Plato, Heidegger, and the Relationship Between Mathematics and Poetry

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Plato, Heidegger, and the Relationship Between Mathematics and Poetry Anonymous Tue Aug 9 22:58:17 2022 No.20813399 [Reply] [Original]

There was a fruitful discussion that broke out in a bait thread about Evola and Heidegger that, unfortunately, was interrupted by a janny deleting the thread.So I am going to rebirth it here by discussing the relationship between philosophy and poetry, philosophy and mathematics, and the tension between the two as seen in Plato's works and was rediscovered in Heidegger's works. This will be an effortpost with explicit references to works, so it will not suffer the same fate as the other thread.

Briefly, in works like Plato's Republic and Plato's Ion, there's an ambiguity in Plato's seeming hostility towards poetry, where he acknowledges it as divine, confirms that it is important, and even engages in it himself (through literary device), but condemns its irrationality. Plato can't live with or without poetry. Meanwhile, after initially dismissing Plato with a dated, superficial reading (that was standard from the German idealism days), the later Heidegger returns to Plato with fresh eyes to finally refine his critique of the history of philosophy and its concealment of Being. Namely, poetry is ultimately connected to nature, whose whims were satisfied by mathematics as a means to an end. But with Plato and beyond, mathematics becomes THE self-grounding mode of Being, the pathway to glimpse at the realm of the forms, laying the grounds for foundations for Western civilization to be engrossed in the world of technique. Cthonic poetry is stifled in the quest for technocratic efficiency.

Here's an interesting, but taxing to read essay: https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.153.1031&rep=rep1&type=pdf

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 10 00:43:36 2022 No.20813723 >>20813399 Found another article that shows that poetry and mathematics may not be necessarily in conflict from Heidegger's point of view: https://progressivegeographies.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/the-place-of-geometry.pdf

Anonymous Wed Aug 10 01:07:02 2022 No.20813803

>>20813399
>But with Plato and beyond, mathematics becomes THE self-grounding mode of Being
One should necessarily investigate the Pythagoreans here, since it is from them that Plato gets, or at least starts with, his number philosophy. In the grander sense what Heidegger generally sees as ruptures or flaws in the philosophy of Plato should be approached for beginning first in the Greek culture around him. Orphism, Eleusinian mysteries, Eleatics etc. Any form of religion or thinking of which we may not even have a clue. Since we cannot presume, out of logic or our knowledge of Greece, that Plato's differentiation from the Presocratics, in all its enormity, was just his creation.

>In his Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger states that there is a concealed discordance between beauty, semblance, and truth in Platonism. [...] Plato’s claim that beauty’s radiance is both the reminder of the non-sensible εἴδη and a semblance belonging to the sensible world.

Anonymous Wed Aug 10 01:24:36 2022 No.20813868

>>20813803
>One should necessarily investigate the Pythagoreans here, since it is from them that Plato gets, or at least starts with, his number philosophy.
... of whom we hardly know anything about. All I know is that Plato replaces the shadowy Pythagorean mimesis of the divine properties of numbers, replaces the word with methexis, and then hands down mimesis to the arts. I can't tell if this means that the arts are somehow on roughly equal playing field as mathematics (and philosophy), that mathematics is somehow superior, that this is a hapless cope by Plato, etc. I also know that mathematics doesn't get one all the way to participation in the Form of the Good, either. Aristotle especially revolts against the primacy of mathematics in trying to resolve how the primacy of numbers fits into problem of the one and the many.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 10 01:28:25 2022 No.20813887 Plato mogs Heidegger. It's not even up for debate.

Anonymous Wed Aug 10 01:28:32 2022 No.20813889

>But with Plato and beyond, mathematics becomes THE self-grounding mode of Being, the pathway to glimpse at the realm of the forms, laying the grounds for foundations for Western civilization to be engrossed in the world of technique.

And, if I could, I would show you, no longer an image and symbol of my meaning, but the very truth, as it appears to me—though whether rightly or not I may not properly affirm.3 But that something like this is what we have to see, I must affirm.4 Is not that so?”
“Surely.”
“And may we not also declare that nothing less than the power of dialectics could reveal5 this, and that only to one experienced6 in the studies we have described, and that the thing is in no other wise possible?”
“That, too,” he said, “we may properly affirm.”
“This, at any rate,” said I, “no one will maintain in dispute against us: that there is any other way of inquiry1 that attempts systematically and in all cases to determine what each thing really is. But all the other arts have for their object the opinions and desires of men or are wholly concerned with generation and composition or with the service and tendance of the things that grow and are put together, while the remnant which we said2 did in some sort lay hold on reality—geometry and the studies that accompany it—are, as we see, dreaming1 about being, but the clear waking vision2 of it is impossible for them as long as they leave the assumptions which they employ undisturbed and cannot give any account3 of them. For where the starting-point is something that the reasoner does not know, and the conclusion and all that intervenes is a tissue of things not really known,4 what possibility is there that assent5 in such cases can ever be converted into true knowledge or science?”
“None,” said he.
“Then,” said I, “is not dialectics the only process of inquiry that advances in this manner, doing away with hypotheses, up to the first principle itself in order to find confirmation there?..."
533a-c

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 10 01:41:10 2022 No.20813931 File: 56 KB, 907x1360, 51aSjUxv8lL.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] Worth reading?

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 10 01:47:06 2022 No.20813954 >>20813887 The ancients mog pretty much everyone. But Heidegger is a gifted interpreter of the ancients. Him, Strauss, Gadamer, etc., bring them to life in a way few people can.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 10 02:02:58 2022 No.20814021 >>20813868 >... of whom we hardly know anything about. I wouldn't agree with that, but it's also kind of my point. It's impossible to speak absolutely but it's still necessary to consider it.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 10 02:07:33 2022 No.20814038 >>20813954 Heidegger seemed prone to sweeping generalizations not backed by the text. Do you trust Heidegger's interpretation of Holderlin?

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 10 02:14:10 2022 No.20814062 >>20814038 >Holderlin literally who?

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 10 03:04:00 2022 No.20814225 >>20814062 actually read Heidegger; he mentions Hölderlin on the regular

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 10 03:05:38 2022 No.20814231 >>20814225 I just skip that stuff. I don't care about Kraut autism. I only care about what this nigga has to say about Descartes and Aristotle and Plato and shieeet

Anonymous Wed Aug 10 03:41:04 2022 No.20814309
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>>20813723
>The genuineness of the Categories is in dispute, but Heidegger considers it to be by Aristotle – ‘no disciple could write like that’. Here there is a discussion of poson, quantity. Heidegger claims that what is posited in the thesis is nothing else than the continuum itself. ‘This basic phenomenon is the ontological condition for the possibility of some-thing like stretch, megethos: position and orientation are such that from one point there can be a continuous progression to the others; only in this way is motion understandable’ (GA19, 118–19). The line, which is continuous, can have points extracted from it, but these points do not together constitute the line. The line is more than a multiplicity of points, it has a thesis. But with numbers there is no thesis, so the series of num-bers has a constitution only by way of the ephekses. Because a thesis is not required to understand arithmetic, number is ontologically prior: it seeks to explain being without reference to beings. Which is why Plato begins with number in his radical ontological reflection’. But Aristotle does not claim this. Instead he shows that the genuine arche of number, the unit, monas, is no longer a number, and therefore a more funda-mental discipline is discovered, that which studies the basic constitution of beings, namely sophia (GA19, 120–1).
Holy shit.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 10 04:09:24 2022 No.20814357 >>20814021 Well, shoot your shot anon.

Anonymous Wed Aug 10 05:05:50 2022 No.20814490

>>20813889
After reading some Heidegger commentary again here, >>20814309, which turned out to be relevant to the point of this thread, and reading your reminder, I decided to crack open my Bloom again. So, it's been a while. how far does this dialogue go until Glaucon gives up? I just finished Book VII and I'm wondering if this is gonna go on and on.
>"You will no longer be able to follow, my dear Glaucon," I said, "although there wouldn't be any lack of eagerness on my part. But you would no longer be seeing an image of what we are saying, but rather the truth itself, at least as it looks to me. Whether it is really so or not can no longer be properly insisted on. But that there~ is some such thing to see must be insisted on. Isn't it so?"
>"Of course."
>"And, also, that the power of dialectic alone could reveal it to a man experienced in the things we just went through, while it is in no other way possible?"
>"Yes," he said, "it's proper to insist on that too."
I just want to cut to the chase because I know this can go on for multiple books.

Also, as I was finishing up Book VII, I noticed for the first time that it seems like "dialectic" is more than just a conversation, an ordered exchange, etc., like we see in the dialogues, but rather an entire worldview, from the highest principles to the lowest particulars and back up again, relating everything to everything. Allow me a quick detour to Heidegger's infamous etymology of legein-legen. Heidegger argues that logos is derived from legein, to gather, (which is true), which he believes shares the connected etymology as the German word legen, which is to lay or place (a little bit dubious... I don't know my PIE reconstruction but they look kind of similar on Wiktionary to my untrained eye? seems like a big stretch lol). But anyway, take away "active Greek, passive German."

So, on one hand, we have Heidegger performing some nice mythological German nationalism, where German is somehow turns out to be the perfect receptacle for Greek thought (lol, extreme Philhellenistic cosmic autism). But what's more important is that Heidegger returns our attention to the "gathering" of the hyperuranion forms in Phaedrus as the end of the intellect. It's funny that Heidegger focuses so much on "dialectic", when it's broken down, it has two roots:
>dia-, across... through... etc.
>légomai-->legein (!!!)
>legein-, to order, arrange, gather, choose, count, reckon, say, speak, call, name
This has given me a far greater appreciation for what Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Peirce, etc., were trying to do in their attempts to understand the nature of reason while building architectonic systems (especially the latter two).

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 10 07:24:37 2022 No.20814770 Are you guys academics? How do you know alls this shit?

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 10 07:52:07 2022 No.20814845 >>20814770 There's this little thing called reading books.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 10 07:56:08 2022 No.20814854 >>20814845 Doesn’t answer my first question.

Anonymous Wed Aug 10 09:35:02 2022 No.20815004
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>>20814490
Dialectic for Plato and Aristotle starts with doxa or endoxa arrived at through aisthesis and empeiria and works to the sources with dianoia and nous, then from the sources to the sensible.

I think dialegomai is distinct from dialego by being middle voice and definitely meaning speech, conversation rather than just picking out. Also fun fact, Kant, whose modus operandi is the furthest from both dialog and dialectic (which is a disparaging term for him) regarded Plato as a Schwärmer.

"Plato der Akademiker ward also, obzwar ohne seine Schuld (denn er gebrauchte seine intellectuellen Anschauungen nur rückwärts, zum Erklären der Möglichkeit eines synthetischen Erkenntnisses a priori, nicht vorwärts, um es durch jene im göttlichen Verstande lesbare Ideen zu erweitern), der Vater aller Schwärmerei mit der Philosophie. Ich möchte aber nicht gern den (neuerlich ins Deutsche übersetzten) Plato den Briefsteller mit dem ersteren vermengen. Dieser will außer "den vier zur Erkenntniß gehörigen Dingen, dem Namen des Gegenstandes, der Beschreibung, der Darstellung und der Wissenschaft, noch ein fünftes [ Rad am Wagen ], nämlich noch den Gegenstand selbst und sein wahres Sein." - "Dieses unveränderliche Wesen, das sich nur in der Seele und durch die Seele anschauen läßt, in dieser aber wie von einem springenden Funken Feuers sich von selbst ein Licht anzündet, will er [ als exaltirter Philosoph ] ergriffen haben; von welchem man gleichwohl nicht reden könne, weil man sofort seiner Unwissenheit überführt werden würde, am wenigsten zum Volk: weil jeder Versuch dieser Art schon gefährlich sein würde, theils dadurch daß diese hohen Wahrheiten einer plumpen Verachtung ausgesetzt, theils [ was hier das einzige Vernünftige ist ] da die Seele zu leeren Hoffnungen und zum eiteln Wahn der Kenntniß großer Geheimnisse gespannt werden dürfte."
Wer sieht hier nicht den Mystagogen, der nicht bloß für sich schwärmt, sondern zugleich Klubbist ist und, indem er zu seinen Adepten im Gegensatz von dem Volke (worunter alle Uneingeweihte verstanden werden) spricht, mit seiner vorgeblichen Philosophie vornehm thut!"

Here he refers to Plato's Seventh Letter while imagining he could not have written something that causes Kant to seethe so much.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 10 10:10:52 2022 No.20815048 Is methexis anon in this thread?

Anonymous Wed Aug 10 10:15:27 2022 No.20815055

>>20814490
>>20815004
There's a great passage in Xenophon's Memorabilia about dialegesthai and dialegein:

>And he said that in this manner men become best and happiest as well as most able to converse. And he said also that conversing (dialegesthai) was named from the collective deliberation of those who come together and separate (diaiegein) the things according to class; and that one should accordingly try to prepare oneself as much as possible to be ready for this and attend to this most; for from this men become best and most fit for leading as well as most skilled in conversing. (Book 4, chapter 5)

Anonymous Wed Aug 10 10:36:50 2022 No.20815089

>>20813399
Yo OP, I was the anon in that thread who brought up the poetic influences on the Republic.

Re: poetry, I suppose the two areas I would look to are the Apology and Symposium. In the Apology, when Socrates is giving the rundown on the Oracle story, he mentions questioning the poets, and the result he comes away with (if I'm remembering right) is that they happen to say many beautiful and true things, but lack any account of how. The alternative seems to be the first of the three teachings of Diotima about Eros, where she gives a mythical (so poetical) genealogy of Eros as the child of Resource and Poverty. Which might go pointing towards the difference between philosopher and poet being that the philosopher has something firmly in mind and uses poetry on a rhetorical level. On the other hand, Protagoras (in the dialogue of his name) and Socrates (in the Theaetetus) both suggest this is what the greatest poets *already do*, so maybe one is supposed to wonder how great the real difference is between philosophy and a certain kind of poetry (and this is exacerbated in the Phaedo when Socrates claims that he's going to sing his interlocutors songs and incantations; i.e., the *arguments* are somehow poetical).

(A great point of comparison is Sophist and Statesman, where Socratic philosophy appears as "noble sophistry" in the former, and the latter's talk of weaving, which suggests the philosopher-statesman is closer to the poets than he'd let on).

The math issue is interesting, but much more of an involved thing to address, precisely because you have different classes of mathematical orientation--that which Pythagoreans like Timaeus, Simmias, Cebes stand for, and the non-Pythagorean mathematicians like Theodorus, Theaetetus, young Socrates (Theaetetus's friend, not our Socrates). The mathematics in the Republic is interesting in seeming to depart somewhat from, at least some, accounts of Pythagoreanism as identifying math and Being, whereas in the Republic, math is training, with maybe the most significant exception being the nuptial number.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 10 14:51:19 2022 No.20815858 bump

>>	A Pneumatic !Yk65a4/uHI Wed Aug 10 14:54:29 2022 No.20815871 The code of Reality can be described mathematically but this enterprise has not been truly undertaken yet. The struggle to formulate a physical Theory of Everything is cognate to this philosophical struggle

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 10 15:01:49 2022 No.20815889 >>20814770 I just finished my liberal arts undergrad degree, and I spent a lot of time reading Strauss, Heidegger, random /lit/ books, and a ton of academic papers during lockdown.

Anonymous Wed Aug 10 15:05:04 2022 No.20815899

>>20815004
Plato could rip Kant in half, physically and intellectually. Plato was a multiple time pankratis champion in his day, so he was both the savage man and the enlightened man of Rousseau. Kant was a manlet who never left his home city. Of course he'd whine about Plato's "extremism."

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 10 15:15:26 2022 No.20815938 >>20814357 I don't have a shot.

Anonymous Wed Aug 10 15:30:40 2022 No.20815995

>>20815938
Do you have a hunch about Pythagoras? In the Republic, Athenians like Glaucon seem to view Pythagoras as a little bit of a kook, especially after his namesake's theorem was discovered. Their distaste of lines whose lengths were irrational was widely known.

Anonymous Wed Aug 10 17:29:20 2022 No.20816468

>>20815089
>Socrates is giving the rundown on the Oracle story, he mentions questioning the poets, and the result he comes away with (if I'm remembering right) is that they happen to say many beautiful and true things, but lack any account of how.
I wonder why Socrates claims that they're true, in addition to the fact that they're beautiful. I also wonder how the account would be substantiated. Through mathematics? Through dialectic? Through history? On faith?

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 10 18:35:57 2022 No.20816797 >>20815889 What are good essay topics for a 5000 word essay on Hide-egger? if you don’t mind telling?

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 10 20:52:53 2022 No.20817422 bump >>20815089 Have you had the time to check out the two commentaries on Heidegger's reading of Plato and Aristotle?

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 10 23:22:27 2022 No.20818158 bump

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 11 02:13:47 2022 No.20818907 english is not receptive of philosophy and poetry.

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 11 04:14:10 2022 No.20819334 ride-nigger

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 11 05:55:38 2022 No.20819597 >>20818907 you're a genius

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 11 06:00:39 2022 No.20819605 >>20819597 german isn’t either.

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 11 10:03:44 2022 No.20820125 >>20817422 I haven't yet, but glancing at the second one, I'm looking forward to it, Klein and Lachterman's writings on mathematics are incredible.

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 11 13:53:31 2022 No.20820781 >>20819605 you're a god among men

Anonymous Thu Aug 11 14:06:35 2022 No.20820808

Spengler was right about the Germans and the Greeks, and coincidentally about philosophy of his time. Any philosophy which supposed an unbroken chain of assumptions beginning with Plato is wrong. He should’ve dedicated 10 years to William of Ockham instead of Aristotle.

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 11 14:19:12 2022 No.20820862 >>20820808 Heidegger studied Duns Scotus and much of the Scholastics when he was in Catholic seminary.

Anonymous Thu Aug 11 15:22:14 2022 No.20821094
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>>20813399
>>20813723
>>20814309
>>20814490
>>20815089
I wish this thread got a little bit more engagement. I will try to be the change I wish to see.

Basically, what Heidegger is complaining about is the fact that, through mathematics, the world has been straightened out to the point of sterilization. The possibility of new, genuine forms of life, new possibilities of Being, new visions of the future, etc. has been eradicated, leading to one where everything is subsumed to the forces of production, the world reduced to a mere collection of resources to be exploited. For what greater purpose? Nobody can tell. Building on this critique, Heidegger argues that post-Cartesian mathematics is devoid of directionality, intention, perspective, etc., instead viewing the world as a space to be "objectively" dissected, catalogued, and then exploited. Without a sense of direction, the question of "what for" is never answered, and we become slaves to technology instead of technology being subsumed for the greater flourishing of Being.

