/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.21931535]

is cartesian meditations a good starting point with husserl? what works do i need to study to understand his critique of kant?

[Anonymous No.21932339]

>>21931535
>cartesian meditations a good starting point with husserl?
No, it's not. Start with Philosophy as Rigorous Science to situate him first against historicists, relativists and to a lesser degree existentialists.

[Anonymous No.21933478]

>>21932339
>>21931535
Sorry for the quick answer, I was at work and could only tabletpost.
To be more precise, Husserl develops his criticism of Kant through multiple phases, which cover a large part of his career (at least 1901 - 1923), so its hard to answer your question specifically, you have to dig in proper to get it. It starts at least in the 6th LI, 1901, and set the tone for the rest. Husserl essentially believes that Kant isolated the wrong concept of a priori on which to base all of his further epistemological inquiries. The 6th LI doesn't develop this criticism, however, it simply offers a better option. A good study of the 6th LI, and perhaps the previous ones to explain how he got there, would be a minimum requirement.

[Anonymous No.21933565]

>>21933478
>>21931535
The 5th LI prepares the 6th, which is where Husserl presents a phenomenological theory of knowledge. the 5th explains that objective scientific knowledge is brought about not by following the specific scientific method, but rather by "stringing the right series" of intentional acts. Validity or truth in the objective statement produced is dependent on the validity or justification of the intentional acts themselves. The important part of this entire theory is that for Husserl, there is no mediation of experience necessary to posit the intentionality of a psychic act. Intentionality is "larger" than consciousness so to speak. The absolute basis of Husserl's theory of knowledge is not an item of experiential data but rather the "presence of something over-against", which gives itself apodictically. The 5th further qualifies "moments of intentional consciousness" as acts, the variations in how these acts reaches their object-matter are identified as act-qualities (judging, wishing, remembering, etc). He further distinguishes matters from the object, and essentially channels Frege's theory of signification (it was verified that they both developed it at the same time independently).
However he is not satisfied that the act-quality and act-matter pair are sufficient to explain the acquisition or creation of knowledge. This process, fulfillment (Erfuhlung) is the core of the 6th LI, and where Husserl (covertly) situates his earliest criticism of Kant

[Anonymous No.21933657]

>>21933565
>>21931535
The beginning of the 6th LI introduces another pair of distinctions, the signitive-intuitive one, to qualify the interpretative form of acts. Acts can be signitive or intuitive or a bit of both, but they all have a matter and a quality.
Here Husserl can identify a key component of knowledge's essence, namely that all knowledge is based on a relation between signitive and intuitive acts. Only signitive acts can provide the "meaning" side of a meaningful judgement. A perceptual act can offer the object-directedness, but it does not contain meaning. Therefore, the emptyness of meaning the act does not prevent its operation (in terms of objectivity), in principle, as long as it obtains fulfillment eventually.
Fullness is the admittedly difficult to express "extra" weight that intuitive acts such as simple act of perception gives to something. The full perception of taking a hit in the face is quite simply more real than that of reading and imagining about it, or even just reading the sentence "you take a hit in the face" without imagining it. In a modern sense you could try and understand the difference between intuitive and signitive acts in terms of human/ai communication. An AI can accomplish signitive acts, but could probably not be conceived as doing intuitive acts.
The key difference between Kant and Husserl is here. For Kant, this fullness would purely be the result of being put in contact with the sensory contact implicated.
This however does not for Husserl account for the varied act-qualities we identified earlier. Fullness is also reached in its own specific way in acts of remembering, to pick the easiest example. Therefore fullness must be something separate, something larger than sensible intuition.
Even further, you can imagine that you can entertain an axiom, a mathematical formula, etc, understanding the expression's components, but having no clue about what it means. There will be a series of intentional acts that you can take from where you are to where you should be, and many times none of those steps will contain sensitive content. You do not see ideal objects yet they achieve fullness without necessarily forcing us to resort to their symbolic signitive acts. Therefore, we must posit that there are pure intellectual intuitions, which are acts that plays the role of the sensitive intuition for those empty meaning acts, but which do not contain themselves any sensitive content.

