/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.16111163]

"And you would not accept the statement that one man is taller than another by a head and the shorter man shorter by the same, but you would bear witness that you mean nothing else than that everything that is bigger is made bigger by nothing else than by Bigness, and that is the cause of its being bigger, and the smaller is made smaller only by Smallness, and that is why it is smaller. I think you would be afraid that some opposite argument would confront you ifyou said that someone is bigger or smaller by a head, first, because the bigger is bigger and the smaller smaller by the same, then because the bigger is bigger by a head which is small, and this would be strange, namely that someone is made bigger by something small. Would you not be afraid of this?" - Plato in Phaedo

I very much so enjoyed, agreed with much of, and engaged in Plato's arguments which are stated in Crito and Euthyphro, and I appreciated his speaking in Apology, but what is this bullshit all of a sudden in Phaedo? The whole thing is pseud. He takes recollection as axiomatic in his arguments despite, in his argument for recollection, not considering the idea that people could learn through simply reasoning with the things they already know and logically deducing some conclusion. I could barely understand the counterargument against Simmias, he seems to switch up the definition of "harmony" constantly, and, while I can't put my finger on it exactly, it seems just like a strawman. Here, though, it looks like he's completely confusing the nature of things as they are and the words we use to describe their empirical relations.
Am I missing something? Will Aristotle begin to correct and argue against some of this thought when I get to him?

[Anonymous No.16111209]

>>16111163
Bigness if aletheia

[Anonymous No.16111217]

>>16111163
I'll give a possibly unhelpful hint, or a revelation. Plato is more self-aware than you think in his dialogues, and there is a lot of symbolism as well in the Phaedo, to some degree. That sense of duality throughout it, the change of life to death, largeness and smallness, beauty and ugliness, why do you think he is discussing it in the case of Socrates' death? Socrates' passing, and the order of life as it stands, one may even say in the best possible modernly way, Plato becomes a phenomenologist here. But there is of course a greater metaphysical questioning occuring here, and Plato's "Ideas", as Heidegger says, cannot be understand as mere value holders, but Functioners for being, actualising being in a sense. The beautiful exists by its taking part of the Beautiful, and so forth.

You must learn to understand this, and there are two threads you may learn from in this topic, the former I discussed much in, the latter I created: >>16078623
>>16089063

It would explain most of your problems. You must not underrate Plato, and specifically in the first thread, ctrl f "Parmenides" and look to that mass post.

[Anonymous No.16111221]

>>16111217
I should have used the word
>a greater metaphysical question *beckoning* here
beckoning was the right word.

[Anonymous No.16111224]

>>16111163

[Anonymous No.16111238]

>>16111224
Ahh yes, the true representation in nature of the bigger and the smaller forms.

[Anonymous No.16111250]

>>16111163
The theory of forms in general is a mess and cannot be salvaged. Skip to Aristotle. He shreds a lot of this nonsense.

[Anonymous No.16111267]

>>16111217
>Socrates' passing, and the order of life as it stands, one may even say in the best possible modernly way, Plato becomes a phenomenologist here.
Are you implying that Plato is trying to construct a view of the world as "dual" in all things, i.e life and death, goodness and badness, etc. and applying this also to life? That is, trying to extrapolate some existence in death from what we know about life?
>But there is of course a greater metaphysical questioning occuring here, and Plato's "Ideas", as Heidegger says, cannot be understand as mere value holders, but Functioners for being, actualising being in a sense. The beautiful exists by its taking part of the Beautiful, and so forth.
I'm new to "formal" philosophy, so excuse my not understanding what you really mean here. I've never Heidegger, I've only just recently started with the Greeks. Are you saying that Heidegger sees Plato's forms as ideals to strive for?

I understand the view Plato is trying to construct from Phaedo - there is a 'world' of forms in which 'dwells' the perfect forms of all things, and that which we label as "beautiful" or "just" is simply sharing in the true forms of beauty and justness. It seems that he extrapolates this from the theory of recollection (at least so far, I've only read the Socratic trial dialogues).
>>16111250
I still like his other writings and plan on reading through most of Plato's works, and I see quite a bit of value in the idea of forms, but not really as Plato seems to be presenting it.

[Anonymous No.16111287]

>>16111250
Filtered by the Parmenides.
Many such cases.

[Anonymous No.16111288]

>>16111209
fpbp

[Anonymous No.16111293]

>>16111217
>Parmenides
this
Plato subjects the Theory of Forms to shrewd criticism in this dialogue

[Anonymous No.16111325]

>>16111267
>I'm new to "formal" philosophy, so excuse my not understanding what you really mean here. I've never Heidegger
All good anon, I'm still on the Greeks myself but I'm glad enough to know what I do and have read the little modern philosophy I have to better understand them. One of Heidegger's big things was resurrecting the Greeks as it were, or their genius, fundamentally the question of the meaning of being which has in many ways been obfuscated since the Greeks; the "Seinsfrage". No one understand the Greeks better than Heidegger pretty much. And he said the question of being had been, to put it in as dramatic a sense he first did be later rejected, been "forgotten" in part to a few perceptions which he explained, such as taking it to be too "broad" a question and containing no affirmative "character". When I mentioned Heidegger there, I meant that many people take Plato's Forms(you're familiar with them?) as something of unembodied Ideas, like Kant, such as the Beautiful merely being "the Beautiful" of which this world takes part. While Heidegger is saying Plato is affirming a moving and living Forms which as it were exist in the world, but are not their mere existence(this latter part is the obvious part that everyone typically gets). Fundamentally in Plato's (for what could be taken as silly by some very new to it) talking of "biggness" and "smallness", is coming from Plato's philosophic interpretation of life, after all it is an example out of a few, and is not the core point of the argument, he's not just merely talking about big things and small things lol.

>Are you implying that Plato is trying to construct a view of the world as "dual" in all things, [...] and applying this also to life?...
And no, not on the whole, but there is undoubtedly an awareness of the dual in life by Plato. And which is thematically exploited by Plato in this dialogue to not only explain the forms, but above all as it were almost incarnate the forms in this death of Socrates, to revolve around Socrates climbing of the great dividing mountain from life to death, in which all opposites and existencies of life, exist. In a basic sense, he is even just wanting you to know Socrates' story, to just simply see that Heroism. His great fiend, and teacher, one of the greatest of all men. A beautiful person. It is as I believe an earlier dialogue of Plato's, and Plato can hypothetically be said to have radicalised a lot of his earlier ideas in his later and much harder philosophy, or according to some have rejected some of his earlier conceptions. Others merely say it was a development that didn't necessarily change anything.

