/lit/ - Literature

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Anonymous Fri Sep 2 23:09:41 2022 No.20932376 [Reply] [Original]

>"Philosophy as science, as serious, rigorous, indeed apodictically rigorous science - the dream is over."

Was Husserl right on this point?

>>	Anonymous Fri Sep 2 23:10:33 2022 No.20932380 >>20932376 Luckily I have rescued it for everyone

>>	Anonymous Fri Sep 2 23:12:47 2022 No.20932392 >>20932376 Where is this from? Philosophy as rigorous science or the Krisis? I've just restarted Philosophy this afternoon myself, sadly its busy at work so I'm not getting far...

>>	Anonymous Fri Sep 2 23:17:09 2022 No.20932402 >>20932392 Krisis

>>	Anonymous Fri Sep 2 23:29:20 2022 No.20932466 >>20932402 Makes sense, he was definitely less optimistic by 35 than he was in 10-11, and with good reasons. Still, it's pretty insane how he diagnosed the coming wave of postmodernism decades in advance.

>>	Anonymous Fri Sep 2 23:46:50 2022 No.20932555 >>20932376 good news the philosophy as science meme was created by Aristotle and lasted way too long creating too many autists like Kant along the way

>>	Anonymous Fri Sep 2 23:50:02 2022 No.20932565 >>20932466 nothing impressive about old men viewing the younger generations and the ones to come as retards

Anonymous Fri Sep 2 23:56:22 2022 No.20932592
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>>20932565
> Predicts Freudian degeneracy and calls it out
> Predicts the loss of faith in rational truth
> Predicts the rise of empty Existentialism.
> JUST AN OLD DUDE BITCHING ABOUT THE YOUNGLINGS

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 00:04:28 2022 No.20932633

>>20932592
Most of these are recurring conclusions into which reason (as manifest through the history of philosophy) ends up leading men. How many times in history did rational truth not lose its vigor? Not that it is without innovations, but likewise, how many times existential nihilism did not appear there (Hegesias, gnostic sects, buddhist schools, the Romantics, the 20th century existentialists)?

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 00:06:46 2022 No.20932650 >>20932633 >Hegesias, gnostic sects, buddhist schools, the Romantics >the same as 20th century existential nihilism Yikes dude.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 00:10:33 2022 No.20932667 >>20932633 Predicting the loss of faith in rational truth due to the rise of empirical sciences, about 30 years before it fully manifest itself, and pointing out the signs that are heralding it properly, no, that's not the same.

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 00:57:07 2022 No.20932860

>>20932650
>not that it is without innovations

>>20932667
Are you aware of the attack against cartesian philosophy by empiricists and their skeptical tendency (due to their obvious immanentization) in the enlightenment era? Aware of who Schulze was and of what the Sturm und Drang and all Romantics were about?

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 01:06:21 2022 No.20932885 >>20932860 Are you aware, in return that you are derailing a perfectly good thread for no foreseeable gain?

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 01:08:07 2022 No.20932892 >>20932860 >>not that it is without innovations Except you're making that the defining trait rather than, if one even follows you outdated Nietzscheanism, their cultural uniqueness.

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 01:25:59 2022 No.20932963

>>20932376
More on topic, it's hard to see the quagmire that followed Husserl, and the overall barrenness of philosophy in contemporary times and not agree with him, however it shouldn't be a fatalistic assessment. It might be that in 35 the dream was specifically over for him, and that he was conscious that his enemies had won the day, which would lead us to a dark time, but it wouldnt necessarily mean that philosophy as science couldn't possibly reemerge, shouldn't in fact be expected to reemerge, as he himself claimed it was the undercurrent of all philosophy wanting to truly be one itself.

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 03:06:25 2022 No.20933314

>>20932892
I'm simply saying common elements among those philosophies repeated their appearance in the course of history.

>>20932885
I'm responding to the post above, nothing else. You could simply agree with me, instead of, now literally, derail the thread.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 03:14:43 2022 No.20933344 File: 116 KB, 508x785, Rosen Elusiveness of the Ordinary.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] Transcendentalism was a mistake

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 03:36:18 2022 No.20933420 >>20932376 Isn't science just natural philosophy?

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 03:38:49 2022 No.20933430 >>20933344 >some fag constantly namedropping people as if they matter Just get to the arguments, asshole.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 03:51:43 2022 No.20933472 >>20933420 Ideally, yes, however Husserl hoped that a science that is phenomenologically founded would also give proper foundation to less "solid" fields, such as history, anthropology, etc.

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 04:04:23 2022 No.20933502
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>>20933472
>Husserl hoped that a science that is phenomenologically founded would also give proper foundation to less "solid" fields, such as history, anthropology, etc
Unfortunately the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics also applies to memetics and other forms of information, so we're going to have to accept and be honest about our uncertainties if we're ever to do so.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 04:08:01 2022 No.20933514 >>20932376 >apodictically rigorous science This doesn't exist in general. Even in maths, the only thing apodeictical is the necessary connection between judgements, not the content of the judgements.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 04:15:51 2022 No.20933539 >>20933514 So, there is at least an apodictical science of those connections, no?

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 04:23:11 2022 No.20933559 >>20933539 Yeah, but again even that is all form and no content. You can bootstrap content in like Fichte tried to, by using the ego and its negation, but those attempts just seem like post hoc rationalizations which the form easily does away with.

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 06:46:55 2022 No.20933864

>>20933430
It's the first page of a 40 page essay, go fuck yourself
>>20932963
It will reemerge in spite of people like Husserl and his obsession with Descartes and transcendental autism transmitted from Kant. Three people who possessed sheer hostility to the tradition they would render scientific and certain, ignorance of its history and remarkably little self-awareness.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 06:56:15 2022 No.20933885 >>20933864 Still no arguments, I see.

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 07:03:24 2022 No.20933895

>>20933430
It's the first cheek of a 40 gape anal, go fuck your cheeks
>>20932963
It will reemerge in spite of people like Asserl and his obsession with Desfartes and transcendental cheek clapping transmitted from Cunt. Three people who clapped sheer hostility to the cheeks they would render scientific and clapped, ignorance of its history and remarkably little anal-awareness.

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 08:07:44 2022 No.20934019

>>20932466
I love thinking about the Husserl/Heidegger relationship. It perfectly encapsulates the entirety of the degeneration of postwar old Europe, as the Protestant Jew argue for old style Cartesian certainty in metaphysics and truth VS the pomo German who wars against old-fashioned rationalism as much as his follow post-Hegelian relativists.

Unfortunately, to my mind, in seems the universe is running something that looks more postmodern and relativistic than anything a Leibniz or an Aristotle would be happy with, though. Oh well; at least we still have blind faith—that has to be good for something, no?

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 08:10:18 2022 No.20934027 >>20932860 Ah yes, it was the EMPIRICS and that dastardly Locke who turned philosophy into a subjectivist's game of self-masturbation, or perhaps, self-mastication, not at all Descartes' intuitive doubt-ridden education and state filled anxieties. :^)

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 08:20:35 2022 No.20934042

>>20932963
There's no hope at all for modern philosophy. The opportunity cost of someone with intelligence going into the field is just too great, these days. One of the fundamental draws of philosophy in the old day was, beyond its material returns, which were never so great, the draw of Eschatological enlightenment; yet these days it seems the Eschatology is more the concern of would-be-Babel-building Architects rather than philosophers and theologians. Heidegger said that whilst philosophy was useless, it pointed a path. Paths only exist in 3d space, places with a modicum of freedom. What paths are available for the modern world? What hopes can be expected? What changes effected? Nothing. Stasis. Absolute resilience to all possibility of change. In such a world what can a sign wish to accomplish?

Today there's only mindless utilitarianism and a race to the particular Techne which will accidentally destroy humanity—its progeny, mechanical, biological or artificial perhaps inheriting the carcass of this world we've distilled down to its fundaments, its primordial atoms, and discovered to be a worthless hell.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 09:02:37 2022 No.20934124 >>20933420 The separation of philosophy and the sciences has been the biggest crime against thought in history

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 09:16:59 2022 No.20934156

>>20934042
This seems like some real bitch-tier whining.
Everything in the 20. century and even contemporary philosophy have been absolute bangers. There is so much to choose from and to develop further.
Probably more people than ever actually engage with philosophy and hear about thinkers of the past and what they have to say.

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 09:32:46 2022 No.20934182

>>20932376
>Was Husserl right on this point?

I mean isn't it obvious? Metaphysics reached its final stage and evolved into Science. Man reached the moon. Philosophy's role as method of knowing things about the real world is over and done for.

But philosophy is still relevant to myths, aesthetics, politics, psychology etc.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 09:50:47 2022 No.20934208 >>20932376 It’s over

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 11:22:28 2022 No.20934436

20934156
>Everything in the 20. century and even contemporary philosophy have been absolute bangers. There is so much to choose from and to develop further.
I'm not going to respond to your post because of this. The retardation requisite to type this without killing oneself is too much.

No (you) for such a post, friend.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 11:52:18 2022 No.20934494 >>20933420 Wissenschaft, the German word for science, does not just mean the physical science but any systematic area of knowledge. Hence the German Idealists all use this term.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 11:56:14 2022 No.20934500 >>20932376 I guess he wasn't familiar with American and British analytic philosophy. They're more autistically rigorous than physicists. It's why no one is interested in their work.

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 12:30:05 2022 No.20934574

>>20934027
With empiricism the tendency was to posit sensualist epistemology. Not that cartesian cogito is without ambiguities, but philosophers through history interpreted cartesian res cogitans and res extensa as derived from a common source: God (what are is occasionalism after all?).

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 12:34:50 2022 No.20934586
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>>20932592
>fails to produce anything that could dispel all the things he warns about
wasted. I always felt that Frege and Husserl were highly overrated thinkers. Husserl tried to cope by reducing Heidegger's phenomenology to "psychologism", only to miss the point of Heidegger's philosophy to uncover Being as the Greeks (mis)understood it.

Frater Asemlen !XS8vrClKs2 Sat Sep 3 12:39:48 2022 No.20934596

Why are you guys pretending like he’s saying this in a doom and gloom fashion or as some kind of prediction when his goal is philosophy as science via a harsh methodology founded on skeptical methods? Is it just lacking of reading him that’s making this look like by “dream” he’s being sentimental, since he’s not being sentimental, he’s saying he’s conquered the mental illusion.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 12:44:53 2022 No.20934614 >>20934596 Frater Asamlen, long time no see! Could you visit my indeterminate dyad thread if you have the time please? I would value your input: >>20926679

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 12:46:38 2022 No.20934621 File: 685 KB, 824x1024, hegel.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] >>20934596 Frater Asemlen, long time no see! Could you visit my indeterminate dyad thread if you have the time please? I would greatly value your input: >>20926679

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 12:50:51 2022 No.20934631 >>20932633 Materialism is the path towards nihilism, the Gnostic "world of ideas" exists beyond a condemnation of all things existing

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 12:56:07 2022 No.20934642 >>20932376 philosophy is more rigorous than physics

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 12:57:09 2022 No.20934647 >>20932555 kant was soooo autistic lmao

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 13:04:53 2022 No.20934672 >>20934574 And from whose senses and whose mind's finitude deduced from?

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 13:35:30 2022 No.20934770 >>20934672 I’m just showing that there was a growth of subjective psychologism in the 18th century, with elements of Berkeley’s philosophy, with Hume, Condillac, etc.