[Anonymous No.21933684]

please tell me I didn't just effortpost for a fucking bot :^<

[Anonymous No.21934246]

>>21933684
No but OP is away after hours.
I would add that Husserl reiterates criticisms of Kant found in Bolzano (sometimes also Brentano) without dwelling on it.

[Anonymous No.21934669]

>>21931535
Never liked Husserl. Whenever I read an exposition of his work, it sounds like he's adding multiple unnecessary layers, interpretations, and complications to phenomena. It's like when an autist starts to hone in on the smallest detail of conscious experience to the point where it's unintelligible. In contrast, whenever I read Heidegger, even if it's complicated at first, you can tell that he's trying to laser in on some primordial concept that we're all familiar with but have somehow forgotten about. The whole is always within sight, even if it retreats to the periphery for a moment. Unlike Husserl, Heidegger reads like he is a true break from the philosophers he criticizes.

[Anonymous No.21935475]

>>21934669
how about kys?

[Anonymous No.21935755]

>>21934669
filtered

[Anonymous No.21935789]

>>21935475
>>21935755
prove me wrong
>protip, you can't

[Anonymous No.21936056]

>>21935789
I cant because your personal preferences are not based on an objective fulfilled intentional act and therefore doesnt qualify as knowledge, and isnt oriented toward Truth.

[Anonymous No.21936134]

>>21936056
>being this caught up in the metaphysics of presence
and how are you different from your forebears?

[Anonymous No.21936644]

>>21936134
>metaphysics of presence
AH! I knew you were the same fucking memester as in the previous thread. Stop trying to shit this up simply because you have no knowledge of the subject matter.

[Anonymous No.21936660]

>>21936644
>use an omnipresent phrase that is common to phenomenology in a thread about phenomenology
>OMG IT'S YOU!!! YOU'RE THAT GUY!!!
take your meds, then read a book

[Anonymous No.21936673]

>>21936660
Look at him squirm once he's been identified.
Also, I already have some light reading, you faggoty cunt.

[Anonymous No.21936706]

>>21936673
I genuinely have no idea who you're talking about, I haven't been on /lit/ in months. But at least I get to live rent-free in your head in communion with other Heideggerians who have retroactively debunked your MO before it even began.

[Anonymous No.21937008]

>>21934669
>I don't care about all that theory of knowledge, let me get some primordial worldview
Proactively refuted by Husserl in Philosophy as Rigorous Science.

[Anonymous No.21937113]

>>21937008
Did someone take me on my rec?
Is there hope for this board?

[Anonymous No.21938423]

>>21937113
Based anon but no I have read everything of Husserl translated in French.

[Anonymous No.21938603]

>>21937008
How

[Anonymous No.21939238]

>>21938603
How about you read it, its a very quick book, it was published as an article in Logos.

[Anonymous No.21939404]

>>21939238
I'm not going to go out of my way to read a book without a promise that's it's worth it. What's the lede of the book? Summarize it, and if it's good, I'll read it.

[Anonymous No.21939846]

>>21939404
Kys.

[Anonymous No.21940054]

>>21939846
How does Husserl try to overcome Heidegger without falling to his method of destruktion?

[Anonymous No.21940980]

>>21940054
By calling not for a rejection of anglo empiricism but for a widening of the concept of experience to include both particulars and essences. And also, by just not giving a fuck
> "[Heidegger is ]involved in the formation of a philosophical system of the kind which I have always considered my life’s work to make forever impossible."
> - Husserl, ‘Letter to Alexander Pfänder, January 6, 1931’

[Anonymous No.21941204]

>>21931535
Before dekving into Husserl, what is his actual connection to Descartes? Does he have anything interesting to add? I ask because Descartes' Rules are straightforward enough I don't see what someone else would add or change about them.

