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/lit/ - Literature

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5249694 No.5249694 [Reply] [Original]

Does /lit/ believe in free will?

>> No.5249700

>>5249694
Yes.

>> No.5249706

>>5249700

If so, why?

>> No.5249707

free will is an illusion

>> No.5249708

not a retarded christfag so no

>> No.5249729

I was told by an atheist in another thread that free will was scientificly proven to be bullshit. He didn't explain himself but you know he's right because atheists devote every waking hour to science.

>> No.5249740

>>5249694
what difference does it make?

>> No.5249746

>>5249740

We may not have free will, but we may still experience existence in its truest and unhidden form

>> No.5249760

Compatibilism ftw.

>> No.5249762

The conditions (structure, density, literally every single fragment of information) at the instant of the beginning of the Universe determined every piece of information and its spatial coordinates at every unit of time.

Probability is humanity's way to cope with the fact that we cannot know or calculate everything. When you flip a coin, in our perspective there is a 50/50 chance it will land on heads or tails. Objectively (as opposed to subjectively: "'probability' is a human subjectification") the side the coin will land on is determined prior to the event (and prior to this, and prior to that, and it goes on and on to the all-deciding singularity) by the force, angle, position of the toss and the plethora of other physical factors. Humans can't perfectly calculate any of this, so we estimate, hence probability.

>> No.5249769

>>5249762
Thank you. Probability is in the mind. It's amazing how many people don't understand this.

>>5249760
Elaboration: http://www.reddit.com/r/HPMOR/comments/1l8scq/determenism_and_you/cc62w3t

LessWrong hate please go; it's on a LW subreddit but the author of this post isn't a LWer (read the comments).

>> No.5249771

>>5249746
and how is that any different from a less-true and more obscured form of existence?

>> No.5249775

>>5249706
I just do. I'm not well-versed in philosophy or debating so I can't defend my position.

>> No.5249789

>>5249775
Me too. It's basically that plus people like >>5249708 get mad over it, so there's some additional fun in it.

>> No.5249790

>>5249771

I guess it depends on whether or not you like to be able to see without water irritating your eyes

>> No.5249795

>>5249694
It's nonsense. It's a false dichotomy based on two contradictory but cheerfully coexisting Christian beliefs.

God made everything and is the boss of everything, But we disobey him and he has to punish us. Why, if he's our boss by nature?
Uh... Uh... He decided not to get what he wants and to jump through various hoops instead, inventing hell, flooding the entire planet in sheer disgust, etc. because, uh... "free will" is a thing. Despite the fact that being independent of the universe and its physical laws would make us godlets.

In Christianity, these logically contradicting ideas coexist in serene stupidity. When cultural Christians start doin' all that thinky-think book learnin', they pick one and deny the other. They still keep the whole package, though.
They believe that there's still a sky boss, just call it "causality" instead of "big daddy who roll on rimz a thunda," and they believe that if he controls everything, then logically they are his bitch. Oh no, determinism! Fatalism! Rest your hand on your forehead, gaze in anguish at the moon! We are but puppets! Ah, woe!

Contrariwise, the mushy C.S. Lewis types pick "free will," but since the idea of beng godlets is too much to accept unless you're an /x/ regular, they accept the sky daddy and just water down Christianity some more.

The idea that physical laws effect us physical creatures is completely moot unless you believe that either individuals or Domino #1 are gods who impose these laws.

>> No.5249810

>>5249760
Compatibilism is annoying in the sense that it's seemingly contradictory, but slides by on the fact that the definitions are changed prior to making the argument. It's like saying "(definition of apple has been changed to meaning orange spherical citrus fruit) Apples are oranges". Technically you are right in the context of your argument, but apples aren't fucking oranges you twat.

>> No.5249825

>>5249795
Didn't Kant believe in free will? Is biological determinism its modern day opposing philosophy?

>> No.5249828

I don't know.

>> No.5249863

>>5249825
I can't speak on Kant. I'm reasonably sure he was one of those watery, half-hearted theists that used to be so common.

"Providence guides us."
*strokes moustache, gazes at sunset with chin at right angle to neck. Hat falls off.*

True biological determinism has no angst; if you're free from the religious personalisation of physics you should not feel confined or bossed around by your own body, instincts, whatever. That's a disease of self-consciousness, a useful tool that becomes a cancerous growth.

>> No.5249872

I liked the scene where they released the whale into the ocean.

>> No.5249892

what exactly does "free will" mean? kind of important to have that clear in order to give an answer

>> No.5249897

>>5249694
i believe in free will within the sandbox of knowing there's no free will.

i can understand, rationally, that all the evidence points to a deterministic universe and that's what i think is true, at the same time I accept that men were never made to not believe, or to be capable not to believe, in free will; so i accept that free will will always be a reality, for me - for all practical purposes.

>> No.5249904

Can a machine have free will?

>> No.5249940

No and yes. On a macroscopic level, I believe everything is entirely deterministic, and also that, despite the evident 'uncertainty' underlying quantum physic, the subatomic world abides by a certain set of principles that effectively causes it to be deterministic as well. However, in the same sense that meaning can be synthesized by seemingly meaningless things in our lives and world (think overman and existentialism (though I know they dont necessarily go together)), I believe that free will can be perceived to exist, though as an illusion. If you put your mind to something, you can realize it. However, everything you are and think is determined by external or predetermined information such as your DNA and your upbringing. Stimuli causes successive cascades of other stimuli to thereby effect itself and others. A bit like Marshal McCluhan's quote: "we shape our tools and in turn our tools shape us." Cause and effect do not lie on a one way street; they are far more blurred and indistinguishable from one another than people think, for time can be a deceptive specter. Anyway, in short, as I first mentioned, free will does not exist but in the gullible minds of man.

>> No.5249956

Free from what?

>> No.5249961

>>5249940

Despite the fact that I wrote this, I'm going to go ahead and preemptively (because I will it) say:

/thread

>> No.5249964

"Man can indeed do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wants".

>> No.5250012

>>5249964
Ol' Shoppy has always been a golden nugget in a river of shit.

>> No.5250026
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5250026

No, mfw.

>> No.5250034

>>5249940
>>5249961
Absolute tripe, you fuck face.
If free will is an illusion it doesn't exist. So your "yes and no" at the beginning is fucking stupid, as is your deceptive spectre shite and your guillible minds malarkey. shithead

>> No.5250042

>>5249790
I still don't see what the difference is.