There are so many interpretations of each individual dialogue of Plato's, I'm not going to be able to give the defining answer on it, but I hope I've helped you better understand him a bit at least. See those two threads I posted to see what I mean with Plato's self-awareness and complexity in the dialogue.

[Anonymous No.16111349]

>>16111267
>>16111325
>in which all opposites and existencies of life, exist.
I should also say, to hopefully clarify, that Heidegger thought Plato use of "essence" as synonymous with "being" eventually showed its limitations when he approximated the nature of being as best he could. So it is as it were a linguistic attempt to understand that which, in the case of "existencies of life, exist" it is purposeful repetition and linguistic use to achieve the same effect as the use of the word "being". Specifically Heidegger said this when referring to the Parmenides dialogue, as >>16111293 says. Though the Parmenides is not just about the limits of reason as such(which will necessarily relate to linguistics), but also has an affirming quality insofar as the work being an entire question, does not receive an answer from without. Good luck with reading it. Also don't take Heidegger necessarily too seriously, because he is doing his own philosophy, but it does still enlighten a lot about Plato and the likes.

Also not to confused the dialogue Parmenides, with the philosopher Parmenides in which the dialogue is named after.

[Anonymous No.16111405]

>>16111325
>Plato's Forms(you're familiar with them?)
I've heard about them before reading Plato, but he states their existence in Phaedo and spends quite a bit of time at the end talking about them, and Euthyphro, I believe, goes through quite a bit of explanation on the difficulties in defining what a form "is," such as in the case of piety - without actually stating the existence of forms outright, that is.
>Fundamentally in Plato's (for what could be taken as silly by some very new to it) talking of "biggness" and "smallness", is coming from Plato's philosophic interpretation of life, after all it is an example out of a few, and is not the core point of the argument, he's not just merely talking about big things and small things lol.
I understand this is an example, but the way he presents the argument seems extremely semantic, to a point that muddles the idea.
>It is as I believe an earlier dialogue of Plato's, and Plato can hypothetically be said to have radicalised a lot of his earlier ideas in his later and much harder philosophy, or according to some have rejected some of his earlier conceptions.
This helps me to understand it a bit better. The entire system seems unformalized and not necessarily thoroughly proved, but thinking of it as simply an earlier work of his meant moreso to show Socrates and his life makes it take on more sense.
>See those two threads I posted to see what I mean with Plato's self-awareness and complexity in the dialogue.
I will check them out soon, thanks

[Anonymous No.16111497]

>>16111405
>I will check them out soon, thanks
Welcome anon, enjoy Plato!

[Anonymous No.16111599]

>>16111163
>he thinks recollection literally means remembering everything
lol read Meno at least you mong. Try to think for once in your life

[Anonymous No.16111628]

>>16111599
>lol read Meno at least you mong.
I did
>Try to think for once in your life
Good argument lad, I really appreciate the input you made to this thread

[Anonymous No.16111652]

>>16111628
Then tell me: what is the difference between Meno and the slave. What is the difference between how Meno learns and how the slave learns. Why does Socrates explain the theory of recollection unphilosophically. Why does he change the theory after the exhibition with the slave. If Socrates was talking to someone else, how would he have phrased the theory. Why does he never mention philosophy or the philosopher. The slave does not recollect, he even gets the answer wrong twice, how does he gain knowledge.
Sorry for insulting you, I've had a stressful few days.

[Anonymous No.16111841]

>>16111652
Are you the same guy that insists the entirety of Meno has nothing to do with recollection and is, rather, about how Socrates kept the interest of Meno for the conversations length?

[Anonymous No.16111982]

>>16111841
Not at all, but Socrates certainly attempts to keep his interest and uses the theory of recollection partly to this end, why is this? What particular relationship does Meno have to recollection?
Plato often clothes a philosophical idea in unphilosophical language depending on the interlocutor. For example, the simile of the cave to Glaucon vs the fully conceptual discourse in Parmenides. The same is here, recollection is given to Meno for a certain reason, just as it is given to the Pythagoreans during Phaedo. Answer my questions and try discover the idea in its philosophically conceptual language instead of the story Socrates tells the sophistic Meno.

[Anonymous No.16112008]

>>16111163

>he seems to switch up the definition of "harmony" constantly

He doesn't it's the translator that does. English doesn't have appropriate words for a lot of Greek terms used by Plato. Simply put you haven't even read Plato, you read a bastardized version of it.

[Anonymous No.16112019]

Fellas,

In what order should i read Plato? What are the essentials?

[Anonymous No.16112056]

>>16112019
If you're gonna read all the dialogues then pic related is a good order.
If you don't want to read all of them, then read
Apology, Crito, 1st Alcibiades, Protagoras, Meno, Symposium, Phaedrus, Gorgias, Republic, Phaedo, Parmenides.
Then read the rest if you're enjoying yourself.

[Anonymous No.16112059]

>>16112056
Oh yeah I forgot, always read Apology first.

[Anonymous No.16112082]

>>16111982
>Socrates certainly attempts to keep his interest and uses the theory of recollection partly to this end, why is this?
Is it to make Meno realize that he does, in fact, have the answers to the questions he seeks, if only he were to be critical of his thought process and beliefs?

[Anonymous No.16112100]

>>16112082
Perhaps not Meno, for Meno clearly doesn't care and at the end of the dialogue doesn't see through Socrates' bad argument. But you're on the right track, perhaps what you say is true not for Meno but for the audience listening in and for us.

[Anonymous No.16112110]

>>16112019
Read

-Plato Five Dialogues the collection(Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo), and then Ion
-a few smaller ones like Laches, Cratylys and Charmides
-Republic and then Symposium
-a few other ones like Protagoras, Gorgias and Euthydemus
-Philebus and Phaedrus
-Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, Timaeus, Critias, Laws(these are all of the harder and what are considered by some "later" dialogues, and this is the perfect order for reading them, and for understanding each progressing one's contents; and they are his greatest dialogues too)

Just make sure to read his letters, and supposedly fake dialogues too, fake or real, because often they still came out of Plato's school wherein it can be said that it contains some of the ideas in the school at the time not written down by Plato and some of their developments and reaction to Plato initially one could even say as well. Just read it with all the other Greek literature, and one piece of advice on reading the Greek tragedies, start with Sophocles, and then move onto Aeschylus, and then come down to Euripides. Middle, First, then Last of the three great tragedians. And when you've at least read more than one of Sophocles' plays, then read Aristotle's Poetics even if you haven't finished reading Plato yet(so long as you have read most of Plato, Homer, Hesiod, Herodotus and the major presocratics), but from there don't read anything else of Aristotle until down with Plato. It's just such a brilliant, enlightening and entertaining work that it will not only improve your appreciation of Greek tragedy quite a lot, but it will give you a greater depth of Greek thought before actually having read Aristotle to have that contrast, but primarily just how he relates to the tragedy, in contrast to Plato, and as well as just his basic statements on the subject.

