Ethics

[Anonymous No.6705359]

Okay, so let's try this again, with a more general approach this time.

All of my life I was more or less a follower of deontological ('kantian') ethics and contract theory. Rawls and Nussbaum were the contemporary theorists I looked up to in regards of ethics and morals. In reality I certainly couldn't practice the categorical imperative at all times, but I enjoyed the tought of a true 'right and wrong'. In fact, I always looked down upon moral particularism and consequentialist ethics.
By mere accident I got my hands on pic related. Just a few pages in, I began to see things a bit differently. It shows a very comprehensible and logical way on how to deal with some of the biggest practical moral problems of our time (here: animal rights, abortion and euthanasia), with a reasoning that is purely within this world.

What does /lit/ think about Peter Singers take on ethics via the utilitarian route?

[Anonymous No.6705364]

Virtue ethics > deontological ethics >>> divine command theory >>> ethical nihilism >>>...>>> utilitarianism
Peter Singer is a blowhard, analytic ethics is a joke

[Anonymous No.6705368]

>>6705364
It's you again. Well, at least one guy who responds.

So I ask again: Did you read it?

[Anonymous No.6705372]

>>6705364
This. So much.
OP, read Aristotle and Hursthouse. Soon, you too will realise that the Greeks had it right all along.
Utilitarianism may sound simple and intuitively correct, but as an actual ethical theoru, it kinda sux.

[Anonymous No.6705374]

>>6705368
No

[Anonymous No.6705399]

>>6705368
I'm banned lol.

[Anonymous No.6705400]

>>6705372
>>6705374

Could you guys then give a reasoning as to why virtue ethics should be considered superior? At least Singers approach manages to raise both questions and answers that are rooted within our everyday reality, actually making the whole thing pratical. It is not just hot wind in an ivory tower.

[Anonymous No.6705418]

>>6705400
>At least Singers approach manages to raise both questions and answers that are rooted within our everyday reality, actually making the whole thing pratical. It is not just hot wind in an ivory tower.


>Virtue ethics: These are the best qualities a person can have. People should work to cultivate then. If everyone does that, everyone will have the beat qualities people can have and society will function properly, as ethical and virtuous agents interact. Let's debate what these virtues are, though, because dogmatism isn't a virtue.
>Utilitarianism: If everyone tries to maximize goodness in general, the world will be better for everyone and everything in it, since goodness will have been maximized. Pleasure, utility, and happiness are obviously the best things. We don't need to wonder what else might be good. A society with the most utility, pleasure, and happiness will be the best society with the most pleasant, utilitous, and good people.
Utility and pleasure don't seem like the greatest possible goods, when one considers that pursuing pleasure and utility above all other values leads to hedonism and exploitation, either of the self or of another.

[Anonymous No.6705451]

>>6705418
>Utility and pleasure don't seem like the greatest possible goods, when one considers that pursuing pleasure and utility above all other values leads to hedonism and exploitation, either of the self or of another.

Half-True. Bentham (and Singers) utilitarianism pretty much prohibits the expoitation of others, because they are capable of suffering and thus capable of having interests. In their approach, it is not right to go against the interests of another being, unless the opposite interests far outweigh them.

Hedonism I find unlikely. Pleasure and joy can be shallow as well as deep. A scientists does what he does because he's good at it and enjoys it (or because he likes the money and enjoys that, either way it's the same). It certainly gives him pleasure. I'd consider it human nature to aspire and to overcome, it isn't simply overruled by philosophy.

Virtue ethics, as described by you, sounds good and well, but what does it really amount to? Does it tell us how to deal with severly disabled babies or the question whether or not it is ethical to eat meat if it's not necessary for our survival?

>pic unrelated

[Anonymous No.6705486]

>>6705451
>Bentham (and Singers) utilitarianism pretty much prohibits the expoitation of others, because they are capable of suffering and thus capable of having interests.
If utilitarians were virtuous, it wouldn't be necessary to make the case that exploitation should be prohibited.
>It certainly gives him pleasure.
Does that make it good? You're advocating hedonism: doing what gives us pleasure because it gives us pleasure.
>Does it tell us how to deal with severly disabled babies or the question whether or not it is ethical to eat meat if it's not necessary for our survival?
By cultivating our virtues, we can determine what the best way to treat issues lime these are. Utilitarianism rejects phronesis, forgetting that there has to be a link between theory and practice to make sure that a) the theory is about something actually real and b) the practice has a sound basis in theory. The questions you ask are very vague. I'm not convinced that meat-eating being accidental for our survival is sufficient reason to reject it altogether; a more virtuous thing to do would be to attack the roots of animal exploitation and do away with factory farms.