>Fee will exists
>business as usual
>Free will doesn't exist
>business as usual

>> No.5250064

>>5250042
A lack of free will is very disturbing for people who like to call everyone's suffering their own fault.

>> No.5250081

>>5249789
>u MAD trolld u
holy shit you're an idiot

>> No.5250121

>tfw my crotch is concealed behind a library desk
>tfw i unzip my pants and air out my sweaty cock in the study area
>tfw i believe in free willy

>> No.5250158
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5250158

>>5249872

>> No.5250166

No, for free will to exist it must have the ability to generate true randomness which is most likely impossible.

>> No.5250170

>>5249872

>> No.5250197

>>5250034

I explained, albeit possibly poorly, that free will exists as much as meaning exists. Existence is sometimes limited to perception and thought, think intellectual property, and so sometimes you can translate what's in your head into reality (which btw is iffy in itself in terms of existence) which i've *chosen* to do by writing this (or have I?). And if you disagree with that then you're engaging in a completely separate ontological argument. Anyway, just telling me my explanation was utter *malarky without providing an explanation yourself is hardly worth acknowledging. So if you have any specific objections to what I've said other than mentioning my loose use of the 'yes and no' (which you're fair to criticize) then please share them, because otherwise you just sound like a whiny, labeling simpleton.

>> No.5250215

There are neurological cases for libertarian free will, as well as philosophical. Yes, I believe that we make decisions, to an extend. I believe that our free will is very week, I mean, our decisions are highly influenced by our environment.

>> No.5250221

>>5250215
>There are neurological cases for libertarian free will
Nah.

>> No.5250226

>>5250215
which cases would that be?

>> No.5250231

The belief in free-will is the main reason people have difficulty empathizing with others.

While there still isn't concrete evidence for determinism, there's way more for it than free-will, the proponents of the latter using the "I feel free, therefore I am" argument popularized by S. Johnson which obviously is bullshit.

Irregardless, and as many other anons have pointed out in this thread and others, we must function as if free-will exists whether or not it does.

>> No.5250233

>>5249762
>2014
>still thinking the universe had a "beginning"
Good grief.

>> No.5250240
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5250240

>Does /lit/ believe in free will?

hm. interesting question. i'll let you know once i've decided.

>> No.5250254

>>5250221
>>5250226
I'm not super well read in consciousness and phenomenology, but I have read this book called The Neural Basis of Free Will by Peter Ulric Tse. Here's an MIT page for it: http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/neural-basis-free-will

>> No.5250266

>>5249762
>2014
>Doesn't understand the basics of quantum physics
If the universe were deterministic, why is its overall entropy increasing?

>> No.5250271

>>5249694
yes, i'm not a reformatted schwein

>> No.5250274

pic unrelated, only there to get your attention.

Read Voltaire's brief entry on free will.

http://history.hanover.edu/texts/voltaire/volfrewi.html

He basically says that there is no such thing as will, only desire.

Try framing the argument that way and a theory of action might make a bit more sense.

It's like Frankfurt's first and second-order desires-- viz., first-order as desire for things, second-order as desire for desires.

Have a blast

Also, Hume on the topic is fascinating. If you want, respond to my post and we can discuss this. Don't really feel like typing some huge autistic rant of a post about freedom and necessity.

>> No.5250275

>>5250254
Protip: when a neuroscientist is talking about free will, he's mixing up absolute freedom with metacognitions and self-examination that produce the feeling of being in control.

>> No.5250280

Before you existed, you didn't.

Non-existing things can't act.

Therefore the coming into existence was per definition not your own choice.

Therefore everything you do is causally related to that one event that you didn't will.

Therefore nothing you will is on your own account, it's the direct consequence of an event outside your control.

Therefore free will doesn't exist.

>> No.5250285

>>5250280
Interesting argument, and I encourage the spirit of philosophy in you, but consider this:

Does causation necessarily imply that, temporally speaking, the one event (cause) preceded the other (effect)?

>> No.5250296

>>5250275
Except that Tse isn't doing that; he's focusing on the blockage of NDMA receptors by singular particles, i.e. quantum activity. It's not about the feeling of being in control.

Sidenote: Even if the universe wasn't deterministic, that doesn't prove free will to exist; the two aren't mutually inclusive. Even if quantum events are random, we've no concrete proof that they control neural activity.

>> No.5250302

>>5250285
Are you suggesting that I should consider the possibility that I willed myself into existence because time doesn't linear?

>> No.5250303

willy means cock or whale

>> No.5250339

>>5250280
The cause-and-effect relationship of human decision making should be observed from the moment the decision is made. The factor of the decision maker's birth isn't any different than the options he is granted, ergo your argument is of the same basis as "free will doesn't exist, because a person can't do something impossible".

>> No.5250434

Purushartha is basically the understanding in Indian Philosophy and its basically freewill. Many people seek out pleasure but then others like security. However, one might one pursue the life that benefits life the most. That pursuit is called Dharma. To practice Dharma you have to perform sattvik karmAni or ameliorating actions[1].
Liberation from the gross and subtle elements that individuals are bound by is the most superb pursuit. In the case of liberation you become the underpinning of everything rather than individual forms in it.
[1] - being a dharmic person is basically following karma yoga.

>> No.5250481

No, I'm not retarded.

>> No.5250509

Many people here seem to make a determinism -- free will dichotomy. In fact, there is also the option of randomness, which is the way it really is

>> No.5250523

Can there be such thing as "unfree will"? If a will isn't free, then is it a will?

>> No.5250605

>>5249694

I won't even read the thread. I bet my ass it's fully of mentally challenged teenagers who read "determinism" on wikipedia and deduced from their asses that incompatibilism is obviously true.

>> No.5250651

>>5250605
You owe me one ass

>> No.5250660

>>5249729

actually science points towards an indeterminate universe

>> No.5250668

>>5250605
So will I be picking up your ass or will you mail it?

>> No.5250744

My thoughts on free will:

1) an imposition of absolute mechanicality on the necessary infiniteness of existence, is ridiculous

2) an imposition of pure randomness on the order that is human life, is ridiculous

3) god exists, be he/it random or otherwise. human experience could very well be a product of absolute random, but order occurring randomly -- no moment might be real but this moment, there may never have been a past, never will there be a future, just that randomness has aligned to make a reality in this one divine instant/state. God may be consciousness, who knows

4) ultimately, the question holds no significance but that some would like to cast off responsibility

>> No.5250745

Instinctivism is the only way

>> No.5250766

>>5250744
5) we may very well all be sparks of consciousness molding material around us

>> No.5250824

It depends on how you define free will/freedom.