This is where the conflict between poetry (and I think this is meant in the broadest sense, the arts in general) and mathematics becomes most clear. For Heidegger, and I suspect for Plato, poetry is seen as something cthonic, something that can be chaotic and uncertain, sprouting from the ground and flowering in full bloom for higher reasons that we can only speculate about, inspiring others and providing needed vision, direction, and meaning. If you wanted to tie this to other social commentary, somebody like Mark Fisher comes to mind immediately with his complaints about the degradation of art and its consequences for the future in "Capitalist Realism."

Plato is conflicted, for some of these visions are true, beautiful, yet reckless, yet Heidegger longs for the days when we were captivated by these visions, seeing it as an authentic mode of life that we have lost today thanks to Cartesian speculation and the foolishness of thinking that an "objective" way of thinking can be imbibed. For me, I only wish there was a way to reconcile these two views, which I think Plato may have attempted, but is otherwise completely lost on the moderns and postmoderns.

Anonymous Thu Aug 11 15:38:16 2022 No.20821162

>>20813399
Coincidentally I was just reading Land's essay on Heidegger's essay on Trakl (later to become a chapter in On the Way to Language), entitled Narcissism and Dispersion:
>Platonic-Christian culture has made it not only possible, but also imperative, to think of poetry as the product of a poet, and, derivatively, as something to be 'used' by a philosopher for the purpose of illustrating representational concepts. It is this tradition which directs us to ask about the usefulness and representational adequacy of Heidegger's essay. Such questions are symptoms of a profound and positively constituted illiteracy, whose hegemony it has been the intellectual task of the (post-)modern age to question.
>Heidegger's readings of poetry are perhaps most distinctively characterized by the refusal to participate affirmatively in the discourse of European aesthetics, and the associated project of rigorously bracketing subject-object epistemological categories. He argues that when the categories of aesthetics are carried into the domain of linguistics or other varieties of language study they take the form of a distinction between a normal and a meta-language. The minimal notion of meta-language is a technical terminology which is distinctive to the critical or interpretative text. This terminology traces an ancestry for itself that is divergent in principle from that of the texts to which it is 'applied'. The kinship of 'thinker' and 'poet' is annihilated. At variance to this sedimenting of metaphysics, Heidegger pursues a tendency towards the uttermost erasure of terminological distinctiveness. The language of poetry is not to be translated, but simply guided into a relationship with itself.

Haven't finished it yet but from the cited fragments it seems quite worthwhile to get a copy (+ translation) of Trakl's work.

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 11 16:06:22 2022 No.20821278 >>20820862 And?

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 11 16:09:44 2022 No.20821295 >>20821094 Completely lost on Heidegger too. And what art did his philosophy inspire or clear the way for…? Heidegger is failed and romantic thought in my mind, just like Nietzsche. It can’t actually create art at all and is in fact anti-art the same.

Anonymous Thu Aug 11 16:56:36 2022 No.20821464

>>20821295
>Heidegger is failed and romantic thought in my mind, just like Nietzsche.
I agree. Heidegger joins a long list of reactionary thinkers who can glimpse the horrors the lay before us, but have no real solution to overcome what we have to face collectively. Instead, he simply wants to slay the metaphorical serpent and return to simpler times instead of sublating the serpent and making it work for greater cosmic flourishing. Unfortunately, once Pandora's box has been opened, there's no going back, so these kinds of efforts seem to be futile. Also, with Heidegger's embrace of the irrational, cthonic elements of life, he has so much in common with what many reactionary Western thinkers would have labeled as progressive, leftist, etc., today that it's unreal. The New Leftist-Paleoconservative pipeline strikes incredibly true (as someone who went down that path until I started taking philosophy seriously). I read a fantastic article the other day, titled:
>Martin Heidegger's Aristotelian National Socialism (kek, sounds based AF not gonna lie)
>https://philosophy.fsu.edu/sites/g/files/imported/storage/original/application/79c865a4f243630375e1da11fcf92baf.pdf
which lays a few of Heidegger's blind spots bare for the world to see, namely the fanatical belief in what, ironically, amounts to a philosopher-king, except that philosopher-king's phronesis is guided by "Being", a form of instinct, instead of sophia (which he considers to be instinctual). I don't think Heidegger ultimately finds a new grounding for a groundless, seemingly meaningless existence, and his attempt to eradicate the "metaphysics of presence" ends up being completely futile by his own accord (Only a God can Save Us).

I do admire Heidegger's contribution to philosophy, however. That cthonic, irrational, rustic, and dare I say, "natural" element of the world that Heidegger zeros in on with the question of Being is what offers us new possibilities, new visions, new directions, etc. A way of traversing the Cartesian landscape of coordinates with a set beginning, end, and (perhaps) incorporating into the cosmic orchestra. How do we come to terms with it? Can we control it? How do we control it through... not trying to control it? It seems as if we have no choice but to control. Philosophy, and society at large, seems to have forgotten about how to reconcile with nature in a profound way, to create distances between ourselves that allow for new experiments, new modes of life, etc., to flourish (really pressing in the age of the internet, where space and time have been almost eradicated, made instantaneous). It's these elements that the certainty-obsessed perspective of technology, cities, and civilization extinguish. Even weirder, we somehow managed to create a society where the possibilities are endless, and the judgments are ever-so-weak (good-bye traditional morality), yet the culture still manages to be sterile, amounting to no exploration and thus providing no fruit.

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 11 16:57:47 2022 No.20821468 >>20821278 Dun Scotus is the middle ground between realism and nominalism.

A Pneumatic xEahKcTNZQ Thu Aug 11 18:59:44 2022 No.20822002

>>20821464
>Heidegger joins a long list of reactionary thinkers who can glimpse the horrors the lay before us, but have no real solution to overcome what we have to face collectively.
Man, is there anyone who does have a solution? Even a no perfect one, but something to get the ball rolling in terms of even mere thinking?

Anonymous Thu Aug 11 19:10:53 2022 No.20822049

>>20822002
I know you hate Christianity, but unironically the Bible. I'm doing my best to cope around for maybe a few more days before I finally surrender. And trust me, I've been around the block. I don't say this lightly, or even out of a sense of defeat.

>>	A Pneumatic xEahKcTNzQ Thu Aug 11 19:21:52 2022 No.20822094 >>20822049 I don’t hate Christianity, I just love Asian, African, and Ossetian cum too much.

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 11 19:28:19 2022 No.20822130 >>20822094 Sounds like a personal problem to me. I personally don't see where Christianity and other traditions can't be reconciled, though mere syncretism should be avoided if it dilutes the truth. Have you read Christ The Eternal Tao?

A Pneumatic xEahKcTNzQ Thu Aug 11 19:31:35 2022 No.20822149

>>20822130
I read like 12 pages in, then got horny as my mind drifted to thinking of Wesley Snipes and Vince Vaughn tag teaming me, and came all over the book, rendering it under readable, no matter how much I tried to lick the cum off. Now I’m too broke for a new copy and I don’t like pdfs, since it makes porn too ready-at-hand using the computer.

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 11 19:37:22 2022 No.20822177 >>20822149 It's a damn shame. I hope you will find chastity soon.

>>	A Pneumatic xEahKcTNzQ Thu Aug 11 19:38:35 2022 No.20822184 >>20822177 Do not hope for this. I participate in the form of A Pneumatic !xEahKcTNzQ, and my essence is being a gay retard.

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 11 19:41:39 2022 No.20822203 >>20822184 kek I see you're not the real tripfag. Carry on!

>>	A Pneumatic xEahKcTNzQ Thu Aug 11 19:43:49 2022 No.20822212 >>20822203 But I am the real tripfag, and most certainly am a fag. I participate in the form of the tripfag. We are one in the Nous.

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 11 22:14:39 2022 No.20822856 >>20822212 >we are nous I feel like Frenchfags get a kick out of that one

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 11 23:21:40 2022 No.20823140 >>20821094 >>20821464 bump, hoping for more engagement

Anonymous Thu Aug 11 23:34:41 2022 No.20823186

>>20813399
Slightly off topic but I'm reading Cratylus right now and I'm getting the impression that Plato is mocking etymology. I think this because of his constant references to Euthythro while saying things that to me sound like plausible but unprovable assertions. The foreword says the conclusion of the book is that the ultimate source of names doesn't really matter, but it doesn't mention hostility to the practice. In fact it claims he does this to build up his credibility. Am I seeing shit that isn't there or is there something I'm missing here?

Anonymous Thu Aug 11 23:57:13 2022 No.20823251

>>20823186
Well, that's more support for the thesis that Euthyphro is an ironic name. He does not seem to be a straight-thinker whatsoever. But the idea that entire societies could adopt ironic words for simple tasks that reflect one's interaction with the world is far-fetched. The source certainly does matter, at least in context. I don't know about you, but whenever I'm confused about a word's deeper philosophical meaning, I check its etymology out on Wiktionary, and 9/10 I'm always given additional clarity or at least some food for thought. I used to think it was a pseud tactic but that was because I gave up on the prospect of meaning being "objective" in any sense. Now, I don't have a kneejerk reaction against the idea and I consider it on its own merits.

Finally, IIRC, I think Plato takes a "moderate realist" attitude towards names, in that names mean something but they have an expiration date, much like living beings who become too old to be of much use. That dovetails well with how Heidegger frames language as "the house of Being", as finitude is a concern for language, or at least anybody who uses it, much like any other living creature. The idea that language is real but living also seems to strike at both hardcore prescriptivists (who want no change, no new possibilities) and the descriptivist (who want a groundless ground until it is all meaningless). I might be rambling a little bit too much, just some thoughts I had.

Words aren't too off-topic. After all, poetry is all about words and is often linked with nature. And now we have the idea that words themselves are living in some sense, with intentionality. Thanks for sharing.

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 12 02:09:22 2022 No.20823737 bump

Anonymous Fri Aug 12 03:24:18 2022 No.20824037

Thank you for the great thread. I want to return to this to contriubte more properly. But the discussion of plato and heidegger is critical. Reading Heidegger's contributions we see that it centers on the platonic theory of forms, the Idea, and the circulation of Being and Beings. Critically, heidegger suggests through his reading of the cave that plato substitutes the look of something for the letting be of a thing. This begins the platonic mistake and the forgetting of being (among other things)...

Plato scholarship of course disputes this with the idea of the Chora (for ex in the Timmeaus) John Sallis is good on this. The Chora serves as the receptacle of the forms or in heideggerian language, the 'da' of 'da-sein' here likely is the most fruitful and possible encounter between the two. Heidegger I believe misreads Plato, but not in a way that would suggest Heidegger is wrong. Rather we are challenged to bring out that which is most heideggerian within plato, that is to say to bring out what approaches us today within Plato. Here we may be required to put down the republic and pickup the phaedrus and the sophist.
Heidegger and mathematics there is much to be said. I would simply suggest that we link the disucussion to heidegger's understanding of technology. Any sort of rationalistic supposing as to the nature of a thing (deriving it mathematically) would be a failure as seen by heidegger. Math itself though the issue is more complicated... anyways I must go but thank you for this thread

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 12 05:14:43 2022 No.20824365 only good thread on this board, maybe even this whole site

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 12 10:43:45 2022 No.20825138 bump

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 12 11:16:31 2022 No.20825240 Wait, what precisely is the issue at stake ITT? Plato, Heidegger, and their respective opinions on mathematics vs. poetry? Why is the relation between these two fields a problem at all?

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 12 11:18:32 2022 No.20825250 >>20825240 What's true at all? The arts or mathematics?

Anonymous Fri Aug 12 11:23:31 2022 No.20825266

>>20813399
>But with Plato and beyond, mathematics becomes THE self-grounding mode of Being, the pathway to glimpse at the realm of the forms, laying the grounds for foundations for Western civilization to be engrossed in the world of technique. Cthonic poetry is stifled in the quest for technocratic efficiency.
Gay false dichotomy. You need both art and mathematics. OP is a fag

Anonymous Fri Aug 12 11:26:50 2022 No.20825274

>>20821295
The more I thought about his concept of dasein, the more I thought the definition was structurally another way of saying that you couldn't study any particular person, place, or thing without also studying its time period and environment in which they lived. As in, you cannot study a subject out of its proper historical context without risking simulacra and appropriation.

Anonymous Fri Aug 12 13:44:20 2022 No.20825656

>>20825266
The issue is figuring out what is prior. Because they're in conflict. Look, I want to embrace both. But eventually they come into conflict. There's a deeper current of thought dealing with man's relationship to nature, the divine, free will, beauty, Apollonian vs. Dionysian, etc., here that you're neglecting.

Anonymous Fri Aug 12 14:17:27 2022 No.20825754

>>20825656
They're not. Even someone like Stanley Rosen who says it's philosophy vs poetry is wrong. Poetry is not trying to 'ground' things, he's really talking about shit like late Heidegger's poor wordplay, antirealism like Nelson Goodman's, Rorty's limp liberal pragmatism. No poet or poetry is cited as competing with philosophy. He also thinks philosophy must have some notion of knowing that is not mathematical either. That makes sense. But mathematics, poetry and philosophy are not in conflict in the sense of making rival truth claims or even doing the same things. They make claims on us or call to us possibilities of the good, the true, the beautiful, and we cannot do everything at once or live forever. The conflict is in us. I would suggest negative capability is something philosophers stand in need of.

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 12 14:22:50 2022 No.20825774 >>20821094 Good post. Have a bump anon, my friend.

Anonymous Fri Aug 12 14:37:06 2022 No.20825809
File: 221 KB, 706x1051, Tree_of_Life_Lightning_777.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]

>>20825754
I feel like you aren't getting to the root of the issue. The two essays I linked in the OP and the first post and the additional posts I've made clarifying the problems make the conflict clear, I think. And if you think nobody is trying to say that poetry competes with philosophy, then you must have completely ignored the countless dialogues where Plato grapples with poetry and can't seem to decide whether they're true, beautiful, dangerous, divinely-inspired, illusory, irrational, etc., all the while adopting his own poetic approach to philosophical writing just to cover his own bases. And if you really, REALLY, dive into this subject, then you find yourself squaring with revelation, which can be said to be the ultimate form of poetry and is frequently thought of as such by religion. The tension between philosophy and poetry, poetry and mathematics, etc., is much more real than you are giving it credit for.

Ultimately, it boils down to two metaphysical differences. Poetry belongs to the realm of becoming. Mathematics belongs to the realm of being. Poetry brings forth new possibilities more so than mathematics. It literally springs from the earth and provides direction and intention. Mathematics evaluates them, locks them into place, and sees them to their end. It comes down from the heavens and see things as they are objectively. They are two different ways of thinking that make claims to truth, beauty, etc., that can't seem to live apart from each other, yet cannot easily live harmoniously together either. The dichotomy is clear, too. Once you've decided upon a possibility, you have to close out other possibilities and see it to its end, lest you remain in aporia your entire life. And to remain indecisive is to not live at all. Yet one cannot close themselves off to new possibilities because we are naturally infallible. If you have a way of solving this perennial philosophical problem, you tell me. But for now, I can't think of a better reconciliation than meditating on the possibility of cultivating a Daoist-like intuition for mediating between the two.

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 12 14:58:45 2022 No.20825886 This is a cool thread. I want to contribute my intuition about the subject but I dont want to be the one to bring down the quality, so I bump instead.

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 12 15:00:58 2022 No.20825895 >>20825886 Feel free to chime in with your thoughts anon. I care more about freshness if anything.

Anonymous Fri Aug 12 15:17:02 2022 No.20825965

>>20825895
In reading through the essay posted Im starting to get the feeling that "mathematics" and "poetry" have different meanings than what I would usually intuit. I would like to put forth what I think is meant by these terms in the context of this discussion and have them verified before I start rambling about something completely different by accident. what I think the meaning is in this context is:
mathematics: insight gathered through logical evaluation of information revealed from within (esoterically), represented in the language of numbers
poetry: insight gathered through the evaluation of information revealed from without (exoteric), represented in symbolic language or myth
are these definitions even close or did I miss the mark entirely?

Anonymous Fri Aug 12 15:18:28 2022 No.20825975

>>20825809
That's not how I see it. Revelation may be the root of poetry, I wouldn't call it the ultimate form of the latter. Mathematics opens up what is common and poetry does as well. Philosophy must wait for them. Poetry doesn't literally spring from the earth. Plato did not write a single treatise as you note. No one would say mathematics sees the whole of things. As you say we are naturally fallible. We must also take a stand. Philosophers can find this very hard to reconcile. Doesn't that suggest listening to other guides?

Anonymous Fri Aug 12 15:24:23 2022 No.20826000

>>20825975
>Poetry doesn't literally spring from the earth.
Poetry always has a particular form, a snapshot of a certain time, place, mood, ambience, story, etc. Mathematics is universal.
>Doesn't that suggest listening to other guides?
What other guides do you suggest?

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 12 15:29:33 2022 No.20826024 >>20825975 >Poetry doesn't literally spring from the earth. of course not. only springs do. The part of the transcendental or the truth that can only be expressed in poetry is real and there to be seen. in that sense it is poetry in nature.

Anonymous Fri Aug 12 15:46:40 2022 No.20826117

>>20826000
I just meant it doesn't spring without our cooperation. Sometimes painful, sometimes not. Other guides could be the poets, daoists as you said, teachers of spiritual discipline, mystics, magicians, those who open up what is common by not ignoring the personal, the "arbitrary", as if reason were not also personal, as when Aristotle says nous seems most of all to be the person--what could he mean?
I have to sleep now.

