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[Anonymous No.13208492]

How is Hegel different from Advaita Vedanta?

[Anonymous No.13208806]

bump

[Anonymous No.13208811]

He's German?

[Anonymous No.13208875]

>>13208492
Hegel can't lead you to realisation of the Self or non dual state

[Anonymous No.13209003]

>>13208492
Hegel is regarded as the greatest of Kant’s successors and his system the highest that any human brain has produced. For subtlety and speculative boldness, it is unequalled. It wins its triumph by Reason or the principle of the identity of opposites. The object is distinct from the subject, yet identical with it. Hitherto, men were puzzled as to whether the two elements of knowledge should be considered as independent and real (dualism), or whether the one ought to be derived from the other (idealism, materialism). Hegel by a coup de main took the bull by the horns and declared that it was a mistake to suppose that a thing was only self-identical, loading thereby to a speculative impasse. Every thing, like every concept, contained its own negation, was its own negation, so that it would be as correct to say that A equals not-A, as to say that A equals A. Being and Non-Being are identical. For, when all the determinations of a thing are abstracted from, it can be with equal reason regarded as Being or Non-Being. A thing is made up of its determinations, concepts, universals, thoughts. Being is, therefore, identical with Knowing. The world has its logical being in a system of universals, of categories, or reason. It is the Absolute Idea, the identity in difference of subject and object. The Universe is Mind, not your mind or my mind, or even God’s Mind, but objective Mind. Such is a brief description of the main doctrines of Hegelianism.

Hegel’s system is Monism, but with him Reality is not an abstract but a concrete One. The Eleatics, the Hindus and Spinoza are said to have started with an abstract One and hence failed to deduce the world from it, and were obliged to treat it as an illusion, Maya or a Nullity. His method is dialectic. A universal is not necessarily empty. It may carry its own negation or opposite with it and we can deduce a higher entity by a combination of both. Thus, Being contains Non-Being. By combining both, we arrive at Becoming which is a higher category. Becoming is similarly treated as the next thesis, from which an antithesis is developed, and by combining the thesis and the antithesis, a new category is obtained, and so on, till we reach the highest category, the Absolute Idea. Prom the Idea, Nature is deduced, and by a synthesis of these two, we get to the Absolute Spirit which is the end and the consummation of the world-process. Thus the Absolute Spirit is the Absolute Idea which has passed from the sphere of pure thought into actual existence. “Philosophy is the existence of the Idea.” The philosophic spirit is “ the attainment of the end and purpose of the world-process.” “The external Idea, in full fruition of its essence, eternally sets itself to work, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute mind (spirit).” (Stace, page 618).

[Anonymous No.13209006]

>>13209003
In tracing the world to a first principle it is rightly maintained that this principle should not be an individual thing which in its turn craves an explanation, and that, therefore, the most correct principle can be Reason alone. In that case, with what justification can the principle be assumed as a concrete One, rather than an Abstract One ? It is argued that if the first One were altogether empty, how could we deduce the world from it, except as a make-believe? How can we get from the One what was not in it? Well, if so, where is the fun in assuming the world as implicitly contained in the One, and then like a juggler drawing out sheath after sheath from it? Is this Monism? If organic unity is claimed, it always presupposes a manifold in a subtle condition, and in no case will the multiplicity have been accounted for. Besides, the impotence to deduce multiplicity from an abstract unity is an intellectual impotence. Life laughs at it. Consciousness can make an object of itself, though it contains no object. Nevertheless, let us grant that the Dialectic method has a superiority over the doctrine of Maya and see how far it enables Hegel to derive the world from the Idea. His philosophy of Nature is universally looked upon as the most unsatisfactory. It breaks down completely at the most critical point. Declaring Nature as the opposite of the Idea and therefore as irrational and unreal, he thinks he has got over the difficulty of having to deduce it from the first principle. But the validity of the principle is tested by its power to explain the world. Hegers pretentious claims end in signal failure. For to him also, as to the Hindu, Nature is irrational and unreal—is Maya, Neither can we find that his philosophy of Spirit is of any high merit. His treatment of Ethics, of Aesthetics, of religion, of man’s life and destiny, does not exhibit any of that rational basis on which he professes to build up his entire system.

[Anonymous No.13209013]

>>13209006
What is the Good? The coincidence of the individual will with the universal. Well, it might be the result of accident or of voluntary effort. But, why should one seek the Good ? If it is rational, why should the majority of mankind be indifferent and even antagonistic to it? What is Right ? Why should it be so ? What is the impulse in man that inclines him to the Good and the Righteous? In vain do we look for rational answers to these eternal questions of the human mind. In the next place, Beauty is described as the appearance of the Idea through the sensory-world. We know that “a thing of Beauty is a joy for over.” Why should the appearance of the Idea make the thing beautiful a source of eternal delight? His explanation of the aesthetic feeling is far from adequate. As to religion, no one will be satisfied with his triad : the Universal (God) going out into the particular (Man) to become the individual (The Church). To reduce Heaven and Hell, Sin and Virtue, Bliss and Immortality, Worship and Grace, Life and all its trials and tribulations, and finally God Himself, to a series of Universals with inexhaustible fecundity, is the cruellest satire on human feelings and aspirations. The logical severity with which the categories are deduced, gives the system a rational look, but it is a delusion. There are pitfalls throughout, and the very first step by which Hegel proves Being to be identical with Non-Being takes one’s breath away by its audacity. A equals A, A equals Not-A. One would just ask whether all the four A’s here are identical or different. To prove Hegel’s point they must be assumed to be identical. If they are identical, how is their opposition to themselves to be expressed or conceived ? If A is absolutely A, how is it also absolutely Not-A ? How can both the affirmation and negation be equally absolute at the same time ? And we have already seen that to accept even such a revolting proposition brings in no corresponding good. We should be only ringing in the rule of chaos.

[Anonymous No.13209016]

>>13209013
There is a straightforwardness in the Vedantin which might find greater appreciation and imitation. In dealing with the world as a thing apart from the Brahman or the Reality, he firmly declares it to be Maya, unreality, illusion. Stace, a fervent and admirable exponent of Hegel, observes: ‘‘The writers of Upanishads being unable to explain why the One differentiates itself into the many took refuge in metaphors. As the sparks from the substantial fire, so all finite beings issue forth from the One. But this explains nothing. The problem is how the actual world is to be explained from that Ultimate Reality” (Pages 170-171, Greek Thought) Stace does not seem to know that the Upanishads are using such figures as are strictly justified by actual experience and not such as are dictated by fancy. They refer to the oneness universally experienced in sleep and the manifoldness of waking. Certainly, the change is best compared to the sparks proceeding from a burning fire. Considering the relation of the individual souls to Brahman which is that of identity, the comparison is perfect. Stace 'claims greater rationality for Hegels system which, he maintains, explains with success the issue of the many from the One, without reducing the former to a mere nullity. Yet, this promise is belied later. On page 184 {Greek Thought) we read :

“Our Senses make us aware of many individual horses. Our intellect gives us the concept of the horse in general. If the latter is the sole truth, the former must be false. The objects of sensations have no true reality. What has reality is the idea of the horse in general.”

