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6346605 No.6346605 [Reply] [Original]

how can existential statements be qualified?

it seems that many thoughts I have include the prefix 'there is' or 'it is'.

do these terms signify anything or are they empty placeholders?

Quine said the central question of ontology is 'what ultimately is there?' and the easy answer is 'everything' and then he proceeds from there to try and define the question more narrowly.

is this question answerable? Is there ultimately anything 'there' or is an endless series of associated referents the 'ultimate' structure of discourse?

>> No.6346853

bump

>> No.6346881

“Is," "is," "is"—the idiocy of the word haunts me. If it were abolished, human thought might begin to make sense. I don't know what anything "is"; I only know how it seems to me at this moment.”

― Robert Anton Wilson, Nature's God

>> No.6346908

I don't think anything "is", I think in terms of concentrated and dispersed elements, emerged and veiled, connected or released and so on. What is, only is for a moment, for a space, for a point of view, for a given circumstance and it is indistinguishable from everything else unless you are not in that place.

>> No.6347005

>>6346881

>how it seems

is still an existential statement

>> No.6347007

>>6346908

>concentrated and dispersed

in what?

>elements

of what?

>emerged and veiled

from what?

>> No.6347094

>>6347007
In, of, from each other. I made a conscious choice not to go to those points or else I'll get all tautological and I'd rather be laconic, but if you insist... You could say, for example, that it is about sensual perception and how your attention is focused on something and then ceases to be, that things emerge in front of you and are implied, etc. But I think perception itself can be one of those elements. The word "element" here is used in a very loose sense, because I don't think anything really is at an elementary level, no core, no essence, no true reality, but an all true series of indefinite processes that may appear definite at certain points, but are just as illusory as a dream that you can awake from. These "elements" or "stuff" or "things", are not really solid and fixed, but can be a day in your life, an object on a table next to a background, your whole life, the truth of some religion, a vision through a microscope, and so on. Infinite worlds.

>> No.6347192

>>6347094

>These "elements" or "stuff" or "things", are not really solid and fixed,

you're still making a positive assertion, which relies on an assumed truth value

how can 'x is y' ever be said to be true

>> No.6347397
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6347397

bump

maybe I should've kept it under 140 characters?

>> No.6347403

>>6346605
They can't, that's why German idealism exists for true intellectuals.

>> No.6347408

>>6347094
>sensual
Nice Freudian.. Lacanian slip

>> No.6347409

>>6347403

>muh Geist qua Geist

>> No.6347413

>>6347403
Including Stirner, by the way.

I miss Feminister.

>> No.6347416

>>6347409
>muh noumena

>> No.6347550

encouraging further adequate responses

>> No.6347945

>>6347192
Because my assertions are also part of it and are also only true to a certain extent, to a certain point. That's why I can say it, but I never said it was an absolute truth, I was merely speaking my mind at this moment.

>>6347408
I meant sensual. It sounds a bit weird, but it's more than just sensory information, but our engagement with it, to be completely mesmerized by it.

>> No.6347961

>>6346605
the substantives are a mistake

-- any linguist

>> No.6349098

>>6347961

elaborate on this mistaken nature of nouns

>> No.6349161

They are "qualified" because they fundamentally *refer* to the objects, properties, relations, events, and so on; and what they refer to are distinct from the names one uses (to refer).

>it seems that many thoughts I have include the prefix 'there is' or 'it is'.
"There is" and "it is" are not existential statements. They are called first-order *quantifiers*. "It is", when uttered, would be meaningless, for example, without a proper meaning of 'it'. In that sense---yes---if you fail to provide the meaning of 'it', "It is" would be an "empty placeholder" signifying nothing in particular.