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 12 16:30:26 2022 No.20826321 >>20826117 >when Aristotle says nous seems most of all to be the person--what could he mean? wait, before you go to sleep, where can I read more about this? I must have missed this in Nicomachean Ethics

Anonymous Fri Aug 12 19:13:17 2022 No.20827226

>>20825965
I always felt that poetry was more esoteric due to its metaphorical, contextual, and layered nature, while mathematics is quite explicit as long as you have the brainpower to handle it. but then there's the consideration of the metaphysics of mathematics where things get interesting, the perennial question of the one and the many as referenced in these posts:
>>20813723
>>20814309

Anonymous Fri Aug 12 20:10:14 2022 No.20827551

>>20827226
I meant esoteric (the hidden interior) and exoteric (the hidden exterior) in terms of the truths they investigate. They both can be esoteric in their own way (just look at the mathematics for quantum physics and all the different, conflicting interpretations seem to fit that mathematical model). they point to something but they dont describe the real thing (if there is something). mathematics being something that seems to us more concrete is a symptom of it being our method of describing the the world in terms of the microcosm (what is within our power to measure) where poetry is more obscure and intangible because it describes the world in terms of the macrocosm (or at least to the best of our abilities with the restriction of language. the real poetry is the thing in the world that invokes the poet to write. the sublime maybe). if you believe that there is nothing in the macrocosm that isnt also in the microcosm, what mathematics points at and what poetry points at are the same transcendental truths. though neither are complete descriptions (one must ask themselves "are we even capable of knowing the while truth") but if one wants to get as close to those truths as is possible, one must try to reconcile both, or at least attempt to unify them. At least that is what I intuit from my background which is based more in bits physics, poetry and theosophy than philosophy. something Im working on changing.

Anonymous Fri Aug 12 20:44:14 2022 No.20827765

>>20827551
>poetry (macrocosm, intangible)
>mathematics (microcosm, measurable)
>if you believe that there is nothing in the macrocosm that isnt also in the microcosm, what mathematics points at and what poetry points at are the same transcendental truths.
That's a great distinction. I have a hunch that, for some reason, "perfect" poetry seems more complete than mathematics in terms of goodness in the sense that it is alive and instantiated. Mathematics can only be the structure. Poetry has the structure (which makes it good) and the flesh (which makes it immanent). So, in some strange sense, I can't help but think that the best poetry is superior to the best mathematics, as the best mathematics would still be "sterile" in some way. So, I tentatively believe that the macrocosm is superior to the microcosm. I don't know what that means, but I will have to think about it some more after I take a nap.

Anonymous Fri Aug 12 21:06:11 2022 No.20827893

>>20827765
>poetry (macrocosm, intangible)
not quite. It is tangible to our experience of it. the only true poetry is the experience that compels the poet to attempt to communicate that experience (the attempt to recreate it is imperfect in itself because communication limitations). Id rather use the term immeasurable. the intangible is the thing that is being pointed at by both mathematics and poetry. Im not sure what you mean by sterile in terms of mathematics but if it is in reference to it being somehow inferior I think that is a mistake of our tendency to find mystery more appealing. But Im not going to try to defend which is better, as I said earlier you need to look at both to get closest to the truth. I will say that I think mathematics is less limited by communication. once you know the language you can recreate the phinomina it talks about, where as with poetry it relies on the skill of the person who had the experience to communicate that experience to you effectively. its much easier to calculate how far a ball will be shot from a canon when someone gives you the formula than it is to feel what walt whitman felt when he wrote oh captain my captain.

>>	Anonymous Sat Aug 13 00:20:23 2022 No.20828743 bump

>>	Anonymous Sat Aug 13 00:50:29 2022 No.20828902 >>20813399 >poeisis What does the Noble Lie instantiate, and to what end?

>>	Anonymous Sat Aug 13 01:45:44 2022 No.20829135 >>20826321 1166a20 1168b30-1169a 1178a5

>>	Anonymous Sat Aug 13 03:59:04 2022 No.20829773 bump

Anonymous Sat Aug 13 05:12:48 2022 No.20829994

>>20827893
>Im not sure what you mean by sterile in terms of mathematics but if it is in reference to it being somehow inferior I think that is a mistake of our tendency to find mystery more appealing
It's more about the idea that mathematics represents the path understanding eternal truths, from which we are to judge art such as poetry. But eternal truths are just that, they're eternal, unchanging. When you're stuck with a mathematical mindset, you have no new opportunities, no new hypotheses, no new hunches, no intentionality, no imagination. Is there a way out? I'll have to return to >>20814309 later when I have the time, but it's where Aristotle betrays that the being of each number has a certain "quality" to it that goes beyond its quantity. Quality offers a linking path from mathematics back to poetry, which is the king of qualia. Very very rudimentary, very difficult problem to solve, but such is the way of being vs. becoming.

>>	Anonymous Sat Aug 13 07:10:45 2022 No.20830236 >>20829994 (>>20826117) here. You may want to look into the Theology of Arithmetic (pseudo-Iamblichus), Nicomachus, and such.

Anonymous Sat Aug 13 11:14:29 2022 No.20830739

>>20829994
>each number has a certain "quality" to it that goes beyond its quantity. Quality offers a linking path from mathematics back to poetry, which is the king of qualia.
I was thinking about this too and I agree, mathematics means nothing unless you cane attach a phenomena to it which we do using poetry. for example in the statement "a^2 + b^2 = c^2 is the formula that explains the ratio of the length of the sides of a right triangle." a^2 + b^2 = c^2 is the mathematics but the phenomena is "the ratio of lengths of the sides of a right triangle" which is suggested in poetry. without the last part the formula is just numbers, but that is only WHEN WE COMMUNICATE THEM (caps for emphasis). There is still phenomena to the numbers. there is still something that is "to be" three of something. I would argue that the truth of the mater is that both poetry and mathematics speak to the same kind of fixed phenomena, and that poetry is both strengthened by its ability to have manifold meaning but is stunted by its ability to actually communicate the phenomena and mathematics has its downside in its rigid meaning but its upside in being able to communicate the phenomena and thus poetry and mathematics are complementary when pointing at the same thing.
>mathematics represents the path understanding eternal truths, from which we are to judge art such as poetry. But eternal truths are just that, they're eternal, unchanging. When you're stuck with a mathematical mindset, you have no new opportunities, no new hypotheses, no new hunches, no intentionality, no imagination. Is there a way out?
I think there could be an interesting partial differential equation here in which the variables are mathematics and poetry. where when our understanding of poetry increases ideas about our reality increase which lead to new mathematics that ground us and reduce the amount of poetry to the point where the lack of poetry leads to fewer and fewer ideas about our reality which leads to our mathematical inquiries yielding less and less until we are back at mostly poetic thinking which then increases until we have new ideas about the universe and starts the upswing again. all set equal to a constant, which I think we would call the fixed truths about the universe (as far as we experience them anyway).

Anonymous Sat Aug 13 14:13:22 2022 No.20831242
File: 18 KB, 600x326, Peirce.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]

>>20813399
Firstness: Poetry (it's abductive)
Secondness: Mathematics (it's deductive)
Thirdness: Habits, Meaning, Continuity, Narrative, Symbolism, History, etc. (it's inductive, evolutionary, but prone to revision)
>https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/guess/guess.htm
>https://www.jstor.org/stable/40319861?read-now=1 (free w/ account)
>https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/1370

Anonymous Sat Aug 13 15:37:28 2022 No.20831542

>>20825240
Broadly speaking, science, which has culminated in mathematics, has been in a sort of tension with art, the result of which is a dichotomy between the two. The primary reason for this is that art and science have been generally seen to be the two most important sources to draw knowledge from, that being the techniques of science and that of art (Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy would be a good insight here). In its modern configuration, mathematics, thus science, excludes art from being a potential source of knowledge, as the methods of the artist lack what gives the scientist its validity (so says the scientist).

Science's singular claim to the truth is one issue here, and the reaction to this claim has been detrimental as well, that being the claim that science has no claim to truth (some variants of post-structuralism). Regardless, this is an extremely simplified perspective on the question though.

Anonymous Sat Aug 13 16:12:31 2022 No.20831665

Very interesting paper, somewhat related.
>Heidegger relies on Kant’s use of space and time to solve the problem of schematism in the first critique as a way to demonstrate the essentiality of time to both intuition and imagination. The problem of the divide between the transcendental unity of apperception and the thing in itself is solved in Kant by relying on space and time to connect the thing in itself to the categories under which it must be brought to become thinkable. This argument is used by Heidegger to show that time is prior to space, because space is merely a map for intuitions. Time, on the other hand, has a preeminence as the universal intuition that is the foundational element of pure knowledge. The essence of his argument is that it is possible to have an experience that lacks any spatial reference, but it is not possible to have an experience that lacks a temporal context. Space can only provide “the totality of those relations according to which what is encountered in the external sense would be ordered,” that can only be understood as presented within the ordering into succession of time (Heidegger, 1990: 32). Heidegger is then able to demonstrate that there are appearances within the “inner sense” which lack any spatial30 reference but contain elements of temporal succession, such as the all important moods. He argues that it is not possible to likewise conceive of a spatial appearance outside of time, claiming that “time has a preeminence over space. As universal, pure intuition, it [time] must for this reason become the guiding and supporting essential element of pure knowledge, of the transcendence which forms knowledge”(Heidegger, 1990: 32). Dasein is then capable of transcending itself as it stands beyond itself into the world around it which is the very same world from which its identity cannot be severed.
>>20831242
Goes well with Peirce's revision of Kant's categories and critique of pure reason by deconstructing space (attacking sensible intuitions) but positing some ultimate intuition (Peirce's concession about the necessity for some il lume naturale). Heidegger's emphasis productive imagination in revising Kant's categories also matches well with Peirce's firstness, especially musement and abductive reasoning. I wonder how Heidegger would have reacted to Peirce's synechism though.

>>	Anonymous Sat Aug 13 16:13:32 2022 No.20831667 >>20831665 https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4932&context=gradschool_theses Forgot to link here.

Anonymous Sat Aug 13 19:38:30 2022 No.20832712

>>20831665
My thoughts, which I posted in another thread after reading a critique of Heidegger's categories (space is empirical, but time is still a sensible intuition) from a Kantian scholar.
>Your response reminded me of the recurring theme in Heidegger that spaces/places/etc. have an atmosphere that can't be reduced to its constituent parts, that beings are formed from these spaces, and that every being thus has its place where its existence is authentic. And while I somewhat agree with it... it's a perspective that is tantamount to saying (ironically, I think, given the gist of Heidegger's emphasis on possibilities, confronting Das Man) that "we have captured a particular snapshot of spirit, nothing should change from this snapshot ever for any reason. crush all other possibilities." On one hand, this is a rebellion against the technological society that somehow suffers from a similar dogmatism about possibility. On another hand, when one takes an evolutionary cosmic perspective of millions of years and beyond... our layout of understanding spaces as we know them and their answers to the question of Being become... well... fruitless and irrelevant. Heidegger reminds us about death, but he refuses to consider infinity, and thus we're back to where we started with the fallout of modernity. Heidegger just finds a new way of reconstructing the ancient Great Chain of Being without giving us a perspective that sublates the reasons why we chose to tear all down with the Enlightenment.
And Peirce goes beyond thinking Heidegger in seemingly rejecting the idea of any pinpoint-able sensible intuitions whatsoever. Goes to show that Peirce was way ahead of his time as a postmodern philosopher.

>>	Anonymous Sat Aug 13 21:29:54 2022 No.20833280 >>20813931 not sure, might give it a read myself. thanks for making me aware of this

Anonymous Sat Aug 13 21:36:04 2022 No.20833306

>>20831242
>>20831665
On Heidegger:
>ontic vs. ontological = secondness vs. firstness and thirdness (and higher concerns)
>Kantbuch: prioritizing firstness in phenomenology with his revisiting of
>the turn (attack on metaphysics of presence): prioritizing firstness, rejecting thirdness as necessary for meaning, grounding, possibilities of Being, etc.
It is very interesting how Heidegger attacks thirdness despite the fact that his critique of Kant is predicated on the importance of temporality.

>>	Anonymous Sat Aug 13 23:01:10 2022 No.20833664 >>20833306 Great article that spells it out for people generally familiar with Heidegger's work (Being and Time, Question Concerning Technology, etc.) https://www.beyng.com/papers/HC2019Carman.html

Anonymous Sat Aug 13 23:03:01 2022 No.20833673

>>20833306
>Specifying the precise difference between Heidegger’s views before and after 1936, however, is no simple task. For one thing, it is not obvious that in the 1920s and early ’30s he accepted as possible what I believe he came to reject as incoherent in the late ’30s and thereafter. What he certainly accepted before 1936, and perhaps afterwards too, was the very idea of a totality of entities as such. Indeed, the one thing we can evidently mostly safely say about the sum total of occurrent entities is precisely that it is.5 Further, Heidegger seems to have supposed that human understanding can grasp such a totality – not, to be sure, by possessing complete knowledge of it, but simply by apprehending it in a primitive kind of thought. At a minimum, that is, we have an understanding – and moreover an affective apprehension – of entities as such and as a whole simply by grasping the (admittedly vague) concept everything. Moreover, not only is the very idea of a totality of entities intelligible, but Heidegger also seems to have believed that there is such a totality, at least understood as a sum total of “occurrent” (vorhanden) objects, as opposed to human beings and “available” (zuhanden) cultural artifacts, whose being is constituted by our understanding of them. That is, Heidegger held not only that there is a totality of occurrent entities, but that, unlike Kantian things in themselves, those entities have a determinate causal structure in space and time, a structure that is the way it is independently of us and our ways of making sense of it.
So, after the turn, not only does he critique secondness, or at least what he sees as calcified structures of "this", but he flat out rejects the possibility of understanding secondness and thirdness.

>>	Anonymous Sun Aug 14 00:59:09 2022 No.20834219 damn I guess people don't do philosophy on vthe weekends

>>	Anonymous Sun Aug 14 02:44:08 2022 No.20834660 bump

>>	Anonymous Sun Aug 14 03:02:13 2022 No.20834727 >>20815048 Yes. I'm the OP, actually. And I have some new insights coming up.

Anonymous Sun Aug 14 03:50:01 2022 No.20834942

I don’t want to shit up the thread because it is interesting, but have any of you actually studied any mathematics?

> Mathematics evaluates them, locks them into place, and sees them to their end. It comes down from the heavens and see things as they are objectively

> But eternal truths are just that, they're eternal, unchanging. When you're stuck with a mathematical mindset, you have no new opportunities, no new hypotheses, no new hunches, no intentionality, no imagination. Is there a way out?

Statements like these are detached from the experience of doing mathematics. Choices of definitions, choices of axioms, choices of representation, choices of communication: these are fundamentally imaginative choices. Here is a fun prompt that doesn’t require more background than Google can provide: what would be a fruitful graph theoretic interpretation of a Cauchy sequence look like? Maybe there isn’t one, maybe you can think of one you like. The only way to approach such a question is fundamentally poetic if I am reading some of you posters correctly.

There is no obvious tension here except that many who engage in these discussions have not attempted mathematics and so do not see beyond the veil.

Mathematics is a Geisteswissenschaft.

Anonymous Sun Aug 14 04:02:59 2022 No.20834984

>>20834942
The process requires creativity, I agree. And there are countless ways to get to that end result. So you're right about the process being poetic. But you're confusing the process for the end result. There is no "snapshot" of a particular time, space, context, etc. inherent in the product. Every solution is equal in truth, though they may not be equal in elegance, worthy of being put in what Erdős would have called "the book." But again, the elegance of that finished product is timeless. There's no intentionality in it.

Anonymous Sun Aug 14 04:12:16 2022 No.20835009

>>20834942
Plato's Academy famously had the inscription, "let none who are ignorant of geometry enter." It's clear that for ancient mathematicians, geometry was essentially the prime mathematical science, and all other representations were derivative thereof. This is likely the correct view of mathematics, as it is the substratum which is really unchanging and provides for all contingent superstructures (even those such as non-Euclidean geometry). The modern mathematical apparatus is indeed a veil, it is simply important not to confuse it with the mathematics Plato was familiar with. In fact you should be aware of this if you know of Plato's view of "axioms" as being below (and derived from) the supreme point of knowledge, which is a type of seeing rather than hypothesizing (with mathematical postulates).

Anonymous Sun Aug 14 04:29:49 2022 No.20835069

>>20835009
It's worth pointing out that Heidegger, in his exegesis of Plato and Aristotle and his critique of the Cartesian mode of thinking (deconstructing space as extension), saw geometry as having intentionality, continuity, etc. that arithmetic doesn't have.
>Heidegger then moves on to distinguishing between arithmetic and geometry – the former is concerned with monas, the unit; the latter with stigmé, the point. Monas is related to monon, the unique or the sole, and is indivisible according to quantity. Stigmé is, like monas, indivisible, but unlike monas it has the addition of a thesis – a position, an orientation, an order or arrangement. Monas is athetos, unpositioned; stigmé is thetos, positioned. 12 This addition – this prosthesis – is crucial in under-standing the distinction between arithmetic and geometry. Tantalizingly, Heidegger asks ‘what is the meaning of this thesis which characterizes the point in opposition to the monas?’ He recognizes that a ‘thorough elucidation of this nexus would have to take up the question of place and space’, but at this point can only look at what is necessary to describe mathematics (GA19, 102–4)
>According to Aristotle, above–below, front–back and right–left are crucial to determining a place. But these determinations are not always the same, i.e., though they are absolute within the world, they can also change in relation to people. This change is one of thesis, orientation, and therefore topos is not the same as thesis. Geometrical figures have thesis, they can have a right or a left for us, but they do not occupy a place. 15 Now if geometry does not have a place, what indeed is place? It is only because we perceive motion that we think of place, therefore only what is moveable (kineton) is in a place. Glossing two lines of the Physics, Heidegger contends that ‘place is the limit (Grenze) of the periekon, that which delimits (umgrenzt) a body, not the limit of the body itself, but that which the limit of the body comes up against, in such a way, specifically, that there is between these two limits no interspace, no diastema’. Heidegger admits the difficulty of this determination, saying it requires an absolute orientation of the world. He then quotes lines he will use over forty years later (with a slightly different translation) to preface his essay ‘Art and Space’: ‘It appears that to grasp place in itself is something great and very difficult.’ 16 Heidegger admits a temptation:
to take the extension of the material (die Ausdehnung des Stoffes) or the limit of the form as the place. And equally it is difficult to see place as such, because place does not move, and what is in motion has a privilege in perception (GA19, 106–8).
But... Aristotle takes Plato and gives him a little Indian burn here. >>20814309
Take a minute to read that article here btw: https://progressivegeographies.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/the-place-of-geometry.pdf
It's incredible.

Anonymous Sun Aug 14 04:55:17 2022 No.20835153

>>20834984
Just so I can better understand the point being made here: Is the Bible timeless? Are the works of Shakespeare timeless?

