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5174702 No.5174702[DELETED]  [Reply] [Original]

The argument against free will that uses Cause and Effect is flawed.
Cause and Effect is temporal, and time is a concept that only related to appearances, not things in themselves (the noumena)
So those of you who do not believe in free will, how do you disprove it now?

>> No.5174715

Nobody here is going to prove or disprove free will click clacking on their letter machines. These stupid ass threads exist for e peen flexing.

>> No.5174723

>>5174715
I know but I recently saw a free-will thread here on /lit/ and they all seemed to rely on determinism to disprove free-will.
I feel a bit guilty for making this thread but I hope some of them return to find a better reason.

>> No.5174815

>>5174723
That's because /lit/fags are mostly soulless positivists

Weird for a literature board

>> No.5174838

>>5174815
It wasn't always this way.

>> No.5174862

>>5174702
are our actions things in themselves or appearances?

>> No.5174876

> time is a concept only related to appearances

lol?

time is an axis of reality m8. the rate at which it's perceived may change, but the passing of a perceivable reality will exist so long as there IS change to perceive.

determinism exists in the Newtonian realm, i.e. the world we live in. many have tried to discredit the argument using quantum physics and isotope decay, but again, where molecular physics does not apply to free falling bodies, molecular discrepancies to not discredit determinism.

care to elaborate a bit more on your axioms? I haven't really retorted at all to your statement, but determinism is my shit so I want to hear what you have to say.

>> No.5174886

>>5174876

mind you I haven't read Kant yet. Sorry if that's what you're going by, but I've argued in favor of determinism a long time. If i've missed something, great! Who doesn't want free will? But it's looking as though, to me, it's the only sensical theory of the three concerning free will.

>> No.5174892

>>5174862
I forgot to add that time and Cause and Effect are concepts that we created to describe what we perceive in the outside world, and not us ourselves.
I'm sorry if this seems a bit confusing but I'm tired right now so I'm explaining the best I can/
>>5174876
>the rate at which it's perceived may change
Exactly, and we perceive appearances, not reality itself.
>care to elaborate a bit more on your axioms?
Not min, Kant's, but really I'm just saying that you can't disprove free-will based on determinism, not that free-will does or does not exist.

>> No.5174903

>>5174886
>mind you I haven't read Kant yet. Sorry if that's what you're going by
I'd really recommend him, I used to be a determinist and positivist until I read his works, the way he explains everything is just so clear and meticulous.

>> No.5174921

>>5174892

okay I gotcha I gotcha.

To me, it's honestly appearing as though Compatibilism is the real-deal. I know I just said determinism, but my take on comp. is so closely linked to det. that I feel they're essentially the same.

To me, free will *exists* in the sense that we're still able to choose what we see fit, it's just that in each instance regarding our choosing, there is only one valid choice to be made.

I.e. if you get to choose between icecream and fruit, and you, based on your genetics, which you have 0 control over, you have a predisposition to a liking of fruit moreso than icecream, you'd naturally choose the fruit, as it's nonsensical to choose an option that would make you the least happy.

So, bearing this in mind, ice cream was never a valid option for you to choose, because given the choice, due to your disposition, you'd always want the fruit. this can be applied to almost any choices, as whichever option you favor will be the only valid one, and the elements that prompt you to favor something will be out of your control.

tldr: you can still choose, it's just you only ever have one choice. free will exists in the illusion of choice.

>> No.5174928

>>5174903

I really do wish to. I have a HUGE stack of works to pile through, but he's definitely on the list.

I was declared as a philosophy major, but I swapped over to the math faculty and am now doing a math major with a double minor in physics and philo. I'm sure I'll come across Kant at some point.

>> No.5175037

>>5174702

what sort of free will are we talking about here?

if you're suggesting that the world-in-itself does not operate under the principles of causation then you would have to explain how this noumenal world manages to interact with and affect the physical or apparent world because what is free will if you cannot affect the physical and apparent world? Even if you theorize about a mysterious non-causal, non-phenomenal world you need further ad hoc theorizing to make it consistent with the fact that free will is a phenomena, whatever other metaphysical nonsense you claim it is on top of being a phenomena

a theory of free will is supposed to be an explanation of the very real sensation of willing, causal reduction is an explanation, but many people find this explanation unsatisfying because it does not privilege their choosing faculty over the other causes in the system, such as environmental forces.

