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3756608 No.3756608 [Reply] [Original]

Why do postmodernists want to get rid of theoretical rigor, comprehensibility, and logic?

>> No.3756609

cuz they're full of shit and trying to camouflage and have dumb 1980s hipsters buy their trash.

>> No.3756611

cuz one must learn2talk from le hart; logic is fictitious and poisons everiteng

>> No.3756615

why so pietist?

>> No.3756654

>>3756608
Because of intellectual integrity.

inb4 smug response of someone who doesn't realise logic isn't founded in anything

>> No.3756680

Here's what Judith Butler had to say:

'It would be a mistake to think that received grammar is the best vehicle for expressing radical views, given the constraints that grammar imposes upon thought, indeed upon the thinkable itself. But formulations that twist grammar or that implicitly call into question the subject-verb requirements of propositional sense are clearly irritating for some. They produce more work for their readers, and sometimes their readers are offended by such demands. Are those who are offended making a legitimate request for “plain speaking” or does their complaint emerge from a consumer expectation of intellectual life? Is there, perhaps a value to be derived from such experiences of linguistic difficulty? If gender itself is naturalized through grammatical norms, as Monique Wittig has argued, then the alteration of gender at the most fundamental epistemic level will be conducted, in part, through contesting the grammar in which gender is given.

The demand for lucidity forgets the ruses that motor the ostensibly “clear” view. Avital Ronell recalls the moment in which Nixon looked into the eyes of the nation and said, “let me make one thing perfectly clear” and then proceeded to lie. What travels under the sign of “clarity” and what would be the price of failing to deploy a certain critical suspicion when the arrival of lucidity is announced? Who devises the protocols of “clarity” and whose interests do they serve? What is foreclosed by the insistence on parochial standards of transparency as requisite for all communication? What does “transparency” keep obscure?'

>> No.3756682

>>3756680
Wow, I literally stupid reading after the first sentence. She's an idiot. What evidence does she have to support that?

>> No.3756686

>>3756680
When Nixon lied he was trying to make it appear as a truth. To be a good lie it must look exactly like a truth: what does this imply? Truths are clear. Everything clear is true? No. But everything true CAN be expressed clearly. When something cannot be expressed clearly it's legitimate to ask for what it's based on, because it's suspicious of being not true.

Transparency and cleanliness only serve a pragmatic cause. Do you want me to understand you? Try to be clear. Do you want me to confuse me? Use obscure expressions.

What do totalitarian (and not so totalitarian) regimes do? They pervert the language, they confuse the people: this is how they manipulate the people, making their vocabulary obscure - But they try to make it look like what they say is clear - Of course, because it must look like if it's a truth.

>> No.3756687

>>3756682
generally the structure of discourse is that the first statement is developed into an argument by the following sentences

also The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House et al

>> No.3756692

>>3756687
Well she's proven wrong by... science. Ta-daa, I wonder how many scientists has completely thrown the old aside knowledge and invented new paradigms because of the knowledge they had so they could see the flaws of old system, contra the people who knew absolutetely nothing and had the insight of being "radical".

captcha: brough onanise

I thought it to be fitting.

>> No.3756698

>>3756692

Do you even speak English

>> No.3756712

>'It would be a mistake to think that received grammar is the best vehicle for expressing radical views, given the constraints that grammar imposes upon thought, indeed upon the thinkable itself. But formulations that twist grammar or that implicitly call into question the subject-verb requirements of propositional sense are clearly irritating for some. They produce more work for their readers, and sometimes their readers are offended by such demands.

I'm merely proving a point.

>> No.3756720

>>3756692
Newton was an alchemist and drew his theory of gravity at least in part from alchemy and occult knowledge. I'm not a scientist, but dozens of examples can obviously be found. What you're saying is in step with what she is, anyway, because throwing away old knowledge and inventing new paradigms is exactly what being radical means. I'm not really sure what you're arguing, actually, except that science is good and proves everything you think to be right.

Abandoning "plain truth" doesn't force us to work without any guidance at all, certainly not as a pium desiderium which bids one to lawlessness and a romantic lust to lose sight of land, but it does prevent us from falling into obfuscation through assertions like "science proves you wrong" given without scientific evidence.

>> No.3756718

>>3756686
One of the oldest and dumbest prejudices is that the truth owes it to us to be simple and comprehensible. Expressing a truth can be no more simple than that truth itself is. While a truth should be expressed as clear as possible for pragmatic purposes, some notions simply aren't simple. So these notions are necessarily expressed in a complex manner or simplified while sacrificing truth. In the former case the most clear expression might still be horribly obscure to the uninitiated. To say that all truths are clear or must be clear is to demand that existence conforms to the human mind and thereby to logic. We have no reason to believe that it will.

>> No.3756736

>>3756720
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isaac_Newton

read this

>> No.3756742

>>3756718
>truth owes it to us
But this isn't what I said.
>Expressing a truth can be no more simple than that truth itself is
But we invented concepts to express truths clearly. That's is the whole point of cognition and understanding.
Read my post again: I didn't say truths ARE clear. I said truths CAN be expressed clearly. We often invent new languages to express truths that are too complex to be expressed clearly with the natural language (e.g. physics are expressed with mathematics).

>> No.3756748

>>3756742

When I look at a physics equation, I don't understand shit.

>> No.3756752

>>3756718
>>3756742
Btw, when I said
>what does this imply? Truths are clear.
I didn't mean I say this, I was making explicit an implication.

>> No.3756753

>>3756742
>truths
>being capable of being expressed at all

>> No.3756757
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3756757

>>3756608

Because they lack theoretical rigor, comprehensibility, and logic.

/thread

>> No.3756758

>>3756748
Because you don't know shit about physics. Learn the language and you will start seeing it clear. This is why Hawkins is famous: he can explain with natural language what most people can only explain with formulas.

>> No.3756760
File: 211 KB, 500x286, tumblr_m9n1xdQIhN1rtpha2o1_500.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
3756760

>>3756736
>In his Hypothesis of Light of 1675, Newton posited the existence of the ether to transmit forces between particles. The contact with the theosophist Henry More, revived his interest in alchemy. He replaced the ether with occult forces based on Hermetic ideas of attraction and repulsion between particles. John Maynard Keynes, who acquired many of Newton's writings on alchemy, stated that "Newton was not the first of the age of reason: He was the last of the magicians." Newton's interest in alchemy cannot be isolated from his contributions to science. This was at a time when there was no clear distinction between alchemy and science. Had he not relied on the occult idea of action at a distance, across a vacuum, he might not have developed his theory of gravity.

I'm still not sure what you're saying

>> No.3756761

>>3756753
I'm a human being.
>Yes, I'm a wizard.

>> No.3756764

>>3756758
>Because you don't know shit about physics. Learn the language and you will start seeing it clear.

Exactly. Thank you and good night.

>> No.3756765

>>3756758
>he can explain with natural language
though he fails miserably at this; the amount of logical fallacies he committed in his le brief history of time... have you read it?

>> No.3756780

>>3756765
No, only watched some of his conferences a long ago. But it helped me understand a lot of stuff. Anyway, I'm not an expert on physics, I don't really know to what extent he's right or full of shit, he's the only one I've seen properly explaining physics to ignorant people.

>> No.3756785

>>3756760
I'm saying that you are misinterpreting the majority of Newtons career, which are the result of hard studies in scientific fields, to point out the fact that he also studied the occult.

I'm also saying that you seem to be comparing the scientific world of the 17th century to the one in the 21th century as of nothing has happened.

It's not the lack of "grammar" that created Newtons achievements. It is the huge and extensive knowledge of grammar and his ability to crticize it that allowed it.

You don't build the fastest airplane by NOT knowing about airplanes.
You build the fastest airplane by knowing a heck of a lot about airplanes and a lot more in other fields as well.

>> No.3756823

>>3756785
You're doing violence to Newton by assuming that study of science and study of alchemy is an either/or, and you've done nothing to show that his scientific theories were not at least partially inspired outside of the bounds of "science proper." I'm not even trying to prove anything about science right now. If we were talking about developments in the scientific world between the 17th century and now I'd talk about how the development of science obviously wasn't revealed to us by nature objectively but we're not even talking about that.

One benefit of abandoning "plain truth" is it often avoids reading your own biases into history, by the way :-)

>> No.3756827

>>3756823
I give up. You "win".

