for_Academia

Here's Bruell's most recent (as far as I know) form of the theses, via Thomas Cleveland:
https://twitter.com/tcleveland4real/status/1392474478869942275#m

[Anonymous No.21543302]

>>21540636
I tend to accept the ancient views on what was or wasn't a Platonic dialogue. They knew Greek infinitely better than the finest classicist today, and weren't uncritically accepting by any means. Anyone who seriously thinks Plato didn't write Hipparchus or First Alcibiades is a German retard. Stylometric tests I take with lots of salt, as they usually have massive amounts of assumptions and presuppositions behind their interpretation.

[Anonymous No.21543332]

>>21543302
I tend to agree, but knowing how much writing that might shed more certain light from that period is oblivion, I venture cautiously. You're certainly right re: modern scholars and their presuppositions tho; fuck, Schleiermacher's claims about what is and isn't spurious tend to be pretty silly.

[Anonymous No.21543720]

>>21543332
>Schleiermacher's...
The whole 19th century German high criticism movement was pretty weird, honestly. Similar high handed claims about what was spurious or not abounded with Shakespeare, Homer, Plato, Aristotle, and the New Testament. And more often than not, the reasons tended to be retarded (like saying Paul couldn't possibly have written Ephesians because the doctrine of the Church as Christ's Body was far too advanced for 1st century Christians, nevermind Acts recording Jesus asks Saul "Why are you persecuting me?" in regards to jailing Christians).

Put more positively, I like to read those more obscure, shorter works and after reading them thoroughly, I don't really care whether Plato wrote them or not. The Hipparchus is stupidly brilliant, laying out the conflict between morality and philosophy in what, less than 20 pages? Discussing that sort of thing is what I find fascinating: when Plato wrote the dialogues, which ones he ackshually wrote, and when he ackshually wrote them....I couldn't give less of a shit. Telling that most Platonic scholarship (Straussians excepted) tend to focus on that very question.

[Anonymous No.21543808]

>>21542606
God bless you anon, just got off work, ordered Bolotin's translation, and laughing my ass off at this disputation. Just download Pangle's Interpretation article still, since it came first. Will go through it and see if I can make sense of this Straussian catfight.

[Anonymous No.21544218]

>>21535327
Annapolis or Santa Fe?

[Anonymous No.21544226]

>>21535403
>there are multiple complete works editions?
No. Not in English, at least, and the one there is unfortunately is of varying quality.

[Anonymous No.21544227]

>>21538517
>Aristotle
>Nietzsche
>Karl Popper
Notice every critic of Plato is exponentially worse than Plato.

[Anonymous No.21544265]

>>21544218
Lol nta, but Naptown here.

>>21543808
Cheers man, and happy reading! I've been banging my head against the Pangle-Bruell argument for a bit now, and it's still a bit torturous. Best I can tell is Pangle thinks, via the Strauss letter to Kojeve, that Bruell doesn't take seriously that Aristotle thinks he has wisdom on account of his science of natural beings, but the detailed arguments and citations between the two are all over the place and I haven't had a good chance to sit down and follow Aristotle on any of it.

[Anonymous No.21544283]

>>21544227
“Aristotle doesn’t merely praise Plate in the piece he wrote about him, but he also delivers praise in the elegies he composed for Eudemus, writing as follows:

[missing line of dactylic hexameter]

'Once he came to Kekrops’ famous plain
He reverently built an altar for the sacred friendship
Of a man whom it is not right for the evil to praise
Who alone or first of mortals demonstrated clearly
Through his own life and the practices of his words
That the good person and the happy person are the same.

And now there is no way for anyone to do the same things again.'”

