So tell me, /lit/, if this man's opinions should be immediately and violently discarded, whose shouldn't?

File: 9 KB, 480x360, Daniel_Dennett.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 11:09:14 2015 No.6054796 [Reply] [Original]

So tell me, /lit/,
if this man's opinions should be immediately and violently discarded,
whose shouldn't?

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 11:11:13 2015 No.6054802 Why would we discard the man who put the last nail to the coffin of consciousness? Despite the hype, it doesn't exist. Just deal with it.

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 11:11:37 2015 No.6054803 >>6054796 My opinions.

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 11:12:39 2015 No.6054807 >>6054802 Of course it exists, just not whatever we mean by the word!

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 11:21:28 2015 No.6054835 >>6054796 I've always found panpsychism and dennetianism to be exactly the same thing, only described using different words. Was witty right all along? Is this just semantics by now?

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 11:29:36 2015 No.6054859

>>6054807
If there is no meaning (read: reference) to the thing, it just plainly does not exist.

You might as well postulate the existence of "topkekness" and see how far you can go in convincing others of its existence. Eventually, if enough people are talking about it, you might spawn a new field of research: the search for the structure of topkekness. Hundreds of students would then line up and pursue their PhDs for the sake of being one of the firsts to pioneer the field.

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 11:39:54 2015 No.6054904

>>6054835
>panpsychism and dennetianism to be exactly the same thing
It's not though; they are mutually exclusive. Panpsychism claims that consciousness is a property of all matter, while Dennett denies its existence altogether.

>Is this just semantics by now?
But that's a good thing. We define our terms in hope so that a potentially fruitful conversation may come out of it; otherwise we are talking past each other. Those who belittle semantics typically have never studied Semantics (topic that was at the center of analytic philosophy in post-WWII) in any considerable depth.

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 11:40:05 2015 No.6054906 >>6054859 topkek

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 11:51:49 2015 No.6054955

>>6054904
I'm interpreting Dennett as saying that the thing we call consciousness is a faulty concept. What there is instead of this must be physical matter arranged into particular states, that together produce an effect we call being 'aware', 'alive' or 'conscious', which is an effect we have been designed to notice.

In essence, physical states make us ascribe consciousness to various physical objects due to our internal makeup.

Chalmers takes the view that we're physical machines as well, but the reason we feel that we're conscious, but have nothing but physicality to recline upon, consciousness has to be physicaloty itself.

That is where I see the convergence of their thinking; we are having experiences because of the physical world. What else is there but atoms and energy? Consciousness. And is that just atoms and energy too, or a separate category? We may never know...

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 11:53:29 2015 No.6054961 >>6054859 >If there is no meaning Consciousness = the state of being aware of one's sorroundings.

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 11:58:51 2015 No.6054980 >>6054859 But, like, what if nothing exists, man. If the consciousness that is the only proof of things existing doesn't exist....

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 12:20:51 2015 No.6055031 File: 869 KB, 728x954, hohoho.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] "There are no mental events, you're only imagining them" - Darwin

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 12:22:20 2015 No.6055037 >>6054802 The fact that you consider it something that simply either exists or doesn't shows how ignorant you are of the field

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 12:24:52 2015 No.6055047

>>6054955
>Chalmers takes the view that we're [...] nothing but physicality
Your interpretation is false, since Chalmers is a property dualist...

>What else is there but atoms and energy?
Some would say, numbers.

>We may never know...
Well, if it's all matter in the end, sooner or later we should be able to 'read off' and 'project' human memories out of the neurobiological tissues they reside in, as we are able to do with informational systems such as computers, phones, video and photo cameras. No longer then it would be considered as qualia, I think. But there's a lot of controversy about whether memories are literally in the brain or not. Wittgensteinians claim that it cannot be said that they are IN the brain, since if they were, we would be able to scatter the brain and collect them. Instead, we retain and retrieve memories with our endowed minds (and the powers associated with retaining and retrieving).

Indeed, who knows.

