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6130175 No.6130175 [Reply] [Original]

Am I the only one who doesn't get the mind-body problem and the debate over consciousness?

It seems like such a non-issue to me. Surely what we call "the mind" or "consciousness" is just the experience of being a human being. So-called "qualia" isn't mysterious at all because we can't conceive of it being any other way - we don't find it surprising that water is wet (or if you do, you shouldn't). Then you have the materialists who say you = your brain. But surely I'm my whole body (including the brain)? I walk with my legs, not with my brain. I feel an itch on my arm, not in my brain. There's no extra "thing" called a mind or consciousness.

>> No.6130187

>>6130175
I'll give you a bump because I am also stupid. I mean, curious.

>> No.6130198

There is no 'body' only the phenomenal experience of having a body

There is nothing outside the text.

>> No.6130209

>>6130198
phenomenal experience is all there is

>> No.6130215

>>6130175
>I walk with my legs, not with my brain. I feel an itch on my arm, not in my brain.
This isn't even scientifically true, let alone a philosophical argument. As a rule of thumb if you think some issue that great minds have laboured over for millennia is a non-issue for a trivial reason, you're probably wrong.

>> No.6130241

>>6130215
>As a rule of thumb if you think some issue that great minds have laboured over for millennia is a non-issue for a trivial reason, you're probably wrong.

This. Stay in school OP

>> No.6130249

Yes, you are.
>>>/b/

>> No.6130252

You don't get it because you misunderstood it

I think you passed your judgement already

>> No.6130254

>>6130215
1. It's not a scientific issue, it's a philosophical one.
2. There have been many philosophical issues throughout the ages that have turned out to be non-issues
3. Why don't you actually show how I'm wrong instead of just appealing to authority

>> No.6130277

>>6130215
>I walk with my legs, not with my brain
>This isn't even scientifically true
wut

>> No.6130303

>>6130254
>Never mind science, I'm smarter than that
>If I say it's a non-issue without explaining why then it's a non-issue
>Tell me why I'm a faggot
I'm not that guy but I'll actually do this.
You've chosen an arbitrary definitituon for consciousness, one that resembles no other I've encountered in philosophy of mind. This concept has better names. Qualia might be used for it, if you mean the ineffable qualities that being-for-oneself brings wit itself. You haven't really examined why consciousness and the experience of being human are identical, or how one is the essence of the other. You've simply asserted it without any reasoning and proceeded from there.

This could almost be considered axiomatic reasoning if it weren't for issues in following steps.
>So-called "qualia" isn't mysterious at all because we can't conceive of it being any other way
Yes we could. I can conceive of someone experiencing as green what is red to me. I can also conceive of a qualia-free universe. You're not making any sense here. Nothing leads to or follows from this proposition.

> - we don't find it surprising that water is wet (or if you do, you shouldn't).
If I touch frozen water, it would surprise me to find it wet. Likewise, steam isn't wet, even though it's gaseous water. Why shouldn't we find wetness strange? Is this a moral commandment, or do you just want us to agree with you that it makes no sense to think water could be in a condition where it isn't wet, or that we could never conceivably be in a state where we find the wetness of water mystifying?
This is terrible work, kid.

>> No.6130314

So what grand technologies will solving the mind-body problem lead to?

>> No.6130344

>>6130314
Absolutely none, people just need something to justify their hunt for grants.

>> No.6130364

Anon, that's why some cultures will say they think with the heart. Because it's not about what gave the signal for the heart to beat faster, but how aware are you of its beating and thus, how aware are you of how your world affects your whole being. Consciousness is not a brain issue, it's in the heart and legs or in the videogame that seem to take all of your mind or the car that feels as the extension of your body. The idea that the brain is the core of the human being is an ideological position, no more true and no more false than any other. It is the easiest organ to assimilate with the mechanization of men, the one that sends the information, but not the one who actualizes it, at least no more than any other. Those who think consciousness is a brain process or even that knowledge is a brain process, things for neurologists to talk about, etc. That is missing crucial points concerning our life. I wouldn't make the contrary statement like you did, but I certainly understand the sentiment.

