Neo-Parmenideanism

[Anonymous No.22442627]

Parmenides thread? Parmenides thread!

>discuss parmenides and plato/aristotle & beyond wrt parmenides

Anyone read this? Mind-blowing shit. Charged by vatican w heresy. But some lovely atheistic mysticism.

Also, I highly recommend Kingsley wrt shamanic angle of beginning of poem...

Other things to discuss:
>heraclitus n empedocles
>hegel
>via analogia
>via negativa
>univocity
>nihil ex nihilo fit
>privatio boni
>pantheism/panentheism
>eternalism/presentism
>Being n beings
>Being n ???

[Anonymous No.22444134]

>>22442627
Ok so how does Parmenides actually explain why things appear the very specific way they do, like why does it SEEM like there's redness here and blueness there, instead of the opposite? How does one simple Being do anything to MAKE my appearances look like that, and not another way?

[Anonymous No.22444146]

>>22444134
Parmenides ideas of oneness and the illusory aspects of motion is entirely unfalsifiable and can not be proven or disproven. His poem is both dogmatic in its depiction of him as the arbiter of truth appointed by the goddess and it does not actually relay any factual information.

[Anonymous No.22444179]

>>22442627
This looks really good. Let me read it and get back to you.

[Anonymous No.22444181]

>>22444179
How are you just finding out about this?

[Anonymous No.22444212]

>>22444181
I’m only on /lit/ casually and prefer Roman literature on the understanding of the human condition, philosophy, the state and our relations to others

[Anonymous No.22445317]

>>22444134
Parmenides' poem was divided into two sections, The Way Of Truth (αλήθεια) and The Way Of Opinion (δόξα). Unfortunately, we only have about 10% of the second section, where Parmenides tried to provide an explanation.

We still have some clues however. They lie in the word αλήθεια/alethia itself.

As you know, the Greek prefix α- denotes a negation, for example apathy a- -pathos means without passion.

In the same vein, a- -letheia means without forgetting, or unforgetting. Remeber, the mythical river Lethe was the river of forgetfulness for the Greeks.

So to answer your question: the reason reality appears to us like this is because we human beings are fractals of the One and thus don't possess the whole field of vision (cognition, intellection, whatever you want to call it) of the One. We, as it were, "forget" it.

Remember Being in Heidegger's sense of the word: philosophers have mostly conceptualized being as that which is present (Anwesend in German), but Heidegger goes further and say we have conceptualize Being as that which is not present (because it lies in another space-time) as well.

From the vantage point of the One, past, present and future are equally present in a single moment, aka eternity. Cue Wittgenstein: eternity is not infinte duration of time, but timelessness.

[Anonymous No.22445377]

>>22442627
Severino was a retard, don't bother with him

[Anonymous No.22445398]

>>22444134
If I remember the twenty or so pages of Severino that I've read his answer is that appearance just is.

[Anonymous No.22445414]

>>22445317
>So to answer your question: the reason reality appears to us like this is because we human beings are fractals of the One and thus don't possess the whole field of vision (cognition, intellection, whatever you want to call it) of the One. We, as it were, "forget" it.
It is interesting to point out that all of our sensory information is still being received and compiled by "one" being to make a "whole" perception.

[Anonymous No.22445417]

>>22442627
I haven't read it because I don't really see the point. What is heckin' Severino's point?

[Anonymous No.22445432]

>>22445414
Well, yeah. The One is the Totality of Being. It encompasses all of time and space without being contained by them. That's why some Jews refer to G-d as "the Omnipresent".

Our brains are just biological filters. There are animals which can perceive sounds and colors we can't and viceversa.

[Anonymous No.22445438]

>>22445432
I guess I meant to say that if we were as large as the universe, we'd probably be able to see the whole universe at once.
>So to answer your question: the reason reality appears to us like this is because we human beings are fractals of the One and thus don't possess the whole field of vision (cognition, intellection, whatever you want to call it) of the One. We, as it were, "forget" it.
But I suspect that if you were to direction your attention to any one point in the universe, you'd still end up "forgetting" everything else, at least temporarily.

[Anonymous No.22445449]

>>22445438
>I guess I meant to say that if we were as large as the universe, we'd probably be able to see the whole universe at once.
I agree with that sentiment. It's a shame we aren't (or maybe a blessing, who knows?)
>But I suspect that if you were to direction your attention to any one point in the universe, you'd still end up "forgetting" everything else, at least temporarily.
Yes, exactly because then you'd "fall" into time and space, but the One is above time and space.

[Anonymous No.22445469]

>>22445449
It's a weird thing to behold. It would be nice to be able to give every point of our field of vision the same attention as one point at all times. In a way, it's hard to imagine why that can't be the case, even for our little sliver of reality that fits into our field of vision.

[Anonymous No.22445471]

>>22442627
Very interesting stuff. Not familiar with Parmenides but I can kind of follow along in this thread from my readings of Jacob Boehme, which strikes me as quite curious.

[Anonymous No.22445537]

>>22445469
>It's a weird thing to behold. It would be nice to be able to give every point of our field of vision the same attention as one point at all times.
Maybe we're doing precisely that right now, only with the caveat that we may solely "switch" point of vision once the self-sustainment of the currently observed fractal reaches its end, aka death.

[Anonymous No.22445707]

>>22445537
We’re not. Otherwise peripheral vision wouldn’t be a thing.

[Anonymous No.22445821]

>>22445417
Tl;dr: Advaita Vedanta on steroids. Being as God. All beings being Being and Being being eternal. Becoming as an illusory event horizon which can be ever expanded to see higher manifolds of oneness. Non-being non-existing. Non-being being part of being. Being as a non-being.

[Anonymous No.22445824]

>>22445821
How is this not just Hegel?

[Anonymous No.22445855]

>>22445824
Hegel is panentheist whereas Severino is pantheist. Also Severino is more Parmenidean and Hegel is more Heraclitean. Obviously, however, he builds off both Hegel and Heidegger, but in the end rejects them both for reifying nothingness and misunderstanding destiny and fate. In fact, he repudiates most of post-Socratic philosophy...

It's an interesting thought experiment at the very least. How does a modern Parmenidean react to modern phil/his/lit/soc/etc. yano?

I myself err more toward Christianity and its existential phenomenology a la Levinas and Marion as well as Nouvelle Theologie (Balthasaar, Lubac, & Ulrich are faves) but if I was more atheistic still I have no doubt I would be some mixture of AV/Neoplatonic/Parmenidean...

[Anonymous No.22445863]

>>22442627
>Kingsley
Redpill me on this dude, /lit/

[Anonymous No.22445891]

>>22442627
>Neo-Parmenideanism
Midwit philosophy. If you actually hold to all the tenets of Eleatic philosophy, which is the proposition that "Being is", :"Not-Being" is contradictory and unintelligible, and that Being is:
>1) Whole (one);
>2) Simple (without parts);
>3) Uniform (undifferentiated);
>4) Perfect (complete);
>5) Unchanging (without time or motion).
... then you end up running into problems regarding description, predication, etc., which is what many of Zeno's paradoxes hinted at. Essentially, you must come to the conclusion that, if all of these propositions are true, then paradoxically, Being cannot be spoken of with any meaning.