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 16:40:15 2022 No.20935506

>>20934770
You're retreating from the point. Descartes' subjectivism is what itself promulgated the doubting epistemology of sensualism, he only managed to escape it by a deus ex machina of God's goodness. All subjectivism must necessarily be of the critical type—Descartes 'greatest' legacy to all philosophy.

I take your point, but you're diminishing the importance of the modernist turn away from Scholastic realism.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 16:45:15 2022 No.20935523 >>20934586 An an inventor of many concepts and pehnomenology he does have the pedestal rightly, but I agree that he is highly overrated overall as an authority in critical philosophy.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 16:47:44 2022 No.20935532 >>20935523 I could concur with that. credit given where plenty of credit is due. and Husserl's impulse was based desu.

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 16:57:15 2022 No.20935570

The only phenomenologist one should concern themselves with is Merleau-Ponty. His systematizations are as rigorous and insightful as his writing is clear. Heidegger Husserl and all the others are rendered obsolete by the beautiful synthesis rendered in his Phenomenology of perception

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 17:22:09 2022 No.20935669

>>20935506
If any ground on transcendence was understood as subjectivism by the enlightenment philosophers, then I agree, but my point is that perhaps it was not how most of them understood cartesian philosophy; even though we could reduce every dogma, metaphysical principles, to this inevitable skeptical conclusion of ego-axiom so to speak. And that actually in an enterprise to move away from it, they (some of the empiricists as said) ended up with subjective psychology, regardless of their wishes.

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 17:25:47 2022 No.20935688

>>20932592
>NOOOOOO STOP DOING PHILOSOPHY IN A DIFFERENT WAY AS DESCARTES WANTED IT TO BE THIS IS THE ONLY CORRECT AND RELEVANT WAY 500 YEARS LATER BECAUSE IT JUST IS OK NOOOOOOOOOOO THE DREAM IS OVER NOOOOOOOOOO STOP TRYING TO UNDERSTAND THINGS IN DIFFERENT WAYS EVEN IF THE END RESULTS MAY BE WRONG STOP EXPERIMENTING JUST REPEAT WHAT EVERYONE ELSE DID NOOOOOOO STOP ADRESSING THE CONDITIONS OF MUNDANE LIFE AND THE CONCRETE PROBLEMS OF IT AFTER THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION NOOOOOO PHILOSOPHY MUST BE AUTISTIC AND ISOLATED FROM THE WORLD IN WHICH HAPPENS AND GIVES IT ITS CONTENTS AND MEANING NOOOOOOO
the funny thing is that Husserl in his later work was already doing stuff similar to what Heidegger did and you probably havent read even 50 pages of Husserl and are just using these pics and the OP quote as a masquerade to disguise your jordan petersonian brainletism and pseudo intellectualism behind the face of a genius philosopher
I miss when your kind was a minority here

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 18:16:01 2022 No.20935898
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>>20935688
>you probably havent read even 50 pages of Husserl
Picrel.
>masquerade to disguise your jordan petersonian brainletism
You need to work on your reading comprehension, buddy.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 18:18:23 2022 No.20935906 >>20934642 Pales to math

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 18:20:36 2022 No.20935915 >>20935898 oh wow you spent money on a bunch of books, is that pic supposed to imply something else, like you are actually an expert reader of Husserl?

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 18:21:23 2022 No.20935918 >>20935898 Honestly what have you learned of value from all of this? Did it lead you somewhere?

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 18:22:02 2022 No.20935923

I hope that the PhD anon who is a leading world expert on Husserl posts in this thread. The guy who racked up six figure debt on the way to the doctorate and who couldn't get anything published because Husserl is currently unfashionable in contemporary anglo Academia, so he just manages a Wendy's instead.

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 18:23:01 2022 No.20935924

>>20935915
m8 if the guy has that many husserl books there's at least a reasonable chance he cares about husserl, don't be such a contrarian and so fixated on the "SO? SO WHAT? SO WHAT?? YOU HAVE A LOT OF BOOKS SO WHAT, THAT DOESN'T PROVE NOTHING NECESSARILY!!" technicality that you miss an opportunity to talk to someone who may know interesting things

why not just say "Cool, so do you study him or something? Where do you recommend starting?"

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 18:26:41 2022 No.20935949 >>20935923 That's so autistic it's actually very based. He should be granted government money until he dies so he can read and write books forever

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 18:31:33 2022 No.20935969 >>20935918 What a retarded question to ask

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 18:42:54 2022 No.20936016

>>20935915
I've been reading Husserl since 2005, when I randomly took some classes on him with a teacher who happened to be one of the greatest expert on him and Brentano in North America. I'm not saying this to pretend to be an authority, I know very well that, for an author as prolific and deep as Husserl, I'd have to dedicate my entire life and career to him, and sadly, that ship has sailed long ago. But I've read more than 50 pages of Husserl between today and yesterday alone. Also, why the fuck are you picking on that post, that was clearly just an answer to the one I replied to, and in no way was supposed to showcase my understanding of Husserl at large. Stop acting like a cunt.
>>20935918
>Honestly what have you learned of value from all of this? Did it lead you somewhere?
Considering it made me reconsider my entire worldview over, made me practice my analytical skills and reduced general psychology to a child's play, yes, I'd say it did lead me somewhere and brought me valuable skills.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 18:55:06 2022 No.20936067 >>20936016 You are a psychologist?

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 18:59:11 2022 No.20936080

>>20936016
That's incredible. I have a few questions for a Husserl expert:
1) Could you expand on the "general psychology" point for a few paragraphs? I'm curious.
2) Was Husserl's criticism of Heidegger correct? That Heidegger was merely engaged in psychologism? It's worth noting that Heidegger eventually "turned away" from the "humanism" of his early Being and Time days, too.
3) How would have Husserl responded to Heidegger's attack on Cartesian dualism and its metaphysical problems?
4) I'm genuinely well-read in philosophy. My favorite philosophers are Plato, Aquinas, Leibniz, Rousseau, Kant, Heidegger, Peirce, Evola, and Laozi. What do you suspect Husserl would offer me that I'm currently lacking?
5) If you had to assign me reading that will allow me to speedrun Husserl and get the gist of him, what do you offer? I can't spend my whole life on him. I just need philosophical "completeness."

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 19:00:00 2022 No.20936082

>>20936016
For me reading phenomenology with Heidegger and Husserl, and especially returning to Heidegger again after getting Husserl so it was like a Heidegger-Husserl-Heidegger thing, completely changed the way I read and think about philosophy. It's like the real completion of Kant's project and the ultimate foundation of any true philosophy, even though it is only a foundation. Someone who masters the technique of phenomenological seeing and "conceptual" analysis really can recover the same philosophical potential of the Greeks and the Greek moment in philosophy, but for our modern stage of development. Phenomenology is the beginning and not the end of true thinking, it's a new beginning.

On a more concrete level it makes every other philosophical text come alive in its own way (or to speak Heideggerese, its "ownmost" way, "from itself") and in its interconnections with all other philosophy and also culture and thought in general. Gadamer said taking Heidegger's classes was the first time he felt like he was in dialogue with Aristotle on the same plane and seeing what Aristotle saw, not just playing with dead abstractions.

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 19:02:12 2022 No.20936088

>>20936080
Not the guy you're replying to but if you already understand Heidegger reasonably well, I recommend reading Merleau-Ponty's preface (his summary of phenomenology) in the Phenomenology of Perception really quick to see if it gives you some clues as to Husserl's significance.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 19:02:17 2022 No.20936089 >>20936082 Who cares.They’re just another anally aggressive westoid cheek slammers that talks of post Germanic shithole and writes a ass pile while taking shit in front of eachother . he's lucky he's not dead.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 19:06:00 2022 No.20936107 >>20936080 I might answer if it's really slow but fyi I just had to come in for an emergency shift, so I'll be off at around 11 EST tonight, if I haven't given you a thorough answer by then it should come shortly afterwards.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 19:07:15 2022 No.20936117 >>20936107 Thanks anon. Hopefully it's not too busy and the thread is still up. I'll be traveling.

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 19:11:04 2022 No.20936141

>>20936016
>Considering it made me reconsider my entire worldview over, made me practice my analytical skills and reduced general psychology to a child's play, yes, I'd say it did lead me somewhere and brought me valuable skills.
Explain. Philosophy hasn't impacted my life in any way.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 19:13:21 2022 No.20936151 >>20936082 I'm not read on philosophy. What are Husserl's key ideas

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 19:14:11 2022 No.20936157 >>20936080 >my favourite philosophers >Evola >genuinely well read in philosophy lmao

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 19:16:12 2022 No.20936169 >>20936107 >Emergency shift What do you do? Also have you ever considered learning German to read Husserl in the original?

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 19:19:12 2022 No.20936186

>>20936157
You can't even parse Ride the Tiger if you aren't familiar with virtually the entire history of Western philosophy along with both Western and Eastern religion. So yeah, it holds true. I enjoyed Evola because he served as a sane guide to the occult and an eye-opening critic of the nihilism of Western philosophy writ large.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 19:32:25 2022 No.20936239 >>20936186 >occult Can I talk to dead relatives after learning Evola?

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 19:49:34 2022 No.20936311

>>20936067
No, initially my interest in philosophy came from Law.
>>20936141
I'll go in more details later but Phenomenology, following Husserl, is not just reading and writing philosophy, it really goes back to a vision of philosophy as a transformative life practice. And I realize this sounds incredibly gay and New Age but if you were to dedicate yourself to even just a fraction of the program Husserl set himself and his students at the time, you'd realize it's the furthest thing from it.
>>20936169
Supervisor at an emergency dispatch center.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 19:53:03 2022 No.20936326 >>20936016 >that was clearly just an answer to the one I replied to, and in no way was supposed to showcase my understanding of Husserl at large ok, but you are still flexing your collection

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 19:55:46 2022 No.20936337 >>20936326 It's a nice collection, so why not?

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 21:08:37 2022 No.20936646 >>20936186 Keep digging.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 21:31:44 2022 No.20936750 >>20936157 >seethes over fucking Evola you racist, bigot. Why would you attack an author of color like that?

Anonymous Sat Sep 3 22:36:53 2022 No.20937047

>>20936080
>1) Could you expand on the "general psychology" point for a few paragraphs? I'm curious.
I believe using a very general application of a mixture of Brentano's and Husserl's more "psychological" concepts and theories (the theory of the three degrees of mental acts in Brentano, the definition of the natural attitude in Husserl, the rejection of a freudian subconscious in both, for example) provides a much more accurate, simple and effective psychological heuristic. "Natural attitude psychology", or as I like to call it, everyone's Theory of Psychology (akin to a Theory of Consciousness in CS) attributes a false depth to psychological events, which Phenomenology dispels and puts back in its proper place. In other words, people become really easy to read once you dispel the notion that their (shallow) psychological life is the result of some subconscious alchemy of ideas when it is in fact bound to conscious re/presentations.

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 23:49:17 2022 No.20937359 >>20937047 That’s really cool. Bumping

>>	Anonymous Sat Sep 3 23:50:02 2022 No.20937362 >>20932376 >apodictically Speak english, kraut

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 00:22:55 2022 No.20937484 >>20935898 How's work at Wendy's?

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 00:39:19 2022 No.20937557 >>20937484 I dont think we have Wendy's here, sorry.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 00:53:56 2022 No.20937618

>>20933864
>It's the first page of a 40 page essay, go fuck yourself
And he's starting off the first bits with gossip about some eggheads? Usually people start with some kind of hook and elaborate as they go on, often covering the history of how their point came to formation (this is where it's appropriate to put the academic dick sucking).