>> No.3756831

>>3756823
>you've done nothing to show that his scientific theories were not at least partially inspired outside of the bounds of "science proper."
Well, Newton practically defined what we consider "science proper" right now.

>> No.3756836

>>3756827
You declining to produce any further arguments has no bearing on the arguments already produced but ok

I suspect your stumbling point is that Newton was of course "a man of science" and thus what he does is given the approval seal of scientific inquiry as a genuine seeker of truth, but this of course reduces Newton to nothing but a scientist, which he certainly was not. As I said with biases—we value Newton today for nothing but his value as a scientist, but he wasn't just a scientist (rather a monster, in fact)

>> No.3756839

>>3756687
>The Master's Tools will Never Dismantle the Master's House

Never really got that. Shouldn't it be "the master's tools will always dismantle the master's house? I mean, isn't that what usually happens, both in a metaphoric sense and in the actual sense? The master's tools are sort of designed and intended to dismantle the master's house. I mean, if you're going to dismantle the master's house, what would you use? And if you're thinking in terms of people a in a metaphor, who's better placed and better motivated?

>> No.3756843

>>3756839
>Shouldn't it be "the master's tools will always dismantle the master's house?"

It's an ongoing debate in postcolonialism, and I kind of see where the other side is coming from. It's kind of deflating to offer a critique of your colonizers in their language, that you got from their educational system, etc. But on the other hand, publishing in some obscure African language is also going to marginalize your thought.

It's a tricky business.

>> No.3756847

>>3756760
People forget that the alchemists weren't just mystics. They were tremedously talented practical researchers. Many of their legitimate discoveries in terms of dyes, preservatives, reagents, inks and various aspects of metalurgy were used right down to the twentieth century. They differed from modern scientists mostly in that they concealed their knowledge instead of sharing it, and they had amystical theoretical basis for their practical explorations. Someone wrote a book on the last great triumph of alchemy, the discovery of a porcelain process that could be used practically to make china.

>> No.3756874

>>3756608
Rigor is not a rigorous concept.

And comprehensibility is a relative concept.

>> No.3757080

>>3756680
Judith Butler has the record for most bad writing awards.

>> No.3757707

>>3757080
I thought that was carnap.

>> No.3757720

Because postmodernists were modernists at one point. I.E they have gotten over such ideas, or so they would like to believe.

>> No.3757722

Cioran anally banging Derrida

>> No.3757733

>>3756608
Because rationality implodes upon itself. At the very heart of logic lie issues which are simply unable to be resolved. Just as a building built on mud has no strength, so too any structure built on weak foundations cannot support its own weight.

>> No.3757736

>>3756720
Copernicus appealled to discredited theories, as well, including the Pythagoreans.

>> No.3757769

>>3757733
It's better to build a building on mud than to build it on bullshit.

>> No.3757825

>>3756654

this.
post-modernists were only consistent in their position to the very end, even if it meant showing that, hey, guys, our shit's arbitrary.

this in no way, however, makes science impossible or rigor useless or whatever other baseless insult you want to make out of postmodernism. at best, they show the limits of what we can do with language. at worst, little bitches like OP misinterpret it and scream: POSTMODERNISTS STOOPID.

>> No.3757841

>>3757733
[citation needed]

>> No.3757854

>>3757733

nah, that's overstating shit. postmodernism points out the fundamentally arbitrary foundations, yes, this, however, in no way implies that it'd be better living in mud huts or smth. just know the limits, brah :j

>> No.3757874

>>3756758
>This is why Hawkins is famous: he can explain with natural language what most people can only explain with formulas.

No, it's because he came up with revolutionary theories in astrophysics.

>> No.3757879

hey guys, fuck off.

postmodernism isn't really a coherent movement, it's a period, which follows the major cultural shifts following the second world war. you cannot generalize about what postmoderns say without sounding like an idiot.

>> No.3757918

If they do it in fiction, I'm okay with this.
If they mess it up in politics and social science it gets ridiculous.

>> No.3758000

>>3757874
A lot of people came with revolutionary scientific theories but aren't famous. Outside the academic world he's famous because he can explain his theories in plain language.

>> No.3758012

Does anyone else see scientism, materialism and logical positivism as worldviews with primarily aesthetic concerns?

It's a nice thought that the truth can be revealed, that it is communicable, and we are all bound by the physical plane. Idealism is a lot harder to defend in a global society, so I think that's why it's been pushed aside. I don't think Materialists would deny having "beliefs" or idealizing a material world if they weren't at least a little concerned with aesthetics.

>> No.3758015

>>3757769
>>3757841
>>3757854

Induction is not as strong as you think:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/
http://www.academia.edu/809979/The_Problem_of_Deduction_Humes_Problem_Expanded

>> No.3758017

>>3758012
How old are you? Just answer me this question.

>> No.3758019

>>3757825
>they show the limits of what we can do with language
Wittgenstein already did it. And he did it better. post-modernism is famous for other things like taking bullshit too seriously (e.g. Sokal's troll article).

>> No.3758035
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3758035

>>3758017
19

>> No.3758047

>>3758015
It's still stronger than pseudo-scientific bullshit.
Don't link me to those entry level articles, I already know how induction works.

>>3758012
>Does anyone else see scientism, materialism and logical positivism as worldviews with primarily aesthetic concerns?
No. Anyway, realism is better than all that shit.
>so I think that's why it's been pushed aside.
It's been pushed aside because idealism is laughable.

>> No.3758056

>>3758052
Well, this too.

>> No.3758052

>>3758000

no its because black holes are cool and he's iconic in his wheelchair

>> No.3758064

>>3758047
>It's been pushed aside because idealism is laughable.

They aren't mutually exclusive though. Materialism can be understood as an ideal, and ideals can be understood as material, right? Like, they exist in your brain as matter.

>> No.3758067

>>3758047
>pseudo-scientific bullshit

You are not even funny. Just stop tripping

>> No.3758075

>>3758019

I agree, wittgenstein did it. not sure if better, but sure, he did.

but the problem is shown by the very inclusion of sokal's article in the problem. namely, the problem with postmodernism is that dipshits think it is this trolling thing, when the few serious authors post-modernism had would not have fallen for any of that. of course, there's the fashion side, too, but I'd like to think that there was something serious behind all that, too.

>> No.3758077

>>3758015

and induction is related to postmodernism or logic how exactly?

read something on postmodernism first, before spouting any irrelevant crap.

>> No.3758087

>>3758012

all the relativity and complexity of real world dispels any aesthetic concerns, since the picture painted by realism is, by no means, a simple or an elegant one. on the contrary, it's complicated and chaotic as fuck. nothing aesthetic about this.

idealism, on the other hand, is pretty simple and beautiful, just like a pastime fancy should be.

>> No.3758098

>>3758012
As a science student I'd say this is one of the most interesting post in this thread.

>>3756761

And what is a human being ?

>>3758047
What kind of realism and idealism are you talking about ? Those word have very different definitions depending on the context.

Also, if you think there is no sort of aesthetical concern in the requisit physicists impose upon their own theories, then clearly you have never met a physicist (or at least a physicist with a strong knack for theory).

>> No.3758102

>>3758064
Naturalism tries to go beyond this. Dualism only leads to confusion.
>>3758067
Induction is the best method we have. If you still don't know it, then you need to wake up. I know it doesn't bring absolute knowledge. Hell, EVERYBODY knows it. This doesn't mean it's the best (and only?) way to achieve knowledge. Now go back to read Foucault and Lacan.
>>3758075
It's disliked because of the legion of fans it brought. It became popular and every student started taking the worst of those authors and taking it to ridiculous levels. See, this >>3758015 is an example of the kind of people who make everybody hate post-modernism.

>> No.3758108

>>3758087
Same problem as above. What do you mean by realism ? This word has been used by both sides of various debates with different meanings for centuries.

What picture is "painted" by realism ?

>> No.3758114

>>3758087
Pretty much.
>>3758098
A member of our species. An homo sapiens sapiens.

Realism as in "there's a world existing out there outside of my representations that causes them". Idealism as in Hegel's "real=rational, rational=real" and shit like that.

>> No.3758120

>>3758102
>This doesn't mean it's NOT
Forgot the "not".

>> No.3758123

>>3756680
>given the constraints that grammar imposes upon thought, indeed upon the thinkable itself

So.... Grammar is the root of all evil?

