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8558699 No.8558699 [Reply] [Original]

I don't understand the intersection of Aristotelian logic and philosophy.

What fundamentally decides whether a "trope," or feature of an individual thing, is essential or not? What decides whether something is accidental? Why don't genera and species admit of infinite theoretical cross-categorisations, like:
>Genus: Animal
>Subgenus: Footed animal
>Subgenera: Bipeds + Quadrupeds
>Etc.
rather than Aristotetelians classifying "footedness" as not essential, as not a secondary substance?

What determines what gets secondary substance status?

>> No.8558719

>I don't understand the intersection of Aristotelian logic and philosophy.

I meant to say metaphysics, not philosophy.

>> No.8558736

>>8558699

>What fundamentally decides whether a "trope," or feature of an individual thing, is essential or not?

a feature is essential when if the subject were to lack that feature, it would no longer be in the category it belongs to (bearded men must have beards to be bearded men)

>What decides whether something is accidental?

when something can have a feature that other things in the category do not need to have to be in the category, it is an accidental feature (a beard is an accidental feature in the category of men)

>Why don't genera and species admit of infinite theoretical cross-categorisations

using your example, anything that is not shared by every animal would be a secondary substance.

using set theory to explain this would make it a lot clearer

>> No.8558771

>>8558736
This helps, thank you.

Do you have any recommendations on when / how Aristotle crosses over from the conceptual level to realism?

Porphyry says in the Isagoge he is restricting himself to "mere" logic, not getting into higher-level wrangling. And it seems like the Ancients saw category and syllogistic logic as a propadeutic to metaphysics, in general. But I am struggling with the extent to which the Ancients doubted the ontology of their preliminary logic itself, once they had moved past it.

Is Aristotle just a sort of naive realist about the subsistence of species and genera? Did Ancient/Medieval empiricism do the Humean bundle-theory thing at all?

>> No.8558805

>>8558771
can't help you with any of that, sorry