Is this to preserve the reality of the world intact, and explain its origination from Reality or God ? Instead of the open distinction between Reality and unreality, the fashion is to discriminate between existence and reality. What presents itself to the sense, a tree for example, exists, but is not real ; what is not so perceived—quality for example—is real. In other words, individual things whether external (a tree), or internal (a feeling) are unreal, while universals, concepts alone, are real. The reason furnished is unconvincing. The tree deprived of its determinations, universals, becomes reduced to nothing. Hence, it depends for its existence on the universals. It is unreal, while they are real. But are the universals independent of the tree ? Can we take them apart except mentally? No, but still they must be conceded real being. They are real. Yet, they are not real as a subjective concept, which is an event in time, in the stream of consciousness. They are real as objective concepts. As such they are independent of every individual mind. They are the world which is thought objective. Obviously, all individual things—all immediate presentations to consciousness are unreal.

[Anonymous No.13209022]

>>13209016
But what is meant by objective concepts ? If we cannot know them, how can we assume them ? The answer given is, they are identical with subjective concepts and as these we know them. Hence, our knowledge of the categories is direct. If the categories, as concepts, are identical with the subjective concepts, how is their objective reality to be established at the same time ? To say that the categories are not the concepts of your mind or my mind, or of any individual mind, but objective concepts, beyond time and eternal, is to hide ignorance behind a cloud of words. They are simply abstractions, and can have no reality apart from the mind that conceived them. Similarly, an objective mind is an abstraction of my mind and can have no real being apart from it. Objective thought and objective mind should bo dismissed as veritable myths of fancy. Vedanta declares, on the unimpeachable authority of experience, the unity of the highest Reality, and the Manic nature of the world divorced from it. Hegel admits the unreality of everything presented immediately to consciousness—a sensuous object, a volition, or a subjective concept—but claims reality only to the objective concept which is timeless, which has no existence, and which is not my concept, though this is identical with it. The truth is, this objective reason is a mere assumption, and while it is taken to be real, all the rest is declared to be unreal. How does Hegel differ from Vedanta? Brahman is established from an entire study of Life and its three manifestations ; Hegel’s Absolute Idea or Absolute Mind is a mere hypothesis, a ghost of fancy—a spectral king of “ bloodless categories.”

[Anonymous No.13209024]

>>13209022
If, now, the objective categories are timeless and have only logical being, how do they enter the region of existence, of Time and Place ? This is the crux. How does Hegel answer? Nature, the sphere of Time and Change, is irrational, and hence unreal. We cannot, therefore, rationally deduce it from the Idea. This is a pitiable collapse, after such a preliminary flourish. Was not his Dialectic made possible by deducing Nothing from Being, which was his greatest feat, and by a synthesis of both ? What is the net result of the pains taken, if, like Plato’s Ideas, Hegel’s Categories should not be able to effect their entrance into the sensuous world? Failing to deduce Nature from the Idea, how is the deduction of Spirit or Mind possible which demands a synthesis of them both ? The doctrine of Maya is often held in superior contempt. What do the successive failures of thinkers possessing the highest genius for speculation to explain the world indicate? Surely, it is the illusion of illusions to go about a task without ascertaining its nature and to believe in having accomplished it, when like the labour of Sisyphus, it has to be commenced over again. The Reality is the Absolute. The world is characterized by Maya or the principle of contradictions. To relate the two is to fall into her net, and be caught in its meshes, without hope of escape.

And what, according to Hegel, is Reality? Independent Being. The Universal is independent and therefore real. A thing, a constituent of the world, depends for its existence on the universal, and is therefore unreal, though a presentational immediacy. But is not a Universal also dependent on the thing? Can it have being apart from things ? What is the ground on which the statement rests, that the Universal, the Idea, is independent? Stace can vouchsafe no better answer than this: “We cannot suppose that universals, on which the very existence of things depend, are nothing, have no being of any sort. We must admit, then, that universals have being”, (page 19, Philosophy of Hegel), To be the principle of the world, they must be real, and must explain themselves. But on page 200 we find : “The Indian describes the world as Maya mere nothing, non-entity. For Hegel, the world is likewise appearance, but the appearance is the essence, i.e., it is not less essential than the essence itself,” and again on page 212 “The external world is certainly appearance, phenomenon. But it is not a nullity. It is just as essential to reality as essence is. Were it not so, it would be impossible to understand why the essence (Brahman, Being, etc.) should ever manifest itself. It does so because it must, because it is essential to its own reality that it should do so, because without its manifestation it would itself be unreal. Reality, then, or actuality, is not the essence alone, nor is it the manifestation alone, but it is the essence which manifests itself.”

[Anonymous No.13209028]

>>13209024
Now, if Reality cannot help manifesting itself, if the Idea must appear as the world, how can its being be independent, and without independence how can it be real ? It cannot be real unless it manifests itself, but it cannot be real, if it must manifest itself. Both the world and its principle are reduced to the condition of absolute mutual dependence, and, in Stace’s own words, dependence is the sign of unreality. His passion to display the superiority of the Hegelian doctrine, the obsession of the modern mind with the notion of the reality of the practical world—the sphere of his daily triumphs and joys, the absence of a clear idea of what constitutes reality, has made Mr. Stace so hopelessly contradictory. It is not true that to the Hindu the world is a mere nullity. It is the sphere of probation, of purification through experience, of self-expression, and of selfrealisation, to the spirit. If, after all, this is not accepted as the highest reality, how can a cultured soul blunder over the truth?

The fact is, Stace has not arrived at a correct definition of Reality. Vedanta cannot accept his definition. Independency of being, though based on better evidence than what is furnished in behalf of the Universal, cannot necessarily imply reality. Independence is a notion, and such notions may visit the human mind in dreams as well as in waking. I behold a parrot in a dream. It is a congeries of universals. Hence, going on Stace's principle, I conclude at the time that the thing, the parrot, is unreal, but the universals of which it is made up are real. The parrot has only existence but the universals have real being. I wake to laugh at the illusion of it all. The notion of the independence of the dream-universal could not endow it with real being. This imperfection is inseparable from all partial views of Life, views confined to the waking experience alone. The distinction between existence and reality made by Stace collapses in dream-Iife. If it is urged that this objection is invalid, as no one takes dream experience seriously, the answer is, so much the worse for a system of thought. Besides, the defence is particularly ill available for Hegel to whom All is Idea, Thought. For dream-life is as much within the region of thought as waking, and if Hegel’s procedure is right, dream-life must be as rationally ordered as the other. Rut it is opposed to universal experience.

