Tips on Plotinus?

[Anonymous No.21323024]

I just finished Plato - had a great time. Now, I am starting with Plotinus. There are a few points I want to clear up with you guys:
>Apparently all the translations suck, but the Guthrie one is the best? It's the one I have, but I was shocked to see the author self-deprecate his own translation in the foreword.
>What's the read order for the Enneads? I have been going through them according to the way the translator/editor have arranged them, which seems to be very different from the order that Porphyry had initially compiled them in. I have no idea why the order is different, but will it hinder my comprehension? I am 50 pages in and haven't had any trouble thus far, at least.
>Note taking - for Plato, his writing style was quite intuitive so I did not feel the need to take any notes. Is Plotinus, for the most part, similarly easy to handle, or is he a more troublesome thinker that requires a lot of notetaking? I am a bit worried because the concentration of new, important information seems to be higher in Plotinus, and it's also often sandwiched by more boring polemical material so my concern is my attention slipping throughout the reading because of the uninteresting polemical aspect and then not being able to retain the new information
Other than this, I don't think I have any major questions for now. I will just say - Plotinus is a fucking genius. He's destroyed incorrect opinions that I did not even knew I had.

[Anonymous No.21323581]

>>21323024
I have nothing ti offer you, but I am also looking for the answers to some of these questions.

[Anonymous No.21323596]

>>21323024
Do not try to anticipate problems. Dive into the works, and then ask for help about specific issues. Always be prepared to take notes.

[Anonymous No.21324002]

>>21323024
probably hopeless given that we're on /lit/, but bump anyway

[Anonymous No.21324094]

>>21323024
Idk how guthre orders them but Porphyry’s editing is retarded. He intentionally moved shit around and split things up because he wanted to force the “ennead” format and get 6x9 because he was autistically obsessed with 54.
> Apparently all the translations suck
That’s a meme
> for Plato, his writing style was quite intuitive so I did not feel the need to take any notes. Is Plotinus, for the most part, similarly easy to handle, or is he a more troublesome thinker that requires a lot of notetaking?
Depends on which book you’re reading. Treatises like “on the genera of being” and “problems of soul” are much longer and more complex than the rest of the books. You will know when you need to slow down and take notes because you will stop understanding. But plenty of it is understandable easily.

[Anonymous No.21324139]

The new Gerson one is amazing

[Anonymous No.21324163]

>>21323024
Don't skip Aristotle. Plotinus relies on him a lot.

[Anonymous No.21324195]

https://twitter.com/HoDiadochus/status/1308912078858719232

[Anonymous No.21324253]

>>21323024
haven't read this, but Gutherie's translation of the fragments of Numenius of Apamea ("the Father of Neo-Platonism") was one of the best things i've read in awhile. an excellent preliminary to plotinus

[Anonymous No.21326116]

>>21323024
Do not try to anticipate problems. Dive into the works, and then ask for help about specific issues. Always be prepared to take notes.

[Anonymous No.21326305]

>Plotinus is a fucking genius. He's destroyed incorrect opinions that I did not even knew I had.
Such as?

[Anonymous No.21327258]

>>21323024
Hey guys I'm also reading the Guthrie translation of Plotinus atm and have a question - I am seeing Plotinus make reference both to the "First" (capital letter) and to the "One", and I am not sure if these are supposed to be the same thing or different things? I had assumed that the First is just a synonym for Intelligence, but iirc as soon as I thought that, Plotinus specified that the First is not Intelligence. So now I am not sure what to make of this - from his description I thought the One lies above everything, and the First lies beneath it alongside the other causes like the Second, the Third etc. - which I am not really sure what they stand for anyway t b h.
As a different issue, I also saw Plotinus refer to there being "two Ones" which seems... difficult to process.

[Anonymous No.21327272]

>>21326305
The sky being blue.

[Anonymous No.21327295]

>>21323024
I’ve read the Gerson version which I quite liked, so I’ll try to answer your questions based on that.
1. Porphyry’s version (followed by Gerson) is bunched together by ‘theme’ to some extent, which isn’t a very good idea but it does make the different books flow from one to the next. However, the difficulty changes somewhat randomly because of that, since you have earlier works interspersed with later ones. Porphyry’s organization is more esoteric (as opposed to exoteric), so unless you’re already familiar with the concepts (the ladder of being, the One, Intellect, etc), it might take a while until you catch on to what he’s on about. However, if you pay close attention and read the whole thing, it does come together. Gerson’s version also offers a chronological sequence if you want to read it that way, and I suspect that would be easier.
2. For my money, Plotinus writes much more densely than Plato. Plato’s writing is almost like reading literature, very easy to follow. Plotinus, especially in the longer works, writes very technically, so you’re likely to reach a point where you might want notes, or at least want to read more slowly. Unlike Plato, he wants to get into the minutiae of Being, kind of a proto-Scholastic writing, rather than the lyrical way Plato deals with stuff.

Anyway for other people wanting to read this, it’s best if beforehand you read:
- all of Plato
- most of Aristotle (he comes up a lot) - in particular Organon, Physics, Metaphysics, On the Soul, Nichomachean Ethics
- have an idea about Stoicism as well as early Christian thought

[Anonymous No.21327302]

>>21327258
The One is the source of all Being (or rather, is Being, or more properly speaking, just ‘is’). I don’t know about your translation exactly, but the First should also be the One. Intellect is certainly under that (to be intelligible you must first be), intellect is the ‘second thing’ so to speak.

[Anonymous No.21327307]

>>21327302
Okay, thank you anon, I will think of the First with that in mind.

[Anonymous No.21327321]

>>21327302
The One is not Being, it transcends this category entirely. This is basic knowledge which I can quote directly from Plotinus if you disagree. Nor is it a "thing." This is probably why OP is confused.
>The One is the source of all Being
You are correct about this much, which is why "First" would likely refer to it unless they are referring to the divisions of Intellect (in which case "first" would be "Being", as Being itself is the first sub-hypostasis of nous after the One, which then divides from the derivative unity of Being into the intelligible Beings in nous, or Forms).

[Anonymous No.21327332]

>>21327321
>>21327258
You’re right, this explains it even better, guy who was asking. The One is above even Being, but is the source of it (by default if you will), and of course it’s not a ‘thing’ because it transcends ‘things’, we just need to refer to it in some way on this Nepalese basketweaving forum.

