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/lit/ - Literature

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20632742 No.20632742 [Reply] [Original]

>Aristotle had 10 categories
>Plotinus had 5 categories
>Kant had 12 categories AND 12 judgments (wtf? where did they come in?) and dropped substance/essence/etc.
>Hegel had his famous triad
>Peirce remade the triad and did everything in triads?
wtf were these niggas doing? also, what would be the category for revelatory knowledge?

>> No.20632796

>>20632742
I don't know how you're conflating the categories with the triads, Pierce's Triad has more to do with the Appearance vs. Essence distinction than categories which are predicates of substances/essences, which was then ripped off by Lacan in his Real-Imaginary-Sylbolic triad
Hegel's Triad is simply dialectic, and arguably has more in common with Aristotle's causes than categories. (And the master-slave dichotomy was again ripped off by Lacan to which he added the Hysteric and Analyst)

>> No.20632819

>>20632796
>I don't know how you're conflating the categories with the triads
Because Hegel explicitly set to restructure the categories as triads in the Science of Logic.

>> No.20632831

>>20632819
Yeah, but that's a series of Triads... not the triad itself

>> No.20632877

>>20632831
fair enough, I misspoke. but the fact that he had a recursive triadic structure to structure his categories is still fascinating

>> No.20632893

>>20632877
Not really, he just repackaged the categories like Kant did. Kant did it with the Judgements in groups of 4, Hegel found a way to fit them into triads.
Now, were they right to constantly repackage and reorganize the categories? That's a good question. Some have noted that Aristotle's categories are primarily linguistic based. Could non-verbal or even Proprioception categories exist?

>> No.20633264

>>20632893

>Could non-verbal or even Proprioception categories exist?

Been a while since I read the first critique, isn't that literally what he did?

>> No.20633995

>>20633264
This lmao, assuming poster meant "pre-perception" which is a priori, that's exactly what he did. Space and Time are proto-linguistic, they structure the very appearance of things which we perceive as representations, including language.

>> No.20634192

>>20632893
emotion? logic?

>> No.20634203

Human cognition works categorically. We set bounds, semantic associations, ontological substance we even carefully tinker the relativity of all of the concepts defined by such variables above. So it's no surprise that our best minds also view the world in categories.

>> No.20634294

>>20632742
>revelatory knowledge?
what's that?

>> No.20635663

>>20633995
No, Proprioception which is stuff like sense of balance - like when riding a motorbike or doing ballet, knowing how to touch your nose on your face, or reaching to pull up your sock without looking at it

>> No.20636311

>>20632796
Please don’t mention Peirce if you don’t know what you’re talking about. You can blaspheme Kant, Hegel, Aristotle. Hell, even Plotinus. But you don’t come to my house and say that PEIRCE’s TRIAD ARE ABOUT APPEARANCE VS ESSENCE DO YOU EVEN GRASP THE IDEAS OF PRAGMATICISM? FUCKING ESSENCE? ARE YOU ABSOLUTELY SHITTING ME?

>> No.20636368

>>20636311
what does Peirce have to say about essence?
t. brainlet who never heard about Peirce before

>> No.20636520

>>20636368
I don’t know but the anon I replied to made me uneasy.
Peirce uses triads a lot and he wrote on a lot of different topics, mostly in scientific and mathematical context. Not philosophy. So talking about Peirce as appearance vs essence sounds weird. For our concern, the topic is metaphysics/epistemology. For most of philosophy, metaphysics /epistemology have dealt with elusive, mythical substances and structures. Peirce writes about it pretty radically different as a modern scientist/mathematician. Essence as such belonged to a previous era. His theories are more like series of steps in a hypothesis. The significance of the steps is that they’re self-differential and self-referencing. It’s akin to geometry in neo-Platonism but without any mythology. He’s focused on understanding the general process of existence by means of axioms and functions. For example, what is a sign? For Peirce, sign is a process the results in a sign. You are a sign. These words are signs. You reading these words is a process that can understood as being a sign waiting to be interpreted. It’s stuff like that but really interesting.
In general Peirce relates to process philosophy. You can search more on how process philosophy differs in its approach to essence compared to other schools of metaphysics.

>> No.20636705

>>20636520
You are a massive brainlet

>> No.20636767

>>20632742
>revelatory knowledge
narcissistic schizophrenia

>> No.20637077

>>20636311
How are secondness and thirdness not just "appearance"?
If Objects are Substance: things in themselves, then anything else is an appearance. Secondness is apprehension right, it's how it appears to a subject? It's not the thing in itself but a constriction on it's qualities... that's an appearance.
>For Peirce, sign is a process the results in a sign. You are a sign. These words are signs. You reading these words is a process that can understood as being a sign waiting to be interpreted. It’s stuff like that but really interesting.
Signs are appearances.