[Anonymous No.13209035]

>>13209028
Moreover, a definition of waking is as hard to light upon, as that of reality. “ Why, this is waking”, one might impatiently exclaim. Yes, but that does not help us to define the state in definite terms. In dream, the feeling is identical, “ this is waking,” and no proof proceeds beyond the meagre ‘ this ’ in both cases.
Again, what is the world, according to Hegel, which is to be explained ? Does the concept include subject and object ? If so, it must leave out the consciousness in which the concept appears, and suffer in its comprehensiveness; and in fact, no idea can be free from this defect so long as the view-point is restricted to waking. If the subject is excluded, then evidently, the concept does not represent the sum of reality. Again, in explaining the Absolute Idea (page 292, Philosophy of Hegel) Stace declares it to be “the absolute identity in difference of subject and object”. “The subject instead of having the object as something alien and outside it, now recognizes that the object is itself. Mind or the subject duplicates itself, puts itself forth as its own object in the form of an external world, and in contemplating that world contemplates itself. It is mind which knows itself to be all reality. It is thus the thought of thought, thought which thinks, not an alien object but only itself.” This is to treat mind or the subject as if it were an object, and put both subject and object on an empirical footing of equality. Subjectivity can only be viewed as an empirical contingency of Reality which, as the substrate of subject and object, cannot be properly treated as subject or object, and the Hegelian deduction of one category after another were impossible without playing false to the genuine nature of Reality which resists all attempts to objectify it. The inherent impossibility to treat Reality, Brahman, as an object, is what forced the Vedantin, in order to be faithful to Truth, to acknowledge a secondary principle of illusion and of contradiction, Maya.

[Anonymous No.13209042]

>>13209035
Side by side with Reality, it is a mere nothing. But as descriptive of the character of the empirical world, its name is the most significant. For every attempt to trace the development of empirical multiplicity from the transcendental unity has ended in despair and Hegel’s is not an exception. People, under the power of Maya forget that to draw out anything from consciousness they have to do violence to its nature, and convert it into an object first, when all the while it remains as the imperturbable witness of their fruitless cogitations. A Hegelian might turn round and ask, ‘‘Is not all Monism sailing in the same boat, Vedanta as well as the rest ? Should not subject and object be both reduced to unity, to identity ? How has Hegel suffered for want of a doctrine like that of Maya ? ” Vedanta admits that Monism reduces all existence to a single principle. Its one, however, is neither an abstract nor a concrete one. ‘Abstract ’ and ‘concrete ’ savour of duality. It is absolute and cannot be conceived to have relations with the world which is its manifestation. It transcends the subject and the object and is immediately realized only as Pure Consciousness. It is eternally beyond the reach of change and time, and is assumed to manifest itself only when associated with Maya. In the exoteric view. Brahman is both changeless and changing, and all our speculation with its self-contradictions and inconsistencies, can have a bearing only on the empirical side, not on the transcendental side of Reality. Vedanta teems with doctrines that are often fanciful and dogmatic but they do not and indeed cannot touch its central Truth which by its immediacy is ever secure.

Further, the distinction that Stace makes between existence and reality is not clear. Existence seems to be euphemism for unreality. A thing exists but is not real. The univerals do not exist but have real being. The unreality of a thing is due to its dependence on the universals. May we not question whether mere dependence should necessarily imply unreality? Stace’s illustration of a shadow does not exhaust all cases of dependence. My writing depends on the pen. Is my writing unreal therefore ? My strength depends on the food I take. Is my strength unreal ? These are obvious instances of the falsity of his principle, and of the regrettable carelessness with which philosophical truths are often elucidated. In the next place, according to Stace, there need not be anything unreal. From Being to the Absolute Idea, from the Idea to the Absolute Spirit and again from the Absolute Spirit to Pure Being, everything is logically deduced, and nothing is lost.

[Anonymous No.13209048]

>>13209042
The world in its entirety, the categories, Nature and Mind, are all included in the philosophical circle which returns into itself. ” Where is then room for unreality ? Why should individual things be unreal, when their existence can be logicaly explained ? It is opposed to the principle of Hegel that what is rational is real. Moreover, Stace disagrees with Hegel when he declares that Nature is undeducible, since on account of its contingency and irrationality, it is an absolute unreality. Stace says : “But since it exists, and since it is not deduced, not derived from thought, it has, therefore, an independent being of its own. It is an absolute reality, (page 310, Philosophy of Hegel). It appears, therefore, that according to Stace, a thing is real when it is not deduced from thought, when it is irrational. It is unreal when it is so deducible, when it is proved to be rational. Why rationality any more than dependence should lead to unreality is not evident, especially in the face of Hegel’s statement that Nature is unreal because of its irrationality.

The problem of evil is the toughest in philosophy. Here is the Hegelian pronouncement on its nature. “ Some things which exist, such as evil, are not rational. Hence, such things are mere shows, outward nullities which do not reveal the inward reason of the world.” (page 212, Philosophy of Hegel). But this is strangely contradicted later. “ The existence of evil, error, imperfection is no mere subjective illusion. Those are real, yet they are compatible with the fact that the Absolute Good is already, now and always, accomplished and that the universe, therefore, is perfect.” It is difficult to understand this inconsistency unless we accept the doctrine of degrees of reality which is just what Vedanta, in its theory of Maya propounds. Evil is the effect of Ignorance, of Maya and is real, with the reality of the second Degree. Thus Hegelianism agrees with Vedanta in many important respects; where they differ, the advantage is clearly on the side of Vedanta. Hegel starts with Being which is the Idea implicit, treats it as a concrete One and deduces from it the whole world, but pronounces the entire world to be unreal, while the Idea alone is real. Vedanta starts with Brahman which is absolute Being, which does not lend itself to be viewed in relation to everything else, which is Pure Consciousness and blessedness, and explains the origination of the world as its manifestation, through the power of Maya (the principle of unreality) associated with Brahman in the mind of the unenlightened. Reality is thus left intact in its eternal purity. Hegel makes the world deduce itself logically from the Idea, and yet, most inconsistently, is obliged to regard the world as unreal. Vedanta, again, finds Brahman or Reality, in our Life, Experience. Hegel’s Idea is a logical fiction.

[Anonymous No.13209056]

>>13209048
One with such precarious notions of reality and unreality need not have accused the oriental mind of its vagueness. Hegel’s system cannot comprehend in its purview Life in its entirety. Concepts form but a part of it, though a very self-assertive part. Percepts as the original will not be compressed into concepts—the copies—and more than both there is Life itself without which neither concepts nor percepts can leap into birth. It is I that conceive or perceive the world, and surely I cannot be included in my own acts. I am not my own act. I may choose to bo idle, to go to sleep, to be reduced to immediate being. I am more than concept or percept. Reality must include both and cannot be exhausted by only one of them. Hegel's Absolute Idea is therefore an inadequate conception. Again, if every category, such as Being, includes every other, it must have every other implickly in it, and development is their becoming explicit. But this process presupposes time, and as the objective universals or categories are timeless, the process is inconceivable, impossible. Hence, no purpose is gained by foisting implicitness and explicitness on the categories. In the next place, every category being the Idea already, whether explicitly or implicitly, no reason can bo shown why such a self-contained unit should crave expansion or contraction. If it is a necessity like that which causes a seed to grow into a tree, then all talk of freedom is clean moonshine. A seed is an element of the world of plurality, and must submit to environmental conditions, to forces acting on it. But the Idea which is the only Reality cannot be conceivably forced to work under external conditions, as it can have nothing external to it. If it is answered that it imposes its own laws on itself, the question still would be ‘ to what end ? ’ A defence may possibly be set up on the analogy of Vedanta. Why should Brahman create ? For sport ? Well, the Idea also sports. Yes, but to Vedanta, creation or manifestation is but Maya and Brahman remains unaffected.

