[ 3 / biz / cgl / ck / diy / fa / ic / jp / lit / sci / vr / vt ] [ index / top / reports ] [ become a patron ] [ status ]
2023-11: Warosu is now out of extended maintenance.

/lit/ - Literature

View post   

File: 10 KB, 231x219, images (38).jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
23065163 No.23065163 [Reply] [Original]

Note: this general is still a work in progress, help from other anons educated in contemporary analytical philosophy would be welcome. It would be good to discuss how to structure the general in a way that still allows for quality discourse whilst being engaging and welcoming to newcomers.

>What is Analytic philosophy?
Analytical Philosophy is a school of philosophy Started by Bertrand Russell and others in the twentieth Century, it has a strong focus on rigour and clarity in argument, and borrows from scientific methods to think about philosophical problems. Analytic philosophy papers and books usually have a very narrow scope for the focus of their philosophical project.
Since the 20th century, analytic philosophy has become the dominant approach in the Anglosphere.

>How is it distinct from other schools of philosophy?
Philosophy maybe broken into three main avenues of study: History of philosophy, Continental Philosophy and Analytical Philosophy. Prior to the twentieth century, philosophy was taught in chronological order, typically as part of a liberal education, this is why those asking how to start in philosophy are told to "start with the Greeks". After the twentieth century, a divide formed between analytical and Continental philosophy, which typically has a broader scope to its philosophical project and emphasised an artistic sense in writing.

>How to start learning about analytic philosophy
The main 5 areas in contemporary Analytic Philosophy are:
Feldman's Epistemology (Foundations of Philosophy Series)
Pollock's Contemporary Theories of Knowledge
Taylor's Metaphysics (Foundations of Philosophy Series)
Lowe's A Survey of Metaphysics
Koons' The Atlas of Reality
Govier's A Practical Study of Argument
Sider's Logic for Philosophy
Soames' Philosophy of Language
McGinn's Philosophy of Language
Kim's Philosophy of Mind

Below these are many others fields like ethics, aesthetics, law, etc. List in the making. Much help would be appreciated on that front.

>Philosopher/work of the Thread
Saul Kripke:
The question of logic


>> No.23065164

first for zyzz

>> No.23065165

>Under the influence of Quine’s famous manifesto, many philosophers have thought that logical theories are scientific theories that can be ‘adopted’ and tested as scientific theories. Here we argue that this idea is untenable. We discuss it with special reference to Putnam’s proposal to ‘adopt’ a particular non-classical logic to solve the foundational problems of quantum mechanics in his famous paper ‘Is Logic Empirical?’ (1968), which we argue was not really coherent.


>Analytic Philosophy Resources
•Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu/))
•Internet encyclopedia of philosophy (https://iep.utm.edu/))
•Philpapers (https://philpapers.org/))

>Philosopher/work to be discussed next thread
The Gamers dilemma
the gamers dilemma argues that there is no moral difference between fps like call of duty and games with child pornography, if you can't defeat the dilemma, you are either committed to condemn first person shooters or morally accept lolicon visual novels.

>> No.23065170

I almost took a class with this guy lol

>> No.23065183
File: 238 KB, 1146x1600, 1641757868318.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]

>The next summer, my advisee invited me to dinner at his apartment, where he had taken up light housekeeping with a lovely Radcliffe girl. Saul was there as well. Saul's father was a Conservative Rabbi, and Saul had had a serious Jewish upbringing. As he talked, he davaned, which is to say he rocked back and forth vigorously. As he talked and davaned he ate, gesturing spastically, and as he talked and davaned and ate and gestured, his food scattered all over the table, as if to illustrate the law of entropy. With gentle understanding, the young Radcliffe student patiently swept the peas up from the table top and put them back on Saul's plate, where they stayed for a bit before being restrewn.

>I have often wondered whether Saul, brilliant though he undoubtedly was, ever understood how much slack everyone was cutting him, from Quine on down. Somehow, I think not.

>> No.23065201

It's known that he was extremely autistic. Actual autism, not 4chan autism. I've talked to former students of his and other professors from Princeton and CUNY who've mentioned that back in the 80s and 90s, he would lurk in the bushes to watch girls walk by and stare at their butts/boobs. He genuinely didn't know that was not okay to do.

>> No.23065212

>aaaaaaaaa is that one thing with two names im going insane

>> No.23065249
File: 15 KB, 195x235, 1692539547746055.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]

> Since the 20th century, analytic philosophy has become the dominant approach in the Anglosphere.