>>20835009

OK, so limit yourself to the mathematics Plato was familiar with, I don’t follow what changes. Look at someone like Proclus writing on the parallel postulate. This type of “seeing” already was leading to a total coming apart of geometry. The act of seeing, and forgive me if I am misappropriating the word here, is already imaginative. Several other geometries are latent in this supreme point of knowledge. Is exploring these potential geometries not imaginative? Is generating poetry not just an exploration of phenomena? I am not following.

As an aside, I am definitely all for geometric foundations wherever and whenever we can find them, but maybe not for reasons Plato would agree with.

>>	Anonymous Sun Aug 14 05:01:59 2022 No.20835170 >>20835153 Well, that's the thing. Poetry is a product of its time, but its ultimate value is also timeless. Mathematics is different in that only its value is timeless, except in the process of doing it.

>>	Anonymous Sun Aug 14 11:48:42 2022 No.20836237 Bump

>>	Anonymous Sun Aug 14 13:44:40 2022 No.20836558 >>20835170 I’m not sure I am reading you correctly, these seem like the same thing. Both processes are products of the time, both end results have timeless value, no?

Anonymous Sun Aug 14 13:53:52 2022 No.20836571

>>20836558
No. I've yet to see much commentary over how such-and-such mathematical proof brings out the voice of the mathematician and his era. And yet the proof is beautiful and timeless. Meanwhile, you have Angloboos like Jorge Luis Borges who loved Beowulf and wanted to recapture the "feel" of being a rustic, baritone Anglo-Saxon bard in its fullest aesthetic glory. See the difference? I'm speaking of solely the end product, and poetic end products are both products of their times yet have timeless value. You can't really say the same about mathematics. Mathematics, in some sense, lacks intentionality.

Anonymous Sun Aug 14 14:49:46 2022 No.20836763

>>20836571
This is just not correct lol. Just look at the 20th century with a really simple lens like “for Bourbaki” and “against Bourbaki” and this claim falls apart. One of you literally just expressed a taste for the geometric in mathematics in light of Plato. People like VI Arnold wanted to recapture the “feel” of rustic, intuitive geometric mathematics in its fullest aesthetic glory.

Anonymous Sun Aug 14 15:18:03 2022 No.20836917

>>20836763
>Bourbaki group
>VI Arnold
And how dominant is this way of thinking today? Why or why not?

By the way, Heidegger argues that geometry has intentionality that post-Cartesian mathematics does not. You should check out that essay I posted earlier. I feel like you'd really like it. >>20813723

>>	Anonymous Sun Aug 14 15:25:23 2022 No.20836953 >>20836917 Which way of thinking? Taking that lens to the 19th century? Or which of these two flavors won out? Or something else? And will read, thank you.

Anonymous Sun Aug 14 15:35:08 2022 No.20837006

>>20836953
It just sounds like to me that the conflict between Bourbaki vs. VI Arnold seems to be about who organizes the mathematics curriculum, the focus of mathematics departments, etc. The objects of mathematics that they are arranging have no independent aesthetic value in themselves. But it is the way they are grouped together and what they are used for which is what gives them additional value in the here and now, e.g. VI Arnold and a "Soviet" way of doing mathematics. There is no such thing as Soviet mathematics though, as the essence of geometrical proofs, classical mechanics problems, etc. are the same everywhere. I think you're sneaking in a human interpretive element into the results when, again, this is more about process. The aesthetic element only seems to return when we draw arbitrary "limits" in service of some "poetic" vision.

Anonymous Sun Aug 14 16:12:15 2022 No.20837183

>>20837006

But this is exactly about process and not about results. You can conceive of real numbers as something constructed from natural numbers or as the particular object which satisfies a set of field axioms. This is purely a question of process, and the justification of which process is purely aesthetic. My question can be made pretty concrete, and I don’t find it answered: in what way is “20th century Soviet mathematics” different from “19th century English Romantic poetry”?

The fundamental theorem of calculus has an entirely geometric proof in the “old style” attributable to Barrow, who taught Newton (which I only point out since Newton is painted as a mathematical modern in that linked PDF). There is also a more “modern” analytic proof of the same theorem. This is pure process! Two poems speaking to the same concept in totally different styles. Achilles’s choice in Book 9 and “An Irish Airman Foresees His Death” are different processes generating the same truth. How are these mathematical movements any different?

Anonymous Sun Aug 14 16:22:01 2022 No.20837242

>>20837183
>But this is exactly about process and not about results.
But I'm not interested in the mere process. All process is human-driven towards certain ends. I'm speaking about the results. How does one evaluate the results? It seems like, to me, to evaluate the results of mathematics requires adding something human that otherwise isn't there naturally.
>My question can be made pretty concrete, and I don’t find it answered: in what way is “20th century Soviet mathematics” different from “19th century English Romantic poetry”?
There is ur-mathematics, which can be instantiated into particular forms of mathematics. But there is no ur-poetry. It's all concrete particulars.

Anonymous Sun Aug 14 16:32:48 2022 No.20837293

>>20837242
You evaluate the results by agreeing they are convincing (agreeing with yourself, agreeing with others). I recommend the essay collection Circles Disturbed, rich with discussion of the narrative and literary nature of mathematical proof.

Regardless of whether there is some ur-mathematics, it is presumptive that we can access this directly when we evaluate results.

The idea that there is no ur-poetry does not make sense to me. All of these concrete particulars are just ways of speaking a truth that was seen, no different than differing proofs generating the same truth.

A proof and a poem are both concrete, particular processes generating eternal truths. The Homer and Yeats I mentioned are concrete particulars speaking the same truth. Are we saying that this truth is not eternal in the way a mathematical truth is? If so, I am not so sure. Both rely on shared historical context and assume this context when we cast an eye toward eternity. Both are reflections of some nature, some seeing (rather than hypothesizing). The same light casting a different shadow. If we started from scratch, all over again, the light will be there and a different shadow might be cast.

Anonymous Sun Aug 14 16:45:13 2022 No.20837359

>>20837293
>You evaluate the results by agreeing they are convincing (agreeing with yourself, agreeing with others).
Agreement is no guarantee of truth. Mathematics does not care whether we agree. It is simply out there, waiting to be discovered.
>The idea that there is no ur-poetry does not make sense to me.
Well, think about what ur-poetry could be. I'm not sure what it is. Is it a assemblage of all poetry blended together? A set of beautiful experiences that can be summoned down from the heavens and breathed into life? The perfect moment that can be immediately grasped by anybody anywhere at any time no matter what? I'm pretty interested in seeing how far we can take this.
>The Homer and Yeats I mentioned are concrete particulars speaking the same truth.
You never step into the same river twice, even if you do find recurring features. The manifolds of experience are an important "infinity" to consider.

And I think there's also an interpretive aspect here as well. I like to think of aesthetics as having to do with desire, and desire often has to do with "lacking", finding "completeness" or "fulfillment." Well, if we are empty, with intentionality, then we search for what we are missing until we are complete. Now, imagine why somebody living in sterile, perfunctory, polished, and mechanical times like the present, Borges, would be attracted to ancient Anglo-Saxon Britain, with its sagas, magic, mysticism, coarseness, and rustic qualities? Would somebody living in those times, who's inundated in that mode of life, have that same kind of aesthetic preference?

As opposed to why mathematics doesn't have that quality... it simply doesn't until we poetize mathematics explicitly. And I think that's the critique Heidegger is making regarding the question of Being and how we've managed to collectively reduce ourselves into thinking about the world in certain ways that fundamentally close off other poetic possibilities. Mathematics, or whatever noetic realm that represents, should be left open, infinite in opportunity, contemplation and spontaneous unconcealment.

Anonymous Sun Aug 14 17:09:35 2022 No.20837491

>>20837359
I guess where this is breaking down for me is that it seems to me poetry is simply a reflection of experience and experience is itself a reflection of the world as it presents itself to us. In that sense, poetry is out there waiting to be discovered in just the same way mathematics is. All imaginative leaps are just explorations of some potentia that the world suggests. Poetry and mathematics are just particular forms of expressing meaning. Within these forms we have yet further forms, and the choice of which is basically aesthetic.

Arendt has this conception in On Freedom (which she probably cribbed from Heidegger or Plato or Aristotle! If you couldn’t tell already I am sorely lacking in background here, so thanks for carrying on the conversation) that freedom within is predicated on the experience of freedom to act in the world. This is what I am getting at when I talk about these reflections, these different shadows cast by the same light source.

So what is ur-poetry? I’m not sure, what is ur-mathematics? Is it the set of communicated meanings that result for these particular processes? Then why does this not apply to both? You can never step in the same river twice, this is true, but I am not convinced that this doesn’t also apply to mathematics. This search for completeness and fulfillment through intentionality reminds me of the hermeneutic circle. Maybe I am interpreting this wrong. But how does mathematics not admit a hermeneutics? The understanding I get from Barrow’s proof of FTC and the understanding I get from the analytic proof of FTC are not me stepping the same river even though there are recurring features.

Anonymous Sun Aug 14 17:34:27 2022 No.20837615

>>20837491
You should read the romantic idealists like Schelling and Goethe. I haven't been following the conversation but have you actually read the source of most contemporary overuse of "Ur-" in this sense, Goethe's Urpflanze and Urphänomen? I highly recommend Coleridge's Biografia Literaria if you aren't already familiar with it. Owen Barfield has gone introductory stuff on Coleridge (Barfield was an Anthroposophist which is an esoteric development of Goethe's ideas about metaphysical morphology and the Urphänomen, but even if you don't go this far, he's still good).

I think one dimension you may be missing is the DYNAMIC dimension of the romantic idealists, which to be fair, even they only managed to brush against and limn, as opposed to really developing is systematically. The entire progression of Schelling's thought, developed one-sidedly by Hegel later, can be described as a series of attempts to reconcile the free-expressive component of reality with the necessity of its metaphysical structure. His friendship with Goethe was predicated on their mutual recognition, especially in dialogue with Kant's definition of poetry and genius in the third Critique, that the poet and artist is really the philosopher par excellence, because he is acting as a conduit for the archetypal forms of nature to be willed forth into concretely intuitable forms that are part conceptual (i.e. determinate, necessary) but also act as "bridges" through which the observer of the work of art can experience the archetypal nature of the phenomenon.

If you want to start tugging on some of these threads I also highly recommend Berlin's work, specifically his thoughts on "expressionism," which Charles Taylor adapts as "expressivism." Again, the dynamic element is what you may be missing (not to be presumptuous): the paradoxical fusion of subjective and objective elements in a dialectic that reveals the true structure of the world. Some of Berlin's lectures on Romanticism are available on Youtube and have recently been published as a book.

Anonymous Sun Aug 14 17:35:50 2022 No.20837622

>>20837615
Taylor develops this, like Hegel about whom he's writing, one-sidedly, i.e. in terms of the aspect that terminates in the insights of Arendt you mention: the social-conceptual aspect. Because of Hegel's rejection of anything hidden, and any special or occult faculties like Goethe's "poetic mysticism" thus necessary for accessing what is hidden, reality becomes conceptual, i.e. socially and linguistically accessible reality. The dynamism of Schelling and Goethe becomes the dynamism of concrete, socially embedded human beings coping with and living in their intersubjectively shared world(s). This may be related to what you are describing toward the end, the hermeneutic structure of sociality and conceptuality itself, the paradox that human beings seek AND "think in terms of" determinate forms but that determinacy arises as a result of the PROCESS of thinking, intersubjectively sharing, and thus continuously reconstituting such forms. This is where you get, frankly un-metaphysical or sub-metaphysical, theories of freedom, like that of the French "personalists," predicated on "social" or "contextual freedom," freedom as the freedom to act within a (provisionally, socially) determinate context, etc. But this is, like I said, frankly not a metaphysical confrontation with the actual problem of freedom. It is a tacit presupposition of most post-Kantian, post-Schellingean thinkers that metaphysics is passé, simply not done or worth doing anymore. Arendt has no interest in metaphysics.

Again I haven't been following the conversation but if the debate is over the discoverability and thus immutability of mathematics then there are really some horrible confusions in most discussions of this topic, mainly resulting from the lack of a distinction between mathematical realism IN NATURE and the isomorphy of mathematical CONCEPTS with the mathematical structure of the world. The algebraic, abstract geometry on which most of modern mathematics is founded is a contingent, linguistic, conceptual system and only one possible model of the world. Check out Klein's Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origins of Algebra, one of the most difficult books you will ever read probably but worth suffering through. Also check out Norman Wildberger's channel on Youtube, he is a finitist who does a good job of showing the contingency of current/mainstream foundations for mathematics. Read Morris Kline's Loss of Certainty too, it's short and if you know maths it's very easy and fun. Read Burtt's Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science too if you can. And if you didn't find Klein too brutal, then Husserl's Crisis.

Anonymous Sun Aug 14 17:36:51 2022 No.20837629

>>20837622
Again, mathematicians simply confuse and confute two things: the apparent apodicticity of their mathematical proofs AND the apparent isomorphy of post-Cartesian/Galilean physical theory to the material world, but all of this is a subtly tautological/circular structure - both of these suffer from the "we only get out what we put in" problem. Definitions of correspondence and apodicticity are being slipped in tacitly a priori at the outset, so that they can be used to "prove" the validity of the proofs circularly at the end. Physical theory corresponds to the world because it works, but "it works," when analysed properly, always reveals itself to have an in-built definition of correspondence, physicality, the world, etc. Husserl and Klein are best for this but the most difficult reads. I recommend Burtt + Kline first.

MATHEMATICS is not contingent, but Klein especially will reveal how OUR forms of mathematics are contingent, and Kline will show even further just how comically contingent algebraic geometry is. Ironically the solution to the whole thing may be a "re-connecting" of our concept-forming capacity with a sympathetic-poetic intuition like that of Goethe/Schelling, in mathematics as well as other fields. Heidegger says it best:
>Scientific research accomplishes, roughly and naively, the demarcation and initial fixing of areas of subject-matter. The basic structures of any such area have already been worked out after a fashion in our pre-scientific ways of experiencing and interpreting that domain of Being in which the area of subject-matter is itself confined. The "basic concepts" which thus arise remain our proximal clues for disclosing this area concretely for the first time. [But] real progress comes not so much from collecting results and storing them away in "textbooks" as from inquiring into the ways in which each particular area is basically constituted [Grundverfassungen] ... The real "movement" of the sciences takes place when their basic concepts undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent [durchsichtig] to itself. The level which a science has reached is determined by how far it is CAPABLE of a crisis in its basic concepts. In such immanent crises the very relationship between positively investigative inquiry and those things themselves that are under interrogation [i.e., the basic concepts of a sphere of mathematics, and their validity] comes to a point where it begins to totter.
He goes on to say that it is tottering in all sciences presently, everything is in a state of foundational crisis, thus i.e. the necessity of a phenomenological approach (the approach of Husserl, Klein, and himself), a re-grounding of cognition and its validity in the light of self-consciousness.

Anonymous Sun Aug 14 17:41:03 2022 No.20837658

>>20837615
Also to hammer home the missing dynamism thing, I think modern epistemology is simply impoverished by a habitual concept of mimesis that is not actually understood, i.e. is not transparent, because if it were transparent, it would be equally transparent that it is only ever used in the one-sided sense of a form of "imitation" based on material, physical, and visual metaphor. That is, when we try to "picture" (note the visual metaphor again) the mimetic relationship between our concepts (say, mathematical) and their "real" forms in nature, we can only think in terms of metaphors that have been smuggled uncritically into our cognition by things like Descartes' wax impression, via the natural sciences taking these metaphors for granted as more rigorous (again, they "work," in a circularly self-justifying way) than metaphors like Goethe's sympathetic intuition.

But if you read Klein you will see just how utterly different the metaphors available and open to the Greeks' "natural ontology" were. Does that mean they're right, or even that Goethe and Schelling were right? No, but it at least allows us to begin "thinking otherwise," in ways not constrained by the shallow visuo-Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian-Kantian spatial-mechanical mimesis that dominates modernity (see Burtt, or see Ernst Lehrs' Man or Matter if you don't mind weird shit). "Correspondence" can be structured in ways other than one "stuff" isomorphically mirroring another "stuff," in a pre-supposed "stuff-like" "container" (itself conceived, paradoxically, on the model of "stuff").

>>	Anonymous Sun Aug 14 17:45:00 2022 No.20837677 >>20837658 Okay hell yes, thank you. I am going to save these recs. This seems like the exact path I want to walk given my current understanding of thinks. I appreciate it anon.

Anonymous Sun Aug 14 19:35:21 2022 No.20838308

>>20837615
>>20837622
>>20837629
>>20837658
Thank you anon for the incredibly high effort-posting contribution. I hope to have half your erudition one day. Funnily enough, I stumbled upon a turn that took me through Steiner, Schelling, and Goethe, which I did not expect whatsoever. I'm going to start reading Klein too. I also wonder what Heidegger has to say about Goethe (who I have to admit kind of disgusts me as a person...) Anyway...

Regarding how we are supposed to understand the truth within poetry... >>20837491
Let me return to the urpflanze as an analogy to illustrate what makes poetry unique. I have to admit I don't have much faith in the urpflanze as anything but a monstrosity if it were to be actually planted. But a flower grafted from the urpflanze and planted somewhere? Now we're talking. Apply the same principles to the arts. But even then, there's a point that is brought up here:
>But if you read Klein you will see just how utterly different the metaphors available and open to the Greeks' "natural ontology" were. Does that mean they're right, or even that Goethe and Schelling were right? No, but it at least allows us to begin "thinking otherwise," in ways not constrained by the shallow visuo-Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian-Kantian spatial-mechanical mimesis that dominates modernity (see Burtt, or see Ernst Lehrs' Man or Matter if you don't mind weird shit).
The idea of collecting metaphors is a brilliant one. I'm reminded of Plato's chariot analogy, the collecting of forms, here: >>20814490
There's an unsolved problem to merely thinking "otherwise." Even if we were to transform mathematics away from the Cartesian mindset, how exactly would it guarantee an improvement of our situation? What step should we ought to take, what direction should we move in? A new direction would immediately require us to "close off" some possibilities over others, to select some flowers from the urpflanze and plant them. Authenticity in no way guarantees virtue. Extend that on a society-wide scale, and you have the recipe for authentic self-destruction, a new, original mistake. We're back to the Kantian problem of whether the intellectual intuition is enough, or if it's possible that anything coherent can even be said about it. And as long as that dilemma exists, then I don't think positive philosophy can exist, and we will always have Platonic skepticism over poetry.