"Even birds are chained to the sky." shit

If you look at it in a scientific way we are determined by our genes, parents, people surrounding us, place where we live, what age we live in, context etc. And all our decisions are made on the fundaments of these. Some say being aware of the influences gives room for being free. Some say this getting aware is also determined by genes and context etc.

Another sound comes from for example the virtue ethics/ life-art who look at it the other way and say if you get to know yourself as best as you can, you can make decisions that are the closest with yourself as you can get and thereby being free in a way.

>> No.5250827

I think free will suffers from the same problem that theological noncognitivism pins on the concept of God

On one hand it's supposed to be some mysterious property that allows people to make wildly different choices in the exact same situation for no reason whatsoever; on the other hand it's the only thing that separates us from automatons and gives us any real responsibility. There's a reason why people separate into compatibilist and noncompatibilist camps and it's because we can't agree what the bloody thing is

>> No.5250856

>>5250827
>no reason whatsoever
I do, because I love. Do you confine my love to materialism? Is this *sensible*?

>> No.5250862

>>5250856
Do you love strawberries enough to have chosen them over blueberries if you picked blueberries the first time?

>> No.5250867

>>5250856
You know, the blind followers of Christianity may indeed be dumb, but the religion itself is pretty much the most profound thing that we know.

>> No.5250875

I can will myself to do stuff; hence there is free will.
Things follow the rules of cause and effect; hence determinism is true.

Welp. Seems we're done here.
/end thread

>> No.5250879

>>5249762
>we cannot know or calculate everything
>declares the supremacy of Newtonian physics

I'm actually laughing.

>all-deciding singularity
Maybe you're trying to make me laugh?

>> No.5250880

>>5250827
>people
I should clarify that I mean "a person." I'm referring to the idea that free will means that you could have done otherwise even though all the factors that caused you to do what you did are still present.

>> No.5250881

>>5250862
You confine experience to the material? This is to impose absolute mechanicality on infinity, which is absurd.

>> No.5250892

>>5250881
Do you love 4chan enough to have chosen thinking about my post rather than about the sublimity of mathematics

>> No.5250921

>>5250892
You're strawmanning. I don't deny human ordering, but the denial of consideration otherwise. Is your love of 4chan finite in size?

>> No.5250925

>>5250280
That's cute, but the assumption that environmental conditions and one's own existence are unchanging is unfounded.

>> No.5250938

>>5250921
>but the denial of consideration otherwise
I didn't deny that though, your denial of my denial is in error
>Is your love of 4chan finite in size?
yes

>> No.5250943

>>5250938
>yes
And now we're onto the sublimity of mathematics. I wonder what Zeno would say about your answer here.

>> No.5250959

>>5250943
I'm not sure if the greeks believed that all instances of love were infinite

>> No.5250964

It is easy to say, "I care only because these cares have been put in me, they are not my own," but with a little further consideration one will find that their cares are infinitely their own. There is no point to a thing where it becomes something else's. And such is the sublimity of mathematics.

>> No.5250966

>>5250925
Why would I assume they are unchanging? How is that necessary for my argument?

>> No.5250971

>>5250959
Perhaps they did not apply their paradoxes to feelings, but the absurdity of infinity holds true there too. Christianity certainly did though.

>> No.5251039

>>5250966
It sounds an awful lot like you are arguing that because one instance of a person's life was outside their control, then all instances are outside their control. If not, please say more about your ideas.

>> No.5251064

>>5251039
At which point do you think you become an unmoved mover?

>> No.5251079

>>5251064
This question works better the other way around.

>> No.5251083

>>5249729
But do you believe in the atheist?

>> No.5251100

>>5250215
>There are neurological cases for libertarian free will, as well as philosophical. Yes, I believe that we make decisions, to an extend. I believe that our free will is very week, I mean, our decisions are highly influenced by our environment.
There are neurological cases to be made for free will, as well as philosophical.
"Yes, I believe that our free will is very weak - I mean, our decisions are highly influenced by our environment."

>> No.5251140
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5251140

>>5249694

I believe everyone has agency. But not everyone believes they have agency. So they dont take responsibility for their own life, and therefore revoke their own free will.

Ofcourse there are some things you cannot control. There are going to be walls put there by others, but you still decided what you do with those walls.

>> No.5251166

>believing in things
>believing in things people can't even give a definition of
>believing in things people can't even give a definition of for which there is an extremely large emotional incentive to do so
yeah no

>> No.5251170

>>5251100
Your actions are also your experience.
>dubs
>God is what everyone is an no one wants to admit to being.
>>5251166
>dubs

>> No.5251447

>>5251064
Do you think your parents fucking is determining the words that you are typing?

>> No.5251498

>>5249694

I think that within this temporal plane we do have a certain degree of it. Re: this anon's mention of "agency" -
>>5251140

But on a macro level free will doesn't exist, it would preclude an otherness to the fold that seems fundamentally against life to me.

The need to insist on free will is born from human ego, the natural order has no need for it and doesn't know it.

>> No.5251505

>>5249892

Here's three definitions, use them both to estimate where the basic concept falls:

>the capacity, in having made a choice, to have chosen otherwise in identical circumstances (where 'identical' does not mean 'really really similar' but *literally* identical ie the exact same circumstances - imagine a remote control that lets you rewind time, rather than a series of circumstances that appear similar but are temporally distinct).

>the existence of choices made by causal agents not arising exclusively from the influence of prior circumstances

>the characteristic of moral agents which allows them to be held culpable for their actions

>> No.5251524

>>5250197
>I explained, albeit possibly poorly, that free will exists as much as meaning exists.

Yeah, but that's dumb. Meaning exists where people believe it exists, because meaning is far better understood as 'something that people do' than as 'a quality objects possess'.

The fact of perceiving meaning is what creates meaning. The same can't at all be said for 'free will'.

>> No.5251532

>>5250744

1, 2 and 3 are false and 4 is just Bulverism. Your thoughts aren't worth much, sorry.

>> No.5251537

>>5250875
>I can will myself to do stuff; hence there is will.

Fixed. Amazing how many people get this wrong.

>> No.5251548

Doesn't us being self aware beings sort of imply we have free will, at the very least to a small degree?