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 12:30:41 2015 No.6055070

Dennett is based as fuck. It makes perfect sense that the functioning of the brain will one day be reduced to near-complete third person physical understanding just as the functioning of the stomach or heart was before it. I don't think he takes the view that consciousness is completely illusion - he's not a behaviorist in the vein of BF Skinner after all - but that our first person account of consciousness as a unified flow of experience may not be completely correct regarding how consciousness actually operates in the brain. He makes a comparison in one of his books to people thinking they don't have a blind spot in their vision, or can see color in their peripherals. Also, his idea of human decision making and free will is one of the most developed and well argued I've ever seen. I especially like his observation that our sense of agency derives less from our final decision specifically and more from the ability to terminate deliberation and actually just act.

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 13:05:00 2015 No.6055206

>>6054859
>You might as well postulate the existence of "topkekness" and see how far you can go in convincing others of its existence.
Are you the same guy in every thread? That isn't a funny or good response. The difference between topkekness and consciousness is that consciousness is something that everyone is supposed to have immediate access to and denying that consciousness exists is no different from denying that the conscious person to whom you're denying its existence exists. What is topkekness? What if topkekness exists and is very important? Who are you to say what does or doesn't exist?
Dennett's rejection of Cartesian dualism isn't proof that consciousness doesn't exist, and it isn't even proof that the Cartesian soul doesn't exist. Occasionalism does away with Dennett right away by simply acknowledging that there is no connection between the body and mind and not pressing the matter any further, not expecting empirical evidence to show up at all since the soul has no material presence.
>>6054955
> What there is instead of this must be physical matter arranged into particular states, that together produce an effect we call being 'aware', 'alive' or 'conscious', which is an effect we have been designed to notice.
So there's such a state as 'being conscious' but consciousness isn't something we can discuss?

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 13:17:17 2015 No.6055263 >>6055031 He doesn't claim that, that's the Churchlands. He says there are no qualia/that qualia are a useless shitty concept that doesn't even mean anything.

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 13:22:39 2015 No.6055289 >>6054802 >the man who put the last nail to the coffin of consciousness? He missed the coffin because he reduced reality to something that doesn't include it in the first place.

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 13:27:06 2015 No.6055305

>>6055263
>He says there are no qualia/that qualia are a useless shitty concept that doesn't even mean anything.
Considering I have experience of qualia, or at least experience of experience of qualia, where do you see the difference between your correction and anon's "you're only imagining it"?

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 13:29:02 2015 No.6055312 >>6055305 Qualia is a problem with the inadequacy of language to communicate subjective experiences

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 13:48:11 2015 No.6055373

>>6055206
>Are you the same guy in every thread?
Are you the same guy who cherishes consciousness, but in his objections to my objections comes off as flat-footed in every thread?

>everyone is supposed to have immediate access
Everyone, meaning what? All humans? Or do nonhuman animals count too?

Describe me the procedure for accessing one's consciousness.

>the conscious person to whom you're denying its existence exists.
This is how your sentence reads: "Has anyone ever gone so far as even to need more to do look more like?"

>Dennett's rejection of Cartesian dualism isn't proof that consciousness doesn't exist, and it isn't even proof that the Cartesian soul doesn't exist
We are strictly speaking of consciousness here: something that is not exclusively a part of Cartesian dualism; there are many theories of mind that suppose it. Why do you muddle Descartes and souls into the discussion?

>there is no connection between the body and mind and not pressing the matter any further, not expecting empirical evidence to show up at all since the soul has no material presence.
You write as if that is seen as a mighty strength of the theory, which it is not. If there is no mathematical relation (read: connection) between the two, it means that there is no interaction between the two. Thus one of the substances (matter or mind) cannot co-exist, is nonexistent, and hence physicalism is right. I'll just ignore the soul part.

>Occasionalism does away with Dennett right away
I'm sure it does, but outside of religious circles it is only ridiculed, as I am ridiculing consciousness right now.