[Anonymous No.21544317]

>>21535298
Alright this isn't a complete list, but it's got the major works of Plato in it, and the translations are pretty solid:
>Republic
Allan Bloom
>Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, Symposium, Philebus
Seth Benardete
>Laws
Thomas Pangle
>Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Charmides
Thomas West
>Timaeus
Peter Kalkavage
>Phaedo
Eva Brann
>Meno
Kalkavage, Brann, Eric Salem
>Gorgias, Phaedrus
James Nichols
>Lysis
David Bolotin
>Hipparchus, Minos, Lovers, Cleitophon, Theages, Alcibiades I, Laches, Lesser Hippias, Geater Hippias, Ion
The Roots of Political Philosophy, ed. Thomas Pangle
>Alcibiades II
David Johnson
>Menexenus
Devin Stauffer
>Euthydemus
Gregory McBrayer, Mary Nichols
>Parmenides
Albert Whitaker

There's about half a dozen dialogues not mentioned there: Cratylus, Protagoras, Epinomis, and a few more I can't remember. But these will occupy a decade of your life if you read them carefully. Buy Bruell's On the Socratic Education if you're serious about learning to live like Socrates. All the dialogues he 'guides' you through are listed here. Best of luck, anon.

[Anonymous No.21544355]

>>21544317
Can add to that:

>Cratylus
Joe Sachs (Socrates and the Sophists)
>Protagoras
Robert Bartlett (the edition contains Meno as well)

[Anonymous No.21544427]

>>21544265
I'm going to start by reading Bruell's lecture half a dozen times, then I'll go through Pangle's Interpretation article, then his contra ad Bruellem. Bruell has a very tranquil, contemplative style which makes him very enjoyable to read, even though he's elliptical as fuck and conceals what he truly thinks more than a fornicating atheist living in Torquemadan Spain. Which is frustrating (HEY BRUELL THE PUBLIC DOESN'T GIVE A SHIT ABOUT PHILOSOPHY ANYMORE THIS ISN'T ATHENS 399 BC, STOP WRITING AS IF YOU'LL BE MURDERED IF YOU SAY PLEASURE IS THE GOOD), but hey, what can you do?

As an aside, they sound a bit like catty schoolgirls. Why can't they just come here to /lit/, call each other retarded nigger faggots for awhile like the rest of us already do, and then just lay their case out straight? Anons would provide helpful and amusing commentary, I'm sure. The histrionics, holy shit. Just LOOK at that passive aggressive Pangle article. Why didn't he copy/paste the email? Would have been top kek, I bet. I've never seen thinner skins or greater insecure pride than my time in the academy, and I'm by no means a colossal genius, I just like to read sometimes.

Hopefully this thread stays alive, and if it does, I'll add my thoughts on the schoolgirl fight tomorrow.

[Anonymous No.21544591]

>>21544427
Adding to this, regarding the agora. Socrates as Plato depicts him is often talking to (literal) faggots in the agora/marketplace/forum about shit and what better modern analogue is there for that than /lit/ or 4chan or what have you? Even if some famous professor came through here and started arguing for a position, some smart/a/ss faggot would post an anime reaction of Aqua vomiting, just like how in ancient Greece someone might overhear part of the conversation, pass by Socrates/Alcibiades, fart loudly, and say, "The both of you are retarded" and leave without elaborating. I am 100% sure this happened at least once while Socrates tried to talk to Athenian retards.

This is both funny and provides flavor to the conversation; it also helps everybody take a joke every once in a while.

[Anonymous No.21544954]

>>21543720
Hipparchus is interesting but it is really just word play that hinges on your definition of the word “profit.” Lots of dialogues are just playing around with words like that. The implication is likely that you can’t be greedy for the form of the good.

[Anonymous No.21545371]

>>21544954
>The implication is likely that you can’t be greedy for the form of the good.
Why wouldn't it be the opposite, that vulgar greed is dumb, but greed for the Good is rational?

[Anonymous No.21545522]

>>21544954
>>21545371
this is correct, love of gain is without limit or restraint when it concerns the good. And making a direct parallel to the shameless greed of traders and moneylenders, coupled with Socrates being a total and absolute sophist to his interlocutor, gives the distinct impression that the philosopher might be only tenuously concerned with what is conventionally moral.

[Anonymous No.21545671]

>>21545522
>gives the distinct impression that the philosopher might be only tenuously concerned with what is conventionally moral
Could you say more about what you think might follow from that?

