/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.23293303]

>Books to understand the central banking cartel

[Anonymous No.23293308]

[Anonymous No.23293314]

>>23293303

[Anonymous No.23293357]

>>23293303
>>23293308
>>23293314
ITT: third worldist brownoids

Real Aryan Chads support Israel, Janet Yellen and the Federal Reserve

praise BAPS

[Anonymous No.23293400]

[Anonymous No.23293451]

>>23293303
Uh I guess this

[Anonymous No.23293480]

>>23293303
I don't read the rambling of the mentally ill.

[Anonymous No.23293575]

>>23293303

[Anonymous No.23293680]

>>23293303

[Anonymous No.23293744]

>>23293303
America never had anything like a central bank after Andrew Jackson deposited public money in private banks that issued their own private fiat currencies that floated against each other and paper dollars were never equally valuable, look into what kind of a mess that caused. The modern Federal Reserve system came into existence after decades of lobbying primary from farmers.

>>23293308
2 seconds of googling will tell you the Aldrich Plan was never the legal basis of the Fed but none of these conspirtards can be bothered

>>23293400
archetypical leftard who whined about Volcker shocks, anti-"easy money" inflationistia, anti-monetarist monetarist moron

[Anonymous No.23293960]

>>23293744
What books on the Federal Reserve would you suggest? Other than the ones above being "Central Banks Bad". I lean towards disliking Central Banking but never really read anything in its defence. I'm intrigued by your counters to the above and would love to learn more.

[Anonymous No.23294042]

>>23293960
Not that anon but I recommend Allan H. Meltzer’s A History of The Federal Reserve. It’s quite dry, but extremely insightful. Meltzer himself is a libertarian (he was even a member of the Mont Pelerin society) though he isn’t specifically against central banking.
He will, for example, point out how Federal Deposit Insurance during the Great Depression put smaller banks out of business while big banks got bigger because they could actually afford to pay their depositors.
It’s a very good book (3 books to be exact) if you genuinely want to learn about this stuff.

[Anonymous No.23294064]

>>23294042
Another thing about Meltzer’s book: it provides a wonderful intellectual history of central banking at the beginning of the book wherein he describes the main line of thought central banking leant toward when the Fed was founded. It talks about thinkers like Bagehot & Thornton and how the Bank of England formed the basis of what the Fed would later become.

[Anonymous No.23294091]

>>23294042
>>23294064
Thanks Anon I appreciate the reply, I'll start with these as they sound great

[Anonymous No.23294145]

>>23293960
>What books on the Federal Reserve would you suggest? Other than the ones above being "Central Banks Bad". I lean towards disliking Central Banking but never really read anything in its defence. I'm intrigued by your counters to the above and would love to learn more.
You'd have to read into the silver agitation after silver coinage was demonetized after America went on the gold standard and the agrarian agitation against New York bankers from the late 19th century.
The Aldrich Plan (what Jekyll Island was about) was structurally supposed to be more like the German Bundesbank but the Federal Reserve System ended up a weirder monster because the Democrats got in office and not as favourable to Wall Street so you get it ending up more "decentralized"

>>23294042
>He will, for example, point out how Federal Deposit Insurance during the Great Depression put smaller banks out of business while big banks got bigger because they could actually afford to pay their depositors.
This is very strange take. Before and after deposit insurance America had/has an unusually large per capita amount of banks. Show me another country with "small banks" on par with America before/after deposit insurance?
Look next door. Canada never had deposit insurance at that time and actually never had a central bank till like 1934 but has always been highly oligopolistic (and much more stable) on the banking front. You'd think all that "competition" would mean Americans get more interest on deposits but it ain't show so even

[Anonymous No.23294150]

>>23294145
See pic, why the big difference?