[Anonymous No.21941340]

>>21941204
>I ask because Descartes' Rules are straightforward enough I don't see what someone else would add or change about them.
You mean the Rules of the Direction of the Mind? No, Husserl doesn't add on to those specifically. I don't see him disagreeing with any of it, in fact a significant part of his philosophy serves to justify 1.
The connection with Descartes comes in rather late, at least 25 years into his writing career, and marks more or less the affirmation of transcendental idealism within phenomenology. Having isolated the pure ego, he uses Descarte's Cogito to expose its principle, although pushing it much beyond what Descartes did himself. As such, Husserl's use of the Cogito is often referred to as a radicalization.
Shameless copy post from notes because I'm still just about 50% sure I'm replying to bots.
> Every actual cogito has an intentional object (and is a mode of thinking about something). The cogito itself may become a cogitatum if the principle that "I think" becomes an object of consciousness. Thus, in the cogito, the act of thinking may become an intentional object. However, in contrast to the Cartesian principle that "I think, therefore I am" (cogito ergo sum), the phenomenologically reduced cogito is a suspension of judgment about whether "I am" or whether "I exist." The phenomenologically reduced cogito is a suspension of judgment about the question of whether thinking implies existence. Thus, phenomenology examines the cogito as a pure intuition, and as an act of pure consciousness.
Also note that Husserl very rarely directly tackles another philosopher. Most of the time if Husserl addresses someone its a contemporary with whom he is in open dispute. If his own works brings him in a territory that was already uncovered by another philosopher, and he sees an opportunity to specify his own theory further by contrast, then he will mention the author (such as Descarte's Cogito, or kantian or neo-kantian theories). If he dislikes someone or believes they are not doing anything close to philosophy, he will not speak their name (I do not believe he ever mentions Nietzsche once, for example).

[Anonymous No.21942184]

>>21940980
>essences
Debunked by Heidegger.

[Anonymous No.21942502]

>>21942184
Could you perhaps entertain, only momentarily, as it is the only way to entertain anything, really, one must say, the possibility, however likely or unlikely, that is of no real concern, of not, that is, negatively, as the inverse of positively, being (and not not beying, you will notice) such a nigger?

[Anonymous No.21942521]

>>21942502
I could if you could give me a good argument as to why Husserl debunked Heidegger without either making Husserl sound like a sinister chimera of Descartes and Russell or giving a laughably bad reading of Heidegger.

[Anonymous No.21942528]

>>21942521
Huh.
But you are asking me to give something to a nigger. Surely you understand my dilemma here?

[Anonymous No.21942537]

>>21942528
if you gibsmedat, I might just go muhfugguh somewhere else or, inshallah, undergo complete and spontaneous vitaligo syndrome on the spot.

[Anonymous No.21942757]

>>21942521
>Husserl debunked Heidegger
Husserl preempted Heidegger's critique, he never debunked it because once it became clear Heidegger joined the anthropologists/existentialists/historicists faction it wasn't worth discussing it anymore. As I said before, if Husserl didn't like someone, you didn't learn it from his writings, you got it from his letters.
>a sinister chimera of Descartes and Russell
I guess we're at the point where we casually accuse each other's pet authors of having poor character. I wonder who is going to end up on top on this one, the Jew who couldn't even bring himself to say something bad about the Nazis on the off-chance they might be right and gave his son's life to the defense of the German people, or the fucking creepo who dodged the draft until 44 to fuck his students some more?
There is no similarity between Husserl and Russell. Absolutely none. Not in content, not in deployment, not in methodology and certainly not in character. The only thing you could latch on is that both were mathematicians, however even in that there were pronounced differences. Husserl started as a mathematician. He choose to do his "doctorate" on a subject which however ended up requiring that he takes philosophy classes, at which point he was recommended to Brentano. It is from Brentano, who is much more an aristotelo-thomist than a cartesian himself, that he understood the fundamental role of philosophy within the structure of knowledge. From that point on, he essentially stopped doing mathematics with the exception of letters to preeminent mathematicians to dispute the philosophical basis of their theories. FFS his theory of signification is essentially the same as Frege's, and you choose to compare him to Russell? How dumb are you?
The very same could be said about Descartes, with the exception that at least Descartes plays a role at some point in Husserl's development. 30 years in. If you got meme'd by the title of the CM, which happens to be Husserl's worst book, well guess what, you missed the part that says its the transcript to a conference given in honour of Descartes birthday (or deathday, not exactly sure) to a French audience. Its specifically shaped that way as an aesthetic tool of communication. And the content suffers for it quite a bit too.