[Anonymous No.16112118]

>>16111209
Kek

[Anonymous No.16112126]

>>16112019
Anon don't listen to this>>16112056

Both the picture and the description by the anon are nonsensical. The picture is good for just holding all the dialogues in ones head, but don't take the description too seriously, and don't take the ordering seriously whatsoever. That's not credible in the slightest insofar as it's taken as anything more than just underpinning that extremely simple description and thereby an attempt to organise and hold all the dialogues in ones head. But when it actually comes to reading the dialogues chronologically, and by that obviously individually, ignore it COMPLETELY.

And as for the anons list stated list it is somewhat uneven and mine is better.

[Anonymous No.16112183]

>>16111267
>Are you implying that Plato is trying to construct a view of the world as "dual" in all things,
Notice at the beginning of the Phaedo Socrates stands and mentions that pleasure follows pain. Duality is a major platonic theme and it seems like Phaedo revolves mainly aorund it.
>>16111163
>recollection as axiomatic
Read Meno if you haven't already.
>counterargument against Simmias,
This was actually my favorite part. You need to understand the pythagorean take on harmony, which I'm not competent enough to explain. I liked this part because it was an early example of a debate regarding emergent consciousness. The soul as a composition of parts akin to a lyre is like saying the consciousness is a composition of parts of neurochemicals. Plato has some notion of heirarchy. The whole is the authority over the parts and not subject to them. This can be extrapolated into modern conversations about free will and emergent properties. I thought it was pretty cool to see that

[Anonymous No.16112235]

>>16112110
>>16112126
That guy asked for the essentials, and you told him to read everything even marginally connected to the academy.
As for your own ordering:
Symposium after Republic is bad because Symposium introduces forms properly, as well as eros both of which should be kept in mind while reading Republic.
Protagoras, Gorgias, and Euthydemus before Republic is also poor since these tie in with the other earlier (and I don't say this as someone who believes in strict chronological dating but merely as shorthand to refer to the grouping) Socratic dialogues in rethinking concepts of virtue and rhetoric before these are directly addressed in Republic.
Philebus should be after Parmenides-Theaetetus-Sophist-Statesman not before (and certainly not before Phaedrus) as it continues the explication of the ontology begun in Republic and Parmenides and carried on through Sophist.
Only after the definite Platonic dialogues should the spurious writings and letters be read since you'll then know what to look for as to any unwritten doctrines. Your list also fails at the fundamental request anon made of a list of the essentials.

[Anonymous No.16112246]

>>16112235
Oh I almost forgot, Phaedo should be between Republic and Parmenides since it continues both the theory of recollection from Meno and the theories of the soul and forms from Republic while simultaneously beginning the system of divisions which are expanded on in Parmenides and Sophist.

[Anonymous No.16112278]

>>16112235
Euthydemus after Republic*

[Anonymous No.16112308]

>>16112235
>>16112246
>because a dialogue of a similar thinker has similar subjects, it should be read in that order
What you're saying, is again as I recognised, a bling ordering of quality over chronology. And it is blind because it is limited to a perception of the subjects of discussion in a 2d and shallow manner.

Opinion discarded you didn't actually reply to my point, only restated your previous one.

[Anonymous No.16112320]

>>16112235
>Only after the definite Platonic dialogues should the spurious writings and letters be read since you'll then know what to look for as to any unwritten doctrines.
That's literally what I said you utter brainlet.

>Your list also fails at the fundamental request anon made of a list of the essentials.
On the contrary, all he has to do is easily extract out the information I have given in the post of the essentials. He can say "Plato Five Dialogues", Republic, Symposium, Philebus, Phaedrus and so on. As far as the later much more difficult works, it is simply impossible and a retarded idea for him to start reading Sophist here, and then maybe read Parmenides there. There is an order for them which I have clearly posted and your feeble mind is against only in a selfishness.

[Anonymous No.16112347]

>>16112183
>Read Meno if you haven't already.
Everyone keeps saying this, I've read Meno and I'm still not at all convinced of his argument in any way. What is it about Meno that is so important, or disproves the idea that knowledge of the forms can be reasoned with as simply logically deduced idealisms of observable 'things'?

[Anonymous No.16112363]

>>16112308
You have yet to make a point, nor have you to give an explanation for why your ordering is justified. You clearly don't recognise the development of ideas through dialogues otherwise you wouldn't have put Symposium after Republic, Philebus before Parmenides, and Phaedo before Republic.
>>16112320
>That's literally what I said
Fair, I take it back.
Giving Plato's Five Dialogues as a starting point is a decent idea since it's one book, but if you continue to recommend dialogues you certainly should say Phaedo belongs after Republic. As I've already said, your ordering particularly of putting such a late work as Philebus early seems ridiculous.
>it is simply impossible and a retarded idea for him to start reading Sophist here, and then maybe read Parmenides there.
Agreed, as I said, Parmenides should come before Theaetetus-Sophist-Statesman.
>There is an order for them which I have clearly posted and your feeble mind is against only in a selfishness.
Very angry fellow aren't you? I have no idea how you interpret my posts as selfish, and resorting to insults like this isn't very becoming of someone who claims to read Plato as you do.

[Anonymous No.16112440]

>>16112363
Why Parmenides so early?

[Anonymous No.16112506]

>>16112440
It's not that early, it's absolutely meant to be read after Republic since it begins with a Cephalus and Adeimantus + Glaucon, as well as the fact that Parmenides discusses conceptually what is only told in unphilosophical imagery to the audience of Republic (and challenges an understanding of the forms grounded in such imagery), which allows one to better understand the concepts of the forms and the One. I believe Phaedo should be read before Parmenides since it introduces a method of divisions which are expanded upon in the hypotheses and later in Sophist.

[Anonymous No.16112532]

>>16112440
>>16112506
Compare also this page from Republic. This "turning around" Socrates speaks of is what is accomplished in Parmenides, from considering the forms and the one in terms of sense objects (becoming) towards a true conceptual understanding (being). Republic points towards Parmenides thematically while Parmenides itself points to a true understanding of the ideas in the Republic as its goal.