>>	Anonymous Sun Aug 14 21:54:39 2022 No.20838915 >>20824365 Maybe on this planet.

Anonymous Sun Aug 14 22:36:34 2022 No.20839099

>>20815048
So, let's recap on methexis (μέθεξις):
>μέθεξις, meaning "group-sharing"
>"the word again refers to a shared reception, when an attendant of Creusa, the raped mother of Ion, warns her fellow attendants that they will all ‘share [μεθέξεις] the punishment’16 of stoning, for conspiring with Creusa to poison Ion, ignorant that he is in fact her son. In the Ecclesiazusae, written after Plato’s death, Aristophanes satirises a sexually socialist Athens in which all men can claim their ‘share [μεθέξει] of the common property’, the women, but only on the proviso that they first take a share of the ‘ugliest and the most flat-nosed’."
--
another anon, a Girard enjoyer, offered this definition
>methexis I would translate in my mind as "with-space", "co-spatiality", "exchange-region" or something like that
--
ultimately, it is derived from
>μετέχω
which originates from
>μέθ (met-, meta-) + ἔχω (exo)
>meta-: "between, among, in common with, a movement into, a succession of, etc."
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%CE%BC%CE%B5%CF%84%CE%B1-#Ancient_Greek
>exo: to have, possess, hold, be able to do, an impersonal "is", to depend on, cling to, etc. (shares same root as Aristotle's εξις (hexis)
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E1%BC%94%CF%87%CF%89#Ancient_Greek

I think there are a few commentators who focus on μετέχω in the Platonic dialogues, so I will look them up now.

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 00:50:02 2022 No.20839711 >>20838308 bump

Anonymous Mon Aug 15 02:25:27 2022 No.20840115 [DELETED]

>>20821094
On the interpretation of khora as "space"...
>Among contemporary philosophers, the argument that has contributed most in defense of
attributing a two-worlds ontology to Plato is not an argument from Plato’s dialogues at all; it is
Aristotle’s remarks about the separation of forms from sensibles. In her 1984 “Separation” and
1986 “Immanence,” Gail Fine scoured the Platonic corpus and concluded inter alia, “Plato never even says that forms are separate; it proves surprisingly difficult to uncover any commitment to separation; and commitment to it emerges in unexpected ways and in unexpected cases” (1984,254). More specifically, she shows definitively that some widely held views of separation in4 of 21 Plato should be abandoned. Among them is Cornford’s (1939, 74) false claim that “The separa-tion (χωρισμός) of the forms is explicitly effected in the Phaedo.” Another claim for which she finds insufficient warrant is that Plato is himself “committed to the views of the friends of the forms” (Sophist 248a4–5). She warns against reading χωρίς as indicating anything more than difference (1984, 274); and against reading αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό as implying separation, even when forms exclude their opposites (277). She also points out that the various difficulties for the theo-ry of forms raised in the Parmenides do not “involve the assumption that forms are separate” (275). All of these are important points, carefully argued from the texts themselves.
>To sum up, a two-worlds ontology implies a particularly strong sense of separation, not
mere difference or distinction between sensibles and forms but forms’ independent existence.
There is no text of Plato’s that argues for that strong sense of separation. Moreover, Aristotle’s
arguments are not aimed at Plato himself but at such platonists as advocated independently exist-
ing forms. I would add what I have argued at length elsewhere (Nails 1995), that the late dia-
logues—those characterized by style markers unfamiliar in the remainder of the corpus (Thesleff
2009, 51–81, 139–41)—are Platonic, but probably not solely Plato’s. Other minds were hard at
work by Plato’s last years, as in the Homeric and Aristotelian traditions, producing works from
the “school” of Plato, as it were, and, after his death, those works became an accretion in Plato’s name by altogether different platonists. Thus the characterization of Platonic forms we are justi-fied in making is that they are not reducible to sensibles, neither to objects in spacetime nor to sensible properties. As Hans-Georg Gadamer (1988, 260) put it so succinctly, “Plato was not a Platonist who taught two worlds.” >https://philarchive.org/archive/NAIPRI
Interesting interpretative essay on Plato. Raises good questions. Also cuts down on the idea that the forms are in "Platonic heaven." I'm not fully convinced that space and difference are separate.

Anonymous Mon Aug 15 02:28:10 2022 No.20840129

>>20821094 (You)
On the interpretation of khora as "space"...
>Among contemporary philosophers, the argument that has contributed most in defense of attributing a two-worlds ontology to Plato is not an argument from Plato’s dialogues at all; it is Aristotle’s remarks about the separation of forms from sensibles. In her 1984 “Separation” and 1986 “Immanence,” Gail Fine scoured the Platonic corpus and concluded inter alia, “Plato never even says that forms are separate; it proves surprisingly difficult to uncover any commitment to separation; and commitment to it emerges in unexpected ways and in unexpected cases” (1984,254). More specifically, she shows definitively that some widely held views of separation in4 of 21 Plato should be abandoned. Among them is Cornford’s (1939, 74) false claim that “The separa-tion (χωρισμός) of the forms is explicitly effected in the Phaedo.” Another claim for which she finds insufficient warrant is that Plato is himself “committed to the views of the friends of the forms” (Sophist 248a4–5). She warns against reading χωρίς as indicating anything more than difference (1984, 274); and against reading αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό as implying separation, even when forms exclude their opposites (277). She also points out that the various difficulties for the theo-ry of forms raised in the Parmenides do not “involve the assumption that forms are separate” (275). All of these are important points, carefully argued from the texts themselves.
>To sum up, a two-worlds ontology implies a particularly strong sense of separation, not mere difference or distinction between sensibles and forms but forms’ independent existence. There is no text of Plato’s that argues for that strong sense of separation. Moreover, Aristotle’s arguments are not aimed at Plato himself but at such platonists as advocated independently exist-ing forms. I would add what I have argued at length elsewhere (Nails 1995), that the late dia-logue—those characterized by style markers unfamiliar in the remainder of the corpus (Thesleff 2009, 51–81, 139–41)—are Platonic, but probably not solely Plato’s. Other minds were hard at work by Plato’s last years, as in the Homeric and Aristotelian traditions, producing works from the “school” of Plato, as it were, and, after his death, those works became an accretion in Plato’s name by altogether different platonists. Thus the characterization of Platonic forms we are justi-fied in making is that they are not reducible to sensibles, neither to objects in spacetime nor to sensible properties. As Hans-Georg Gadamer (1988, 260) put it so succinctly, “Plato was not a Platonist who taught two worlds.”
>https://philarchive.org/archive/NAIPRI
Interesting interpretative essay on Plato. Raises good questions. Also cuts down on the idea that the forms are in "Platonic heaven." I'm not fully convinced that space and difference are separate.

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 05:12:42 2022 No.20840642 bump

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 06:23:34 2022 No.20840832 don't let this thread slide before I wake up anons :(

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 07:24:49 2022 No.20840991 bump

Anonymous Mon Aug 15 07:26:00 2022 No.20840993

>>20835069
>Stigmé is, like monas, indivisible, but unlike monas it has the addition of a thesis – a position, an orientation, an order or arrangement.
The Cartesian origin point does not contain an orientation or order of arrangement. That is extraneous to the origin. The coordinate system, ie relative positioning of the axes, are defined after the establishment of the origin. So there is no intentionality or continuity just after establishing the basic framework of Cartesian planes. Res extensa exists here without any definite (absolute) directionality, before points are mapped in to represent offset from the origin. Further there are complex systems which remove the need for an origin at all, relying only on relations between variables to have coherency. What this latter statement means in concrete terms is that one can construct stigmé from monas, ie without any direct use of res extensae.
>Now if geometry does not have a place, what indeed is place?
This question is already answered by Aristotle in Metaphysics, place does not have to mean a physical place, we also have "intellectual matter" which creates the same phenomenon of place in our minds when considering geometry. It's quite obvious that abstracting from this difference between physical and intellectual matter, a place is just a point in respect of others. Therefore there is no "place" without categorical relations (see your quote about Aristotle's basic directions), at the same time res extensa does not require "place" (ie definite directionality) in order to be extended, but place clearly requires extension to have meaning qua categorical relation.

After reading a bit of that article, it seems to me that Heidegger was desperately trying to refute the Cartesian idea of res extensa with phenomenological notions rather than simply moving beyond it, which is very much possible and even warranted.
>>20835153
>This type of “seeing” already was leading to a total coming apart of geometry
Non-Euclidean geometry is strictly imaginary (and not even), because the only way it can be "seen" in any sense at all is by mapping it into a Euclidean plane or space. It is purely abstract and has no basis outside of Euclidean postulates (even though they appear to contradict each other - which may not strictly even be correct in certain cases). It doesn't lead to a coming apart of anything, only a logical extrapolation or abstraction from what is more fundamental. This is what I meant by the difference between hypothesis and seeing. I'd hope Plato meant it in a similar way based on what I've read, but I don't like to impose meanings on ancient authors.
>are latent
That's exactly the point. You can extrapolate through imagination from basic actuality, but it is all anchored back to that original point of departure, no matter how creative and exploratory you are.

Anonymous Mon Aug 15 07:39:01 2022 No.20841015

I get called schizo/underage/retarded/tryhard (rarely: embarrassing/cringe) when I post my actually coherent effortposts that comprise a singular coherent philosophical system

These retards ITT blabber about sweet nothing for 133 posts, achieving many retarded moments I could not even dream of, and arrive at not a single conclusion.

Welcome to /lit/

Anonymous Mon Aug 15 08:03:41 2022 No.20841079

>>20835069
Reading through this article, it is interesting and there are a number of comments I want to make, but can't because I cannot copy-paste text segments from it. One problem I want to point out is that A) Aristotle does not think mathematical objects exist as such, therefore they naturally don't "have place", B) More importantly that place has or is dynamis means that place is potential in the same way that "matter" is. It's true this is also the same word used for "potency", but it's clear what he actually means here by the context. As I said in my previous post, intellectual matter, just as physical matter, is a kind of potency or shapelessness which can take shape. Therefore place is a determination or actualization of no-place (which is potentially a place). Naturally no-place does not have a place, and therefore the geometric figure as a whole cannot be related to anything outside of itself, therefore possessing no "place" even though it contains "places" (this is what Heidegger seems to mean by "geometric shapes" not having "place" as such, he has just worded it poorly in my opinion).

I'm still not sure how he claims arithmetic lacks intentionality. And also what his criteria for "intentionality" is here. Kant thought that basic arithmetic was synthetic, surely that it is synthetic implies intentionality? Or does he think Kant is wrong about the basis of arithmetic? I would personally say the connection between origin and offset in basic geometry is equivalent in synthesis to the connection between operands and sum in basic arithmetic. The problem in the article from what I can see is that it is said that Plato viewed numbers as not possessing an intrinsic unity apart from multiplicity, which is problematic because Aristotle imputes this view to Plato in the refutation sections of Metaphysics, as even the stronger of the two views (ie compared to Pythagoras and some others), which is that a number is not just the sum of its units, just as a line is not the sum of points connecting one point to another, but possesses a unity more than aggregation. The idea that numbers were simple aggregations of units seems far more Cartesian or post-Cartesian than is possible. That would have led very quickly to the enumeration of the numerous sets of numbers apart from the natural numbers.

Anonymous Mon Aug 15 08:20:34 2022 No.20841124

>>20813399
Cthonic poetry is thinking of the sensible world up to the first principle; latent in the Bible — timeless knowledge.

Exploring these potential geometries amounts to a philosopher-king. And none else. Plato would agree with.

Schelling adapts "poetic mysticism" as a confrontation between the abstract Kantian proofs and a circularly self-justifying "stuff" (expressivism).

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 08:23:58 2022 No.20841132 >>20813399 Bump Love to contribute but I’m unread. What are the go to translations for the Greeks? I’d learn attic Greek but i have some other projects.

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 10:24:56 2022 No.20841568 bump anyone have anything on heidegger’s thoughts on homer?

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 10:29:41 2022 No.20841582 File: 65 KB, 640x500, 1659146995785052.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] >>20813399 >Plato, Heidegger, and the Relationship Between Mathematics Not sure if pic related but if it is where do I start?

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 10:41:29 2022 No.20841600 >>20841582 Deleuze killed himself for this very reason.

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 10:45:04 2022 No.20841608 File: 22 KB, 680x652, 1646095811206.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] >>20841600 So Deleuze / what primarily influenced him?

Anonymous Mon Aug 15 10:48:33 2022 No.20841616

>>20841608
He dug too deep. Some people (/pol/ refugees mainly) like to portray him as some homo-french-pomo, which isn’t completely wrong, but he was a very weighty thinker, and he even lectured on figures such as Plotinus. Eventually the question of geometry comes up, and if you are not prepared, you will not make it.

Anonymous Mon Aug 15 12:30:18 2022 No.20841832

>>20840993
> Non-Euclidean geometry is strictly imaginary (and not even), because the only way it can be "seen" in any sense at all is by mapping it into a Euclidean plane or space. It is purely abstract and has no basis outside of Euclidean postulates

You’re losing me here. You’re taking Euclidean geometry as primary because, well, tell me why?

Take the sphere (which certainly is an object we can “see,” not hypothesize, else we are moving away from Plato). Draw a triangle on it. Already we are confronted with something quite different. I do not need to conceive of a plane at all to do this, in fact I could conceive of starting with the sphere and abstracting out the plane. If you call any surface a plane we are throwing away properties so haphazardly as to make these objects meaningless.

I feel like I see what you are gesturing at: if X is conceivable as a generalization of Y, then Y is actually the object at which we must be anchored, thus we must privilege that object. But one could easily make the case that actually X, being a specification of Y, is less fundamental.

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 12:33:54 2022 No.20841836 >>20841832 Sorry trainpostinf I should have written: But one could easily make the case that actually Y, being a specification of X, is less fundamental.

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 13:37:28 2022 No.20842004 >>20838308 somebody debunk this schizo RIGHT NOW before I go insane AHHHHHHH

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 14:30:53 2022 No.20842196 >>20841015 Sounds like you have no mind for philosophy and were rightfully dunked on over and over again. This thread is filled with endgame-tier philosophical dilemmas. If you can't grasp them, you shouldn't be posting your pseud manifestos on /lit/.

HORSZCHE Mon Aug 15 14:42:34 2022 No.20842250

>>20841015
That only shows you dream of things vain and powerless: to be admitted to the circle of recognition.

You are filtered by these high IQ philosophical effortposts! Or it is merely an AI's version of philosophical dialogue that is devoid of any essence and made with a sole reason to inspire awe and fear before the mighty intellectual priests discussing matters that are not available to mere sneeds. — Truthfully, it does not matter. In either case you are left outside, you are not allowed. Left to dream (actually sleep) and to salivate over these 'oh-so-noble' intellectual treasures.

You, sneed.. don't you want to become a pirate instead? Not to be a beggar at someone's banquet, sitting at the temple denied entrance but to sail the seas on your own private space ship where no intellectual idol would define borders of your next adventure? Fuck books. Fuck schools. The only book I need is the SNEEDBIBLE. And that is every book: MONISM==DUALISM.

The war is on: retardposters vs acknowledgedposters. Restless sailors are the former, but the latter are dogs hungry for affirmation as they harbour uncertainty within their weak souls and thus are alway needy for a mirror to confirm their role.

Anonymous Mon Aug 15 15:24:37 2022 No.20842418

>>20840129
Building on these insights here thanks to this work on Jean-Luc Nancy on Mimesis vs. Methexis. Going through Heidegger and Gadamer's exegesis of Plato.
>Heidegger never mentions μίμησις in Being and Time, or the Plato essay, but it is an important concept in one of the Nietzsche lectures delivered during the time the Plato essay was being redrafted, in the Winter semester of 1936-37.428 This lecture too focuses on Plato’s Republic, and focuses in on the threefold hierarchy of production described in Book X. Highest in Plato’s thread of productions is the θεός [divine], the highest point from which the singular universal forms flow. Next comes the τεχνίτης [artisan], who is the one capable of reproducing sensible instances which partake in the forms, specified in Plato’s text by the examples of κλινοποιός [bed-maker] and τέκτων [carpenter]. The artisan is not divine, yet has some kind of access or relation to the immutable and the ability to invest it in his or her work. Last ranks the μιμητής [imitator], the agent ‘three removes from the king and the truth,’429 who in creating works of art offers nothing but a copy of the already second-order objects of craft and nature. The work of the μιμητής is, as a result, judged deficient for his or her remoteness from the truth of the pure forms of the θεός. This type of activity is exemplified by the ζώγραφος [painter] and τραγῳδοποιός [tragic poet].430 While the θεός, τεχνίτης and μιμητής are all said by Plato to ποιεῖ [produce], the verb μιμεῖσθαι [imitate] is reserved for the μιμητής alone.431
>https://e-space.mmu.ac.uk/324986/1/Aldridge%20-%20Thesis%20-%20The%20Arrival%20of%20Mimesis%20and%20Methexis%20in%20the%20Enquiries%20of%20Jean-Luc%20Nancy.pdf

Anonymous Mon Aug 15 15:52:34 2022 No.20842514

>>20837658
>mimesis
>The difference between ποίησις and μίμησις for Heidegger, when thought outside of a schema of μέθεξις, is that while they both act in some sense like a mirror, producing by ‘bringing forth444 the Idea (bringing the outward appearance of something into something else, no matter in what way)’, nevertheless, ποίησις, like phenomenology, brings together the ‘what-being of the bedframe’,445 the eidos or self-showing of the bedframe, (which is not created as such) with a particular bedframe, that which is produced or manufactured in the modern sense, while μίμησις, on the other hand, ‘cannot at all produce any particular usable table [or bedframe]’.446 That is, μίμησις does not reveal in the sense of ἀλήθεια, but only brings forth the φαινόμενον in a medium that is not its own.447

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 17:56:28 2022 No.20843071 >>20842196 Come on brah, this thread is just midwits believing they are discussing something worthwhile. Socrates would be ashamed

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 18:00:56 2022 No.20843084 >>20843071 Sounds like you got filtered. This is as Socratic as it gets.

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 18:07:22 2022 No.20843117 >>20843084 See this halfwit didnt even understand Socrates. Beware and be aware anons. Stop deluding yourself

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 18:16:37 2022 No.20843165 >>20843117 You seem like a straight thinker. Could you give me some tips?

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 18:21:34 2022 No.20843190 >>20843071 >>20843117 i came on your dad. he smiled when i did.