...Holy shit, Stallman was right. We need to all learn Lisp right now.

>> No.3758160

>>3758114
Homo sapiens sapiens is a subspecies, not a species.

What does it mean to be an homo sapiens sapiens ?

>Realism as in "there's a world existing out there outside of my representations that causes them".
I don't see how this is averse to putting aesthetic concerns in study of this outside world. Kant wrote, if I remember well, that transcendental realists (the realists you described) are empirical idealists.

> Idealism as in Hegel's "real=rational, rational=real" and shit like that.

I haven't read Hegel, but the idea that the real is constituted by was is rationally determinable seems to fit quite well with the practice of modern science. There would a lot of idealism in scientists way of thinking about their own activity.

>> No.3758171
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3758171

>>3758087
I, at least, cannot comprehend a "real world". My perspective is limited and I think idealism is born out of that in a sense. You do see some people aesthetisizing the "real world" though, like Sagan.

This is why I have a problem with reductionism. I can comprehend an atom, but I cannot comprehend EVERY atom in a miniscule space, let alone the universe. Reductionists try to deny that things can be more than the sum of their parts, yet they ascribe definitions to macrocosmic entities like "humans" or the "universe." To me, the idea that atoms and cells and organs combine to form a unified human "self" or identity is just as ludicrous as saying the universe adds up to more than the sum of it's parts, which would be God, I guess. Like, I can comprehend 1, or a trillion, but I cannot comprehend a trillion 1's. I must ascribe a new sign for a trillion 1's, being a trillion, which does not actually exist, right?

I think the macrocosmic/microcosmic dichotomy is important right now. The popularization of neuroscience has led to all human experience being relegated to neurological occurrences. This is like saying that all physical relations are atomic. Even atomic interactions don't have an effect on the quantum level (so I've heard.)

One last thing: I watched a video where Neil Degrass Tyson basically refutes the idea that the universe has a "purpose". I see this as extremely illogical, because only humans may have or assign purpose to things, and the question anthropomorphizes the universe. The universe has no more "purpose" than it has "purposelessness". Autistics are less likely to anthropomorphize objects, yet we see Autism as an inherent problem in Western culture. That, I believe, is an example of idealism.

Okay I'm done. Pic related.

>> No.3758180

>>3758160
>What does it mean to be an homo sapiens sapiens ?
It means being able to reproduce with humans and having a set of characteristics similar to other humans (such as being able to talk etc). What's next, Socrates? "Define 'define'"?
Lol Kant. I don't care about him. I'm realist, not "transcendental realist". And aesthetics had nothing to do with what I was talking about. I was talking about ontology. What's wrong with Hegel is that reality is something that doesn't depend on our mind, even if we cannot conceive it.

>> No.3758188 [DELETED] 

You're an idiot.
Do you understand how many academic philosophers world-wide would laugh at your biased and pure unadulterated horseshit?

Both, dualism and idealism, have their arguments; If you think that dualism borderlines with Descartes and idealism with Hegel, you're either (i) an idiot, as i mentioned earlier, who got into philosophy for the wrong reasons; (ii) a philosophy dummy who needs to do/catch-up with contemporary-stuff on Philosophy of Mind; or (iii) both.

Where do you put yourself, faggot? You come off as an uninformed fedora-wearing-rebbiter of the highest kind.

>> No.3758192

>>3758102
You're an idiot.
Do you understand how many academic philosophers world-wide would laugh at your biased and pure unadulterated horseshit?

Both, dualism and idealism, have their arguments; If you think that dualism borderlines with Descartes and idealism with Hegel, you're either (i) an idiot, as i mentioned earlier, who got into philosophy for the wrong reasons; (ii) a philosophy dummy who needs to do/catch-up with contemporary-stuff on Philosophy of Mind; or (iii) both.

Where do you put yourself, faggot? You come off as an uninformed fedora-wearing-rebbiter of the highest kind.

>> No.3758193

>>3758171

naw, baby. the reductionism you talked about used to be a thing, but there are very few scientists who actually think like that. read some on emergentism or whatever. it's pretty widely accepted, that, even while one level of the world is made up of a smaller level, the laws of the higher level can not be reduced to the laws of the lower level.

what you expressed is a preconception of realism, or, how I define it, the mainstream look at reality in science these days. but reductionism is not nearly as prevalent as some (older) theorists would have you believe.

the agrument against argument against universe having a purpose is pointless. statement that universe has a purpose is in no way equivalent to statement that it doesn't have a purpose. you yourself recognized how retarded of a question that is, but some do believe that world has a meaning, a higher purpose, I assume this is what that guy (whoever he is) opposed.

>> No.3758197

>>3758180

if all you have to say about kant is "lol kant" you have no business talking about philosophy

>> No.3758198

>>3756608
Because in the works of Pynchon, a predominant concept is the distinction between feminine and masculine. Therefore, the characteristic theme of the works of Pynchon is the role of the poet as participant. Wilson implies that we have to choose between postdialectic dematerialism and subpatriarchial objectivism.

“Class is part of the absurdity of truth,” says Derrida; however, according to Prinn , it is not so much class that is part of the absurdity of truth, but rather the meaninglessness, and eventually the absurdity, of class. It could be said that Sontag promotes the use of neotextual socialism to analyse and read narrativity. The example of postdialectic dematerialism intrinsic to Smith’s Dogma emerges again in Mallrats, although in a more mythopoetical sense.

In a sense, Foucault uses the term ‘capitalist discourse’ to denote the stasis, and thus the failure, of poststructuralist class. The main theme of Buxton’s essay on postdialectic dematerialism is a self-justifying reality.

It could be said that Bataille suggests the use of nihilism to deconstruct class divisions. The premise of postdialectic dematerialism holds that sexual identity, perhaps ironically, has objective value.

Thus, if nihilism holds, the works of Smith are reminiscent of McLaren. Any number of narratives concerning the cultural paradigm of context may be found.

>> No.3758206
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3758206

>>3758180
>philosophy discussion
>"I don't care about Kant"

>> No.3758205

>>3758198
And of course if one examines modern subcultural theory, one is faced with a choice: either reject neotextual discourse or conclude that academe is fundamentally meaningless, given that reality is distinct from culture. It could be said that Lacan promotes the use of modern subcultural theory to deconstruct and modify class. The main theme of the works of Eco is a posttextual totality.

In the works of Eco, a predominant concept is the concept of deconstructivist reality. Therefore, the subject is interpolated into a neotextual discourse that includes consciousness as a whole. If capitalist narrative holds, we have to choose between neotextual discourse and Lyotardist narrative.

It could be said that several narratives concerning capitalist narrative may be revealed. The subject is contextualised into a subdialectic libertarianism that includes truth as a totality.

Therefore, la Fournier holds that the works of Eco are postmodern. Bataille suggests the use of neotextual discourse to challenge hierarchy.

It could be said that the characteristic theme of la Fournier’s essay on capitalist narrative is the bridge between sexual identity and language. Foucault promotes the use of subtextual discourse to read class.

Thus, if neotextual discourse holds, we have to choose between capitalist narrative and constructive postcultural theory. A number of theories concerning a mythopoetical paradox exist.

>> No.3758208

>>3758171
>The popularization of neuroscience has led to all human experience being relegated to neurological occurrences.
Well, one thing is saying human experience is based on neurological occurrences and cannot exist without them. But saying that's all there is... That's a very extreme vision.

I pretty much agree with you. I don't understand the last line, though. The example of idealism is anthropomorphizing? Then I'd say yes.

btw, I'm this >>3758180, dropped the trip to post on another board and forgot to put it back.

>> No.3758212

>>3758205
But don't forget the textual paradigm of reality, one is faced with a choice: either accept neotextual discourse or conclude that the raison d’etre of the observer is significant form. However, in The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, Eco examines subcapitalist discourse; in The Name of the Rose he affirms neotextual discourse. Bataille’s analysis of capitalist narrative states that art is part of the stasis of narrativity, but only if the premise of modern subcultural theory is invalid.

“Society is dead,” says Marx; however, according to Long , it is not so much society that is dead, but rather the defining characteristic, and thus the dialectic, of society. But the opening/closing distinction intrinsic to Eco’s The Limits of Interpretation (Advances in Semiotics) is also evident in The Name of the Rose. Derrida suggests the use of capitalist narrative to attack capitalism.