The analtical school formed just in the 20th century. There was no analytical philosophy in the 19. Century. Neither in America, nor in europe.

> After the twentieth century, a divide formed between analytical and Continental philosophy, which typically has a broader scope to its philosophical project and emphasised an artistic sense in writing.

The lable "Continental philosophy" is a exonym used by analytical philosophers. The continental thinkers have very differen aprocheds. There are thinkers with their own form of regor like the phenomenologes, in Germany the school of Erlanger Konstruktivismus or the school of von Freytag-Löringhoff and Günther Jacoby (in the subsequent of Ernst Schröder), you have marxist theoretics like Adorno and even such things like Camus.

The term continental philosophy is a complication for the rest which is dominated by analytical philosophy.
By the way analtic philosophy domintes even Japan, as far as I know.

>> No.23065269

> > I have often wondered whether Saul,
> > brilliant though he undoubtedly was,
> > ever understood how much slack everyone
> > was cutting him, from Quine on down.
> > Somehow, I think not.

Where is this quote from?

> I've talked to former students of his and other professors from Princeton and CUNY who've mentioned that back in the 80s and 90s, he would lurk in the bushes to watch girls walk by and stare at their butts/boobs.


Does this actually happend or its just a legand?

>> No.23065284

>Does this actually happend or its just a legand?
Multiple people have mentioned it unprompted whenever I've asked them what it was like working with him. Whenever I meet other philosophers for the first time, I almost always ask about their advisor and dissertation committee, so he's come up a few times, especially after he died. You learn a lot about someone that way.

>> No.23065330

The human factor is often overlooked. I also remember such anecdotes about Norbert Wiener, Kurt Gödel, and of course Nash.

>> No.23065345


You could be the 2nd Diogenes Laertios.

>> No.23065846
File: 95 KB, 267x400, file.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]

thanks anon for baking the bread. Here's what Kripke is known for:
The idea of "rigid designators" in defence against descriptivist attacks
Modern modal semantics with "Kripke models"
Theme for next thread should be Tarski

>> No.23065898
File: 84 KB, 487x589, 1659486292328451.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]

Been looking a bit more into Daniel Dennett and Keith Frankish's ideas on consciousness (mainly with an emphasis on Frankish, but considers himself a follower of many of Dennett's ideas). If I'm understanding them correctly, it seems like the reason they take such an odd position as to deny phenomenal consciousness is because they deep down understand how problematic it is for a physicalist to contend with phenomenal states, so they just decide to bite the bullet and discard it all together. Frankish himself says that he can't image how a bunch of neurons lighting up can be identical to a phenomenal state. They then give odd answers, like Frankish says in an interview that he doesn't deny someone being in a state of pain- pain is real, but there is no pain in the phenomenal sense in the brain and that it's really just an intuition we have that brains have these phenomenal states. He basically just ends up saying our brain and bodies are so complex and reacting to each other in so many ways that it creates a pain state. Which just seems very vague. They will also pair this explanation with real world examples like Anton syndrome where people with brain damage to their occipital lobe and are now blind will insist that they can see. They'll use these as examples to help show that our intuitions about our own consciousness can be mistaken. Which then opens the gate for them to say your intuition that you have phenomenal states is also a false intuition. Anyways, that's what I gleaned from a cursory look into what they say, so I may be misunderstanding their point.

So it seems a combination of at least three things has driven them to this illusionist perspective:
1: Complete deference to science and what it can tell us from its third-person perspective.
2: Refusal to entertain anything outside of physicalism
3: Doubt that phenomenal states can be identical to brain states.
So that leaves them to discard the phenomenal states.

To those more familiar with their work, did I mess up anywhere in this summary?

>> No.23066046

this retard has now shown up and will now derail the entire thread. this dude has made literally thousands of posts about daniel dennet being le NPC on /sci/, /lit/ and /his/ over the last 2-3 years.

>> No.23066083

Perhaps I am unable to use the site well enough to see the paper but my attempts to see it redirect to a different website that requires access. As such I can not see the particular points in the paper so if I am in error any assistance would be appreciated but is this is an argument about whether logic is derived from our environment or from ourselves as it pertains to scientific inquiry? I have also seen arguments about when the distributive law fails and when the associative law fails as well, if this paper is more in that league I would be interested in seeing it if it is possible but if not then so be it.