Eleatic philosophy destroys the grounds for its own existence, and trying to revive it without making substantial changes to its premises is simply running into the same problem.

[Anonymous No.22445895]

>>22445891
> Essentially, you must come to the conclusion that, if all of these propositions are true, then paradoxically, Being cannot be spoken of with any meaning.
Why not? It’s perfectly understandable to say that Being is simple, unchanging etc

[Anonymous No.22445902]

>>22445891
If non-being is non-existent then I am always talking being and being being even when I talk non-being :^)

[Anonymous No.22445905]

>>22445863
Terribly overwrought writer but a good intro to mysticism in antique Greek thought. I actually think such Neo-Parmenideans should appreciate Plato more however. Did he sacrifice the esoteric doctrine? Or did he somehow sublate and preserve?

[Anonymous No.22445925]

>>22445895
Well, I already spelled it out in my post, but I can go into more detail.

We have subjects (things) and predicates (properties). We know subjects through their predicates. We could just say that "Being is", but unless you know what Being is in its entirety, then it can only be a laughably vague, obvious, and vacuous statement. Being must be predicated, e.g. described, for us to know what it truly is.

Unfortunately, predication is the art of drawing out an aspect of that thing, a property) into the limelight, while allowing the rest of that thing to recede into the background. In other words, predication embodies partition, multiplicity, and differentiation. Language requires being able to "single out" qualities such as wholeness, simplicity, uniformity, etc., to effectively understand what Being is, yet these qualities are somewhat distinct from each other, which creates problems when your entire philosophy is about how Being is one simple, whole thing. The tenets of your philosophy don't actually exist.

Basically, all you can say is "Being is", which renders Being ineffable. But now you don't even have the rules that makes it so that you can't talk about Being. So you must talk about Being. But if you repeat the Eleatic tenets, then you're back to Being being ineffable. See the problem?

[Anonymous No.22445930]

>>22445925
huh?

[Anonymous No.22445938]

>>22445925
The illusion is real within the illusion. All philosophical systems are either incomplete or contradictory at some level. However, eleatics can claim that their one exists on a higher discursive level than the world of appearances and illusion even if the latter is how we experience former.

[Anonymous No.22445978]

>>22445930
Which part is confusing? Think about it. If you want to tell me more about a mountain, what do you say?
>Well, a mountain is large.
So, a mountain is just any large thing?
>No no, that's just one part of it.
Well, tell me more.
>A mountain is made of earth.
So, a mountain is a large rock?
>No no, a mountain is a type of terrain.
Ah, so if I find a large, rocky feature of terrain, then that must be a mountain.
>obviously this continues on for a very long time until you say
>A mountain is a mountain. You'll know it when you see it.
>>22445938
Every philosophy runs into dead ends, but I think Eleatic philosophy is guilty of being contradictory at a fundamental level. Few other schools of philosophy have such a simple, elegant, and all-encompassing worldview, and yet to simply speak it is to also invalidate the act of philosophy. So how can it be a philosophy? It simply isn't a philosophy.

I think that is the reason why Parmenides communicated his work through a device that is essentially an act of revelation. Once you see it, you can no longer "unsee" it, but you can't describe it and do it justice.

But there's also a darker element to it as well. Being is supposed to be something that everybody is immersed in, and the Eleatics speak of Being as being this whole, all-encompassing thing. Yet some Eleatics attempt to rob everybody else of their experience of Being by claiming that experience itself is illusory. The implication is that Eleatics, if properly initiated, exist in a "higher" state of Being that nobody else can see. This ties into the theme of revelation as I noted earlier. But I think this claim to an "initiated" state is ridiculous, as that would clearly violate the Eleatic tenet regarding the unity, simplicity, and unchanging nature of Being, and it would also carry the consequence that uninitiated people don't exist.

The more I think about this problem, the more I come to the conclusion that Parmenides is wrong, Heraclitus is wrong, and late Plato's and Hegel's approach is right. It's either that, or Being does not coincide with thought and thus is not intelligible, and trying to make sense of anything is literally a futile endeavor.

[Anonymous No.22446015]

>>22445978
Parmenides says everything which exists exists including thought. Therefore, parmenidean being includes thought and even the thought of non-being. Time is a flat line. But the intitiatic element is a vertical dimension. It is meant for self-ascension, not putting others down. There is no way but the way but even stopping or not going the way is part of the way.

[Anonymous No.22446083]

>>22446015
>even the thought of non-being
This can't be a thing. The thoughts are always about something. A thought about "no thing" would have a placeholder instead of a pure nothing.
>It is meant for self-ascension, not putting others down.
The point isn't that Eleatics are running around trying to feel superior. The point is the implication that initiation can't even work according to the principles of their own philosophy, or that it is solipsistic.

[Anonymous No.22446107]

>>22446083
Even the space between thoughts and within which they swim exists in Parmenidean Being.
>incoherent
Why does flatness on one dimension exclude a vertical dimension on another?

[Anonymous No.22446111]

>>22445925
>But if you repeat the Eleatic tenets, then you're back to Being being ineffable. See the problem?
Not really, the whole gamut you laid out is besides the point and inapplicable if you hold that people already have an intuitive understanding or grasp of being from the get-go. In this case, there is no issue in saying that Being is uniform and simple etc because it’s just describing through one or another perspective the Being that everyone is already intimately acquainted with.

[Anonymous No.22446215]

>>22446107
You’re not completely addressing the problem.
>>22446111
If people already have an intuitive understanding of Being then Eleatic philosophy would be pointless. In fact, our intuition presupposes change so intuition contradicts Eleaticism.
> In this case, there is no issue in saying that Being is uniform and simple etc because it’s just describing through one or another perspective the Being that everyone is already intimately acquainted with.
Now you’re not even engaging the problem at all. At least the other guy thought (naively) that it was a problem of dimension. Perspectivism implies partialism implies either the failure of Eleaticism or that the perspectives are illusions. The intimate familiarity of Being would refute the need for Eleatic philosophy.

[Anonymous No.22446318]

>>22446215
>If people already have an intuitive understanding of Being then Eleatic philosophy would be pointless.
False, because being familiar with something in a general sense or having an intuitive knowledge of it doesn’t automatically entail that one has the correct opinion or conceptual grasp when it comes to the finer details of that same thing. Someone can have an intuitive knowledge of Being that is enough for them to parse the statements of eleatic philosophy through allowing them to connect the idea being discussed with the reality/object of being itself, but without that person having a well-developed enough conceptual understanding of Being such that discussing Eleatic philosophy is pointless.

>In fact, our intuition presupposes change so intuition contradicts Eleaticism.
So? As long as intuition allows someone to be familiar enough with being to be able to understand Eleatic philosophy and render its statements non-meaningless then it doesn’t really matter if intuition also communicates other information which contradicts Eleatic thought, because this other information is what is negated.

>or that the perspectives are illusions
So? Illusions can still communicate true information/knowledge. If a dream person tells you that you continuing to be late to work means you are risking being fired, the fact that said info is being transmitted within a dream instead of waking life where the job is doesn’t make it any less true of a statement.

[Anonymous No.22446323]

>>22446318
So, is intuition here important or not important? Does intuition lead to knowledge or does it lead one astray? You can't have your cake and eat it too.