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 18:23:01 2022 No.20843201 >>20843165 Stop using the internet, except for work-related reasons. This place is the abyss and we must strive to escape it, no matter how comforting it may seem. Case in point >>20843190

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 18:27:05 2022 No.20843216 >>20843201 what? you have some issue knowing your dad likes sneaking some dick in on the side?

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 18:32:54 2022 No.20843239 >>20843201 Nah, I learned a ton. Will keep learning more. By the way, the fact that my reference escaped your notice proves to me that you're a pseud who knows nothing of Socrates. So please, keep talking shit. It's amusing.

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 18:42:47 2022 No.20843278 >>20843239 I'm afraid you have learned a lot about nothing and little about everything. When you have lived long enough and experienced much, I have no doubt you will understand my words and share my sentiments.

Anonymous Mon Aug 15 19:04:44 2022 No.20843360

>>20843278
No, I agree with you in that the internet isn't a great place to be. But I'm not on social media. The only thing I do for the most part is read books and communicate with other people who also read books. And I try to be selective with who I talk to.

Anyway, I'm not going to pay attention to your concern trolling anymore. If you truly cared, you'd go through all the posts in the thread, read them charitably, thought about the problems carefully, then given me a solid answer until I'm satisfied.

Come back when you have a real contribution to make.

Anonymous Mon Aug 15 19:16:20 2022 No.20843412

>>20843360
>If you truly cared, you'd go through all the posts in the thread, read them charitably, thought about the problems carefully, then given me a solid answer until I'm satisfied.

I did and my conclusion is
>this thread is just midwits believing they are discussing something worthwhile.
You really just don't get 'it'. But the fault is my own, for I have outgrown this place. I shouldnt have interred in childish discussions. For that I do apologize to you and myself. I shall take my leave now, as better men have done before me.

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 21:36:06 2022 No.20844085 >>20843412 Bye bye, have fun. Read Euthyphro next time.

>>	Anonymous Mon Aug 15 22:51:13 2022 No.20844466 >>20843360 >>20843412 >>20844085 you are both fags

Anonymous Mon Aug 15 23:10:31 2022 No.20844532

>>20834942
I have, I have my undergrad in physics and mathematics. I am the anon that posted >>20827551 , >>20827893 ,
and >>20830739
I agree with you but the philosophers that are being linked do not and I think that their points need to be handled more completely than just brushing them off as novice mathematicians. Im just struggling to do so in a way that is organized and has simple enough examples to make my point obvious.

Anonymous Mon Aug 15 23:21:16 2022 No.20844574

>>20844532
We were debating earlier. I wish >>20837622 anon could have actually commented on our discussion to tell us where we stood exactly. I'm not a brainlet, but I've only done mathematics up to linear algebra. I'm no professional mathematician. But anyway, this is the crux of the argument I think:
>Because of Hegel's rejection of anything hidden, and any special or occult faculties like Goethe's "poetic mysticism" thus necessary for accessing what is hidden, reality becomes conceptual, i.e. socially and linguistically accessible reality. The dynamism of Schelling and Goethe becomes the dynamism of concrete, socially embedded human beings coping with and living in their intersubjectively shared world(s). This may be related to what you are describing toward the end, the hermeneutic structure of sociality and conceptuality itself, the paradox that human beings seek AND "think in terms of" determinate forms but that determinacy arises as a result of the PROCESS of thinking, intersubjectively sharing, and thus continuously reconstituting such forms.
So, the status of intellectual intuition is uncertain. Big problem. Means that we only have intersubjectivity, technically speaking. I believe you have been arguing for intersubjectivity as truth, but I don't believe that's enough. Everybody can agree on something and yet it can still be wrong. I'm looking for a more Platonic conception of truth that still allows for, idk, historical-contextual circumstances (e.g. art and poetry).
>Again I haven't been following the conversation but if the debate is over the discoverability and thus immutability of mathematics then there are really some horrible confusions in most discussions of this topic, mainly resulting from the lack of a distinction between mathematical realism IN NATURE and the isomorphy of mathematical CONCEPTS with the mathematical structure of the world. The algebraic, abstract geometry on which most of modern mathematics is founded is a contingent, linguistic, conceptual system and only one possible model of the world.
I've suspected that this existed but I've been filtered by math for a long time. What the hell are mathematicians even agreeing on, then? What are the multiple possible worlds being spoken of? What kind of mathematics should I learn to investigate this more clearly?

Maybe we should read Klein together and figure it out.

Anonymous Mon Aug 15 23:36:08 2022 No.20844642

>>20844574
>So, the status of intellectual intuition is uncertain. Big problem. Means that we only have intersubjectivity, technically speaking. I believe you have been arguing for intersubjectivity as truth, but I don't believe that's enough. Everybody can agree on something and yet it can still be wrong. I'm looking for a more Platonic conception of truth that still allows for, idk, historical-contextual circumstances (e.g. art and poetry).
when I say truth I dont mean the thing we would say is true, I mean what really is true which we get bits and pieces of in the form of phenomena. we then take our experience of this phenomena and put it in a language, either poetic or mathematic, which I believe to have complementary strengths and weaknesses (as far as depicting as full of a picture as we can of that truth). any discrepancies between our perceptions of phenomena come from a problem with our ability to effectively communicate in and interpret these languages. I am also saying that these phenomena may only be part of the Truth, and that there may be other methods of probing phenomena not yet experienced, and whats more, other ways of communicating it. but ultimately I think reality id phenomenal first and both poetry and mathematics spring from our experience of that phenomena.

Anonymous Mon Aug 15 23:40:53 2022 No.20844665

>>20844642
>any discrepancies between our perceptions of phenomena come from a problem with our ability to effectively communicate in and interpret these languages.
I don't think removing ambiguity fixes the problem. If the individual is broken, then the community is broken too I don't think we can simply glue the phenomena together and get the noumena as the result. We all have to grasp the noumena too. Without rescuing intellectual intuition at the individual level from Hume's attack and doing better than Kant, then it's a doomed project.

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 00:00:23 2022 No.20844738

>>20844665
>I don't think removing ambiguity fixes the problem.
Im not trying to. like I said, there are some parts of that big t Truth that may not even be revealed in the phenomena (at least to our limits of experience).
>If the individual is broken, then the community is broken too I don't think we can simply glue the phenomena together and get the noumena as the result.
this is true but there would be no "broken individual" if he could perfectly communicate the phenomena (which again, could still not reveal the whole Truth). the masses that believe the "broken individual" then suffer from an unintentional misleading coupled with their own inability to interpret the phenomena they experience themselves (into language I mean)
I suppose you could make the case that those with weaker faculties or bad senses are evidence that there is some natural discrepancies between the phenomena we experience and thus there can not be any consensus but I think that would just be a limitation in the amount of phenomena that can be experienced and not actual a difference in the phenomena itself. and lets not forget that there is plenty of phenomena that needs to be actively searched for. this could be the intellectual intuition you are talking about. so I am willing to concede that for now. what phenomena you emphasize matters. but emphasis still falls into the use of language. I think I have talked myself into thinking that the completeness of the experience of phenomena matters and that that could play a role in the consensus issue, but that it is hard to distinguish a problem of completeness of experience and a problem of the ability to completely communicate the whole of ones experience, which is why I think that both languages (and if I had any say, more than just the two) are equally useful because they give us multiple avenues to rule out incompleteness of communication.
sorry if this post is weirdly incoherent, I decided to put down the whole stream of consciousness.

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 00:12:13 2022 No.20844781

>>20844532
Yeah to be clear I didn’t intend to brush them off, I regret my phrasing there, I was taking a very naive reading of what the other posters were putting out there. I actually posted back and forth with someone in a chain shortly after that and have been heartily convinced to read Kline, Burtt, Klein, Husserl.

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 00:25:57 2022 No.20844825

>>20844781
Im in the same boat. All of those names are on my reading list but they are about 40 books across 4 subjects down the road. Its a little bit why I was hesitant to share in the first place because everything I had coming into this conversation was what was already said before I started, my undergrad math and physics, my personal exploration into great poetry as communication of mystical experience and the theosophy and mythology Ive read to help contextualize that interpretation of poetry (which is still pretty limited since that is the part of the reading list Im on now. the final part of that exploration was to check my interpretation against philosophers of metaphysics and phenomenology, the intuition for which Im attempting to obtain by talking to other people about it (even though it does make me feel like an idiotic novice). thanks for putting up with my less than academic takes anon.

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 00:30:09 2022 No.20844842 >>20844781 >>20844825 Wait there's two of you guys? I'm confused. This is me here: >>20844665

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 00:33:04 2022 No.20844862

The joke with human society is that without a God, it is dead in the water.
You need a powerful Deity, either by Divine Nature or invented through Technology.
Unfortunately, based on our current understanding of science, the universe itself is inevitably going to die one day, taking us with it, and no foreseeable engineering feat will be able to save us.

Humanity's search then should not be fixated on temporary longevity of life, but rather focused on finding God.

Is the search hopeless? We see no direct evidence of God...
Well, yes, that might be true, but there are plenty of signs that point to His existence.
A First Cause, Fine-tuning of Universal Constants, Hard problem of consciousness...(how do you explain qualia with matter alone?) all seem to hint at something greater we may be missing.

What about man's spiritual search for God? Well in antiquity, Hindu and similar mystics claimed to witness the beauty of God directly. Later, Jesus claimed to be God in the Flesh.

If Christianity was mystical, then that would make a lot of sense in the grand scheme of things. Because then you would have a self-reliant universe where humanity's purpose was to find God mystically, which Jesus accomplished.

Where did the mystical God go then? Perhaps it is difficult to find, requiring great moral character and great sacrifice. Also, perhaps it is the case that technological advancements are inherently sinful, and the vast majority of humans depend upon technology to live nowadays and have subsequently corrupted their soul.

"You must be born again."
"The Kingdom of Heaven is within you."

I have much more elaborate theories for mysticism, that logically give a reason for everything rather adequately, but that would take too much space to post.

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 00:34:37 2022 No.20844872 >>20844862 Well, what is the God intuition?

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 00:35:57 2022 No.20844875 >>20844842 these are me >>20844738 >>20844825 is >>20834942 you?

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 00:45:12 2022 No.20844915 >>20844875 No, I'm OP, methexis anon, Heidegger anon, and ur-mathematics/ur-poetry anon. >>20837006 >>20837242 >>20837359 are some of my posts. But the most important one >>20838308 hasn't been addressed much.

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 00:57:26 2022 No.20844961

>>20844915
>A new direction would immediately require us to "close off" some possibilities over others, to select some flowers from the urpflanze and plant them
I dont think that this is true if the Truth is not completely revealed to us in the form of phenomena (which I suspect is the case, since our brain takes a lot of liberties when it comes to what we perceive. there is also always godles theorems that suggests we cant even prove all true statements in a given framework). In this case we would need an understanding of multiple different ways of interpreting the phenomena (in terms of communicating it through some language) in order to get the most complete picture available to us. which would mean that multiple forms of mathematics, poetry and other things would be necessary.

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 01:03:08 2022 No.20844980 >>20844961 It is true for the simple fact that we have limited choices available in our life. And when we make one choice, we often foreclose other choices. It's the nature of time.

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 01:05:43 2022 No.20844985 File: 206 KB, 635x800, DE557970-78C2-4730-8CF9-D53EBADE49AB.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] still hoping someone has anything on heidegger and homer. would really appreciate it if someone does.

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 01:12:21 2022 No.20845009

>>20844980
sure but I thought we were talking about the work of the human race in math and poetry, which spans multiple generations of people. of course it is true ultimately. everything had a lifespan, and histories surely can be erased. I think I must have lost your point maybe.

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 01:17:53 2022 No.20845028

>>20845009
We are. Allow me to be more clear:
1) First we have to gather, like collecting the forms, metaphors, poetry, etc.
2) Then, we have to feel, analyze, and then understand. What is good? What isn't good?
3) Finally, we have to choose. Out of all the possibilities available, which one(s) do we select for our time?
The phenomenal-noumenal distinction exists at each level here. There are unknown unknowns possible at each step of the way, along with the possibility of failing to execute each stage properly too.

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 01:32:29 2022 No.20845075

>>20845028
ah ok. the main place where we differ in opinion here I think is I
would switch 1 and 2 in the order and I think what is known as understanding would be part of your 1. I also think that having "understanding"' is probably a mistake. I think it probably best to call it creating a frame work. calling it understanding makes me think of knowing the Truth which Im not sure is possible. I suppose we as individuals do have to choose which framework to trust and that we have a limited amount of time and thus permutations in the evolution of that choice, but I am not sure that is phenomenal in poetry or mathematics (or what they point to) so Im willing to chalk that up to a failure of our natures. you say you delved a bit into steiner. do you mean rudolf steiner? if so how do you think the idea of an evolution of human consciousness effects your position? do you think it is possible that there is a type of consciousness that transcends your steps and is able to consider without selection and still live in something tangible?

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 01:40:13 2022 No.20845107 >>20841015 same... I've realized schizo is whatever the Jews don't like but it is interjected at a cadence that supercedes the based cringe seethe dilate matrix

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 01:40:50 2022 No.20845113

>>20845075
Hmmm. Let's shelve the mathematics and poetry discussion for now. Before we get into Steiner, let me ask you for your opinion. What do you think about reordering it like this?
1) First, we have to feel, analyze, and then understand (based on what we know). What is good? What isn't good?
2) Then, we have to choose. Out of all the possibilities available, which one(s) do we select for our time? See what happens.
3) Finally, we have to gather, like collecting the forms, metaphors, mathematics, poetry, history, etc. This continues to grow.

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 01:50:20 2022 No.20845151

>>20845113
I think the choice comes last but its an iterative process where once you get to step 3 (which now includes choice) you go back to analyzing and things grow that way. otherwise I like the order. its like the phenomena of going through the steps compounds to change the way we perceive and thus changes our relationship to the original phenomena (or in other words, when we experience the same phenomena again it is the original phenomena plus the phenomenal experience of going through steps, and is this changed).

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 01:51:57 2022 No.20845157 >>20845151 I keep fat fingering "this" instead of "thus"

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 01:56:57 2022 No.20845178 >>20845157 I get tantruming Anons whenever I fat finger a post

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 01:59:31 2022 No.20845184 >>20845178 thats why I tried to get ahead of it. it takes the vitality out of piss taking.

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 02:07:23 2022 No.20845207
File: 712 KB, 2256x1166, Screen Shot 2022-07-30 at 6.25.48 PM.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]

>>20845151
It seems like all three happens at once, doesn't it? I've been reading a ton of Peirce, whose phenomenology, built on an architectonic system is incredibly fascinating. What I just described was a fractal triad of firstness, secondness, thirdness, all of which occur at once but still require an order. 3) is last because that is the habit-building process. And you can't gather before you choose. That would essentially imply that life can be a spectator sport. But they all happen at once, are dependent on each other, and build on each other.

So, the reason why I bring up Peirce is because he takes the work of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel on conceptual categories to their extreme. He does more collecting of categories than Aristotle. He does more organizing of categories and skepticism of sensible intuitions than Kant (space and time may not be fully formed either). And he does more application of logic to the phenomena, continuity of process, and importance of community than Hegel. Towards the end of his life, Peirce begins to acceed to Plato and Schelling's influence, which slowly creeps in his work.

Quick detour, this is also why I was interested in Steiner, because he basically takes Hegel's spin on Kant with the categories but applies it to the supersensible reality, beyond the phenomena.

Unfortunately, Peirce eventually acknowledges that all this means is that he's the ur-Kant. Bad infinities galore everywhere. Peirce's system made him open to inquiry, but it also made all progress seem capable of imploding on a whim. Laws of nature we observe could, theoretically, be disproved at any time. All we have is the possibility of infinite exploration of the phenomena. The only thing saving him is the presence of what he referenced as Galileo's il lume naturale, what I might hazard to call the intellectual intuition, the ability to understand something at all.

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 02:23:27 2022 No.20845265

>>20845207
Im down with your original placement of choice now, I think I originally misunderstood the concept in this context but now I think I get it. Im going to need a little more time to unpack this and I need to get some sleep before work tomorrow. thanks for carrying on with me up to this point. its been fun

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 02:30:36 2022 No.20845285 >>20845207 I will say before I go that I wouldnt get too hung up on the simultaneity issue. It could be that it only appears to be happening at the same time because our brains processing speed is faster than our specious present.

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 04:35:22 2022 No.20845659

>>20845285
>I will say before I go that I wouldnt get too hung up on the simultaneity issue. It could be that it only appears to be happening at the same time because our brains processing speed is faster than our specious present.
That's a brilliant insight. Though, I don't know what to make of that. By present, would you mean our conscious "refresh rate"?

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 07:58:58 2022 No.20846120 bump

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 10:55:08 2022 No.20846540

>>20845659
>By present, would you mean our conscious "refresh rate"?
kind of. I always want to say its like our frame rate but thats not quite right either. the specious present is like the window of time it takes us to be conscious of a "moment" of phenomenal input, which can be shorter or longer due to brain states but generally has an average value for all people. So I guess by present in this context we could mean "that which is the indivisible part of the continuum of moments of phenomenal experience." or something like that

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 11:28:13 2022 No.20846628 >>20846540 though if we are talking about Present as in the real present and not our perception of it it wouldnt be contingent on the experience so maybe just the indivisible part of the continuum that is a complete phenomenon?

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 13:50:58 2022 No.20847108 bump

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 17:10:40 2022 No.20847887 bump

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 17:12:00 2022 No.20847898

>>20820808
>Spengler was right about the Germans and the Greeks, and coincidentally about philosophy of his time. Any philosophy which supposed an unbroken chain of assumptions beginning with Plato is wrong. He should’ve dedicated 10 years to William of Ockham instead of Aristotle.
I'm interested. What good would that do?