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 13:55:39 2015 No.6055408 >>6055373 Sorry, meant to say: >hence physicalism (or idealism) is right

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 14:42:16 2015 No.6055617

>>6054955
>I'm interpreting Dennett as saying that the thing we call consciousness is a faulty concept. What there is instead of this must be physical matter arranged into particular states, that together produce an effect we call being 'aware', 'alive' or 'conscious', which is an effect we have been designed to notice.

You're incorrect in that interpretation. Dennett thinks consciousness is an emergent from biological, neural processes. He is not a physicalist, and he faults a lot of 20th century philosophers for thinking physics has much to say about free will, consciousness, etc.

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 14:44:22 2015 No.6055626 >>6054796 Oh, come one, you don't have to hate on Santa Claus just because you didn't get a present last Christmas

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 14:57:27 2015 No.6055686 Freud was proved irrelevant 30 years ago, that's a great wax sculpture of him though.

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 14:58:15 2015 No.6055689 >>6054796 How does this guy honestly believe in the Turing test? All it tests is the limitations of tests. It's like saying, if you can paint a painting so good that it convinces someone that it's a window, then it is a window.

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 15:02:50 2015 No.6055702 >>6055305 People claims to have experience of God, but that doesn't mean he exists.

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 16:00:32 2015 No.6056054 >>6054796 >dedicated his life to solving a strawman lel

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 18:48:23 2015 No.6056836

>>6055689
Well, if the painting of a window looks like a window from all angles, is conducive to touch and smell in the same way as a window, shatters into pieces of glass when you hit it with a hammer like a window, behaves similarly to an actual window when analyzing its chemical constituency, is able to be placed on houses like a real window, then it's probably a window.

It's just a matter of which categories you consider essential enough to test for.

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 18:53:26 2015 No.6056864

>>6055617
You're talking past me; I'm telling you there's no further weight behind the notion of 'physical' beyond describing that which is causally linked to your own experience of the world (meaning all that exists). In short: Physicalism is idealism, all things considered. The difference is what parts of the whole you emphasize.

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 18:54:56 2015 No.6056873 >>6056836 >then it's probably a category error to infer that it is a window Fixed. I mean, >painting >shatter into pieces of glass ...really?

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 18:55:55 2015 No.6056878 >>6055305 http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heterophenomenology

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 18:59:22 2015 No.6056893 >>6056873 The turing test implies that if an AI is functionally similar to actual intelligence, then it's intelligence. Hence my attempt at reductio.

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 19:00:04 2015 No.6056897

>>6056864
>I'm telling you there's no further weight behind the notion of 'physical' beyond describing that which is causally linked to your own experience of the world (meaning all that exists)
What the hell am I reading here? Someone please parse and interpret this.

>Physicalism is idealism
What's next? Apples are oranges? Men are women? Lagrangian mechanics is Hamiltonian mechanics? Earth is Mars?

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 19:00:24 2015 No.6056899 >>6056893 similar-->identical sorry

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 19:03:21 2015 No.6056910 >>6056893 >if an AI is functionally similar to actual intelligence, then it's PROBABLY intelligence. Fixed. I haven't read his original paper, but did Turing define 'intelligence' at all?

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 19:05:13 2015 No.6056924 >>6056897 I'm trying to tell you that their implications would be identical, hence the difference resides in the label. Think "a knife is a can opener is cutlery is a weapon etc.". Sloppy analogy, but I hope my thoughts are represented sufficiently.

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 19:34:01 2015 No.6057073

I'm not sure about his current position, but I believe Dennett was reevaluating his position on computation, and the turing test, after reading Terrence Deacon's work.

In any case, Dennett's mistakes don't matter. Analytic philosophy doesn't care for such details. Like science, it is a monster that will simply devour what works and discard the rest. Its approach allows to work piece meal like that, and avoid personality politics, because its filled with Hi IQ men.

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 19:37:59 2015 No.6057089

>>6056924
>I'm trying to tell you that their implications would be identical
Then it shouldn't be so hard for you to name me at least two statements that are implied by both, Physicalism and Idealism, and that are identical to each other by the virtue of their meaning or logical form.