Remember, in response to the gamut, you described it as such:
>Not really, the whole gamut you laid out is besides the point and inapplicable if you hold that people already have an intuitive understanding or grasp of being from the get-go. In this case, there is no issue in saying that Being is uniform and simple etc because it’s just describing through one or another perspective the Being that everyone is already intimately acquainted with.
What makes the gamut irrelevant? How exactly is the Eleatic perspective something that everybody is "intimately acquainted with" innately?

[Anonymous No.22446389]

>>22446323
> So, is intuition here important or not important?
It is
>Does intuition lead to knowledge or does it lead one astray?
Certain things that intuition tells us are correct, while other things it tells us may be incorrect in certain circumstances
>You can't have your cake and eat it too.
Why not? There is no logical necessity or even a plausible reason whatsoever why intuition should always be 100% correct or 100% incorrect. It doesn’t harm Eleatic philosophy if intuition is correct about Being and wrong about change because what intuition may tell someone about change occurring or change being real is what is negated as false by Eleatic philosophy.

> How exactly is the Eleatic perspective something that everybody is "intimately acquainted with" innately
I never said that everyone is intimately acquainted with “Eleatic philosophy”, just that they are already acquainted with Being to such an extent that they can understand Eleatic statements and relate those statements to Being without them becoming meaningless.

[Anonymous No.22446433]

>>22446389
>Certain things that intuition tells us are correct, while other things it tells us may be incorrect in certain circumstances
How do we tell the difference?
>Why not?
Because then the philosophy is meaningless because it could explain everything and thus explain nothing.

[Anonymous No.22446440]

>>22446433
And by explaining everything I mean explaining contradictions as if they weren't contradictions by accepting the contradictions. There's something called the "principle of explosion" that results from this. The goal of philosophy is to explain everything, in the broadest sense, while giving everything its proper place.

[Anonymous No.22446469]

>>22446433
> How do we tell the difference?
That’s not a concern of Eleatic philosophy, having an intuitive grasp of being permits someone to be able to understand what its saying; and whether or not someone can put forward a criteria for distinguishing true intuitions from false intuitions doesn’t change this, so to frame that as an “issue” is kind of moving the goalposts onto a whole other topic. I suppose an Eleatic might say that whatever intuition is contradicted by Eleatic thought is false and that’s how you can tell, but regardless or whether or not you have a criteria just having the intuition would allow you to parse Eleatic statements.

>Because then the philosophy is meaningless because it could explain everything and thus explain nothing.
That’s not true, intuition isn’t the same thing as engaging in philosophical thought, just because intuition may sometimes be right and sometimes incorrect has no bearing on what the limits of philosophical thought are.

> The goal of philosophy is to explain everything, in the broadest sense, while giving everything its proper place.
Said who? Etymologically speaking that’s incorrect

[Anonymous No.22446473]

>>22446440
>ohno my logic designed not to accomodate contradiction can't accomodate contradiction!!!!
Or you could just use alternative logics.

There's also issues with deduction in general being unable to prove anything. And meta-problem of induction.

Why target contradictory logics when all logics fail on some level?

[Anonymous No.22446496]

>>22446469
>>22446473
It seems like you have an amorphous way of thinking, not guided by any adherence to principles nor concerned with any self-contradiction. Possibly guiding with arguing for the sake of arguing. It's impossible to argue against you because there's nothing to argue against.

[Anonymous No.22446523]

>>22445863
Kingsley rightly observes tendencies in modern scholarship to view the ancients as simpletons who progressively develop towards science, as though said scholars implicitly believed in an almost-Hegelian progression of history. However, Kingsley also tends to rely very strongly on Diogenes Laërtius, "correct" ancient sources when they don't say what he wants them to (so in his Empedocles book he has to change Plutarch's ascribing "aer" as an element to "aither" in order to make certain distinctions for his case, and he also has to make his case about an Empedoclean geometric "central fire" by ignoring both Empedcles fr. 52, Seneca, Pseudo-Plutarch, and Proclus who all explicitly speak about fires beneath the earth, not in a centre), and the vast majority of his citations are, contrary to his claims about scholarship, to 20th century papers instead of leaning harder on ancient texts or archaeology (and a lot of citations tend to be of the type "x shows y is influenced by z" where actually looking at the thing cited tends to show a bald claim not backed by anything further). He's, I'm sure, exciting from a certain view looking to see modern scholarship justifiably pilloried, but he doesn't really get you the goods. He just kinda asserts shit and relies on no one checking.

[Anonymous No.22446560]

>>22445978
How does Hegel solve this problem?

[Anonymous No.22446609]

>>22442627
Cool to see more parmenides/eleatic material. That book doesn't seem my style though; once people start drawing in non-being I have to break ways with them.

>>22444134
Not sure you have a question there, anon. The colour red looks red instead of blue because it's red. Hth, I think the real answer lies in the assumptions or general model that gave rise to the question itself.
>>22445891
>If you actually hold to all the tenets of Eleatic philosophy,

Sour grapes right here. I recognise you; your general thesis/argument was reviewed and ultimately rejected in detail in the other parmenides thread that is still on the front page. People needn't adopt your interpretation of the text/those terms.

[Anonymous No.22446639]

>>22446609
>Sour grapes right here. I recognise you; your general thesis/argument was reviewed and ultimately rejected in detail in the other parmenides thread that is still on the front page. People needn't adopt your interpretation of the text/those terms.
That thesis was never rejected, and I don't think you recognize me because we just concluded a friendly conversation in that very thread.

I think you confused the premise of that other thread (which was affirmed resoundingly multiple times) with one of the sub-debates involved in it, like whether Tweetophon was a true Eleatic (for accepting partition and differentiation), whether Zeno's argument can deal with partition and differentiation, etc. Now, *those* arguments did not pan out as much because they were built on a straw man, which was that Tweetophon was an orthodox Eleatic. Obviously you aren't an orthodox Eleatic (and I said that as such), so those sub-debates petered out for the lack of relevance. If you accept partition and differentiation, then there is no problem. But then it wouldn't be an Eleatic philosophy.

[Anonymous No.22446651]

>>22446639
ah right my bad. although declaring one to be an "orthodox eleatic" is improperly priming the debate. There have been different Eleatic positions since Eleaticism began; the melisseans and parmenideans are discussed seperately, and actually the first eleatic to be described in a text is melissus. But I don't mean to go off on the tangent, I just would hate other anons to think that there's been some broad refutation of Eleatics. Which there hasn't, Eleaticism remains top tier philosophy, and if the core teaching is rejected (reality as an unchanging, perfect whole) then it's really over for philosophy and coherence in general.

[Anonymous No.22446659]

>>22446651
Fair points all round.
>I just would hate other anons to think that there's been some broad refutation of Eleatics. Which there hasn't, Eleaticism remains top tier philosophy, and if the core teaching is rejected (reality as an unchanging, perfect whole) then it's really over for philosophy and coherence in general.
I think so too. Funnily enough, I think Plato brings up this point in Theaetetus or Meno, I forget which.