Therefore, the subject is interpolated into a neotextual discourse that includes reality as a whole. Lyotard promotes the use of Sontagist camp to deconstruct and modify sexual identity.

In a sense, Geoffrey implies that the works of Eco are modernistic. Many theories concerning capitalist narrative may be discovered.

But the example of neotextual discourse prevalent in Eco’s The Limits of Interpretation (Advances in Semiotics) emerges again in The Island of the Day Before, although in a more self-falsifying sense. Lacan’s essay on modern subcultural theory states that narrativity serves to exploit the underprivileged.

>> No.3758215

Everytime someone asks you some pseudo-deep question like what is the meaning of life and you answer them "whatever makes you happy" or "you must create your own meaning" you are being post modernist.

Pros of postmodernism: it washes away the old bullshit

Cons of postmodernism: it creates a lot of new bullshit since nothing is outside the text

Don't be mad rationalists just because you don't understand postmodern thinkers there is other ways of being logical and analytic

>> No.3758216

>>3758212
>>3758212
>>3758205
>>3758198

Babby's first postmodern essay generator

>> No.3758222

Suppose you are an intellectual imposter with nothing to say, but with strong ambitions to succeed in academic life. Postmodernism allows you to do this.

>> No.3758223

>>3758215
>Nothing is outside the text
Except many postmodern thinkers are coming to grips with the limitations of reading the world like a text. A lot of postmodernist history and sociology is more empirical than stereotypes would have you believe. See: Patrick Joyce, Nikolas Rose, Peter Miller, and of course, the later Foucault.

>> No.3758224

>>3758192
>Where do you put yourself, faggot?
I said that before. Realism (ontologically speaking), naturalism (epistemologically speaking). Stop being mad, you're pathetic.

>>3758197
>>3758206
I have to say I ignore Kant's vocabulary. I said I was realist, not "trascendetal" realist. That vocabulary isn't needed at all on this discussion. All this people craving Kant's cock makes me think that you didn't actually read him or that you didn't read anything related to epistemology from the 20th century.

>> No.3758232

>>3758224
I simply found it amusing you dismissed one of the most, if not the most, influential thinkers in Western epistemology. The reasoning and explanation in your posts is already pretty slim, so it kinda hurts your credibility...

>> No.3758249

>>3758180
>I d'ont care about Kant
You discuss philosophy but you don't care about important philosophers ? You post in a thread about intellectual rigor but you d'ont care about properly defining the terms you use. Sigh.
>I'm realist not "transcendental realist"
If you don't know what transcendental realist means you can't be sure that you aren't one. Do you know what it is ? Realist is a buzzword. In a debate about logical rigor, using it without clarifying what you mean is a best being oblivious, at worst being a fraud.

>And aesthetics had nothing to do with what I was talking about.
The argument we're currently having began because someone asked wether they are aesthetics concerns in the principle of science or scientism and you answered by "no". I meant to discuss that. So we were discussing aesthetics, tangentially.

>What's wrong with Hegel is that reality is something that doesn't depend on our mind, even if we cannot conceive it.
In this case you are assuming that there is "something" outside of our shpere of perception and conceptualization, that exists or at least can possibly exist but of which we can't say anything about and we can't have a proper concept of it. Sounds very much Kantian to me, except with more reckelessness in that you assume the "outside world" exists instead of simply refraining from making positive statements about it.

This point of view is legit, but it hasn't much to do with realism: if your reality is something we can't talk about (at least not about what it is in itself) your realism is not functionally different from the idealism you described. You're like an idealist (in the sense you used above) who would say: "actually, real is not rational, but as for that kind of reality we can't have any concept of it". In this case you would be a cautious idealist.

Unless you think this outside reality has significant influence on our rationality even tough we can't grasp it, of course.

>> No.3758258

>>3758223
I agree, I was trying to imply that with postmodernism nothing is sacred but I delivered that poorly.

And yes I surely hope no one is putting the qualitative over the quantifiable or vice versa. When it concerns humans both have merit since we often do interpret the world in terms of logic but also, we create narratives based in language, that are equally important if not more important.

>> No.3758261 [DELETED] 

At times I think the only reason philosophers write something is to make others feel happy (powerful) when they pretend (in front of themselves as well) that they understand and explain it to others. This doesn't apply to everything a philosopher writes, but some parts of (continental philosophy) just sound like this:

Nietzsche: I have taken a massive shit on a badger and then roundhouse kicked the sky into cat.

His commentators: Here we have an ironic comment about the transvalutive post-historical dichotomy of quasi-dialectical reductionism manifested as existential ressentiment for the basis of badger-related nihilism stemming from the essence of matter as form and feces.

>> No.3758265
File: 17 KB, 479x344, jack the ridah.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
3758265

At times I think the only reason philosophers write something is to make others feel happy (powerful) when they pretend (in front of themselves as well) that they understand and explain it to others. This doesn't apply to everything a philosopher writes, but some parts of (continental philosophy) just sound like this:

Lacan: I have taken a massive shit on a badger and then roundhouse kicked the sky into cat.

His commentators: Here we have an ironic comment about the transvalutive post-historical dichotomy of quasi-dialectical reductionism manifested as existential signifier for the basis of badger-related neurosis stemming from the essence of matter as form and feces as described in Freud.

>> No.3758267

>>3758193
I mainly just see this kind of reductionism as problematic in neuroscience. Neuroscience should always be based on Eliminative materialism. It isn't reconcilable with psychology.

>>3758208
>The example of idealism is anthropomorphizing?

Yes, and calling autistics or other mental outliers an inherent problem, which is straight out of psychiatry. I blame big pharma mostly for what neuroscience is becoming.

>>3758215
>you must create your own meaning

SO BORING

>> No.3758273

>>3758267
>SO BORING

Indeed I feel like punching someone in the face when someone says that.

>> No.3758274

>>3758265
There's nothing comforting or empowering about Post-structuralism.

>> No.3758279

>>3758224
>I have to say I ignore Kant's vocabulary.
Then how can you dismiss it ? Saying "I don't know what this means" will not get you beheaded.
And I merely used Kantian vocabulary to show that someone considered an idealist in a context can be said a realist in another, and vice versa. Hence my demand that you clarify what you mean by realist.

>I said that before. Realism (ontologically speaking), naturalism (epistemologically speaking).
Now that's better. But it still don't see what it has to do with your claim that: "realism is better than all that shit." (shit being aesthetic concerns and some form of idealism that you seem to associate with it). Naturalism doesn't preclude aesthetic filter since you will always need a way to properly phrase a description of nature's way (and that description will as such be judged by all kinds of linguistical standards, including possibly aesthetical ones). As for ontology, this is a bit irrelevant to the practice of science, and so it has been for centuries.

>> No.3758281

>>3758273
Yeah, they completely ignore the importance of a million other factors and relegate all meaning to the self. It's Facebook-tier thinking when taken out of context in Existentialism.

IMO, Philosophy has never solved any problems and science creates as many new ones as it solves. Questions are more important than answers in both, I think.

>> No.3758282
File: 39 KB, 500x500, Jack the Ridah strikes again.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
3758282

>>3758274
I just meant it in a nietzschean sense of feeling full of yourself when you think you understand (have control over) something no matter how wrong you are.

>> No.3758294

>>3758282
I love how this pic is supposed to have the last word written in some kind of French while the word is the same in both French and English (save for the accent). Sorry for being off-topic.

>> No.3758300

>>3758281
>Plebeians gonna pleb

I don't know would be a better answer and in my fantasy they would then go on explaining why they don't know laying bare the complexity of the universe which will lead to a two way explorative dialogue, and then both parties would probably have had an awesome time

>> No.3758301

>>3758265
There is gobbledygook in every discipline, though. I guess postmodernism is especially prone to mouthfuls of lingo because it is primarily a rejection of past ways of thinking about the world. Whereas the pursuit of nation-building historians has been to create a triumphalist account, a postmodern historian generally prides him or herself on "deconstructing" nation-building assumptions to create a new interpretation of the past. This requires a new way of thinking and speaking about the past.

>> No.3758312

>>3758300
I hope this happens over the next few generations. I think people are slowly realizing that academic partisanship is just as ineffective as political partisanship.

It would be great if disagreements could be expressed without rejecting other schools of thought. I'm working on my biases against people like Dawkins, Hitchens and Harris. I think they all have some pleasant things to say when you remove the sensationalism and dogmatic thinking inherent in transference to the masses.

