How do I break out of Analytic Philosophy?

[Anonymous No.20773183]

It's neat, quasi-mathematical formalisms, and use of intuitionism is extremely seductive and yet there's clearly something missing. Something that classical philosophy of the Greeks has and analytic philosophy lacks.

I always was averse to the feels over reals mentality of the continentals. It doesn't help that it overwhelmingly pushes collectivist nonsense. In the past, I didn't care for so-called "mental masturbation", but I now see practical uses of dialectics, and other aesthetic presentation in helping realize the ineffable. It's a kind of rationalistic mysticism which I desire.

Any places to get this, or other foundational critiques of Analytic philosophy?

[Anonymous No.20773236]

>>20773183

[Anonymous No.20773282]

>>20773236
Thanks for the tip, I've been looking for good arguments against Empiricism.

However, per OP, I'm looking for perspective of philosophers outside the analytic tradition. Followers of CS Pierce, perhaps?

[Anonymous No.20773317]

As a self-declared 'continental philosopher' I know what you're talking about. I took out of principle at least 1/3 of my courses as analytic courses, but I never 'got it' in the sense you're talking about. But continental philosophy, and this may be because I have no academic ambitions, isn't that much better. When you really dive in deep, beside the point that as a researchers you will practically do the same shit with both anyway, it's again about logic and those same 'quasi-mathematical' formalisms, but packaged differently and not as concerned with appearing mathematical or scientific in a contemporary sense.
Maybe you're talking about something in between aesthetics and purposiveness of how continental philosophy (or may we say synthetic philosophy) is more "about philosophy" than analytic philosophy, which as stated still tries to interface with sciences - from what I've heard - on a somewhat common ground specifically not-speculative. That
'Something' is maybe this speculation you're missing, which you wouldn't find in analytic philosophy because of the lack of Hegel but would of course in continental philosophy because of dominance of Hegel. 'Speculative', which is how Hegel is so different from Kant; how he intended to bridge S-O and the two worlds issue with Kant. (Hegel specifically is why I put that neat synthetic vs analytic dichotomy up there, referring somewhere after §223 in the Zusätze. He talks abotu formal-ism and theorems and synthetic/analytic.) You might get around Kant, but you can't avoid Hegel, no matter where go you with German or French philosophy after Hegel.

The issue however that just reading speculative philosophy such as Hegel isn't enough when you're reading them still as a 'analytic philosopher'. I find in general that these popular categories are breaking down anyway. But following with analytic philosophers who themselves expressed similar desires as you and started reading Hegel from the 90s onward, I think, gives a somewhat skewed picture I heard people call 'pitiful'.
That may be due to trenches and barbed wire in the older generation or because those philosophers "can't into Hegel" from their pov, or more generously don't want to conform more so with how continental philosophy is actually done beyond just the thematic freedom, also the methodological freedom which differentiates the two even in a undergrad/grad studying practice. Where you probably could go into another point about the differences in teaching between the two which also takes great part in the appeal of, for example, continental philosophy when you're discontent with Anglo-US university culture as philosophy is such a painfully academic and closed off field.

[Anonymous No.20773440]

>>20773317
Hegel is tough to grasp. I would probably need a companion book or two. And pretty much all academic subjects are "closed off". Autodidacts are never taken seriously, even if they have credentials in related fields. It's an unfortunate product of the modern institutional zeitgeist.

[Anonymous No.20773519]

>>20773183
Husserl is a nice bridge between the two. >>20773183

[Anonymous No.20773535]

>>20773519
I agree. Husserl is definitely underrated in the US.

[Anonymous No.20773666]

>>20773183
If you want to just get out of analyticism, you should as the anon above said read Husserl but also Heidegger. But you said:
>It's a kind of rationalistic mysticism which I desire.
You won't find it in continental philosophy (although there are certain exceptions). For this there are two routes. First there is the thinkers associated with the Eranos circle, figures such as C.G. Jung, Mircea Eliade, and Henry Corbin. Then there is the 'Traditionalist' school, which despite the memes is actually legit. From this group look into the worke of Guénon, Fritjhof Schuon, and their most prominent contemporary representative S.H. Nasr. Imo reading them in the order I wrote them above probably would be best (ie phenomenology > Eranos circle > Traditionalism), which is the order I myself approached them by chance.

