[ 3 / biz / cgl / ck / diy / fa / ic / jp / lit / sci / vr / vt ] [ index / top / reports ] [ become a patron ] [ status ]
2023-11: Warosu is now out of extended maintenance.

/lit/ - Literature

View post   
File: 104 KB, 754x767, Willard_Van_Orman_Quine_passport.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
21419188 No.21419188 [Reply] [Original]

Is there really no difference between analytic and synthetic sentences? I always thought all tatutologies are true statements.

>> No.21419270

>>21419188
>modern science is the greatest accomplishment of man
>>what is it?
>lolidunno
BRAVO

Really though, the nub of his argument is just that intention is an integral part of meaning which can't be conveyed through signs alone, yet he wasn't sufficiently metaphysical to think of there being a way to properly unify the disparate intentions of men.
Hence either a Heideggerian analysis of society sharing an innate sense of signs=meaning, or a more ambitious Russellian Platonism regarding universals. Quine took the easy pragmatic (=social) out in just saying 'it works'.

>> No.21419609

>>21419188
You have to distinguish between what I'll call (in a Tarskian spirit) formally analytic and materially analytic truths. Quine is fine with analytic truth in virtue of form (All unmarried men are unmarried), which you could call formally analytic. His issue is with analytic truth in virtue of the meaning of non-logical vocabulary (All bachelors are unmarried men).

Tautologies, traditionally defined, are sentences which are true under arbitrary reinterpretation of non-logical vocabulary. A predecessor to this discussion is in Tarski's work on logical consequence, where he distinguishes between formal and material consequence. Formal logical consequence is truth-preservation under arbitrary reinterpretation of non-logical vocabulary, while material consequence is truth preservation under the intended interpretation of non-logical vocabulary. Tarski worries about the formal/material distinction because it seems to call for a principled distinction between logical and non-logical vocabulary, but Quine in 2 Dogmas accepts the distinction uncritically and attacks the idea of truth solely in virtue of the meaning of non-logical vocabulary. But he doesn't attack the idea of formal analyticity, which is truth in virtue of the meaning of logical vocabulary; this latter notion is intended to substantiate the notion of truth in virtue of form, because 'form' here means logical form, which is provided by an interpretation of the logical vocabulary of a sentence.

>> No.21419702

>>21419270
this is literally retarded by the way, also no one thinks intentions can be conveyed by signs but rather that audiences can identify the communicative intention underlying a public performance.

>> No.21419812

>>21419609
>Tautologies, traditionally defined, are sentences which are true under arbitrary reinterpretation of non-logical vocabulary.
No, they remain true by replacing words that are synonymous

>> No.21419820

>>21419812
You obviously haven’t read the paper