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 01:13:08 2022 No.20937673

>>20935969
It's a pretty simple question that anybody, fluent in the man's arguments, would be able to simply answer. In the case of Peterson, I can easily point to what arguments he puts forward enough to explain them to a layman
>anti-depressants work on lobsters to change how they behave in their hierarchy (likeliness to fight or flee when faced with other lobsters), demonstrating both a proof of concept that behavior is affected by neurotransmitters and how ancient these neurological systems are since the effects of our drugs work similarly to creatures that diverged from our own family tree hundreds of millions years ago
Give me a wee taste of your boy, Husserl

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 01:25:57 2022 No.20937733

>>20937673
>Comparing Peterson and Husserl
Wew lad.
But Fuck it, good luck.
https://altexploit.files.wordpress.com/2017/11/edmund-husserl-10-edmund-husserl-auth-philosophy-of-arithmetic_-psychological-and-logical-investigations-with-supplementary-texts-from-1887e280931901-springer-netherlands-2003.pdf

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 01:29:34 2022 No.20937739 >>20937673 You also missed all is retarded logic and agruments attempting to explain how lobster hierarchy and brains even remotely equate to humans.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 01:38:15 2022 No.20937770

>>20936080
>2) Was Husserl's criticism of Heidegger correct?
For the most part, yes, I tend to side with Husserl on almost every issue, but specifically
>That Heidegger was merely engaged in psychologism?
No. Even if it was psychologism, which I don't recognize here at all (Husserl's argument against psychologism define and target a rather clear type of fallacy, it isnt like the charge of 'historicism', for example, which can pretty much mean anything), it would be a *very* advanced form of psychologism, and that alone wouldn't make it "bad philosophy". Husserl's own first decade was itself much more "psychologistic" than Heiddi's, and he literally states in Ideen that it may take years of practice for someone to comfortably switch from eidetic to transcendantal reduction. From a purely academic, theoretical stance, he was being unfair to Heiddi here.

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 01:47:11 2022 No.20937798 best thread in ages BUMP

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 02:49:00 2022 No.20938001 File: 362 KB, 638x479, laughter.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] >>20937733 >links to a pdf on a wordpress site instead of just giving me a single argument lmao @ your life right now holy shit this is rich

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 02:50:28 2022 No.20938011 >>20937739 Do people not become demoralized the more they fail? Do they not become more timid when they constantly get their asses beat in fights?

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 02:51:15 2022 No.20938016 >>20932376 Husserl was gigatard

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 02:57:50 2022 No.20938046

>>20938001
>Wants to summarize a summary
Ok. Don't know what you want then, you asked for a crack at the guy to prove your communication skills there you go. Why not hear what the guy was about from the guy himself. Also, What agrument was there to respond to?

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 03:08:13 2022 No.20938075 >>20938046 >Summary >542 pages This is peak sophistry. If you are taking the piss, consider me thoroughly jarated. >Also, What agrument was there to respond to? Pick your favorite, the one you can best explain to a layman.

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 03:14:09 2022 No.20938100 >>20937047 >Husserl (Apollo) vs. Freud the Crucified (Dionysus)

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 03:27:04 2022 No.20938147

>>20938075
Did I misunderstand something? You said that someone who was fluent in what Husserl argued could summarize him, you used Peterson as a example, you then said you want a crack at him, there you go, thats your crack, it you wanted a agrument then be a bit more specific. please tell me where in that post you made it obvious you wanted an argument, I didn't read your post in an aggressive/argumentative tone because it doesn't have to be, I thought you just wanted to see Husserl's work. I was trying to keep the threat on point and Neither of us has clearly done that.
There all ready was someone that was summarize him anyways, deal with him not me, I don't care enough to compete on a basket weaving board right now.

(I guess this is a example of how writing and speech are different)

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 03:28:39 2022 No.20938157 >>20933559 What do you mean "the form easily does away with"? Fichte BTFO'd your idea of the impossibility of content-filled apodictic propositions with his derivation of I am.

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 03:31:48 2022 No.20938169 >>20934019 "We still have blind faith" requires knowledge that you still have blind faith. To say "I have blind faith that I still have blind faith" is to reason circularly. There is no escape.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 03:32:24 2022 No.20938170

>>20938046
So reading the first page of meat (like 65 in the PDF), it seems the guy is going off about different words for numbers. I seem to have a grasp on what he's saying, but I need a bit of help with:
>All of these and similar concepts have an obviously secondary character. Even though they are not logical specifications of the concepts of whole numbers, they nonetheless are more restricted formations which presuppose those concepts, in that they link them up in a certain manner with other elementary concepts. This view is contested only in the case of the ordinal numbers. The linguistic dependency of their names upon those of the whole numbers is indeed no less manifest, and the comparison of concepts also seems, as in the other cases, to point toward a corresponding relation of dependency.
I accept that I'm likely an illiterate in comparison to such vibrant prose, but I feel like there might be ways of getting this across in a way that my limited brain can process.

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 03:32:28 2022 No.20938171 >>20938157 >Fichte BTFO'd your idea of the impossibility of content-filled apodictic propositions with his derivation of I am. He really didn't. As I said, it's at best just a post hoc rationalization of something that is already given.

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 03:41:17 2022 No.20938200 >>20938147 He obviously wanted you to outline some beliefs and reasons for those beliefs of Husserl in 5-6 sentences. Can you genuinely not read the situation to that degree? God, autists disgust me.

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 03:45:23 2022 No.20938212 >>20938171 >He really didn't. Proof? For reading his argument, it is completely consistent, so I assume you have grounds for saying that. Please locate the inconsistency.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 03:46:09 2022 No.20938214

>>20938001
This is not a summary, btw, this is Husserl's Doctorate dissertation. He pretty much abandoned it within a decade (even tho the main gist remained with him the whole time). This is a terrible way to familiarize himself with him, especially given that this entire dissertation boils down to "Numbers are made by counting".
>>20936080
>3) How would have Husserl responded to Heidegger's attack on Cartesian dualism and its metaphysical problems?
The same way he responded to him in a more general manner regarding everything else : "This is only because you fail to recognize the possibility of a suspension and its absolute necessity for the reduction." (not an actual quote, but the spirit of his reply). The heideggerian argument against the separation of the subject and object in cartesian philosophy falls completely aside if you accept Husserl's position on reflexivity and the possibility of a suspension founded on the reflexive moment. Being-in-the-world is but a specific moment of the Ego for Husserl.

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 03:49:41 2022 No.20938220 >>20938200 You have to be autistic to a degree to be interested in the way Hurssel analyzed the subject and consciousness. Autism goes with Hurssel in the same way it goes with Kant.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 03:55:25 2022 No.20938230

>>20938147
>Did I misunderstand something?
Clearly
>You said that someone who was fluent in what Husserl argued could summarize him
Yes, yes I did. 542 pages is not a summary. That's a fucking book. Do you think I came on /lit/ to read books?
>you used Peterson as a example
And also provided a summary of an argument he puts forward. I was hoping you would follow suit.
>you then said you want a crack at him, there you go, thats your crack
I never said that. I said I wanted a taste of what he's bringing to the table.
>it you wanted a agrument then be a bit more specific
I have a feeling our problem is our differing understandings of the word "argument." I am using it to mean a statement of something that is right or wrong. He seems to be about numbers and psychology, so I'd assume there would be some interesting observation or conclusion he's made that compelled you to read so much about him.
>I thought you just wanted to see Husserl's work
That is precisely what I want, albeit curated from someone well-versed in that work.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 04:02:08 2022 No.20938242
File: 214 KB, 419x610, Pot of Greed verbose.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]

>>20938214
>Numbers are made by counting
What's fucked up is that, based on the little bit that I read while reading a few paragraphs every few pages as I'm skimming through, this seems like precisely what he's trying to get across. This truly is a demonstration that you can take a simple statement and increase the verbosity infinitely

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 04:04:14 2022 No.20938245

>>20938212
The inconsistency is what Fichte admitted himself in the 1807 Wissenschaftslehre: "I am" can be substituted with virtually any content, including "God is." Fichte's personal belief was that any content other than "I am" was not "critical enough" for modern philosophy, and therefore that "I am" is primary (even though there are two "moments" of "I am": I am (absolute) and I am (limited), and then the negation "I am not" (limited) ). The problem is, as I just pointed out, that this is quite clearly just a substitution of content for content, which still depends on the underlying "form" in order to even have validity in the first place. His entire system is an attempt to find a more secure piece of content, which already existed prior in the form of "God"/"Nature", which still has nothing apodeictical about it when examined closely. In contrast, the form is STILL apodeictical because here it is actually being used to justify the use of Ego as content, and is not justified by anything else, not the Ego nor the movement from positing to negation. In other words, Fichte still does not overcome Plato, even though this is an abstraction of the topics Plato dealt with. Form is still prior and apodeictical over whatever content you decide is "primary."

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 04:06:39 2022 No.20938249 >>20932376 https://djvu.online/file/5hssiEAXQNP9T check out Dreyfus' Husserl and Heidegger: Philosophy's Last Stand. That is one of the best summary on these two.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 04:08:32 2022 No.20938251

>>20938170
Form of the number is a fascinatingly old debate. Plato believed in unity through number. Aristotle rejects that and believes in unity through geometry. Descartes combines the two through analytical geometry and the Cartesian plane—a radical new way of looking at place, space, extension, etc. that would have been several steps removed from how the Greeks would have conceptualized it. But Descartes thought he was moving geometry away from the abstract world and to the real world. This is what Husserl is defending and what causes Heidegger to recoil with every fiber of his being.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 04:13:00 2022 No.20938264

>>20938214
What’s the best way to be introduced to the “eidetic reduction”, “transcendental phenomenology”, “lifeworld”, and the general gist of Husserl’s way of thinking? I don’t want to get mired in him, as I strongly suspect that it’s merely the last hurrah of Cartesian autism, the separation of subject and object, and I agree with Heidegger that it’s ultimately no good when the abstractions are divorced from Being. But I want to see what I’m missing and extract value from it.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 04:27:51 2022 No.20938296

>>20938251
>Plato believed in unity through number.
What does he mean by this? Like that it's a solid foundation that we all can unambiguously share in common? I'll carry this assumption throughout the post, but please correct me if I'm wrong.
>Aristotle rejects that and believes in unity through geometry
I don't disagree, however I think Plato's argument would also imply Aristotle's
>Descartes combines the two through analytical geometry and the Cartesian plane—a radical new way of looking at place, space, extension, etc. that would have been several steps removed from how the Greeks would have conceptualized it.
So unity through spacetime? I feel like they're just saying more specific versions of the same thing.
>But Descartes thought he was moving geometry away from the abstract world and to the real world
Can we even escape the abstract? We're rather bound by it in our description of reality.
>This is what Husserl is defending
What's the basic gist?
>and what causes Heidegger to recoil with every fiber of his being
What's his spiciest rebuttal?