[Anonymous No.22446737]

One of my favourite lines in Persuasion and Rhetoric is Michelstaedter's take on a line by Parmenides. Apparently Carlo was quite the Greek buff. Anyway here is the line:
They drag themselves, mute and blind, stupefied, a confused multitude for whom being or not being has the same value and does not have the same value. --Parmenides

[Anonymous No.22446753]

>>22446651
I guess I have one last thing to say. I don't think calling it "orthodox Eleaticism" is unfair. At the very least, it is the dominant interpretation of what the Eleatics broadly held, it is certainly the most attention-grabbing set of positions, and I think one could make the argument that holding at least a certain amount of tenets automatically holds you to a commitment to the rest of the tenets, too. So it's not clear that we can pick or choose if we face the Eleatic gamut.

If we have to view philosophy as a clash between "Parmenides and Heraclitus", then it might be nice to have Flanderized versions of both thinkers to represent their respective poles, so we have room to find where we want to sit in-between them, if such a space exists.

[Anonymous No.22446802]

>>22446753
If someone brings a list of things that have to be believed to receive a label, and those things must be interpreted or understood in a way that is in direct contradiction with the goddess and the idea of people ever having written or discussed these texts, then I think most would immediately reject it. But I think "orthodox" carries with it a certain positive sense of being the correct opinion, or being the right way to understand something, so obviously I wouldn't like it. But sure, most people are not eleatics and would treat it as a bit of a meme, you are probably right that is the dominant understanding to the extent people care about them.

Regarding the clash of parmenides and heraclitus, I think that point goes to what I said about it being a meme, so I guess we may agree. That dichotomy seems to be more of a stage device for Plato and others; certainly it was not a real debate between those two thinkers.

[Anonymous No.22446888]

>>22446802
There will have to be more threads on the Fragments to settle the issue once and for all.

[Anonymous No.22446922]

>>22446888
Yeah but stop it with the threads on Parmenides. At this point we should fully focus on Heraclitus. Maybe we shouldnt do it immediately. We could instead read his fragments for 2 or 3 days, and only then open a thread

[Anonymous No.22446944]

>>22446888
not me; if only there was some way to click on a post and see which other posts in a thread are coming from the same IP or whatever. Heraclitus is interesting, as are all the pre-socratics and sophists, but I don't see myself reading and discussing his fragments at length on this site unless it comes up as part of some other discussion.

[Anonymous No.22446969]

>>22446922
I'm not stopping the threads on Parmenides until I'm finished.

[Anonymous No.22447166]

>>22446969
Heraclitus is how you finish Parmenides.

[Anonymous No.22447521]

>>22447166
I... uh... I'll get to him... when I'm FINISHED

[Anonymous No.22447617]

>>22447521
"I... I'll stop pursuing the turtle once I get to it!!" said Achilles. "Jump!" responded Heraclitus

[Anonymous No.22447636]

>>22447617
I jumped and only moved in the Y axis. And then I moved back to the start.

[Anonymous No.22447664]

>>22447636
Very heraclitean!

[Anonymous No.22447670]

>>22447636
Not true, you didn't land in the same spot

[Anonymous No.22447686]

>>22447664
>Very heraclitean!

Oh?

And it is all one to me / Where I am to begin; for I shall return there again.

[Anonymous No.22447721]

>>22447686
Cold things become warm, and what is warm cools; what is wet dries, and the dry is moistened. - Fragment 126

[Anonymous No.22447751]

>What awaits men at death they do not expect or even imagine.
G-guys?

[Anonymous No.22447786]

>>22442627
>Kingsley
I'm reading Catafalque, only 200 pages in, I understand that I probably won't ever understand.

[Anonymous No.22447794]

>>22447751
No one expects non-being...

[Anonymous No.22447820]

>>22445905
>>22446523
Not him but thank you.
>. He just kinda asserts shit and relies on no one checking.
He really calls Sonu Shamdasani and other Jung "experts" out on not caring enough about the mystical side in a way that is very unprofessional. I feel like a need another viewpoint to consider I am worried about missing things if I don't check

[Anonymous No.22447872]

>>22445905
100%; there is no book in more need of an editor than "Reality" by Kingsley.

Apparently his book, "Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic: Empedocles and Pythagorean Tradition", was kind of revolutionary/thought provoking and good. He's clearly not an idiot and he apparently really did write a great book.

But beyond that, holy shit don't touch his stuff it is painfully repetitive.

[Anonymous No.22447941]

>>22447820
Part of the problem is just how he even sorts his notes; the Empedocles book is at least footnoted, but Reality and In the Dark Places of Wisdom just have a pile of sources concerning a whole section with a brief phrase for what he's sourcing, and otherwise large swathes of characterization just go by without any source for you to check (for example, what he says about the Phocaens in I.2 of Reality; I'd love to read more about this "conservative" people with "Anatolian customs" that lasted "close to a thousand years", but there's nada in the endnotes, so I'm forced to wonder where the fuck he's getting any of this).

>>22447872
His Wikipedia page says it's influential, etc., but besides John Dillon liking it, I don't really see anyone from any school of thought whatsoever talking about it, so I'm not sure if he has people propping his work up online. It's very odd.

[Anonymous No.22448194]

>>22442627
Why would read a book about not believing in anything? I don't need no pompus European pedo to tell me that. I can figure that shit out on my own. Literal waste of time.

[Anonymous No.22448329]

>>22447941
>or example, what he says about the Phocaens in I.2 of Reality; I'd love to read more about this "conservative" people with "Anatolian customs" that lasted "close to a thousand years", but there's nada in the endnotes, so I'm forced to wonder where the fuck he's getting any of this
That's quite concerning, is there the assumption that he expects his readers to do their homework?

[Anonymous No.22448391]

>>22445317
>From the vantage point of the One, past, present and future are equally present in a single moment, aka eternity. Cue Wittgenstein: eternity is not infinte duration of time, but timelessness.

Time is a measure, space is a shadow, indeed.

[Anonymous No.22448398]

>>22445891
>"Not-Being" is contradictory and unintelligible, and that Being is:

Shadows aren't things and reification is the ultimate drug.

[Anonymous No.22448845]

>>22448398
I was denying the beingness of shadows.

[Anonymous No.22449101]

>>22448329
>That's quite concerning, is there the assumption that he expects his readers to do their homework?
No, he thinks he's spelling things out and correcting the way scholars approach things! It's baffling.

[Anonymous No.22449108]

>>22445891
>"Noooo you cannot talk about non-Being!!!!"
>has literally just talked about non-Being

[Anonymous No.22449156]

>>22449108
>Doesn't realize that everything, including thought of non-being, is being
Laughinggirls.jpg

[Anonymous No.22449167]

>>22449156
>Doesn't realize that then non-Being is Being too, and Being is non-Being
Parmenides has been sublated

[Anonymous No.22449180]

>>22449167
That's a speculative temptation that must be avoided otherwise you end up in close circuit Hegelianism. Tl;

[Anonymous No.22449189]

>>22449180
Blah. Didn't finish reply. Am sleepy.

*tl;dr: read theology such as Aquinas

[Anonymous No.22449225]

>>22449180
Dunno why people keep mentioning Hegel, this stuff wad already present in Heraclitus and Empedocles

[Anonymous No.22449240]

>>22449225
Sublation isn't a real word but was made up to translate Hegel's use of aufhebunghole.

[Anonymous No.22449359]

>>22449108
It's more of a discussion of Non-Being where it is seen as the end of Being. You can't go any further.