There is no need to turn to analogies when you can demonstrate things concretely.

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 19:41:50 2015 No.6057107 >immediately and violently discarded >tfw my dennett shitpost was made into its own thread I bet you love the rest of the Four Horsemen as well, OP

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 19:43:03 2015 No.6057113 >>6056910 >autists defining their axioms

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 19:48:02 2015 No.6057129 >>6057113 Shhh, Johnny; the adults are talking.

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 19:50:51 2015 No.6057144 >>6057089 monism, mkay

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 19:51:40 2015 No.6057154

“Some years ago, there was a journalist in Italy named Giulio Giorello, and he did an interview with me. And I don’t know if he wrote it or not, but the headline in Corriere della Sera when it was published was "Sì, abbiamo un'anima. Ma è fatta di tanti piccoli robot – "Yes, we have a soul, but it’s made of lots of tiny robots." And I thought, exactly. That’s the view. Yes, we have a soul, but in what sense? In the sense that our brains, unlike the brains even of dogs and cats and chimpanzees and dolphins, our brains have functional structures that give our brains powers that no other brains have - powers of look-ahead, primarily. We can understand our position in the world, we can see the future, we can understand where we came from. We know that we’re here. No buffalo knows it’s a buffalo, but we jolly well know that we’re members of Homo sapiens, and it’s the knowledge that we have and the can-do, our capacity to think ahead and to reflect and to evaluate and to evaluate our evaluations, and evaluate the grounds for our evaluations.

It’s this expandable capacity to represent reasons that we have that gives us a soul. But what’s it made of? It’s made of neurons. It’s made of lots of tiny robots. And we can actually explain the structure and operation of that kind of soul, whereas an eternal, immortal, immaterial soul is just a metaphysical rug under which you sweep your embarrassment for not having any explanation.”

-- Dennett

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 19:56:34 2015 No.6057189

>>6055373
>Describe me the procedure for accessing one's consciousness.
The act of thinking consists of accessing consciousness. The act of speaking is a disclosure of consciousness. Thought is only possible and is essentially synonymous with consciousness. It is the objectively present side of subjectivity.
>Thus one of the substances (matter or mind) cannot co-exist, is nonexistent, and hence physicalism is right.
Have you read the Monadology? Does the notion of a preestablished harmony irritate you because it isn't materialism?

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 19:58:30 2015 No.6057200

>>6057107
Dawkins' selfish gene is great, his 'philosophy' is kindergarten-tier, Hitchens was an autistic rabble-rouser, Harris has no self-awareness whatsoever and is currently making megabuxx off of gullible people and snorting cocaine in people's living rooms.

Dennett is legit tho, if a little clumsy at times

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 20:20:41 2015 No.6057326 >>6057200 Harris seems more like the MDMA-type to me..

>>	Anonymous Mon Jan 26 20:30:44 2015 No.6057384 >>6057107 Its one of the better philosophy threads /lit/ has seen in a while. Thanks.

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 20:46:53 2015 No.6057446

>>6057144
That's not a statement, but a category that both Physicalism and Idealism happen to fall into.

It is true that certain members of Physicalism and Idealism satisfy the statements "Physicalism is Monism" and "Idealism is Monism", but that doesn't mean that they are identical theories. For them to be identical you would have to demonstrate that all statements of Physicalism are isomorphic to all statements of Idealism.

I'm afraid you will have to be more elaborate than that.

>>6057189
>The act of thinking consists of accessing consciousness
No; thinking = retrieval of concepts that are rooted in memory. You are not accessing any extra thing in addition to that.

>The act of speaking is a disclosure of consciousness.
No; it is a disclosure of being relatively literate.

>Thought is only possible and is essentially synonymous with consciousness. It is the objectively present side of subjectivity.
Do you have a worked-out theory behind these claims?

>Does the notion of a preestablished harmony irritate you because it isn't materialism?
It's certainly vague, until it is explained within a given theory. Since I haven't read much Leibniz, you will have to either define it by yourself or cite Leibniz.