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 05:30:39 2022 No.20938428

>>20938242
>This truly is a demonstration that you can take a simple statement and increase the verbosity infinitely
That's essentially what any philosophy dissertation is, but yes, this is the gist of it, he was trying to prove that whole numbers were foundational to mathematics, and that whole numbers are produced by counting. He'll modify his theory later and say that instead of whole numbers and counting, it is on ideal objects and the ability of the mind to conceive that that mathematics as a whole is founded.
All in all, his early mathematical theory (and even his later, really) is only significant in that it is what drew Frege's criticism, which is what prompted Husserl to work on psychologism and then phenomenology.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 06:11:39 2022 No.20938519

>>20937673
>Give me a wee taste of your boy, Husserl
Ok, I'm going to bite, if only because this entire tangent is getting tiring. Usual ideas and concepts associated with Husserl are
> Psychologism (as in, fallacy, fault, accusatory), the tendency (in vogue at the time) to reduce logical laws to psychological laws (ex. "The principle of non-contradiction would be false if a human mind had the ability to imagine something and its contrary at the same time."). Frege accused Husserl of this regarding The Concept of Number, Husserl pleaded guilty, then spent years working on defining the fallacy in order to avoid it.
> Intentionality : The essential property of mental acts. This concept was initially a Scholastic idea which was reintroduced by Husserl's teacher, Brentano. Husserl modified the concept (which was in Brentano metaphysical, intentionality was to the psychic world what causality was to the physical) and retained it as the essential form of all mental acts.
> Epoché (bracketing) A Stoic term referring to the willful act of suspension of judgement necessary to reach ataraxia, Husserl uses it to refer to a state of mind/process of reflexion in which judgement or assent is not given, where the subject is not involved in his circumstances, so to speak. This process of bracketing can be universal, i.e. you can decide to suspend judgement in everything, or it can be local, meaning you can accept any amount of premises and yet neutralize another other amount you wish. And you can organize and structure what you suspend judgement on, leading us to
> Reduction, in very general terms, without going on between the various reductions, is the process of successive bracketing of the object at hand, producing knowledge through what you could call abstraction.
> Phenomenology is the science of reductions, of the study of intentionality, and its method is phenomenological reduction, the validity of which is founded on the adequation Husserl draw between the Epoché, reduction and his analysis on reflexion and "abstraction" (the term is not really appropriate but its the closest thing without having to get into a whole other branch of Husserl's theory).
> Transcendental idealism, there is a huge (in fact, too big) debate in regards to Husserl's affiliation re realism vs idealism. Husserl himself disliked most German idealists for their lack of epistemological commitment, and displayed most traits that would be associated with realist philosophy, however he came out mid-career in strong support of a transcendental idealism, and claimed that had been his essential position all along. His own theory avoids a lot of the hardship Kant encounters thanks to his concept of categorical intuition.

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 06:15:23 2022 No.20938530 >>20938264 >What’s the best way to be introduced to the “eidetic reduction”, “transcendental phenomenology”, “lifeworld” Those are mid-to-late career concepts for Husserl, you'd have to start around Ideas, which is definitely not an easy read.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 06:26:59 2022 No.20938556

>>20938519
What is the endgame of Husserl? i.e. What does it look like to have mastered Husserl? Do you go out in the world, engaging in:
>the process of successive bracketing of the object at hand, producing knowledge through what you could call abstraction.
until you have accumulated a critical mass of abstraction memory?

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 07:20:30 2022 No.20938692

>>20938556
>What does it look like to have mastered Husserl?
No fucking clue, I'm not going to pretend I have mastered him, I am but the humblest of his students. But
>until you have accumulated a critical mass of abstraction memory?
In part, because why wouldn't you want to try to become a mentat, really? But more seriously, no, the endgame is to eventually push toward the transcendental reduction, eidetic reduction is just a practice made to initiate students and familiarize them with the potential of introspective analysis. Then Phenomenology acquires a certain type of ethico-ontological quality that essentially equates to religiosity. To note, when asked by Ingarden what was the fundamental problem of philosophy, Husserl replied
> "God, of course."

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 10:49:04 2022 No.20939087

>>20938692
>Then Phenomenology acquires a certain type of ethico-ontological quality that essentially equates to religiosity.
Why does it become religious?
>In part, because why wouldn't you want to try to become a mentat, really?
I just wonder if one gets further and further away from the thing-in-itself through abstractive processes, not closer. What exactly does Husserl have to say in response to Kant?
>Well, I'm just gonna _____... and that's a _____ part of the puzzle of what could potentially be said about the noumena

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 11:29:46 2022 No.20939170 >>20932376 >>"Philosophy as science, as serious, rigorous, indeed apodictically rigorous science - the dream is over." the sentence doesn't even make sense

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 11:33:49 2022 No.20939176

>>20938519
Much appreciated. Your post is exactly what I'm looking for and I greatly appreciate you breaking down the jargon for me.
>"The principle of non-contradiction would be false if a human mind had the ability to imagine something and its contrary at the same time."
Something can be both tall and short at the same time, given they are terms of relation. The human mind has a greater capacity for abstraction than just simple logical operations.
>Husserl pleaded guilty, then spent years working on defining the fallacy in order to avoid it
In a nutshell, what did he find? Was it close to my previous statement, or am I looking at it from the wrong direction?
>Husserl modified the concept (which was in Brentano metaphysical, intentionality was to the psychic world what causality was to the physical) and retained it as the essential form of all mental acts.
I'm a bit lost on this one. Why does intention have to be essential for all mental acts? How does muscle memory (and its humorous glitches) factor into this? What about observation? I'm not intending to process the information pouring into my eyes, but it happens anyways. Intrusive thoughts are another issue that causes problems with this line of thinking.
>Epoché (bracketing) A Stoic term referring to the willful act of suspension of judgement necessary to reach ataraxia, , Husserl uses it to refer to a state of mind/process of reflexion in which judgement or assent is not given, where the subject is not involved in his circumstances, so to speak
I guess one could argue that genuinely not giving a shit gives people a sense of tranquility about something. It seems like an abdication of one's own will to just go with the flow and be happy.
>Reduction is the process of successive bracketing of the object at hand, producing knowledge through what you could call abstraction
I don't disagree, however is there knowledge that wouldn't be abstraction?
>Transcendental idealism
I always found idealism to be transcendental by nature. Am I wrong in this assumption?
>categorical intuition
I tried looking this term up and felt more confused afterwards.
I think my biggest criticism of the guy so far is that he has a tendency to obfuscate his arguments with verbosity. I understand academics live for it, but I feel like it just makes it harder to understand and address what he's saying.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 11:39:46 2022 No.20939188

>>20938692
>To note, when asked by Ingarden what was the fundamental problem of philosophy, Husserl replied
>> "God, of course."
I always just found God to be an abstraction, with each person holding a differing idea on what that abstract encompasses. If you base your philosophy on his existence, sure you'll run into problems, given that existence is unfalsifiable and renders all things depending on it as also unfalsifiable. I argue that philosophy isn't dependent on God and can function just fine with its existence being unknowable.

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 11:44:09 2022 No.20939197 >>20939176 Categorical intuition just sounds like different modes of consciousness, like perceiving things in relation to time, or to space or color or shape

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 11:45:38 2022 No.20939200

>>20939176
>I tried looking this term up and felt more confused afterwards.
There's no obfuscation, it's just a history. Are you familiar with the gist of Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason? Categorical intuition refers to the concepts, the "empty vessels of thought" that are "filled" by the sensible intuitions in order to interpret experience. Think of the categories of concepts as the kinds of perceptual-logical filters that you see everything in after you've obtained raw sensory information. A great summary of Kant's thoughts on the topic is:
>Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."
By the way, categories are quite complicated. Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Peirce, and even Steiner have wrote extensively about what the categories are, how to organize them, what they say about what can be known, etc.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 11:54:11 2022 No.20939217

>>20939200
>Categorical intuition refers to the concepts, the "empty vessels of thought" that are "filled" by the sensible intuitions in order to interpret experience.
We aren't empty vessels, though. We come with programmed instructions from our biology and build our knowledge upon those.
>Think of the categories of concepts as the kinds of perceptual-logical filters that you see everything in after you've obtained raw sensory information
We don't even get raw sensory information. Our bodies already filter and curate it for us, without any conscious effort involved.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 12:06:34 2022 No.20939233

>>20939200
I've counted six (though I'm sure more can be discovered
1. Objects in relation to color
2. Objects in relation to size
3. Objects in relation to time
4. Objects in relation to distance/space
5. Objects in relation to other objects (contextual)
6. Other Objects in relation to the one object (reverse contextualism)

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 12:09:48 2022 No.20939239

>>20939217
>We come with programmed instructions from our biology and build our knowledge upon those.
If you want to expand on the "programming" metaphor, you could say a human mind is born as a natural neural network with an immense set of inputs it can take in and perform both supervised and unsupervised learning from. It only becomes molded into something once it has received and processed a sufficiently large amount of input that has then been structured out into a certain type of directed graph.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 12:11:01 2022 No.20939244

>>20939233
Space and time are sensible intuitions that have to be superimposed onto raw sense data for us to navigate in a dynamic, chaotic world at all. Color, size, relations, etc., are categories which filter the sensible intuitions and give it texture. At least according to Kant, who was trying to unify rationalism and empiricism. You may want to think to yourself why that division was important and if it can be done differently.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 12:12:50 2022 No.20939247

>>20939217
You're missing the point. Nothing I said contradicts what you pointed out. I never said we are the empty vessels, but rather thoughts are empty vessels. The fact that they are vessels implies that they have a certain structure to them that could be explained by biology. Now, what kind of "liquid" are you filling them with, and are you restricted on what kinds of liquid you can use?

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 12:20:06 2022 No.20939270 >>20939244 I guess without it no one could sense anything at all, and it would get in the way of perception entirely. Good point, I guess

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 12:22:52 2022 No.20939272 Revising that, its then 1. color 2. size 3. other objects 4. objects in relation to the "one"" 5. and possibly, amount Does that look good?

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 12:23:29 2022 No.20939276 >>20939272 How do you deal with symbols, history, and memory? What about nothing at all?

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 12:28:30 2022 No.20939285 >>20939272 One more, shape. So that's six categories

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 12:30:35 2022 No.20939292 >>20939276 Isn't history congruent with time? And no one can actually visualize "nothing" logical impossibility Symbols are representations of objects

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 12:32:37 2022 No.20939298 >>20932376 >STILL rehashing presocratics in the 20th century KEK that's why I don't read anything from western europe. You are entirely excluded from the truth.

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 12:34:05 2022 No.20939305 >>20939292 Furthermore, if we cannot perceive the "thing in itself" then phenomenologically, all things are simply representative symbols that can be divided into the six categories

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 12:35:52 2022 No.20939311 >>20936016 Kek the Husserl PhD meme story is back?

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 12:37:38 2022 No.20939316 >>20939292 What are representations

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 12:42:50 2022 No.20939327 >>20932633 >Hegesias, gnostic sects, buddhist schools, the Romantics Lol how were these nihilists? Do you just lump all hedonists/schizos/pseuds under nihilism? Actually based.

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 12:45:24 2022 No.20939329 The first book of the critique of pure reason is as scientific and rigorous as it gets. The illiterate pseuds pretending otherwise are ngmi.

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 12:48:02 2022 No.20939333 >>20939329 >t. started reading philosophy this year

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 12:55:28 2022 No.20939348

>>20939272
>>20939285
It's all over the place. How would you even fit smells in there? Yes, imagine the smell.
Even talking about the study of spatial objects you would need multiple notions of congruence (which I guess might be forced into something as vague as "other objects"). That's not even going into the question of orientation.
It doesn't even cover the purely analytical objects.

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 13:04:11 2022 No.20939370 >>20932633 >Romantics The romantics were naturalists and reacted against rationalists. I mean, read novalis.

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 13:06:35 2022 No.20939375 >>20939370 >The romantics were naturalists and reacted against rationalists So like Nietzsche?