[Anonymous No.22449482]

>>22449240
Yeah I was just memeing when I used that word, the main point was in the greentext
>>22449359
>The end of Being
Parmenideans are in shambles

[Anonymous No.22449513]

>>22449482
>Parmenideans are in shambles
How so?

[Anonymous No.22450059]

>>22445414
>>22445432
>>22445438
>>22445449
>>22445469
>>22445537
>>22445707
sad to see that this conversation ended too early

[Anonymous No.22450225]

>>22450059
What do you think, sir? (Or madame)

[Anonymous No.22450238]

>>22450225
Well, I don't know. I made this original point, wanting to explore it more:
>It is interesting to point out that all of our sensory information is still being received and compiled by "one" being to make a "whole" perception.
...
>It's a weird thing to behold. It would be nice to be able to give every point of our field of vision the same attention as one point at all times.
>Maybe we're doing precisely that right now, only with the caveat that we may solely "switch" point of vision once the self-sustainment of the currently observed fractal reaches its end, aka death
>We’re not. Otherwise peripheral vision wouldn’t be a thing.
And I personally don't know how to overcome the "problem" of peripheral vision. Why is our sight about "one" particular thing instead all the particular things in their particularity (and more)? Why does language also behave similarly (the problem of predication, aka Peirce's concept of "prescision", where we always have to describe things in ways that single out only an aspect of them at the cost of the unified whole)?

[Anonymous No.22450260]

>>22450238
Attention/intention -- as phenomenlogists say

Or desire as per Hegel. Will?

I suppose Parmenides would call both ways of opining. He only say truth when taken as far as chariot of desire so to speak...

Ya. You ever read Pythagorean stuff? Modality and numerality is trippy

[Anonymous No.22450273]

>>22450260
Attention... intention... will... desire... all very complicated things that all seem very similar yet very distinct and fragmented at the same time.

I also am reminded of how Newton insinuated that "space" was the "sensorium of God", but refused to elaborate further on what that meant as anything other than a metaphor.

>Ya. You ever read Pythagorean stuff? Modality and numerality is trippy
I finished doing some reading on the generation of numbers in Plato's Parmenides. And I think I get why duality exists before twoness.

[Anonymous No.22450286]

>>22450273
I like Blake's "body is extension of soul" -- p nondual. I guess I would like to claim ownership of both mind and body. But also promote egoless moral behavior. Yet also say ego is real. So I guess that is why Parmenides appeal. The one is foreclosed and yet inevitable mayhaps a heideggerian god already came and so on.

[Anonymous No.22450498]

>>22444146
>>22445317
>>22445398
Well thanks for sharing thoughts that seem frank about how we either don't have enough to know Parmenides' full answer, or accept that he (or Severino rather) just have to answer the issue with an "it just is." Unfortunately, for me that's where I feel the need to get off the boat of Eleaticism. I need something that satisfyingly explains why things are one way and not another, qualitative-wise, and in terms of arrangement, to my senses. The classical explanation is to just say it's because whatever explains it must also be substructured and complexly organized, and it could have been structured and organized differently, and then the appearance would change too. Parmenides' Being can't explain that well. So I prefer pluralism. Would love to hear thoughts from other anons. It's worth remembering that the pluralists (Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the atomists) were Parmenideans in some regards. But they became pluralists basically to answer my question better. The Zeno/Melissus lineage focused more on proving things false (negatively), but it became anemic: it can't explain why things are as they are (positively). I'm not sure how you can do it without pluralism.

[Anonymous No.22450511]

>>22450273
>i finished doing some reading on the generation of numbers in Plato's Parmenides. And I think I get why duality exists before twoness
NTA. Are you the guy I talked with in the thread about Plato's Parmenides? Im the guy who mentioned Plato's Sophist

[Anonymous No.22450517]

>>22450498
You don't have to go for the pluralism route. If you really want to do it there's Empedocles, but if you want to stick with monism you should give Heraclitus a try. The neoplatonists might offer you some insight too

[Anonymous No.22450546]

>>22450498
>I need something that satisfyingly explains why things are one way and not another, qualitative-wise, and in terms of arrangement, to my senses.
I've been screaming at people to read Peirce for exactly this reason.
>>22450511
Yes. When I was grappling with the problem of duality and twoness, I had Aristotle's critique in mind, which was that you couldn't abstract "two" separate from "two things." But then I thought about Aristotle's emphasis on individuals in his own metaphysics, and I realized something important. In order to count "two things", you have to impose a uniform standard of "thisness" on both things. Otherwise, they would be one object A and one object B instead of two object As. Now, we have to go back to the generation of numbers to understand the implications. First, we began with One, and then we recognize an internal contradiction in One, in which we have a pair of concepts, One and Being. Since these concepts "emerge" out of difference in internal contradiction, the pair has to come "before" twoness. Only in reconciling the two concepts in their being can twoness emerge from the pair.

I feel like I have to put scare quotes around "emerge" and "before" because I don't think of this as an evolution in time but rather a logical procession that is also eternal due to the nature of the concepts involved. In some sense, I think that One, Being, and Difference have to all be there as a "tripod", as they're all dependent on each other.

I haven't gotten to the Sophist yet, unfortunately. I like to marinate in what I'm interested in before I move on.

[Anonymous No.22450585]

>>22450546
>peirce
Literally hegeliandialectics / christiantrinitarianism / neoplatonictriads / pythagtriangles / egyptiangnosis for dummies

[Anonymous No.22450594]

>>22450585
Peirce rebutted Hegelianism for not considering Firstness and Secondness in their own right. And reducing Peirce to mystical work is an extreme disservice to the work that Peirce did in logic, metaphysics, etc., by straightening out millennia of discourse on predication with rigorous precision.

[Anonymous No.22450598]

>>22450594
>mysticism le bad
He was retroactively refuted

[Anonymous No.22450601]

>>22450598
Where did I say that mysticism was bad? You missed the point. Besides, Peirce is unique among Anglo-American philosophers at the time (with perhaps William James as a close second) for finding mysticism interesting and important.

[Anonymous No.22450618]

>>22450601
>peirce le rebutted
Firstness secondness and thirdness is an incredibly old concept. Every circumstance is meant to be. There is no Peirce without Hegel. No Hegel without Peirce. No Parmenides without Heraclitus. Or vice-versa. And Empedocles and Plato are always impossibly ever actually possible too. No chaos without order. Compossibility one could say.

[Anonymous No.22450629]

>>22450618
Do you know what Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are? Or are you waxing poetic without saying anything of concrete substance?

[Anonymous No.22450647]

>>22450629
Do you know what you know? How do you know what I know?

How old are you? How much do you read? Do you think Peirce is obscure? That you are special to have read him?

[Anonymous No.22450666]

>>22450647
It's strange that you're making this personal instead of trying to be clear about what you believe. I only know based on what you present. There's no need to be coy.

[Anonymous No.22450689]

>>22450666
I've read Peirce. I know what firstness, secondness, and thirdness is. In any case, it is possible to both wax poetic and share things of concrete substance simultaneously.

[Anonymous No.22450700]

>>22450689
Yeah but you're being vague. It's also a serious question. I spent months reading Peirce before I finally understood what he was doing with Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. Though Peirce describes it as "tones" of thought, it's not a mere collection of qualities, themes, structures, etc. in an arbitrary grouping by a man with a brilliant intuition. The very root of it is a "phenomenological" predicate logic, one that Peirce derived by reforming Aristotle's and Kant's propositional categories in accordance with the development in logic in the late 19th century.

