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/lit/ - Literature

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4610276 No.4610276[DELETED]  [Reply] [Original]

How would different philosophers go about solving the paradox?

If Pinocchio lies then his noes grows. So what happens if he says "My nose will grow now"? If it does not grow then he is lying. But if it grows then he is telling the truth.

>> No.4610277

Truth is relative.

>> No.4610286

>implying uttering a false belief is lying

>> No.4610304

>tfw you realised this paradox at 4 years and 7 months old
>tfw you instantly had a massive existential crisis about the nature of epistemology, causality, and Being itself
>tfw you came out of it stronger and were ready to tackle philosophy head on at only 5 years 5 months of age
>tfw 10-15 year head start on /lit/ plebs who only started feeling angst in their late teens
>tfw literally ubermensch

>> No.4610310

The statement "My nose will grow" isn't true/false when stated; it's only AFTER the statement does it become true or false.

So, in essence, nothing would happen, because it's not a known state of affairs: it's just a prediction.

>> No.4610313

>>4610310
What about "My nose is growing...currently..."?

>> No.4610328

>>4610313

HIS NOSE IS NOT CURRENTLY GROWING, THEREFORE THAT STATEMENT IS A LIE, SO HIS NOSE WILL THEN GROW.

DO YOU EVEN THINK?

>> No.4610333

>>4610328
But he holds off on saying "currently" until it begins to grow.

>> No.4610338

One way is to say that the statement in this context is nonsense.

Alternatively, you could say that Pinocchio is stating a false belief rather than a truth.

>> No.4610339

>>4610333
What if he talks with a slur, so his nose can't understand him?!

>> No.4610345

>>4610339
Then he'd be a drinker and his nose would already be big.

>> No.4610346

HIS BODY WOULD KNOW THAT THE SENTENCE IS NOT COMPLETE YET.

>> No.4610350

>>4610346
No true, since he might not himself know that. What if he's speaking in bop prosody?

>> No.4610351

He is stating his nose will grow in the future, now, therefore he is lying, because the future, is not now, in the sctric sense of the word.

As soon as observer understands this, his nose begins to grow, the logic is not broken, and both Heisemberg and Schrödingers cat are vindicated.

>> No.4610359

>>4610351
Hold the horses mister and take the time to write properly, even if you are horny to get the easy frag.

>sctric
strict

>Heisemberg
Heisenberg

>> No.4610363

does his nose only grow when he speaks lies, or may he lie in some other way?

>> No.4610364

>pinochhio's face when his nose grows 5 seconds later instead

The nose never specified it would grow the very exact moment he says something, and even in the movies, there's always a delay.

The nose doesn't give a fuck about your paradoxes.

>> No.4610365

>>4610351
How? you just made a statement of certainty and you're saying it vindicates the uncertainty principle?

>> No.4610366

>>4610350

IF HIS BODY IS AWARE OF WHETHER HE IS LYING, IT IS LOGICAL TO ASSUME THAT IT OPERATES UNDER A KIND OF SEMANTIC SYSTEM, THEREFORE IT WILL DETECT WHETHER THE SENTENCE IS COMPLETE.

>> No.4610367

>>4610364
Then that would vindicate Pinocchio: his nose DID grow. "Will" is not a definitive frame of time.

>> No.4610370

Wittgenstein would invite Pinocchio to sip espresso with him by the fireplace.

>> No.4610371

>>4610276
Lies are intentional. He has no intentional control over his nose, therefore his 'lie' is a non-statement.

>> No.4610374

>>4610366
Bop prosody doesn't always follow conventional semantics. "Nose" might be a metaphor for his creative soul.

>> No.4610375

>>4610276
Or you know, you could just ask the purer form of the paradox.

"This statement is false." Is it true or false?

>> No.4610378

>>4610375
False in one respect, true in another.

>> No.4610379

le recursion faec

>> No.4610380

>>4610375
No criteria, therefore not even a statement.

>> No.4610385

>>4610367
You seem to be forgetting the "now".

Pretty sure the nose would do nothing given a future scenario like an indefinite "My nose will grow", because it doesn't know the future, only knows the truth on present statements.

>> No.4610387

>>4610365

Because wether the uncertainty principle is or not vindicated depends directly of two valid conceptions of time, assert that takes us tangently to >>4610277

>> No.4610393

>>4610375
Both.

>> No.4610398

>>4610371
He causes his nose to grow by lying. Can can intentionally bring about this action with an intentional lie.

>> No.4610399

>>4610387
And the fact it is or not vindicated, vindicates the vindication, assert which takes us tangently to >>4610379

>> No.4610404

>>4610378
>>4610393
Wrong

>>4610380
Bingo

>> No.4610454

>>4610380

What do you mean with no criteria?