>> No.23066287

Relax. I've maybe posted a max of three NPC memes in my entire life. I was mainly interested in the reasons for accepting illusionism because it seems interesting and thought the pic would be kinda funny. That's all.

>> No.23066508

The paper argues against the view put forward by Quine that logical theories are as revisable as scientific ones. Specifically that
>The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs... is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges... A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. Re-evaluation of some statements entails re-evaluation of others, because of their logical interconnections – the logical laws being in turn simply certain further statements of the system.
Quine follows the principle that in choosing what to revise, whatever has the minimal repercussions should be preferred, and so the logical laws would be the last thing to be revised. Kripke thinks that the logical system is a different kind of thing entirely, and under no circumstances could we revise it. Namely, we need universal instantiation to be able to establish truth values from a theorem of any sort of logic, and we need the law of noncontradiction else we hold something to be be simultaneously p and not-p.

He also refutes Putnams "quantum logic" (does it really need refuting in 2024) by showing how it leads to 2×2>5. Other alternative logics aren't an issue as long as they aren't "adopted" or used to replace classical logic. They are formal systems that have their own interpretations but we reason about them using classical logic.

>> No.23066534

Thanks for the summary.

>> No.23066580

Its not a particularly interesting paper, and too verbose. It seems like theres an argument to be made in showing how the rules of inference and primitive operators of classical logic are a necessary condition in order to be able to be able to think in accordance with some system at all. That doesn't reallu change affect Quine's point though.

>> No.23066845
File: 1.11 MB, 862x1040, Screen Shot 2024-02-10 at 2.16.25 PM.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]

Dennett is an NPC (I'm not that guy, just a bystander with a brain)

>> No.23066863
File: 102 KB, 1000x1000, 2018_01_Winter_William_James_01.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]

>My thesis now is this: that, when we think of the law that thought is a function of the brain, we are not required to think of productive function only; we are entitled also to consider permissive or transmissive function. And this the ordinary psycho-physiologist leaves out of his account.

>Suppose, for example, that the whole universe of material things—the furniture of earth and choir of heaven—should turn out to be a mere surface-veil of phenomena, hiding and keeping back the world of genuine realities. Such a supposition is foreign neither to common sense nor to philosophy. Common sense believes in realities behind the veil even too superstitiously; and idealistic philosophy declares the whole world of natural experience, as we get it, to be but a time-mask, shattering or refracting the one infinite Thought which is the sole reality into those millions of finite streams of consciousness known to us as our private selves.

>"Life, like a dome of many-colored glass,
>Stains the white radiance of eternity."

>Suppose, now, that this were really so, and suppose, moreover, that the dome, opaque enough at all times to the full super-solar blaze, could at certain times and places grow less so, and let certain beams pierce through into this sublunary world. These beams would be so many finite rays, so to speak, of consciousness, and they would vary in quantity and quality as the opacity varied in degree. Only at particular times and places would it seem that, as a matter of fact, the veil of nature can grow thin and rupturable enough for such effects to occur. But in those places gleams, however finite and unsatisfying, of the absolute life of the universe, are from time to time vouchsafed. Glows of feeling, glimpses of insight, and streams of knowledge and perception float into our finite world.

>> No.23066866
File: 544 KB, 740x1000, ill_page_086_lg.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]

>Admit now that our brains are such thin and half-transparent places in the veil. What will happen? Why, as the white radiance comes through the dome, with all sorts of staining and distortion imprinted on it by the glass, or as the air now comes through my glottis determined and limited in its force and quality of its vibrations by the peculiarities of those vocal chords which form its gate of egress and shape it into my personal voice, even so the genuine matter of reality, the life of souls as it is in its fullness, will break through our several brains into this world in all sorts of restricted forms, and with all the imperfections and queernesses that characterize our finite individualities here below.

>According to the state in which the brain finds itself, the barrier of its obstructiveness may also be supposed to rise or fall. It sinks so low, when the brain is in full activity, that a comparative flood of spiritual energy pours over. At other times, only such occasional waves of thought as heavy sleep permits get by. And when finally a brain stops acting altogether, or decays, that special stream of consciousness which it subserved will vanish entirely from this natural world. But the sphere of being that supplied the consciousness would still be intact; and in that more real world with which, even whilst here, it was continuous, the consciousness might, in ways unknown to us, continue still.

>You see that, on all these suppositions, our soul's life, as we here know it, would none the less in literal strictness be the function of the brain. The brain would be the independent variable, the mind would vary dependently on it. But such dependence on the brain for this natural life would in no wise make immortal life impossible,—it might be quite compatible with supernatural life behind the veil hereafter.

