[ 3 / biz / cgl / ck / diy / fa / ic / jp / lit / sci / vr / vt ] [ index / top / reports ] [ become a patron ] [ status ]
2023-11: Warosu is now out of extended maintenance.

/lit/ - Literature

View post   

File: 47 KB, 498x498, Reeeee.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
23478714 No.23478714 [Reply] [Original]

1.) Universals ("man", "horse") are not substances (Meta Z.13)
2.) Only particular substances are substances (Cat, and passim)
3.) The particular is a composite of matter and form (Meta Z.3)
4.) The form is what the substance really is (Meta Z.4)
5.) The matter individuates the form ("Callias and Socrates are the same in form but differ in matter") (Meta Z.8)
6.) The form is a universal ("Callias and Socrates are the same in form but differ in matter") (Meta Z.8)


>> No.23478719

Well I read Aristotle's Metaphysics. Still a KHHV. What should I do

>> No.23478745

Sex isn't important anon. Aristotle proves this syllogistically in Prior Analytics Book 2 c. 27 (not a jest, look it up. His view of sex was probably more or less Platonic).

>> No.23478750

Sorry it's chapter 22 not 27.

>> No.23478805

what's confusing you

t.read all of Aris thrice (that's a lie; twice)

>> No.23478832

Alright here's my attempt to deal with the problem in the OP and then you can tell me why I'm retarded and it's wrong. The solution to the problem of universals occurs not where you'd expect (E, Z, H) in the discussion of substance, but in the middle of his criticisms of Platonic number theory in book M, c. 10. "Knowledge like knowing is spoken of in two ways - as potential and actual. The potentiality, being, as matter, universal and indefinite, deals with the universal and indefinite; but the actuality, being definite, deals with a definite object - being a 'this' it deals with a 'this'. But per accidens sight sees universal color, because this individual color it sees is color; and this individual A which the grammarian investigates is an A." Did you catch that? The relation between universals and particulars is exactly the same as the relationship between a genus and its species. The genus is "matter", the differentia "form", and the species a composite of the two. Similarly, the universal species is merely matter to the particulars, but this ofc does not mean it isn't real, anymore than numbers are not real just because they don't exist apart.


>> No.23478836

Do you not see the contradiction between those ideas, anon?

>> No.23478847

But doesn't that contradict Z.8 where he speaks of Callias and Socrates as being "the same in form but different in matter?" Not at all. You have to understand that the matter of the composite is actualized such that it IS form. Matter does not really exist in actuality, it is just the potentiality of a thing. When you say the bronze is the matter of the bronze sphere - yes, it is, but it no longer exists as matter, but as the one unified actuality of the bronze sphere. "What are you talking about, where does he say that?" A few places actually. Meta 7.7: "The bronze circle has its matter in its formula." This does not mean that the potentiality is somehow magically actuality, but its "thisness" including its actualized matter is its essence. Again, "we should not say without qualification, if we looked at things carefully, that a statue is produced from wood or a house from bricks, because its coming to be implies change in that from which it comes, and not permanence." And there are similar passages especially in H. Now, the word "eidos" can mean either the form or the universal species. So in the passage of Z.8, it is referring to the universal. The choice to translate it as "form" instead is incorrect. Socrates and Callias have different essences, and this difference necessarily involves the actualization of their matter, because a composite being simply is the actualization of matter. So yes Aristotle uses "matter" inconsistently, as he does many other crucial terms ("necessary", "actuality", "essence" etc.) In this case it refers to the concrete "thisness" and actualization of the composite. How could a thing be differentiated BY its matter? Matter doesn't even really exist, at least not in that way. At the same thing, the particular is not "the same as its essence" because it does include matter, i.e. it changes, and this is one reason that particulars are not definable. But its essence is its substance, and the essence isn't definable either because it includes the matter in the sense explained above. There's not a bit of form here and a bit of matter there, it is a true unity. Again, "Soul and essence of soul are the same, but man and essence of man are not". The essence of man is a universal which does not exist apart. But the essence of soul is the essence of the particular.

tl;dr - Aristotle believed in forms of particulars. Contra Averroes and Aquinas, a particular is not simply "this matter + the universal form" - the universal doesn't really exist in the first place, at least not in that way.

>> No.23478880

Also let me say in defense of this reading that Plotinus also accepted that there had to be individual forms, and criticized the Peripatetic understanding of universal + matter. I'm just saying I don't think that was really Aristotle's view, either. And this is important because it absolves Aristotle from having created some sort of naive Fisher Price universe with a bunch of discrete universal forms being actualized over and over, as if there are no problems of "boundary" between species and between individuals within a species. ("Is this a European swallow or an African swallow?") If you accept particular forms, this problem goes away. As the philosopher says:

"Indeed in some cases it is even obvious that that which generates is of the same kind as that which is generated—not however identical with it, nor numerically one with it, but formally one—e.g. in natural productions (for man begets man), unless something happens contrary to nature, as when a horse sires a mule. And even these cases are similar; for that which would be common to both horse and ass, the genus immediately above them, has no name; but it would probably be both, just as the mule is both." This line of thought would not even make sense if there were real, discreet universals in the way that many peripatetics thought there had to be, because of Meta Z.8.

>> No.23479279

You'll have to put it into words. You can't just rip single sentences from such a complex book without their context.

>> No.23479606

Yeah, a lot of the Metaphysics deals with refutations of other philosophers. I wish the OP would give more context; Aristotle clearly condemns the idea of platonic ideals as substances (such as man-himself, horse-itself, etc)