>> No.3758323

>>3758312
They can be fucking obnoxious, the only respect I have for Dawkins is the selfish gene, I think that was well written, Harris can suck a cock and Hitchens has a god tier attitude but when it comes to his spite for religion it sometimes gets too onesided

>> No.3758327

>>3758224

You are such a speglord. At first your abrasive posts offended my delicate sensibilities, but now I feel pity towards your humorous invectives and pathetic sham of a worldview

>> No.3758332

>>3758323
Hitchens isn't pretentious (unlike Dawkins) about his one-sidedness though. He makes assumptions and leaves questions unanswered but doesn't give the air of snobbishness that Dawkins does. After going through my edgy atheist phase at 13 I probably got more out of Hitchens than anyone else if only because of his rhetorical abilities. Also, I find his political and moral arguments against the existence of deities much more convincing than scientific and epistemological ones.

>> No.3758335

>>3758232
Fuck my credibility. I don't really care if you don't believe me.
>>3758249
>defining the terms you use
I defined them, are you blind or retarded? Ask if you want me to define something in particular instead of bitching.
>>3758249
I know what means, I just don't speak in Kant's terms. Stop being so dense.

I don't really think aesthetics are that relevant when talking about epistemology.

>we can't say anything about
No. We can say a lot of stuff about it (we don't have 100% certainty since there's no "direct" access to it). I'm not a fucking kantian, don't insult me, please. There is something that makes our representations exist. Trying to discuss against it is absurd, this has been proved throguhout the last century, this is definitely convinces me that this:
>All this people craving Kant's cock makes me think that you didn't actually read him or that you didn't read anything related to epistemology from the 20th century
was right, specifically the last part.

We definitely can talk about reality: it has a structure and we can gasp details from it (via induction, though) which make it possible for us to make predictions.

>Unless you think this outside reality has significant influence on our rationality even tough we can't grasp it.
I agree, most of the influence reality has on our rationality happens unconsciously. Our cognitive system makes inferences all the fucking time and we don't even realize it. Our rationality and our consciousness are the tip of the iceberg.
>>3758279
I didn't say I don't know what it means. I say it's totally irelevant to what I say.

Aesthetics are only relevant in the sense of "experience" or "perception". What I meant when "better than" I was referring to >scientism, materialism and logical positivism

>As for ontology, this is a bit irrelevant to the practice of science, and so it has been for centuries.
Well, it's definitely not for philosophy of science and epistemology (which is relevant to cognition and psychology).

>> No.3758340

>>3758312
>>3758300
>>3758281
>>3758332
>>3758323
>>3758267
>>3758208
>>3758171

I think you are confused. This discussion really belongs in >>>/sci/. You are welcome

>> No.3758345

>>3758335
>I don't really think aesthetics are that relevant when talking about epistemology.

confirmed troll

>> No.3758346

>>3758335
>No. We can say a lot of stuff about it (we don't have 100% certainty since there's no "direct" access to it). I'm not a fucking kantian, don't insult me, please. There is something that makes our representations exist.

>We definitely can talk about reality: it has a structure and we can gasp details from it (via induction, though) which make it possible for us to make predictions.


Your positivism is seeping through

>> No.3758347
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3758347

>>3758335
>I don't really think aesthetics are that relevant when talking about epistemology.

>> No.3758349

>>3758323
I'm just working on seeing their points from an aesthetic perspective. It may be projecting, but it makes more sense to me. I vehemently disagree with their critiques of religion as being sciences, but I also think there's something kind of comforting about it.

I think it's really bad that Harris uses neuroscience to "prove" that Islam is immoral, but I guess that's because I see radical Islam as more of a means of resisting Globalism than anything else. I find Secular Humanism restrictive but some of the arguments for it are quite eloquent.

>>3758332
They are all extremely helpful in understanding the prevalence of radical atheism today. I grew up in an irreligious household so I never really knew what people were so mad about. I guess I'm a bit sheltered.

>>3758340
We're discussing Philosophy of science here.

>> No.3758354

>>3758327
>speglord
Man, you can do better, we're not in highschool anymore. Anyway, stop talking about me, I'm not so important (and your opinion is absolutely irrelevant to me).
If you wanna discuss something worthy in particular I'll be waiting.
Btw, I'm glad I hurt your faggy ass. But you could try explain me exactly why, to enjoy it completely.

>> No.3758360

>>3758354
>If you wanna discuss something worthy in particular I'll be waiting.
Sure. Why don't you start?

>> No.3758362

>>3758340
No. Deal with it. You are welcome.

>>3758346
It's not positivism, it's realism. Positivists are much more empiricists than me. If you can give me an argument against what I said (I'm afraid you can't) I'll be happy to hear it.

>> No.3758364

>>3758332
I get that what I like about Hitchens is his use of immanent criticism of the abrahamic religions, I have huge respect for always attacking within the confines of the internal logics of scripture most others have the style equivalent of shouting "communists!" At North Korea.

>> No.3758370

>>3758362
> If you can give me an argument against what I said (I'm afraid you can't) I'll be happy to hear it.

Your arrogance is great.

>> No.3758371

>>3758340
New age atheism is postmodern and we are debating authors sorry if your jimbobs are rustled?

>> No.3758372

>>3758360
>But you could try explain me exactly why.
Referring to your
>delicate sensibilities
And then you can try to explain why my
>sham of a worldview
is "pathetic."

You now, pedantry isn't totally effective if you stop at name-calling. You need to go further.

>> No.3758375

>>3758370
I'm only arrogant when I can (when someone is applying adjectives to me without being able to actually discuss what I said and NO, greeentexting me isn't discussing what I said).

>> No.3758378

>>3758372
>You now
know

>> No.3758387

>>3758372
Okay how about this tripfaggot. Why don't you take five minutes to think about exactly what your position is on the philosophical issues that have been raised in this thread, then put your opinions into one condensed "authorized" post and I will then analyze what you have to say. If you wish to use words like "realism" or "naturalism" please post the definition you are using for those words.

>> No.3758389

>>3758349
>radical Islam as more of a means of resisting Globalism than anything else

Yes, I see it the same way, add conspiratards, envirofascists and neonazis to the equation and you have the "modern resistance"

>> No.3758397

>>3758335
>idealism is laughable
>induction is the best (only?) method to achieve knowledge

You're a cancer. Good luck with developing mathematics with induction, idiot.

>> No.3758414

>>3758389
Yeah pretty much, though I'm sympathetic to all of them to a degree. I disagree with the American notion of Progressivism as wanting to abandon one's own traditional social values and applying that to some global metanarrative. I see "diversity" of all types as inherent in American culture, but I think it's also important to recognize places where the same kind of diversity isn't valued, like most high-context cultures.

I have problems and sympathies with both parties though.

>> No.3758434

>>3758327
>speglord
You misspelled smeglord

>> No.3758439

>>3758387
>definitions
Pffff... Again?
Realism: reality exists even without our representations. This reality has a structure. That structure can be perceived through our representations (it creates them). We can trust on our knowledge about that structure because we can make successful predictions.
Naturalism: our knowledge takes place in the natural world. We are animals, our consciousness and our rationality depend on our biologic structure. This doesn't mean our biologic structure is ALL there is: I've got consciousness, and it's not just brain cells, my consciousness is a process of my body. So, I'm refusing materialism and idealism, it leads to excessive reductionism.
>>3758397
No, thanks, I don't like mathematics. I love it when someone gets so mad he stops being able to use rationality to discuss and just says something like "idiot".

>> No.3758444

>>3758414
Exactly I like to think that they all grasp a part of the truth they are all just too blinded by their own part to see the totality not that anyone can (yet)

but I do think its boring sometimes not really believing in something myself

>> No.3758446

Question /lit/: Can one understand Post-modernism without understanding Modernism? Isn't it paradoxical to assume you can?

>> No.3758451

>>3758446

Not really. You can understand how the sweage works without understanding the process of digestion.

>> No.3758471

>>3758446
Well, it's not absolutely necessary, but it helps a lot. You need to understand what's Modernity to understand why post-modernism exists. But you can understand what post-modernism is without knowing why it does, anyway.