>> No.5251554

>>5251548

No. Why would it? What is it about "self-aware beings" that you feel implies "capable of uncaused action"?

>> No.5251584

>>5251532
Sure they are.

>> No.5251618

If I had freewill I wouldn't be on this fucking website.

>> No.5251646

I choose to believe in free will,
why would I choose to believe in anything else?

>> No.5251657

This is one of the easiest philosophy questions out there. Just closely watch the Matrix and you'll get it.

If you want the really effortless version, here's the summary:

The default state for the natural world is deterministic fatalism. This is also the default state for humans the majority of the time--we are directed by our brains toward the ideal "decisions" for our continued survival. However, it is possible for humans, by rote of our self-awareness, to occasionally transcend/beat the system and make a truly independent decision by sheer force of will.

Any other explanation is philosopher's babble which is best ignored.

>> No.5251659
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5251659

>>5249694

Everything is determined by genetics and be environment.

Your belief is jesus is determined by culture, and environment. If you were born in the middle east, you would be a muslim.

>> No.5251663

>>5251659

by environment*

belief in jesus*

>> No.5251668

>>5249694

The middle east being muslim and the west being christian just shows that there is no free-will with regard to religion.

Your location location determines what religion you are. That shows that free-will does not exist.

>> No.5251672

>>5251659
Think of how many assumptions this point of view rests on. Your words are empty, anon.

>> No.5251679

>>5251672

What assumptions are those?

That the majority of people in the middle east are muslim? That's a fact. That's not an assumption.

>> No.5251684

>>5251554
Just that the thought that we're aware of our actions yet, ultimately we're unable to make a difference seems like a fate worse than death.

Well every action has a cause and effect so I can't possibly say anything is "capable of uncaused action", but with self awareness comes our ability to think about ourselves and our place in the grand scheme of things, and with that comes our ability to rationalize.

Don't these two things give us free will? The power to choose what to do or not to do.
Does not believing in free will eventually make you believe that we have no control over our lives, even in the most mundane tasks and decision?

>> No.5251690

>>5251679
You're just a pair of eyes in eye socket, anon, and I am the devil.

>> No.5251716

>>5251618
You do you're just weak willed.

>> No.5251721

>>5251657
>to occasionally transcend/beat the system and make a truly independent decision by sheer force of will.

"Our will is sometimes free by dint of its intensity."

No.

Your mistake is in confusing the general case of what determines our actions - the selected-for propensity to choose the course of action most compatible with survival - with the general case of the fact of our actions' being determined.

You should imagine not those cases where 'the brain' successfully guides us to a course of action resulting in survival, but rather those cases where it fails - suicide, self-sacrifice, monumental stupidity of the Darwin Award variety. Here, we can see that what you characterise as the engine of determinism - the brain's function in guiding us to survival - has failed. Yet there is nothing in these cases to suppose they are non-deterministic. A failure of neurochemostasis, an excess (by the standards of survival) of pseudofilial attachment, a deficiency of computational capacity - these are all causes. These are all causes external to the in-the-moment act of choosing and so are entirely reconcilable with free will's non-existence.

>>5251684
>Don't these two things give us free will? The power to choose what to do or not to do.

Nobody disputes that we have 'the power to choose'. The issue is whether our choices are free or arise solely from prior conditions.

>Does not believing in free will eventually make you believe that we have no control over our lives, even in the most mundane tasks and decision?

Yes.

>> No.5251732 [DELETED] 

unfavorable, or you could just drift.

>> No.5251763
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5251763

Undecidable, but a necessary postulate for practical reason.

I say this every single thread. No one listens.

>> No.5251782

This entry-level philosophy question gets asked every day. I know the debate can go farther than me just saying this, but: whether free will or determinism exists doesn't matter because the universe will occur the same way.

The only actual argument that somewhat uses free will and determinism is this common political debate about 'where crime begins'. Basically, this debate wants you to imagine a poor and generally uneducated neighborhood with a high crime rate. The debate wants you to decide if the crime rate is a result of the type of neighborhood, or if the neighborhood is the result of the high crime rate. If you believe the crime rate to be a product of the neighborhood, you believe (or tend to believe) in determinism, and vice versa.

>> No.5251822

>>5251721
>The issue is whether our choices are free or arise solely from prior conditions.
So you think free will could be an illusion which masks our decisions which are predetermined from prior conditions?

What about meditation? A decision to do nothing but exist?

>Yes.
Than that would mean our existence is entirely deterministic and we're just going along for the ride, but if someone was to reject that notion and do what they wanted, or at least what they thought they wanted, wouldn't they then be in some form of control of their own actions?

Doesn't the illusion of control liberate us in a way from being controlled?

We are who we are due mostly to the sum of our experiences, but I believe we get to a point in which we can dictate which direction we go.

>> No.5251834

>>5251782
>If you believe the crime rate to be a product of the neighborhood, you believe (or tend to believe) in determinism, and vice versa.
What if you believe in a bit of both. A viscous cycle?

>> No.5251844

>>5251763
>but a necessary postulate for practical reason.
as in?

I'm listening anon.

My question is does it matter if the results are the same?

>> No.5251847

Yes, in a kantian sense.

>> No.5251863

>>5251822
>What about meditation? A decision to do nothing but exist?

I don't understand the question, but in general terms, I don't believe the question is empirically determinable, so I don't think there's any specific instance you could offer that would actually give me pause (as I would not expect a committed libertarian to be pushed to doubt by some specific instance I might offer).

>Than that would mean our existence is entirely deterministic and we're just going along for the ride, but if someone was to reject that notion and do what they wanted, or at least what they thought they wanted, wouldn't they then be in some form of control of their own actions?

No. See >>5251524
>The fact of perceiving meaning is what creates meaning. The same can't at all be said for 'free will'.

>Doesn't the illusion of control liberate us in a way from being controlled?

It liberates us from the perception of being controlled. Whether the knowledge of being determined is psychically taxing varies from person to person (and within a lifetime, it varies within people, too).

>>5251844
>as in?

I assume he means 'necessary' in that you don't think the correct response to understanding free will doesn't exist is to abolish incarceration for people who like to, say, kill and eat children.

>> No.5251885

>>5251863
Does it matter if the result is going to be the same?

IS the belief in free will like believing in god? Something that gives certain people comfort?


Not trying to be edgy just only comparison that comes to mind.