for some people, it is enough to say that the will creates action, and that no external will can come between a person's will and their action, and this is all the freedom that is required for free will. this make sense to me.

others like nietzsche said that even this is really just tricking yourself into believe the will is unified. He would say that "you", the ego, just identify yourself with the emotion, the motivation, that "won" out, when you "act freely", and really "you", the ego, have no place in the scheme except as to hide these uncomfortable details "from yourself" so as to smooth out the process of being a human with desires and biological needs. this makes sense too

i dont think there is a definitive answer to whether there is free will, free will does and does not exist for the purpose of certain discussions

>> No.5175067

>>5175037
>what sort of free will are we talking about here?
The ability to choose your actions and carry them out.
>you would have to explain how this noumenal world manages to interact with and affect the physical or apparent world
The noumenal world is the real world, the physical or apparent world is how we perceive it.
>whatever other metaphysical nonsense you claim it is on top of being a phenomena
The noumena isn't phenomena, that's why it's named the way it is.
We can't perceive it for what it is.
Imagine if I hooked you up to a computer and made it send out the electric currents that it would when transferring data to another computer, let's say a .txt file with "Hello World!" in it. You wouldn't be able to make out what the computer is sending you because you're senses are limited, but the other computer would.
>i dont think there is a definitive answer to whether there is free will
Which is why I didn't say that it exists or doesn't exists, only that you can not disprove it with determinism.

>> No.5175103

>>5175067

i agree with you mostly except the noumenal is nothing

all individuation and description is ideal, mental, phenomenal, perceptual, physical, etc

the world in itself is *a continuum* I guess, even thats too descriptive, it defies precise description, I'm not sure if it can be approximated either. However, I do know that it can't be part of explanations, which are just reductions, you cannot reduce any phenomena too the noumenal, it really has no place in discussion of the will. I really question all these philosophers like Kant and Schopenhauer who think the will is somehow less of a phenomena than any other phenomena. it's the most elusive one, it is hard to grasp with your conscious attention, it slips away.

I have heard it said that the will can't be perceived, only its effects, but it is no different in this sense from any other object, they all exist entirely in terms of their effects that can be seen or otherwise sensed.

>> No.5175135

>>5175103
>i agree with you mostly except the noumenal is nothing
I think the confusion lies in how Kant described the noumenal, it's a bit different from the Greeks.
>the world in itself is *a continuum* I guess, even thats too descriptive, it defies precise description,
That's what Kant states with Substance.
He even describes it as always existing but that even describing it as such is flawed since that implies that it is temporal.
>you cannot reduce any phenomena too the noumenal
Phenomena is how we perceive noumena

>> No.5175182

>>5174892
>Exactly, and we perceive appearances, not reality itself.
Why do you not believe something like gravity is reality? Maybe I'm misunderstanding you, but in case I'm not, say I lift my arm. No matter how much I want it to stay lifted, it will fall eventually because of gravity. Or in less metaphysical terms, say I've been kidnapped. I technically can ignore my captor, but by doing so I significantly endanger my life. So while my free will hasn't been totally revoked, it has been in a practical sense and determinism pulls me almost irresistibly towards whatever end my kidnapper specifies. Maybe that "almost" is important, but I don't think it is.

>> No.5175198

>>5175182
>Why do you not believe something like gravity is reality?
It's one of "reality's" appearances.
Lifting your arm is reality, but while it may appear to you to be lifting your arm it could mean a completely different thing in the "actual" reality.
See the example I posted >>5175067
>Imagine if I hooked you up to a computer and made it send out the electric currents that it would when transferring data to another computer, let's say a .txt file with "Hello World!" in it. You wouldn't be able to make out what the computer is sending you because you're senses are limited, but the other computer would.
To the computer it's getting a .txt file no matter what, it can ignore it, but according to its senses, that's the harsh reality, while to you it just seems like a bunch of electrical impulses.