> Is there ultimately anything 'there' or is an endless series of associated referents the 'ultimate' structure of discourse?
"Endless series of associated referents" implies that ultimately something is 'there', since by 'referents' we mean 'that [object / property / relation, etc.] what is referred to'. The second part of the sentence---"the 'ultimate' structure of discourse" (whatever that means)---is too obscure for me to parse. Moreover, that's not what Quine meant---at all. He wasn't concerned about whether or not there is an independent reality outside of our thoughts of it; THAT he takes as a given. He more talking about what kind of things there are in the world: numbers? sets? functions? quarks? tables? etc.

>> No.6350034
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6350034

>What is Heidegger

>> No.6350045
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6350045

>>6346605
>Is metaphysics possible?
No

>> No.6350562
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6350562

>>6349161

>they fundamentally *refer* to the objects

>From then on it was probably necessary to begin to think that there was no center, that the center could not be thought in the form of a beingpresent, that the center had no natural locus, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of non-locus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play. This moment was that in which language invaded the universal problematic; that in which, in the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse-provided we can agree on this word-that is to say, when everything became a system where the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences. The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the interplay of signification ad infinitum.

>> No.6350587

>>6350045
You're retarded to link Wittgenstein with that

>> No.6350597
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6350597

>> No.6351036

>>6349161
there is is an existential quantifier

>> No.6351053

>>6346605
Philosophy can only ever be the engagement of symbols. The human mind is the bridge between reference and referent. But the act of philosophy can only ever stay in the realm of pure reference.

>> No.6351066

>>6351053
In other words, OP, no. No existential statement can be verified. You seem to be asking for a non-subjective bridge between reference and referent, and that's just not possible.

>> No.6351118

Everything IS but a wave in a field. The rippling of this field is not itself a thing, it's the action of this field. The field is all that there is.

>> No.6351212

>>6351118

how can the wave be said to exist?

>> No.6351913

>>6350587
Why?

>> No.6352096 [DELETED] 

>>6346605
The tl;dr answer is: they can't.

The way I look at this question is, how can one ever deconstruct the signified to a single, irreducible homoreference within the sociolectic discourse field? The perceptive I-subject is situated within a multivalent sign-matrix in which utterances are multivocally performed between non-unitary vocalising entities. Ratio-linguistic discourse is ineluctably compromised by the historicist supercessesion of binary logic by non-Euclidean algorithmic metanarratives. And that is irregardless of the pressures imposed by etymological genealogies and hegemonic superstructures within the diachronic socio-economic conceptual marketplace. The semiotic shifts precipitated by these fluctuating, iridescent picto-linguistic strands are what give rise to socio-psychopathalogical contructs, among the more obvious of which are cis-gender and sexual preference. Thus, this struggle is eternally fought within the sociolectic discourse field in a process of infinite regression and deferral of meaning to ensure the perpetually auto-generative nature of the phallogocentric sign system.

>> No.6352103 [DELETED] 

>>6346605 (OP)
The tl;dr answer is: they can't.

The way I look at this question is, how can one ever deconstruct the signified to a single, irreducible homoreference within the sociolectic discourse field? The perceptive I-subject is situated within a multivalent sign-matrix in which utterances are multivocally performed between non-unitary vocalising entities. Ratio-linguistic discourse is ineluctably compromised by the historicist supercessesion of binary logic by non-Euclidean algorithmic metanarratives. And that is irregardless of the pressures imposed by etymological genealogies and hegemonic superstructures within the diachronic socio-economic conceptual marketplace. The semiotic shifts precipitated by these fluctuating, iridescent picto-linguistic strands are what give rise to socio-psychopathalogical contructs, among the more obvious of which are cis-gender and sexual preference. Thus, this struggle is eternally fought within the sociolectic discourse field in a process of infinite regression and deferral of meaning to ensure the perpetually auto-generative nature of the phallogocentric sign system.

>> No.6352107

>>6346605
The tl;dr answer is: they can't.