[Anonymous No.20773694]

>>20773183
Define individual and society without using either term or concept. Oh look concepts aren't logically representable in themselves but only in their perfect relationships.

[Anonymous No.20773743]

>>20773440
Who cares about being 'taken seriously'? Just do your own work. If it has merit, it should be enough for your own personal satisfaction.

[Anonymous No.20773754]

>>20773440
Who cares about being 'taken seriously'? Just do your own work. If it has merit, it should be enough for your own personal satisfaction. That said, in my own personal view reading Hegel is not of much benefit. It's blatant obsfucation without much intellectual merit. I think for "rationalistic mysticism," Schopenhauer is much more preferable. Given that he is known for writing precisely and clearly and not shying away from interpreting "mystical" works such as the Upanishads or Meister Eckhart in a logically rigorous manner.

[Anonymous No.20773771]

>>20773183
>Any places to get this, or other foundational critiques of Analytic philosophy?
Śrīharṣa's Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍanakhādya (The Sweets of Refutation) is directed at another school of Indian philosophy (Nyaya), but a lot of it is applicable to analytical philosophy and positivism; there are several English translations of it that have been published

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sriharsa/

[Anonymous No.20773784]

>>20773694
An individual is a featherless biped that can conceive of and communicate its interests.
A society is a collection of agents agreeing to obey a set of rules.
Under these definitions an AI is not an individual but it can participate in society.
I still agree that concepts exist in a context. I just wanted to try the challenge.

[Anonymous No.20773791]

>>20773317
>you can't avoid Hegel,
Yes, you can.

[Anonymous No.20773919]

>>20773784
>featherless biped that can conceive of and communicate its interests.
Yes, man is a rational animal. Congratulations for repeating the classical definition in more words.

[Anonymous No.20773986]

>>20773919
The point was to not have "society" depend on it and featherless biped is funny. Saying "rational" also doesn't always get the distinction across, as if animals aren't individuals because they're dumb. I know that's not what it means but talking about measurable things like communication is useful. A purely practical definition that's about respecting individuals to make sure they don't murder you would be based on things like the ability to communicate their interests. You don't need abstract ideas like rationality, you don't need to appeal to anything like morality, decency or virtue to respect individuals.

[Anonymous No.20774014]

>>20773986
You didn't even use 'individual' in your definition of society, you used 'agent', which you are yet to define. You said the individual "can conceive of and communicate its interest." Now this could either mean in a non-rational instinctual sense, such as we see for example in dolphines or primates, in which case your definition would include plucked chickens (to the delight of Diogenes) and also fully shaved apes. Are they individuals as well? Or if the conception and communication of interests is meant in a rational sense, then your definition could be reduced to the classical definition without much loss.

[Anonymous No.20774024]

Read The Limits of Analysis by Rosen

[Anonymous No.20774032]

>>20774014
Adding to what I said here. Actually you don't even need to shave the ape, because the definition says 'featherless', not 'hairless,' so the apes already qualify.

[Anonymous No.20774054]

>>20774014
>You didn't even use 'individual' in your definition of society, you used 'agent'
Which was the entire point. I'm also not going to define things "essentially" or define the entire chain of context my references rest on. I didn't define biped either, I referenced it. I also referenced the concept of agent and gave a non human example.
An animal doesn't conceive of its interests.
An agent is an identity that can interact with things, it includes almost everything. "Something that makes something happen".

[Anonymous No.20774069]

>>20774054
>Which was the entire point.
Only if agent and individual are not convertible.
>An animal doesn't conceive of its interests.
Again, conception of interests can be done in two ways: rational or non-rational. If your definition has the non-rational in mind, then animals certainly conceive of their interests in such a way. If you hit an animal, doesn't it squeak, run away, or try to defend itself? Doesn't it look for food every few hours? If your this is the case, then your definition includes animals. If not, that is, if conceiving of interests is meant in a rational way, then your definiton reduces to rational animal.
> includes almost everything.
Dogs obey a set of rules, as they are trained to do so. Are they part of society according to you?