[Anonymous No.21327364]

>>21324094
I see, well it's good to hear that the Porphyrean ordering isn't good, because it's easier to read page by page instead of skipping from chapter to chapter and back again in an attempt to hunt down meaningful connections.
My experience with the notes are also checking out thus far. Thanks anon.
>>21324163
I am skipping him for now, but I might go back to skim read some of Aristotle's major texts. I am going to be specialising in classics, so I probably won't be able to get away with not reading that guy.
>>21324253
There's nothing about Numenius in this compilation, except Porphyry's "Life of Plotinus" mentions that Plotinus didn't plagiarise him. That's all I've seen on him here.
>>21324195
No mention of the translations there, but thanks for the resources, I'll examine those more later.
>>21326305
Such as "the soul changes". He has an elegant proof on how the soul does not change, although I would think that perhaps its contents change - the soul always remains the same, however, and is always in possession of the principle of life (making it immortal). I am not sure what implications this has exactly on life after death and the survival of the personality, but this is an important point that is necessary for figuring the problem out.
>>21327295
1. I believe the Guthrie version is chronological and it's a bit confusing because there are so many topic switches - in some of the earlier chapters Plotinus deals with various topics related to Intelligence, but the actual definition of Intelligence is in later chapters. It is a bit jarring, but if it's the best way to read his works, then I'm content.
2. I agree, although his writing is probably at the upper limit of what my mind can tolerate. I think I'll be fine just reading through him, but I am already trying to take some very short rudimentary notes on the most important points, since there's so much new information to cover that I am not sure I will absorb it otherwise. With Plato, the characters, the setting and the time spent on the dialogues helps a lot more with digesting the information.

[Anonymous No.21327414]

>>21327321
>>21327332
Okay, I see. It would appear that reading Plotinus is going to be a huge headache! Well, it is what it is.
I am going to take the liberty of consulting this Proclus model I saw posted here a while ago and assume that the One in some manner is above Being or involvement in causal relationships, and, well, I have no idea about the First - I guess I'll have to do my best by trying to work with context.
I suppose there is also a further question about the One - I don't know if you are familiar enough with other traditions to offer comparisons, but I suppose the One would be analogous with Brahman (whether active or passive)? I have seen a lot of confusion on whether the One is the peak of Being (as with the upper limit of theistic religions), whether it is fully universal and transcendent as Brahman is, or whether it goes beyond/encompasses both being and non-being in some paradoxical sense (like the "Void", as some traditions posit it).

[Anonymous No.21327524]

>>21327414
I’m not familiar enough with Eastern traditions to think of a comparison, but I will try to offer two explanations. The first is by way of Aristotle: Plotinus’ issue is that you can’t define a category (or genera) by using something that’s already part of that category, you need something above the category to encompass it. This raises a problem then when talking about existence (‘being’), because all we have access to when trying to define being is part of being (including ourselves, our minds, the universe, etc). So the One, as Source, needs to be somehow above being, transcendental by definition, but also because of that, ultimately incomprehensible to us. In fact, it’s something (although he is at pains throughout the Enneds to point out it’s not ‘some’ ‘thing’ at all) that we can only point to vaguely and not actually define in words. This leads to the second way of looking at it, via pseudo-Dionysius and negative theology - a tradition that then continues in some Scholastic (and Islamic) writing on God and negative theology. The One (or God) is so different from human experience that we can only grasp what it is not, and can only understand through its manifestations/emanations (creation).

Whether it encompasses both being and non-being I’m not sure how to answer, perhaps someone else can chime in. My instinct is to say that the neo-Platonist system doesn’t really allow for the concept of non-being, because it would be seen as a ‘lack’ rather than something that has ‘positive’ existence. In other words, there is no such thing as non-being for it to encompass, non-being is just a way for human intellect to conceptualize an opposite to being, but can only ‘exist’ if ‘being’ already exists. Put another way, it only ‘exists’ in the way the term ‘smaller’ exists, as a comparative quality. But if any other neo-Platonism readers would like to offer ankther view I’d like to hear it.

[Anonymous No.21327575]

>>21327524
>This raises a problem then when talking about existence (‘being’), because all we have access to when trying to define being is part of being (including ourselves, our minds, the universe, etc). So the One, as Source, needs to be somehow above being, transcendental by definition
I see, that is a great explanation - I think it would be analogous to Brahman then, since it would be the complete sum of being (although that is probably a poor expression to describe it since we are not talking about something quantifiable here). Perhaps a better way to put it could be that it encompasses all of being within it, in a certain manner.
>Whether it encompasses both being and non-being I’m not sure how to answer, perhaps someone else can chime in. My instinct is to say that the neo-Platonist system doesn’t really allow for the concept of non-being, because it would be seen as a ‘lack’ rather than something that has ‘positive’ existence.
I think you are fully correct, and what you said earlier answered the question I was trying to ask there besides.

You also seem to have a very good understanding of the subject matter, so do you mind if I ask you another, unrelated question? The new terminology in Plotinus is throwing me off a bit so I would like to confirm my view with you:
>We have the One, above all, as the supremely transcendent
>Then we have the intelligible realm where Intelligence lies, and it is a kind of non-spatial dimensions - this, in the Platonic corpus, we know as the World of Forms. This is the realm of constancy, eternity and being, and is where the various forms exist, and also where intelligence and intellection occur.
>Further below is the realm of souls and individual beings; the divinities (besides the One) all exist on this plane, as does the Universal Soul, as do the little souls. These can exist both spatially when they inhabit a body, and non-spatially when they don't. Their power is the power of self-driving movement and of life, and they also have a direct connection to the intelligible realm/world of forms - they are perfect living beings fashioned after the Forms, but much more accurately than bodies, since they are immaterial.
>At the bottom, there is matter, which receives its form and life from souls in an imperfect manner
So basically, you have the One, and you have the Intelligible world which is capable of intelligence but which is in a sense static, and in a state of constancy and rest, then you have the souls which share in the intelligible realm and with the added element of life can allow the actualisation and in a way self-consciousness of the Intelligence/forms, and then there's matter which is very straightforward. Did I butcher anything here or do I have the image right, or am I missing something important? I believe I got a good grasp on Plato's forms, but Plotinus' discussion of intelligibles is throwing me off, I am not really sure what is analogous to what so my mental model is a bit troubled.