>> No.5251898

>>5251834
If you believe that the criminals are to blame for the bad neighborhood, then you would likely believe that improving security, like police and prisons, is how to repair this "vicious cycle".

If you believe that the bad neighborhood is to blame for the criminals, then you improve the neighborhood through a variety of means, usually improving education, economy, or recreational places.

If you believe in a little bit of both, then I guess you believe that there should be an improvement in both the security and the development of the neighborhood, but attempting to focus on both can be difficult.

>> No.5251903

>>5251863

Please don't speak for me.

>>5251844

To put it a little too simply, the entire concept of moral action is incoherent without the presupposition of a free will. If there were no free will, we could not deem an action, even an action wholly consistent with practical maxims, as "good" or "bad" (i.e. worthy of sanction), as the cause (the "agent") of that action (or maybe we want to call it merely an event) cannot be considered responsible for it. It is simply one event in a series of events. There's no inconsistency in thinking of the world as such, but to do so removes absolutely all possibility of moral action.

>> No.5251913

>>5251898
So it's a question on nature or nurture?

>> No.5251921

>>5251913
Yes, but it links back to free will and determinism. Really, I feel like all things will link back to this argument eventually, as its the most basic ("entry-level") of philosophical beliefs.

>> No.5251943

>>5251885
>Does it matter if the result is going to be the same?

I know what you mean by this, but I think it's a poor phrasing.

>IS the belief in free will like believing in god? Something that gives certain people comfort?

Sure, it gives them comfort. That doesn't oblige me to mollycoddle them. I'm sure some people derive comfort from astrology, too (an unapologetically deterministic superstition, ironically) - should I pretend agnosticism on that front, too?

>>5251903
>to do so removes absolutely all possibility of moral action.

Which we care about because...?

>> No.5251961

>>5251943

You might not care. You'd be in the minority.

And actually, I was being a bit disingenuous--it is a bit inconsistent to believe in determinism. Or, rather, it's inconsistent to believe in determinism and the possibility to make a theoretical judgement as to whether or not determinism is true.

>> No.5251972

>>5251943
You don't have to do anything.

>> No.5251985

>>5251961
>Or, rather, it's inconsistent to believe in determinism and the possibility to make a theoretical judgement as to whether or not determinism is true.

Go home, Alvin, you're drunk.

>> No.5252006

>>5251985

If you judge that determinism is true, you have contradicted a fundamental precept of determinism: that you have no power of judgement. Determinism holds, among many other things, that you will "believe" precisely what you are determined, by antecedent events, etc etc,. to "believe." So, if determinism is true, you cannot make a judgement as to whether it is true or not.

>> No.5252059

>>5252006
>a fundamental precept of determinism: that you have no power of judgement.

That is not a fundamental precept of determinism. Only your (ie, Plantinga's) insertion into the definition of 'judgement' of "oh by the way it's also a result of libertarian free will because I said so shut up not taking questions" can render 'judgement' inconsistent with 'determinism'.

My Casio calculator doesn't have free will. Are its operations therefore suspect?

>> No.5252112
File: 1.03 MB, 1500x1324, 1386480124401.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
5252112

>People ITT who believe in determinism

It's like they haven't moved past the late 19'th century.

>> No.5252125

>>5252112

For one thing, we use 'determinism' as shorthand for 'the non-existence of causa sui self-direction in conscious beings' and for another thing, it's recently become somewhat more controversial to claim that quantum theory disproves determinism.

>> No.5252130

>>5252059

I don't follow Plantinga in any of this. You are rather presumptuous.

The operations of your calculator are mechanical in a similar way to the operations of logic, so I can see where you might think "judgement" would be analogous to "calculation." But notice I used the term "belief." You can follow a chain of reasoning mechanically towards a conclusion, and if you're reasonable, you'll accept that conclusion if the whole argument is sound. But actually accepting a conclusion ("believing" such is the case)--the ability of which is part of what I would think we mean when we say someone has a power to judge--is not mechanical, for there isn't any rule, at that point, forcing your hand (assuming determinism is false). But there is a rule (the principle of causality, or however you want to put it) if we assume determinism is true. Therefore, if determinism is true, you cannot make a judgement as to the truth of the matter. Which is just to say, you have no choice in your beliefs.

I am not the one manipulating the extension of "judgment". You're the one arbitrarily restricting it so that it sits consistently with determinism.

>> No.5252206

>>5252130
>I don't follow Plantinga in any of this. You are rather presumptuous.

You say the things Plantinga says for the reasons that Plantinga says them. Whether you're aware of that or not is no concern of mine.

>But actually accepting a conclusion ("believing" such is the case)--the ability of which is part of what I would think we mean when we say someone has a power to judge--is not mechanical, for there isn't any rule, at that point, forcing your hand (assuming determinism is false). But there is a rule (the principle of causality, or however you want to put it) if we assume determinism is true. Therefore, if determinism is true, you cannot make a judgement as to the truth of the matter.

AKA "oh by the way it's also a result of libertarian free will because I said so shut up not taking questions"

'Judgement' is the process whereby we come to hold a particular belief, right? Now, my position is that judgement exists (spoiler alert: you agree with this position). We know that judgement exists because we experience the process of rendering judgement. Therefore judgement, like, for example, cars or trees, exists whether or not free will exists. Of course, since I am a person who does not believe in free will, my definition of judgement does not incorporate 'free will'. But it falls to you to justify your incorporation of it into your definition of 'judgement' - it's not my job to prove otherwise.

>Which is just to say, you have no choice in your beliefs.

I'm not certain that we would have a choice in our beliefs even if 'free will' existed. My experience of the formation and alteration of beliefs is not at all consistent with the illusory sense of free will I experience in choosing what flavour of ice-cream to eat, for example.

>> No.5252301

>>5252206

>AKA "oh by the way it's also a result of libertarian free will because I said so shut up not taking questions"

There's no "result" involved here. It's already contained in the concept of judgement as we've both, apparently, accepted. See below.

>'Judgement' is the process whereby we come to hold a particular belief, right?
>But it falls to you to justify your incorporation of it into your definition of 'judgement' - it's not my job to prove otherwise.
We are making the same claim about judgement, why should the onus fall to me?

>Since I am a person who does not believe in free will

This is the part where you beg the question. I've already shown the inconsistency in holding on the one hand that determinism is true, and on the other hand that you can form a belief about the veracity of determinism.