A certain impression I'm under is that Socrates is interested in the conventional opinions about morality to the extent that testing them might give some insight into the beings (here I'm thinking of Socrates' discussion of hypotheses in Phaedo following the autobiographical portion); there seems to be a curious correspondence between the philosopher's morality and that of the non-philosopher, insofar as the philosopher will not be vicious or immoderate or unjust (in the popular senses), but not for the same reasons underlying the conventional understanding of morality, but rather because they get in the way of desire for wisdom (i.e., having food, drink, or sex on your mind, or too much concern with acquiring wealth, or taking retribution on someone for an insult or wrong, distracts from the more consistent and self-sufficient pleasure of thinking). Do you suppose that makes sense, or do you see it another way? (It might be reasonable to observe, for example, that in Phaedo, for all of his talk about the philosopher's disinterest in body, that Socrates' infant son is present at the beginning, i.e., he had sex within the year or two before his trial.)

[Anonymous No.21546569]

Bump

[Anonymous No.21546952]

>>21545671
Anon that's a very elegant way of putting it. "Thinking is more pleasant when your biological impulses are properly directed, therefore moderation and avoiding the hatred of others makes sense" is more or less how I'm understanding the Greek vision of the philosopher. It puts him in this kind of strange kinship with an Eastern ascetic, in some ways. In that vein, I think that's why Socrates pushes the point so hard in Hipparchus - it's not as if he's going to go around robbing people (Socrates was famous for his poverty), it's being dramatic for the sake of emphasis: nothing will hold the philosopher back from seeking the good/pleasure.

I'm not entirely sure I fully agree pleasure is the good (and maybe I'll write up my reservations why itt), but it seems to have the fewest problems. I really wish Plato had given us more help thinking about this: his Philebus, which is ABOUT the relationship between pleasure and the good, is an absolute nightmare. It makes Heidegger or Hegel look like child's play. I've never heard of, met, or read anyone who understands it. Seth Benardete's commentary was beyond useless. It gave me a new appreciation for Aristotle, who actually gives you arguments to think about, vs. Plato who gives you theater and word games which lead to arguments to think about.

[Anonymous No.21547468]

I wrote the following after beating my head against the steel bulkhead that is Plato's Philebus, getting triggered by all that esoteric shit, and turning to Aristotle's Ethics for guidance and not finding much:

Several candidates appear for the title, 'good':
1. Flourishing, i.e. the development and exercise of a being's capabilities.
2. Being
3. Pleasure
4. That which we choose for the sake of itself alone

1 is something I came up with. That first definition is my own. A friend criticized it soundly on the following grounds: development of a being's capabilities reduces to the exercise of a being's capabilities; and since everything a being does is an exercise of its capabilities, no matter what it does, it is accomplishing the good. Therefore the definition is worthless, in the sense that understanding the good should enable us to set an aim or purpose for our actions, or at least provide understanding our actions.

2 is Aquinas and most traditional Christian philosophers/theologians. Second, existence. Aquinas makes a case for this when he equates the good with being (he also identifies it with the fullness of being. The two statements may or may not be equivalent). This seems to fail for most of the reasons above. If not, consider: every choice and every action is made by an existing being. They are made real, incarnate, by that being. Therefore insofar as they equally are, they are all equally good, and no choice or way of life could be set above or apart from another as superior or degenerate, even when they completely contradict one another, as they often and manifestly do.

3 is an obvious one from ordinary experience, and it's not terribly repugnant even to Christians, because for a Christian, true ecstasy is found in the contemplation of and being caught up in the triune life of God.

An obvious objection is that we choose these and such things because they are good - sharing in the divine nature, philosophic speculation, music, service to others - and that pleasure necessarily accompanies the good, that the good is pleasant. Hence these things are pleasing, but pleasure is not the sufficient reason for us choosing them. This fails for the following reason:

Of all our choices and actions, none of them would occur if they were wholly devoid of pleasure and purely painful instead (this, in fact, is what believers understand hell to be like); from a father making difficult sacrifices for his family, to serving others (not even enjoying the happiness of others), to the passion of the martyr. What do we do that is good simply, and entirely painful? This is practically inconceivable. Therefore, since there is no good without pleasure, and since we choose pleasant things, and avoid painful things, the conclusion that pleasure is the sufficient reason for our choice seems increasingly inescapable, meaning that ‘pleasure’ and ‘the good’ are convertible terms.This seems to be the most solid of all the positions.