[Anonymous No.13209060]

>>13209056
If Hegel should offer a similar explanation for his Idea his position would become identical with that of Vedanta, except in one essential respect. Brahman, to Vedanta, is an established Truth, Life entire; while Hegel’s Idea would still remain a concept—too narrow to take in either individual percept or life. The universal going into the particular to become the individual as the principle of religion is too wide of the mark to give satisfaction to any man or community of men. It would be but fair that I give a specimen of Hegel’s deduction of categories. For obvious reasons I choose that in which the many is shown to spring from the One. “ From the One issues the many or the many ones. For the self-relation of the one is relation. By a negative relation is meant a relation to another, e.e., a relation of the being which negates its other. For the self-relatedness of the one exists only by virtue of that it has its other in it. Being has only become Being for Self by absorbing its other. Its self-relation is therefore relation to another. That other is internal to it, yet because it is another it is also external to it. For to be another means to be external, or in other words, that the one is self-related means that the one is related to the one. This involves a distinction between the one which is related and the one to which it is related. The one distinguishes itself from itself. Thus the one suffers diremption into a multiplicity of one, the many.” (Art: 208, Philosophy of Hegel). The first thing to draw our attention is the expression self-relation. Now, if Hegel began with a real one and deduced the many from it, he must have scrupulously avoided every implication of a second. But a relation implies two terms, and to speak of self-relation is already to have conceived the one to be split up, and the many is seen to be flourishing before it is born with such travails ! Indeed, the scheme of his deduction, thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, starts with an assumption of multiplicity and relation, and the derivation of the Universe from Being, is not the derivation of the man from the one, but of the many from the many, assumed for convenience to be one to start with. Thus his deductions are shorn of all interest beyond their ingenuity.

[Anonymous No.13209062]

>>13209060
What proves, however, beyond doubt the profundity of Hegel’s metaphysical genius is his explanation of sleep and waking. It wanted a very little to enlarge his vision so as to take in Vedantic Truth. “ Whereas ”, Stace says, on page 332, Philosophy of Hegel "on its first appearance the Natural Soul was entirely empty and homogeneous and so without internal distinctions, there is now within it the implicit distinction between itself, i.e., the homogeneous blank with which we begin on the one hand, and the affections of its environment which appear in it as physical qualities and alterations on the other.” The former Hegel calls its immediate being, the latter we may call its content. When the individuality now distinguishes within itself its content from its mere immediate being, we have the state of waking. Sleep on the other hand is its relapse into the state of its immediate being. The immediate being is an undifferentiated universality, which when it become specialized and differentiates itself, gives rise to its content, the physical qualities and alterations. Sleep is, so to speak, the loss of the content, the return to homogeneous universality. In it the Soul has returned to its first phase, mere being. It may be regarded as consciousness robbed of all content, ie., consciousness of nothing, unconsciousness Here we may remarkthat Hegel considers sleep as immediate being or consciousness robbed of its content, the first phase of the Soul. When it develops its content, and differentiates this from itself, it has waking; when it loses this content and returns to its homogeneous universality it sleeps. Now how is the content lost and recovered? Why should it lead to waking or sleeping? Does the content mean the body and the faculties of the mind? If the development of the content leads to waking, what are dreams? Besides, why do we go invariably to sleep every day after waking? And why does sleep betray the same characteristics every time, while no two dreams are alike? Do these states occur as a series in waking time? Why should the soul be looked upon as a denizen of the waking world alone, while it passes from state to state, heedless of the attractions of each ? What is the meaning of the states? Why should the human spirit reduce itself to immediate being every day? How are dream-bodies and dream-worlds to be explained? It is a mere accident that prevented Hegel from pursuing this line of enquiry.

[Anonymous No.13209067]

>>13209062
Otherwise the world would perhaps have had the inestimable benefit of a great mind—one of the most gifted—discovering independent!} those spiritual Truths which lie imbedded in the oldest Upanishads, and which, enforced with his learning and eloquence, must have long ago become the accepted creed and the cherished possession of Europe. “ The purpose of the Universe,” says Hegel, “ is the complete realization of the mind of God in actuality. Philosophy is the knowledge of the Idea by itself. Then the Idea becomes the Absolute Idea or Self-consciousness ” (page 617, Philosophy of Hegel), Hegel forgets that if the Idea seeks to know itself, it begins with Self-consciousness instead of ending with it. As regards the objective universals, we must remember that they are beyond time and space. The difficulty then is to conceive their plurality. While, on the one hand, owing to their difference in character each must be distinct from the rest, their manyness—when they are not limited by space and time—must place them beyond comprehension. The only way to grasp them is to regard them as the Absolute Idea which implicitly or explicitly includes all the universals, while the things, the individual things that exist internally or externally, are its manifestations. A problem now presents itself relating to the scale of values, which Pantheism must solve. On page 312, Greek Thought Stace remarks:

"The main idea of Pantheism is that everything is God. The clod of earth is divine, because it is a manifestation of a deity. Now this idea is all very well and is in fact essential to philosophy. But it must be supplemented by a rationally grounded scale of values, for how is the saint higher than the clod of earth ? Why avoid evil since it is also a manifestation of God as good ? Mere Pantheism ends in this calamitous view. The Hindus worship cows and snakes, and allow grossest abominations. Although Hinduism has its scale of values it has no rational foundation for them. The thought that all is God and the thought that there are higher and lower beings are on the surface opposed and inconsistent theories. Yet both are necessary and philosophy must find a reconciliation. Hinduism fails to do this. It asserts both but fails to bring them to unity. Now it asserts the one view, and again the other. This of course is connected with the general defect of oriental thinking, Hinduism has its doctrine of evolution, but no philosophy of evolution.”

[Anonymous No.13209076]

>>13209067
In his treatment of Greek and Hegelian Philosophy, Stace honours Hinduism by frequent references to it, sometimes in appreciation, but more often to contrast its defects with the perfections of European thought. Every one has the right to hold his own view. But to condemn oriental thinking, as a whole, is more than truth or justice will allow. In this particular instance, his dictum is unphilosophic. Now, which is the sphere of values and where can we have a scale of them? Every pleasure, every desire, every enjoyment in life has its own form and content expressible in terms of this world’s good. Bodily vigour enables execution of work, mental vigour enables conception and carrying out of great designs. Goodness brings its own satisfaction, and between its infinite forms ought to exhibit as many grades of merit. But this is possible only in a sphere of distinctions and differences. In the oneness of the Idea or Brahman, there cannot be a scale of values while in the manyness of its manifestations there can be. This is a simple and obvious truth which cannot be unknown to Stace. A snake, a clod of earth, a saint—these are empirical facts, of different degrees of value among the things of the world, among the manifestations of the Idea; and no one, a Hindu, any more than another, confounds their respective places in life. But as a manifestation of the Reality, the Idea or the Brahman, as a philosophical truth, a snake is as much that, as a saint; a clod of earth, as a crown of gold. To endow the distinctions of sense and of convention, with noumenal or transcendental validity is a fundamental error which Vedanta warns against in the name of “mistaken transference." As regards symbolism in worship, I have dealt with the principle already in detail ; and I will only add that a Hindu choosing any object, a tree or a stone, as a symbol of God for worship, shows thereby the firmness of his grasp of the oneness of Reality behind all variations of forms and names, and the depth of his conviction independent of and triumphing over all individual prejudice or prepossession.