>> No.4610464

>>4610454
Don't pay attention to that silly intuitionist.

>> No.4610481

Pinocchio's nose always grows when he lies, but it doesn't necessarily *not* grow when he tells the truth. His nose grows.

>> No.4610491

This is all nice discussion in all that, but, uh... pinocchio's not real.

>> No.4610505

>>4610491
Yeah, he's just a character, and what the fuck, as if we could discuss characters and whatnot in a literary board right?

>> No.4610511

>>4610276
>How would different philosophers go about solving the paradox?
probably by thinking about it, that is the usual way.

>> No.4610512

If what he says is TRUE, then we get a paradox.

If what he says is FALSE, then we get a paradox.

Thus, his statement has no truth-value.

>> No.4610516

>>4610511
So we are different philosophers then? Cuz I have seen quite a bit of thought in here, I mean not me, but others...

>> No.4610537

Lies are false accounts of the past. >implying the past is static
>implying objective truth of the past can be reached
Speaking of the future is mere speculation. If his nose grew when he said something about the future that wasn't going to happen, then we would be able to say definitively that we live in a deterministic universe and Pinocchio could make a killing in Vegas.

>> No.4610540

>>4610512
In a bi-valuated world, what you say is true. In a quantum, fuzzy, or even temporal one, it is not.

>> No.4610598
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4610598

>>4610387

>> No.4610620

>>4610286
This. "In-text" truth and "meta-truth" are different. Truth is a value which depends on conditions outside the text. The liar's paradox only shows how propositions depend on external truth conditions to have such value.

>> No.4610623

>>4610620
Tarski, pls.

>> No.4610639

>>4610623
Whats your problem with Tarski?

>> No.4610662
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4610662

>>4610620
>Truth is a value
Truth is an act of faith.

>> No.4610699

>>4610662
Nope. Committing to the truth of some statement x is an act of faith and not that truth itself is an act of faith. There's a huge difference.

>> No.4610716

Well, I would say that the non-institutional fact of Pinocchio's nose growing when he lies is a result of the institutional fact of lying. Thusly we need only change our definition of "lying" and our problem is solved. Presumably this is what Pinocchio is attempting to do.

>> No.4610721

>>4610699
Truth itself, it's an act of faith, in a relative world.

>> No.4610723
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4610723

His Nose is the purpose of the form from which it emancipates itself, it is the form that is just about to overcome its own indifference; for, the lie is the immediate emergence, or the actuality just emerging, from the proximity of the form.

>> No.4610726

>>4610723

Is her nose electricity?

>> No.4610728

>>4610716
>non-institutional fact / institutional fact
Elaborate please.

>> No.4610735

>>4610620
>Truth is a value which depends on conditions outside the text

Is this what Wittgenstein meant in On Certainty when he said that what is true depends on the determinants you choose?

>> No.4610736

>>4610721
No, no and no.

>> No.4610742

>>4610735
Reducing it to: truth is relative.

>> No.4610743

>>4610736
That's another act of faith.

>> No.4610744

>>4610735

shit he nailed quantum theory

>> No.4610751

>>4610743
You seem confused. This is the second time you've made a category mistake.

>> No.4610752

>>4610662
No, believing you know is an act of faith. truth is a value some propositions can have (which implies a certain correlation with facts).

>> No.4610764

>>4610752
>truth is a value some propositions can have

isn't there a distinction between tautological truth (that of propositions) and empirical truth (that which is observed to be true)

>> No.4610765

>>4610735
Read Tarski's paper on truth. AnalCrust is talking about how the truth of some statement corresponds accordingly to how the world and its state of affairs is. That's not *exactly* what Wittgenstein said; at least in your example.

>>4610742
Absolutely not

>> No.4610768

>>4610752
>>4610751

No, I am not confused, at all.

What gives unity to the experience of reality, is so thin, so fragile, so etheral, that I am pretty sure when I metaphorically say that giving to things truthness and falseness values are acts of faith.

>> No.4610775

>>4610765
>AnalCrust is talking about how the truth of some statement corresponds accordingly to how the world and its state of affairs is.

doesn't this presuppose knowledge of "how the world and its state of affairs is"? otherwise how do we know it's true?

>> No.4610779

>>4610764
Logical truth (a priori) / contingent truth (a posteriori)

But it doesn't mean that the latter is "less true" compared to the former. E.g. "The Earth rotates on its axis" being less true than "John is male, therefore someone is male."

>> No.4610781

>>4610775
Yes, and? What's your point?