>> No.6130416
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6130416

>>6130303
>missing the point
I haven't put a definition of consciousness, I'm saying how we use the word normally doesn't entail any further questions that need to be explored. You're the one who's asserting the existence of this thing called "consciousness" and then saying "oooh how mysterious!"
>I can conceive of someone experiencing as green what is red to me
You can also conceive of yourself not having a brain. It's scientifically impossible, but not logically impossible. You can conceive of a situation where you get an MRI scan and the doctor says "sorry, you don't have a brain" (I wouldn't be surprised in your case, frankly). But entertaining this situations serves little purpose.
>I can also conceive of a qualia-free universe
That makes no sense. That's like conceiving of the experience of being dead.
>If I touch frozen water, it would surprise me to find it wet. Likewise, steam isn't wet, even though it's gaseous water. Why shouldn't we find wetness strange? Is this a moral commandment, or do you just want us to agree with you that it makes no sense to think water could be in a condition where it isn't wet, or that we could never conceivably be in a state where we find the wetness of water mystifying?
You've completely changed the subject. H2O molecules in such a state where it's liquid, ok? The fact that that would be wet is not mysterious at all, and so shouldn't raise any questions. Likewise, a fully functioning, awake, human being tasting wine shouldn't surprise us that it experiences the qualitative taste.

Thus, there is no problem worth exploring.

>> No.6130428

>>6130303
>I can also conceive of a qualia-free universe.
Oh really? How would it be physically different from this one?

>> No.6130438

>>6130364
Well, I think that's part of it; that the word "consciousness" or "conscious" appears to be used in different ways in different contexts. "Consciousness" in abstract is like talking about "belief" or "knowledge" in abstract. There's no one thing you can point to and say "there it is"

>> No.6130457

>>6130416
>I haven't put a definition of consciousness,
But you have. You said 'Consciousness is X,' which is offering a definition. Without definitions, what do you hope to accomplish? You'd save yourself some face if you knew what you were doing here.
>You're the one who's asserting the existence of this thing called "consciousness" and then saying "oooh how mysterious!"
I'm am absolute idealist and a Catholic. This is my stance IRL. Deal with it: we're opponents, and this is the way our relationship works.
>It's scientifically impossible, but not logically impossible
Point taken, but all the same, why don't you care what science has to say? Surely, what science tells us can help us understand philosophical questions.
>You've completely changed the subject. H2O molecules in such a state where it's liquid, ok? The fact that that would be wet is not mysterious at all, and so shouldn't raise any questions. Likewise, a fully functioning, awake, human being tasting wine shouldn't surprise us that it experiences the qualitative taste.
OK, but why isn't that surprising? Why shouldn't I be surprised? You're just making assertions here.
>Thus, there is no problem worth exploring.
I think you'd gain quite a bit from seriously engaging with the problem, actually. You clearly haven't read much of the relevant literature.

>> No.6130466

>>6130428
I don't know, I'm just saying I can conceive of it in the same way I can conceive of a world full of qualia. Either is equally likely, tbh, I could care less about qualia. Consciousness isn't the same as qualia, though, they're just something it may or may not have immediate access to, depending on their existential status.

>> No.6130475

>>6130466
I couldn't care less* I'm drink and going to bed

>> No.6130490

>>6130457
>But you have. You said 'Consciousness is X,' which is offering a definition. Without definitions, what do you hope to accomplish? You'd save yourself some face if you knew what you were doing here.
It wasn't a definition. I was saying what we usually call "consciousness" usually, it seems to me, means X (that a person is fully functioning and able to do certain things like reason and think)
>I'm am absolute idealist and a Catholic. This is my stance IRL. Deal with it: we're opponents, and this is the way our relationship works
Ehm, ok. Except what I'm saying here shouldn't disprove any Catholic beliefs. If anything I'm giving you ammunition against the materialists.
>Point taken, but all the same, why don't you care what science has to say? Surely, what science tells us can help us understand philosophical questions
Science can't tell us anything about conceptual questions. If the questions "what is consciousness?" were a scientific question then it would have ended ages ago because we would have looked at the brain and seen that there wasn't any ghostly souls or "consciousness" or whatever. Just a brain. Ok, big deal. That has no bearing on the philosophical question.
>OK, but why isn't that surprising? Why shouldn't I be surprised? You're just making assertions here
You may as well be surprised at ANYTHING then. It should surprise nobody (except a baby) that water is wet. Now if you touched water and it was furry instead of wet, THAT would be surprising, and surely would require explanation.
>I think you'd gain quite a bit from seriously engaging with the problem, actually. You clearly haven't read much of the relevant literature
Actually, I lied in the OP. There are some philosophers who have this position and who I'm drawing on.

>> No.6130499

>>6130475
Try be more polite next time, please. God bless you.

>> No.6130529
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6130529

I'm not even reading the thread, I mean it, but those fags that keep quoting every single sentence and responding to every single one are retarded. Can't you just answer to the whole thing at once and, you know, connecting your thoughts with words and ponctuation? Damn, if people were to do the same with what you say, it will only get bigger and bigger until everything is unreadable. Learn to write a full paragraph. Retards.