[Anonymous No.6705509]

Singer is a weird philosopher. I like him very much, he is thorough and rigorous. The problem is that he's doing a reductio ad absurdum, but instead of rejecting the premises he accepts the absurd conclusion.

[Anonymous No.6705512]

>>6705486

I'd like to tackle a specific point then

>>It certainly gives him pleasure.
>Does that make it good? You're advocating hedonism: doing what gives us pleasure because it gives us pleasure.

What makes a thing good or right? Is it automatically the product of public debate or democratic vote? Is it the categorical imperative? Who decides what is a virtue? Is a virtue perhaps simply a symbol, a rule to go by, which has a good consequence in ~90% of all cases and should thus be considered admirable?

Why should it be more absurd to take our ethics from a pratical point of view than from some abstract realm with black & white rules. Afterall, that simply isn't what reality is. Reality is ambigious. Reality forces us to invent rules and to make exceptions to these rules. Reality isn't virtuous.

[Anonymous No.6705530]

>>6705509
>The problem is that he's doing a reductio ad absurdum, but instead of rejecting the premises he accepts the absurd conclusion.

How does he do that?

[Anonymous No.6705547]

>>6705512
>What makes a thing good or right?
You seem to be assuming pleasure does. I'm familiar with most utilitarian arguments, I've read essays by Singer--the doctrine seems good until you put it into practice and realize that you've become robotically attuned to pursue pleasure at the expense of other ends that might make you happier than being merely pleased; a scientist might take pleasure from his work, but he shouldn't neglect his children simply because he doesn't enjoy their presence as much a he enjoys being at the lab. Doing so would be failing as a father.
>Is a virtue perhaps simply a symbol, a rule to go by, which has a good consequence in ~90% of all cases and should thus be considered admirable?
A virtue is an internalized character trait that benefits its possessor and those he comes into contact with, to a greater degree of benefit than there would be if virtue were not present.
>Why should it be more absurd to take our ethics from a pratical point of view than from some abstract realm with black & white rules.
Are you saying that necessarily good character traits are bad? And I'm not sure why you think virtue isn't a matter of practice, it's literally something individuals are supposed to practice and cultivate. Every virtue ethicist says as much.

[Anonymous No.6705574]

>>6705547

>You seem to be assuming pleasure does. I'm familiar with most utilitarian arguments, I've read essays by Singer--the doctrine seems good until you put it into practice and realize that you've become robotically attuned to pursue pleasure at the expense of other ends that might make you happier than being merely pleased; a scientist might take pleasure from his work, but he shouldn't neglect his children simply because he doesn't enjoy their presence as much a he enjoys being at the lab. Doing so would be failing as a father.


Exactly. He would negate their interests and cause them suffering, just for a bit of extra pleasure in his lab. Utilitarianism would not condone such behaviour. If, however, he was close to a groundbreaking discovery that could cure a specific trait of ass cancer, which would be in the highest interest of millions, him neglecting his children a little would be quite excuseable.
Don't stick to the superficial expression of 'pleasure' all that much. Singer for example talks more about the satisfaction of interests.

You have not really answered my question, though.

>A virtue is an internalized character trait that benefits its possessor and those he comes into contact with, to a greater degree of benefit than there would be if virtue were not present.

Of course, that is the technical explanation. Doesn't fully explain what these virtues should be. Take, for example, Nazi Germany (I know, I know, always Nazi Germany. But it's just useful to take examples from) with it's defined virtues of keeping a pure race and so on, all on the expense of people who don't fit into the picture. What makes their virtue any more right or wrong than other virtues? Because it excludes certain kinds of people? Where do virtue ethics draw the line?