>> No.4610785

>>4610764
Yes. Both have a value that depends of their conditions of truth. Tautologies can only have the value of truth, since the proposition itself implies its conditions of truth. Empirical truths imply external factors which can make them have two different values: true or false.
At first I ignored tautologies and contradictions, they don't depend on anything external than themselves to be true or false (they are true and false, respectively, on all possible worlds).

>> No.4610787

>>4610781
how exactly can you be sure you have access to that knowledge at a given time in order to verify the truth of a statement?

>> No.4610790
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4610790

>>4610768
>>4610743
>>4610721


&&

>>4610598

>> No.4610794

>>4610775
In On Certainty Wittgenstein presupposes we do believe some stuff is knowledge (true beliefs) because we don't have reasons enough to doubt it. There's some stuff we "must" believe, otherwise even our very act of doubting might lack consistence.

>> No.4610799

>>4610787
>how exactly can you be sure you have access to that knowledge
100%? Never.

>> No.4610811

Pinocchio isn't real.

You guys may as well argue about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.

>> No.4610817

>>4610811
Dancing is sin. So 0.

>> No.4610818

>>4610787
Depends on the statement's content. For some, lots of empirical observations and recurring predictions have been made and in turn have been accurate and precise.

>> No.4610829

>>4610370
Wittgenstein wasn't that subtle.

>> No.4610831

>>4610817
The concept of sin doesn't apply to supernatural beings.

>> No.4610832

>>4610728

Read some Searle.

>> No.4610834

>>4610832
Not him, but he's too dogmatic about his worldview and too condescending in his assessment of other worldviews.

>> No.4610836

>>4610831

It does, otherwise there wouldn't be fallen angels.

Right now, we are in the middle of medieval times, we are scholars, in some lost european abbey.

Ockham, has been struggling with this same issue, and is pissed off at his elders, in the cold of his room, he meditates, and asks god for a response to the conundrum.

When suddenly, he Eurekas! "Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem", he shouts. And everything begins to have some sort of conforting sense again.

>> No.4610842

>>4610832

Reads with interest.

http://new.ted.com/talks/john_searle_our_shared_condition_consciousness/transcript

>> No.4610843

>>4610836
I feel like you wrote this while consulting a Wiki page.

>> No.4610845
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4610845

>>4610842
>TED

>> No.4610861
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4610861

>>4610829

>> No.4610871

>>4610843

Unfortunately all of that is in my mind. Checked for the latin quote, but it was awfully right.

And this leads me to:

>>4610842

Mr Searle seems to admit a certain difference between mind and brain. Why can't mind be essentially energy, shaped in a peculiar way when focused on the brain, and in various other peculiar ways, when moving an arm, or concieving the cosmos?

>> No.4610879
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4610879

>>4610871

And why can't the concept of mind, or conscience escape traditional conceptions of science, and measurability, because of

>>4610351
>>4610387

>> No.4610887

>>4610845
You underestimate the value of ideas inspiring minds.

>> No.4610933

>>4610845

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-yFhR1fKWG0

>> No.4610945

>>4610933
4 minutes in. What's the fuck am I watching?

>> No.4610949

>>4610829
He would've simply grabbed Pinocchio and thrown him into the fire.

>> No.4610952

>>4610768
>giving to things truthness and falseness values are acts of faith.
Faith implies certain intent. You "do believe". Statements being true or false has more to do with facts hitting you on the face.

>> No.4610956

truth is like matter

you have no reason to believe in it. when are we going to be post-veracity

>> No.4610958

>>4610949
I can see Wittgenstein hitting Popper with a semi-burnt Pinocchio.

>> No.4610966

>>4610952

When what you always thought to be true, turns out to be refuted, then affirmed again centuries later, you tend to understand that assert.

The more complicated the thing you are addressing, the more you enter that specific realm. Things hitting you in the face, aren't true or false, they're things hitting you in the face.

Facts on the other hand... Are subject to an infinite array of interpretations. Because what interprets, has a hard time getting to know facts completely... See the begining of this post to know why.

>> No.4610986

>>4610958
the image of a semi burnt pinocchio in witty's little hands is cracking me up

>> No.4611003

>>4610945
Keep going. 10 minutes or so it starts to wear out its welcome, but hang in there.

>what inspires me is teaching african refugees how to program javascript

>> No.4611004

>>4610966
>Things hitting you in the face, aren't true or false, they're things hitting you in the face.
Yeah, well, facts are facts. Only propositions can be true or false.
Our hypotheses change. Sometimes a correct hypothesis doesn't make correct predictions because of our additional suppositions (there are several cases of this in history, I think this is what you were getting at), which are determining factors during the contrastation, even if not explicitly. But this doesn't imply true and false aren't "absolute" factors, this only implies we don't have means to reach "absolute" conclusions.