The way I look at this question is, how can one ever deconstruct the signified to a single, irreducible homoreference within the sociolectic discourse field? The perceptive I-subject is situated within a multivalent sign-matrix in which utterances are multivocally performed between non-unitary vocalising entities. Ratio-linguistic discourse is ineluctably compromised by the historicist supercessesion of binary logic by non-Euclidean algorithmic metanarratives. And that is irregardless of the pressures imposed by etymological genealogies and hegemonic superstructures within the diachronic socio-economic conceptual marketplace. The semiotic shifts precipitated by these fluctuating, iridescent picto-linguistic strands are what give rise to socio-psychopathalogical contructs, among the more obvious of which are cis-gender and sexual preference. Thus, this struggle is eternally fought within the sociolectic discourse field in a process of infinite regression and deferral of meaning to ensure the perpetually auto-generative nature of the phallogocentric sign system.

>> No.6352149

Not sure I understand the question there, nor how it relates to Quine's famous quote. I don't know how you might want existential statements (and, to be fair, don't ALL statements have an existential statement implicit in them?) to be "qualified," as I feel you may be using the word "qualified" in a way it typically is not (or, at the least, not how I've heard it before). And I think we should be careful to talk of reality and "discourse" separately, as you seem here to conflate them, and I think you need an argument (or at least some kind of justification) for doing so.

In any case, besides by misgivings about your terminology (and the question to begin with), I think the answer is basically no. Existential statements are statements of, I suppose, the most "primitive" sort, and I can hardly see how you can define the notion of existence out of reality - or, indeed, "discourse." Existence seems like the most primitive concept, and one without which all other concepts become null. But again, I feel I can't give a very good answer until you clarify a few things.

>> No.6352418
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6352418

>>6352107

>> No.6352449
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6352449

>>6352107
>phallogocentric
yum

>> No.6352471

>>6352418

I'd literally kill someone to have a beard like that, not gray of course. Why can't i have a single good thing about me? I just want a beard, that's all i ask.

>> No.6352669

>>6352107
you're joking but you're basically correct

>>6352149
>I think we should be careful to talk of reality and "discourse" separately

any notion of 'reality' is by necessity contained within the domain of theoretical discourse

there is nothing outside the text

>> No.6352699

>>6352107
I can distinguish between nonsense and philosophy, unlike angloid fedoras who can't comprehend basic philosophical concepts and terms.

>> No.6352706

>>6352669

reality isn't understood from theoretical discourse, that's just the derivative from actually being in the world

>> No.6352767

>>6352471
>I'd literally kill someone to have a beard like that, not gray of course. Why can't i have a single good thing about me? I just want a beard, that's all i ask.

Why? I hate my facial hair. I'd like to be one of those boymen, with fluffy whisps above the lip, who don't seem to develop facial hair. It doesn't matter how I shave; electric, disposable, straight razor; against the grain, across the grain, five passes; an hour after the shave there is the thick coarse stubble again. Literally a week without shaving and I have a beard. I hate it.

>> No.6352898

>>6352767

Fuck you, I bet you are a tall handsome natural bulky guy that want to be a nigger

>> No.6352940

>>6352706

>being in the world

is a linguistic construct

sorry

'reality' is an empty signifier

>> No.6353018

>>6352940

You aren't always using words in your everyday involved activity, *the mind* isn't auto-referential when doing common stuff. Kinda the effect that proficient sportman describe when playing their sports, the feeling-like-one with the activity you are doing (like rock climbing, etc)

>> No.6353033

>>6353018

all phenomena and activity are structural components of discourse

>> No.6353044

>>6347397
I read Quines "On what there is", I assume you have too.
What do you think he comes up with? I have trouble really deciphering it myself.

I found his two dogmas on empiricism really interesting

>> No.6353069

>>6352107
Derrida please go.

Also:

>irregardless

>> No.6353081

>>6352471
Your beard is not who you are, stop with this tribalistic thinking.

>> No.6353095

>>6353081
>Your beard is not who you are, stop with this tribalistic thinking.

Everything about you is who you are you faggot.