[Anonymous No.16112571]

>>16112347
The paradox of receving new knowledge. For all subjects of enquiry, a person either knows or does not know the subejct. If a person knows, then inquiring is impossible because the knowledge is already possesed. If the person does not know, then inquiry is impossible because you wouldnt be able to ask a question if you did not already know the thing of which you're asking.
I also heard that Meno is used as a justification for dialectic over sophistry. Meno was told many things by his instructor, and he could even recite these things, but true understanding was lacking.
Anyway, the reason I reccomended Meno was because you stated that recollection was taken as axiom without justifcation. Recollection is justified in Meno and is a necessary prerequisite.

[Anonymous No.16112640]

>>16112571
>the reason I reccomended Meno was because you stated that recollection was taken as axiom without justifcation.
I didn't say that it was taken without justification, I said that it was bad and non-thorough justification. He doesn't consider any real counter arguments to his position, and doesn't thoroughly dissect his own position. He jumps right to recollection as the reason for knowledge of forms. If a person does not know something, why does Socrates not consider the possibility of investigation into its parts? Why can one not simply observe dozens of different things which can be considered 'equal', and from there, extrapolate that there may be some abstract concept, the "Equal," which supercedes these? Why doesn't he consider the idea of being able to simply investigate, whether consciously or subconsciously, the nature of things and come to some logical deduction or likelihood through this? Why does he also not consider that, if someone has true opinion of something, but not true knowledge, this true opinion could then, perhaps, be 'tied' down and figured for why it is true, and made into true knowledge in this way?

[Anonymous No.16112689]

>>16112640
What makes you think Plato didn't consider these and other arguments against the theory? Do you really understand the theory of recollection? Go look at the exhibition with the slave in Meno, how does he learn? And how is it different from how Meno learns?
Go through slowly what Socrates says before, during, and after he leads the slave through the problem and at every point consider the questions you're asking with what is presented. Socrates was famous for his irony, and Meno has already said he prefers theatrical explanations instead of good ones. Does he really mean recollection? or something else?

[Anonymous No.16112742]

>>16112689
>What makes you think Plato didn't consider these and other arguments against the theory?
He didn't state them in his dialogue.
>Do you really understand the theory of recollection?
Yes, and I'm convinced you're digging into the theory of recollection much more than it deserves. There can be worth in it, but not in the theory itself; only the the situation surrounding it in the dialogues which mention it.
>Do you really understand the theory of recollection? Go look at the exhibition with the slave in Meno, how does he learn? And how is it different from how Meno learns?

If you're so hooked on the idea that I'm not understanding recollection because of some irony Socrates was using in Meno, why don't we instead look at Phaedo itself, which has a clear argument for the theory of recollection laid out? He takes his axioms, "We surely agree that if anyone recollects anything, he must have known it before" and "Do we not also agree that when knowledge comes to mind in this way, it is recollection? What way do I mean? Like this: when a man sees or hears or in some other way perceives one thing and not only knows that thing but also thinks of another thing of which the knowledge is not the same but different, are we not right to say that he recollects the second thing that comes into his mind?". This second axiom is false, as, like I've said, it can simply be do to a logical deduction, or even random chance. From there, he goes on to say that the "Equal" exists, and that we could not have obtained knowledge of it, but only recollected it through observing some other things in our world which seem to mimic the Equal.

Why do you refuse to just state what you believe is the hidden meaning in Meno? I understand the "debater's argument" brought up by Meno, but I don't see how that has anything to do with Simmias and Cebes.

[Anonymous No.16112750]

>>16112640
I guess this opens the rationalism vs empiricism debate. Can you by way of reflection on impressions learn equality or is it a preconcieved concept necessary for viewing reality? I have no idea, but I bet Kant is the best solution. I really appreciate Plato because of how relevant he is even now.
>>16112689
If his myth of recollection isnt intended to be taken literally then how does he use it to justify his theory of soul, especially with regards to his argument in Phaedo?

[Anonymous No.16112925]

>>16112742
>>16112750
>Why do you refuse to just state what you believe is the hidden meaning in Meno?
Because I'd hope to bring others to a close examination of the dialogues, which I personally enjoy doing, but I will tell you my view.
In Meno, learning is distinguished from memorisation (the sophistic method of memorising rhetorical speeches to recite, how Meno himself learns, from Gorgias or the Poets, which lacks understanding) as recalling from within oneself. The example is given of the slave, and here we see he has no knowledge of geometry but understands certain concepts such as shapes, numbers, doubles, etc. How does he gain knowledge of the geometric problem Socrates presents him with? He forms opinions based on concepts he understands and then these are tested with questions until he narrows his opinions closer to the truth of the matter, and thus he gains knowledge. The point of calling this recollection is that it is not a creative process but one of discovery for the slave, of unfolding the knowledge inherent in the other concepts he understood. Just as we're not consciously aware of memories until we recall them (bring them into conscious awareness), the slave isn't aware of the knowledge inherent in his current understanding until he is made aware of it. Thus Socrates says
>he will have true opinions which, when stirred by questioning, become knowledge
The gaining of knowledge (and more importantly understanding) from within as opposed to from without (as does Meno) is possible because this knowledge is already inherent in the innately understood concepts from which opinions are formed by "stirring up" with questions, and by which truth is then understood and true opinions are transformed into knowledge. The slave thus gains knowledge purely from within himself and not from being told or any external forms of knowledge. The theory of recollection is given to Meno because that's how Meno conceives of learning: memorising speeches and then recalling them when needed. What is really being explained is a theory of innate understanding and knowledge which is inherent in these innately understood concepts but with philosophy one is made aware of it. It is only through investigation that this knowledge is discovered, through philosophical inquiry. Notice how philosophy is completely absent from the whole dialogue, and how the argument against virtue being knowledge hinges on there being no teachers nor students of virtue (and the list of possibilities given are virtuous men and sophists, the philosopher is not even considered and when he is the argument falls apart). Thus Socrates shows that we can arrive at knowledge of things from within ourselves through formation of opinion by the "stirring up with questions" the innate understanding we have and then testing them with questions to distinguish the truth, thereby arriving at knowledge. This is how the slave learns.

[Anonymous No.16112934]

>>16112925
Now in Phaedo he presents this same doctrine, and the "second axiom" you point towards is the formation of opinion. He says the exact same thing as in Meno, that whatever comes from within is recollection. If we take what I say, that knowledge from within is the actualisation of inherent potential in innately understood concepts, we approach a theory that states knowledge of the forms can be grasped from within, that it is perhaps innate, and therefore a person is born with this innate understanding and already has the knowledge of all these things inherently potential in his understanding, he just requires philosophy to have it actualized and brought into his conscious understanding. The most important thing is that knowledge of the forms is a matter of discovery from within just as knowledge of the geometric problem was, and Socrates thus shows that truth is within, and only requires philosophy for us to be aware of it. I haven't read Phaedo in a while so I might be off in regard to that, if so I'd be happy to go through parts of the dialogue with you and see what we can discover.