[Anonymous No.13209079]

>>13208492
WHAT THE ABSOLUTE FUCK IS GOING ON IN THIS THREAD
I'M SCARED

[Anonymous No.13209089]

>>13209076
To the devout Hindu it is the Truth that counts, to Stace, apparently, the outward form. As to the grossest abominations I am sure no enlightened Hindu will defend or justify them, whether allowed by the follower of one religion or another. But Vedanta is not mere Pantheism; it is a perfect system of Truth, rationally built up, though no man in the street of India or Europe may be expected to know the basic principles of his practical creed. Vedanta reconciles the variety of waking life with the unity of Brahman by the doctrine of Degrees of Reality. To deny that she does, to allege that ‘‘ now it asserts one view, and again the other,” and to ascribe this to the general defect of oriental thinking,” is all utterly bad—crass, unwarranted misrepresentation. But Stace is unaccountably biased against Vedanta. In referring to Philo’s system, he says, “ This has the characteristic ring of Asiatic Pseudo-Philosophy. It reminds us forcibly of the Upanishads. We are passing out of the realm of thought, reason and philosophy into the dream and shadow land of oriental mysticism, where the heavy scents of beautiful flowers, drug the intellect and obliterate thought to a blissful and languorous repose.” (Page 371, Greek Thought). If such is the real view of Stace with reference to the teaching of the Upanishads, and of Asian thought in general, his constant references to Vedantic thought are inexplicable. For I do not wish to believe that Stace, as a philosopher, will condemn what he knows not or be actuated by the pettiness of feelings that characterise inferior minds. In pointing out the merits of Hegelianism, Stace says that as Hegel explains Reason as the principle of the world, it must remain as the ultimate truths for no one can further ask what is the Reason of Reason ? Reason is its own Reason. Quite true.

[Anonymous No.13209090]

>>13209079
A based schizo typewriter got access to the internet

[Anonymous No.13209097]

>>13209089
But one can still question, I think, why Reason should struggle to manifest itself. It will not do to say, It is not existent. It must come to exist.” But why ? The fact of the matter is that pure intellect on which Hegel entirely relies cannot wing its flight beyond diversity. Deduction itself and reason are conceivable only in a sphere of duality. Hegel unconsciously assumes what he so solemnly undertakes to prove. One must take up a definite stand. Either give up Monism or give up deduction. To mix up the two is to come under the power of Maya the principle of contradictions and unnreality. Yet, Hegel’s philosophy is not to be identified with Pantheism, it seems. Stace enters a strong protest against such identification, “For Pantheism asserts that every individual object, a atone, a tree, a man, is God—they are already, in all their immediacy and particularity, identical with God. But Hegel’s position is that the individual human mind is not God. By its immediacy and finiteness it is alienated from Him. It is only by renouncing and giving up its particularity that it can enter into union with God. I as this particular Ego with foolish impulses, whims and caprices, am essentially not the Universal Mind, but only a particular Mind. Nevertheless the Universal Mind is in me, and is my essential core and substance It is not held to be either pantheism or blasphemy to say that God is in the hearts of good men ; and this is the Hegelian position.” Now this is distinction without difference, an illogical pandering to popular prejudice, unworthy of philosophic dignity. To say that I am essentially not the Universal Mind, but immediately to assert that the Universal Mind is my essential core and substance—this is to mystify his position not to elucidate it.

[Anonymous No.13209103]

>>13209097
And how does Vedanta explain the identity? “ I with all my sins and shortcomings am not God, for God is sinless, wise and holy. But he is my metaphysical Self. As a metaphysical being I am He.” Only Ignorance makes mefeel otherwise. There can be no blasphemy when this thought is truly understood. And if I am not God, how can He be the core and essence of my being ? And how unfair and untrue, to identify me with my superficial, temporary features, my whims and follies, and to overlook my essential nature ? For what I am essentially, that I am truly. Either Hegel believes in Monism or does not If he does, then no subterfuge or equivocation can save him from Pantheism-Pantheism Absolute. If there is only one Reality, all distinctions must be appearance, and even a stone, or an animal, whatever its position in man’s practical esteem, must be identical with God. Hegel cannot wriggle himself out of that situation. A Hegelian might say that he does not push his Monism so far. Then it is not ripe speculation, fearlessly carried to its legitimate issue, but speculation that has stopped short half-way, to avoid a disagreeable conclusion. Such an act will give no comfort, for truth consciously hidden away will eternally vex the human mind, and make peace impossible. It may still be questioned, why should not one starting with a single Principle explain the universe as having sprung from it? But that would imply that the Principle is similar to an empirical entity, a seed, for example, which afterwards grows into a tree, in short to an organism. A world-Principle, however, cannot be contemplated as an organism, for the conception of an organism presupposes a whole world of time, space, and causation already evolved, as well as the consciousness of the thinker, waiting for its turn of explanation. And T have already shown that reason and dedication are possible only in an atmosphere of duality.

[Anonymous No.13209106]

>>13209103
It appears to me, therefore, that Hegel’s system of the Absolute Identity marks no real advance beyond Spinoza, and that Spinoza’s Pantheism, was as perfect a Monism, as speculation could make it. Spinoza’s inability to explain the world was not made up for by Hegel’s success in deducing it. For, the latter is mere fancy. Maya cannot be brought under the power of the intellect, its own offspring. It may not be here out of place to dispose of a philistine objection leveled against Pantheism from time to time. If all is God, why should not one commit vice, since commission of vice, no less than vice itself ought to be God ? In putting this question, it is forgotten that punishment that regularly follows vice, must also be looked upon as God. Hence, in defending immorality on the basis of Pantheism, we are reasoning in a vicious circle from which escape is impossible. In the first place, all moral acts proceed from the higher instincts, while immoral ones arise from motives which imply distinctions and difference. In the next place, in every act of ours we are conscious of our own agency automatically,and the Pantheistic concept arises only in moments of reflexion which is invariably countered by the impulses of volition. Pantheism not only does not sanction vice, but is its sworn enemy. For, all being God, genuine Pantheism will find no room left for the indulgence of selfishness. I cannot close this inadequately brief reference to Hegel without calling in question the justness of his remarks on Hinduism. They may be the result of pure ignorance, or of incurable prejudice. They certainly evince no correct information or mature judgment.