[Anonymous No.21327778]

>>21327575
Well, as far as I understand it you have the ‘diagram’ in the right order, although I’d have to re-read specific parts to really be able to say where certain elements fit. The overall structure you describe matches what Plotinus is talking about, but I remember for example one of the books talking more in depth about motion, that is, if the intelligible realm (and certainly the One) is in a sort of eternal stasis , how does motion fit into the lower rings of the ladder? I don’t quite remember his answer to this, but I think it’s something to do with motion developing out of Intellect through its action of self-reflection. However, we’re in the reeds here and I think for questions beyond that basic design you outlined you’ll have to read the thing yourself. Ennead Five covers some of this, maybe more specifically 5.9 (On Intellect, Ideas and Being), 5.1 (On the Three Primary Hypostases), 5.6 (On the fact that that which transcends being does not think and on what the primary thinking is and what is secondary - a very catchy title)

[Anonymous No.21327910]

>>21327524
>Whether it encompasses both being and non-being I’m not sure how to answer, perhaps someone else can chime in. My instinct is to say that the neo-Platonist system doesn’t really allow for the concept of non-being, because it would be seen as a ‘lack’ rather than something that has ‘positive’ existence. In other words, there is no such thing as non-being for it to encompass, non-being is just a way for human intellect to conceptualize an opposite to being, but can only ‘exist’ if ‘being’ already exists. Put another way, it only ‘exists’ in the way the term ‘smaller’ exists, as a comparative quality. But if any other neo-Platonism readers would like to offer ankther view I’d like to hear it.
I've read several of Plotinus' treatises with some focus, but none on this topic. Is it feasible that non-being is treated as Otherness, as it, for example, in Plato's Parmenides and Sophist? In those cases, non-being as Other is treated something like what Hegel calls "determinate negation", i.e., that part of the Being of a some being involves partaking of Otherness in order to distinguish it from other beings (so something like: Justice will partake in Sameness with Curage, Moderation, etc. insofar as they're kinds of virtues, but partake in Otherness such that Justice is also "not-Courage" and "not-Moderation", etc.) Would you imagine something like this is consonant with Plotinus, or do you suppose he departs from it?

[Anonymous No.21327980]

>>21323024
Don’t worry too much about not understanding him, as you will quickly discover his own students were filtered. As long as you can beat Porphyry you’re doing okay.
I’ve read Guthrie and Armstrong. I liked both, but Guthrie is definitely more readable while Armstrong has a more academic style. No clue who is more accurate.
Personally, I think the most difficult to understand treatise is ‘On Matter’, because the Aristotelian terminology is quite dense. I think that ‘On What Exists Potentially’ should be read first instead of second because it gives you an idea of what Plotinus is trying to demonstrate, which is that ‘matter’ by itself is completely unintelligible, having no intellectual characteristics such as number, proportion, size, etc.

[Anonymous No.21328047]

>>21327778
Yes, I am currently reading and it seems that Plotinus considered the intelligibles to be alive in the sense that thought itself is not possible without life, so they must necessarily possess life. Further, I saw him make a clear distinction between form and the intelligibles, which is... very confusing. I suppose it makes sense since a form isn't a thought, but then where do the forms fit in? Some intermediary plane between the intelligibles and the realm of souls? It's very confusing, but I hope I can figure it all out in the end, although I am not sure if I could ever possibly remember so many detailed explanations.
I am about to start reading 5.1 in the next ~10 minutes, although I am going through the pages as they are arranged so I have no idea when 5.9 will get its turn.
>>21327910
My understanding is that Parmenides explicitly denies the idea that there is such a thing as non-being, but it's been over a year since I last read it. I do not believe that there is a Form of Otherness either, but perhaps other anons will know better than me - I do remember that one of the motions described in the Timaeus is the motion of Difference, so perhaps that would serve an analogous function for your purposes. Speaking more broadly, my impression thus far is that Plato and Plotinus considered matter (i.e. that which has no being) as utterly worthless, lifeless and useless on its own, and generally of no concern or impact when it comes to what really matters, which is being.
>>21327980
>as you will quickly discover his own students were filtered
I rather suspect that this will happen to me too lol, although after reading Plotinus on the One and spending a bunch of time reflecting, I suppose so long as I can raise up the ladder of being, preferably as high as possible, what I do or don't achieve or understand doesn't especially concern me.

[Anonymous No.21328154]

>>21328047
On the intellect being different from the forms, there’s a section in 5.4 (see pic) where he says that Intellect is (contains) the Forms, so saying that thought is not a form isn’t quite right. I’d be curious to see this section where he says that the forms and intelligibles are different. Perhaps in the sense that the category of intelligibles contains more than just forms, but I’m not sure.

Anyway as others have said, best if you get through the whole thing because the more you read of it, the more it comes together. It’s quite different to Plato where you can read just one dialogue and get its individual meaning. All of Plotinus sort of fits together into a system (or he wants it to anyway) so the more facets of it you read about the clearer the puzzle becomes. But I agree, it’s basically impossible to actually remember every detail and likely that some parts will filter you. Then again, isn’t that the fun of philosophy, working on trying to figure things out?

[Anonymous No.21328205]

>>21327910
I’m basing my idea on sections such as 1.8 (On what Evils are and where they come from) and extrapolating a bit. And also partly on later Christian writings (Augustine and Anselm) which discuss whether anything ‘exists’ outside God (the One in this case). I think ‘Otherness’ doesn’t apply here, Plotinus rather talks about Sameness being high up the chain of being, followed at some point by Difference (originating with Intellect - which differentiates between itself as thinker and object of thought) - but as you can see these notions already require Being to make sense to us. So I think Plotinus would say that different things first of all participate in being, then participate in difference, leading us away from the question of whether or not ‘non-being’ exists or what it is. If it DID exist it would have to, in a sense, exist outside of the One, which I believe Plotinus would deny as being impossible by definition.

[Anonymous No.21328233]

>>21328047
Perhaps I'm being unclear, but I was referring to Plato's dialogue Parmenides and not Parmenides' poem, which does deny non-being. In Plato's dialogue, the second hypothesis about the One contains an argument concerning how the One that, by hypothesis, participates in beinghood but is not the same as beinghood but other (143a-c). In this case, Other seems to be what amounts to determinate negation, insofar as "the One is other than beinghood" = "the One is not beinghood". In the Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger puts together an account of the "community of forms" where non-being is discovered to be another way of saying "other"; the argument resembles the prior one from Plato's Parmenides, albeit the purpose in this case is trying to settle how a sophist might speak about things that are in ways they are not, i.e., other than they are. I imagine that the Timaeus passage you have in mind has the same Greek word, but translated as "difference" (which is a perfectly ordinary translation for the term I mean by Other). But in any case, I was just asking to see if that seemed to line up with Plotinus at all, and perhaps the answer is a tentative "maybe not."