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 13:53:19 2022 No.20939515

>>20939375
Nietzsche was a specific brand of reaction. The reaction I’m talking looks like this:
>Various are the roads of man. He who follows and compares them will see strange figures emerge, figures which seem to belong to that great cipher which we discern written everywhere, in wings, eggshells, clouds and snow, in crystals and in stone formations, on ice-covered waters, on the inside and outside of mountains, of plants, beasts and men, in the lights of heaven, on scored disks of pitch or glass or in iron filings round a magnet, and in strange conjunctures of chance. In them we suspect a key to the magic writing, even a grammar, but our surmise takes on no definite forms and seems unwilling to become a higher key. It is as though an alkahest had been poured over the senses of man. Only at moments do their desires and thoughts seem to solidify. Thus arise their presentiments, but after a short time everything swims again before their eyes.

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 14:33:21 2022 No.20939604 >>20939348 Smells are a priori intuition, no one needs to make empirical judgements on that

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 14:36:33 2022 No.20939613 File: 7 KB, 226x223, thinkingapu.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] >>20939604 what did Kant have to say about smells, exactly? do they fall under space or time?

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 17:00:51 2022 No.20940168 bump cheeks

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 17:03:30 2022 No.20940188

I'm not following the discussion closely but if you guys are interested in a phenomenology of the senses you should check out Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception and look up Hubert Dreyfus' free lectures on the book, on archive.org or youtube. At least listen to some of them.

Also look into the gestalt psychologists. Not the more recent "gestalt psychology" as a therapeutic, but guys like Christian von Ehrenfels, Wolfgang Kohler, Koffka, Wertheimer.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 18:47:23 2022 No.20940616

>>20939176
>The human mind has a greater capacity for abstraction than just simple logical operations.
Sure, But Husserl was specifically reacting to a type of theory that had become popular with the rise of empirical psychology, which tried to reduce ideas completely to psychological products, irrespective of the validity of their formal content.
>In a nutshell, what did he find?
Att, he began being interested in introspective psychology, and for a time, phenomenology was set to be nothing else but a form of introspective psychology, and it is his effort to formalize the process of rigorous introspection that led him to to the Epoché and the reduction.
>Why does intention have to be essential for all mental acts? How does muscle memory (and its humorous glitches) factor into this?
Intentionality is the form of mental acts because it is the "directionality" drawn between a subject and its object. The definition is in part heuristic, in the sense that to understand the form of a mental act you have to put it in relational terms. It is also categorical, in the sense that for Husserl, something which is not intentional is not properly mental, and thus falls out of its dominion (and more properly into that of empirical sciences).
>It seems like an abdication of one's own will to just go with the flow and be happy.
For the Stoics it was an ethical concern, not for Husserl, the act of bracketing is just necessary for phenomenological analysis.
>I always found idealism to be transcendental by nature. Am I wrong in this assumption?
Yes.
>I tried looking this term up and felt more confused afterwards.
This is the part of the theory I tried to avoid getting into by referring to abstraction, which is not Husserl's language. The important part to understand is that one huge difference between Kant and Husserl is that for Husserl properties, categories, idealities, are given directly and only in the act of perception itself, and are given as unities.
In other words, categorical intuition is the property of the mind which captures moments of invariances in sensuous content, and captures them fully and immediately.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 19:14:40 2022 No.20940762

>>20937047
Could you link any articles/books/papers that explain the methodology of this psychology? I am generally familiar with the phenomenological reduction and a lot of the ways Merleau-Ponty builds on Husserl’s methods. I’d be interested to read about how this is conducted in an experimental setting or even in ordinary life. I have read no Brentano btw.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 20:07:50 2022 No.20941006

>>20939272
Those are all hyletic categories.
For Husserl 'object' refers to any objectivity at large. Husserlian objects are existential, mathematical, logical, intentional and/or formal.
Husserl also does not bother too much trying to define the categories themselves.

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 20:26:56 2022 No.20941082 >>20935923 man this thread is a disaster this entire board has gone to shit

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 20:28:35 2022 No.20941091 >>20941082 >>20937798 The duality of Man.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 22:08:21 2022 No.20941425

>>20939247
I see them less as vessels and more like paths. The more you walk down a path (think a thought, perform an action), the more beaten down and easier to travel that path becomes. Every time you walk down a path, it's changed, even if just slightly.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 22:14:31 2022 No.20941447

>>20939613
>do they fall under space or time?
Don't know or care what Kant said, but here's my interpretation of it: Yes.
>Space
You must be in proximity to smell something. In a chemical sense, you are actually touching a piece of that something, since it binds to your olfactory receptors
>Time
The frequency of these connections determines how strong the scent is. The connections also expire over time (along with entropy just carrying the particles elsewhere over time anyways)

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 22:34:43 2022 No.20941534 To use a horse to prove that a horse is not a horse is not as good as using a non-horse to prove that a horse is not a horse. Monotheism is the only way, and it by no means needs to be intellectual. Philosophy? Big spook.

Anonymous Sun Sep 4 22:44:49 2022 No.20941573

>>20940616
>which tried to reduce ideas completely to psychological products, irrespective of the validity of their formal content
I'm not sure what is meant by this. Like ideas only happen in brains? I figure ideas take the forms of either qualia or memes.
>Intentionality is the form of mental acts because it is the "directionality" drawn between a subject and its object. The definition is in part heuristic, in the sense that to understand the form of a mental act you have to put it in relational terms. It is also categorical, in the sense that for Husserl, something which is not intentional is not properly mental, and thus falls out of its dominion (and more properly into that of empirical sciences)
This makes sense to me, however I disagree. It doesn't explain intrusive thoughts or even habits. It doesn't stop being mental, simply because the decision-making isn't fed into your narrative engine. It's been shown with brain imaging that your decision-making happens before you start writing down an explanation into your own mental narrative for why you decided that. Gut reactions operate like this two.
>the act of bracketing is just necessary for phenomenological analysis
To put this into plain terms, does this mean that you make a conscious decision to ignore as much of your mental autofill as possible when trying to observe something? All your pre-judgements and gut reactions, essentially?
>>I always found idealism to be transcendental by nature. Am I wrong in this assumption?
>Yes.
Could you provide for me a form of idealism that isn't in the abstract? I know it's a weird belief, but I find the world of abstraction synonymous with the supernatural and it's this belief that causes me to find it so.
>In other words, categorical intuition is the property of the mind which captures moments of invariances in sensuous content, and captures them fully and immediately.
I strongly disagree with him on this. Entropy prevents us from capturing anything fully and if there was invariance, then there would be nothing to capture. Consciousness doesn't exist without time and change. I'd argue that consciousness is emergent from our changing matter. It wouldn't exist in any snapshot of the universe and only exists in motion. We can even observe this for ourselves if we ever have a seizure or go under heavy anesthetic where our the chemical patterns are so disrupted that our consciousness simply ceases to be (and thus no experience ever occurs) until the biology of our brain cleans up a bit and allows for those specific electro-chemical patterns to reboot.

>>	Anonymous Sun Sep 4 22:58:35 2022 No.20941641 >>20932376 ya

Anonymous Mon Sep 5 01:02:18 2022 No.20942102

>>20941573
>I'm not sure what is meant by this. Like ideas only happen in brains? I figure ideas take the forms of either qualia or memes.
Put it another way. Take the principle of non-contradiction, or any other foundational logical statement. Do you think it makes sense to believe that there could be a mind, out there, for which that principle isn't valid (excluding any minds that simply dont have the capacity to recognize or handle logical concepts)?
Husserl argues that no such mind is possible.
>intrusive thoughts
Still have a intentionality.
>habits
Same. Usually contemporaries will use pain as the goto for a mental state that isnt intentional.
>you make a conscious decision to ignore as much of your mental autofill?
Yes, and to clearly delineate that 'autofill' as much as possible. For example the first thing brought up by the suspension of any percept of an actual object is the thetic act that accompanies it, I.e. the fact that presence means existence to us.
>Could you provide for me a form of idealism that isn't in the abstract?
Transcendental doesnt mean abstract, it means in opposition to empirical, rationality derived purely through rational exercise. Berkeley would be a good example of a non-transcendental idealist, I think.
>Entropy prevents us from capturing anything fully
Maybe I didnt express myself clearly, we dont capture objects in full, but the properties which are given to us in a perceptual act are not pieced together in any way prior to that perceptual act, as it is with Kant and his manifold.
In fact for Husserl that an object is inexaustivable is constitutive of it (and forms an ethical concern for him).

>>	Anonymous Mon Sep 5 01:35:14 2022 No.20942226 >>20932376 >was some random neurotic jew right? >or 4 billion years of humanity Hmmmmm.... tough question, OP.

Anonymous Mon Sep 5 03:09:02 2022 No.20942526

>>20942102
>Do you think it makes sense to believe that there could be a mind, out there, for which that principle isn't valid
Would a superposition count?
>Still have a intentionality.
I disagree, since they aren't willed into creation. They just pop in and out of your head.
>Same. Usually contemporaries will use pain as the goto for a mental state that isnt intentional.
A lot of emotions aren't intentional either. They just happen and you gotta cope with it.
>Yes, and to clearly delineate that 'autofill' as much as possible.
I don't think it can be completely eliminated. The autofill is what allows us to have some foundation to even identify anything. We're bound to it. Could you even describe an idea or object without a piece of that autofill to relate to?

Anonymous Mon Sep 5 03:13:14 2022 No.20942542

>>20942102
>but the properties which are given to us in a perceptual act are not pieced together in any way prior to that perceptual act
How do optical illusions work if that's true?
>In fact for Husserl that an object is inexaustivable is constitutive of it (and forms an ethical concern for him).
I'm sorry, but I don't understand this sentence. And why an ethical concern?

>>	Anonymous Mon Sep 5 03:20:43 2022 No.20942563 >>20939613 Kant dismisses specific sense data as unintuitive and irrational. It basically impresses on the empirical senses contingently, which is the entire knowledge we have of it.

Anonymous Mon Sep 5 04:50:29 2022 No.20942930

>>20942526
>Would a superposition count?
Not really no, especially since we are already able of perceptive superposition (schizophrenics being an extreme example).
>I disagree, since they aren't willed into creation.
Intentionality is not intention. It is purely that mental states are about something, intrinsically. An intrusive thought is still a thought of something.
>I don't think it can be completely eliminated.
>We're bound to it.
In the natural attitude, yes. But even in it, natural ideation proceeds by two "mechanism" which mimicks bracketing and reduction (in fact its the contrary, Phenomenology founds its method on the very structure of ideation), so in a way knowledge production itself relies on the suspension of this autofill.
>How do optical illusions work if that's true?
Do you know Frege? Pretty much the same way. Sorry if this is a cope out answer, but I'm tired as fuck and Husserl has an entire theory of signification that has its own vocabulary, but it is essentially the same as Frege's, we know they developed them independently from one another tho. I just feel like if I start writing about noema, noemata and noesis I'm gonna get a headache. Maybe tomorrow.
>I'm sorry, but I don't understand this sentence. And why an ethical concern?
I'd need to check where exactly, but I recall Husserl saying that one of the first axioms of Phenomenology was that no object could be perceived in its totality at once.
Sorry about the low quality answers tonight, its been a long week and tomorrow's the start of another one. I just want to crash in front of my tv and watch some Hercule Poirot.

>>	Anonymous Mon Sep 5 12:24:57 2022 No.20943855 >>20942930 >Do you know Frege? Pretty much the same way. That's some extreme simplification. The third world of Frege can't cover Husserl's theory of signification. They would also differ on saturation and other topics.