>> No.20637134

>>20632742
I myself have three categories of the political, the idealist, the conservative and the agnostic

>> No.20637235

>Kant had 12 categories AND 12 judgments (wtf? where did they come in?) and dropped substance/essence/etc.
He derives the necessity of twelve categories from the necessity of twelve forms of judgment, whereas Aristotle, according to Kant, put the categories together in a "rhapsodic" fashion, meaning he did it some what arbitrarily.
Say you have a conditional judgment, like "If x then y, x thus y", you can abstract the form of this judgment to get two pure concepts that would have to fit into the "x" and "y" position of the judgment, which Kant identifies with the category of causality. This is why the Urteilsformen (judgments) determine the structure of the categories, or at least their deduction.

>> No.20637524

>>20637077
But it's in the backdrop of a panpsychic universe/metaphysics. There's no dualism. Appearance is all there is in this sense and appearance is a function/doing.

>>20636705
Why?

>> No.20637626

>>20637524
>Appearance is all there is in this sense and appearance is a function/doing.
It appears you are wrong.

>> No.20637632

>>20632742
le morality goblin

>> No.20637644

>>20637626
Are you the anon that said "thing in itself" with relation to Peirce? Is this the idiot I'm talking to?

>> No.20637670

>>20637644
Explain to me in your own word why things in Firstness aren't "Things in themselves" or equivalent? Spoiler alert: you can't

>> No.20637832

>>20637670
It's disingenuous to say that firstness is equivalent to thing in themselves as if there's independence from secondness and thirdness.

>> No.20638147

>>20632742
>also, what would be the category for revelatory knowledge?
Apodictic intuition?

>> No.20638200

>>20637832
No it's disingenuous to claim there is a difference between them while also obviously avoiding explicating differences between. What is firstness? And how does it differ from things-in-themselves? Things-in-themselves include all extant qualities and attributes of an object - including those which can never be apprehended or perceived, so does firstness. Articulate the precise incompatibility!

>> No.20638221

>>20638147
>Apodictic
top 5 most irritating words in english language

>> No.20638421

>>20638200
Thing in themselves don't exist without thirdness. There is no thing in themselves without thirdness. I'm going off of Peirce's own rejection of Ding an sich. You're trying to emulsify this idea of thing in itself relative to Peirce? How? How does thing in itself work in Peirce's pragmatism?
As of now, you're abstracting the idea of firstness and running with it through some Kantian justification. You can't do that.

>> No.20638429

>>20632742
they’re all just bumbling around like monkeys
the answer is to simply meditate and do nothing else

>> No.20638658

>>20632742
There are only two forms. Those forms are space and time.

>> No.20638670

Meh, at the end of the day it's all one.

>> No.20638718

>>20638670
How do you figure? You're a metaphysician?

>> No.20638725

>>20638718
Yes. We must return to Elea.

>> No.20638745

>>20638725
Dialectically based.

>> No.20639052

>>20636520
What's Peirce relation to Whitehead

>> No.20640018

>>20639052
Not sure. Peirce was a recluse and had schizo tendencies. Whitehead was influenced by James more than Peirce.

>> No.20640496

>>20638421
You haven't given a distinction between Firstness and Things in themselves which I can only assume is because there is no difference beyond terminology.
> There is no thing in themselves without thirdness.
If that's true, then Jupiter as a planet didn't exist until someone imagined it: that you can will physical matter into existence. That sounds retarded. The world is substance, and how we perceive them is appearances. Secondness and thirdness are appearances because they don't exist independent of material objects that are the signified.

>> No.20640638
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20640638

>>20632742

>> No.20640705

>>20632742
>wtf were these niggas doing?
Reading.

>> No.20640722

>>20636705
I came into this shit thread to say this I'm glad someone beat me to the punch

>> No.20640753

>>20636520
This is a good take and I like Pierce, but how is:
>The significance of the steps is that they’re self-differential and self-referencing

Different from Hegel and the dialectical? The dialectical propels itself. And yes, there is also an ontological argument there that isn't in Pierce, but that's because Hegel had achieved Absolute Knowing through the teachings of Boehme and the grace of God, not everyone can count on that.

>> No.20640765

>>20637524
>Why?
Any time someone makes a post on /lit/ that demonstrates a level of interest in or knowledge of a subject that goes beyond skimming Wikipedia someone calls them an idiot or pseud and then refuses to elaborate.

I do wonder if this tends to be a small group of people going from thread to thread to make these posts, or a wider phenomena where, given anonymity, people will tend to randomly insult whoever seems to be saying something is interest at that they can appear superior.

>> No.20640780

>>20640753
Later in his life Peirce praised the POS very highly so he may have realized the parallels in thought.

