[ 3 / biz / cgl / ck / diy / fa / ic / jp / lit / sci / vr / vt ] [ index / top / reports ] [ become a patron ] [ status ]
2023-11: Warosu is now out of extended maintenance.

/lit/ - Literature


View post   

File: 26 KB, 500x479, 1633323505459.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
21794590 No.21794590 [Reply] [Original]

When Plato talks of what is not, this is not the same void of nothingness that I envisage from Parmenides. If a sophist says that he has expertise in something it is not a case that expertise doesn't exist, instead the problem is that he falsely applies a real quality to himself. Falsity might be thought of as lacking in existence but it is made up of parts that do exist being applied in a confused manner. This relates to appearances in general - the method of acquiring images via the senses. These images must have an existence or else they would not able to be viewed, but it is not necessarily the case that they fully correspond to thing in themselves.

Basically I am torn between the intuitive simplicity of Parmenides "nothingness does not exist" and the Plato's doctrine which appears contradictory at first glance: "that which is not, is". I would like to think that appearences must exist, although that they have a lesser existence than things in themselves but if I say "lesser existence" I hear the voice of Plato whsipering to me that that implies that it must have a part of that which is not. Which surely is absolutely impossible! I have not been able to solve this contradiction to my satisfaction yet.