Anonymous Mon Sep 5 14:00:10 2022 No.20944075

>>20942930
It's a rather great conversation. Feel free to take your time answering at your own pace
>Not really no, especially since we are already able of perceptive superposition (schizophrenics being an extreme example).
That doesn't really counter the argument that such minds could be capable of holding contradictory arguments. It's worth noting that humans are especially good at holding views that are mutually exclusive, with the requirement that they just not think about them too hard.
>Intentionality is not intention. It is purely that mental states are about something, intrinsically
I disagree. We can say they are about something, but I don't think it's intrinsic. Could just be a normal pulse of emotion that latches onto whatever neural highway is the path of least resistance. I know I've been angry plenty of times when I logically know being calm is the best solution. The anger will latch onto whatever grievances I have, regardless of how many times I've already addressed (or even solved) those grievances. It's also worth repeating that we make decisions before our brain writes a narrative for why they were made. I see it less as intentionality and more as emergent of our biology.
>so in a way knowledge production itself relies on the suspension of this autofill
Could you provide an example of any such knowledge that isn't built upon our perceptions? I could be biased by my background in computer science, but even something like as math or counting requires input/output and in humans would require our biology conducting similar calculations to feed into our senses. My difficulty comes with what is required to even observe or communicate something in the first place.
>Do you know Frege?
I'll admit, I'm not well read in terms of German philosophers. I tend to find they have a bad habit of being overly verbose and jargon-heavy, making it difficult to pin down what exactly they're saying. This thread is likely the most I've had to look up what the words mean in over a decade, which is saying something because I do it habitually whenever I come across a word/phrase I don't grasp. It is rather enjoyable
>I just feel like if I start writing about noema, noemata and noesis I'm gonna get a headache
I can see why. Noema translates to mental image, noemata is the lines we draw around what something is collectively (like a tree or a ball), and noesis is our perception/judgement of it. This makes sense, although bumps into my earlier argument in that we can't escape our perceptions. Reality itself doesn't make the same distinctions as we do. A ball or a tree are emergent from smaller structures acting in unison, with our understanding of a ball or a tree being abstract mental images that fit certain patterns.
>but I recall Husserl saying that one of the first axioms of Phenomenology was that no object could be perceived in its totality at once
I would completely agree with this, although I wouldn't put it as an axiom since it can be easily proven.

>>	Anonymous Mon Sep 5 14:43:37 2022 No.20944253 >>20942563 In other words, farts are just phenomenal, not noumenal. The noumena lies beyond the cheeks.

Anonymous Mon Sep 5 15:05:37 2022 No.20944311

>>20944075
Not him.
Husserl takes a loto from Bergson, as Heidegger says, the main one being in his view that time is a limitation of reality. Husserl doesn't think we can see Platonic ideas, but ONLY because they're adumbrated by time (of course whether time can be detached from space is a different matter), yet even through time, we can still see their fundamental essences.
>I disagree. We can say they are about something, but I don't think it's intrinsic. Could just be a normal pulse of emotion that latches onto whatever neural highway is the path of least resistance. I know I've been angry plenty of times when I logically know being calm is the best solution. The anger will latch onto whatever grievances I have, regardless of how many times I've already addressed (or even solved) those grievances. It's also worth repeating that we make decisions before our brain writes a narrative for why they were made. I see it less as intentionality and more as emergent of our biology.
This is what Husserl calls Pre-Givenness, and Bergson... Something; I've forgot. Basially the idea is more akin to Kant's pure a priori, in that Bergson views the self as a limitation imposed on the natural totality, with time merely being an emphasised facet because it's what we live through, via memory. Yet, this pre-givenness is basically a perversion by the body (or memory/emotion/physiology, whatever) of the totality's projected purity: in adumbrating the totality through time (memory, though this isn't important for Husserl since he uses intention to fulfill Potentials) the body is naturally tainting it—reduction=tainting—and perverting its essence. The key is that unlike for Bergson, Husserl believes that the Ego is Ontologically prior to the Totality (IS it), and thus that the Ego can undo its own imposed pre-givenness so as to correctly reduce the object to a pure transcendental essence.

The other thing is to understand the confusing manner of speaking regarding the, what is 2 sides of one coin, transcendental phenomenology (holy fuck I hate writing that) and psychology, especially regarding the term 'consciousness'. To avoid going into it, one of Husserl's other main inspirations was James' 'radical empiricism' which caused him later in his career to question the existence (rather the dogmatic definition most give it) of consciousness, failing to see what 'it' adds to the emanation of Being from the Ego. This is why Husserl is forced to, quite solipstically, regard the intention itself with the self. This is what Heidegger questioned when he asked the ontological status of intention: when it's fulfilled the absolute, whence does it go?

Sorry to interrupt but I'm bored.

Anonymous Mon Sep 5 15:51:39 2022 No.20944461

>>20944311
>Husserl takes a loto from Bergson, as Heidegger says
Heh, I'm terrible with names. I dunno who Bergson even is.
>the main one being in his view that time is a limitation of reality
A limitation? I figured it was simply the evolution of it.
>Husserl doesn't think we can see Platonic ideas, but ONLY because they're adumbrated by time (of course whether time can be detached from space is a different matter), yet even through time, we can still see their fundamental essences
Platonic ideals are our own inventions based on pattern recognition. They only exist in interactions with our perceptions. So yeah, without time, nothing makes sense.
>Husserl believes that the Ego is Ontologically prior to the Totality (IS it), and thus that the Ego can undo its own imposed pre-givenness so as to correctly reduce the object to a pure transcendental essence
Has he managed to achieve this? Does he have a single example of an object reduced to pure transcendental essence? Granted, I haven't seen anything that's pure a priori either, so I'm curious if Kant ever found anything that fits that description.
>transcendental phenomenology (holy fuck I hate writing that)
I think academics do it to fuck with us
>to avoid going into it, one of Husserl's other main inspirations was James' 'radical empiricism' which caused him later in his career to question the existence (rather the dogmatic definition most give it) of consciousness, failing to see what 'it' adds to the emanation of Being from the Ego.
I dunno what the dogmatic definition of consciousness is, but I see it as an emergent phenomena of our pattern recognition and decision-making, itself emerging from a game of survival going several layers of abstraction deep.
>This is why Husserl is forced to, quite solipstically, regard the intention itself with the self. This is what Heidegger questioned when he asked the ontological status of intention: when it's fulfilled the absolute, whence does it go?
Pardon my ignorance, but I'm having a lot of difficulty breaking down what these statements actually mean.
>Sorry to interrupt but I'm bored
It's an open forum where interruptions are encouraged. Any of us bozos can join the conversation with our ideas and interpretations. It makes things much more interesting. 4chan also has the idea quoting system to manage it with.

Anonymous Mon Sep 5 17:19:43 2022 No.20944848

>>20944461
For Bergson the body's senses and mind is a limitation, linked together via memory, the medium we exist and are conscious through. Husserl is different: adumbration is literally what it is, in the whole transcendent object is whole and one, yet seen and pieced together iteratively through different spatial/temporal instants joined together by the persisting intention. Go look at a branch and then walk past it whilst still focusing on it: the persistence is the binding intention that holds together the manifold of the branch's essence through separate spatial + temporal instants. Yet, this essence can only be pieced together because there DOES exist the whole Platonic object which the intuition gives, which is then 'overlaid' if you will over the transcendent object; Husserl is very clear here: the transcendent object can't be known, but the intuited essences can serve as a 1 to 1 facsimile of it.

Your view of Platonism is a nominalist's, which is not Husserl's. He believes that the essences must have validity wholly prior to all other sciences, including logic.

The Pure Ego is absolute Being in that it is absolutely prior to all else phenomenologically speaking. We feel it first. That's all that's necessary to prove it. The point is that it differs from a Kantian in that there are no pure a priori that precedes the intuition (I'm not writing phenomen whatever). The absolute Being of the pure ego IS all existence (Husserl was accused of solipsism a lot), and thus what it 'reveals' itself to (what it becomes aware of ontologically) IS equally ALL that is, entirely. Hence there isn't an object that 'appears' or is synthesised from a manifold of a priori categories, but simply becomes as a whole ontological 'picture' that is solely what it is. The question of an actual transcendental reduction of something to an essence is vexed; we have no record of it, apparently.

It's more their desire for consistency. Kant was meticulous in his etymology, it's just that it didn't really care for human convention. The main thing IMO is inventing words that allow yourself to wholly create the meaning.

Your view of consciousness is phenomo ly speaking wrong. It doesn't matter the physiology of consciousness—the essences of physiological-psychology are just as susceptible to trans reductions as anything else—merely that consciousness is a thing that we feel and can use. I'm just stating, to my awareness, Husserl's view; I'm a pan-psychist who doesn't believe in free-will and thus the import of consciousness.

The point RE Heidegger is tricky. Basically in Scholastic theology the soul was equatable with self + consciousness. Modern philosophy disabused us of this, since we can't really explain what exactly a persisting self would either provide, or persist in. If it persists alone, it doesn't do anything, and thus is worthless; if it does something, the question is what and how does any other process lack in not having that.

Anonymous Mon Sep 5 17:26:23 2022 No.20944868

>>20944848
CONT
The point is that Husserl couldn't fine anywhere to 'stow' the self (important to him for religious reasons) itself in the Ego's Being's intention. That is, the Ego's Being is all that there is, and its sole motion is in a constantly changing intention directed to objects. What is the Ego? Where is it? In the intention. The actual self is not a thing taken in a still moment, but only is a thing in the constant changing of its intention. To put it simply: the Ego contains within itself a whole schema of all possible potential objects as potentialities that gradually come to be actualised through intuition. The self exists only WITHIN each object on which the Ego's intention rests—there is nothing to the intention without the object, and the Ego can't exist without the intention. This also isn't a Kantian subject/object, btw. Heidegger's critique was that if intention lives in objects, and objects exist only to fulfill the possibility-objects, and there are a finite amount of possibility-objects—what becomes of the intention when all possibilities are actualised? Since it can only live in objects, all of which have been fully actualised, it can have no ontological existence.
Heidegger's point being the object-potentialities can never be fulfilled, since they vary constantly.

>>	Anonymous Mon Sep 5 20:57:33 2022 No.20945818 Bump

Anonymous Mon Sep 5 23:30:59 2022 No.20946397

>>20944075
>That doesn't really counter the argument that such minds could be capable of holding contradictory arguments.
The claim is usually that "No mind can hold something to be true and its contrary at the same time and in the same manner." (this is not a phenomenological claim as such, just to be clear), so it does leave space for ambivalence. And usually, it refers to a judgement being made immediately, not in relations to incompatible beliefs which are not challenging one another.
>I disagree. We can say they are about something, but I don't think it's intrinsic
It's worth noting then that the central place of intentionality in Phenomenology (if not even the validity of the concept) as been increasingly challenged in the last decades. That it is what held back Husserl. I don't agree but feel free to explore the alternative.
>Could you provide an example of any such knowledge that isn't built upon our perceptions
Not all our perceptual content is 'filled'. But instead of providing you a specific example, think of any process in which you 'produce knowledge', so to speak.
Take something simple. Your roommate asks you if you know where his car keys are. Maybe the location of the keys are still vivid in your mind, maybe you just passed them by and without even having to think about it, you say "on the kitchen counter". You shared knowledge while fully and completely in the natural attitude.
Now say that this knowledge is now readily available, it isnt vivid to you, but you do have it somewhere, what do you do to extract it? You engage in a reflexive moment, you suspend parts (going back to all of us being able of some degree of superposition) of you current circumstances and bring to presence whatever memories are necessary to answer the question, right? You are still mostly in the natural attitude, but not completely, it is partially bracketed in that you are no longer primarily involved in your present circumstances. You have reduced the analysis of the content of your memory to a simple process of parsing.
Obviously, as we said, there is still knowledge produced and transmitted in the natural attitude, but it is fairly limited, the production of complex judgements already evokes the Epoché & reduction.
>>20943855
>That's some extreme simplification
Absolutely, I dont deny that, I just know that Husserl literally answered that very question somewhere and I dont remember where and I'm trying to disguise my laziness.