>> No.5175303

>>5175135

>Phenomena is how we perceive noumena

yes, but perception is inherently a transformative process

take atoms/molecules. these are part of the phenomenal, they are ideas. But it is not these ideas, that have the qualities of "being made of protons, neutrons, and electrons" and "being electromagnetically neutral", but rather it is the thing in itself that has these qualities. our ideas have qualities like "being defined socially" and "associated with complex neurological cycles"

so when we perceive something, when the radiation it reflects and/or gives off hits our eyes, when its vibrations move our inner ear apparatus, when its minute particles reach our olfactory sensors (correct me if thats not how smell works), the noumenal, whatever forces and materials that exist, becomes phenomenal, that is it becomes part of the electrical signaling system that is the brain, and is then "presented for the consciousness", whatever that entails.

how are we, the egos, some relatively arbitrary segment of the brain functions of our body, supposed to come to knowledge or conception of the noumenal except by perception? It would seem to ignore spatiotemporal contiguity for us to be able to know it in any other way.

Kant and Schopenhauer seemed to object, "turn within", but can you really? are we not just observing our appearances? can we turn within and come to knowledge beyond the world of appearances?

i dont think so

>> No.5175573

>>5175303
>but rather it is the thing in itself that has these qualities.
No they appear to us as "being made of protons, neutrons, and electrons" and "being electromagnetically neutral", we can never see things as themselves due to our limited senses.
>how are we, the egos, some relatively arbitrary segment of the brain functions of our body, supposed to come to knowledge or conception of the noumenal except by perception?
Empirically, and analytically, like Kant put it.
>are we not just observing our appearances?
Yes
>can we turn within and come to knowledge beyond the world of appearances?
Kant's longest Critique dealt with this.

>> No.5175585

Kant's idea of time kinda' falls apart when you introduce special relativity and modern day understandings of space time.

Just saying, guys.

>> No.5176189

>>5175573
>No they appear to us as "being made of protons, neutrons, and electrons" and "being electromagnetically neutral", we can never see things as themselves due to our limited senses.
Kant isn't concerned with limitations of our senses. The 'viewpoint of one's mind', so to speak, is an essential precondition for all experience. It has nothing to do with any sort of physical constraints. If it were merely physical constraints on our bodies, it would in theory be possible to bypass these constraints. It is a constraint for all experience, due to the nature of experience. To try to speak of things-in-themselves is to try to speak of things without the necessary precondition (the vantage point of the "I") of all experience.

We can't know anything about the noumenal world at all, either. Remember that for Kant, attributing spatiotemporality to things-in-themselves is categorically false, as are attributions of the categories. Existence/nonexistence is one of Kant's categories, so an attribution of existence OR non-existence to the noumena is itself false. Since all our knowledge is structured by the categories and forms of intuition (except for knowledge of the categories and forms), we can't have any knowledge of the noumena at all, not even knowledge of its existence.

This should strike you as an immediate problem with the Kantian two-worlds doctrine, which is a necessary presumption for your free will argument.

>> No.5176206

I Kant.

>> No.5176302

>>5175135

>phenomena is how we perceive noumena

what? no.

no, no, no.

There are places in the Critque where Kant identifies noumena with the transcendental object--that is, with the object as it is in itself. You cannot have a peception (we should maybe say, you cannot form a representation), properly speaking, of the transcendental object, as to do so would be to go beyond the faculties of intuition and understanding, which make representations possible. You would be representing the unrepresentable.

This is not to say that you cannot *think* about noumena--only that these thoughts are basically empty, purely formal speculations, and so do not bear us knowledge, properly speaking

>> No.5176311

>>5176302
To my understanding, we can't think of the noumena coherently at all. All thought is structured by the categories, which are inapplicable to the noumena on pain of contradiction. It's utterly unknowable formally and empirically.

>> No.5176324

>>5176311

If that were the case then Kant's project would be sunk from the very beginning, considering the central role the transcendental object plays in his whole doctrine. (The self, for instance, is a transcendental object).

All empirical intuitions--the objects of knowledge--are subject to the categories. This is not the same thing as "all thought."

>> No.5176352

>>5176189

Freedom of the will in the Kantian sense is not actually dependent on the two-world thesis. It would be in sad shape if it were.

The best defense of this I can think of is Henry Allison's, as it follows along what he calls the "two-aspect" interpretation of transcendental idealism, a summary of which can be found here: http://transcendental.ucoz.ru/_fr/0/allison_kti_com.pdf

For the implications of Kantian freedom, see his Kant's Theory of Freedom

>> No.5176365

>>5176324
Kant is extremely specific in saying that the categories do NOT structure empirical intuitions. They structure the understanding and the syntheses of empirical intuition. The understanding is one of two faculties of thought for Kant, and is structured by the categories. The other faculty is largely irrelevant to discussion here.