I'd like you to define what Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness is, in your view, so I can see how far apart we are (or how close we are) in our understanding of them.

[Anonymous No.22450880]

>>22450700
It's a semiotic map of blah blah blah about immediacy and mediation and intermediation. Relativity and intersubjectivity and absolutism. A triad. A triangle. A triforce. Or even teractyl... indral network perhaps insofar as it reflexes

[Anonymous No.22450934]

>>22450517
The neoplatonists and Heraclitus are frankly very structured. Their "monism" isn't a problem because of that. I'm fine with them, but not with how they think it's monism. The issue is the monism talk, and Parmenides is more consistently and truly monist than them. And that's the problem with Parmenides as I said. Pluralism is the way to go.
>>22450546
I have Peirce's collected writings but it doesn't have his paper on the first/second/third categories but I downloaded a pdf to check out. I like Peirce from what I've read but some bits I don't like, mainly the infinite semiosis and pragmatic theory of truth, the rest sounds interesting, I have my own other sources to draw inspiration from but I'd be happy to investigate Peirce more if you have advice.

[Anonymous No.22450960]

>>22450880
If that's what you got from it, you got filtered hard. Semiotics are an extremely peripheral concern relative to the internal logical/phenomenological core of Peircean thought. It's great, but it's like finding a nugget of gold in a hillside creek, not knowing that there's an entire vein of gold in the nearby mountain.
>immediacy and mediation and intermediation.
Immediacy is related to the quantitative scope of predication (just one thing), intermediation isn't even an "element" (would simply be subsumed under mediation, quantitative scope of three things (a first and a second related to a third), and you can figure out why by understanding the Peircean reduction thesis), and you've entirely neglected Secondness in your account, too. Peirce also isn't interested in founding a theory on "intersubjectivity" because that's a return to the Cartesian subject-object distinction, which he wants to do away with completely.

Sorry, but I can see why you were reluctant to discuss the topic. You don't know anything about Peirce. You wrote him off.
>mainly the infinite semiosis
What's wrong with infinite semiosis?
>and pragmatic theory of truth
The later Peirce distanced himself from other American Pragmatists because they were unconcerned with establishing a "realist" framework for their theory of truth.
>but I'd be happy to investigate Peirce more if you have advice.
I recently fleshed out my thoughts on an introduction to Peirce guide.
>>22427217
>>22427223

[Anonymous No.22450968]

>>22450880
If that's what you got from it, you got filtered hard. Semiotics are an extremely peripheral concern relative to the internal logical/phenomenological core of Peircean thought. It's great, but it's like finding a nugget of gold in a hillside creek, not knowing that there's an entire vein of gold in the nearby mountain.
>immediacy and mediation and intermediation.
Immediacy is related to the quantitative scope of predication (just one thing), intermediation isn't even an "element" (would simply be subsumed under mediation, quantitative scope of three things (a first and a second related to a third), and you can figure out why by understanding the Peircean reduction thesis), and you've entirely neglected Secondness in your account, too. Peirce also isn't interested in founding a theory on "intersubjectivity" because that's a return to the Cartesian subject-object distinction, which he wants to do away with completely.

Sorry, but I can see why you were reluctant to discuss the topic. You don't know anything about Peirce. You wrote him off.

>>22450934
>mainly the infinite semiosis
What's wrong with infinite semiosis?
>and pragmatic theory of truth
The later Peirce distanced himself from other American Pragmatists because they were unconcerned with establishing a "realist" framework for their theory of truth.
>but I'd be happy to investigate Peirce more if you have advice.
I recently fleshed out my thoughts on an introduction to Peirce guide.
>>22427217
>>22427223
At some point, I may compile a list of good secondary sources. The primary reason why I haven't is that 1) I usually feel that the more, the merrier when it comes to Peirce, so it's hard to prune things to the bare essentials; and 2) the best secondary source I have on him isn't on libgen and costs a pretty penny.

[Anonymous No.22451059]

>>22450968
>What's wrong with infinite semiosis?
I am a realist and it bothers my realist sensibilities
>The later Peirce distanced himself from other American Pragmatists because they were unconcerned with establishing a "realist" framework for their theory of truth.
Are you saying Peirce was realist compared to them? Interesting. Infinite semiosis combined with his rejection of intuition/acquaintance (the given) just feels deeply anti-realist/nonrealist to me. It's ok though I find much to learn from nonrealists too. I like James, don't know Dewey well though.
>At some point, I may compile a list of good secondary sources.
Thanks a ton for those posts, I'll write them up in a document for later consulting. Much appreciated.

[Anonymous No.22451129]

>>22451059
Abduction is literally intuition

[Anonymous No.22451134]

>>22450968
Yawn

[Anonymous No.22451176]

>>22451059
>Are you saying Peirce was realist compared to them?
He was such a realist compared to them that he coined the word "Pragmaticism" to distinguish his thought from the Pragmatist movement.
>Peirce in 1905 announced his coinage "pragmaticism", saying that it was "ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers" (Collected Papers (CP) 5.414).

[Anonymous No.22451179]

>>22451134
You're not as smart as you think you are.

[Anonymous No.22451950]

>>22451129
Abduction is literally not intuition. Abductive reasoning is an artifact of reason, intuition is (if real) the direct grasp of given content in experience previous to conceptualization, in turn previous to thetic judgment structure, in turn previous to ratiocination about propositions. Abduction happens only at that last level.
>>22451176
I've heard this before, interesting. But still finding it hard to accept he's realist to my taste with the infinite semiosis and anti-acquaintance bit. Isn't he basically keeping us stuck in a prison of symbols bouncing against each other in the void? Very Saussurean/structuralist (to be expected of another semioticist, since Peirce also developed that). I need help understanding how Peirce would get us out of that if he rejects a given of intuition/acquaintance as well as keeping us in infinite signs-bouncing-of-signs? Isn't he just sounding a little like Derrida?

[Anonymous No.22452284]

>>22451950
>I've heard this before, interesting. But still finding it hard to accept he's realist to my taste with the infinite semiosis and anti-acquaintance bit. Isn't he basically keeping us stuck in a prison of symbols bouncing against each other in the void?
First, for my own sake, I need to understand what you find anti-realist about infinite semiosis. Why do you find that objectionable? Usually when Peirce accepts infinite anything, it's related to preserving continuity in the universe.
>Very Saussurean/structuralist (to be expected of another semioticist, since Peirce also developed that).
A big distinction between Saussure and Peirce is that, for Peirce, everything, literally every-thing, is a sign, even things that have nothing to do with intentionality. Many signs are linked to physical causality, being dependent on things actually happening in the world and not just arbitrary conventions we establish, too. Other signs are linked heavily to chance, context, and circumstance. Basically, semiotics is a way for Peirce to describe the conditions for the possibility of meaning, and it's closely connected to his understanding of the community of inquiry. I also would hesitate to describe Peirce as a structuralist because a Peircean "structure" could substantially change or evolve at any time.