[Anonymous No.16113137]

>>16111163
I think Plato was arguing against the notion than a cause can have more than one effect. In the case, the cause that you are bigger than someone cannot by the same cause of someone being smaller than you, because if a cause had two effects, the effects would be the same. But since being small is different than being tall, other thing must be the cause, in his explanation, the idea of smallness and bigness. But I don't really know well.

[Anonymous No.16114695]

Bumping to comment later

[Anonymous No.16115360]

>>16114695
Bumping to reas your comment later

[Anonymous No.16116307]

>>16111163
Just less busy, I'll try and go into more detail soon. The Phaedo is one of a few dialogues that discuss how Socrates came to philosophize the way he does, and one of the few dialogues wherein he offers a characterization of philosophy (in the Symposium it's a sort of Eros, here it's a sort of dying and being dead). The dialogue is labyrinthine both to the characters in the conversation, to its narrator Phaedo (who frames the conversation by referring to the myth of Theseus saving the Athenian youths from the minotaur in a labyrinth; note the 14 youths and the 14 named people present, the argument as a labyrinth, and, surprisingly, Socrates as the minotaur at 117b), and it ought be to us.

Regarding the Forms, all I'll say for the moment is that it's important to see how they're discussed as *hypothesized*.

>>16111841
If you're talking about the Phaedo thread from a few days ago, that would be me, though I wouldn't say the Meno is about keeping Meno talking (though that is a big part of what I think recollection does there; the other big part has to do with why the geometry example chosen results in finding a line incommensurable with others. It seems maybe suggestive of how to understand virtue, but that's tricky...).

[Anonymous No.16117542]

>>16112925
>>16112934
Give me a moment to type a response, if the thread survives. I just woke up

[Anonymous No.16117597]

>>16112925
>>16112934
While I understand what you're saying with regards to Meno, and I accept that Plato is trying to explain the differences between memorization, such as with the sophists, and true understanding from within, such as with the philosopher.
The problem is that, in Phaedo, he states that, when you recollect something, you are recollecting that which you knew from a time before you were born:

"Then before we began to see or hear or otherwise perceive, we must have possessed knowledge of the Equal itself if we were about to refer our sense perceptions of equal objects to it... But we began to see and hear and otherwise perceive right after birth?... It seems then that we must have possessed it before birth... So then, Simmias, our souls also existed apart from the body before they took on human form, and they had intelligence... Is this the position, that there is an equal necessity for those realities to exist [referring to the forms], and for our souls that there is an equal necessity for those realities to exist, and for our souls to exist before we were born? If the former do not exist, neither do the latter?"

Here, Socrates is speaking about recollection, from about 72e-76e. He's stating this to Simmias an Cebes, so as to argue that our souls, as seen in the last lines, have lifted before birth and therefore have experienced the forms firsthand, and this is where we "recollect" their existence.
While you are correct in the sense that Socrates is trying to indicate that understanding comes from within, he is also literally using the idea that recollection of forms from the time before you were born is the reason why we know of them.

[Anonymous No.16117612]

>>16117597
That entire post was a grammatical/spelling mess, but you get what I mean.

[Anonymous No.16118574]

>>16117597
If you allow me to attempt to carry over my interpretation of Meno, I believe the fact the (ostensibly) same theory is given in two dialogues means that Meno is important to understanding this aspect of Phaedo.

First of all Socrates describes recollection by saying whenever something elicits an association to another thing in your mind, this is recollection since this association is nothing more than reminding about something else already known. This seems to say that you cannot draw an association with something you don't know. Then he posits the existence of the form Equal and says that because people think of the idea of Equal after seeing many equal things, they must already have knowledge of it because they're drawing an association to something. Thus they must have knowledge of the form Equal and just recall it.
Now when we begin to ask questions we get a clearer picture. The most obvious thing one can ask is "do we not learn what equal is from others?" we certainly learn the literal word from others, do we not learn the concept? No, the way in which Socrates wants us to understand our innate understanding of equality is not that we formulate the concept of equal but that we call many things similar, or more precisely that thinking of one thing draws an association to something similar. The fact that we draw this association means that we must understand equal to be able to think two things the same, and thus when we abstract this it isn't anything new. Recollection here is the same as Meno inasmuch as Socrates defines the acquisition of any knowledge from oneself as recollection. Now, is this thing, the elicitation of association by equality, really recollection? It is a much more subtle argument than in Meno, but we can say the same response: if we say that by recollection Socrates means simply innate knowledge, then when he calls (apparent) understanding of equality recollection, he simply means it is an innately understood concept and that recognition of the concept of equal as apart from the actual drawing associations is thus merely describing this action, and is thus knowledge that was inherent in your cognitive use of equality. Thus it is not that we remember the idea of Equal, but that we use the concept in practice before we have a name for it, and thus that knowledge of the idea is inherent in that innate understanding. Recollection is thus just a theory for innate knowledge, and for extrapolation from that innate knowledge to further understanding. Just as the slave understood the basics of geometry and was able to form opinions from it, so we too have innate understanding of equal and make associations based on it.
What is similar between Meno and Phaedo is that whenever he speaks of "having knowledge" and "remembering" this, Socrates means having the potential for knowledge of a thing inherent in an innately understood concept, and that knowledge of this thing comes from within and nowhere else.

[Anonymous No.16118584]

>>16118574
Thus the knowledge of the geometric problem's solution is gained the same way as knowledge of [the idea of the] equal: it is inherent in innately understood ideas, and requires philosophy to be actualized ("remembered") and brought into conscious awareness.

[Anonymous No.16118873]

>>16118574
I'm not arguing you on the fact that recollection is the name given to explain the phenomenon of recollecting innate understanding, in this case the Equal, after seeing examples of it, say two equal sticks. What I'm arguing is that Socrates then goes further in Phaedo, saying that these innate understandings come from forms which an individual's soul has already experienced knowledge of in an earlier existence. He is literally saying that this innate understanding is from the soul's existence apart from the body before the soul came to inhabit the body.

Also, do you hold a similar position on "Ion"? I just finished reading it, and my opinion on it is that Plato is trying to make clear the differences between good speaking without understanding (sophistry) and true understanding.