[Anonymous No.6705590]

>>6705574
>If, however, he was close to a groundbreaking discovery that could cure a specific trait of ass cancer, which would be in the highest interest of millions, him neglecting his children a little would be quite excuseable.
I'm not so sure that's necessarily true. Is helping large, abstract groups of people by contributing a little bit of labor power to a project that millions of doctors and scientists are working on really worth neglecting the people you love? Utilitarianism seems to throw out emotions completely, which is actually impracticable.
>Nazi Germany
Nazi Germany wasn't operating on virtue ethics. Racial purity isn't a virtue a person can internalize, it's a quality that a body does or doesn't have.
As I've said, discussion within virtue ethics is about what the virtues should be. It doesn't assume that pleasure and suffering are respectively the best and worst things there are, unlike virtue ethics. I would say that charity, respect, understanding, impartiality, piety, and kindness are virtues. Feel free to suggest alternatives.

[Anonymous No.6705617]

>>6705590

First of all, thanks for the responses. I'm a pleb when it comes to virtue ethics.

>Utilitarianism seems to throw out emotions completely, which is actually impracticable.

That is a good point. But then again, which rigorous philosophy is good at capturing unquantifiable things such as human emotion? I feel that, while utilitarianism doesn't tell us what exactly to aspire, it helps us to critically revalue our acts and decisions. As for the example, I cannot say at which point it would be 'right' (or, let's say 'okay') to neglect the people you love. But I am certain there is such a point. Finding it requires utilitarian logic.

[Anonymous No.6705620]

>>6705418
I think you've misunderstood what utility is.

Obviously different people will have different interpretations but utility as I treat it is the aggregation of all the things a person most desires. In any case, by definition, an informed person will prefer the option with the greatest utility because utility is a measure of preference.

I agree with the objections to equating utility to pure hedonistic happiness. Utility shouldn't be thought of as an experiential thing. In a utilitarian system, utility is nothing more or less than the thing that is being optimised - it's only synonymous with experiential happiness if that is the sole intrinsic value, and doing that results in a system that can't explain or justify sacrifice, or choosing to be miserable but free, or choosing against something like Nozick's experience machine. I personally go for a utilitarian system based on a utility determined by plural values that are weighted differently between people.

[Anonymous No.6705621]

>>6705400
Rough MacIntyreauote from heart, basically started modern virtue ethics.

"at the heart of all morals are ethical judgements,the further truth of which cannot be proven"
Basically if there is an infinite number of virtues (as in anything can be deemed good win the right mindset) then ones own virtues should be based on what is contexutally best for society/environment/himself. Rather than leading a series of moral mathmatics to guarentee a good life, adopting your choosen virtues creates good outcomes based o your character.

[Anonymous No.6705626]

>>6705620
>Obviously different people will have different interpretations

Nah, pretty much everyone since Bentham has agreed on what utility is. And it has absolutely nothing to do with what you said. You just made up a new definition for a word that everyone else agrees on.

[Anonymous No.6705632]

>>6705621
>Basically if there is an infinite number of virtues (as in anything can be deemed good win the right mindset) then ones own virtues should be based on what is contexutally best for society/environment/himself.

But isn't that also just consequentialist reasoning? Virtue X is good because it has the best consequences at this time? I see little contradiction with Singers utilitarianism, actually.

[Anonymous No.6705640]

>>6705617
>which rigorous philosophy is good at capturing unquantifiable things such as human emotion?
There are plenty that leave room for it. Existentialism, for one. If you equate rigour with the analytic method you'll never find a good philosophy that can satisfy both your intellect and your spirit.
>I feel that, while utilitarianism doesn't tell us what exactly to aspire, it helps us to critically revalue our acts and decisions.
Phronesis, man, phronesis. The Greeks literally figured all this out. Virtue ethics is the ethics in which theory and action inform each other. Utilitarianism gives us ultimately arbitrary criteria by which to evaluate certain actions.
>>6705620
>utility as I treat it is the aggregation of all the things a person most desires
That isn't a definition I've seen anywhere else.

[Anonymous No.6705643]

>>6705632
No, because that anon didn't use the word consequence in his post and virtue ethics isn't consequentialism. You've twice assumed that consequences are part of the foundational axioms of virtue ethics when no one ITT has claimed they are.