Also, yeah, the whole reason German Idealism started was because a bunch of big philosophers did believe Kant's project was sunk by the noumena (Fichte in particular).

>> No.5176386

>>5176365

What would intuitions be, if they were not subject to the categories of the understanding? They would be noise! The understanding is the faculty of cognition which brings intuitions under its categories. The intuition and the understanding are discursive--they can only operate in "communication" with one another, otherwise they are useless. Hence the famous phrase "[t]houghts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."

I think you misunderstood me. (5/10, made me bust out my copy).

And actually, I am wrong to say that the categories apply to "empirical intuitions." They apply to intuitions generally.

>> No.5176394

>>5176386
Yes, I assumed you were claiming the categories to be necessary preconditions of intuitions in the way the pure forms are.

Nonetheless, I would assume that something has gone awry if we can think about the noumena, yet any assertions we can make about it are categorically false. And indeed, they are. Unless I've missed something again.

If so, what exactly do you mean by a purely formal "speculation" as opposed to a "claim"?

>> No.5176407

>>5176394

You can think about noumena in the same way that you can think about a unicorn, only in the case of the unicorn you can make a determinate judgement as to whether it exists or not, etc. A judgment about the transcendental object is not true or false, merely empty, so not really a judgment at all. It does not fit inside the framework of our reality (or our representations)--it is the frame for that reality (for our system of representing objects). That is, I guess, the difference between a "claim" and a formal speculation. I can make a claim about the existence of unicorns, and that claim can be true or false. I cannot make a claim about God, however, as that cannot be proven true or false.

>> No.5176418

>>5176407
Then isn't the idea of noumena essentially akin to Kant's Ideas? It transcends all possible experience, so he's gotta check himself before he wrecks himself if he follows his own advice.

It's important to note, though, that we also can't speculate as to whether or not the noumena exists, because the noumena is not the kind of thing which can be said to exist or not exist. The categories are utterly inapplicable to non-phenomena.

Essentially, to rephrase my earlier point, it should be impossible to name a coherent speculation about the noumena. Any speculation takes the form of a judgment, even if it isn't truth-functional, and any judgment will refer to a category (or a derivative category). Since categories are inapplicable in-principle to noumena, any judgments or speculations (which are judgmentlike) about noumena are universally incoherent. sorry for not being too fluent right now, it's 4 AM here and it's been quite a day

>> No.5176451

>>5176418

Yes, noumena may be compared to Kant's concept of an Idea. (The terminology is deliberate, of course--noumenon is derived from the Greek noien, an apprehended thing).
I would take another look at the antinomies.

Of course you can speculate on noumena, despite not being able to make a determinate judgement about them. The two sides of each antinomy are basically theses on some view of ultimate reality, the very meat of metaphysics. They are mutually incompatible, and they represent the positions that various philosophers prior to Kant would take. What Kant attempted to show was that these positions were antinomies precisely because they were held independently of possible experience--each was formally compatible with experience, but none could be *proven* by any appeal to experience.

But this isn't the only role the noumena play. In some places, they have a regulative function, in others they are essential the Kant's more basic transcendental argument.

Noumena should really just be thought of as objects that are conceived independently of our normal mode of representation. They are objects as God would know them. We lack this privileged perspective.

>> No.5176464

>>5174702
That's retarded.

>> No.5176467

>>5174815
Who /logical positivist/ here?

>> No.5176504
File: 166 KB, 947x697, 1402302106770.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
5176504

>>5176418
To jump into this interesting discussion I'd like to add a few thoughts of my own.

I would consider the noumena in the context of Hume's bundle theory. If we think of the qualities/properties of an object and we separate them (which we can do, because anything conceivably separable is separable) then what we get would be the noumena.

But now, does it make sense to say that an object exists without any qualities or properties? it seems kind of illogical. Therefore I think noumena are analogous to the concept of nothing, which in and of itself doesn't make sense. You can't have a content-less concept.

Kant said we can't know either way, but the concept of nothing doesn't seem to be influenced by the categories. Nothing is a meaningless concept, just like noumena are.

As to free will.
Given a statement A
This statement according to the laws of bivalence, non-contradiction, and the excluded middle is either true or false.

Now when I say you're going to sleep after reading this text. This statement is either true or false.
Well, either way, true or false, the statement's truth value is already determined. We won't know it's truth value until it has happened, but the statement already has a truth value.