>> No.6130534

>>6130175
>qualia
>phantom limb syndrome
>brains in a vat

>> No.6130540

>>6130490
>I was saying what we usually call "consciousness" usually, it seems to me, means X (that a person is fully functioning and able to do certain things like reason and think)
So that's your definition of conscious, then? So there is such a thing as being conscious.
>Except what I'm saying here shouldn't disprove any Catholic beliefs
It won't disprove anything the way you've phrased it. And absolute idealism proposes that everything is mind, so your ideas clearly contradict that proposition, unless. I've really misinterpreted you, which I would blame you for, anyway.
>You may as well be surprised at ANYTHING then
Why shouldn't I be surprised by everything? Everything is miraculous, in that it is at all. But do you mean to say that wet water is normal, but dry ice isn't? Or do you only care about wetness and not qualities in general?
>Actually, I lied in the OP. There are some philosophers who have this position and who I'm drawing on.
Who?

>> No.6130546

>>6130529
In this format, responding point by point makes more sense than writing a paragraph to respond to 'lel ur a pleb'
>>>/reddit/

>> No.6130557

>>6130546
Only if you think in bullet points like a highschooler stem-lover wikipedia maniac retard.

Do you read books?

>> No.6130585

>>6130529
Fuck you

>>6130540
>So that's your definition of conscious, then? So there is such a thing as being conscious
Yes, there is such a thing as being conscious. But there is no such thing as "consciousness" - that is, no thing you can point to and say "there it is" (Neither is there a "thing" that you can't point to, like a soul. It's not a substance or a kind of stuff)
>It won't disprove anything the way you've phrased it. And absolute idealism proposes that everything is mind, so your ideas clearly contradict that proposition, unless. I've really misinterpreted you, which I would blame you for, anyway
Ok
>Why shouldn't I be surprised by everything? Everything is miraculous, in that it is at all. But do you mean to say that wet water is normal, but dry ice isn't? Or do you only care about wetness and not qualities in general?
Yes but that's a different thing; that's a religious experience, not a scientific or philosophical point of inquiry. Being at amazed at the way the world is is to see the world as a miracle, and so can't be explained (God isn't an "explanation" in this sense; he's not scientific or philosophical, he's religious/mystical).
>Who?
Wittgenstein, Peter Hacker, Hilary Putnam

>> No.6130587

>>6130198
Incapable of assessing correspondence. Dropped.

>> No.6130603

Check out the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The thrust of his philosophy is a response to the ideas dualism has cemented in our culture, through philosophy and science. In sum, he claims that it is impossible to separate the things we experience in our mind from the world that dualism claims to be "objective."

It is very compelling shit. The major problem when discussing dualism is that it is so cemented that it is hard to use language other than dualistic language: "subjective" "Objective"

>> No.6130621

>>6130557
You're causing a scene. How about you calm down instead?

>> No.6130801

>>6130209

exactly. that's my point

>>6130587

assessment is phenomenal, as is correspondence

>> No.6131146

>>6130801
If you assess a body, there is a body to be assessed.

Taking the stance that there is only phenomena and that you can assess things that aren't phenomena is incoherent.

Furthermore, casting doubt on correspondence of non phenomena brings you to the problem of knowing whether phenomena actually corresponds with phenomena. If you can't be sure of one, you can't be sure of the other either.

>> No.6131287

>>6130254
>>6130254
>1. It's not a scientific issue, it's a philosophical one.
>2014 + 1
>still thinking philosophy can be adressed without science and vica versa

>> No.6132004

>>6130585
>Neither is there a "thing" that you can't point to, like a soul. It's not a substance or a kind of stuff
Spirit is immaterial. No one has ever claimed you should be able to touch a mind.
>Yes but that's a different thing; that's a religious experience, not a scientific or philosophical point of inquiry.
And yet the experience of being amazed by wetness is still an experience prior to your applying these labels to it. Should or shouldn't people wonder about these things from time to time? Who's to say wondering why water is wet isn't scientific inquiry? It seems like the kind of thing you could test.
>Being at amazed at the way the world is is to see the world as a miracle, and so can't be explained (God isn't an "explanation" in this sense; he's not scientific or philosophical, he's religious/mystical).
I disagree, many philosophers have spent a lot of time writing about God. Thus seems blatantly false to me.
>Wittgenstein, Peter Hacker, Hilary Putnam
Read Descartes before you start talking about the mind-body problem. These aren't interesting solutions, you've just decided you like the analytic response.