[Anonymous No.6705655]

>>6705643
But that anon claimed that one should pick the virtue which is
>contexutally best for society/environment/himself
at a given time.

I thought this implied positive consequences. How else do you contextually choose what virtue is best right now if not for it's consequences?

[Anonymous No.6705658]

>>6705655
When did relativism become consequentialism?
You continually ignore what I've said about phronesis, which is basically an understanding of one's own way of being based on experience *and* reflection. Read Plato's Meno.

[Anonymous No.6705663]

>>6705626
>>6705640
Try learning about utility as it exists in economics. It's not a different concept there, just one that gets looked at differently.

In any case, there is plenty of precedent within philosophy for utility based on preference. Consider Mill's "proof" of utilitarianism. His argument for happiness being an ultimate end is that it is desirable because it is desired. The core of his justification of utilitarian ethics is that the outcome suggested by it (in which utility is maximised) is the most desirable one. I differ from him in that he considers happiness to be the sole end whereas I think there are more and that utility is maximised by finding the optimal balance of these multiple values.

[Anonymous No.6705668]

>>6705663
So you're not a utilitarian?

[Anonymous No.6705673]

>>6705658

>When did relativism become consequentialism?

Never. But my point still stands, does it not?

>You continually ignore what I've said about phronesis, which is basically an understanding of one's own way of being based on experience *and* reflection. Read Plato's Meno

I haven't ignored it. I just haven't read up on it yet. But if it's merely pragmatic knowledge, I don't see what the big fuss is all about.

[Anonymous No.6705676]

>>6705359
Read up on Dancy and ethical particularism

[Anonymous No.6705686]

>>6705668
I'm a utilitarian in that I think utility should be maximised but I disagree with a lot of mainstream utilitarian thought as to happiness being the sole component of utility.

I'm not alone there, I should say. I'm pretty sure Singer is a preference utilitarian, which doesn't take happiness as the sole end like you assume utilitarianism always must, and there's Moore's ideal utilitarianism which values art/aesthetic sorts of things as well as friendship as intrinsically valuable.

Mine isn't exactly the same as either of those two but they're clear examples of how utilitarianism isn't just the classical happiness-based sort.

[Anonymous No.6705698]

>>6705673
>But my point still stands
No, it doesn't. The reasons virtues are chosen have less to do with what the consequences of exercising them are than with whether or not they're desirable qualities for people to have.
>But if it's merely pragmatic knowledge, I don't see what the big fuss is all about.
Read Plato's Meno.

[Anonymous No.6705701]

>>6705686
>I'm pretty sure Singer is a preference utilitarian

OP here. Yes, first of all he is a preference utilitarian. Which is how and why he adds certain principles (such as preference and autonomy) to his theorem which value a person higher in comparison to a non-person

[Anonymous No.6705709]

>>6705698
>whether or not they're desirable qualities for people to have.

But on what basis do they choose these desirables qualities then? This sounds so vague.

>Read Plato's Meno

I will. Sooner or later.

[Anonymous No.6705836]

>>6705709
Again, that's literally what all debate within virtue ethics is about: which virtues are the best and why.
>2015
>Not starting with the Greeks
When will people realize it isn't just a meme?

[Anonymous No.6705889]

>>6705836

>and why

That is exactly what I'm asking you the entire time. Which method do you use to evaluate virtues? I'd appreciate it if you wouldn't just regurgitate some terms you picked up and instead actually answered the question.

[Anonymous No.6705899]

>>6705359
it's shit, natural law theory is the way

[Anonymous No.6705920]

Is /lit/ really just all opinion and no substance?

[Anonymous No.6705948]

>>6705889
I've been saying phronesis all along, are you just dense? Practical reason (I should have corrected your use of the phrase 'pragmatic understanding' earlier) tells us what the best way to be is. Please, for the love of fuck, start with the Greeks. If you haven't read the Meno you shouldn't have even bothered to read a 20th century ethical theorist.

[Anonymous No.6705958]

[Anonymous No.6706692]

I saw Peter Singer in Princeton once, made my hotdog taste even better.
>thats all i have to contribute