>> No.4611025

>>4610768
>giving to things truthness and falseness values are acts of faith.
Except that's not what you originally said (Truth is an act of faith.). What you're saying now is more or less what I said when I corrected you initially.

>When what you always thought to be true, turns out to be refuted
Call me up when the statement "Water is H2O" gets refuted.

>> No.4611028

>>4611004
To clarify:
Some proposition being true (having correspondence with the physical world) doesn't imply we can justify it. We can believe x is true because of wrong reasons, but it's still true. The only thing that changes is the validity of our knowledge (and I think this is what you somehow implied). Truth is something rather simple, knowledge on the other hand...

>> No.4611034

>>4610933
What the fuck dude

>> No.4611035

Pinocchio is a fictional character thus the question is irrelevant.

>> No.4611036

>>4611003
That guy is a fucking crazy man

>> No.4611047

>>4611004

>imply true and false aren't "absolute" factors

One would tend to think truthness and falseness are relative to the "facts" you are considering anon, in this regard, they have the references that are atributed to them in a given ruleset.

If in our given ruleset, we concieveth diferent gradations of truthness and falseness, or if you prefer, quantums, or even organic and armonic proportions, what conception of truthness and falseness are we having?

Is there such thing as absolute values, in a different place than our mind games?

Where would you place the frontieer between truthness and falseness?

>> No.4611060
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4611060

>>4610339

>> No.4611067

>>4611028
>Some proposition being true (having correspondence with the physical world) doesn't imply we can justify it.
Nonsense. If it corresponds then it is justified. Clarify, if I'm misunderstanding you.

>We can believe x is true because of wrong reasons, but it's still true. The only thing that changes is the validity of our knowledge (and I think this is what you somehow implied).
Please give us some examples; it's painstakingly difficult to plow trough what you have written and what you are getting at.

>> No.4611068

>>4611003

Too bad what inspires him isn't showing african refugees how to potabilize water using the energy of the sun.

Or else, using said water to elaborate efficient and water savy irrigation hydroponic fields, with 365 production so they do not rely on international help to strive and subsist.

Or else, teach practical engineering, and architecture, merging millenia solutions, with modern technology, to solve the ressource problem.

Or else, teach agora techniques for conflict resolution, in order to avoid violence at all costs.

>> No.4611070

nobody nose the trouble i've seen
nobody's nose but me

>> No.4611090

>>4611004
>correct hypothesis doesn't make correct predictions
Oxymoron. Got an example of a correct hypothesis that didn't make correct predictions? What do you mean by "correct" in this context?

>> No.4611091

>>4611047
>One would tend to think truthness and falseness are relative to the "facts" you are considering anon, in this regard, they have the references that are atributed to them in a given ruleset.
Propositions have conditions of truthfulness and value of truthfulness. The value of truthfulness (or falseness) is somehow absolute. It is one thing or the other. The conditions may depend on empirical factors.
>If in our given ruleset, we concieveth diferent gradations of truthness and falseness, or if you prefer, quantums, or even organic and armonic proportions, what conception of truthness and falseness are we having?
I don't know.. here "truth" and "false" would stop having the meaning they have when we are speaking about logic.
>Is there such thing as absolute values, in a different place than our mind games?
No (I think). But propositions (the only true/false things) are always IN our language games.
>Where would you place the frontieer between truthness and falseness?
In a value attributed basically to internal consistency (contradiction, tautology) or "external" correspondence (having that proposition a certain kind of relation with the empirical world aka facts).

>> No.4611093

>>4610333
it wont begin to grow until after he says currently. if he waits, nothing will happen until the lis is finished and in the past.

>> No.4611098

do you think gipetto ever made pinocchio sleep in the same bed with him

>> No.4611099

>>4611098
boku no pinocchio

>> No.4611104

>>4611067
>Nonsense. If it corresponds then it is justified. Clarify, if I'm misunderstanding you.
You can make some statement about some random subject you don't know shit about. And you can guess it. Did the man who won yesterday's lottery know he was going to win? He didn't. Yet he bought the winning number.
A clock: it suddenly stops. You look at it and say "it's 5 o'clock". I ask "do you know it", and you answer "yes, I know it". Then we discover the clock stopped, you had luck. Were you right? Yes. Was your belief justified? Well, yes (the clock says so). Your belief was based on the clock working. The clock didn't work, you had luck and guessed the time. You didn't have knowledge (even thought you had a justification).