>1/2

[Anonymous No.21547520]

>>21547468
But that position isn’t free of difficulties either: some people find pleasure in cruelty. Torturers, rapists, serial killers, etc. Less dramatically, some, perhaps many people, find manipulating and hurting others fun, pleasant, and enjoyable. If pleasure is the good, than it would seem as if cruelty and kindness were equally good - and isn’t that absurd?

Or on a more mundane level, the sorts of controlling, domineering people who enjoy flaunting their superiority or privilege. I know or have encountered plenty of such people. Lucretius bears witness to this type in general when he writes how sweet and pleasant it is to lie on the grass, watching while a ship wrecks itself on the coast, thinking to yourself how nice it is that you are spared such things. It's an uneasy for me to think that way, but it's a cogent, coherent view.

Or a second counterargument, addiction: intoxication, food, and sex are all variously pleasurable to some degree; so why is what we call addiction to these things bad?

To the second argument, the most obvious way forward to is argue that these ways of life are not genuinely pleasant. Consider gluttony and pornography. Before, mostly during, and after, there is often nothing but pain: shame, guilt, self-disgust, self-loathing, seeking to forget, trying to numb, etc. Excess in general is characterized more by pain than pleasure. Habitual disspiation of the appetites is the result of sadness, not joyful delight.

I regard the answer to the second objection sufficient for me, but I don't regard it as demonstrative, unless it’s inconceivable that an addict to anything could be happy - and I’m not sure how to prove that yet.

The first objection is much more difficult. The only possible ways out would be to deny anyone truly takes pleasure in hurting people; e.g., that a rapist takes no pleasure in rape (which, while I’d like to, seems completely absurd. The idea of a woman pleading and crying beneath me while I do what I want is a massive turn off, but even I can see how the dominating, shaming, and controlling sides of rape are very pleasant. Therefore etc. And this doesn't even touch rape fantasies, widely shared by women, etc), or argue that such things are driven by compulsion (people making these choices are diseased, sick, etc), and that compulsion is not pleasant. Both of those replies seem to fail for manifestly obvious reasons (the second reply is attractive, but it fails to explain why these disordered choices are unpleasant, nor does it give us a way of evaluating and ranking the pleasures of different choices).

>2/3

[Anonymous No.21547544]

>>21547520
A way out might be Aristotle's definition: That which we choose for the sake of itself, and not for anything else. Sure, but whatisthat? Well, he's going to tell us: Happiness. Alright, but what is happiness? And so we return full circle. Because some will say wealth, honor, pleasure, contemplation, etc. Aristotle's own answer seems to be pleasure, understood as contemplation, the highest pleasure, if I'm understanding Nicomachean Ethics X right.

Aristotle (and Plato, who might have a similar view, but nobody fucking understands the Philebus so who knows?) can hold this opinion because they were conversant in bodily, spirited, and intellectual forms of pleasure, and being deeply experienced in all three (they were all rich Athenian noblemen, and I can only imagine the parties they attended, not to mention enjoying wealth, honors, privilege, and staggering intellectual genius), chose philosophic contemplation as the most pleasant (why didn't they choose music? A question for another time).

That method - an ascent from the lowest, bestial sorts of pleasures to the highest, culminating, in the Christian view, of being caught up in divine, triune love and sharing in the love of others - might be a way forward, but I still don't have an objection that demonstrably rejects those lower pleasures as bad when they seem to be while holding pleasure as that which we choose for the sake of itself and not for the sake of anything else.I don't see how you can have the one without the other. So I guess I'm stuck.

>3/3

[Anonymous No.21547739]

>>21546952
>>21547468
>>21547520
>>21547544
These are wonderful effortposts, anon; part of what keeps me coming to /lit/!