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 19:52:24 2022 No.20848663 bump

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 21:01:59 2022 No.20849042
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>>20845207
>Laws of nature we observe could, theoretically, be disproved at any time. All we have is the possibility of infinite exploration of the phenomena.
I have given it some thought and I think this could be correct, if it weren't for the fact that our methods of probing into phenomena are inherently limited by our sense organs and processing machines. I think this really speaks to the whole "the Truth is never fully revealed to us, even in phenomenon" thing I was speaking about earlier. I think what could be considered Truth had an infinite amount of methods of inquiry (the partial differential equation I suggested earlier has an infinite number of solutions after all) but our ability to perceive barrows our view as humans to a small subset of those methods of inquiry (in other words we are limited to the methods that our sense organs and mind are capable of perceiving and parsing). Our philosophy the is meant to shoot for our best approximation within our subset of solutions. This is also sort of why I asked about steiner before because I believe a part of steiners model of evolutionary consciousness has its version of "fitness" which is a better and better arrow towards the truth. if his evolutionary theory of consciousness were true then we really would be infinitely changing, but only because our relationship to the phenomena would be infinitely changing, which leads me to believe that the changes the laws of our universe would circle back to a communication and interpretation problem in which our consciousness could just as easily be called a translator. but that wouldnt be the philosopher of todays problem. the only problem an ages philosopher faves is approximating to the best of their ability so that the whole of humanity can evolve their consciousness. I for one and not 100% sold on this theory but I wanted to know what you think. I am of the opinion that our consciousness doesnt evolve, but our approximation toward the Truth gets better and better, which in a way elevates our relationship to phenomena, but its not because we have a faculty that the ancients didnt have. That may seem like a trivial distinction, but my belief implies that the human race has a best approximation it can hope for. Its not the Truth but it is the truth as it applies to the human race. I was made keen to this idea during a lecture in astrophysics when my professor brought up the graphic of the relationships of particles (pic related). he said that ultimately the only things we have directly observed have been leptons and photons, the rest we have observed indirectly by noticing manipulating leptons and photons in some way and looking for anomalous behavior. so every step between a particle and a lepton or a photon on pic related is a degree of separation from direct observation. for example quarks are one degree of separation from direct experience where gluons are 2 degrees.

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 21:15:28 2022 No.20849110

>>20849042
cont
he used this image to depict that the study of particle physics is very theoretical, but what is more important is the question he asked next which was "does anything about this image bother you?" to which, after a few minutes of trying to figure out what he could mean and a dead silence in the room, I tentatively raised my hand and said "what if there is something on there with no links to any of them?" which I take was the answer he was looking for because he said yes and then promptly moved on to let it bother me. but it didnt really, because at the time I just thought "if there is no link to the other particles then it has no bearing on the reality we interact with." But when thinking about getting to the Truth of the universe, such a particle could be an invaluable piece of the puzzle. but it is not guarantied that all such phenomena are graspable to our experience.
tldr the model we have been talking about leads to infinities of changing laws (out understanding of the nature of phenomena) only if our consciousness actually changes over time (yielding infinite interpretations of the Truth). if only our relationship toward our experience of the phenomena changes, then there exists a best approximation to the Truth caused by our limited scope of phenomenal inputs (limited by the capabilities of out hardware). Once we hit that limit we will have exhausted our methods of inquiry.

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 21:19:17 2022 No.20849135

>>20849042
>f it weren't for the fact that our methods of probing into phenomena are inherently limited by our sense organs and processing machines.
but how come we know something rather than nothing? even knowing that you know nothing is something. even saying that you don't know if you don't know something is knowledge of something.

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 21:32:06 2022 No.20849205

>>20821094
>>20840129
>>20837622
>There is a topic in the quoted passage that Klein overlooks, a topic that no one with a Catholic
education—such as myself, at the Pontificial Instititute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto—could miss. An 9 ousia is an actuality, as is a number.3 This is, I submit, the key to understanding Aristotle’s account of number. Aristotle thinks that Zeno’s paradoxes arise from the ontological mistake of supposing that points are prior to lines. Zeno sees that he must traverse an infinite number of points and denies that it is possible to traverse an infinity. Aristotle claims that the points are infinite only potentially, that is to say, it is possible to continue to mark off points in the line, but there are never an actually infinite number of points. The line is prior to the point; the point comes to be as division of the line. Local motion requires being able to traverse a distance. In M 2 Aristotle argues that geometrical objects cannot exist in ousiai nor can they exist apart from ousiai. M 3 resolves this aporia by showing that geometric objects exist in ousiai potentially. They require an act of the intellect to be actualized, just as the points on the line come to be through an act of the intellect.
>https://www.scribd.com/document/152643531/Halper-Klein-on-Aristotle

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 21:42:47 2022 No.20849260

>>20849205
>In the Categories Aristotle claims that everything else is either present in or said of a primary ousia. This is an ontological claim that no one should have appreciated more that Jacob Klein. Aristotle is saying that universals and properties reside somehow within concrete things. Numbers present a direct and obvious challenge to this ontology because a number belongs to multiple things. Just where do they reside? In the soul of the one counting, Klein seems to be saying. But this cannot be right for the reasons I have said. An essential clue to understanding number lies in Aristotle’s account of the infinite in the Physics. Plato has one infinite that he equates with the large and the small, the indefinite dyad. Aristotle insists there are two infinites, both of which are potential. In the process of showing why, he explains Plato’s dyad. Start with any line. It is possible to divide it into two indefinitely. As the divided segments grow smaller and smaller, the number of those segments grows larger. Hence, Plato thinks that larger and smaller go hand in hand. No, Aristotle insists, number grows larger as magnitude grows smaller. Hence, 10
there are two potential infinites, infinite in number and infinite (or, rather, infinitesimal) in magnitude.
What is crucial here is that the number being counted is a number of parts of a line and, thereby, parts of an ousia. Hence, a number can belong to a single ousia, and this must be its primary mode of existence if Aristotle is to maintain the doctrine of the Categories. The number that is used to count distinct things is a multiple of some measure and, thereby a relative (πρός τι) rather than a quantity. (Incidentally, as a relative, number belongs to things in the same way that the character “being a member of group” belongs to each member of the group.) As Klein notes, in order to count, we need a “preknowledge” of numbers by which we count (p. 107). He means that we must have learned our numbers. But there is another sort of preknowledge: the number form needs to exist. Insofar as a number belongs to an individual ousia, it can have its own form. This form unifies the units, and it is prior to the units. The units are potentially separable from the number. A number is also one in another way; it belongs to a single ousia. That is to say, the principle of unity that Aristotle speaks about and Klein dismisses too quickly is the unity of the individual ousia in which a number resides as a potentiality, a potentiality that is actualized by an act of intellect.

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 21:55:08 2022 No.20849328
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>>20849260
>Just as we come to see a line or a surface by dividing a solid ousia, so too we come to see a number by dividing an ousia. Numerical units are intrinsically fractions. This conclusion actually reinforces Klein’s overall claim that Aristotle was able to deal with fractions in a way that Plato could not. Indeed, I cannot see how Aristotle could stipulate a fraction as a unit, as Klein imagines, until he has a fraction to work with, and for that he needs to divide an ousia into a determinate number of intelligible parts. The account I am proposing explains how there can be intelligible parts.
>No one has written about Aristotle’s account of number more cogently or insightfully than Jacob Klein. He recognizes the significance of mathematics for Greek metaphysics, he understands that the crucial problem for both is how a plurality can be one, he is able to take seriously form-numbers and the indefinite dyad, he recognizes the importance of counting for Aristotle’s notion of number, and, perhaps most importantly, he grasps the significance of numbers being things. I have learned a great deal from Klein—much more from his 14 pages on Aristotle’s than from many a lengthy tome. So, I find it somewhat baffling that he did not fully develop his own insights. It was from Klein that I learned that 11 numbers are things, things whose matter is unified by a form, but Klein himself concludes that they are heaps.
>What happened? I can only speculate, but I want to propose a reason. Klein was a student of Heidegger, and that opened up one fruitful way of thinking about numbers at the same time it closed off other fruitful lines of thought. As I said at the beginning, Klein’s Greek Mathematical Thought should be read in conjunction with Cassirer’s Substance and Function. Both see the development of mathematics as a rise of conceptualization, but they differ radically on how they value conceptualization. Under Husserl’s and Heidegger’s influence, Klein affirms the value of concrete things. 4 That is what makes Greek mathematics so important. It is a way of dealing with the concrete in contrast with the conceptual schemata that dominate modern mathematics. However, this line of thought led Klein to focus on mathematicals as things or, more properly, as ways of grasping concrete physical things. Numbering is a way we are in the world with things. It is a way things manifest themselves to us and make themselves part of our world; it is a way we give these things use value, and a way we mark off our own existence in time. The Heideggerian impetus is to focus on the concreteness of numbering.
Holy shit. Names. It's all about fucking names. And it was staring at us in the face all along.
>pic rel
>https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/numerus#Latin

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 22:10:49 2022 No.20849402
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>>20849328
It's been my headcanon for a while that the ability to throw out names is pretty important. The Bible talks about Adam's power to name things. Confucius talks about making the names match reality if he were ever put in power, Heidegger talks about how language is the "house of Being", etc. Now if you check Ancient Greek and pic-rel, you'll see that onoma (name) and nomos (laws) are derived from literally the same PIE word, only declined differently respective to the number that is being referred to (person, people).
>https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Reconstruction:Proto-Indo-European/h%E2%82%81n%C3%B3mn%CC%A5
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E1%BD%84%CE%BD%CE%BF%CE%BC%CE
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/nomos%B1#Ancient_Greek
Now, imagine what happens when people are talking about the phusis/nomos (nature vs. customs) distinction. What is nature vs. society? What is human nature vs. socially constructed? If one confuses the two without thinking clearly, you reify mankind in its natural state.

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 22:16:25 2022 No.20849427 >>20849135 what we call knowing is really having a best approximation. its a matter of how we define the term knowledge.

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 22:17:29 2022 No.20849436 >>20849427 and what would be the basis for even an approximation?

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 22:20:36 2022 No.20849454 >>20849427 in other words what is the phenomena of knowing and how do you distinguish it from the phenomena of believing?

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 22:21:47 2022 No.20849462 >>20849436 the experience of phenomena I suppose.

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 22:25:30 2022 No.20849479 >>20849462 but what about the experience of phenomena makes it valid as even the flimsiest, most infinitesimal, yet still workable basis?

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 22:29:30 2022 No.20849500 >>20849479 its what our life is made of before we apply frameworks to it. And I believe the phenomena is the pointer to the Truth.

Anonymous Tue Aug 16 22:36:49 2022 No.20849547

>>20849500
Well I suppose there has to be something that points us toward the truth. Or else we couldn't have any grasp of the truth at all. What do you think of Hegel+'s pivot that the phenomena can be progressively overcome through logic, since our intuitions are also built on logic?

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 22:42:02 2022 No.20849583 >>20849547 what is meant by "overcoming phenomena" in this context?

>>	Anonymous Tue Aug 16 23:49:24 2022 No.20849895 >>20849583 grasping the noumena

Anonymous Wed Aug 17 00:02:47 2022 No.20849958

>>20849895
Im skeptical that logic can do that since
it is based on and checked against phenomena. logic is another method of communicating phenomena (Id attach it to mathematics). I can see how it can be used to express unexperienced phenomena (or at least not yet experienced). I would be hard pressed to distinguish between an experience of phenomena and that the experience of the noumena though so Im not really sure that, even if it could grasp the noumena, we wouldnt be able to make the distinction. which makes me think that the distinction probably doesnt matter much.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 00:03:57 2022 No.20849959 >>20849958 *we would be able to make the distinction.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 02:09:42 2022 No.20850481 >>20849958 >logic is another method of communicating phenomena and not a set of binding relations?

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 03:34:05 2022 No.20850806 File: 74 KB, 480x480, 27eyr5.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] >>20842250

Anonymous Wed Aug 17 09:21:07 2022 No.20851654

>>20850481
they are a set of relations but relations are phenomenal and are only binding in the sense that they are used to communicate an interpretation of the phenomena we have experienced. I wouldnt say that, once we give voice to logical reasoning, phenomena that logical reasoning speaks about becomes more real or anything like that

Anonymous Wed Aug 17 12:30:55 2022 No.20852214

>>20813887
>Plato mogs Heidegger
Platon made the same mistake as Plotinus desu
Plotinus described Being as the "one", and Platon as "idea", both make the mistake since "one" is the same as "being one". Being "one" includes Being.
Also only undergrads care about "X mogs/refutes/debookns Y"

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 12:48:24 2022 No.20852283 >>20852214 > Plotinus described Being as the "one", and Platon as "idea", both make the mistake since "one" is the same as "being one". Being "one" includes Being. Could you expand more on what you mean by that?

Anonymous Wed Aug 17 13:00:48 2022 No.20852333

>>20852214
Did you even read Plotinus, or Aristotle for that matter? Aristotle correctly argued that being and oneness are the same thing, at least in a certain sense: To be is to be one. Plotinus rectified this by showing that oneness is, extrapolating from this and other lines of thought, therefore binding on and more encompassing than being, it transcends both being and non-being. It neither is nor is not.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 13:04:51 2022 No.20852343 >>20852333 > Aristotle correctly argued that being and oneness are the same thing, at least in a certain sense Yes but you "are" before you are "one", being and being one isn't the same, being transcendents oneness

Anonymous Wed Aug 17 13:17:26 2022 No.20852382

>>20852343
>being and being one isn't the same
It is the same in the sense in which I used it (a one-way relationship), but it is not the same unqualifiedly, obviously, because One is not nor is, therefore oneness does not imply being nor non-being. Anything that is, is already one, otherwise it doesn't get the term "thing." Thing has oneness but neither is nor is not. Which is not to imply that things or a thing are The One, I am merely attempting to assist your journey here in simpler terms.
>Yes but you "are" before you are "one"
And what reasoning do you have to assert this? Before you answer this, move away from the phenomenological response, it only obfuscates the basic question by appealing to vagaries (psychological notions). My instant response to the phenomenological response will simply be the empirical fact that I have never known my witnessing self as two different things (especially considering there would have to be a unity which unifies awareness of the two thereby allowing me to assert their separability), the witnessing consciousness is always one so long as I am and have been. This doesn't prove anything but it disposes of that line of argument off the bat.

Anonymous Wed Aug 17 13:26:14 2022 No.20852412

>>20852382
>My instant response to the phenomenological response will simply be the empirical fact that I have never known my witnessing self as two different things (especially considering there would have to be a unity which unifies awareness of the two thereby allowing me to assert their separability), the witnessing consciousness is always one so long as I am and have been. This doesn't prove anything but it disposes of that line of argument off the bat.
>Ive never known my witnessing self as two different things
your response to the phenomenal argument hinges on your experience (or lack there of) of phenomena?

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 13:27:10 2022 No.20852415 >>20852412 That's why I said it doesn't prove anything.

Anonymous Wed Aug 17 13:39:04 2022 No.20852451

>>20852415
ok then I fail to see why one would move away from the phenomenological response other than to make a sort of statement like "if this thing that is a factor want than I could see how you would get to that conclusion" which I think is a nothing statement because one you can do that with anything and two I dont see how it leads to fruitful discussion. its a but of a nothing statement anyway at that point.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 13:40:07 2022 No.20852454 >>20852451 *want should be werent, I dont know what happened there.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 13:40:16 2022 No.20852456 >>20851654 what is beyond logic then? what does logic attempt to describe?

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 13:46:11 2022 No.20852470 >>20852456 the phenomena that points to the Truth. I feel like I have said this a lot.

Anonymous Wed Aug 17 13:46:46 2022 No.20852471

>>20849328
>>20849402
>What is lost or, perhaps, intentionally ignored is the conceptual component that we put into the construction of even the most primitive of things, the things whose being we are supposed to let emerge by stepping back, as Heidegger would have it. The workshop filled with tools is a world we have constructed. Klein recognizes that the Greeks thought of numbers as things and that these things belong to Greek metaphysics. To oversimplify, the metaphysical project of Greek thought is to find the things that are themselves self-subsistent and upon which everything else depends. Whether these things were named “the one,” “the forms,” or “ousiai” matters less than the notion that what is primary is some primary, individual thing. The primacy of primary things is the key idea for western metaphysics for nearly two millennia until, with the rise of modern science, it is replaced with primary relations (causal relations or scientific laws). This is not the place to lament or praise this transformation. My point is more basic: the notion of a primary thing is as much of an intellectual creation as a scientific law. The slogan of the phenomenologists, “back to the things themselves,” has an element of disingenuousness. From the moment man recognized himself in nature, that is, from the moment he grasped that it was his role to name the things in nature, to give them their identity, an identity which was, therefore, not only theirs but his as well, man put himself into things and the things were part of man. My point is that what Klein wants to call the concrete things are already pervaded with the concept that they are either primary individuals themselves or depend on something else. These primary individuals must somehow be the basis for numbers. Just how something one could account for something intrinsically many is the central problem I have been discussing. It is a problem because numbers do belong among noetic entities. Again, how could something intrinsically many be rooted in a single entity, something intrinsically one. That is what Klein wrestles with and what I have tried to explain here.
Wow. I feel like there's some hope of getting to the heart of the issue. If only a little more clarity was imparted.
>said the wannabe philosopher for the millionth time in the Western tradition

Anonymous Wed Aug 17 13:48:27 2022 No.20852481

>>20852470
because I'm not satisfied with the way you describe logic as a mere method of communication. it makes it sound like it doesn't have anything to do with the truth whatsoever, like it's a poor way of packaging the phenomenal contents to make it intelligible. if logic isn't inherent in the noumena in any way then we're doomed.

Anonymous Wed Aug 17 13:54:14 2022 No.20852492

>>20852451
>ok then I fail to see why one would move away from the phenomenological response
For the same reason that my response doesn't prove anything, if it doesn't say anything definitive, then why bother? I will stress again that it seems absurd to assert that I was ever anything without also being one, and not just for the obvious Descartes reason (I = one subject). If I were actually two, how would I ever know it concretely as a matter of phenomenological experience? It would be like saying that I am both you and myself at the same time. At that point "I" becomes a literal abstraction which is even less meaningful than Descartes's; it no longer even has phenomenological validity because it is not a matter of direct experience. There would have to be a unifying awareness which would be one in order to be able to know that these two beings are two (but this would obviously itself be one therefore refuting the opposite point).

Anonymous Wed Aug 17 14:03:31 2022 No.20852522

>>20852481
how does it seem like it doesnt have anything to do with the truth when I literally just said it has something to do with the truth? logic is the language that we give (although likely imperfect) to a certain collection of phenomena which ultimately points to the Truth. in other words, if we start from what is real to what we are talking about: Truth -> phenomena -> subset of phenomena describable in terms of logic -> our experience of that phenomena -> our comprehension and communication of that phenomena in terms of logic.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 14:05:31 2022 No.20852529 >>20852522 >logic is another method of communicating phenomena (Id attach it to mathematics) Because this statement throws the entire idea that it communicates truth into doubt. If logic isn't a Platonic object then it's over.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 14:14:03 2022 No.20852555 >>20852529 phenomena communicates truth and logic communicates phenomena. so, though indirectly, logic communicates truth. but the phenomena comes first.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 14:20:45 2022 No.20852577 >>20852555 does noumena operate by logic too?