>> No.4611130

>>4611090
It's not an oxymoron. Right now I don't remember an specific example of this (I can think of Vulcano, Aristotle's physics and shit like that but it's not the exact example you want, since those would be incorrect hypotheses making true predictions thanks to additional suppositions), but one hypothesis is NEVER contrasted alone: it depends on initial conditions (technology, environmental factors, etc.) and additional suppositions ("X and Y theories are true", etc.), never on hypotheses alone. One hypothesis can be true and still make wrong predictions.

>> No.4611133

>>4611098
Well, he ended up in jail for pedo. But apparently he didn't.

>> No.4611147

>>4611091

We are discussing the concept of Absolute Truth and Falseness.

You are begining to speak of "somehow absolute", this is quite a different stance than the one we could assume as your thesis. If the conditions depend on empirical or lingüistic -in the sense of logic- factors, the absolute value of both concepts disapears.

Truth and false, have different meanings in different contexts, we can formulate games in which we subvert, for the fun what you seem to call "veritative values", if veritative values are subverted, and vary from a game to another, the absolute value of both concepts disapears.

If propositions, only take place in our language games, and therefore do not cover the whole of things there are, the values of truth and falseness of a set that lets other sets outside of it's reach, can not formulate absolute values. It can indeed formulate absoluteness for the given scope of its reach, in this regard, the absolute value of both concepts disapears.

>> No.4611149

>>4611104
I was thinking more about an observational justification that can be verified, not epistemological

>> No.4611175

>>4611147
>If the conditions depend on empirical or lingüistic -in the sense of logic- factors, the absolute value of both concepts disapears.
No: facts are what they are, ok? Any proposition making an accurate description of facts is true, as true as a tautology (the problem appears when we want to admit it as knowledge), but it's a truth. Truth is just a matter of proposition-fact. It can be true or false, not "in-between". We can get a bunch of propositions and take them as a whole... then we can say "it's part true" since there are some true propositions and some false propositions in the set. But it's somehow "absolute" (black or white, no grey).
>Truth and false, have different meanings in different contexts
I think I made explicit before I was talking about logic. Not about "telling your true feelings" or shit like that.
>we can formulate games in which we subvert, for the fun what you seem to call "veritative values", if veritative values are subverted, and vary from a game to another, the absolute value of both concepts disapears.
We only change the meaning of words here. Not the logical value of truthfulness.
> If propositions, only take place in our language games, and therefore do not cover the whole of things there are, the values of truth and falseness of a set that lets other sets outside of it's reach, can not formulate absolute values. It can indeed formulate absoluteness for the given scope of its reach, in this regard, the absolute value of both concepts disapears.
You misinterpret what I meant by absolute. I'm not talking in a hegelian sense of absolute. I talk about propositions having a value (+ or -, 1 or 0, true or false). That's absolute, there's no grade. Our propositions only exist on our language games, and the conditions of truthfulness depend on the facts. Truth, as a value, Only pertains to propositions. True propositions are the ones which happen to correspond with the facts (which are never true/false, they just are, even if you can't find the way to express them propositionally).

>> No.4611179

>>4611149
Well, then we were talking about different stuff. But I don't really understand what you mean. Maybe a "simpler" (more intuitive) version of what I was saying?

>> No.4611181

>>4611175
>depend on the facts

their status as fact depends on the rules you've set for the game. even in logic. i mean you might agree with that already i just scrolled by this thread.

>> No.4611183

Well, I'm out for today, guys. Tomorrow we may continue.

>> No.4611187

>>4611183
Sleep tight and thanks for the fun.

>> No.4611193

>>4611179
I simply meant that in justifying e.g. the statement "The snow is white" we go and see whether or not the snow is white. If the object in question corresponds with the predicate in question, then we are justified in saying that it is true, if not, not.

>> No.4611215
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4611215

>>4611175

Yeah well I think the veritative values of what we said, is relative to the conceptions of truth and falseness we had in mind when we formulated our respetive propositions.

;)

>> No.4611219

>>4611215
>respetive
respective

>> No.4612342

>>4611181
>their status as fact
If you mean that's a matter of what we feel like considering or not, yes. But facts are facts, even if we don't recognize them as such.
The problem I think you're talking about here is: when can we be 100% sure that what we consider (according to our language games' rules) facts are really facts? Well, never. We can approach a 99,9..% of sureness maybe. But our rules are always relative to a specific game, and there's no meta-game criteria. But I think 99% is enough to be pretty sure.
>>4611193
Ok, yeah, that's a justification (the problem I pointed out was that truth, belief and justification aren't enough ingredients to get actual knowledge).