>We know that judgements exist because we experience the process of rendering judgement

This should be, for you, beside the point. Again, if determinism is true, you have no ability to "form a belief," i.e. accept that x is true, because the "formation" of that "belief" is determined by antecedent processes external to that event.

>> No.5252326

>>5252301
>We are making the same claim about judgement, why should the onus fall to me?

We are not making the same claim about judgement. I am making the claim that we experience a phenomenon whereby we form an attitude to a given proposition. You are making the claim that we experience that phenomenon and that this phenomenon arises as a result of free will.

So - if you prove to me that free will exists, I won't suddenly sit up and say "Well, by hell! Judgement does exist after all!" I posit the existence of judgement based on the fact that we experience and observe it. I make no direct claims about its nature.

You, on the other hand, do make a direct claim about its nature - you claim that it can only exist if free will exists. The burden of proof is always on the claimant.

>This should be, for you, beside the point. Again, if determinism is true, you have no ability to "form a belief," i.e. accept that x is true, because the "formation" of that "belief" is determined by antecedent processes external to that event.

Petitio principii. Stop repeating yourself.

>> No.5252330

>>5251447
Would I be typing them if my parents didn't fuck? I wouldn't. So yes, they have directly determined my typing.

>> No.5252393

>>5252326

Here's you:

>'Judgement' is the process whereby we come to hold a particular belief

I would say this is not exhaustive of judgement, but yes, judgment includes accepting that x be true, or to put it more imprecisely, that it allows us to "form beliefs." So ware making the same claim, in this regard.

The argument "if determinism is true, you have no ability to "form a belief," i.e. accept that x is true, because the "formation" of that "belief" is determined by antecedent processes external to that event" is not an appeal to principle. It follows from the doctrine of determinism. "Believing x to be true" is a state of affairs within a universal state of affairs. If the state of the universe at time C is determined by the state of affairs at time B, which was determined by the state of affairs at time A, and so on, then the "holding of belief x" is determined. It follows that every belief is determined.

>You are making the claim that we experience that phenomenon and that this phenomenon arises as a result of free will.

Again, I am not making the claim that it "arises" out of free will. The ability to judge, in the sense that we have both been using that term, presupposed a free will. Any appeal to the experience of "forming an attitude towards x" is superfluous, and actually begs the question (again), for how, exactly, or you "forming" that attitude?

>> No.5252480

>>5252393
>So ware making the same claim, in this regard.

We agree that we are describing the same phenomenon, which is trivial - we've always agreed that.

>It follows from the doctrine of determinism.

Only if you already accept that 'judgement' requires a non-determinist process, ie, insertion into its definition the stipulation 'arises from free will' ie petitio principii, ie for the love of god stop repeating yourself.

Put it this way - one way of disestablishing 'the doctrine of determinism' is to prove that certain phenomena arise without resulting from prior circumstances. The existence of that which is truly random satisfies this criterion.

So. Insert into the definition of judgement the proviso 'arises at least in part from a truly random process' and what do you find? That free will exists? No. Only that 'determinism' as it has been defined is false.

All you are doing is defining 'judgement' as 'something that needs free will' and daring me to prove you wrong. But it's not my job to prove you wrong, it's your job to prove yourself right.

I don't even posit classical determinism, I just express disbelief in the existence of traditionally-understood "free will". You need to get it into your head that you are the positive claimant here, not me. The burden of proof is squarely on me and definition is not proof.

>If the state of the universe at time C is determined by the state of affairs at time B, which was determined by the state of affairs at time A, and so on, then the "holding of belief x" is determined. It follows that every belief is determined.

Yah. This does not establish that beliefs do not exist, or that there exists no process whereby we come to hold beliefs, or that 'judgement' is an inappropriate label to affix to that process.

Consider, for example, 'asphyxiation'. This is the process whereby we cease to intake sufficient oxygen to maintain our existence. There are many circumstances which can lead to the inception of that process and many of them are entirely separate from us and even the most ardent libertarian could not hold but that they are entirely deterministic. Is it inappropriate to term these deterministic asphyxiations 'asphyxiation'?

You will obviously agree with me that it is not inappropriate. And why? Because you are not importing into the definition of 'asphyxiation' the proviso 'Must arise from a causa sui act of self-determination'.

>> No.5252491

>>5252480
>The burden of proof is squarely on me

lol. "On you", obv.

>> No.5252584

>>5252480

>We agree that we are describing the same phenomenon

Well, actually, I was under the impression that we were talking about a concept, i.e the concept of judgment. We both accepted that the power to judge includes the power to "form beliefs." You want to justify this in terms of experience. I contend there is no such need, as "the power to form beliefs" is contained within the concept "power of judgement." Our disagreement lies in how beliefs can be formed.

>[it follows] Only if you already accept that 'judgement' requires non-determinist processes.

No, actually, it doesn't. The "process" you want to call the "formation of beliefs" would have to be, given your acceptance of determinism, a deterministic process. The introduction of "truly random processes" adds nothing. Whether the "formation of belief x" is the result of an immediate causal chain, or if it is probabilistic, the result is the same--it is determined.

Certainly you could apply the label "judgement" to the end result of this deterministic process. But it would render the common sense understanding of that word unrecognizable. All you're doing, in effect, is playing a bit of Three Card Molly.

I have not "imported" anything into the concept "judgement." I have been using the term as it is most commonly understood. You, however, have "exported" everything meaningful out the concept, only so you can retain the term in your determinist argument. This is simply equivocation.

>> No.5252603

>>5252480
>I don't even posit classical determinism, I just express disbelief in the existence of traditionally-understood "free will". You need to get it into your head that you are the positive claimant here, not me. The burden of proof is squarely on me and definition is not proof.

We've actually been quibbling over a small tangent--my claim that theoretical judgement and determinism are incompatible. My primary claim about the status of moral action has not been touched.

>> No.5252629

There's no "free will" or determinism. Both are illusions of what is happening.

Sometimes you become aware of the drives that triumph over others in you and you think to yourself "this is freedom, my force upon something else".
Other times you become aware of the drives that others are triumphing over in you and you think to yourself "this is necessity, some other force upon me".

When mind believes in free will he wants to take credit for those strong drives.
When mind believes in determinism his drives are weak and this is his excuse.

But in reality there is no free or non-free will. There is only will as such.