Re: matter, I do think Plotinus goes further than what I see in Plato in regarding matter as of little worth. Texts like Phaedo and Phaedrus seem to make cases for being embodied souls as being good for us, insofar as it's that limitation that makes philosophy possible (in Phaedrus, there's two ways to the vision of the hyperuranians: the long path via chariot up to the place of the hyperuranians themselves which is always short-lived and followed by a descent, and the shorter path via the black horse racing to the beloved, since Beauty is the only hyperuranian being said to be the same down here as up there. The Phaedo has some similar reflections, insofar as Socrates' meditation on pleasure and pain comes about through the release of his shackles; but there's also playing with Phaedo's hair, the presence of Socrates' newborn or toddler, Plato being said by Phaedo to be absent on account of being sick, i.e., insinuating that Plato may have made a calculation in favor of taking care of his body. Something like this seems to also be the necessary starting point for the Ladder of Love in Symposium: one has to start with the appreciation of beautiful bodies, and, even if of lesser dignity that the Beautiful itself, there's no skipping steps.)

[Anonymous No.21328351]

>>21328047
As the man himself says:
> All things are the One; or rather, they are not the One yet, but they will be.

[Anonymous No.21328373]

>>21328047
My interpretation of the Theaetetus is that neither matter nor sense objects are, proper speaking, objects of cognition or knowledge. Rather they are objects of opinion, which as we know is a rather lowly thing to Plato. Yet thought has an object, which can only be the eternal forms perceived behind a veil of ignorance. In regards to sameness and otherness, it might help to reframe from ‘forms’ to ‘intellectual notions’. As we know from Phaedo, Plato considered Equality to be a form.

[Anonymous No.21328470]

>>21328154
>there’s a section in 5.4 (see pic) where he says that Intellect is (contains) the Forms
I don't think that the passage necessarily implies this, since it can also mean that the intellect can contemplate things without recourse to forms. I really don't know though. The passage you posted seems familiar so I think I read it just a couple of hours ago, but my translation may have used different terms for some of these. At any rate, things are rapidly becoming very confusing for me because many of the definitions I am encountering (of the souls, bodies, intelligibles, forms) seem to contradict each other, at least at first glance. Or perhaps the relationship between these things is far more complex than I originally suspected and they intermingle to a considerable extent and with considerable nuance, rather than being strictly distinct from one another.
>I’d be curious to see this section where he says that the forms and intelligibles are different. Perhaps in the sense that the category of intelligibles contains more than just forms, but I’m not sure.
If I recall correctly, it was a passage referring to matter and how it has form but cannot access the intelligibles, or something like that. I can't remember. Sorry anon.
>Then again, isn’t that the fun of philosophy, working on trying to figure things out?
I suppose it is! What a happy reminder. Though one might hope truth awaits on the other shore and all that.
I do feel like the issue is becoming clearer as I read. I am not sure if I should just try to rush as much as I can and finish the book in a week, week and a half, hoping to keep the mental images fresh and interconnected, or do what I usually do and read about 15-25 pages per day, since reading a limited amount of any one text per day massively increases my retention.
>>21328233
I was referring to the dialogue as well. My most clear memory of that dialogue was Parmenides telling Socrates to avoid using the phrase "that which is not" (i.e. non-being). I have no familiarity with Hegel and his way of thinking is extremely alien to me, so I can't comment on anything like that - my view of Sophist and Statesman is that they are dialogues based on the demonstration of dialectic, and as for Parmenides, you've already seen my opinion.
I absolutely agree with your view on the difference between Plato and Plotinus on the value of matter - Plotinus seems to see himself as being in conformity with Plato and occasionally cites passages that I considered merely lyrical, such as the one referring to the soul being entombed in the body. In my view, however, Plotinus is radically sceptical of the body in a very much unacceptable way - Plato seems a lot more contented with the body and matter. In fact, in the Republic he outright states that philosopher-kings should rule as a duty - something which seems to contradict Plotinus' unilateral anti-matter stance and his promoting of isolating oneself from life. I still admire him, of course.

[Anonymous No.21328477]

>>21328373
I think I agree with everything you've said. Although, I am not really sure what this Form of Equality refers to here - assuming you are referring to the equal, that would necessarily mean the same. I think sameness could probably be a form, but I do not know about otherness. A lot of this would be easier if we had a complete list of all valid forms.

[Anonymous No.21328531]

>>21328470
>I was referring to the dialogue as well. My most clear memory of that dialogue was Parmenides telling Socrates to avoid using the phrase "that which is not" (i.e. non-being). I have no familiarity with Hegel and his way of thinking is extremely alien to me, so I can't comment on anything like that - my view of Sophist and Statesman is that they are dialogues based on the demonstration of dialectic, and as for Parmenides, you've already seen my opinion.
If you'll forgive the quibble, I think you're still referring to Parmenides' poem where the goddess warns Parmenides away from saying "is not"; in Plato's dialogue, Parmenides seems to show Socrates that his formulations about the forms result in each one form becoming many (the third man arguments) or each whole becoming many parts, a kind of ironical "et tu" since Socrates just tried to refute Zeno's book the same way. But, quibble aside, you have made clear how Plotinus would seem to treat the matter.

(Re: Hegel, I wouldn't necessarily say you *ought* to read him, but if you're exploring the thought of the Neoplatonists, he's a very similar and consonant thinker to them. Not to play down significant differences--he's clearly different from them--but if the notion ever occurs to you to look into him, he might not be as alien to you as you suspect.)

>I absolutely agree with your view on the difference between Plato and Plotinus on the value of matter - Plotinus seems to see himself as being in conformity with Plato and occasionally cites passages that I considered merely lyrical, such as the one referring to the soul being entombed in the body. In my view, however, Plotinus is radically sceptical of the body in a very much unacceptable way - Plato seems a lot more contented with the body and matter. In fact, in the Republic he outright states that philosopher-kings should rule as a duty - something which seems to contradict Plotinus' unilateral anti-matter stance and his promoting of isolating oneself from life. I still admire him, of course.
I think this is wholly right; the striking difference between the two is certainly in politics, which Plato everywhere emphasizes, while Plotinus seems to view it all with suspicion. (Though I suppose even he was tempted by politics, if the story Porphyry relates about almost setting up Platonopolis is true!) Curiously, politics seems to have become more important again to the Neoplatonists by the time Olympiodorus wrote. He doesn't harp on it, but there's greater recognition of the importance of the political situation for philosophy to continue and be possible, perhaps aware of how fragile the Academy's situation was in a now Christian empire.

[Anonymous No.21328600]

>>21327414
One isn’t analogous to Brahman really at least in plotinian metaphysics. Brahman is sat-cit-ananda, the one is none of those.