[Anonymous No.13209112]

>>13209106
In the chapter on Religion, Stace represents Hegel as criticizing Hinduism in these terms ;

“In Hinduism the conception of substance is more explicitly developed There is only substance ... It is formless. God is the formless One, Brahman—abstract unity. As against this One all other existence is unreal, merely accidental. Nothing has any right of independent existence in itself. It arises out of the One and again vanishes in the One. Though the One may frequently be spoken of in terms which seem to imply personality, yet it is not spirit that is the real content, but only substance. Such phrases merely imply superlicial personification. The One is essentially neuter.”

Well, I am irresistibly reminded of the proverb, “ those who live in glass houses should not throw stones." Hegel, who audaciously erects mere universality into a God, which is not a Person, but only a personality, and manufactures concreteness by imagining one universality to contain infinite others, who has never shown how an individual thing can arise by piling up any amount of universals, reproaches Hinduism alleging that its God is substance, and not spirit, that its unity is empty, that the One is essentially neuter and that no other thing has any right of independent existence. In the first place, we are not told how Hegel was able to form these views. Is it the Vedas, the Upanishads, or the Puranas, the Epics, or the Smritis that led to his conclusions? Has he been able to separate the rational—Vedantic—element from the poetic, the traditional and the ritual elements ? A whole life devoted to the study of the immense mass of Hindu Scriptures with their disciplines, will not suffice to accomplish the task. Yet critics with glib tongues will be blatant over the defects and the inconsistencies of the Hindu religion and philosophy. Many of these detractors cannot claim to possess even a passable acquaintance with Sanskrit. Do they study their Plato and Aristotle in the same fashion, I ask ? But to answer his charges. The Hindu God is not Substance but Spirit, not mere spirituality, but a personal Being. Siva is the cosmic consciousness, the central all-pervading Light at which every other torch of individual consciousness has been lighted. Vishnu is the inmost essence of man, of all Existence, the being immanent in all hearts, while Brahman in the neuter gender is the witness of the three states, neither male nor female, but the Principle of Unity that holds the world together. But what is more than all, what the greatest thinkers fail to recognize is that the Hindu God is never an external entity, can never be regarded as object, except to help the human understanding, except to offer worship. The very aim of Vedanta in declaring Brahman to be void of attributes is to caution the enquirer against conceiving it as substance.

[Anonymous No.13209113]

>>13208492
he pooed in a loo

[Anonymous No.13209121]

>>13209112
As to “ nothing else having an independent existence in itself ”, this is ungracious, mischievous. Hegel’s own system is equally guilty of the doctrine. To him also, things have no reality, no independence, as they depend on the Universals which alone are real, but do not exist. That they all arise out of the One and vanish into the One, is not speculative fantasy. It is our undeniable experience through the three states. But it was not given to Hegel to descry the only source of real knowledge. Brahman as the Great Being is neither an abstract nor a concrete One. The terms cannot apply to it. For it is beyond the reach of intellectual distinctions. Hegel’s ignorance of Vedantic method is responsible for the next statement. “It (the One) does not genuinely produce them out of itself, and then again restore its own unity by taking them back into itself. . , . Although it is asserted that they have proceeded out of the One, and are therefore dependent beings, yet since the One is abstract and has not itself produced them, they are for that reason in reality independent beings ... a chaos of disconnected forms. . . . Because it does not retain them within its grasp, they are therefore outside it, independent of it, and riot in this independence.” The fault of Hinduism was, according to Hegel’s first statement, that it allowed nothing the right of independent existence in itself, and now he has so soon forgotten himself and veers round saying that since the One does not genuinely produce things out of itself, they are independent beings—a chaos of disconnected forms, rioting in their independence. Can unfairness go farther? How is Hinduism to save itself? Things proceed from the One and depend on it. No, says, Hegel, your One is abstract and cannot produce. Things must be independent of the One—but they are unreal, accidental. In that case, you will not allow them right of independent existence.

[Anonymous No.13209134]

>>13209121
Hence, to concede or deny independent existence to things is equally culpable, and Hinduism in any case must go to the wall. I am not concerned to prove that the conception of Trimurti is identical with the Christian Trinity or claim a Hegelian’s approbation on that account. I shall proceed to his criticism of Hindu worship. “ The element of worship in Hinduism,” he says, (page 497),” corresponds to its conception of God. God is here substance, the undetermined, abstract, contentless emptiness and vacancy. Now worship means essentially the annulling of the separation between God and Man, the Reconciliation, the restoring of the unity and identity of God and Man. Hence, in Hinduism what man has to do in order to become identical with God is to empty himself of all content, to become that very vacancy which God is. Thus the state aimed at is an emotionless will-less, deedless, pure abstraction of mind, in which all positive content of consciousness is superseded. God is here a pure abstraction, and man, in becoming the same abstraction, becomes identical with God, attains ‘ union with Brahma." Thus worship aims at the complete submergence of consciousness." The idea of worship in Hinduism or Christianity is not “the annulling of the separation between God and Man" or “the restoring of the unity and identity of God and Man."

[Anonymous No.13209140]

>>13209134
Worship presupposes difference and distinction, and is impossible in the philosophic level which unifies all. It is external and belongs to the sphere of action, or recognition of the great interval between the Highest Being who is all holy, and the human being, an individual. Worship is offer in word, deed and thought, of love and esteem due to the Author of our living. Hence, the Hindu distinguishes it from meditation which is contemplation, logical or formal, of thought or sensuous forms. When the Devil said, “ All these things will I give thee if thou wilt fall down and worship me," Jesus answered, “Get thee hence, Satan; for it is written thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and Him only shalt thou serve.”—St. Matthew. It is, hence, clear that worship means service. As Hegel has misrepresented the Hindu notion of God, one cannot expect him to have done better in respect of Hindu worship. God to the Hindu is the highest Personal Being endowed with all auspicious qualities, Mercy, Love, Wisdom etc. God is simply the dynamic obverse of .Reality or Brahman, the Lord of Creation, Protection and Destruction, the principle of salvation to the human soul. The Vishnu, the Bhagavata, and the other great Puranas, recount the stories of God’s incarnation and His incessant activities for the good of the world. There are many collections of “ Praises,” each consisting of a thousand names by which the nature and character of the Deity is described for purposes of meditation and prayer—Vishnu, Siva, Krishna, Lalita, etc. Each has His or Her own list of names, daily recited by the devout in Hindu homes. The most poetic praises and supplications occur in the Rig-veda with which every one aspiring to be a well-informed critic, ought to be perfectly familiar.