>> No.6353111

>>6353095
Your deeds define who your are, faggot, everything else is pure thought.

>> No.6353122

>>6353111
>Your deeds define who your are

Not really. Your looks do too. And your words.

>> No.6353133

>>6353122
What define your looks is pure abstraction who comes god knows where projected from you consciousness, you might looks cool to yourself now but in 30 years not. Either way you're constructing your self-identity on a whim of other people's sense of aesthetics with no actual concreteness.

>> No.6353163

>>6353133
>Either way you're constructing your self-identity on a whim of other people's sense of aesthetics with no actual concreteness.

Everyone does that. If you don't think looking good, and feeling good about that doesn't affect people you're delusional.

The guy you were talking about who wanted a beard, would probably feel better about himself if he got one, and thus live a more fulfilled life, because he is more comfortable in his own skin.

You say looks are an abstraction, but it's an abstraction that people care immensely about, and have done since human beings started existing.

>> No.6353184

>>6353163
Of course people do it, I do it, but it's beyond superfluous to say 'I'm a guy with a nice beard' as what defines you instead of 'I constructed a house for my family' or 'I wrote a book'.

> feel better about himself
I'm not even gonna enter into the question of the narcissism inherent to this.

>> No.6353197

>>6353184
I never said you yourself should define yourself that way, but what makes constructing a house or writing a book more valuable than having a beard? That's just completely subjective m8.

>I'm not even gonna enter into the question of the narcissism inherent to this.

Everyone is a closet egoist, and care mostly about themselves and their families. There is difference between healthy and unhealthy narcissism.

>> No.6353206
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6353206

>>6353197
>but what makes constructing a house or writing a book more valuable than having a beard? That's just completely subjective m8.


You can't be serious.

>> No.6353232

>>6353206
Look, clearly it is subjective. You might be thinking I'm arguing with hyperbole into a reductio ad absurdum, but I'm right am I not?

How do you quantify someone's feelings about a subject and say, wanting to look good is shit, but building a house is automatically valuable?

>> No.6353271

>>6353232

I just thought about a simple test concerning this: first choose two companies to send your curriculum; to company A you put in it all your great Ubermensch physical features and consumption hobbies, how your dreads look cool, your massive collection of /fa/ clothes and clever facial hair, etc.
To company B you will make list of things such as (and you can lie here, since there is no difference between it and the truth, which is subjective anyway): that you were voluntary in some big sports event, that you wrote a thesis on Hegelianism, and that at the age of 18 you raise a child of your own.

Which one do you think will get a better response?

>> No.6353286

>>6353271
depends on the company you're submitting to and what one considers a better response

>> No.6353291

>>6353271
So, people who work in employment departments at major corporations are more interested in your merits, since your merits can make them more money.

How does this invalidate my claims? I could conjure up a similar scenario where the two people are exactly the same qualifications, but one dresses sharply, has well-groomed hair, and is closely shaven, and looks suave, and the other one looks like an overgrown hippie with 500 tattoos.

Who do you think they'll choose then?

>> No.6353300

>>6353286
Christ would you stop being so fucking obtuse. Are you happy and fulfilled? If not, ever consider that it might be because you've accomplished anything?

>> No.6353501

>>6353044

from what I vaguely remember he says there are things, people, places, etc in the world, and tries to define what these things are formally

I don't remember if he succeeds or not but he's basically saying that substantives have some kind of corollary with 'actual things in the actual world' which seems kind of stupid to me

>> No.6354148

>>6353111

'you' is a social construct

>> No.6354335

>>6346605
Check out Sellars' Naturalism and Ontology and 'Grammar and Existence'

https://youtu.be/6UiV-vMOueY?t=9m26s

>> No.6354372

>>6354335
Holy shit, i didn't know there were any recordings of Sellars. He sounds like Doc from Back to the Future or something.

>> No.6354950

>>6354335

will do

thanks