>> No.5252632

>>5252480
>>5252584

I also think a lot of our disagreement is stemming from your confusion of empirical processes and a priori conditions. Free will is an a priori condition for the possibility of judgement. This is demonstrated negatively, through the principle of determinism (classical or probabilistic). Either you have judgements, or you have determinism. (Or you have transcendental idealism, which allows you both. This is actually my position).

>> No.5252701

>>5252584
>Well, actually, I was under the impression that we were talking about a concept, i.e the concept of judgment.

Yeah, see, there you go. We aren't talking about a concept. We're talking about a process that occurs. We agree that this process occurs - ie, that people form beliefs - what we disagree about is the nature of that process.

>The introduction of "truly random processes" adds nothing. Whether the "formation of belief x" is the result of an immediate causal chain, or if it is probabilistic, the result is the same--it is determined.

You're not hearing me. Firstly because a *truly random process* is explicitly NOT probabilistic (probabilistic outcomes can be predicted in aggregate along a sufficiently long timeline, truly random processes cannot) and secondly because the point of the example is to show that 'determinism or libertarian free will' is a false dichotomy. We can conceive of a process which is neither determined nor freely willed. So clearly, where one party holds that a given phenomenon is compatible with all conceivable circumstances (which is what I say of 'judgement' as I say it of 'trees' or 'cars') and another holds that it is only compatible with one state of affairs, the latter party is importing into their conception of the phenomenon premises that the former party doesn't share (you don't dispute that trees will exist if free will does not, because 'free will' does not form part of your definition of 'tree' - are you getting this?).

>This is simply equivocation.

For sure. Let's pretend that we're living before the Michelson-Morley experiments and that the general consensus is that light travels by propelling itself through the luminiferous aether.

Me: I don't believe the luminiferous aether exists.
You: LOL WUT? You don't believe that light travels?
Me: No, I obviously do believe that light travels. What I don't agree with is that it travels by means of this 'luminiferous aether', which I don't believe exists.
You: Sorry, bud, but the phenomenon whereby 'light travels' is generally conceived as taking place by means of the luminiferous aether. So according to your very own doctrine 'aluminiferousaetherism', light must not travel.
Me: But light does travel. We know it comes from the sun and that it arrives here. All I'm saying is that I don't think you've justified importing 'via the luminiferous aether' into 'light travels'.
You: Look, end of the day, most people think that light travels via the luminiferous aether. All you're doing is removing that from the definition of 'the means by which light travels'. This is simple equivocation.

>>5252603
>My primary claim about the status of moral action has not been touched.

The arguments about them are identical.

>>5252632
>Free will is an a priori condition for the possibility of judgement.

This is what I have been saying you are saying, and what you have been vigorously denying that you are saying, all the while saying it as loudly as you can. (cont)

>> No.5252711

>>5252632
>Free will is an a priori condition for the possibility of judgement.

I disagree - do you understand that? I disagree that free will is an a priori condition for judgement. OK?

Now. You have CLAIMED that this is the case. The burden of proof is thus ON YOU to establish that this is the case. You've spent like the last two hours or so spazzing around pretending not to even understand that you've made this claim, but now you've come right out and said it. Good. This is progress.

So. What justification can you offer for this claim?

>> No.5252805

>>5252711

It's not an empirical claim. Again, it is proved negatively through the principle of determinism. That is what justifies it. What other proof do you want?

We only have reason for accepting your skewed definition of "judgement" if we accept that determinism is true. But whether or not determinism is true is undecidable, because both it and it's contrary are compatible with our experience.

As to true randomness: it is equally incompatible with free will, so you run into a similar antinomy. It, however, does not have the virtue of conforming to our experience, so there's no reason to accept it as a possibility. We can conceive of all kinds of alternate states of affairs, each crazier than the last. But if they do not ultimately conform to a possible experience, they are empty musings.

You are also under the impression that I am a proponent of libertarian free will, which is incorrect. You've been imputing upon me positions that I do not hold, which is exacerbating your confusion.

>> No.5252827

>>5252805
>It's not an empirical claim.

I am not saying that it is an empirical claim. 'Justification' is not an exclusively empirical process.

>We only have reason for accepting your skewed definition of "judgement" if we accept that determinism is true.

No, we accept my definition of judgement ("the process whereby we form beliefs", remember?) regardless of whether or not free will exists.

>As to true randomness: it is equally incompatible with free will, so you run into a similar antinomy.

Uh... obviously? That's why I brought it up - to establish that incompatibility with determinism does not imply compatibility with 'free will'.

>You are also under the impression that I am a proponent of libertarian free will, which is incorrect.

Oh, OK - what is your position, then?

>> No.5252861
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5252861

>>5249694

Forget phantom fears and kindness that can kill, I will choose a path that's real.

I will choose free will.

>> No.5252874

>>5252827

And I have given you a proof.

>No, we accept my definition of judgement ("the process whereby we form beliefs", remember?) regardless of whether or not free will exists.

The "process," for you, *is* deterministic. You apply the label "judgement" to the end product of that process. We only need accept this if determinism is true. Whether determinism is true is undecidable, etc etc.

>That's why I brought it up - to establish that incompatibility with determinism does not imply compatibility with 'free will'.

It's only been established that "true randomness" is equally incompatible with free will and determinism. The contention, however, is between determinism and free will. The conceivability of "true randomness" is beside the point, for reasons already given.

>Oh, OK - what is your position, then?

Basically Kant's, which is a kind of incompatibilist compatibilism too complicated to get into now.

>> No.5252902

>>5252874
>And I have given you a proof.

You have done no such thing. You have repeatedly asserted a premise.

>We only need accept this if determinism is true.

Again, because "we" aka "you" import into the definition (with no justification as yet) the premise "free will exists and is necessary for this".

>It's only been established that "true randomness" is equally incompatible with free will and determinism. The contention, however, is between determinism and free will.

This is like the most circumlocuitous way possible of saying "I'm going to ignore what you've just said".

>Basically Kant's, which is a kind of incompatibilist compatibilism too complicated to get into now.

There is no such thing as "incompatibilist compatibilism". Are you a compatibilist?

>> No.5252910

No, I believe in Causality. It doesn't bother me, though. I still do what I should do. I just act according to my nature and reaction to things that happen.

>> No.5253017

>>5252902

>You have done no such thing. You have repeatedly asserted a premise.
>Again, because "we" aka "you" import into the definition (with no justification as yet) the premise "free will exists and is necessary for this".