>> No.3758472

>>3758446
No they are 2 different paradigms or attitudes

But in some way one is the progression of the other towards more radical "relativism" than modernism, modernism still held to fantasies of a universe of meaning

But don't get me wrong I don't think there is any individuals who sincerely are radical relativists everyone thinks some ideas are better than others it's just the metafoundation has cracked or disappeared

>> No.3758478

>>3758444
>myself

Would you qualify the belief in self as analogous to belief in other concepts? It seems, to me at least, that as collectivist goals weaken along with tradition, people just turn inward. It's like, I don't think you can just replace something with nothing, and there's evidence that introspection is prone to just as many biases as the "modern resistance."

>>3758451
>>3758471
>>3758472
I guess some people can sort of "sense" it in a way, without knowing what it is. That claim isn't really any more falsifiable than ESP though.

>> No.3758481

>>3758439
>I don't like mathematics
That's your problem, son.

>> No.3758519
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3758519

>>3758481

>> No.3758531

>>3758478

Indeed. The advantage with postmodernism is that it is a bland, instinctive ideologicalish collection of thoughts, which makes it way easier to grasp.

>> No.3758549

>>3756692
Oh god, one of those "science" types. Go back to reddit.

>> No.3758550

>>3758478
>Would you qualify the belief in self as analogous to belief in other concepts?

No my perception is constructivist, so I think belief in the concept of self is more evident than outside phenomenon. I do not claim to know what the nature of the self is though I don't think we purely adapt to the surroundings nor is a product of pure predetermined biochemistry, I do think its a mix and I don't want to guess the ratio

So in essence we construct our own world within the limits of biochemistry/biology

And yes I don't believe introspection is the answer, I believe that "alternative belief systems" are evidence of a strong culture. Since I believe that real rugged individualism without collectivist goals would lead to more conformity exactly because nothing can't replace something, and this is my main beef with postmodernism.

>> No.3758562

>>3758335
I asked you repeatedly to define you terms. Only after did you proceed, albeit poorly. It took you three post to sort out a relatively clear argument. All that because I took he time of "bitching" about your post, as you say. So maybe that xasn't so useless after all. Don't be a smug and act like you were cogent and articulate from the get-go.

>I know what means, I just don't speak in Kant's terms.
Then you should have made it clear from start. Don't get mad at me, you're building your argument from my critics since I entered the debate. It's not my fault if you needed someone to play the teacher.

>We definitely can talk about reality: it has a structure and we can gasp details from it (via induction, though)
Then it is not reality in an ontological sense.
Again, you should have said it before. The only thing we get about your conception of external reality from your precedent post is that "it exists though we can't conceive it". By the account of what I quoted above in greentext, you say that we can know something about reality, but not with certainty (so it is a kind of relative empirical knowledge). You don't say anything about the "reality" per se. You still sound a bit like a transcendantal realist, and being offended for that is rather ridiculous (and also a bit strange).

>was right, specifically the last part.
Only the last part. Having (presumably) read on 20th century epistemology oesn't change the fact that you couldn't articulate a proper point until people called you out on your lack of substance. That's fair, not everyone is gonna be a good communicator, but don't ask to be treated like a provider of crystal-clear arguments.

>> No.3758564

>>3758562
cont'd
>I didn't say I don't know what it means

And I didn't say you did. But you never stated or showed that you understood, and by your reaction, you sounded like someone who simply doesn't want to clarify what he says. That's why I asked you if you understood the term. After you said "I'm not a transcendantal realist, I'm a realist". I remind you that at this point we were precisely trying to define what you mean by realism. So that was kinda relevant.

>I agree, most of the influence reality has on our rationality happens unconsciously. Our cognitive system makes inferences all the fucking time and we don't even realize it. Our rationality and our consciousness are the tip of the iceberg

Why didn't you start with that ? This alone is more relevant and interesting that everything else you posted in this thread.

>Aesthetics are only relevant in the sense of "experience" or "perception".

It also is in the determination of a method. There are principles which governs the way theories are built and selected in modern science, and aesthetics play a role in it. Physicist want they theories to be as simple and elegant as possible, even when it is actually harder to come with an elegant formulation. Principles of symetires are important assumptions about the form of theories in physics, and one of their main motives is to make sure theories please some aspects of our cognitive abilities.

>scientism, materialism and logical positivism
But you didn't explained in what they are better. That's precisely the question here.

>Well, it's definitely not for philosophy of science and epistemology
So you consider that ontology is a valid concern for naturalist scientists, at least in principle (because obviously in daily practice of experimental science you care mostly about what you can observe) ? Non-ironic question.

>> No.3758569

>>3758564
finis'd
I will have to quit now, I have an exam tomorrow and it is way too late in my country. But I'm glad we are starting to get at something. I'll see tomorrow if this thread is still alive.

>> No.3758584

>>3758550
Then I guess we agree on pretty much everything.

>>3758208
>But saying that's all there is... That's a very extreme vision.

I just want to say that this is the logic of people who say "depression is a chemical imbalance," as if happiness is any kind of natural state.

>> No.3758653

>>3758439

Ever heard of emergent materialism?

>> No.3758674

I did on
>>3758114
And what you said was ask where I put myself on. When you told me to define I did.
>"it exists though we can't conceive it"
This is not exactly what i said. We can know about the structure of the world, at least we can assume we do because we get trustworthy information through our experience. There's no phenomena/noumena distinction (that would make me a transcendental IDEALIST, that's what Kant calls his doctrine). Reality per se has a structure (this is a very important point). That structure is the only thing that "exists" outside of our representations (and we can know a lot of things about it). This fundamental structure is the "core", it's what there is (from an ontological perspective). Our representations are "fruit" of our biology which is just a part of the fundamental structure. There's no noumena in Kant's sense (there would implicitly be something that's beyond of our cognitive system which guarantees morality: remember that Kant tried to unify pure and practical reason, ethics have a metaphysical origin, metaphysical as in "noumena"). I don't really believe in a dualism phenomena/noumena: there's only (strictly speaking) structure. And everything is "inside" of it. Our representations don't happen in a transcendental point where transcendent and immanent coincide. That's very different from Kant's schema.
>Non-ironic question.
Yes. What interests me is the relation psychology/linguistics/metaphysics.<wbr> If we want to talk about epistemology and language we end up talking about metaphysics (so ontology). I've lately been craving Ted Sider's theories a lot (mereological nihilism, about the problems of parthood and change), google it, his papers are all online.

Now, quickly:
>scientism
I don't consider science the only relevant thing, I don't consider philosophy should disappear and be totally substituted by science. I think there shouldn't be a barrier between science and philosophy, but not one absorbing the other.

>> No.3758695

>>3758674
>materialism
Well, I think this was answer with the "naturalism" part. Consciousness cannot be completely reduced to the ideal nor to the material (both extremes of dualism, and a not so extreme position leads to a lot of problemas (descartes mind/body)). Everything exists on the same reality (monism).
>logical positivism
We can go beyond radical empiricism: we can talk about stuff even if we can't be sure about its existence, we can talk about metaphysics without being early XVII century rationalists.

>> No.3758701

>>3758267
>Yes, and calling autistics or other mental outliers an inherent problem, which is straight out of psychiatry.

That's the problem of "illness".
Illness is just a slight change of biological variables from the norm that a doctor finds problematic.
Autism is problematic because a doctor says so and he says so because our society has a certain standards of mental health that humans have to adapt to.
Mental health is the norm here and the doctor is just saying "this is not normal, hence it is an illness".
Medicine is very democratic in a way, and so is evolution, since human societies have been molding the environment of humans since a while.

>> No.3758705 [DELETED] 

>>3758653
Yes. Emergentism is one kind of materialism. There's a lot of discussion about different views on naturalism. But yeah, I like that side of the discussion.

>> No.3758715

>>3758653
Yes. Emergentism is one kind of naturalism. There's a lot of discussion about different views on naturalism. But yeah, I like that side of the discussion.

>> No.3758719

>>3758569
FUCK. Forgot to quote from
>>3758674
and
>>3758695

>> No.3758775

>>3758439
>Realism: reality exists even without our representations.
"That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination exist without the mind is what everybody will allow. And to me it seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them."