Anonymous Tue Sep 6 00:36:32 2022 No.20946639

>>20944075
>My difficulty comes with what is required to even observe or communicate something in the first place.
There is no start of knowledge without some empirical input, I dont believe Husserl would deny it, however the claim is that Phenomenology (and really, philosophy as a whole) wants to push beyond the empirical, that is what is meant by apodictic in the OP.
To give a more precise answer, in regards to a reduction and what comes out of it *very quickly*, take something very simple, an everyday object, and reduce it as much in regards to its existence alone through the different layers identified by Phenomenology. For example, take a table.
> Natural attitude : the table exist because it is there when I enter the room, when I have left it and when I come back. Maybe if I'm a high IQ STEMfag I have some notions of of physics or whatever contributing to my theory of the existence of the table, but I usually wont draw on that unless I'm sperging out.
> Eidetic-phenomenological reduction : The table exists because it is an empirical object constituted of a flat surface of sufficient size for use, at a specific height (my dad was a woodworker, he told me the rule for table height but I dont remember it right now) and with enough legs for it to be fully stable rest. (essentially, its definition)
> phenomenological reduction : the table's existence is given to us in a thetic act, itself the correlate (in the case of empirical, physical objects given in perception) of the invariance drawn throughout every 'slide' of perception.
> transcendental reduction (I think, like I said, I'm not a master) : the table's existence is the correlate of the potential and actuality of its presence within the totality of pure inter-subjectivity.

Anonymous Tue Sep 6 01:06:41 2022 No.20946741

>>20936080
>5) If you had to assign me reading that will allow me to speedrun Husserl and get the gist of him, what do you offer? I can't spend my whole life on him. I just need philosophical "completeness."
Oh just coming back to this one. There is no good way to speedrun Husserl, unfortunately. Usually someone would say Cartesian Meditations, and in a way they aren't wrong, becauseit is literally Husserl trying to speedrun you on Phenomenology, but I have issues with that very notion, and also with the way it is "handled". People and commentators acts as if it's like the Traktatus, as if there is some extra layer of esoteric meaning to be extracted from it if you consider it just in the right light. It really was just Husserl giving a bunch of speeches.
Philosophy as Rigorous science is imho better, as an introduction to the style of philosopher he is, what he generally wants and who his enemies are, but it won't give you any deep understanding of his method.

>>	Anonymous Tue Sep 6 01:08:31 2022 No.20946746 >>20936016 HusserlANON IS THAT YOU?

Anonymous Tue Sep 6 02:03:41 2022 No.20946933
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>>20944848
>>20944868
I very much appreciate these posts, especially since they were laid out in a way that is extremely easy to understand. The fact you could lay it all out so plainly shows that you genuinely know your shit. 10/10 anon, you fucking delivered

Anonymous Tue Sep 6 02:06:20 2022 No.20946938

>>20946746
No, Husserlanon is a burger, I'm French-Canadian. Weirdly one of the few good things about this place is that we have an abnormally high number of Husserl specialists (Lavigne, Fiset, Gagnon). Hussrlanon would have been immediatly hired if he had applied for a job at McGill University.
> at least it's not UoT :s

>>	Anonymous Tue Sep 6 02:08:14 2022 No.20946943 >>20932466 >postmodernism Is over. He have something new now.

>>	Anonymous Tue Sep 6 02:09:08 2022 No.20946948 >>20946943 >replymodernism It's just beginning. The future is now

Anonymous Tue Sep 6 02:10:05 2022 No.20946951

>>20946746
>>20946938
I think I'm either "Husserlanon" or one of the people who gets called Husserlanon often. The funny thing is, I'm not the Husserl PhD from the famous copypasta, but I AM the guy asking him to play CS in that pic.

To the French-Canadian Husserlanon, are you the one who was recommending Gaston Berger a while back on Husserl's transcendental "turn" and whether it was a turn at all?

>>	Anonymous Tue Sep 6 02:13:42 2022 No.20946967 >>20946948 Modernism was Fascism and Communism, Post-modernism was laissez-faire capitalism. Today it's ESG, hyper-equality, and living like a dog, from moment to moment because not doing so is racist.

>>	Anonymous Tue Sep 6 02:15:25 2022 No.20946977 >>20932376 philosophy is pseudoscience 9 out of 10 times

>>	Anonymous Tue Sep 6 02:18:56 2022 No.20946996 >>20946397 >It's worth noting then that the central place of intentionality in Phenomenology (if not even the validity of the concept) as been increasingly challenged in the last decades. Any example on this?

>>	Anonymous Tue Sep 6 02:21:46 2022 No.20947005 >>20946951 >are you the one who was recommending Gaston Berger Yes, did you find it?

Anonymous Tue Sep 6 02:29:46 2022 No.20947035

>>20946996
Check David Cole and Cody Turner on philpapers if you have a pass, I no longer do... :(
I remember assisting at a conference on Phenomenology without Intentionality a decade back at University Laval. Must not have been very good because I dont remember anything else from it other than the subject and the fat fucking bowtie wearing cunt that was giving it.

Anonymous Tue Sep 6 02:29:48 2022 No.20947036

>>20946397
>You are still mostly in the natural attitude, but not completely, it is partially bracketed in that you are no longer primarily involved in your present circumstances. You have reduced the analysis of the content of your memory to a simple process of parsing.
>Obviously, as we said, there is still knowledge produced and transmitted in the natural attitude, but it is fairly limited, the production of complex judgements already evokes the Epoché & reduction.
Is this a form of reconstruction? Is it abductive reasoning? Does it rely on deterministic assumptions about the past?

Anonymous Tue Sep 6 02:41:10 2022 No.20947075

>>20947035
>>/lit/thread/S20782962
How do you think about this thread? I was the OP of that thread.
Currently working on STEM field and people know that all the attempts they have made so far have failed, but they try again to create AGI without knowing philosophy whatsoever.
I only read some of Dan Zahavi and Hubert Dreyfus, but I was amazed by the concept of intentionality, aboutness - This seems to be the most important point where current artificial intelligence and human thinking are different.
Can you tell me what books describing harmonious combination of phenomenology and artificial intelligence?

Anonymous Tue Sep 6 02:49:21 2022 No.20947107

>>20947036
>Is this a form of reconstruction
In what sense?
>Is it abductive reasoning
No, phenomenology is a descriptive science of essences, not causes. Or do you mean something else?
>Does it rely on deterministic assumptions about the past?
Those would be bracketed away, except in cases and a times where you cannot. If you want to talk about Phenomenology of color perception, for example, you could at the beginning mention the whole goddamn dress meme, that wouldnt be out of place. Eventually you would bracket away everything from that case and retain only the essence of what you wanted to bring to light by mentioning it.

>>	Anonymous Tue Sep 6 02:56:25 2022 No.20947125 >>20947107 >essence What do you mean by that? That's a philosophically alarming word.

Anonymous Tue Sep 6 02:59:10 2022 No.20947136

>>20947125
Not him but exactly, Husserl uses it in a very confusing way.. Two of the easiest summaries of it that make sense of the phenomenological meaning of it are Merleau-Ponty's preface to Phenomenology of Perception and the introduction to Heidegger's Being and Time, the part where he talks about phenomenological existentiae/essentiae.

>>	Anonymous Tue Sep 6 03:01:55 2022 No.20947146 >>20947125 Here's a very good paper on it. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17482620500478405#:~:text=An%20exploration%20of%20Husserl's%20ideas,(1995%2F1945)

>>	Anonymous Tue Sep 6 03:08:53 2022 No.20947170 philosophy was never science there is philosophy of science

Anonymous Tue Sep 6 03:11:57 2022 No.20947182
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>>20933502
>2nd Law of Thermodynamics
is demonstrably false. The description cannot dissipate. It is as perfectly ordered as the day it was drawn. Materialism is logically absurd... Self contradictory. Not possible.

Anonymous Tue Sep 6 03:28:21 2022 No.20947249
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>>20947136
>>20947146
>I thought in the start of this project that I should illuminate essences of phenomena. What I found was that essences are their phenomena; the phenomena are their essences. Phenomenology shows that everything is experienced as something, i.e. everything has its own style An essence is, simply, a phenomenon's style, its way of being, and thus the essence cannot be separated from the phenomenon that it is the essence of.
... that's it? That's Husserl's solution to the phenomena-noumena distinction? I'm not even going to waste a disgruntled pepe on that. Here, have a regular ass frog.

>>	Anonymous Tue Sep 6 03:56:47 2022 No.20947346 File: 1.75 MB, 240x160, spilled milk.gif [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] >>20947182 Explain this then, if you're man enough

Anonymous Tue Sep 6 07:56:28 2022 No.20948093

>>20947249
>That's Husserl's solution to the phenomena-noumena distinction?
Again, Husserl argues for a *descriptive* science of essences, an "aesthetic" of essences, and systematically argues that any attempts at building an arithmetic of essences, as he puts it, are doomed to failure.

>>	Anonymous Tue Sep 6 12:58:07 2022 No.20948959 >>20948093 So he’s giving up with Kant’s challenge? Lame.

Anonymous Tue Sep 6 13:42:25 2022 No.20949113

>>20948959
He does not "give up". To Husserl the "noumena" are complete nonsense. The phenomena are arguably also complete nonsense in the way Kant tries to frame them. He has his own conceptions that don't have any translation/transposition in terms of Kantian phenomena-noumena.

>>	Anonymous Tue Sep 6 13:46:02 2022 No.20949134 >>20949113 >it’s just nonsense, okay bro? nothing is grounded in anything Laziest critique ever, I’m noumenally yawning

Anonymous Tue Sep 6 14:16:44 2022 No.20949268

>>20949134
Everyone has to be look for those noumena because....they just have to, ok?
Husserl did touch on the thing-in-itself as far as it corresponds to the clear concept of synthesis from hyletic data, showing there aren't any. Whether or not that corresponds to the ever nebulous noumena of Kant is up to you.

>>	Anonymous Tue Sep 6 14:21:58 2022 No.20949300 >>20949268 >you get what you see >because you just do, okay chud?!?!

>>	Anonymous Tue Sep 6 14:28:13 2022 No.20949336 >>20949300 As opposed to getting something that you don't get, no matter the synthesis and referencing? It's obvious you don't have any idea on the theory of signification.

>>	Anonymous Tue Sep 6 14:30:35 2022 No.20949345 >>20949336 you can signify this dick nigga, literally skullfucking Husserl's grave rn fr fr

>>	Anonymous Tue Sep 6 14:31:40 2022 No.20949349 >>20949345 Celibate my ass. Kant was gay, no cap.

>>	Anonymous Tue Sep 6 14:47:23 2022 No.20949424 File: 92 KB, 645x970, f2b.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] >>20949349 >uhhhhh ummmm >I'm BRACKETING my schizophrenic delusions >that's how I know that they're FOR REAL

>>	Anonymous Tue Sep 6 18:14:25 2022 No.20950404 >>20949336 I get something you don't get, mad pussy. clown ass nigga

>>	Anonymous Tue Sep 6 21:54:55 2022 No.20951348 I refuse to let such a good thread end in such a shitty way.