No. Do you not understand how transcendental arguments work?

http://www.iep.utm.edu/trans-ar/

The "importation," as you call it, is justified through the proof. You fail to see this partly, I think, because you are stuck on your own as-yet-unjustified labeling of a certain product of a certain deterministic process as a "judgement". Again, we only need to accept this label if determinism is true. This follows from everything both of us I've already said regarding judgements. It is separate from the question whether judgements must presuppose free will. I don't know how to make this clearer for you.

>This is like the most circumlocuitous way possible of saying "I'm going to ignore what you've just said".

The reasons for dismissing "true randomness" as irrelevant, as I have already said, are above. I'm not the intransigent one here.

>There is no such thing as "incompatibilist compatibilism".

Note the qualifier "kind of." I already told you, it's too complicated to explain here. I don't really feel the need to label myself for you, anyway.

>> No.5253146

>>5250266

Quantum physics doesn't change anything.

>>5250879

I'm not declaring the supremacy of Newtonian physics in particular. I'm declaring the supremacy of physics, and if you can logically dispute that go ahead.

>> No.5253151

>I freely deny I have free will

>> No.5253153

>>5250879

Just because we can't know everything, doesn't mean we can't know certain things either. I thought that was implied.

>> No.5254409

>>5253017
>The "importation," as you call it, is justified through the proof.

You haven't presented a proof. You have asserted a definition. Continuing to assert it does not constitute 'proof'.

>I'm not the intransigent one here.

Oh, yes, you absolutely are. True randomness does not need to be 'dismissed' because it was never invoked as part of my position - I brought it up to establish the false dichotomy you had presented.

>I don't really feel the need to label myself for you, anyway.

You don't really feel the need to put yourself in a position where you can be shown to be talking nonsense, I rather suspect. Can hardly blame you.

>> No.5254446

>>5250240
A nonthinker's answer.
Decisionmaking ability does not prove free will. I could write a perl script with decisionmaking ability.

>> No.5254451

>>5250266
so you criticized that anon for not understanding quantum physics, and then you suggest that increasing entropy has anything what the fuck ever to do with causality?

are you one of those retards who thinks the 2nd law of thermodynamics disproves evolution too?

>> No.5254948

>>5251524

Well now we've begun a semantical argument. I don't necessarily disagree with you, but I still hold to what I've said. I was essentially stating that free will can only exist in the minds in those that believe in it, which is to say not at all, or more specifically, in the sense that it is, like meaning, as you say 'something people do' rather than 'a quality possessed.' Free will is the untamed dog of an owner who is convinced he has control of it; in the end he doesn't. But to try to be as succinct as possible: the question of free will lies largely upon the matter of qualia. For instance, why is the barn red? Is it red because our brains translate the light reflecting off of it into a certain sense of redness, or is it red because of some a priori quality that insists on being red, regardless of the observer? The answer is both. Cause and effect, as I've said, are not as distinguishable from one another as people believe, this explains the seemingly inexplicable nature of quantum mechanics (namely things like the double slit experiment). Our minds work too linearly for most of us to grasp this seemingly paradoxical nature of things, so we jump to a yes or no conclusion. The universe is trinary, not binary. 1 and 0, yes and no, are but 2/3 of the equation.

>> No.5255270

>>5249825
>>5249863
>I can't speak on Kant. I'm reasonably sure h was one of those watery, half-hearted theists that used to be so common.

Well you'd be pretty cataclysmically wrong.

>> No.5256275

>>5249706
I do, because I don't have the choice not to.

>> No.5256321

>>5249769
>dat link
Fuck me, it makes sense. Cheers, /sci/fag.

>> No.5256336

>>5256275
>>5256275
>>5256275

>> No.5256340

>>5249769
i read this three times now and it's not at all convincing.

basically all counters on determinism are weak jack-off arguments in the line of "yeah actually everything is rigid but it doesn't matter if you don't feel it"

>> No.5256350

>>5255270
shit nigger..

>> No.5256355

>>5256275
rip H

>> No.5256361

>>5249940
>>5249940
>>5249940
>>5249940
/thread

>> No.5256373

>>5256340
Not really … it's "The universe is deterministic, but you have free will." Aka compatibilism. If it's good enough for the courts, it's good enough for me.

>> No.5256380

It's like atheists decided that since Free Will is in the Bible, they have to not believe in it

>> No.5256385

>>5256373
Determinism Aka "you have something we're calling free will but means the complete opposite."

Compatibilism is pure retardation

>> No.5256393

>>5256373
compatibilsm is just cock-sucking.
>yeah determinists are right but we can't deal with that so here's this half-assed bendingoverism

besides determinism is no problem for courts, you can still put people in jail because they are a danger to society

>> No.5256458

Our passions and instincts are biologically driven yet we can choose to deny them. Otherwise biology doesn't even make sense, men aren't determined to kill themselves, but we can with effort, men aren't determined to abstain from sensual pleasure but we control ourselves. This is what we romanticize as Reason, but it has many limits.
Determinism is just another self-refuting bastion of fakse intellectuals like nihilism. If nothing has meaning, their linguistic constructs that try to explain this are meaningless and baseless, if everything is determined there is no reasoning power to reach this conclusion. The most hilarious thing is "free will doesn't exist, accept the truth you fucking platonist" Accept with what? Processes in my brain I have no control over?

>> No.5256466
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5256466

>>5256380
That's how they came up with outer space

>> No.5256626

>>5256458
>Otherwise biology doesn't even make sense, men aren't determined to kill themselves

Petitio principii.

People are so fucking thick on this one issue it's absolutely unreal.

You are invoking something along the lines of an argument from selective pressure, right? The idea being something like "Natural selection couldn't possibly favour suicide that didn't directly preserve kin of the one committing suicide, therefore the classic case of suicide because of depression can't be the product of a selective pressure."

It may seem superficially plausible, but it's bollocks. Firstly and most importantly because natural selection doesn't deal in behavioural absolutes in the vast majority of cases. That natural selection favours a given behavioural profile almost never means that no other behavioural profiles exist or persist. Secondly because natural selection is 'blind' and ruthlessly utilitarian - we can imagine a possible phylogenetic profile which leads in, say, 80% of cases to excellent reproductive success, in 19.9% of cases to moderate reproductive success and in .1% of cases, to suicide. What will happen to this profile? It will flourish, that's what.

And thirdly, of course, because biological determinism is merely a special case of determinism in general. Cancer isn't 'selected for' and yet people die from it every day. Does cancer have free will? Does it prove we do?