[Anonymous No.21328606]

>>21327524
Non being exists in neoplatonism and it’s called matter

[Anonymous No.21328648]

>>21328531
I think anyone who perceives Late Plato as supporting political engagement is misreading him pretty badly. Putting aside letter 7, we can simply read the ‘Lords of Philosophy’ speech in Theaetetus to see that the radical detachment that Plotinus advocates is consistence with Plato’s later thought. This speech contains Plotinus’ favourite quote about fleeing evils by becoming godlike. To summarize my impression of late Plato’s political thought:
>Although states and forms of government are consistently coming into being and being extirpated in turn, regarding the poor state of their citizens and the viciousness of their actions none can be considered to be truly good.
>The only way to actually improve the situation would be to make the citizens lovers of wisdom and virtue, but;
>This will never happen, because any attempt at spreading philosophy to the greater populace will fail since no human possesses the requisite powers of wisdom and statesmanship.
>Therefore the philosopher sets his mind upon God and not the world of men, which he flees from.

Additionally, Plato’s injunction for philosophers to go back down into the cave in the Republic is explicitly only referring to those who the city has brought up to be philosophers, because they owe a debt to the city. Philosophers who do not dwell in such ideally philosophical cities have no ethical obligation to spread philosophy.

[Anonymous No.21328703]

>>21328477
Hmm, it'd be tough to set down, but interesting to work out.

Since I have some time, maybe I could give this a go with Gorgias and Phaedrus, if it helps.

Gorgias:
>454e Two forms of persuasion, one making belief without knowledge, one making knowledge (tentative, Socrates ask "do you wish us to set down..." to Gorgias)
>473e laughing is a form of refutation (probably rhetorical, Socrates is annoyed with Polus)
>503e forms are what good men and, by analogy, craftsmen aim for their productions to have

Phaedrus:
>229d the form of the "Hippocentaurs" (seems to be casual expression)
>237a there's a form of song
>237d-238a there's multiple forms of hubris; ideas are causes of hubris and moderation, specifically the ideas of opinion and desire
>246a there's an idea of the soul, which the rest of the palinode apparently is
>246b-c soul comes to being in forms
>247d hyperuranians: justice, moderation, knowledge (elsewhere Beauty is named as one, at 250b it's the only one evident outside of the heavens)
>249a-b there's a human form
>249b-c recollection is the gathering up of many perceptions into one perception by reasoning with respect to form
>251a there's an idea of the body
>251c soul has a form
>253b tricky to parse, but there's either an idea of each god or an idea of the lover
>253c the soul, for the purpose of the palinode, has been split into two horse forms and a charioteer form
>253d the white horse has a "straight form"
>259d there's a form of honor belonging to each muse
>263b a rhetorician must grasp the characteristic of each form (examples here might be justice and good, immediately prior)
>265a two forms of madness, one from human illness, one from divine origin
>265c-266a two forms of...speech? One that teaches by definition and comprehends many things leading to one idea, the other carving apart by forms as if carving at natural joints
>266c Phaedrus supposes there's a form of the dialectical distinct from the rhetorical
>270d the subjects of arts may have either simple or multiple forms as objects
>271a a question about whether the soul has one or many forms like the body
>271d a rhetorician must know how many forms the soul has, how many forms of speeches there are
>272a forms of speeches: brief speech, piteous speech, exacerbating speech
>273d-e distinguishing beings by forms and comprehending them under one idea is necessary for artfulness in speeches (for persuasion)
> 277b-c there's a form that fits each nature

Lol this doesn't seem to have been as helpful as it could be.

[Anonymous No.21328723]

>>21328531
As I said, I remember only bits and pieces of Parmenides, and only the ones that I found interesting. If there is a poem within the dialogue, then that may in fact be what I am referring to - however, I do not read any poetry in my free time of my own volition, so if you are referring to an original poem by Parmenides, I assure you that I have not read it.
I also feel like we may have spoken in a Plato thread before. At least, your writing style reminds me of that poster. I posted a number of questions about the Republic with the same pic as here >>21327258 - are you the one who responded to me? I think I did see you mention reading a bunch of authors including Hegel. Personally, I really dislike German idealism, but of course I am not the most qualified on the topic.
>perhaps aware of how fragile the Academy's situation was in a now Christian empire.
Probably a bit late to start worrying at that point. I think this is ultimately why Plato demanded that the philosophers should rule, or at least one part of the reason why - you either rule, or are ruled. If philosophers are not really philosophers, and if they allow others to rule them, then they are leaving philosophy and wisdom at the mercy of others. This is also one of the reason why I disagree with any mystic that emphasises renunciation, at least as regards that particular point.
>>21328648
Plato's letters describe his experience in trying to establish a philosophical kingdom in Syracuse (at least) three times. I am not really sure how you interpret that as an argument against politics. I do agree that there is reasonable ground for Plotinus to claim continuity from Plato as regards renunciation, but to assert that Plotinus' extremes are consistent with Plato's obvious partiality to politics and to harmonious coexistence with the body is too much.

[Anonymous No.21328761]

>>21328703
I think you're using the term "form" a bit too liberally here. There's a lot of good and useful ones here, though - for example, the fact that Plato asserts that there is a form of the Soul makes some things clear which are a bit obscure in Plotinus.

[Anonymous No.21328784]

>>21328648
I didn't say he supported political engagement per se, but if that was ambiguous, let me spell out what I mean more. I take it that Plato holds political engagement in low esteem insofar as something like the Kallipolis is very unlikely and improbable (but not impossible). But politics can't be dismissed because the philosophers live in a city that affords them the leisure to think and wonder as opposed to hunt, farm, or forage. But the city does not guarantee acceptance or the safety of philosophers, whose questions are thought by the city to be destabilizing. Therefore philosophers, to protect their activity, will deal responsibly with the city and its citizens, encouraging certain associations or friendships and virtues (as Plato does in the other letters, and as Socrates is depicted as doing to Plato's politically-minded brothers in the Republic), and will attempt at the least not to make men worse (harder, because while a Meno might show Socrates trying to get Meno to think about what virtue is, any Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides can be held against him all the same). I.e., I take it that advising people or educating some within certain bounds is acceptable while ruling is ridiculous.

>Additionally, Plato’s injunction...
Absolutely, I agree with this, but with only the qualification that it's not about spreading philosophy, which the philosopher will attempt to do even in the face of every Glaucon, Cleitophon, and Theages who will fail, but it's ruling the city that the philosopher doesn't owe to the non-philosophical city they live in. (Were you in on any of the Crito threads from the last few months, by the by?)

