/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.22760336]

I was recently reading Strawson's paper "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility" (premises and conclusion are below in a paraphrased form). I'm curious: Why isn't this paper given more weight in the discussions about moral responsibility? Are there any compelling arguments against his theory?

(P) Nothing can be within itself. Nothing can be the cause of itself

(P) In order to be truly morally responsible for one's actions one would have to be causa sui, at least in certain crucial mental respects.

(C) Therefore nothing can be truly morally responsible.

[Anonymous No.22760369]

>>22760336
>(P) Nothing can be within itself. Nothing can be the cause of itself
is this the power of analytic philosophy?

[Anonymous No.22760387]

Another non choice proposition

Just say am a determinist and ask for tax exception cause is just a religion

[Anonymous No.22760426]

>>22760387
Imagine a choice

[Anonymous No.22760429]

>>22760426
What is your favorite color?

[Anonymous No.22760470]

>>22760336
Check out the SEP article. There are a number of criticisms.

Since Strawson published, support for reductionism has really dried up across the sciences, particularly in physics. The claim that "facts about large things must be reducible to facts about smaller things ," is increasingly seen as wishful thinking, a way to simplify things and beg a whole boatload of questions.

There are now arguments for the existence of strong emergence in many fields, even the more "basic" fields of chemistry and physics. This is important when you consider the argument for fatalism popular in Strawsons time, which goes:
>All facts about people are actually reducible into facts about atoms.
>Atoms lack purpose and conciousness.
>Thus, conciousness can have no causal role in the world.

But of course, barring panpsychism, conciousness itself seems like a very strong candidate for strong emergence. If such strong emergence exists, it is "fundemental" (e.g. irreducible) and plays a role in causation.

The fatalist who grounds their argument in the impossibility of strong emergence really doesn't have a good empirical case. The position mostly seems strong because it's been so popular and is dogmatically enforced in some areas.

>(P) Nothing can be within itself. Nothing can be the cause of itself

Of course, systems can and do cause themselves. There is the entire field of complexity studies to consider, self-organizing systems, etc. There are no truly closed systems, but this doesn't really seem to threaten compatibilism. No one thinks we are absolutely free. Our actions are determined by our past, otherwise how could it be "us" choosing the actions — we preexist our choices. But nothing seems to bar the possibility of our concious decision making process playing a role in our actions.

Against such fatalism, you might also consider work on the causal closure principle, namely that it seems impossible to formulate coherently, or arguments that the lable "physical" is trivial, expanding to cover "whatever science says exists." (Hemple's Dilemma).

Determinism works with compatibalism, its reductionism that suggests fatalism.

People become more or less self-determining based on how they shape their own enviornment. This is where political liberties and education enter the picture, and "positive freedom." But this requires looking at people as systems, not a simple superveniance relationships on bodies. E.g., when you leave a post it note to remind yourself of something, you are shaping the enviornment which in turn shapes your behavior. Self-determinion can then be seen as the degree to which the sub-system of concious decisionmaking affects the larger system of person + enviornment. This also allows for organizations, businesses, states, etc. to be relatively self determining as well.

Note that the social sciences never stopped using "purpose" in explanations. It's prima facie unreasonable to declare purpose plays no role in cause.

[Anonymous No.22760492]

>>22760336
>(P) Nothing can be within itself. Nothing can be the cause of itself
From this it can be seen that the universe could not have caused itself. Thus, this premise establishes the need for a Prime Mover.

Who could this Prime Mover be? Just consider Anselm's ontological proof of God, the being of whom nothing greater can be conceived.

Therefore, God created the world.

If God created the world, then God can make people as free as God wants and give them moral responsibility.

God did indeed do this.

Thus people have a right to be punished.

Glory be to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as it was in the beginning, is, and ever shall be, world without end, amen.

[Anonymous No.22760578]

>>22760429
RED

[Anonymous No.22760585]

>>22760492
>Glory be to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as it was in the beginning, is, and ever shall be, world without end, amen.

God bless you

[Anonymous No.22760590]

>>22760578
No one cares

Has no unforseen consequences

Whatever they claim is caused by your personal choice is them doing things for their own reasons

Personal responsibility

So you know anon likes red?