[Anonymous No.16119012]

>>16118873
The doctrine of the immortality of the soul derives from how Plato understands being, and it is not from having "already experienced knowledge of in an earlier existence" that one has knowledge of being, but by the soul's being and therefore access to the forms (being). He goes into this in Symposium, Phaedrus, Republic, and more abstractly in Parmenides. Between death and birth the soul exists without connection to the material becoming and from this, I think, Plato says it gains access to being. Socrates is using the demonstrable existence of innate understanding to argue for this, since what is understood (intuitive knowledge of the forms) has being, thus the soul has access to this knowledge by its own being. Memory is a purely physical phenomenona, so when Socrates calls the acquisition of knowledge about being "recollection" it is in line with the idea that the soul has access to knowledge of being but the physical memory of it isn't present. It is important to note that knowledge or truth and memory are not the same, as Meno has much memory (of sophistic speeches memorised) but no knowledge/understanding, while the slave has no memory of geometry but has an understanding which allows him to form true opinions. Thus to say the soul has an innate understanding but we have no physical memory of this gives to the claim of recollection some credence. I'm still working out my understanding of this theory so forgive me if it's a poor explanation.

As for Ion, I think that it's more tied to his views on art (see Republic book X) and how poets and artists don't have knowledge but are imitators of appearance, but also when we hear how Ion becomes rapt in the emotions of the work this is perhaps to do with a more mystic kind of experience, where it is not by reason but by this irrational experience that he gains a sort of understanding through the work. It is not sophistry, because he does not claim to have any knowledge, whatever understanding Ion gains through poetry is not by (and is opposite to) the same gained by philosophy, while sophistry just claims to have knowledge while it is just rhetoric, and there is no understanding. If I'm misunderstanding your question forgive me.

[Anonymous No.16119048]

>>16112363
>Very angry fellow aren't you?
Haha, I was the anon you were arguing with, I like you now.

[Anonymous No.16119198]

>>16119012
that's a good post anon

should i go euthydemus-protagoras- gorgias and then meno-phaedo-symposium-republic-parmenides and finally cratylus-theaetetus-sophist-statesman-philebus? or what do you recommend?

[Anonymous No.16119508]

>>16119198
What do you wanna do, read em all?
1st Alcibiades->Lysis->Laches->Charmides for what I call the introductory dialogues, which give you a grasp on the basic ideas of excellence, virtue, and aporia (among many others) which will be expanded on later (if you don't want to read every dialogue then these aren't that important for understanding his metaphysics etc but I still recommend them since they're quite short and have a lot in them, they also teach you how to really think about each of the topics)

Meno->Euthyphro->Apology->Crito for the Socratic dialogues, if you don't read the introductory dialogues then at least read these since they give you what you need to know about an oft repeated episode: the trial of Socrates. Meno is also the starting point for many threads which will continue such as the ideas of knowledge vs opinion, unities, and the theory of recollection/innate knowledge

For (what I term) the sophistic dialogues go Protagoras -> Hippias major -> Euthydemus -> Gorgias. Of these Gorgias is the most important and Hippias is very good to read before Symposium as the aporia from Hippias is resolved in Symposium. Euthydemus is very funny and Protagoras continues the discussion of virtue which began in the introductory dialogues and Meno.

For the "middle period" I'd say Symposium->Phaedeus->Republic->Phaedo. Phaedrus and Symposium are quite complimentary since they both speak of different aspects of love, and Phaedo expands on the discussion of forms discussed in Republic. The Republic is, in my opinion, Plato's masterpiece and a work you'll spend your whole life reading. Take your time and after you've read it I recommend reading the essay on it by Leo Strauss in his book the City and Man to get a fascinating perspective on the work.

The dialogues after this point are what is generally termed late and much of what is said expands on concepts within the Republic.

Next is the great tetralogy Parmenides-Theaetetus-Sophist-Statesman. Parmenides and Sophist are especially tricky works to get a grip on since they deal in depth with Plato's ontology, and if you're having a hard time with Parmenides (as many have) i recommend the book Plato's Parmenides: the conversion of the soul by Mitchell Miller. It's a really fantastic commentary which will help you with understanding not just Parmenides but also the dialogues generally.

Cratylus, Ion, and Menexenus are harder to place and can be read really whenever. Cratylus is best read before Republic, since it brings up problems with Hetaclitean becoming which are resolved in Republic, but it doesn't really have a solid place so you can read it before Symposium if you want. It can get quite tedious since most of it is going over etymologies but if you really want to read it them go ahead. Ion is so short you can read it right now, and you can read it whenever you have 15 minutes to spare. Menexenus really doesn't fit anywhere particularly either so read it at any time you wish.

[Anonymous No.16119516]

>>16119508
Finally is Philebus->Timaeus->Critias->Laws.
Some put Philebus earlier but hidden under the surface is a discussion of the advanced ontology of Parmenides and Sophist, so I put it after thost at least. Timaeus is infamously inscrutable, but you should be able to make connections with the metaphysics and ontology explicated earlier. Critias is unfinished but short, and Laws is historically known as his final work. It is his longest and a much more mature work of serious legislation.

Don't let my recommendations force you down any path though, you're the boss of what you read, but having read all the dialogues this is the order I think is best. There are many spurious works and letters, which if you're interested in afterwards you could read (definitely read the 2nd and 7th letters at least).

[Anonymous No.16119580]

>>16119012
>whatever understanding Ion gains through poetry is not by (and is opposite to) the same gained by philosophy, while sophistry just claims to have knowledge while it is just rhetoric, and there is no understanding.
I shouldn't have mentioned sophistry, it's not your misunderstanding. I was simply saying that it could be "Ion" is about the difference between speaking with knowledge, despite thinking you have it, and actual knowledge/understanding. I accept the explanation you give though and considered it while reading, but this thread's discussion pushed me more towards that line of thought instead of wanting to take the dialogue at face value.

I haven't read the dialogues you mentioned yet, so perhaps they make the discussion on the soul and recollection more clear (or, perhaps, Plato changed his position slightly in later dialogues), but in Phaedo, where I quoted, he literally argues that the soul's existence before birth is proven by the theory of recollection.

[Anonymous No.16119600]

>>16119516
A note on reading the dialogues: great attention should be paid to how something is said not just what is said. In Plato the form determines the content, and understanding the person speaking will help you to understand why he's arguing what he is.

For example, Meno. Meno, we are told, was a student of Gorgias. Gorgias would have his students memorise speeches to recite instead of teaching them how to argue with an aim to gaining understanding and truth about a matter. Meno thus asks Socrates constantly to be told the answer, and when pressed simply cites "Gorgias says..." or "the ports say..." etc. We can thus see that Meno sees learning and knowledge as memory and recollection, and when Socrates tells him the definition for shape, he wishes instead for a more theatrical answer (presumably so he can recite it later) so Socrates gives him a sophistic definition of colour as what is seen through the eyes. In response to Meno's character, Socrates then presents him (and us) with his theory of learning in terms Meno understands: memory and recollection. However, here we see that "recollection" is just knowledge gained from within, as opposed as what is told to someone (knowledge from without, how Meno learns).