[Anonymous No.21328846]

>>21328761
>I think you're using the term "form" a bit too liberally here
Lol, that would be Plato's fault, if anyone's. All of these passages feature eidos or idea, the two words crucial to his vocabulary. One does have to tread carefully for all sorts of reasons, since Socrates asking if someone would set down something as a form is suggestive, but not as definitive as one might desire, and taking passages from the three speeches from the first half of Phaedrus might need to untangle them from issues like how Socrates' first speech is meant to be an improvement on Lysias' that e might not stand behind, or that his second speech is a palinode which needs untangling to see what the account amounts to outside of rhetorical myth. And obviously, if the dialogues have a dialectical progression, then the early uses of eidos or idea might need to be revised in light of later developments in the argument.

>>21328723
If your memory is of someone bringing up Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Strauss, but also Ficino and Al-Farabi, then that's certainly me lol. If it's you, it's nice chatting with you in another thread.

[Anonymous No.21328906]

>>21328846
>If your memory is of someone bringing up Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Strauss, but also Ficino and Al-Farabi, then that's certainly me lol. If it's you, it's nice chatting with you in another thread.
I recall the first three, but not the last two - although I saw someone else bring up Ficino and Plethon in another thread very recently, although I remember nothing about it. Nice seeing you again either way!

[Anonymous No.21328939]

Definitely take notes. I regret my speedreading of him and might go back to it next year. He’s generally an easier read than some of Aristotle’s more byzantine treatises but more difficult than Plato. Also Guthrie’s order is chronological so it’s probably better than Porphyry’s mishmash.

[Anonymous No.21329014]

>>21328906
Cheers dude! Have you had any further luck re: making sense of the soul and immortality?

[Anonymous No.21329201]

>>21329014
Not entirely. It seems like the topic just doesn't really get dealt with to the required degree of specificity. For example, Plotinus offers some proofs of the immortality and eternal life of the soul, but he doesn't describe to what extent the soul retains its personality from life. I can't tell if this immortal soul he describes dumps all its "psychological" contents - as we would know them - on each reincarnation, or whether it even continually exists as an independent unit or gets absorbed and then spat out by the world soul again and again. In this type of cases, even having an immortal soul won't really do "me" much good. Unless I can discover some proof that the soul is both immortal and to some extent retains its identity, I will have to to hedge my bets on henosis or some other type of esoteric transformation.

[Anonymous No.21329217]

>>21328723
My reading, especially of letter 7, is that Plato thought that, although educating everyone to be a philosopher organically was not possible, it could be approximated if the absolutist tyrant was made a philosopher, who could then make everyone act as if they were a philosopher. This approach failed pretty badly, and the attempt got several philosophers killed. Compare the Plato who wrote the Republic to the Plato who wrote Laws, who seems to believe that the best possible political system is secretive totalitarian control.
I also believe that Plato and Plotinus are closer than you believe. In the Phaedo, the body is described pretty bleakly as a hindrance to right reasoning, and is said to be the cause of injustice and immoderation. I think Plotinus actually appreciates the sensible world much more than Plato. For evidence, there is a section in (I believe) On Providence where Plotinus, speaking as the World Soul, chastises us for not having the wherewithal to appreciate the great amounts of beauty which the sense world contains. In his work ‘On Beauty’, he also speaks of the beauty in the works of nature, giving on us the example of a brilliant flash of lightning. It’s not so much that Plotinus is ashamed of being in the world; moreso ashamed of being a lowly human.
>>21328784
Obviously, the philosopher will act in a godlike way because he is himself trying to be godlike. Since making someone less virtuous or wise is to harm them, and it is never just to inflict harm needlessly, the philosopher in dealing with any other will never do intentionally do it. But I don’t agree with the premise that philosophers, in the strict Platonic sense, are intentional spreaders of philosophy. They are seeking out wisdom for themselves, and the fact of human life is that when we collaborate we can achieve more than we can as individuals. The spreading is thus a secondary, but not by any means unwelcome, outcome of the practice of searching for wisdom for yourself. That’s why the philosopher persists even though many fail along the path.
>Where you in on any of the Crito threads
No, I’m an infrequent poster.

[Anonymous No.21329229]

>>21329201
In Ennead 4-3, I believe, Plotinus argues that the soul does not maintain memory, although everything about your life is in a certain manner eternally retained in Nous.

[Anonymous No.21329249]

>>21329217
Again in Letters, in Plato's praise of Dion, he makes it quite clear that Dion's attempt to establish a philosophical city after the removed of Dionysius II was both extremely noble and almost successful, if only he had not been foiled by chance. The Letters make it quite clear that Plato believes the undertaking to have been both admirable and possible, at several points.
The difference between Laws and the Republic is owed to the difference between practical advice and ideal theory.
I don't think Plato's claim that vice originates in the body somehow discredits bodily existence, as he also makes it quite clear that the rational soul can dominate this same body and its impulses. As for Plotinus, his polemic against the Gnostics is wonderful, so it is not clear to me why exactly he considers renunciation to be the right thing to do or bodily existence as irremediably corrupt. Plotinus' own life plainly demonstrates the possibility to dominate the body and matter, and many other people have done the same as he has, with or without also pursuing philosophy. I simply cannot comprehend how or why we should deem existence here a kind of punishment. Plotinus' alternative explanation that we are here to assert order and actualise the divine possibilities is so much more beautiful and compelling, and, it should be noted, in total contradiction with the doctrine of renunciation.

[Anonymous No.21329258]

>>21323024
How should I read Plato? I know there isn't any definitive chronological order on when written or setting of work and also that subjects vary throughout so a more unorthodox order might be required. Should I just read in the order from the Hackett complete works?

[Anonymous No.21329266]

>>21329229
Well, if the soul retains no memory, and the characters of incarnate beings are mostly conditioned and inherited, I guess henosis really is the only way to maintain personal continuity. Although perhaps I am looking at things from a flawed perspective in the first place - if you make yourself as free as the one, to the point that you can achieve oneness with it, then in a sense you've changed nature to that of the One, haven't you? Then again, I suppose if I had to choose between being free and conscious or being a slave to materiality/destroyed, I would prefer the former, with or without any personal continuity.

[Anonymous No.21329270]

>>21329258
>Should I just read in the order from the Hackett complete works?
That's what I did and it was perhaps the best thing I've ever done. I hotly recommend you do that, anon.