[Anonymous No.20774077]

>>20774069
>Only if agent and individual are not convertible.
All individuals are agents but not all agents are individuals. I gave an example of AI so I shouldn't have to repeat all this.
>conception of interests can be done in two ways: rational or non-rational
No. When I hit an animal it responds based on conditioned responses and biological adaptations. It does not conceive of the event at all.
Yes dogs can be part of a society according to my definition. So can non human agents and insects. I already told you this.

[Anonymous No.20774152]

>>20774077
Your definition of society does not adhere to the common usage, which excludes animals. If we are not considering the common usage, I could as well define society ton include only myself, which would be just as nonsensical.
>No. When I hit an animal it responds based on conditioned responses and biological adaptations. It does not conceive of the event at all.
So you define 'conceiving' to mean conceiving in a rational way. Which is why your definition of individual is reducible to rational animal.

[Anonymous No.20774201]

>>20774152
>does not adhere to the common usage, which excludes animals
False. It's commonly used to describe what animals do. Insect societies are a common topic of discussion. In some cases I think about groups of non biological entities in terms of societies.
I told you why I didn't use the word rational. I could have but didn't. I don't define conceiving, I refer to the common usage which is about conceiving of ideas in a mind and then I elaborate by adding communication. The individual has to be able to conceive the idea of his own interests and communicate that conceptualization to some degree.

[Anonymous No.20774221]

>>20774201
>False. It's commonly used to describe what animals do. Insect societies are a common topic of discussion. In some cases I think about groups of non biological entities in terms of societies.
Equivocation fallacy. When 'society' is used without clarifying any context, the usage is commonly understood to refer to the human society. When one wants to refer to the society of ants, when specifies so. It is not the case that the society of animals includes the society of ants.
>I told you why I didn't use the word rational. I could have but didn't.
The point is your idea of 'conceiving' presupposes rationality. Which is why I am saying one could reduce your definition to rational animal.

Anyway, you already got several great recommendations. Rather than insisting on your obviously flawed definition, start reading the books.

[Anonymous No.20774229]

>>20773791
You just lost the game.

[Anonymous No.20774231]

>>20774229
You lose the moment you take Hegel seriously.

[Anonymous No.20774254]

>>20774221
>Equivocation fallacy
When you clarify you're clarifying what type of society it is, human or ant but both are societies.
>The point is your idea of 'conceiving' presupposes rationality
And bipeds presuppose life. I told you why I didn't use the word rational many times but you don't engage. You barely even read anything you replied to before replying.
>you already got several great recommendations
I assume you think I'm OP. You did not recommend anything or help me in any way. You repeatedly ignored what I said to mindlessly parrot irrelevant garbage and promote that as actual thinking. I wish my posts were critiqued by someone capable but you're simply not.

[Anonymous No.20774269]

>>20774254
>And bipeds presuppose life.
Precisely, hence biped could be reduced to the 'animal' part of 'rational animal'.
> You repeatedly ignored what I said to mindlessly parrot irrelevant garbage and promote that as actual thinking.
I didn't mean to dismiss your attempts, which is fine as far as attempts at definitions go. To clarify, to address why you don't use rational animal you said:
>I know that's not what it means but talking about measurable things like communication is useful. A purely practical definition that's about respecting individuals to make sure they don't murder you would be based on things like the ability to communicate their interests.
This is all well and good, but my concern here is logical reduction, not practice. Could your definition be logically reduced to rational animal? In my opinion that is so.

[Anonymous No.20774301]

>>20774269
It could be reduced a lot more depending on context. If we both agree to reference it as "x" then I just have to say x. Conceiving and communicating implies the reasoning for why rationality should be the distinction. It has more information, if you reduce it the information is removed. I could also make the definitions more verbose and try to make it work in even more contexts where less is assumed to be known by the reader.

[Anonymous No.20774315]

>>20774301
Which is why I said *logical* reduction, ie, reducing it without losing any logically meaningful feature which could not once again be derived from the reduced form. Here one could reduce "conceiving of interests" to the more basic feature that is 'rational', and once again one could derive "conceiving of interests" from the more basic form, 'rational'. So in the logically reduced form, no logically meaningful feature is lost.