[Anonymous No.21942772]

>>21942757
What makes Heidegger a historicist, anthropologist, etc.? The only reason Heidegger gets called an existentialist is because brainlets can't figure out where to situate Heidegger in the history of philosophy so they pair him with the French existentialists who were loosely inspired by him.

Again, what does "metaphysics of presence" mean to you?

[Anonymous No.21942807]

> Poster count goes up for each reply.
Confirmed bot thread, calling for extraction.

[Anonymous No.21942839]

>>21942757
sounds like a lot of seething. desu I think you just picked Husserl because he's sufficiently obscure enough to pretend that he has all the answers instead of being a (commendable) dead end

[Anonymous No.21944075]

bump

[Anonymous No.21944702]

cump

[Anonymous No.21944949]

>Unlike Heidegger and Derrida, I see no advance, recovery, or sophistication taking place in the Husserlian reading of Kant. The phenomenological reduction of appearance [Erscheinung] to evidential Schein is a dogmatic decision which defangs the tentative skepticism of the critical philosophy, taking it even further from the deep epoche of unknowing: the vast abrupt discovered confusedly by Pyrrho of Elis, the repressed of monotheistic civilization. Husserlian suspension or bracketing is not Pyyrhonian but Socratic; a reservation of judgment that is subordinated to apodicticity, to knowing what one knows even if nothing else (to doubting as a power of the subject). Epoche, chaos, Old Night, death, however it/she is named, the way there is not our doing. Suspension is to be discovered, not performed.

>So what is to be thought of a differance that radicalizes, deconstructs, or subverts a suspension thus crushed under a phenomenological dogmatics? What is it that would take us this way, if not that which appears (in Kant's sense, not Husserl's) as the humanistic pretension — the spirit — of representational philosophizing? Such suspension is of course a detour, an avoidance, but scarcely an inevitable one. On the contrary, it is peculiarly deliberated; meticulously valorizing a specific philosophic tendency (passing through Husserl), effacing another (the Schopenhauerean fork of post-Kantianism), and painstakingly transferring signs from the latter to the former (Nietzsche read through Heidegger!). Section 7 of Sein und Zeit is exemplary here, with its insistence upon an evidential reading of phenomenality, thereby dismissing the entire problematic of Nietzsche's thinking in a single casual gesture. What sense to the insistent theme of fiction in Nietzsche's writings after such a move has been made? What sense to enigma? (We always already have the meaning of being built into the structure of existence, Heidegger suggests, it is merely that we do not yet know that we know. Questioning is remembering. Socrates smiles.)

>We do not know yet, a not yet that can be dilated corrosively; frustrating the end of metaphysics, interminably deferring truth. Yawns become scarcely controllable. Does it matter what we know or will never know? Let us not forget that philosophy is also primate psychology; that our loftiest speculations are merely picking through a minuscule region of the variegated slime encrusting a speck of dust. An obsessional concern for such insignificances is a tasteless parochialism. What matters is the Unknown: the escapographic matrix echoed spectrally by the negative prefix, sprawled in immense indifference to all our "yets". Beyond the anthropoid gesticulations of knowing, suspension is not differentiable from death, and death ("one's death" as we so ludicrously say) does not belong to an order that can be delayed. Has our Socratism reached such a pinnacle of profanity that we really imagine she would wait for us?