[Anonymous No.13209147]

>>13209140
Hegel’s dictum, therefore, that “ in Hinduism what one has to do to become identical with God is to empty himself of all content, to become that very vacancy that God is ”, is shorn of all dignity and worth, for he is concentrating all the force of his soul in kicking at that vacancy which he conjures up as the Hindu God. First, Vedanta is not Theology, and worship is not Vedantic knowledge. Secondly, Hindu Theism does not aim at absorption in God, or “union with Brahman”. To confound so woefully knowledge of Truth which reveals the Divine in man with acts of faith that raises a wall between God and man would not have been possible to better-informed souls, more sympathetically disposed towards alien faiths. God is not a pure abstraction. The Vedas teach that God, who was alone at first, conceived the wish to become many, and so became all this Universe. It is, besides, impossible for a man to empty himself of all content. For, whatever is seen as hi.s content, is objective to him, and he surely is not what he can separate from himself ; and what he cannot, how can he abstract from ? But Hegel's notion of the subject is unphilosophic and untrue, for his actual soul is the result of the coalescence of two halves of the soul to unity—to a single self or subject, (page 337). He that can thus make the subject originate like an object, through a split or coalescence, can surely be excused lesser enormities of thought or action. It is not true that Hindu worship aims at complete submergence of consciousness. Meditation does that, whether Hindu or any other. Not to distinguish between the two is deplorable. Hegel’s is not a perfect system, not a universal provision for all grades of intellect, for all conditions of life and strata of society as Vedanta is. He has not uttered a syllable to explain the mystery in which birth and death are wrapped up, or the lot of those that die young, miserable, or ignorant. If, as Hegel claims, the sole purpose of the entire Universe is to arrive at his Philosophy, it cannot be that the World-Spirit was indifferent to the spiritual interests of those who never can or could attain to it. It is the height of ego-centric illusion.

[Anonymous No.13209153]

>>13209147
Stace draws our attention to two points in this connection. First, God is spirit which is not abstract but concrete. Salvation is not attained through mental abstraction, “ but through the concrete work of the spirit, through its striving after universal ends, in morality, in the state, and in religion.” Secondly, “ Hindu renunciation in order to attain union with the One is not like Christian self-sacrifice, nor does this renunciation import any sense of sin, or atonement for guilt, since the Hindu God is abstract Morality and righteousness are no essential part of Hindu Worship.” Comparing this with the representation of Hegel’s view on page 489, namely, “It is only by renouncing and giving up its particularity that it (this individual human mind) can enter into union with God,” I am bewildered as to what to look upon as the definite position of Hegel in regard to worship. I do not believe that Stace takes up the position of one who holds a brief for any particular religion, but his uncharitable fling at Hindu God and renunciation as unworthy of the free religions of the world, squares neither with facts, nor with fairness. I have shown that to Vedanta God is not a pious hope as it is to revealed religions, but the fundamental fact of Life, identical with the ego, and only wrongly conceived as another. Still to brand the Hindu God as abstract is either crass ignorance or willful perversity ; and to vilify Hindu renunciation, at whatever sacrifice, or annihilation of self, as deficient in morality or righteousness, because it imports no sense of sin, is consciously to do a bit of heartless Evangelism, which under the cloak of philosophy might delude the unwary, but is no true or sensible criticism. But I have done with bitterness and harsh words. I would fain part from Stace and his memorable work on Hegel with deep feelings of grateful appreciation. Without his clear and methodical exposition, I should have found it nearly impossible to got at the core of Hegel's thought, and in whatever respects I may have disagreed with Stace, or Hegel, I hope that my views may be received as fairly conceived and frankly expressed.

[Anonymous No.13209155]

>>13209153
Hegel’s is not a system whose prominent parts fit into each other artistically or rationally. The first Principle which is real and independent is unaccountably afflicted with an uncontrollable craving for existence or unreality—a notion that militates sharply against that of the Soul’s fall, and its endeavour to reunite itself with the One through Christian worship. Why should the World- Principle sustain a fall, moral or spiritual, only to seek re-ascent to its pristine purity if it should recover its lost position, had it really fallen from it ? Or is it all a fiction woven out of the slender threads of fancy? When it is added that Evil being irrational is unreal, and the Good, although seemingly unrealized, is eternally accomplished, does it not unquestionably reduce Morality, Righteousness and Christian Self-Denial, by the reality and necessity of which such store is set, to worse than nullity, nay to tragic mockery ? To avow, therefore, that his philosophy closely corroborates the doctrines of Christian Religion, of the Trinity, the Creation, the Fall, the Incarnation, the Redemption, the Resurrection and the Ascension, is a strain on Reason, and no solace to the Soul.' Hegel’s Absolute as a concrete Idea involves him in all the contradictions of an intellectual concept. If the first Principle contains within it the whole world implicitly, then this relation of the container and the contained must make it an empirical entity, within the domain of time and change, and cannot explain the latter. To do that the first Principle ought to be, as Hegel himself claims, beyond time. To conceive it therefore as concrete is to dash it down from its transcendental throne, deprive it of its independence and reality. The distinction that he insists on between the Hindu conception of an abstract Being, and his of concrete Being is thus suicidal.

[Anonymous No.13209161]

>>13209155
Abstract and Concrete are divisions of the intellect. Life and reality include far more than the intellect and cannot be confined within its narrow bounds. Vedanta's Brahman is neither abstract nor concrete. It is Life that we all experience as transcending the three states, no mere figment of a learned imagination. Yet, it is all this picturesque world, with its marvellous change and development. To believe in a principle and then to fight shy of the consequences of such a belief is ridiculous. To adopt a monistic, a self-determined principle, the Idea, and to derive a scale of values from it without the admixture of a second entity is impossible. Plato and Aristotle were more successful, because they were expressly dualists. They started with matter and form. Hegel does away with matter and contrives to explain variety and development with the aid of non-Being, contained in Being which is not a pure, an abstract Being but a concrete Being. But the device is ineffective, since the conception is untenable, as already pointed out. If then all is the Idea, how are the distinctions of life to be accounted for if every object, notion or image be the Idea, why should one thing be treated as a higher, or a lower manifestation than another ? What determines the difference? On the side of the Idea, there is no second entity to differentiate it. Consequently the only element of difference is to be sought in the effect that each thing produces upon the mind, with its individual likes and dislikes. Values thus depend upon the perceiver, and his particular feelings, upon life and how things promote or retard its purposes. Surely, by itself nothing is good or beautiful. It becomes such by its relation to life. The contempt for pantheism which sees the manifestation of Reality in every object, is ill-conceived and unwarranted. For, that the Idea is better manifested in one thing than in another is unreasonable. Hence, Hegel's aesthetics is unsound. He cannot explain beauty or morality.

The strongest objection to Hegel is that his system, makes me a hopeless riddle to myself. My ‘ I ’ becomes a non-descript It is not an existence like the tree that I perceive, for it is not presented to consciousness. It is not a real being, since it is not a mere idea, or universal As an individual entity it is unreal. Yet I cognize the whole world only as an object to myself. Am I real or unreal ? What interest has Reality or unreality to me, if I am not the very presupposition of all experience ? Thus, Hegel’s solution carries with it its own refutation. That which is best known to me, that which should precede everything else in my estimate of life, that through and for which alone I must seek to know the Absolute—my own self—sweeter to me than a hundred philosophical systems, becomes a mystery, neither real as an Idea, nor unreal as an object of Nature, neither existing nor being—a veritable Maya.

*dabs*

[Anonymous No.13209188]

Good work

[Anonymous No.13209194]

Based

[Anonymous No.13209198]

Cringe.