[Anonymous No.20774323]

>>20773183
Just read Hegel (the Science of Logic) and "help him" to make it work, i.e. don't get caught up in errors and inconsistencies to dismiss his thought but see what you would have to change so you could accept it.
With this you will not only get something (or probably a lot even) from Hegel but also learn how continentals read other philosophers.

[Anonymous No.20774327]

>>20773183
protip, the greeks were not part of the bourgeois revival of the academia in order to gain power and get intellectuals seat on their asses in comfy universities.
If you want to do philosophy, you have to leave academia forever.

[Anonymous No.20774336]

Hegel was a low IQ child of the French revolution and the Enlightenment and helped translate radical literature in German from French during the height of German Enlightenment hopes that the Revolution still represented a new epoch in human consciousness, the fruit of a century of emergence of bourgeois civil society, freedom of thought and expression, and post-feudal social and econommic behaviours, but the Revolution produced Jacobinism, and its legacy was ultimately more mixed and pragmatic constitutions like Napoleon's Empire (with its codes, reforms, and rationalising-renewing outlook) and the Prussian state after Jena (which sought to imitate the French Revolution's and Napoleon's reforms "from the top down" and without a social revolution). Hegel adapted his enthusiasm for the Enlightenment and the finer aspects of the revolution project to the romantic platonist idealism then current, which also featured a strong enthusiasm for a "process-oriented" creative misinterpretation of Spinoza's Cartesian rationalism, which heavily emphasized the ultimate IMMANENCE of rationality, which clashed with the mystical and intuitive turn then being taken by people like Schelling, Goethe. Hegel elevated Enlightenment historiosophy to the culmination of process-Spinozist immanent rationality, but he also absorbed and subordinated the mystical and intuitive elements in German Protestant and pietist thinking, including his own strong affinity for the German mystical tradition (especially Eckhart and Bohme), with the result that Spinozist immanent "pure" thinking/rationality is the teleological endpoint of a world-process that is simultaneously mystical-intuitive-noetic and purely immanent, with the intuited element (the pure Idea in its "completeness" rather than its "otherness," as traditional mystics would have it) being turned into the telos of a historical-phenomenological process, even though this involved ambiguities about when and how this process would be completed, if ever (the same ambiguities invoked by Fichte's subjective idealism, which is why later radical Hegelian had a Fichtean reading of Hegel), which ambiguities then forced Hegel to prevaricate and probably dial back the historiosophical process he had outlined in order to make it less utopian-eschatological and more asymptotic and "regulative" in the Kantian sense, which is ironically a lapse back to Kant's own perspective in "What is Enlightenment?" and his musings on a philosophical anthropology and history of reason.

The Phenomenology of Spirit represents an early phase in this development where Hegel may have been more confident and thus content with "limning" the process unsystematically, explaining the contradictions and irresolvable ambiguities in the text, such as whether it describes only a phenomenological process or an historical one, or both, whether it describes the progress of one "Geist," mind, or the inevitable progress of every mind, OR the progress of THE world-Mind.

[Anonymous No.20774339]

lmao

[Anonymous No.20774392]

>>20774315
>Which is why I said *logical* reduction
This distinction makes no sense and this doesn't engage with anything I said in the post. Reducing the definition to x in a context where it's already defined as x is just as logical. We can reduce the definition to "human" if we want to and it's just as logical, no information was lost if you assume all the implications you assign to human are shared like you do with "rational".
Rational is abstract, there's no empirical test involved. Communication of ideas contains a test. Reducing it to rational removes information and actually does have a different meaning.

[Anonymous No.20774409]

>>20773183
>I always was averse to the feels over reals mentality of the continentals. It doesn't help that it overwhelmingly pushes collectivist nonsense.
when you totally know what you're talking about

[Anonymous No.20774544]

>>20773183
Do you have any interest in reading psychoanalysis? Something like Fink's The Lacanian Subject is a fine intro, and will smash the naive conception of subjectivity used in analytic philosophy.