Socrates ends the dialogue by arguing that virtue is right opinion because there are no students nor teachers of virtue. But what about Socrates himself, the philosopher? If we consider this then his argument falls apart and we discover that virtue is knowledge and the philosopher is the student and teacher of it.

Why does Socrates make this false argument? This is explained by the general 4 part structure of the dialogues. Plato also writes them in the form of a elicitation of the general belief of the subject, then refutes this. This results in aporia and the second half is devoted to resolving it. The philosopher then provides his reorienting insight, and then there is a return to the original question. The interlocutor always fails to realise the return is given as a poor argument, and it is our job to see through this and answer the question with the insight gained in the 3rd part. Seeing the dialogues in this way may help you to go through them with a sharper eye.
What is also good to know is how each dialogue abstracts from something. That is, the argument ignores a vital element. For example, Meno ignores the existence of philosophy which allows the closing argument against virtue being knowledge to prevail. Trying to understand what is missing too helps to answer the problems Socrates raises. I hope this helps in some way.

[Anonymous No.16119645]

>>16119580
Yeah Phaedo is one of his more spiritual dialogues since it is about the soul, and I think it is significant that Phaedo relates this all to a Pythagorean philosopher (whether to signal to us the origin of the ideas or the style they are related in). I haven't read Phaedo in like a year so my memory of the details isn't the best, but I'm sure he's trying to tie the innate understanding of the forms to the soul through being, and uses the familiar idea of innate knowledge (signalled by recollection) to connect the two, since innate knowledge of the forms implies some fundamental association with them perhaps, and so the state of the soul before it is born (he goes into this in Phaedrus) is in connection with the One and forms, but my understanding isn't great and I'm still working on really getting a hang on the concept. Socrates is famously ironic so don't take what he says at face value.

[Anonymous No.16119729]

>>16119508
>>16119516
>>16119600
wow i really appreciate all of this, thank you
what do you think of reading commentaries by platonists after reading the dialogues on which they comment? probably that miller's book is much more accessible after reading parmenides for the first time while proclus' commentary on it would be more accessible after a second reading of the parmenides

[Anonymous No.16119795]

>>16118574
Looking back through Phaedo last night, something that struck me about recollection and the forms in it was the difference between the content of recollection (how knowledge comes about) vs. the biographical account Socrates gives later. In the latter, he posits the existence of forms and hypothesizes about them, and seeks safety in logos in this way, i.e. consistency in speech. This related to the rejection of mechanical cause Socrates talks about and the confusion over teleology (Socrates is in prison. Because his body is situated there vs. because both he and Athens separately by different understandings of the Just and Good thought it was good for him to be put to death). In Meno, recollection is followed up by the method of hypothesis, so for some reason it's important to see that movement. This would also connect both works to the Parmenides, wherein the young Socrates is shown how to work out hypotheses in order to strengthen logoi.

For OP, since this form passage was what they had in mind, this might be worth thinking about. Socrates's "second sailing" amounts to avoiding being blinded by looking at the beings themselves in favor of looking at them in "reflections", i.e. logo, speeches.

[Anonymous No.16119893]

>>16119729
You should read the dialogue before reading a commentary. A word of warning about reading (neo)platonist commentaries and writings is that sometimes their interpretations are informed by a long tradition which took for granted certain assertions about Plato's views (which are warped by centuries of platonists responding to platonists etc, John Dillon's book the middle platonists goes into this in some depth), while modern commentaries look purely and directly at Plato's writings and only at platonists when trying to understand what Aristotle calls his "unwritten doctrines". Someone like Proclus therefore should be read not only as an astute student of the dialogues but also the product of a long tradition, and you should be wary that his commentary is written with later assumptions about Plato in mind.
>>16119795
I completely agree with the connection of hypotheses that run from Meno to Phaedo and Parmenides, I also think it's an important connection between those works, and perhaps the later method of divisions in Sophist.
Good post.

[Anonymous No.16120469]

>>16119893
>I also think it's an important connection between those works, and perhaps the later method of divisions in Sophist
Hmm, maybe even as a contrast, perhaps? I'm trying to work that out; it looks as though what Socrates presents with his Second Sailing is an attempt to provide unity to things like Justice, the Good, the Beautiful, etc., which may be what's meant by "a safer way" in logo. The Stranger's art bifurcates, according to him, where a subject can be cut "naturally", though there's at least one alarming passage in the Sophist where he implies it doesn't matter which selection Theaetetus makes (222b). There's a kind of arbitrary approach in the Stranger's method (why do we have to do this 6 or 7 times? By what would we understand 5 to be too few and 8 to be too many?), but there maybe is this similarity to what Socrates does: they both start and orient themselves by opinion, and sometimes Socrates, as with the Stranger, ends up with a Multitude instead of a One.

I'll have to chew on that some more.

[Anonymous No.16120582]

>>16119508
>Protagoras -> Hippias major -> Euthydemus -> Gorgias
I'm a different guy, but I'm also reading through Plato. Two questions; firstly, at what point should the Lesser Hippias be read, and secondly, I've heard another say that Phaedrus should be read before Symposium - why do you consider it to be better read afterwards?

[Anonymous No.16120846]

>>16120582
Lesser Hippias is one of the works of disputed authenticity, and is more about the idea of the "hero" than other subjects of focus in the dialogues. It can be read just after Hippias major, I just forgot to put it there.

Symposium I think should be read first because it is the dialogue which explicitly brings up the forms in a way almost in response to Hippias Major, and thus I see Hippias major as a dialogue which transitions between the Socratic and sophistic dialogues to the truly Platonic dialogues. As well as this, Symposium has as its subject eros, a topic which is expanded upon in Phaedrus with the discussion of philos. You can, of course, read them in either order, but in how Phaedrus treats love and the soul, I feel like it's a continuation of the discussion of the same subjects in Symposium. Just as clarification, I read Phaedrus before I read Symposium but feel the latter should be read first.

>>16120469
I think it's an important point that in a dialogue called and about the Sophist, the methodology used by the stranger is itself quite arbitrary and sophistic. These are real questions we should ask: why does the stranger make the divisions he does? Is he right that there are "natural divisions" and if so, are any of his divisions natural? What is the difference & similarities between the divisions and the hypotheses? I think in answering these questions we shall see what the stranger is really trying to do, and we'll get a better understanding of Plato's intention with the hypotheses and divisions as I believe them to be relayed. Most important of all, why does Socrates stand by silently as the stranger makes these arbitrary divisions?