[Anonymous No.21329284]

>>21329270
I'm also going to read a different translation of the republic and symposium when I get to them like a lot of /lit/ charts rec. did you do the same? I think the main difference is the republic is more literal and the symposium is more poetic or something.

[Anonymous No.21329290]

>>21329258
The Hackett order is perfectly fine, especially because the longer works are towards the end. The only change I would make, but an important one, is to leave Parmenides until the very end, it’s by far the most esoteric dialogue and a good lead-in to neo-Platonism if you want to go that way

[Anonymous No.21329296]

>>21329290
Thank you for the tip.

[Anonymous No.21329316]

>>21329217
>Obviously, the philosopher will act...
I think we agree on a good deal, but we might disagree on two points. The first point is on philosophy itself; per Symposium and Phaedrus, it's said that to be wise simply belongs onky to the gods, and so it does follow that to desire wisdom is to desire to be a god, and up to here we don't disagree, but we may here: to philosophize is not the same as to actually have wisdom, and it may be that the philosopher in Plato is perhaps more satisfied with seeking than with finding, as troubling as that might be.

The second point would be on making further philosophers; we agree, I think, up to this extent: Plato doesn't believe in universal enlightenment. But the philosopher still desires something like philosophical friends, both to bounce ideas off of and to verify their opinions. To this extent, the philosopher will provoke their friends to philosophize even they fail t make them do so. (It seems worth noting both Crito and Polemarchus; the former Socrates provokes all the time, even though it never takes, and the latter of all people is said approvingly to have become a philosopher in the Phaedrus.)

But we do seem to agree to a good deal.

[Anonymous No.21329322]

>>21328606
That’s true, but we’re confusing terms here, what the OP asked about was non-existence (period) rather than non-being.

[Anonymous No.21329707]

>>21329316
Regarding the first point, I will admit the verbal misstep, but in self-defence I must cite the Symposium, where Diotima instructs Socrates that there is a middle ground between being wise and being ignorant, which is where philosophy occurs. So while perhaps there is no earthly wisdom, surely there are better and worse degrees of ignorance here.
>>21329266
My interpretation of Plotinus is thus: while we maintain no extreme personal continuity between transmigrations, it would be more objectionable if we did, because then we could hardly be ‘the principle of all things’ and hence would have no hope of salvation. Secondly, the soul in a sense changes even during the time we are in the body - are you the same person now who you were five years ago? See Symposium. Additionally, a memory of something happening is definitely not the same as actually experiencing it happening. Wouldn’t it be better to have eudaimonia than to have perfect memory of an imperfect human life? Thirdly, Plotinus argues that the souls are distinct right up until their final achievement of henosis, and that the world soul is just one soul amongst many, albeit stratospherically better than our souls. If this was not true, and our souls were simply ‘reabsorbed’, it would be impossible to maintain cosmic justice across lifetimes, which is a tenet of Platonism.
>>21329249
I really, wholeheartedly, believe that you are somehow confusing them. Plato is an unceasing pessimist about bodily desires. When Glaucon objects to the ‘city for pigs’ Socrates mocks him for his immoderation. In the Gorgias and the Philebus Plato describes the human life as a vessel with holes, which we always try in futility to fill without success. In Philebus he further states that the philosopher only takes pleasure in the eternal forms and mathematics. The only way in which Plotinus can be said to be more austere than Plato is in his praise of celibacy, which is pretty muted compared to that of his Gnostic, Epicurean, and Christian contemporaries.

[Anonymous No.21330828]

>>21329258
Honestly starting with whatever dialogue touches upon the concerns or subjects closest to your concerns is usually the best route. The rest of the dialogues have ways of suggesting how the many topics might be related. So to start with, what stirs the most questions in you?

[Anonymous No.21330875]

>>21328606
Prima materia is the same concept in Scholastic philosophy, and it does not exist by itself, because its essence is separate from its existence. The essence of matter is pure potency or receptiveness, but its existence is distinct and is quintessentially attached to a being (a form, an act), even if a being which is not ensouled, like a rock for example.
>Non being exists in neoplatonism
Plotinus uses the translated phrase prope nihil, which means "almost-nothing", which can be said to exist without contradiction. Which means he is referring to materia secunda by this term, and that pure matter cannot exist by itself because to say so would be illogical. This is how post-Socratics solve Parmenides problem of non-being, they basically concur with Parmenides that non-being/matter has no substance (and cannot even be thought let alone touched or found), and that what we typically consider non-being are actually special subdivisions of being, like act and potency, both of which "are" in a sense, and therefore can be conceived.

[Anonymous No.21331363]

>>21329284
I thought the Hackett translation was perfectly good for both dialogues, personally I wouldn't bother to hunt down a different source. It's up to you.
>>21329707
>My interpretation of Plotinus is thus: while we maintain no extreme personal continuity between transmigrations, it would be more objectionable if we did, because then we could hardly be ‘the principle of all things’ and hence would have no hope of salvation.
This is sensible, but it is a bit dispiriting in that it would appear the "correct" way of being of the universe really isn't geared to human beings. This much should be obvious, of course, but it still seems a bit depressing to me, at least right now.
>Secondly, the soul in a sense changes even during the time we are in the body
I agree, and I think Plotinus probably would too, with the reservation that he clearly believed the soul does not change in any notable way (i.e. structurally), but perhaps that the contents it carries change. Although I don't know how, if at all, the contents of a soul would be classified by the Platonists. Memory is considered a faculty of the soul, and if the soul does not change as Plotinus says it doesn't, then memory must either be in some way subordinate to the rest of the soul or it will be impossible.
>Wouldn’t it be better to have eudaimonia than to have perfect memory of an imperfect human life?
The memory is not important but some continuity of the commanding principle is important to me - otherwise we end up with a similar situation to the Christian heaven which, especially if understood in its more vulgar version, is somewhat offputting.
>If this was not true, and our souls were simply ‘reabsorbed’, it would be impossible to maintain cosmic justice across lifetimes, which is a tenet of Platonism.
I am not sure I really believe that this cosmic justice actually occurs in any meaningful fashion (i.e. you would need a continuous person in order to judge him), and besides there are some Enneads on the unity of souls that I found rather confusing so I can't really discuss the unity or multiplicity of souls. My impression was that souls are all one but also multiple at the same time or something like that.
>>21330828
I don't recommend doing that because it means leaving all the less interesting dialogues for the end and in a 1800 page book this may be unwise. It is better to have them interspersed throughout your reading as treats IMO. I hated most of Laws but read 200 pages in two days simply in order to get to the next dialogue and see what it's like. (The next dialogue was Epinomis, so the joke was on me! Although there was at least one interesting argument I found there.)