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 21:12:48 2015 No.6057554

>>6057446
>monism etc.
I don't really know what to say. I'm just drawn to the symmetry of being able to describe everything causally linked to the physical world as necessarily a part of it by virtue of that interaction. If souls were proven to be a measurable part of the brain, then souls would have to be physical in order for them to interact with physical things.
Similarly, if our phenomenology would have such a symmetrical structure (described above) as to by our own volition causally interact with things outside of our phenomena, then by virtue of that interaction the outside world would have to be part of our phenomenal domain. If we will things into the world, the world and the source of our will have to be made of the same fundamental stuff.

Maybe it's pleb-tier or fallacious, but I merely liked the symmetry of this reasoning.

Anonymous Mon Jan 26 21:35:21 2015 No.6057657

>>6057554
>If souls were proven to be a measurable part of the brain, then souls would have to be physical in order for them to interact with physical things.
Souls by definition are immaterial; unless you stipulate a new, unorthodox meaning of the term, it is wholly inconsistent to claim that "Behold! We have measured the first soul!".

>I'm just drawn to the symmetry of being able to describe everything causally linked to the physical world as necessarily a part of it by virtue of that interaction.
You might be interested in this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conceptualism#Conceptualism_and_perceptual_experience
and the works of someone like Carnap (e.g. The Logical Structure of the World) and Quine's view of mathematical objects. My own view, although still half-baked and not much worked-out, leans towards a mixture of McDowell and someone like Carnap.

>Similarly, if our phenomenology would have such a symmetrical structure (described above) as to by our own volition causally interact with things outside of our phenomena, then by virtue of that interaction the outside world would have to be part of our phenomenal domain. If we will things into the world, the world and the source of our will have to be made of the same fundamental stuff.
Since I am exhausted, I won't pretend I comprehended this. Seems a bit all over the place.

Anonymous Tue Jan 27 05:32:49 2015 No.6059259

>>6057554
Almost.

Chalmers attempts to set up a coherent alternative to emergentist philosophy of mind. Chalmers accepts the alternative because of a problem he sets up, which basically asks WHY perception occurs, even after explaining HOW it works.

This is supposed to be related to philosophy of mind, but he takes the position that consciousness in humans must still emerge, as it is more complex than that of say, atoms, and therefore wouldn't interfere or preempt the work of neuro-scientists working on understanding human consciousness. So its not really relevant to them.

BUT there is one major difference: That question earlier, of why. Non-panpsychists would have to answer it, and so would neuro-scientists. Its very clearly a stupid question, as it could be applied to all causal forces, so it should be ignored.

So yeah, Chalmers sets up a stupid question so he has the grounds be an imaginative special snowflake. The work of analytic philosophers is frequently showing that someone is playing a stupid game like this, the same way other mathematicians reduce an equation to its most elegant formulation, devoid of unneeded concerns.

>>	Anonymous Tue Jan 27 05:38:06 2015 No.6059266 >>6054796 He's the only member for new atheism that isn't a complete dick. Which begs the question, what's the point of new atheism without massive cocks?

Anonymous Tue Jan 27 05:56:50 2015 No.6059297

>>6057384
Whether it's for Analytic or Continental, I feel like /lit/ can get good Philosophy topics only if it's on a specific Philosopher or a specific concept of theirs. I've seen some good Heidegger and Deleuze threads, and good threads for Analytics as well, but it always comes about out of this requirement for a very focused topic. Kind of speaks to how easy it can be to sidetrack these kinds of discussions, which is kind of what i'm doing right now.

>>	Anonymous Tue Jan 27 10:30:43 2015 No.6059905 >>6059266 He is a massive dick, he just doesn't show it so much in public. His writing about other philosophers is very cunty.