>> No.23067076

Searle vs. Dennett.


>> No.23067457

This seems to be a sort of hybrid of the 2 arguments from my previous post, with some other interesting points as well. If I am reading this correctly the overall point that is trying to be made is that the existing frameworks are still subject to interpretive bias and there has yet to be a method created that removes this bias? If this is off base let me know. I would say that Quine's position is considerably more 'pragmagic' for lack of a better word, if my car needs a new starter then I would not expect the mechanic to be poking around in the rear differential, or what amounts to a sort of principle of least invasiveness so that whatever revisions occur do not in and of themselves cause more problems. I am inclined to agree with Kripke that there likely is no currently existing method that removes all interpretive bias, the best arguments seek to define all the stated parameters and this is likely the best we have to work with until a better system in invented. I think it is also fair to point out that there is a tendency for people to take the abstract of some of these arguments to have the weight of demonstrable and replicatable evidence when in fact they do not have these things, or perhaps have not acquired them yet. For instance, to demonstrate a failure of the associative law you have to start incorporating more dimensions than we can currently scientifically account for. If you just read the abstract you may walk away thinking this is world shattering but in reality there is no way we can test it yet, and no built in assumption it can be tested at all for that matter, the full argument makes this known, but is rather exactly what it claims to be, a demonstration that the existing logic holds this to be true if there were a way to test it, and even if tested we may still find the argument to be in error if the associative law still holds for that matter. Given the following I would agree it is always prudent to try to limit interpretive bias as much as possible, and I am already inclined to agree with the notion that the logic being used is likely born of an incomplete system, until a better system makes itself available it is what we have though and if we need to revise or change things then a principle of least invasiveness is not necessarily a bad idea desu. The current framework still allows for people to experiment and make arguments that can potentially lead to better changes which is likely all we can achieve until a universal system is designed, assuming it can be created at all.

>> No.23068343

I think the logical system you are referring to is quantum logic. It does not have distributive law, and somehow evalutes propositions on a potentially infinite dimensional lattice. Kripke shows in the paper quantum logic leads to the results that 2+2>5 and that the Principia Mathematic is inconsistent.

>> No.23068348

>Big Boys of English Speaking academia
The philosophical equivalent of Judge Judy, Singer's self-contradictory pap ("abortion and infanticide are acceptable because these immature humans are incapable or rational preference" vs. "rationality is not a requirement for ethical conduct. Any irrational being will avoid pain, which is why cruelty to animals is unethical", which are flatly contradictory positions). Makes money by writing books that tell Liberals 'doing what you want is A-OK"
A buffoon.
A decent linguist, his work in every other field is no more (or less) than self-serving rent seeking which he publicly admits that he, himself, does not believe.
Darn good at making a buck of gullible college students, but (unless you are speaking of linguistics, where he is very good) not a big academic.
A mediocre-at-best scientist who will leave exactly zero mark on actual science, he became popular as a writer of PopSci books. When that income source dried up (because his theories were soundly thrashed by scientists) he switched to a series of popular books trashing what he thinks religious people might believe.
Never was a great thinker, never will be.
A man who counted on his readers having never heard of Gorgias, Rorty took facile rhetoric, relabeled it neopragmatism, and sold it like snake oil.
About time an actual academic appeared. although, to be fair, while he does a fine job of reminding everyone of the hard problem, he has no answers. Which is no one's fault.
Refuses to use proper terms, mainly to hide that, deep down, he he knows any clear statement of his theories leads to eye-rolling
Not a serious academic.

This list is a list of "People that stupid people think are smart"

>> No.23068553
File: 34 KB, 700x700, assvegas_42784_gode_dragon_squarel_dildo_3662811383405_6[1].jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]


>> No.23068580

How does Gorgias debunk Rorty?
>counted on his readers having never read Plato
Isn't that like 90% of modern philosophy? lol

>> No.23069484

I have seen arguments about associative but I do not recall the specific context per se. I do agree though, if anything I would even go so far as to say that finding inconsistencies is a good thing since it means there is still progress to be made.

>> No.23069821

>Kurt Gödel
gödel never did anything remotely pervy. he was a huge weirdo, very conspiratorial in particular, but not a creep

>> No.23069827

>Theme for next thread should be Tarski
good suggestion
on that note, has anyone read feferman's book on tarski and would recommend it?