[Anonymous No.21331371]

>>21329707
>I really, wholeheartedly, believe that you are somehow confusing them. Plato is an unceasing pessimist about bodily desires.
That he is. However, being a pessimist about bodily desires does not mean advocating a withdrawal from the world. Plato was himself personally active in the world and if Letters are to be believed, he explicitly wanted to be more than a theorist, i.e. a doer, someone who acts in the world, presumably because that is a good thing. Just because matter is flawed does not mean that we have to withdraw from it. Yet, this is precisely the position Plotinus continually maintains, quite radically. Porphyry's Life of Plotinus even describes him approving of that senator who abandoned everything - his public life, his honours, his office as a praetor, his wealth, his household, even his family and children - in order to pursue philosophy. I think this is in violation of the virtue of moderation.

[Anonymous No.21331770]

>>21323024
Pogtinus seems fun. Picked up.

[Anonymous No.21331793]

>>21323024
How old are you? Quality post.

[Anonymous No.21331832]

>>21331793
I'm 24.

[Anonymous No.21332178]

>>21331363
>I don't recommend doing that because it means leaving all the less interesting dialogues for the end and in a 1800 page book this may be unwise.
How so? If someone's interested in the nature of man, you read the Alcibiades Major, if interested in the daimonion, you read Theages, if interested in beauty, you read Hippias Major, etc. Philosophy has its best chance to reach someone by catching them where they are. The Hackett order is arbitrary insofar as it's not the actual order of composition, or the dramatic order of the dialogues, nor a pedagogical order supplied by Plato or anyone else; why commit to it as though it had to be a meaningful order? There's plenty of time in a life to read the dialogues. (I say this as someone who's spent the last year and a half focusing on Rival Lovers, Cleitophon, and Theages)

[Anonymous No.21332247]

>>21329707
>Regarding the first point, I will admit...
Then we're in agreement on that point.

[Anonymous No.21332433]

Skeletonposting anon here.
I just got done reading On Matter and a couple of other chapters. I am glad I took some notes, because it was a wild ride. Apparently, matter is simultaneously simple, one, infinite and incorporeal! And a kind of celestial version of matter even exists in the realm of the intelligible! This, Plotinus designated intelligible matter. I never would have dreamt up the idea, but I think I more or less understand it now and it makes sense, so that's good. Reading this (and Plotinus in general) is quite gruelling though, it's taking me much longer to get through a single page than usual.
>The Forms
I also saw some clarification of what the forms actually are, specifically, that which imbues an essence into a given thing - this includes even abstract notions and seemingly materialistic notions like a Form of Quantity. So long as there is an imparted nature (or something to participate in), it seems we are speaking of a form at play.
>Souls and Guardians
Some of the stuff on these topics were really confusing. Plotinus expressed himself in such a strange way that I have no idea if he was claiming that the vegetative part of our souls really *are* parts of our souls, or if they are actually a part of the Universal Soul only, or somehow simultaneously parts of both.
The Guardian stuff was so obscure I could reliably make out around maybe 1/3 of it - Iamblichus seemed to be much more straightforward on this topic. I am not really sure what the implications of the chapter are on the topic of transmigration either. I would try to elaborate but honestly it was just very obscure in general, with reference to the Guardian himself being a part of the soul, but also of leading the soul to its judgement, joining and guarding other souls, etc. And apparently these Guardians are specific faculties, with there being a difference between reason and intelligence (and presumably between the types of intelligences and their dignity as well). I am sure I misunderstood a lot of things here but I doubt I will figure them out just by reading Plotinus.
>The One and Henosis
The picture on transmigration is looking bleaker than ever, but at least my doubts about henosis have been totally vanquished. A static existence seemed somewhat unpalatable to me, but Plotinus makes it quite clear in an inspiring way that the One, whilst lacking life and consciousness, in a way possesses both super-life and super-consciousness, since it is the ultimate source of both life and consciousness AND cannot be merely reduced to them either. In other words, at least as far as henosis is concerned, it is an unambiguous good and supremely desirable.
>>21332178
What I mean is that when I was slogging through Laws, what kept me going was the idea that, if I am done with it as soon as possible, I will get to stuff I find interesting again. If I had read all that I found interesting first, I would have probably only grudgingly and very slowly finished the rest of the dialogues.

[Anonymous No.21332508]

>>21328205
Wrong. Being, sameness and difference are coordinate.

[Anonymous No.21332610]

These are the best lectures on Plotinus I've found

https://archive.org/details/cu31924103069773/page/n11/mode/2up

more concise, insightful, digestable, interesting than anything going on in this thread.

[Anonymous No.21332613]

>>21332433
Try reading the essay on Plato in The Greek Concept of Matter and reading about aoristos dyas

[Anonymous No.21332614]

>>21332610
>/lit/ reading dean inge
very based

[Anonymous No.21332683]

>>21332610
Idk why you're insulting your fellow anons when no one here is attempting to give a lecture at all.
>>21332613
Can you give a bit more information about this as it is the first time I hear about any of this. Are you referring to a book, and who is the author?

[Anonymous No.21333195]

>>21332433
>What I mean is that when I was slogging through Laws...
Granted, sometimes you have to eat your vegetables on account of their being good for you as opposed to looking toward what might please you more immediately. But for a random anon asking about a reading order for Plato, is it worse or useless to recommend starting from where one finds oneself? Such a recommendation might not work for, say, Plotinus, where you have to start from a roughly proper beginning with a proper end in sight, but isn't that case different in Plato?

Plus, won't encouraging one to read straight through what was historically read carefully over a long period risk resulting in a more rushed and flippant reading? It might be the case that some people are set with a single thoughtful reading of the Euthyphro in a day, but perhaps some people need a month. In any case, if you're worried about readers skipping dialogues, isn't it also true, more or less, that the dialogues have built in relationships to each other to encourage one on to dialogues one miht not initially find interesting? By way of example, maybe someone starts with something focused on language, as quite a bit of modern academic philosophy is, like the Cratylus, or they start with the poetic Phaedrus. Both dialogues contain important asides about legislators, and a reader naturally curious about that might be led to the Laws, whose theme is who the legislator is and what they consider in setting laws, which they might otherwise skip.

I'm not trying to suggest this is the only way, but does it seem a fair and legitimate recommendation?

[Anonymous No.21333246]

>>21333195
You make a perfectly good point, I suppose a self-aware third party should choose whichever of the two methods we have shared.

[Anonymous No.21333452]

>>21324195
Thanks for sharing this anon.