[Anonymous No.22452315]

>>22452284
>I also would hesitate to describe Peirce as a structuralist because a Peircean "structure" could substantially change or evolve at any time.
NTA but change/evolution of structures is usually considered compatible with most variants of structuralism and especially post-structuralism.

[Anonymous No.22452320]

>>22452315
>NTA but change/evolution of structures is usually considered compatible with most variants of structuralism and especially post-structuralism.
Well, it's hard to describe structuralism without describing any body of knowledge, isn't it? Peirce is partially "structuralist", but he's also highly interested in the things themselves and not just the relationships between them. I've also rarely seen Peirce described as a structuralist for some reason, even in semiotics where he is a well-known name.

[Anonymous No.22452322]

>>22452284
>everything, literally every-thing, is a sign, even things that have nothing to do with intentionality. Many signs are linked to physical causality, being dependent on things actually happening in the world and not just arbitrary conventions we establish, too. Other signs are linked heavily to chance, context, and circumstance.
Sounds mcluhanesque...

[Anonymous No.22452409]

>>22452322
Or Guattarian!

[Anonymous No.22452791]

>>22450511
>>22450546
Plato anon, you still there?

[Anonymous No.22453351]

>>22452791
I am now. But please don't call me "Plato anon". I love the name, but I don't think I deserve it, since I still don't understand the Philebus (which as a dialogue might end up changing my entire understanding of Plato's philosophy).
>>22450934
I think they make it work by showing that Being is not the end of the story. Technically Plato does that too, when he places Being above all Ideas, while also claiming that there is an Idea of Being. This insight has been adopted by countless philosophers in the medieval period, and by all German Idealists, but it was already present in Heraclitus, Plato and Plotinus. This move is usually done by showing that Being (qua Being) still requires some conditions to be met to be itself.

[Anonymous No.22453405]

>>22453351
Ha, I have to call you something!

I was mostly interested in your feedback regarding my understanding the generation of numbers, if you would humor me please.
>since I still don't understand the Philebus (which as a dialogue might end up changing my entire understanding of Plato's philosophy).
The limited versus the unlimited, I think, is a major key to understanding late Platonic metaphysics and how it all "fits together" after the naive theory of forms is destroyed.

[Anonymous No.22453408]

Since this thread has Severino in the OP I will post a quote of his on Parmenides, taken from his textbook on ancient philosophy. The translation is mine, with a few cuts here and there (nothing substantial, it's just to avoid excessive repetitions).

"Even by his ancient commentators, the thought of Parmenides was taken not only as a refutation of the existence of Becoming, but also as a refutation of the existence of Multiplicity, for the affirmation of said existence would entail the affirmation that "Non-Being is", which denies the Truth for which Non-Being is not. Indeed only Being is, since Non-Being is not. And if only Being is, then every determinate thing, exactly because it is determinated in a certain way (as color, form, sound, tree, star, animal, house, water, air, fire, earth, and so on) is not Being, which is to say that it is non-Being.
For example, a tree is not Being; which is to say, "a tree" does not mean "Being" (or in other terms, what is referenced with the expression "a tree" is not what is referenced by the expression "Being").
And a tree is not a part of Being either, since either 1) this part is identical to Being – and then it would not be a part, but Being itself – or 2) it is different from Being (but this would mean that *it is not* Being). Of all the things that constitute the world, the Truth shows that, since they are not identical to Being (nor in existence nor in meaning), they must be non-Being.
Then, if one affirms that a determinate thing is (e.g. if one affirms that a tree is), then he will affirm that Non-Being is, which is to say that Non-Being is Being.
Therefore the existence (the being) of Multiplicity and of the Becoming must be denied, for they entail the identification of Being and Nothing. If one posits that Being is not Nothing, one must admit that the many things and their becoming is nothing. Therefore Being, which is the whole, is not only eternal and unchanging, but is also not composed of parts.
Therefore the belief that Multiplicity exists is the content of the opinion of the mortals."

[Anonymous No.22453421]

>>22453405
Honestly my current understanding is that the theory of forms was not destroyed by Parmenides, hence its inclusion in later dialogues, like Sophist, Statesman and Timaeus. Hell, even in the Parmenides Parmenides praises the young Socrates for not having excluded Ideas from the things that are (meaning that the Platonic Parmenides was in fact accepting of the Doctrine of Forms).
Regarding your post on the generation of numbers (and the precedence of the dyad over the Two), I didn't respond because I mostly agree with what you've said.

[Anonymous No.22453422]

>>22453408
Thank you for sheer effortposting of translation.
>Therefore the existence (the being) of Multiplicity and of the Becoming must be denied, for they entail the identification of Being and Nothing.
What does Severino have to say about late Plato? Hegel? It sounds they reach similar conclusions but take a much different approach to how to deal with this conundrum.

[Anonymous No.22453440]

>>22453422
Thank you anon.
I still don't know (regarding your question in Plato and Hegel), I started reading Severino's textbook very recently and I haven't gotten to those parts yet. I might update you (either here on in future Parmenides/Severino threads) when I get to those sections. Out of curiosity, which anon are you? Im startiny to recognize some of you by your styles and positions, and that might make it easier for me to update you in the future

[Anonymous No.22453501]

>>22453440
I generally make threads on Plato, Aristotle, the pre-Socratics, Heidegger, and Peirce on a regular basis. I guess you can call me Peircefag or Peirceanon?
>I started reading Severino's textbook very recently and I haven't gotten to those parts yet. I might update you (either here on in future Parmenides/Severino threads) when I get to those sections
Looking forward to it!

[Anonymous No.22453512]

>>22453501
> I guess you can call me Peircefag or Peirceanon?
Ah then I am sure I will be able to recognize you lol

[Anonymous No.22453543]

>>22452284
If we're stuck behind signs from getting to any sign-in-itself, as infinite semiosis presupposes, we never get at anything as it is in itself, that's what intuition/acquaintance is about, and he seems to reject it. As such it becomes meaningless to say there are things we maybe cannot or will not know, and that's a key robust realist tenet. It also keeps us stuck in the world of signs bouncing off signs and this dramatically reduces out understanding to only what's inside, not outside. That's my worry; correct me if Peirce isn't making these mistakes (maybe I misunderstand him?), and even if he makes them doesn't mean I won't like him (I love lots of people who are nonrealists, including James, etc; I learn a lot from them).
>I also would hesitate to describe Peirce as a structuralist because a Peircean "structure" could substantially change or evolve at any time.
Fair. But that's how I thought Saussureans already thought. Certainly fits with Nietzsche and the Dilthey hermeneutics people (Heidegger, Carnap), as well as Saussure's descendants (Foucault, Derrida), the existentialists descended from Heidegger, and the neopragmatist analytics tracing from Carnap on one hand and maybe Peirce/James/Dewey on the other.
>>22453351
I have some thoughts on that above-Being thing that plays a ground role. You do see it with the German Idealists, what's less obvious is that it's still there with the phenomenologists/hermeneuticists in continental phil (leading up to the structuralists and post-structuralists, which includes Deleuze and his descendants) as well as with a big bulk of the analytics tracing from Carnap, Wittgenstein, and Sellars (three separate sometimes-blending strains), and also influenced by the earlier American pragmatists (Peirce, James, Dewey, etc). In the end I think they're actually wrong; but they're a lot closer to being right than people realize.