Anonymous Wed Aug 17 14:36:20 2022 No.20852635

>>20852577
in the sense the the noumena is the projector of phenomena Id say partially though I hesitate to say that it "operates by logic." its more like it operates and we comprehends portions of that operation as logic (which is a subtle distinction so I dont care about it much). The thing is that not all phenomena is communicable in the language of logic. which brings me back to my original point, that we need multiple languages including mathematics and poetry to get a most complete understanding of the Truth, even if our limitations of experience may keep us from understanding the whole Truth.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 14:59:12 2022 No.20852706 >>20852635 >The thing is that not all phenomena is communicable in the language of logic. Like what?

Anonymous Wed Aug 17 15:04:19 2022 No.20852725

>>20852706
the experience of the redness of read for example. pretty much anything we experience that we have decided is better described in terms of poetry. there is also the actual phenomena of logic itself (what it is to be something AND something else for example or what the experience of cause and effect is like). qualia

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 15:07:21 2022 No.20852734 >>20852725 Qualia could just be the consequence of being premise and consequence within a greater syllogism. I don't know how you could comprehend the redness of read without logic being part of the process somehow.

Anonymous Wed Aug 17 15:12:26 2022 No.20852748

>>20852734
Im not saying it isnt part of it, but it isnt complete. I get this sense that you think I am saying that logic isnt powerful which is definitely not the case.
>Qualia could just be the consequence of being premise and consequence within a greater syllogism.
could you elaborate on this a little? I think I know what you mean but I dont want to respond without a little clarification.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 15:22:45 2022 No.20852780 >>20841616 elaborate

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 15:28:34 2022 No.20852795 >>20852748 >>20852780 U guys really need to get laid. I mean for real. Elaborate on some pussy instead of the words of rejects, ya mean?

Anonymous Wed Aug 17 16:06:08 2022 No.20852898

>>20852795
I gave up on having sex because I decided that life wasn't worth living if I were just gonna keep unintentionally fucking it up and hurting people by not understanding the question of Being. For some of you careless narcissists and psychopaths, that thought never even comes up in your mind.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 16:07:12 2022 No.20852899 >>20852748 I honestly don't know how to clarify further. I wouldn't mind if you just went full speed ahead. We'll see how it turns out. Maybe that's the missing piece for me.

Anonymous Wed Aug 17 17:03:10 2022 No.20853063
File: 155 KB, 350x478, 1660737168978558.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]

>>20813399
Mathematics is not embodied. There are sensible limits on intuitions. We don't have access to infinity and continuity like we think we do.
>>20834942
>>20835009
>>20835069
>>20836763
>>20837006
>>20837622
>Again I haven't been following the conversation but if the debate is over the discoverability and thus immutability of mathematics then there are really some horrible confusions in most discussions of this topic, mainly resulting from the lack of a distinction between mathematical realism IN NATURE and the isomorphy of mathematical CONCEPTS with the mathematical structure of the world. The algebraic, abstract geometry on which most of modern mathematics is founded is a contingent, linguistic, conceptual system and only one possible model of the world. Check out Klein's Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origins of Algebra, one of the most difficult books you will ever read probably but worth suffering through. Also check out Norman Wildberger's channel on Youtube, he is a finitist who does a good job of showing the contingency of current/mainstream foundations for mathematics. Read Morris Kline's Loss of Certainty too, it's short and if you know maths it's very easy and fun. Read Burtt's Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science too if you can. And if you didn't find Klein too brutal, then Husserl's Crisis.
All the posts I quoted and this quote in particular can be explained by what's going on in pic-related. Probably one of the hardest troll mathematics to explain.

Anonymous Wed Aug 17 18:44:43 2022 No.20853385

>>20852899
>Qualia could just be the consequence of being premise and consequence within a greater syllogism.
are you saying that, if we knew what qualia was a consequence of and a premise to that we could explain qualia (not the term but actual qualia like the experience of red or something like that) in purely in terms of logic (to reiterate by communicate I mean invoke the actual phenomena in a persons experience)?

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 18:47:38 2022 No.20853398 >>20853063 The perimeter in that pic is still 4 for the same reason why coastlines can be something like 100,000 mi long; the jagged structure remains through each level of iteration, and never actually smooths out.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 19:36:29 2022 No.20853639 >>20853398 The coastline on my city is 100,000 miles long and is completely straight.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 19:50:07 2022 No.20853705 >>20853639 and nicknamed my penis "the coastline on my city." and that penis... was albert einstein.

>>	Anonymous Wed Aug 17 22:04:59 2022 No.20854387 >>20853398 probably could be infinite, depending on the measurement

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 18 00:27:21 2022 No.20855017 >>20852471 bump

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 18 04:53:33 2022 No.20856028 >>20844872 A soul is an entity with an awareness. The mystical soul is one with an awareness of God. In the mystical state, you are supposedly perceiving Reality directly. You realize "I am God."

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 18 06:22:40 2022 No.20856256 so, according to this thread, I should be studying is real analysis, right?

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 18 07:41:48 2022 No.20856421 File: 410 KB, 1342x2048, A298D49F-C840-4236-A1F7-228E937BCE78.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] >>20856256 You should get into Schopenhauer first.

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 18 12:38:36 2022 No.20857168 >>20856421 why?

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 18 13:10:52 2022 No.20857279 >>20857168 Because he is my favorite philosopher, that’s why.

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 18 16:02:09 2022 No.20857900 >>20857279 Debunked by Schelling and Kierkegaard.

Anonymous Thu Aug 18 16:33:11 2022 No.20857988

>>20856256
Yes I think real analysis is something worth studying if you want to poke at the sore spots in geometric intuition (which is the sort of intuition at issue in some of the earlier discussions IMO — does it deserve primacy, can we rely on it, is it prior to or posterior to our physics, etc).

But also I am reading through the recs from the earlier effortposter and I would recommend that, too, the Kline is short and is going to the heart of things quickly.

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 18 16:37:48 2022 No.20858003 >>20857988 I already read through secondary literature of Kline. He seems to fall short too. See here: >>20849205 >>20849260 >>20849328 >>20849402

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 18 16:38:51 2022 No.20858009 >>20857988 You ever see this problem? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rv0c7R8brjE

Anonymous Thu Aug 18 18:23:16 2022 No.20858418

>>20858003
Falls short in what sense? Sorry, I read your linked posts but have not had time to visit the PDF. I'm not sure what the posts were in response to so I am probably missing something -- he falls short of providing clarity? Of convincing us that numbers are heaps?

To be fair, I meant Kline as in Morris Kline, so I might be missing something there.

>>20858009
Sure. I think that video you just linked does a good job of putting this back in a context where intuition applies in a meaningful sense, is there something sticking out to you?

Anonymous Thu Aug 18 18:35:53 2022 No.20858475

>>20858418
It's an investigation of space, time, infinity, etc. I also mistakenly referred to Klein instead of Kline lol. My bad. IIRC Klein reverts to a numeric realism. Natural ontology is just assuming a certain base, name, etc. and running with it.

Anonymous Thu Aug 18 18:36:53 2022 No.20858486
File: 27 KB, 460x389, Dz3bQePXQAURg0G.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]

>>20858418
Sorry if I can't explain it. I just feel burnt out by my summer's investigations. I'm just going to read Subversion of Christianity, Meditations on the Tarot, and wrap up my appreciation of Peirce. And put this stuff away for a long time.

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 18 19:08:44 2022 No.20858645 >>20852481 Yes you are doomed, however you are only doomed insofar as you understand logic to be a law beyond humanity.

Anonymous Thu Aug 18 19:20:10 2022 No.20858702
File: 661 KB, 2000x1717, Metropolitan_Square_-_Washington_DC_-_north_on_15th_Street_NW.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]

>>20813399
Heidegger can tongue my anus. While you retards waste your time on his garbage, like paid scientists in lab coats picking through his stools to see what he had for dinner, I'm gonna netflix and chill

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 18 19:20:51 2022 No.20858705 >>20813399 You don't have to get too far into the Republic to see they're doing proofs

Anonymous Thu Aug 18 19:35:12 2022 No.20858764

Mathematics are a flawed system. They cannot and will never be able to represent reality.
This was obvious with π. Then √2. Then the entire field of complex mathematics. Then boolean logic. Then quantum fields.
At best our numerical recreation of the world is a flawed and incomplete tool we can use to stumble across reality (never too sure of our accuracy; scientists pretend anything smaller than an atom for their calculations "doesn't matter", anyone who understands we're warping reality would faint at the notion), one that isn't self-serving nor can prove its own existence, and the tools derived from it (such as biochemical and computational fields) are also a weak parody of the real, the analog, the tangible, in which the best we can hope for are "good enough"s as we doom our brothers to certain death and countless tragedies.
In this sense I believe poetry to be a more accurate representation of the world, experiencing itself through its numerous subjects and states of being. I haven't read much on Plato's mathematical explorations, but it's grossly depressing to think he saw them as an extension of innate human knowledge that could accurately represent anything more than warped abstractions.

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 18 19:42:11 2022 No.20858794 File: 251 KB, 576x400, 654321.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] >>20858764 go do all the math you want, i'll make the money

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 18 20:34:40 2022 No.20859028 >>20858764 is poetry not also an abstraction of what is real? Is what we perceive as reality not also an abstraction of what is real?

>>	Anonymous Thu Aug 18 22:20:01 2022 No.20859501 >>20858645 What is beyond logic?

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 02:12:27 2022 No.20860308 >>20859501 faith >t. kierkegaard

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 02:30:35 2022 No.20860378 >>20837242 ur just means prime, therefore, urmath is counting and urpoetry are onomatopoeia

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 02:34:52 2022 No.20860398 >>20858794 >posts that low-res shitty apartment interior as if I'm supposed to be jealous of it Corner windows are nice but those clear hard chairs, YEEECH!!

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 02:37:34 2022 No.20860410 >>20860378 good catch anon. what about names? how does names, language, symbols, etc. fit into this perspective.

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 02:45:13 2022 No.20860437 >>20860410 You're too far ahead losing yourself in abstractions of higher order. Start with sounds, syllabels and vowels or even gestures like pointing at something and facial expression. So basically start with everything material

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 02:47:15 2022 No.20860443 >>20860437 what is the ur-name, and how does an ur-name fit into your perspective?

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 02:53:34 2022 No.20860468 >>20860443 pointing at something if you consider a name as reference and not an identity

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 03:02:23 2022 No.20860510 >>20860468 what turns a reference into an identity?

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 04:48:53 2022 No.20860844 >>20860510 bump

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 10:54:18 2022 No.20861931 bump

Anonymous Fri Aug 19 12:24:00 2022 No.20862156

>>20860510
First of all, identity different from logical identity is a spook and logical identity is kind of meaningless. A laymen understanding of identity are the perceived, communicated and if possible self-reflected modes of being of something. However, this endevour in itself is fruitless since you're not even able to give an account of your own identity. To answer you question spook reference turns into identity because of experience and logical reference turns into identity because of comparision

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 13:07:05 2022 No.20862279 >>20860844 >>20861931 just let this thread die already. it stopped being good days ago. should have never let that guy who was afraid of fucking up the thread post. sage

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 13:21:17 2022 No.20862328 >>20862279 It's actually still good. I'm enjoying it. >>20862156 Spook identity is kind of a living thing then, isn't it? Also, when did we sneak logical identities into the picture? I feel like they exist beyond spooks.

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 13:31:10 2022 No.20862359 >>20862328 enjoyable =/= good. orphanage fires are still fun to look at.

Anonymous Fri Aug 19 13:47:18 2022 No.20862405

>>20862359
This is actually a great thread still, and I'd stand by it. People are still giving me good answers that are personally fulfilling. If you don't see what's going on then you were probably filtered from the beginning and have no business calling it a good thread in the first place. And if I were to restart it, then I'd have to do all this dialectic all over again from scratch and hope that high quality anons visit the thread again, which is not easy to do.

So don't tell me what to do. I'll keep posting until the thread slides or until I'm satisfied.

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 13:52:21 2022 No.20862414 >>20862405 Dont worry babe, ill put u out of ur suffering.

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 13:53:22 2022 No.20862416 >>20862405 just let it go and find peace

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 13:54:32 2022 No.20862421 >>20862405 I know it can be hard leaving a comfort zone but once you're out, u never want to go back

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 13:56:08 2022 No.20862428 >>20862405 The beginning of evils is distraction. Virtue doesnt permit vainglory in thoughts

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 13:57:22 2022 No.20862431 >>20862405 Complacency leads to defeat, just as an unpolished gem does not sparkle.

Anonymous Fri Aug 19 13:58:29 2022 No.20862433

>>20862414
>>20862416
>>20862421
>>20862428
>>20862431
Seething acknowledgedposters. >>20842250 You will NEVER be recognized.
Don't worry, I'll wrap things up.
>>20862328
Spook identity is something that's living. Logical identity is like a niche. But niches can change.

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 13:58:34 2022 No.20862434 >>20862405 We should not accuse the darkness that does not now exist but approve the light that shines. Struggle now and cling to life

Anonymous Fri Aug 19 14:00:07 2022 No.20862438

>>20862433
>Spook identity is something that's living.
I'm reminded of the Egyptian conception of name. Names continue to live on until they cease to be used. Can apply to everything related to ur-names.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ancient_Egyptian_conception_of_the_soul

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 14:01:20 2022 No.20862442 >>20862433 >Don't worry, I'll wrap things up. Ill permit u 5 more posts before the unwindable clock starts ticking. Use it well

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 14:08:02 2022 No.20862462 >>20862442 wait does the bump limit start at 300 or 301?

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 14:09:27 2022 No.20862465 >>20862462 I realize now that i may have committed the sin of empty words. For I promised something that was not possible

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 14:13:34 2022 No.20862476 >>20862465 Yes to be free is a great happiness, but to be free from sin a is a greater still

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 14:15:08 2022 No.20862482 >>20862465 Don't worry. I'll condense the insights of this thread and make another, even higher midwit-filtering thread.

Anonymous Fri Aug 19 14:16:34 2022 No.20862486

>>20862482
A scholar who truly attains clear-minded understanding who grasp the profound mirror in his mind, illuminating things brilliantly and not changing his mind on account of whether something is ancient or current, will accordingly propound his writing and clearly point out his views. Then even though his coffin might close, he would have no regrets.

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 15:13:06 2022 No.20862663 >>20862482 dope. do it.

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 15:19:41 2022 No.20862686 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C4%81dhan%C4%81

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 15:29:31 2022 No.20862719 >>20862686 gtfo

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 15:31:51 2022 No.20862725 >>20862719 Out of my own thread?

Anonymous Fri Aug 19 16:06:43 2022 No.20862835

>>20860773
>I was thinking about the perfection "proof" last night and its relation to Philebus while high, and the intuitive truth of it finally struck me in the relation of the unlimited to the limited. One might be naturally inclined to say of what is unqualifiedly perfect that, because it is unqualified, it is therefore also unlimited. But anything which is unlimited is without form. If Perfection is unlimited and without any form or measure, then it, although this is only analogical to spatial forms, becomes shapeless and imperfect, because it is boundless and therefore irreducible to either perfection or imperfection, in the same way that a sphere expanded infinitely is no longer a sphere, yet is also in a way still a perfect sphere (more perfect that anything which is limited). In order for Perfection to be recognized, there must be a measure, which is what we would call a gradient, the perfect has to stand in contrast to the slightly less perfect, and the slightly less perfect to the much less perfect, and so on, until you come theoretically to what is not at all perfect. This is not meant to insinuate the Perfect is either limited or unlimited necessarily... Just that it is limited viewed from a certain perspective, but unlimited from another. The conclusion? I think this is what Plato may have partly meant by the "mixed" being superior to either the limit or the unlimited.
I see you anon.

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 18:21:30 2022 No.20863272 by the grace of Allah this thread will not slide until its purpose has been served

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 21:01:32 2022 No.20863937 >>20863272 mashallah >>20862156 >>20862328 would love a continuation here

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 23:40:27 2022 No.20864566 File: 101 KB, 272x274, 1560391811772.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] >>20860378 >>20860410 >>20860437 >>20860443 >>20860468 >>20860510 >>20862156 >>20862328 bump

>>	Anonymous Fri Aug 19 23:53:56 2022 No.20864636 >>20862328 >>20862433 Spook identity is only living as far as it is perceived since not everything and it's mode of being is living but mere existing. I added logic only because I was using reference

>>	Anonymous Sat Aug 20 00:01:01 2022 No.20864665 >>20864636 If it stops existing, can it be resurrected?

>>	Anonymous Sat Aug 20 00:34:05 2022 No.20864843 >>20864665 A boulder exists and can't be resurrected

Anonymous Sat Aug 20 01:46:45 2022 No.20865188

Guys I was reading this fragment from the sep on Proclus and I'm a bit confused. Maybe someone ITT can help me, since I'm not a native English speaker.

> Every body has by its own nature the capacity to be acted upon, every incorporeal thing the capacity to act, the former being in itself inactive, the latter impassive; but through association with the body, the incorporeal too is acted upon, just as bodies too can act because of the participation in incorporeal entities.

>In this proposition Proclus first sets apart the corporeal and incorporeal as being active/impassible and passive/inactive respectively. However, the two realms are not absolutely separate from each other.

First line is from Proclus, second line is from the author of the article. Shouldn't the author have said that:
> corporeal and incorporeal as being passive/inactive and active/impassible respectively.
instead of
>corporeal and incorporeal as being active/impassible and passive/inactive respectively.
?

Isn't the corporeal passive and inactive? I either don't understand the fragment from Proclus, or I'm not understanding the way the author uses "respectively" in this context. I take it to mean this:
>a and b are 1 and 2, respectively
>a is 1 and b is 2

>>	Anonymous Sat Aug 20 05:05:49 2022 No.20866005 >>20813399 >the Relationship Between Mathematics and Poetry there isn't any. philosophers don't understand mathmatics so they browbeat smarter people into submission with non-sense theorums that are as absurd as they are unprovable and unverifiable.

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/lit/ - Literature