>> No.23069868

It is hard to blame the guy given that his friend was assassinated. I would turn more conspiratorial as well.

>> No.23069947

Ya, non-classical logics have proven themselves to be fruitful to explore. That the article focuses on quantum logic rather than the more popular intuitionist logic is because the intuitionist logicians stay in their lane whereas the Putnam paper on quantum logic posits it as a super-logic of sorts from where classical logic is an edge case. It doesn't seem like Kripke is against them otherwise.

>> No.23070030

Nta but, how do such systems deal with truth? Do they still rely on the correspondence theory of truth? Recently read a paper called "conspiracy theory as a tonkish term" and it talked about a paper called the runabout inference ticket, the idea being that rule based logic like inferentialism is flawed because you called introduce a rule that basically let you say whatever you wanted to, hence truth is necessary as a fundamental value for a system of logic.

>> No.23070125

Logicians care less about what truth is than epistemologists. Logic is a truth-preserving operation, not a truth-making operation. Logic textbooks treat truth and falsity like the boolean 1 and 0. It seems like a lot of logicians like Tarski's definition of truth or some development from it.

>> No.23070173

I guess this doesn't answer the question about other systems. The little I've read on intuitionist logic just treats true and false in a mathematical way, although not boolean. If, as Kripke suggests in that paper, it is just a formal system we use as a tool then it doesn't need a philosophical interpretation. There is a paper on exactly that by Dummet though.

>> No.23070746
File: 79 KB, 611x311, Screenshot 2024-02-13 at 22-42-48 Defensive Killing - Helen Frowe - Defensive Killing_ An Essay on War and Self-Defence-Oxford University Press (2014).pdf(1).png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]

How do anals come up with these thought experiments

>> No.23071089

Pretty tame desu.

>> No.23071378

Foids can be ignored regardless of the label.

>> No.23071456

back to your schopenhauer thread, incel. this thread is only for people who can carry out all basic human functions. humans only.

>> No.23071490

This is acceptable

>> No.23071730

Is it enough to read the recommended books or do I have to work through certain exercises in order to understand Analytic Philosophy?

>> No.23072704


>> No.23072749

Its a huge field. Too huge for any one person to "get" it all. Those books are general overviews of their subfields on the undergrad level.

>> No.23073631

Honestly if you just start reading it you can pick up on their different methods.

>> No.23074198
File: 204 KB, 1280x979, soames.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]

>be philosopher of language
>can't even write properly
What did Soames mean by this?
Previous OP here, you might want to scratch my recommendation of Soames' work for Phil of Lang: it's too tough for an actual intro.
McGinn's book of the same name is much better.

>> No.23074225

Vote for your favorite children's books here:

>> No.23074649

If that one also gets too technical check out an introduction to philosophy of language by bernard harrison.

Tbh anon, i'm pretty much done with my undergrad degree in philosophy with good enough grades for honours, and even I haven't read quine or Wittgenstein or Searls longer works. Even some areas like philosophy of mathematics, language and metaphysics i'm kind of hazy about (my uni doesn't offer courses for these subjects, except for a philosophy of mind subject which touches on language and metaphysics, plenty of sjw type philosophy courses though). Like >>23072749 said above books are just general overviews, if your looking for exercises the govier logic book would be your best bet.

>> No.23074952

Looks pretty straightforward. Is it the logic throwing you off? Maybe put the intro to logic book first in the OP, all the other fields of philosophy use logical notation these days. And the Sider work is very good but its at an upper undergrad level logic textbook.

>> No.23075255
File: 191 KB, 747x719, file.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]

I'm the former OP, I've completed all of Sider's work even though I have no academic training. Soames' writing is still tough, although today reading his account of Davidson was better. I guess I may just be over-reacting treating it like a novel: although it's less than 200 pages long the book is very dense.
I mostly said all that because Soames, on Carnap, had essentially just left up Carnap's main argument in his entire work up to be implied as prior knowledge before seemingly entering into some autistic flight of fancy regarding some minutiae. See pic related.
Soames is just very bad at explaining the concepts he is discussing and just keeps going from point to point, not letting me breathe. I'm not the only one saying this either, I've seen a couple of other people on the internet coming to the same conclusion as me, although most say it's worth the struggle.
I guess deep down I am just annoyed that this is where I get stuck in the mud where prior to this all my reading in these texts designed for the advanced-undergrad / graduate level have been much easier for me.

>> No.23075304

thanks anons. I shall begin my ANAL training