A thought occurred to me looking at (1) (flourishing), though I still have to work it out more, and it doesn't necessarily make it airtight. But in the Republic, Socrates draws a distinction between two kinds of Justice, minding one's own business, and minding one's own business *well*, and this is reiterated in the final words, "eu prattein", where the argument amounts to doing well (eu prattein) leads to faring well (eu prattein). I would wonder then if this modification would point to something like the unity of (1) and (4); what might you suppose?

[Anonymous No.21547759]

>>21545522
Hipparchus was himself a horrible tyrant nothing at all like Socrates' description of him from the intro notes in the book I own so I saw the whole thing as being ironic or willfully ignorant on Socrates part in particular.

[Anonymous No.21547761]

>>21547739
And in looking back further at the Republic, pleasure gets the most attention in book IX, in the analysis of the tyrant; there lies both the harshest critique of pleasure but also highest praise of it (as the pleasure of the learning part of the soul). This might capture something of the ambiguity and difficulty of the argument, similar to the treatment of Eros, where in the Republic the tyrant is Eros incarnate, but obviously a crucial activity of the soul re: philosophizing in Symposium and Phaedrus.

[Anonymous No.21547902]

>>21547759
You raise an interesting point, anon. I never understood the reason why Plato stuck a long interlude praising Hipparchus in the middle of the dialogue. The whole thing seemed obscure to me, and I could never figure out why it was there. As a test case of the ultimate lover of gain? As a contrast to the true lover of gain, the philosopher? no idea. I have the same issue with the Minos.

[Anonymous No.21548001]

>>21547759
>>21547902
Well, Socrates' own use is to speciously persuade his comrade that he's not deceiving him; but of course, he uses a beautified depiction of Hipparchus to do so (Socrates might indicate what he thinks of Hipparchus when he alludes to the latter's desire to have his own wisdom better remembered than Delphic sayings that seem to match Socratic practice like "know thyself" and "nothing too much").

[Anonymous No.21548007]

>>21535298
Try reading Plato in French, it's a fucking nightmare but it's fun.

[Anonymous No.21548035]

>>21535308
Do they leave the word "logos" untranslated like it should? The translation in mine is insulting.

[Anonymous No.21548043]

>>21548001
this anon FUCKS
unfathomably based. You basically explained how Plato was trolling tyrants in 485BC. Going to reread the Hipparchus this weekend and see if that stacks up.

[Anonymous No.21548059]

this is tangentially related to the thread topic but I have a question on Forms that probably isn't worthy of its own post. Simply, what does Plato say about the creation of new Forms as mankind invents new kinds of objects? When someone invents something, say a bicycle, what's going on with the Form? Did he think the form existed beforehand, or did it pop into existence at the moment of the physical creation?

[Anonymous No.21548112]

>>21547739
> I would wonder then if this modification would point to something like the unity of (1) and (4); what might you suppose?
I'd certainly agree that doing well would lead to faring well, particularly if you did the latter while always thinking of the former. My objection would be this: isn't this way of doing things only the instrument, not the goal? If I'm always gorging myself sick and drunk then fapping until drained on the weekend because my wageslave job sucks ass, I won't be able to think properly and truly enjoy myself while thinking about the natures of the beings. Hence proper diet, limited alcohol, porn control, etc. All this sounds like judgement concerning the beings that impact our happiness (I'm leaving to one side whether thinking/contemplation is the best pleasure/highest good etc., obviously), rather than considering the beings that motivate our striving. And if that's the case, my earlier 1 and 4, even taken together, could not be the basis for happiness.

>>21547761
You know the Republic, holy shit. I hadn't even remembered that part. That Plato recognizes the same problem makes me hope he has an answer, going to reread Republic IX soon. Maybe it's in there.

[Anonymous No.21548149]

>>21548059
Very good and hard question. The Republic might respond most to your question, but even then, there's some difficulty. In book X, Socrates brings up the poets again, and in making a point about the distance between the poet's depiction and reality, he says:

>"Do you want us to make our consideration according to our customary procedure, beginning from the following point? For we are, presumably, accustomed to set down some one particular form for each of the particular 'manys' to which we apply the same name. Or don't you understand?" (596a)

This is the ground for positing "ideas" of things, which seems to include man-made artifacts; so this passage would seem to grant the thought that everything we might make takes after some already somehow existing idea.