>This reality has a structure. That structure can be perceived through our representations (it creates them).
"But, though it were possible that solid, figured, movable substances may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know this? Either we must know it by sense or by reason. As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived by sense, call them what you will; but they do not inform us that things exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge. It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it must be by reason, inferring their existence from what is immediately perceived by sense. But what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the very patrons of matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary connection betwixt them and our ideas? I say it is granted on all hand (and what happens in dreams, frenzies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though no bodies existed without resembling them. Hence it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always, in the same order we seem them in at present, without their concurrence"

>> No.3758787

>>3758775
"On the basis of what I see, I ascribe properties to the object that presumably gave rise to this perception; I say that the table or its surface is beige in color, shiny, rectangular in shape, cluttered with books and papers. But now, it also follows from the received account that I COULD have had that very same perception, or at least one qualitatively indistinguishable from it, even if there were no such material external table. Consequently, if I INFER the existence and nature of the table from what I am seeing at a given time, I am making a leap that logic will not justify. . . Any single one of my perceptions, or all of them together, could be just as they are even if the posited external object had properties quite other that I judge it to have and even if it did not exist at all."

>> No.3758804

>>3758439
>We can trust on our knowledge about that structure because we can make successful predictions.

Ultimately the only basis I can have for a claim to know that there exists something other than my own perceptions is in the nature of those very perceptions. But they could be just as they are even if there did not exist anything else. Ergo, I have no basis for the knowledge-claim in question.

Now, whenever there is inference, assumption, or presumption, there is always the bare possibility of a mistake; and if each perceptual situation is thus open to mistake, so are all of them together. But the mistake we are speaking about are independent of one another; you don't have to be right in some perceptual judgments in order to be wrong in others, and being wrong in one case in no way makes it more difficult to be wrong in the next case.

Of course nobody doubts that we do indeed observe regularities in the sequence of our immediate perceptions and that in the conduct of daily life we greatly depend upon them; but such regularities give us no basis whatever for drawing conclusions, whether necessary or probable, as to the nature and existence of anything beyond those perceptions.

>> No.3758809

One thing that I find curious is that attackers of Post-modernism spend more time complaining about a book being incomprehensible rather than arguing against the points.
But those theories are not really that hard nor take that much time to study anymore, There are introductions, there are wikipedia pages, there is a lot of info available.

Let's face it the whole "it's not clear and rigorous" is just common anti-intellectualism. People are just finding excuses to not do their homework. And naturally as it always happens there is a whole lot of people that are ready to follow you, because nothing makes people happier than discovering their laziness excused.

>> No.3758817

>>3758439
Your definition of naturalism is not very well informed. I suggest you read this excellent article:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/

>> No.3758819

>>3758817
>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/
>The term ‘naturalism’ has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy

>> No.3758849

>>3758819
Did you read his definition? It's total crap

>> No.3758855

>>3756682
She's actually completely in the right here. Just look into research where cognitive science and linguistics intersect, there's proof everywhere that how our language is structured actually does constrain how we think.

>> No.3758889

>>3758849
Maybe because I'm not your teacher. I won't be doing extensive definitions of every word I use. I only tried to explain in what sense I was using naturalism (from an epistemological perspective based on biology). If you want to learn some concept use the fucking encyclopedia.

>> No.3758905

>>3758809
>"it's not clear and rigorous" is just common anti-intellectualism.
Whoa, no. Take your time and read why it's criticized. "It's not clear and rigorous" means "you're full of shit and try to hide it using vague and obscure words, so undergrads will be impressed and buy your books to look smart even though they won't be getting shit from what they read".

>> No.3758909

>>3758889

>>3758775
>>3758787
>>3758804

>> No.3758912

>>3758855
Somewhat, but not completely. The strong Sapir-Whorf hypothesis hasn't really stood up to serious scrutiny very well. There's decent support for the weak one, but that isn't enough to argue for full-on linguistic determinism.

I don't think what she's saying is entirely wrong, and I would certainly agree that new ideas sometimes demand new terms and new ways of speaking, but I also think that criticisms of obscurantism are often legitimate. I don't think that the Nixon example demonstrates anything beyond 'sometimes people lie.'

>> No.3758915

>>3758804
>But they could be just as they are even if there did not exist anything else.
You can't prove this. You need a reason to doubt, you don't have it. You can't negate your instincts without a reason (thank God, you would be dead by now if you could).
> possibility of a mistake
>no basis
Yes, we make mistakes. No, it's not true that we don't have a basis: we have experience, we have some hypotheses that have never been refuted and lead us to make thousands of successful predictions. This is a basis, this is a huge basis (actually, there's no other basis as strong as this). Read Wittgenstein's On Certainty, this discussion tires me, I've had it more than 5 times only on this board and always is the same.

>> No.3758920

>>3758905
Well I don't believe it's true.
I also don't think that most of those authors are particularly hard. They are as hard as most main authors in philosophy.

I mean seriously, are you gonna argue that the problem is the use of "big words"?

>> No.3758926

>>3758775
>Realism
Is that some kind of rebuttal? Because it's not. That part of text says NOTHING about reality, only about ideas and stuff related to our mind.

You should distinguish between things we know (AND we can justify) and things there are. Of course we only know with our mind, that would be absolutely fucking retarded to state otherwise. But INDUCTION, man. Fucking induction. Hint: the world doesn't disappear when you close your eyes.

>>3758787
It's not justified by logic: it's justified by repetition, experience and INSTINCTS the make us trust them.

>> No.3758931

>>3758912
My problems with the criticism of obscurantism is that it produces obscurantism.

The result is not people that know more, but people that know less. Instead of getting encouragement to read and study you get encouragement not to read. The result is physicists saying that physics solved philosophy and a population that has never read or understood kant.

And let's not tackle the fact the uniformity of style that goes on in analytic departments of philosophy. Which is not a good or particularly clear style, it's just tedious. Tedious because the prejudice is that something this boring must be serious and deep.

>> No.3758934

>>3758920
No, the problem is the use of vague language and masturbatory concepts for the sake of it. This is so true, the Sokal experiment worked. The point is: post-modernist fans were so used to swallow anything written with obscure indiscernible meaning that they swallowed something that had no meaning at all. The key is: if I talk a lot without saying nothing that can be really refuted I always will be right.

>> No.3758938

>>3758931
I prefer reading interesting stuff than bullshit.

>> No.3758944

>>3758934
So it's legitimate to claim that "science fans are so used to swallow anything written" just because there are science frauds?

>> No.3758949

>>3758944
Science frauds are the exception, philosophy frauds (talking specially about french philosophers) are the rule.

>> No.3758950

>>3758938
There is no guarantee that what you find interesting is not bullshit. Very non-rigorous criteria.

>> No.3758953

>>3758949
And what's more important: science frauds are ridiculed, philosophy frauds are praised.

>> No.3758964

>>3758949
You are being dishonest here. You gave me one example, you cannot draw a rule from a single example.

>> No.3758965

>>3758950
My rigorous criteria consists on looking for the people who say interesting stuff. It's easy to spot when someone has nothing to say, it's like on literature: a good writer doesn't use pompous words without a need. Philosophy is meant to help you understand stuff, not to make you stop understanding stuff forever.

>> No.3758969

>>3758964
I'm talking about all the "induction isn't absolute like logic so it has no rational basis" and anyone who subscribes it. Also, any kind of constructivism of facts/idealism/pseudo-scientifism.

>> No.3758973

>>3758953
No one praised sokal.

Yours is a bad argument that goes:
1) There is at least one proved fraud in philosophy.
2) Anyone who I do not like is a fraud.

>> No.3758983

>>3758969
Idealism is not a fraud. Is a serious metaphysics theory.

Also Russell and Popper admitted the problems with induction. Are they frauds too?

>> No.3758985

>>3758915
>But they could be just as they are even if there did not exist anything else.
You can't prove this.

You have not given me a reason why not. You have not disproven it.

>You need a reason to doubt it
What? I just gave you a reason

>You can't negate your instincts without a reason
I think you are assuming that just because you instinctively think something that everybody else must as well. That is false.

> this discussion tires me, I've had it more than 5 times only on this board and always is the same.
I think the reason you continue to have this conversation is because you do not read criticisms of your theory with an open mind. You dogmatise, and when somebody tries to open your mind, you firmly shut your eyes, put your hands over your head, and start to yell "I BELIEVE WHAT I BELIEVE AND SO IT MUST BE TRUE"

>>3758926
>That part of text says NOTHING about reality, only about ideas and stuff related to our mind.