[Anonymous No.21944980]

>>21942839
>Husserl
>obscure
Do Americans really? I can vouch for France, Germany and Italy that no one remotely interested in philosophy would ever spontaneously say that here.
The non-reasoning in your post is also puzzling. How would anon (that you can apparently mind read) go from the supposed obscurity of a writer to claiming he's right because of it?

[Anonymous No.21945959]

>>21944980
>from the supposed obscurity of a writer to claiming he's right because of it?
You're not reasoning well in this instance. I pointed out a rhetorical strategy, not a syllogism.

[Anonymous No.21945994]

>>21933478
>Kant isolated the wrong concept of a priori on which to base all of his further epistemological inquiries
What is the right concept of the a priori?

>>21933565
> "stringing the right series" of intentional acts. Validity or truth in the objective statement produced is dependent on the validity or justification of the intentional acts themselves.
Like Descartes? What makes this new or phenomenological?

>The important part of this entire theory is that for Husserl, there is no mediation of experience necessary to posit the intentionality of a psychic act. Intentionality is "larger" than consciousness so to speak.
Can you clarify this in simpler terms? I don't get it

>The absolute basis of Husserl's theory of knowledge is not an item of experiential data but rather the "presence of something over-against", which gives itself apodictically.
How is this not experience? What access do we have to it other than particular experiences of it? It's only apodictic because we find it so

[Anonymous No.21946316]

>>21945994
>What is the right concept of the a priori?
What Husserl designates the material a priori, in reference to laws of essence, such as the apodictically valid law that a color cannot exist without extension, or a sound without a pitch.

[Anonymous No.21946367]

>>21945994
>Like Descartes? What makes this new or phenomenological?
In what way is this similar to Descartes? 'Intentional act' was conceptualized by Franz Brentano, with intentionality itself being a property identified by scholastics and in some ways the Ancients.

[Anonymous No.21946386]

>>21931535
>Btfos Husserl an entire century before him

[Anonymous No.21946429]

>>21946316
How are those apodictically valid? Why can’t they be refuted tomorrow?
Berkeley throws out all of material reality using similar “arguments”

[Anonymous No.21946434]

>>21946386
How is that?

[Anonymous No.21946445]

>>21946316
Thanks, that makes some sense as an advancement beyond Kant although I have to guess at how it's integrated into a larger framework of pure transcendental phenomenology. I guess through an empiricism aimed at studying all such experiences?

>>21946367
Descartes' clear and distinct intuitions are guaranteed by applying intuition to the chain of inferences as well until its intuitive "evidence" approaches the level of evidence of an individual intuition.

[Anonymous No.21946476]

>>21946434
Husserl got stuck in solipsism like Hegel

[Anonymous No.21946651]

>>21946476
Quite possibly the lowest IQ criticism of Husserl one could conceive.

[Anonymous No.21946687]

>>21946476
No. This seems quite random here, have you read him? especially the volumes on intersubjectivity?

[Anonymous No.21946715]

>>21946687
Intersubjectivity is a meme for coping solipsists

[Anonymous No.21946762]

>>21931535
Cartesian meditations is too expensive for me. There’s some other Husserl I’d like to get though. I own Ideas I

[Anonymous No.21946885]

>>21946762
Try and find used bookstores close to your university quarters. Husserl books usually run very expensive.
>>21946687
> This seems quite random here
It's a Sartrean critique of Husserl, a very basic one at that, which is nearly always used by 2nd year philosophy teachers on their exams on Husserl "What is Husserl's approach to dealing with solipsism, why is it insufficient according to Sartre, and what avenues does he offer in exchange? Do you believe his assessment, and why?", that kind of shit. I believe it's also the very last part of the Stanford encyclopedia article on Husserl, which may explain why its meme'd so much (it might have changed I haven't checked it in years).

[Anonymous No.21948414]

>>21946429
>How are those apodictically valid? Why can’t they be refuted tomorrow?
Unironically, because of God.

[Anonymous No.21949928]

bump

[Anonymous No.21951065]

bump

[anomynous No.21951583]

This was an eye opener to me when i first came into contact with Husserls books back when i was 15.