[Anonymous No.13209200]

>>13209198
T. Materialist

[Anonymous No.13209636]

bump

[Anonymous No.13209725]

nigger

[Anonymous No.13209794]

Feels more like a critique of Stace than anything given how he is mentioned as much as Hegel and it is enframed in his conceptions of Hegel and Vedic philosophy

[Anonymous No.13209939]

>>13209079
>absolute fuck

[Anonymous No.13210028]

>>13209003
Couldn't you have just linked the pdf? (Or book?)

[Anonymous No.13210093]

>>13210028
I wrote it myself while in the midst of an acid and vyvanse binge yesterday

[Anonymous No.13210106]

Holy autism

[Anonymous No.13210331]

Good but Brahman is beyond Being

[Anonymous No.13210812]

tl;dr?

[Anonymous No.13211576]

>>13210028
this, what is it from?

[Anonymous No.13211706]

Hegel called them vague and incoherent. Unable to expand on their one liners and tell us how they actually came to that rationality.

[Anonymous No.13212285]

>>13211706
>Unable to expand on their one liners and tell us how they actually came to that rationality.
If you mean the Hindus they wrote voluminous commentaries/treatises full of logic in multiple sects

[Anonymous No.13212499]

>>13208492

If the cat is a cat and the bagel is Hegel, this suggests that all knowledge comes from a Hegelian perspective. Yet, what does this say to philosophers of philosophy as they lick Hegel?

This raises some questions of the philosophical licking of Hegel and philosophy in general. For example, do some philosophers of philosophy and theologians lick Hegel to the exclusion of others? Are people who refuse to lick Hegel any less knowledgeable about philosophical subjectivities than the majority who do? What do these people think of the philosophy of licking in general and philosophy specifically?

To answer these questions let us focus on the question of whether there are philosophers of licking who believe that the philosophy of licking comes under Hegel's theory. We conclude that there are but not many who determinedly lick Hegel but we do not know how many there are who in general only casually lick Hegel, and it remains to be seen whether these two groups are equally and accurately qualified to express their opinions on the philosophical licking of Hegel.

But what is philosophy? Philosophy is the study of licking. (Note that not all of philosophy's objects are acutely always-already being licked by those who pointedly choose licking as a node of departure. However, most of philosophy's licked objects are physical and therefore, can be studied. The question is, who are the objects that the philosophy of licking are referring to?) For that reason, the philosophy of licking deals with the relation between things being licked and things doing the licking, with the lick-relation between licked-concepts, with lick-relations and lick-forms. But what new modes of licking follow from this?

[Anonymous No.13212531]

>>13212285
Tell that to Hegel not me

[Anonymous No.13213184]

>>13212531
I would if that stupid windbag was still alive

[Anonymous No.13213965]

>>13208492
>Haha Begel

[Anonymous No.13214040]

>>13208492
God I hate the fuck who made this thread. But yet, if Hegel is wrong, why is he one of the select few thinkers who nevertheless still gets praise to this day, rather than simply getting it from his contemporaries. Kant mentions a few people in the Critique of Practical Reason who out of ignorance spouted pseudoscience, and surely there are tons of examples of let’s-chalk-it-up-to-schizocharlatan philosophemes that have come and gone, but how is it that Hegel has remained praised? Op’s first long post sums up everything that can be said in consensus of the guy. I tried getting into it, and I really don’t want to pass judgment on something I haven’t given an honest try, but I watched a couple Sadler videos and even in discussing the first paragraph the dude is reiterating Aristotle and Kant’s ideas as if Hegel said them himself (I mean distinctively saying Hegel set these forth). I read the Kojeve book and eeeeehhhhh. Should we really put faith in this guy? Look at Marxists and Deleuzians. Talk to them. Fuck. This dude literally ended his chain of posts with *dabs*. Does this not automatically disqualify him from the truth? Would not someone with an inkling of an access to the higher modes of thought have spent simply one minute to come up with something funnier, or not have joked at all?

[Anonymous No.13214041]

>>13210093
thank you based anon

[Anonymous No.13214302]

>>13214040
Are you going to be okay anon?

[Anonymous No.13214392]

Hegel's a Platonist

[Anonymous No.13214428]

>>13212499
> the bagel is Hegel
>most of philosophy's licked objects are physical
You are suggesting Hegel is a physical object, capable of being licked. If all knowledge comes from the perspective of Hegel the bagel, the physical object, it is impossible that true licking can occur. Only the bagel can perceive licking, but it cannot itself lick. Those who refuse to lick Hegel are experiencing the only consciousness accessible to non-bagel.

[Anonymous No.13214482]

>>13214392
I'd say a more or less Christian neoplatonist with heathen tendencies and a load of weird.

[Anonymous No.13214675]

include me in the screencap

[Anonymous No.13214803]

>>13214040
>Look at Marxists and Deleuzians. Talk to them. Fuck. This dude literally ended his chain of posts with *dabs*. Does this not automatically disqualify him from the truth?
I know right? How dare that guy have the presumptuousness to criticize the all-knowing Hegel (pbuh) and *gasp* not taking himself seriously while doing so! the outrage!!!

[Anonymous No.13216138]

However, if the licked philosophical object is Advaita Vedanta and the cat is Hegel, does the cat when the licking has terminated poo in the loo? And if the licking is part of the purification process and the purifiers are the karmadras on account of the cat, does that explain why the karmadras have no effect upon the cat as the cat has been thoroughly cleansed? Is it possible for the purifiers to purify a cat by removing the licks in the loo, without further karmadras doing the same? That is my question.

And this is a topic I think I should take up myself. It is, after all, a point that I'm sure any intelligent person would consider but one I have a hard time seeing. What I find interesting is that if it turns out that the lollipop licking effect of the purifier does not really help explain why all the karmadras do not work to make the cat happy, then there are other mechanisms I would hope to see.

For example, it appears to us that when the cat is in the loo, it has no desire whatsoever to clean itself but rather wishes only to be happy and feel happy. We would then expect to have a different cat who, while licking its licking lollipop, licks away the lickers (see also the ontology of Schelling).

[Anonymous No.13216143]

>>13214803
on a literature forum for the higher literati, nonetheless

[Anonymous No.13216166]

Cut Hegel and Marx will follow. But you cannot get rid of Nietzsche neither Freud.

[Anonymous No.13216757]

>>13216143
someone who truly was a member of the higher literati would be able to formulate a cogent response to the points that were made beyond "reee I don't like this, if hegel is bad why do some people like him? talk about this to marxists and deleuzeans instead," marxists and deleuzeans as a rule are typically clueless about vedanta and would most likely be unable to say anything worthwhile in response to the points made here anyways

[Anonymous No.13218101]

bump

[Anonymous No.13219268]

the mere act of hegel naming it 'phenomenology' hits parallels with vedanta of which evokes an 'instance of emergence', but then it automatically fails as vedanta the moment it became political. put simply, it was anti cartesian made cartesian again while retaining the instantiation of emergence. you are going to have to be fluent in german and hindi or whatever to map that out. hegel having a whole school split into right and left, young and old. you could say PoS is hegels biography of his own enlightenment and in that way it is indeed vedantic. pushed into politics it is not. go to town with the dialectic on that. and.. spooks..

[Anonymous No.13220149]

>>13208875
this