[The real totally not fake anon No.23294175]

[Anonymous No.23294212]

>>23294150
if i had to guess its a region/proximal space thing. i guess US only has about 10x more people than canada, but US is much more spread out. most of canadas population lives in a very thin strip to the north of the US border, but the US has a lot more spaces where people live and need to bank

[Anonymous No.23294215]

>>23294145
>>23294150
I may have somewhat misremembered it. Here’s Meltzer’s exact passage:

The Federal Reserve's failure to serve as lender of last resort, principally from 1931 to 1933, is the main reason for deposit insurance. Deposit insurance, however, is not a substitute for the lender of last resort; the insurance fund cannot protect against systemic or widespread failure. For that, the financial system required improvements in monetary policy that the 1930s legislation did not address. Without the many bank failures, the many de- positors who lost money in failed banks, and others who feared such losses in the future, political pressure for deposit insurance most likely would have remained weak. Glass and Roosevelt would most likely have prevailed.

There is no record of the Federal Reserve's opinion about deposit insur- ance, but there is some evidence in the minutes of the executive committee of the New York directors for April 10, which Secretary Woodin attended. The dominant view was opposition, but some directors accepted insurance for national banks. Harrison opposed the plan and criticized the proposal to use the Federal Reserve banks' surplus to finance the insurance fund. Roosevelt had opposed guarantees and insurance in discussions about the bank holiday, and he did not quickly change his position. Glass op- posed insurance, as he had earlier. The Senate bill provided only for a sink- ing fund limited to member banks. Change began after Senator Arthur Vandenberg offered a substitute amendment au- thorizing $2,500 of insurance. Most midwestern senators voted for the bill, urged on by thousands of telegrams and letters from citizens with de- posits in failed banks. 38 At its start, on January 1, 1934, 13,201 institutions joined the new system. Only 1 percent of state banks that applied did not qualify at the opening (Patrick 1993, 179-81). Deposit insurance seemed a great success until the banking failures of the 1980s once again highlighted the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection that were recognized at the time of passage. Almost all banks have chosen to be insured, and insurance of savings and loans, credit unions, and stock market accounts followed. Most mutual savings banks stayed out of the federal system.
White (1997, 35) concludes that the FDIC did not reduce costs of bank failures from 1945 to 1994 and may have raised them. He places the cost of resolving bank failures in these years at $39 billion, with a present value of $7.8 billion. His estimates exclude the much larger costs of savings and loan failures in the 1980s and do not include the benefit of avoiding bank runs. Bank runs almost disappeared under the FDIC, in part because the FDIC absorbed part of the losses and encouraged mergers of failing banks into stronger banks. Instead of a run to currency, depositors in banks and savings and loans, with very few exceptions, held their insured deposits or moved them to another insured bank.

[Anonymous No.23294217]

>>23294215
I think that this part is the one I remembered
>Bank runs almost disappeared under the FDIC, in part because the FDIC absorbed part of the losses and encouraged mergers of failing banks into stronger banks.

[Anonymous No.23294369]

>>23294215
>The Federal Reserve's failure to serve as lender of last resort, principally from 1931 to 1933, is the main reason for deposit insurance.
That's taking a lot of blame off other branches of government. No country got out of the Great Depression because of monetary policy in reality. Countries that totally avoided it like Japan all used fiscal policy smartly. And deposit insurance didn't get America out of the depression WWII did

>Deposit insurance seemed a great success until the banking failures of the 1980s once again highlighted the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection that were recognized at the time of passage.
How was any of that caused by deposit insurance? No one making those type of decisions is thinking about if their clients will be taken care of after their ass is cooked. Savings and loan crisis started with the financial liberalization agenda:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulation_Q#History

Anyways the federal government doesn't insure users of most private businesses like they do with banks but those other corporations and CEOs end up doing even more risky stuff. You could ask why doesn't the federal government insure stablecoins or giftcards in case of failures? If walmart goes bankrupt you're giftcards are useless in the same way as if a bank fails your funds would be gone without insurance... if you want to be "fair" there's an argument there


>the FDIC absorbed part of the losses and encouraged mergers of failing banks into stronger banks
It's more the opposite, without deposits being insured by the government doing business with smaller institutions becomes a lot more risky. Financial institutions would naturally consolidate more since thousands of mom and pop boutique financial institutions would run into runs with the first wobble and people would learn not to trust them