[Anonymous No.20774820]

>>20774024
How would that help?

[Anonymous No.20774906]

>>20773183
There are three thinkers you could look up that might interest you. Stanley Rosen's Limits of Analysis is a reasonable critique that doesn't try to throw out the baby with the bathwater. His teacher, Leo Strauss, has many reasonable and similar critiques of positivism in his books and lectures, but maybe the best thing to read by him is his essay, An Epilogue, which underlines the differences between ancient and modern reasoning applied to politics and ethics. Rosen's fellow student of Strauss, Richard Kennington, has a collection of essays on the early modern precursors to analytic thought, On Modern Origins, looking at Descartes, Bacon, Spinoza, and he makes clear what their guiding assumptions are in rejecting ancient reason and formulating something modeled after math.

[Anonymous No.20774914]

>>20773183
>Something that classical philosophy of the Greeks has and analytic philosophy lacks.
Nous?

[Anonymous No.20775811]

>>20773183
>rational mysticism
philosophy isn't for you

[Anonymous No.20776195]

>>20774409
By "collectivism", I was talking about fascism, communism and leftist anarchism. Bankrupt 20th century political ideologies which almost exclusively invoke continental philosophy in their justification.

[Anonymous No.20776236]

>>20774914
Nous, Logos, emanationist cosmology, that's very much on the nose. But I'm not *against* analytic philosophy, I just want to explore its limitations at understanding reality, and cognition/intuition in particular, as >>20774906 >>20774024 bring up

[Anonymous No.20776272]

I do believe this thread is a great example in why philosophers wish to keep the subject esoteric and impenetrable, because of their fucking inability to learn any scientific skill. Why bother actually learning about how things actually work when you can wax philosophic for several thousand pages, using archaic words that are not difficult to understand in essence just difficult to recognize.

"Hrmm yes I will now postulate why you feel sads after you cooms, here is my dissertation, starting in the ancient greeks the discovery of the yoinkshploinkyianism..."

[Anonymous No.20776330]

>>20776272
don't confuse niggers with black people, or philosophers with mystics

[Anonymous No.20776512]

>>20774544
More importantly, psychoanalysis can shake your faith in language (whether natural language or formal logic) as being a good-enough vehicle to convey truth.

[Anonymous No.20776573]

>>20776272
Science is easy though compared to philosophy, it's the other way around.

[Anonymous No.20776592]

>>20776573
>Science is easy though compared to philosophy,
lmao even

[Anonymous No.20776636]

>>20776592
Wherein do you think lies the difficulty of science?

[Anonymous No.20776694]

>>20776573
Yes, and there is a reason, outlined in the very post you pointed out.

because to such philosophers, it is within their best interest to keep things as esoteric and impenetrable as possible. Not because any of the ideas are actually difficult to grasp. But because it belies an intention to feel smart.

Actual scientists break things down to the easiest understandable component parts and work up from there.

Philosophers debate on what you mean when you say "cum" and divide it into 20 different subsections about the meaning of cum because it stems from a fear of being stripped from the self-appointed title of intellectual. If one digs a thousand tunnels to hide and flee from actual truth-seeking, they will never be forced to admit that they are wrong. This is the root of all metaphysical and analytical thinking. Make shit up that you can in no way prove, follow your tail around in circles and argue about the meanings and definitions of words and shit that doesn't matter to avoid figuring out how things actually work.

[Anonymous No.20776782]

>>20776694
>Actual scientists break things down to the easiest understandable component parts and work up from there.
Yes indeed, science (and here not in the Hegelian sense of the word) can do that but only by restricting the inquiry to that which yields to this approach.

[Anonymous No.20776822]

>>20776694
Lmao this makes me feel bad for the people who fell for the science meme.

[Anonymous No.20778214]

checkout Hubert Dreyfus' companion text to Heidegger, called Being in the world. maybe checkout some actual math, category theory and algebraic topology, though you'll need to build significant prerequisites for the latter. the idea being to see when and when not the axiomatic method plays a role in maths and when 'already being involved in the situation' is more the operative principle. do a psychedelic at least a few times also.