You are missing the point. I am not saying that things DO NOT EXIST. I am questioning how you know anything about how they exist. Try rereading that post.


>It's not justified by logic: it's justified by repetition, experience and INSTINCTS the make us trust them.
These things are not the same for everyone, and if you spent anytime thinking about it, you would realize that the same things do not always appear the same way to you.

>> No.3758987

>>3758934
>The point is: post-modernist fans were so used to swallow anything written with obscure indiscernible meaning that they swallowed something that had no meaning at all.

1. That isn't the point. Sokal was criticized by his peer reviewers for having a bad writing style. (and the journal he submitted to already had a questionable reputation, it should be noted), but it was overlooked because he was a "name". That's the point, and it's a legitimate problem is a lot of fields: "names" often get a more lenient peer review.

2. A lot of people, including Derrida, knew immediately that the Sokal paper was a hoax well before Sokal revealed the hoax. So claiming that postmodernists fell for it wholeheartedly is a mischaracterization.

>> No.3758993

>>3758973
Sokal is a fraud? You can't call a fraud someone you've never read.
This isn't what I said at all. But I don't care anymore. Anti-intellectualism is helpless. Keep living in your incoherent world where everything could be a lie (but you will keep trusting your senses) forever, maybe you'll be happy there. Oh! Wait! Maybe we're only one soul! The same soul talking to itself! Whoa, dude! You can't disprove it! Check mate, realists!

>> No.3758996

>>3758931
I don't see those complaints as criticisms of obscurantism so much as mis-attributions of obscurantism. More people need to understand that obscurantism isn't the same as 'complicated,' 'dense,' or 'difficult to understand'; it's about deliberately making things confusing for the sake of it. There are some authors who apply obscurantism to a purpose, but I seriously doubt that most do.

Kant can be dense, but he doesn't go out of his way to make things hard to understand, so the people who complain about him being needlessly difficult don't really have a leg to stand on. On the other hand, I will admit that I've put down some of Lacan's works because I felt that what he had to say couldn't possibly be worth the effort it would take to figure it out (this attitude was encouraged by the fact that I haven't been terribly thrilled by the Lacan I have actually taken the time to dig into).

>> No.3759012

>>3758983
Admitting problems is what every serious philosopher ever has done. That was a very retarded implication since those two philosophers never behaved like post-structuralists nor did anything I've been criticizing (they both have serious flaws, though.. Russell won't give up trying his empiricist war trying to base knowledge on qualia and only Popper admitted every empirical contrastation gives more strength to a theory until people already praised him for his deductivism).

>> No.3759016

>>3758983
Also, try seeking who still takes idealism seriously nowadays and you will see how much it's respected.

>> No.3759036

>>3758993
Actually I'm a rationalist and not a relativist at all regarding to truth.

I just think that the current wave of naive scientific realists just cuts corners with too many problems.

And I also find that how people dismiss a lot of continental philosophy is basically through very bad arguments, especially strawmen (even if I agree that part of the problem is also due to some of their followers).

Ps. I read sokal, both the toward an hermeneutics... article and fashionable nonsense.

>> No.3759045

>>3759012
If something has a problem you can go two ways: you try to save it or you try to do without.

It seems that the only way not to be a fraud is to agree with your conclusions.

>> No.3759047

>>3758985
>You can't prove this.
Hurr. Your fucking instincts force you to trust your sense, you're lucky because if it depended on your scepticism you would probably be under a car right now. Really, read Wittgenstein.

What reason? "It can be all a lie" isn't a reason. "It happens like this every fucking time, and even my reflexes try to stop me" is a reason.
>I think the reason you continue to have this conversation is because you do not read criticisms of your theory with an open mind.
Trust me, I've done. they're all retarded. There's a reason why since the 80's nobody has seriously continued with this discussion anymore.
>I am questioning how you know
Because I have my whole life full of experience supporting so and the opposite is absurd. If I doubt this, I could just doubt everything even doubt itself. Seriosuly go read On Certainty right now, quick.
>These things are not the same for everyone
Try jumping from a 20th floor. I dare you. Is this the same for everyone?

>> No.3759052
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3759052

god I wish the mods would start deleting shit thread like this. it's painful to read this undergrad twaddle

>> No.3759061

>>3759036
>naive scientific realists
Logical positivism died like more than 20 years ago.
I don't dismiss ALL continental philosophy. I dismiss some post-modern views on epistemology and metaphysics.

>> No.3759067

>>3759052
This makes you sound like if you graduated. Studying a master or doing a PhD? On what?

>> No.3759074

>>3759012
Fuck, that last line makes no sense... i hope you get the meaning, I'm not rewriting it.

>> No.3759079

>>3758996
It's true that Lacan goes out of his way to make things complex, he admits so himself. But Lacan is not a philosopher and he was training analysts.

I've read quite a lot of Lacan, and I think that despite his theatrics he has stuff to say. Stuff that in a way is not easy to say or think since mostly is an attempt to rethink Hegel through the principles of structuralism and materialism.

>> No.3759089
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3759089

>>3759067

Sorry buddy, I refused to play that particular game.

Unlike most people, I don't need my hand held to understand a mature work of philosophy. Professors and the like would have been a hindrance, not a boon.

Plenty of ammo for your gun though. Go ahead, tell me I have no idea what I'm talking about.

>> No.3759104

>>3759061
Most philosophers are still scientific realists.

But anyway, I agree that some post-modern theories of epistemology are bad (others are not like the Lyotard book is pretty good) but you do know that Derrida does not agree with no postmodern theory of epistemology. If you say that you knew we are cool.

>> No.3759108

>>3759089
Ah, you didn't graduate, but you can tell what's undergrad twaddle because of your super-human intelligence and wisdom. I get it now.

>> No.3759119

>>3759104
Well, some of the most known amongst the post-modernist fans (Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze) are famous for hating being called post-modernists.

>> No.3759126
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3759126

>>3759108

I read World as Will and Representation when I was 15; Critique of Pure reason when I was 18. I've also worked on an edited version of the Muller translation of Critique which is currently ongoing.

What have you done? Shitposted on /lit/?

>> No.3759158

>>3759126
I read Wittgenstein's Tractatus when I was 5 and published my first book on metaphysics at 18. I'm famous, actually.

>> No.3759163

>>3759126
>I'm a genius
>I read two books as a teenager
>And did "work" on another book
Holy shit that's fucking incredible you really are a genius

>> No.3759185

>>3759158
Am I Saul Kripke?

>> No.3759193

>>3759185
lol

>> No.3759194
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3759194

>>3759163

That's just the beginning, but I can tell it's already more than you'll ever do.

I'm just passing through. You on the other hand definitely belong here.

>> No.3759202
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3759202

>>3759126
Jesus Christ you are pathetic. I read World as Willy in the womb and I translated it into four different languages when I was four. I finished the Critique in fifteen minutes flat when I was seven. I'm releasing my twenty-second treatise this year about the metaphysics of epistemological ontology. Get on my fucking level pleb.

>> No.3759226
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3759226

>Why can't you all be super-smart like me

>> No.3759231

>>3759194
I've found the world's smartest people generally need to vaguely and repeatedly tell everyone how smart they are on the Internet in between reading Hegel and curing cancer.

>> No.3759239
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3759239

>>3759231

>Reading Hegel

At least trying to cure cancer has some possibility of success

>> No.3759246

>>3758701
Perhaps, but as we find more and more efficient methods of treating these "illnesses" (gene therapy, "neuroenhancement"), it will only create a larger gap between societies. Cultural differences will only create more problems once we start directly molding people's brains based on cultural ideals.

>> No.3759247

>>3759079
Oh, I'm not saying that he doesn't have interesting points, and I understand why he wanted to make his readers work for them, but at the end of the day I usually look at his work and feel like I could be getting more for my time and energy elsewhere. Part of that might just be that I'm mostly interested in language and translation, so Lacan isn't always directly relevant to things that I have experience with (especially because I spend most of my time on Asian languages).

What really annoys me is when writers clearly want to be Lacan, but are just borrowing his act without any of his insight.

>> No.3759256

>>3759126

Step up son. I read the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, as well as the Groundwork, when I was 13.

>> No.3759261

>>3759256

>holding a book in front of your face and reciting the words on the page

I suppose that's one word for 'reading', but still.

Try harder next time.

>> No.3759266

>>3759256
Yeah but did you get anything out of it

ya dumb dick