Consider the statement there's going to be a sea battle tomorrow(uttered the night before the battle of Salamis). Most of us would say that that statement was either true or false. But it seems that if that statement is either true or false before the battle occurred then it seems that the future was (and is) already necessary and determined.

Apply this concept to free will and every choice we make seems to be determined.

>> No.5176532

>>5174702
You got it wrong. Like, the exact contrary of how thje argument works.
Ok, let's assume time doesn't really exist. When we look at the past (something outside of our perception of time) we see causes and effects in a relation, that's why we can say there is no freedom, since shit doesn't happen without a cause (or there are no causes without effects, since we are assuming the temporal order isn't important, ehat's important is the relation). Now let's look at the illusion: the present, where we experience time as something that exists. We can believe we have free will because we don't see causes and efects, we just "are", so we can believe we have free will. But when we assume time is an illusion, we then see how free will (something that can only happen inside the experience of time) is an illusion.

>> No.5176546

noumena seems retarded, it's like here is a red cup, now take away the red and the cup and you've got a .......

except this thing that can't be called a thing is noumena and exists but maybe not because it isn't anything but is beyond the perceotion of the red cup except "beyond the perception of the red cup" is a concept in my mind and so is not noumena or a conception of noumena so it's basically nothing except bla bla bla
>pours hot coffee over your faggot face smashed red cup on your toe fuck you

fuck kant fuck philosophy it's literally old white people arguing about irrelevant bullshit who would need this in their lives? at what point would anyone ever need noumena they are fucking useless

>> No.5176555
File: 15 KB, 320x224, Derrida.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
5176555

>>5176546
>who would need this in their lives?
Who would need you in his life?

>> No.5176558

>>5176555
ur mom lol

:^)

>> No.5176925
File: 449 KB, 393x456, buda.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
5176925

>>5174702
beyond the appearances lies mere emptiness.

>> No.5176940
File: 114 KB, 808x499, we could have had them.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
5176940

>>5176546

>bluh old wyte peepl :^)

suck a smeggy chode you fucking blight on serious discussions.

>> No.5178190

>>5176189
>This should strike you as an immediate problem with the Kantian two-worlds doctrine, which is a necessary presumption for your free will argument.
I'm only arguing that you can't use determinism in the argument for or against free will, and your post does nothing to discredit that to my understanding.

>> No.5178200

>>5176925

you know nothing about buddhism if you think that picture represents the buddha's teachings

>> No.5178283
File: 836 KB, 2477x1448, life-of-buddha-18.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
5178283

>>5178200
Can't find the middle way without trying the extremes breh.

>> No.5178328

>>5176546
>white
Said the white guy, disparagingly.
To repeat an old saw, SWPLs treat culture like the zoo. They go to see apes and zebras, not dogs and horses. Exotic entertainment :o)

>> No.5178666

>>5178283

It's a good thing the middle way has been aka what buddhism actually is.

>> No.5178716

I think your own reasoning disproves it or rather does not prove it.

Humans as things in themselves possess no knowable property suggestive of freedom. Similarly to time, our perception of freedom is also just an appearance.

So while causality doesn't prove the absence of freedom, its existence is not provable by any means either.

>> No.5178770

>>5178666
>middle way has been aka what buddhism actually is.
u wot m8

>> No.5178832

>>5174892

Because science is increasingly showing our actions can be predicted, this erases the already blurry line between us and things we've traditionally thought of as "not us" like rocks, etc. Like much of science, this is more of a hint and less proof that we don't have free will. Assumptions all around.

>> No.5178860

>>5175103
>I have heard it said that the will can't be perceived, only its effects, but it is no different in this sense from any other object, they all exist entirely in terms of their effects that can be seen or otherwise sensed.

but what IS our perceiving/sensing of the world? We can study it, dissect it, measure and quantify all its perceived effects, and STILL we wouldn't be able to say what it means that YOU sense. It is the only thing in itself and it is unanswerable. And because it's unanswerable perhaps we should quit trying to answer it and focus on important things. Lots of shit still needs to get done get to work asshole.

>> No.5178867

>>5178860

who dis nigga tryna impress?

>> No.5178884

>>5174702

Free will is itself a concept related to cause and effect, namely, that one's volition is capable of being the cause of effects without itself being caused.