But the language here is cagey; "customary procedure", "we are accustomed to". Does this guarantee the truth of the matter? Or is this related to a point Socrates makes twice earlier in the Republic, that some of the subjects they discuss have a shorter and longer way to understanding? Glaucon chooses the shorter; is this kind of account a shorter way? Even earlier, the account of the idea of the Good claims that the Good is the cause of all beings; is this related? One hint (not original to me, check out Benardete's Socrates' Second Sailing) is that there's no coincidence in the examples chosen, couch and table, for these are the things that Glaucon claims he wants but sees lacking in what he calls the "city of pigs" in book II. Would this passage, taken together with the account of the Good, and Glaucon's desires, point to how and in what way the Good is the cause of beings? Maybe a tentative account might be that the Good shapes human desires for itself, so it might be closer to the truth of things to say that the artifacts we make don't necessarily have a form or idea, but rather come about on account of our desires shaed by an Idea?

It's very difficult, and I'm not satisfied I understand it all.

[Anonymous No.21548192]

>>21548112
>I'd certainly agree that
I think those objections are fitting, and maybe that highlights a problem not actually solved but perpetually lingering: Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, they're not ascetics, even if more moderate than many; Socrates has given himself over to sex to produce his three kids, and really might not be as far from Cephalus (who praises conversation only because his appetites are incidentally calming in old age) as appears on first and subsequent sights, since Socrates only doesn't have to worry about his needs because his friends readily supply them.

I wonder if this points to something of the meaning of "philosophizing is the practice of dying and being dead" in Phaedo; not literally (though death being something one really only encounters for the most part once isn't of no interest to the philosopher, who wants to know about it), but that thinking takes you out of yourself, somehow dissolving the circumstances one lives with, such as "hungry", "need sleep", etc. This can't hold all the time however, though maybe the peculiarities of Socrates (skips dinner in the Symposium; stays up all night while drinking and stays up all the next day, also in Symposium; stays up all night for the conversation in the Republic, also sipping dinner) points to the problem of Nature and "natures"; some people can eat and digest metal, an astoundingly rare condition. Is philosophizing as Socrates does also a mysterious product of Nature, not necessarily able to be fully modeled after by others?

[Anonymous No.21548198]

>>21548192
>sipping dinner
Lol, *skipping

[Anonymous No.21549344]

>>21548192
>thinking takes you out of yourself
This is 100% true. I still remember what it felt like when I read the Hipparchus for the first time, and after going through it about a dozen times, finally started to understand it. I was so excited there was no way I was going to sleep, and I stayed up all night poring over every line. That was a good night, and the next morning I had a much better understanding of the Socrates in the Symposium who drinks more than anyone else, never gets drunk, and goes talking to boys like normal in the agora.

You're right that these three men - Socrates, Plato, Aristotle - were not ascetics, although Plato is said to have never married, unlike the other two. They simply prioritized thinking about the beings and making accounts of the whole above everything else. So no, I don't think they're mysterious freaks of nature, or that no one else can do that (Maimonides, Aquinas, Descartes, and Hegel all come to mind). I've had more fun in this thread talking with anons about Plato than I've had all year, and while I'm certainly no Socratic genius like the men I've listed, even I know the feeling of being enraptured by thinking.

[Anonymous No.21550424]

>>21548035
What is it?

[Anonymous No.21550596]

>>21535298
How hard is for you to simply learn ancient Greek? You don't need to speak it which tends to be the most difficult part when you learn a language.
You just need to memorise the grammar and vocabulary with a frequency dictionary.

[Anonymous No.21550609]

>>21550596
It will take years of dedicated study to read Attic at an even snail's pace. Plato's prose can be very difficult (not as bad as Aeschylus' verse, holy shit now I know how ESLs feel reading Shakespeare and Marlowe), but pretty damn hard.

[Anonymous No.21550953]

>>21548001
Hipparchus really sets up the context for the Charmides dialogue. They should be read one after the other.

[Anonymous No.21550961]

>>21548059
The Forms are immaterial outside of our knowledge of time so it wouldn't really matter, I would say.