Anonymous Tue Jan 27 10:51:24 2015 No.6059943

>>6057446
>memory
An aspect of the mind, which must be conscious in order to access embedded concepts.
>No; it is a disclosure of being relatively literate.
No unconscious being can speak, barring computers and parrots, which are conscious to a lesser degree than human beings are.
>definition
Preestablished harmony is the doctrine that there is a connection established by God between this world and the metaphysical world. Occasionalism is the doctrine according to which the mind and the body never interact but only seem to. Compare this to Cartesian dualism, which holds that there must be a physical connection between the mind and the body.
>>6057657
He's basically talking about absolute idealism.

>>	Anonymous Tue Jan 27 10:52:45 2015 No.6059951 >>6059259 >HURR DON'T ASK WHY THJNGS WORK JUST ACCEPT IT STEMfaggot ideology at its absolute purest.

>>	Anonymous Tue Jan 27 10:56:05 2015 No.6059962 >>6054796 Iterruptor

>>	Anonymous Tue Jan 27 11:42:16 2015 No.6060142 >>6059297 I feel like this is kind of true of philosophy discussions in general, in real life too. If someone just tries to start something like "what do you guys think of analytical philosophy??" anyone can say pretty much anything.

>>	Anonymous Tue Jan 27 15:21:14 2015 No.6060912 See Caspar Hare and Benj Hellie. Though Dennett is a distinguished thinker and certainly shouldn't be discarded outright. He's just wrong about a few things

>>	Anonymous Tue Jan 27 18:01:19 2015 No.6061564 >>6054859 TOP FUCKING HAHA

>>	Anonymous Tue Jan 27 18:11:55 2015 No.6061598 >>6054859 >If there is no meaning (read: reference) Basically every philosopher of the 20th century wants a word

>>	Anonymous Tue Jan 27 18:29:57 2015 No.6061683 >>6061564 Please spell it out. >>6061598 >20th century philosophy >relevant Also, cite examples. And experimental results, for their discovery of consciousness. I'll wait.

>>	Anonymous Tue Jan 27 19:18:04 2015 No.6061897 >>6059951 add a hat meme for maximum argument

>>	Anonymous Tue Jan 27 19:22:49 2015 No.6061931 File: 116 KB, 615x922, 1422403555939.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] >>6054859

>>	Anonymous Tue Jan 27 19:23:19 2015 No.6061935 >>6060912 Such as..? No snark; genuinely curious.

>>	Anonymous Tue Jan 27 19:26:32 2015 No.6061949 >>6061931 Someone award this man.

Anonymous Tue Jan 27 19:36:06 2015 No.6061986

>>6061931
Potkek is not topkek, but a member of topkek, in the sense that it is a creative synthesis that retains certain characteristics of topkek and should not be confused with topkek itself, which holds all creative syntheses of topkek. So, category error.

Hilarious comic nevertheless. How much time did you spend making that?

>>	Anonymous Tue Jan 27 19:48:28 2015 No.6062040 >>6061683 >>relevant Good God.

>>	Anonymous Tue Jan 27 20:03:21 2015 No.6062105 >>6061986 We have top topkek researchers working around the clock on this.

>>	Anonymous Wed Jan 28 03:39:44 2015 No.6063702 File: 133 KB, 1000x832, 1413212184156.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] >>6054859 I Keked mate, keep it coming!

Anonymous Wed Jan 28 03:58:41 2015 No.6063720

>>6061986
Potkek has traits of topkek despite being a negation of topkek. Think of it in the Hegalian sense: If I have potkek in topkek, I can recognize that topkek is really nothing without potkek. However since topkek itself is much more prevalent than potkek, we can assume a double negation where potkek's influence is felt without potkek even being referenced or seen.

Also, when I react to something with "topkek, m8" what am I really saying? That my m8 is topkek, that his actions contain topkek, or that topkek is what he has invoked? Is "m8" the modifier that changes the entire landscape of topkek?

>>	Anonymous Wed Jan 28 04:09:36 2015 No.6063735 File: 50 KB, 404x350, potlel.gif [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] >>6063720 potlel, m8

>>	Anonymous Wed Jan 28 08:02:42 2015 No.6064139 >>6061935 Any attempt to dismiss experience is automatically a failure. Not going to argue about this btw because that would be stupid and pointless

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