[Anonymous No.16120858]

>>16120846
Just re: Hippias, I think the order should have Hippias major as after Gorgias because of its relationship to Symposium.

[Anonymous No.16120877]

>>16120846
I believe them to be related*

[Anonymous No.16121262]

>>16120846
>I think it's an important point that in a dialogue called and about the Sophist, the methodology used by the stranger is itself quite arbitrary and sophistic. These are real questions we should ask: why does the stranger make the divisions he does? Is he right that there are "natural divisions" and if so, are any of his divisions natural? What is the difference & similarities between the divisions and the hypotheses? I think in answering these questions we shall see what the stranger is really trying to do, and we'll get a better understanding of Plato's intention with the hypotheses and divisions as I believe them to be relayed. Most important of all, why does Socrates stand by silently as the stranger makes these arbitrary divisions?
Those are very good questions. Another: why does Plato devote two whole dialogues with a silent Socrates looking on? The other parallel to that would be Timaeus-Critias, though I'm not sure what do with that (Is Socrates : Eleatic Stranger :: Socrates : Timaeus & Critas?).

It's certainly strange that the Stranger comes to a definition of the Sophist that resembles Socrates before the non-being section. If the Stranger begins with opinion (in order to "know" enough about a Form or Kind in order to divide it), does this just end up revealing how the Philosopher must look in opinion?

I've wondered about the possibly sophistical nature of the Stranger, but it's tricky, right? Are we tempted to say he's statesmanlike in the Statesman?

[Anonymous No.16121341]

>>16121262
A further parallel is the silent Socrates in Parmenides during the hypotheses, how different would it be if it were Socrates answering instead of the not so bright Aristotle? Socrates' silence in Timaeus is exactly parallel you're right, there we should also ask what is significant about the fictional Timaeus giving that speech (and in such mythic language) as opposed to Socrates?

I haven't read Sophist in a while (but this thread is golden >>/lit/thread/S15201563)) so I can't really comment on it, but on non-being recall that in Theaetetus this is where one definition of knowledge failed, perhaps revisiting that dialogue with the insights from sophist would be fruitful.

The stranger from Elea is a mysterious figure (even his name is unknown to us) and so I'm hesitant to even say if we should consider him to be a philosopher or not, or whether like a chameleon he changes to suit the dialogue (like a sophist here, like a statesman there), but perhaps to characterise his methods as overarchingly philosophical is the point, and ultimately what distinguishes him from either the sophist and the statesman (and in this way show us what a philosopher is like as opposed to the other two).

[Anonymous No.16121837]

>>16121341
>A further parallel is the silent Socrates in Parmenides during the hypotheses, how different would it be if it were Socrates answering instead of the not so bright Aristotle?
Hm, one thought is that Eleatics draw a distinction between who a demonstrator is for and who the demonstration partner is. In both cases, Socrates is the recipient of a demonstration, and the partners aren't necessarily getting anything from it themselves. (Also, both Eleativs don't seem to want to demonstrate with older opinionated folks...) This at least seems like a plausible reason for why so many interlocutors in the dialogue seem to go away mostly unchanged; *we're* the recipients who have to somehow see something indicated by the conversation. Even Glaucon and Adeimantus don't become philosophers. Though if this holds, it raises a question about the people in the Phaedo (and I do have reservations about them...).

>Socrates' silence in Timaeus is exactly parallel you're right, there we should also ask what is significant about the fictional Timaeus giving that speech (and in such mythic language) as opposed to Socrates?
Socrates seems able to set up the city in speech, but unable or unwilling to put it in motion to show it in war. It's not as if Socrates doesn't know anything about war, he's served in battle several times. But why should it be a Pythagorean? And why should Critias offer the Atlantis account?

>I haven't read Sophist in a while (but this thread is golden >>/lit/thread/S15201563)) so I can't really comment on it, but on non-being recall that in Theaetetus this is where one definition of knowledge failed, perhaps revisiting that dialogue with the insights from sophist would be fruitful.
I'll give that a read, thanks anon.

>The stranger from Elea is a mysterious figure (even his name is unknown to us) and so I'm hesitant to even say if we should consider him to be a philosopher or not, or whether like a chameleon he changes to suit the dialogue (like a sophist here, like a statesman there), but perhaps to characterise his methods as overarchingly philosophical is the point, and ultimately what distinguishes him from either the sophist and the statesman (and in this way show us what a philosopher is like as opposed to the other two).
That seems right. Maybe even the impossibility of distinguishing them? There are times where Socrates seems to imply philosophy isn't anything other than the art of ruling (Gorgias, Rival Lovers), though those certainly have a rhetorical point as well. The difficulty of unifying them in speech would speak to the difficulty of unifying body and soul as self in the Phaedo.

[Anonymous No.16122279]

>>16121837
>This at least seems like a plausible reason for why so many interlocutors in the dialogue seem to go away mostly unchanged; *we're* the recipients who have to somehow see something indicated by the conversation.
I believe this too, it is significant that equals never argue in the dialogues. Glaucon and Adeimantus don't become philosophers, you're right, and it appears Glaucon at least never becomes even less unphilosophical. Consider how the Republic ends: Socrates, having shown that justice is everything working correctly and therefore that the philosopher is the only person who can be just and benefit directly from it (since he alone has wisdom working as his ruler), tells Glaucon what he wants to hear: that just men lives happy lives and unjust men live miserable lives, and then presents him with the myth (the unphilosophical form of discourse par excellence) of Er to further lead him to act justly. We should be able to see through Socrates' appeasement of Glaucon to what is true. This is really the most explicit display of the difference between the philosopher and the non-philosopher.

The whole of Timaeus and Critias is wrapped in mystery, I've heard Cornford's translation & commentary is a good place to start trying to understand it. What is clear is that we get in myth a full account of Platonic cosmology and metaphysics, and an understanding of his metaphysics from other dialogues will help exorcise the logos from the mythos.

Socrates in Republic certainly shows that politics and philosophy are intertwined, but that the statesman and the philosopher are the same is another matter...is the statesman the same as the philosopher-king? iirc there is a distinction made between the statesman's art and the kingly art, the latter presumably being what the philosopher-king falls under. That philosophy isn't anything other than the art of ruling I disagree, and we see in Meno that he even tries to define virtue as ruling or having the power to rule, which Socrates rejects. As well as this, the impossibility of there being a philosopher-king is because the philosophers don't want to rule. This really raises the question of what is the difference between the statesman and the philosopher-king? I'm actually waiting for a commentary by Mitchell Miller on Statesman to arrive in the mail lel so hopefully that'll help answer the question. For the moment I think we should separate the three - Sophist, Statesman, and Philosopher.