[Anonymous No.22453587]

>>22453543
>In the end I think they're actually wrong; but they're a lot closer to being right than people realize.
Why do you think they're wrong?
Also what do you think about what I've said here >>22453421

[Anonymous No.22453683]

>>22453587
I do have thoughts. I don't want to reveal all my original research here (sorry), but here's two pointers that can help you if you want to try yourself.
1. Plato is going through a dialectical movement (like Hegel dialecitc-like) from early to middle to late Plato. The late step is a return to the position of first but in updated more reflective version, preserving and overcoming both the earlier two stages.
2. If you really want to understand Plato's efforts better you need to understand Socrates. He hasn't been understood well enough to date. My tip is to figure out why exactly Antisthenes (and the Cynics), Aristippus (and the Cyrenaics), Euclides (and the Megarians), as well as Plato (and the Platonists) all went their own directions but claimed faithfulness to the original Socrates. I don't think any of the four had wild revisionist intentions. You need the four to work backwards and reconstruct Socrates' tacit beliefs proper. Remember the point of his aporetic elenchus is that he couldn't really put it into words, so you have to reconstruct his tacit understanding.
>Why do you think they're wrong?
Because realism is based on a more reflective self-analsyis of our own phenomenology of intentionality, and anyone who hasn't realized it is stuck at that earlier philosophy-of-the-Absolute level. It's very tantalizing and tempting to stay there. Going past it requires a certain self-honesty and diligence when doing the reflecting. A lot of people are content with the monism/nondualism as the end all be all. It's definitely closer to the truth than people think, in ways they don't yet understand so well. But the truth is completely difference.

[Anonymous No.22453767]

>>22453683
I must admit that I haven't understood neither of your paragraphs, but it is probably because you're keeping a lot of your research to yourself (which is perfectly reasonable, considering that we're on 4chan).
Are you active on any discord server? iirc you said that you were on the 4chan fight club server, but maybe it was another anon. Anyway if you want to continue this discussion on a discord server in the future tell me where I can find you

[Anonymous No.22453813]

>>22453767
>on the 4chan fight club server
Likely another anon, not me I don't think. I thought about the same (discord communication) with you and the other anon, meaning (idk who's who) Peirceanon and the other anon I responded to (I assume thats you). I'll have to think about it, I'm open to it but school's about to start and I have responsibilities but I'd be happy to chat in the ideal circumstances eventually.

[Anonymous No.22453817]

>>22453813
If you ever want to open a discord server or find one that is good hit me up then. I'm sure we'll keep recognizing each other in these threads, so there is no hurry

[Anonymous No.22453990]

>>22453408
This is so interesting. I wonder how Tweetophon and Pseudo-Tweetophon would respond to it

[Anonymous No.22454079]

Schizofag (op) here. Good thread, everyone. Convene again here on /lit/ and let's discuss more parmenides/plato/purse next weekend?

[Anonymous No.22454141]

>>22454079
Sure thing, maybe use the same title and picture in the OP so I know it's you

[Anonymous No.22454275]

>>22454079
>>22454141
Could make a general, call it /ppg/ for Parmenides and Peirce General or something. Well /pppg/ sounds better since Plato also matters but the PPG acronym is fun. More accurate and short would be /3pg/ or something.

[Anonymous No.22454291]

>>22454275
/P2P/: Parmenides to Peirce general. I think that covers the scope of the kind of philosophy we want to discuss. It's either that, or we ought to find a nice "keystone" term or topic to serve as the name. Something that sounds nice but is also a little bit obscure to filter out the average /lit/ retard.

[Anonymous No.22454356]

>>22454291
Ontological phenomenology?

[Anonymous No.22454392]

>>22454356
It's ugly but it works. I want to keep fishing for more ideas though.

[Anonymous No.22454409]

>>22454356
I was thinking: Being, Phusis, and Dialectics, but that ends up as /bpd/ general and may occasionally attract the wrong kind of /lit/ drifter (probably would be hilarious).

[Anonymous No.22454466]

>>22454275
>>22454291
That's fine to me, but remember that very few members of this thread have gone through Peirce. If you want to turn it into something regular you could, from time to time, maybe dedicate these threads to the discussion of a limited number of essais by Peirce (so that those like me, who have never read him, can discuss him with you guys while keeping the conversation focused on certain texts, rather than his whole corpus)

[Anonymous No.22454478]

>>22454409
/hrt/ -- henadology, rheology, theoria

[Anonymous No.22454504]

Honestly at this point you guys could simply open a discord server and organize reading groups, the anons in these thread seem motivated enough

[Anonymous No.22454526]

>>22454504
If the discussion moves to discord I'll drop out.

[Anonymous No.22454534]

>>22454526
same

[Anonymous No.22454560]

>>22454504
>>22454526
>>22454534
the problem is that half the people here have a hateboner towards Discord because of the stigma attached to the platform, even though it's a great platform for small discussion groups like this. people are scared that they'll get assaulted by trannies or something as soon as they open up the app.

it's an annoying stigma because it's completely wrong.

when you download the app and make a fresh account, you'll literally have nothing but a blank slate. if you only add a few /lit/ anons as friends and join the Parmenides discussion server, you'll have a 100% minimalistic and isolated experience, curated to your needs with nobody else ever bothering you.

but people don't get that, and nobody offers any alternative platforms, so we just have to keep wandering aimlessly on /lit/ and hope that enough of us are online when the threads drop for them to pick up steam.

[Anonymous No.22454590]

>>22454560
I like having the discussions on /lit/ because they're open to anyone who happens to see them, not just whoever knew about them already. Sometimes it means retards blow in and post dumb shit but sometimes it means interesting people who otherwise wouldn't be in the discussion end up joining.

[Anonymous No.22454603]

>>22454590
The threads don't have to stop. I won't stop using /lit/ in the meantime. It's just nice to have an extra bit of structure, memory, and connectivity. We can schedule /lit/ threads, have 1-on-1 conversations, keep in touch, document progress, etc.

Personally, I'd like to keep threads on /lit/ so the ideas can always be discussed for their own sake. Too much namefagging leads to currents of drama that never get untangled. Also, I like to troll around and stir up controversy for fun and to move the discussion along in novel ways (I've probably been identified by 4 different personas and misidentified at least thrice over the past couple weeks), and being on a platform with a permanent identity would make it impossible for me to do that.

[Anonymous No.22454609]

>>22454560
I fully agree, people are really to dismissive of discord, even tho it is basically a glorified skype group chat. The only advantage (and it is a big one) is that at least we know who we're talking to (which has been a big issues, considering how often anons respond to someone mistaking him for someone else)
That said if they want to avoid it, so be it. In that case we should agree on how to call these threads, and stick to them.

[Anonymous No.22454629]

>>22454609
I have a discord where I keep up with ol college buds for gaming n stuff

I would give ya the groucho quote about not wanting to join a club that would want something with me as a member

But since this is 4chan, I'm gonna be honest and say I don't trust you sick fucks nor want to be associated aside from ocassional shitposting

[Anonymous No.22454640]

>>22454629
Literally just make a new account with a new email you don't use and you'll be safe

[Anonymous No.22455456]

bump

[Anonymous No.22456292]

bump

[Anonymous No.22456883]

last bump

[Anonymous No.22456905]

>>22456883
It's over bro, see you next week