Quine vs. Kripke on de re modality

[Anonymous No.22399824]

Help me out /lit/. Lately, I have been trying to understand some analytic phil but I am dumb as fuck. I have been thinking about Quine's argument against de re modality and Kripke's response to it. Here's one way to formulate the argument.

(1) Nixon might have lost the election in 1968.
(2) Nixon = the winner of the election in 1968.
(3) The winner of the election in 1968 might have lost the election in 1968.

So it seems that (3) is false. Substitution fails. The winner of the election in 1968 could not have lost the election in 1968. Quine thinks that whether a particular has a certain property contingently or necessarily depends on how it is designated. But, if I understood correctly, Kripke would say that substitution fails because we can't substitute a rigid designator ("Nixon") with a non-rigid designator ("the winner of the election in 1968"). (3) would be true if we were to use rigid terms. But doesn't Kripke here presuppose that de re modality makes sense in his distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators? So his solution doesn't realy work? I don't really understand what's going on here. Also, does Quine's argument also challenge direct reference?

[xTard No.22399952]

In fact, he did. And he just refuse to discussion the point deeper since "Name and Necessity" is just a writing of some lectures and he has not time to speak about any issue.
As I remember his whole point about modality de re is:
It would be ABSURD to claim that Nixon has could lose the election 1968 if you speak of him as Nixion but he has been necissiary the winner if you tell him "the winner of the 1968 election".

He refuse to eleborate further at serval times in this book.
This ideas and points on logic mybe interesting. If you have another opinion, there is nothing in this book to convert you otherwise.

Either way, Kripke was a fascinating read. Unfortunately, I never went deeper into higher mathematics.

... and know the give this thread to the other anons, to increase the amount of offensives.

[Anonymous No.22399956]

>>22399824
TWO kinds of happiness?

[Anonymous No.22400037]

>>22399824
It's very easy to see that Kripke is quite right if you just follow an intensional possible world semantics. Quine was a nominalist who refused to accept anything but a very austere extensional semantics restricted only to one (the actual, spatiotemporal) world. Quine's extensionalism also poses problems for all kinds of reasons. It's especially embarrassing given that pre-Quine analytics (and anyone who was a competent language speaker of English) understood well how there is a sense/reference distinction, how meanings can vary in their denotations at different specified indices (for example, this place, or this time; possible worlds are just an extension of this index senstivity). Carnap before Quine was open minded enough to develop a modal semantics, and C.I. Lewis also before Quine developed modal syntax too. And nevertheless Quine acted like an ostrich out of nominalist prejudice. Kripke set us back on the right track. Anyone who thinks otherwise doesn't have a proper understanding of language but pretends otherwise.
>>22399952
He really doesn't have to elaborate because the dude spent his early career when he was like 17 designing possible world semantics. It's not his fault you or OP aren't familiar with that, I'm not blaming you either though, but he did do the formal work that underpins the meaning and justification of what he's saying.

[xTard No.22400075]

>>22400037
> It's especially embarrassing given that pre-Quine analytics (and anyone who was a competent language speaker of English) understood well how there is a sense/reference distinction,

Gottlob Frege has made the distingtion between Sinn and Bedeutung.

> It's not his fault you or OP aren't familiar with that, I'm not blaming you either though, but he did do the formal work that underpins the meaning and justification of what he's saying.

That a formal framework exist doesn't mean it describes the reality

P.S.: Could someone put picrel. on the statue of Platon?

[Anonymous No.22400264]

>>22400075
>Platon
in English we say Plato

Captcha: H8DANA
kek I do hate Dana. Fuck that bitch.

[Anonymous No.22400631]

>>22400075
Frege didn't invent the distinction, he just pointed out what was already in existence. Without it, we can't explain why some words could have the same meanings but vary in reference under different conditions. Without it we can't explain how someone with linguistic competence could fail to realize that two terms with different meanings but with the same reference do in fact have the same reference. It's much the same as with Frege's logical discoveries. These are not inventions, they are discoveries.
>That a formal framework exist doesn't mean it describes the reality
It earns its keep because it explains genuine real differences in language use and language competence. Quine's project fails to do that. So when it comes to the two choices, by Quine's own lights (his methodology) we should favor the posits of the better, more explanatory theory.

[Anonymous No.22400635]

>>22400037
>intension
What is meant by this? Do you mean "intention"?

[Anonymous No.22400673]

>>22400635
No I mean intension. There are extensional, intensional, and hyperintensional ways of characterizing bits of language in their relations to each other. Quine came from a period of very extreme extensionalist austerity. Kripke was part of the revival of metaphysics in the 1970s that happened precisely from his work in possible world semantics, which has intensionalist character. Since the1990s forward analytic metaphysicians have shown that even reducing things to just modality isn't enough, so postmodal metaphysics makes use of several hyperintensional notions now.

[Anonymous No.22400773]

>>22400631
>It earns its keep because it explains genuine real differences in language use and language competence. Quine's project fails to do that. So when it comes to the two choices, by Quine's own lights (his methodology) we should favor the posits of the better, more explanatory theory.

I did like Quine a bit.
Gut your argument here sound.

Can you provide me a book or article or like about the system of Kripke?

>>22400673
Do have read Husserl?