Anonymous Tue Sep 6 22:01:26 2022 No.20951376

>>20947249
Husserl isn't really trying to solve the problem of what is beyond our experience of the phenomena, sadly. He IS however trying to found a much more firmly grounded and self-transparent form of transcendental philosophy in the Kantian tradition, which could then begin answering that question. The "natural ontology" or phenomenological elucidation of the "preontological" everyday/lifeworld you find in Husserl/Heidegger/Merleau-Ponty/Klein really is simultaneously a return to the Greeks and the necessary first step in going past the Greeks.

Phenomenology's raison d'etre is ground-clearing, ground-exhibiting, etc., creating a transparent foundation for a new philosophy that is as robust and as rigorous as it is possible for any philosophy qua philosophy to be. That doesn't mean it's any more than a "start." In fact Husserl himself only really "got the start itself started."

Once you understand phenomenology, if you then go and read the introduction to Lonergan's Insight and something like Steiner's How to Know Higher Worlds, you will begin to see what other possibilities for human cognition may be just around the corner. But we need to do the work.

Anonymous Tue Sep 6 22:42:57 2022 No.20951541
File: 97 KB, 952x1360, 61TtiQhFjDL.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]

>>20951376
Hmmm. Have you ever read Charles Sanders Peirce and his architectonic phenomenology? He was trying to do the same thing, albeit from a completely different angle: logic, categories, and semiotics. I think you would be fascinated by him.

Anonymous Wed Sep 7 01:22:33 2022 No.20952156

>>20947075
I remember that thread, I posted in it, a very short reply toward the end. All in all, I can't begin to find a way to reconcile Phenomenology with AI science or whatever it's called. I won't pretend to be terribly well versed in programming, but at least the OP wasn't wrong, seems like semantic space is the focus, and no amount of increase to it will give ground to emergent conscious features.
I don't see how Phenomenology could begin to help you come up with an 'algorithm of intentionality'. At best it could provide you with a near infinite number of features which would need to be accounted for by your AI to pass muster... and even then, they would be pretty "highbrow" concerns, if you will.

>>	Anonymous Wed Sep 7 01:23:57 2022 No.20952163 >>20947075 Have you read Dreyfus' What Computers (Still) Can't Do? There's also an updated "how have AI people responded to Dreyfus' critique" essay in one of the companions to phenomenology. I can try to figure out which in a minute.

>>	Anonymous Wed Sep 7 01:30:21 2022 No.20952176 >>20951376 the quotation marks aptly point out everything that is wrong with phenomenology

Anonymous Wed Sep 7 01:38:04 2022 No.20952196

>>20951376
>The "natural ontology" or phenomenological elucidation of the "preontological" everyday/lifeworld you find in Husserl/Heidegger/Merleau-Ponty/Klein really is simultaneously a return to the Greeks and the necessary first step in going past the Greeks.
I thought that the difference between Heidegger and Husserl was that, whereas Husserl tried digging down to first principles and deriving everything from self-consciousness, like Descartes did, that Heidegger tried going back to Being itself and showing how man cannot reach back to a primal principle if man himself belongs to the world that the primal principle has developed into, and that self-consciousness is not the first step towards understanding the world, but rather the last.

Anonymous Wed Sep 7 02:59:03 2022 No.20952542

>>20952196
Husserl himself believed ontologists to be exactly as deluded as empirical scientists when it came to methodology and epistemology. Heidegger inverses the positions completely.
> [For Heidegger ] intentional content cannot be understood as a function of consciousness alone but must be seen as deriving from the structure of being-in-the-world as a whole, that which enables our understanding of being (Cromwell).
The difference is that for Husserl Heidegger's aim is impossible to reach, while Heidegger's criticism of Husserl would only mean, if it is valid, that formal Phenomenology is itself rather naive, not impossible.

Anonymous Wed Sep 7 03:21:33 2022 No.20952658

> § 4. Essence and Transcendence
> In Husserlian terms, the transcendent is what is given to consciousness as irreducible to consciousness, which means that transcendence signals a subsistence that is beyond the powers of subjectivity, while not being wholly foreign to subjectivity. Across Husserl’s texts few phenomenal areas are explicitly named as full-fledged embodiments of the transcendent dimension: we will mention and briefly illustrate four such embodiments.
> 1) The first and most elementary instance of transcendence concerns the primal dimension of passivity in perception. Primal impressions (Ur-impressionen), sensuous reliefs (Abhebungen), affections (Affektionen) are all expressions that signal the primal level of sensuous experience, whose original passivity points at an original ‘anonymous substrate’. This is the sphere that at first Husserl terms hylé. This term, however, involved sensations interpreted as ‘raw matter’ of intentionality, and sensations are
still immanent data. Therefore, Husserl did successively introduce and consistently use the term Ur-hylé, whenever he wanted to emphasize the ‘pre-cognitive’ transcendent character of the substrate of all sensuous experience.

>>	Anonymous Wed Sep 7 03:23:08 2022 No.20952667 >>20952658 Why is Husserl so difficult?

>>	Anonymous Wed Sep 7 03:24:23 2022 No.20952672 >>20932466 Most academics did. At lear Husserl, Jaspers and Heidegger all agreed on that.

Anonymous Wed Sep 7 03:26:53 2022 No.20952687

2) Secondly, Husserl repeatedly asserts the transcendent nature of material objects. While the notion of object (Gegenstand) is primarilyused by Husserl to name the intentional object in general, that is, the correlate of consciousness a parte objecti, Husserl speaks of things (Dinge) or real (real) objects when he wants to refer to transcendent ‘material’ objects. The transcendent object is what is adumbrated by adumbrations (das Abgeschattete): whereas adumbrations are immanent sensuous data, their ever-elusive butconstitutively intended reference is the real object as transcendent unit. Transcendent is now not just the shapeless pre-cognitive ‘row matter’ of perception (hylé), but also the shaped unit that we intend as independently existent. In fact, real things as such are qualified by cognitive attributions, since they are, at least, recognized as existent in space, and the attribution of spatial predicates can take place only in the wake of sentient spontaneous bodily movements (Kinästhesen), which originarily articulate space with reference to the orientation of our living body (Leib).21 In Ideas II Husserl shows that real things are constituted as unitary schemas or rules of change proper to possible manifestations (Regel möglicher Erscheinungen):22 such schemas are characterized by the fact that the parts of the thing belong together (according to a ‘rule’) when they are involved in common causal circumstances (Ideas II, 42-43/45-46). Husserl, however, clearly distinguishes two phenomenal dimensions in the constitution of the thing: on the one hand, there is the schema, which is the manifestation (Bekundung) of the identity of the thing; on the other, there is sensuous transcendence, which provides the original manifestation (Beurkundung) of the ‘substantial reality’ of the thing (Ideen II, 131/139). This distinction shows that the unity and identity of the thing, which appears through its ‘adumbrations’, relies, as to its ‘substantial reality’, on the reference to an aperspectival transcendent core. Such a transcendent core is precisely the same elementary instance of transcendence that we have previously mentioned. This does not mean that our experience of an actual thing separately displays these two constitutive levels: towards the spatial thing we are receptive in a more specific sense than we are towards mere sensuous transcendence, since we are perceptive of a spatial thing, which can be never fully given in sensuous presence, but is always apperceived on the basis of retained kinaesthetic experiences. In this sense the transcendent thing is transcendent as thing, that is, as something endowed with unity and identity while its sensuous adumbrations change.

>>	Anonymous Wed Sep 7 03:27:13 2022 No.20952692 >>20952672 Why did they agree anon?

Anonymous Wed Sep 7 03:39:21 2022 No.20952749

3) A third sphere of phenomena that Husserl considers exemplary of transcendence is the experience of the Others as Alter Egos. Although Alter Egos can be apprehended only through their bodily manifestations and therefore require the ability to apprehend transcendent objects in order to be properly perceived, they represent also a peculiar instance of transcendence, irreducible to the nature of things. Alter Egos are not experienced just as objects, but also as bearers of intentional experiences, i.e., as subjects. What is specifically transcendent in Alter Egos is not just the unitary completion of definite bodies, but also above all the spontaneous sphere ofintentionality, which finds manifold perceptual manifestations that constitutively exceeds all its manifestations. When we perceive somebody as an Alter Ego, we perceive it as a perceiver, and the nature of intentional acts is never reducible to objectual manifestations. Even if Husserl occasionally mentions the perception of the Other (Fremdwahrnehmung) as the source of all transcendence, he generally recognizes and argues that we must encounter the otherness of the Others on the basis of our ‘primordial’ intentionality, which is the core of intentional consciousness before intersubjectivity comes on stage. This means, among other things, that we can perceive Alter Egos only in the wake of our ability to apprehend material objects. Not everything is straightforward in this consideration, however, because Husserl’s analysis also shows that objectivity can be grasped only with reference to an ideal (transcendental) intersubjectivity: whenever we judge that something has objective existence, we implicitly assume that it is something subsistent for any possible subjects. This seems to produce a paradox: we must be able to grasp objects in order to perceive other subjects, yet, we must already have cognizance of intersubjectivity in order to grasp objects. This issue, when it is treated in the framework of genetic phenomenology, as it is the case in the Cartesian Meditations, turns out to be a rather thorny one, and we cannot hope here either to follow Husserl’s discussion or to offer a fully satisfactory interpretation of it. However a couple of observations are in order and should allow us to profitably progress in our analysis. When we, as single subjects in the primordial sphere (i.e., abstracting from anything of intersubjective origin), perceive an objectual entity (a thing), we apprehend something that can be said to be ‘akin to’ an objective entity, while not being properly objective yet.

Anonymous Wed Sep 7 03:56:31 2022 No.20952807

>>20952749
When we perceive a material thing, we grasp something as permanent across a succession of impermanent impressions (adumbrations). The fact that, regardless of verbal categorization, we can recognize the same object or similar ones in successive moments shows that we have memory of that perceptual unit. This step can be regarded as the primal passive moment in the process of ideation, leading from sensuous to categorical intuition. But Husserl repeatedly argued also that the fact that we have memory of a perceived object implies that the object is potentially available for a plurality of subjects, insofar as it is available for my very self over time (Crisis, 188-189/184-185; Hua XV, 332-333). This consideration seems to open the way towards an apprehension of intersubjectivity and objectivity already in the primordial dimension.28 However, this is no full-fledged objectivity yet, but is rather its primordial presupposition: we have to do with an object endowed with lasting identity, but it is an ‘inexact’ identity, which cannot raise claims of validity for ever andeverybody. The ability to apprehend objects at the primordial level of perception seems to be a presupposition for the intuition of intersubjectivity in three distinct senses. First, because we could not perceive Others if we were unable to perceive their bodies as objectual units; second, because the stable apprehension of percepts in memory is the basic presupposition for any intersubjective agreement or disagreement; finally, because the primordial ability to grasp objects endowed with identity motivates the pursuit of intersubjective validity (objectivity), when the recognition of Alter Egos takes place: since we naturally obtain stable beliefs on what there is, we do not want them to be shaken by Others (when we recognize them as bearers of claims and beliefs in turn), and this means that we must go for an upgrade of our primordial beliefs in the direction of intersubjective validity. All that said, the sphere of intersubjectivity can be fully accessed only in the wake of a specific Fremderfahrung, which manifests also the irreducible kind of transcendence pertaining to other subjects.

>>	Anonymous Wed Sep 7 08:09:51 2022 No.20953622 another bump

>>	Anonymous Wed Sep 7 08:43:39 2022 No.20953734 >>20932376 >serious, rigorous, indeed apodictically rigorous science It ever was? Why should it be anyway? Is it not its task to develop methodological paradigms within which actual fields of scientific knowledge could exist?

>>	Anonymous Wed Sep 7 09:20:01 2022 No.20953808 >>20932380 thx

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