>> No.20640852

>>20640496
>then Jupiter as a planet didn't exist until someone imagined

Holy fucking christ, have you spent my entire day trolling me? Do you not grasp what the fuck a panpsychic universe is?

I'm not saying a panpsychic universe is definitely the case or justifying it. Attack the concept all you want for all I care. But you fundamentally don't grasp what's going.

If this thread is still going tomorrow, I'ma schizorant some more motivated just by hate you've filled me with.

>>20640753

It's not that different. Hegel and Peirce both depend on idealism. Peirce is objective idealism, Hegel absolute idealism.

I would say Peirce's (pronounced "Purs", e before i) breakdown is more friendly to contemporary analysis because it depends on semiology and really treats signs/language as a form of math. It's like Hegel bridged with de Saussure and foretelling some of Wittgenstein.

>> No.20640916

>>20640765
>goes beyond skimming a wikipedia article
The opposite. That anon is smart enough not to waste his time on what would take an entire lecture to rectify. This whole thread is the worst clusterfuck of posturing pseuds I've seen in a while.

>> No.20640942

>>20640765
There are groups on /lit/ that meet elsewhere and know each other. I agree with your take.
There’s two reasons they do so. They want to mark their territory or they’re upset their dogma can’t exist outside their temple and express frustration as a way to save dignity.
The only time one of these idiots cited Peirce against me the anon had to admit to reading the passage wrong.

>> No.20641078

>>20640852
Stop changing the subject and answer these answer these four questions:
1. What is an "appearance?"
2. What are things in themselves?
3. What is Firstness, and how is it different from things-in-themselves based on the definition you answered for point 2
4. How is an interperant (Secondness) distinct from an appearance, according to your definition stated in point 1.
Just to restate the questions differently, but the same damn questions:
1. What in your own words is "appearance"?
2. What in your own words are things-in-themselves, as in Kantian Objects
3. What is Firstness in Pierce's Triad, and how does it different from your definition provided in question 2
4. How is an interpretation (in Pierce's Triad) distinct from the definition of appearance you provided in answer to question 1.

>> No.20641671

I feel like Pierce’s triads are more accurate than Hegel’s triads. more encompassing of epistemology, metaphysics, etc.

>> No.20642387
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20642387

>> No.20642389

bump

>> No.20642553

>>20641671
Me too. Hence Pierce getting picked up so well by biology and to a lesser extent physics. But on the other hand the dialectical seems like a more complete system and I've always felt Hegel's system goes deeper in some ways.

>>20641078
You're badly misunderstanding, which makes calling people idiots less excusable. I'm not going to write an essay on Pierce for you because you can use Google and I'm not the person you're quoting, but a simple example from biosemiotics suffices.

When we describe the process by which DNA is copied we say that the DNA is the symbol. It is an informational encoding of the enviornment. Genomes have long been thought of as one way permeable membranes that store information about the enviornment and you can find many good summaries that explain how this works in an information theoretic framework.

So, the object is the enviornment. The symbol is obviously not the enviornment because you're seeing massive amounts of compression. You need to have compression because otherwise any self replicating far from equilibrium physical system will be overwhelmed by entropy.

The interpretant can be formulated on multiple levels. We might say the transcription RNA is the interpretant, or we might say the entire organism is the interpretant.

This is why, for a while, biosemiotics didn't go anywhere. The theory just spun in circles because it seemed you could flip any player into any part of the triangle. Is the object being seen the object and the pattern of action potentials in the optic nerve the symbol, or is the patterns in the optic nerve the object, the patterns of activation in the visual cortex the symbols, and the global workspace and "self" the interpretant. Because there was/is no good philosophical definition of information, using semiotics and Shannon's theory of information was/is extremely fraught.

But it's still a step up from and different from Kant because here you are defining relationships as the unit of analysis, not talking about appearances of an object. Objects don't exist, there is little reason to think they do from modern physics and new metaphysics (e.g., Every Thing Must Go) try to do away with them. With Pierce you begin being able to move towards process philosophy, with Kant you are still stuck with objects, only worse, now they are calcified and enshrined as necessary.

>> No.20642668

>>20642553
That's quite a neat little explanation of biosemiotics, and quite interesting and I was surprised how much I enjoyed reading it. But I also am failing to understand why and it's relevant, nor does it answer my questions, and saddest of all: I don't know what I'm "badly misunderstanding", so I can't even articulate what's wrong with my questions.
How about this, go through my 4 questions, tell me what I'm misunderstanding with each. Don't even try to answer them, just outline what assumptions I've made, and explain what is wrong with them. You clearly are willing to put in the effort to write paragraphs about biosemiotics, so I think this should be a easy exercise for someone as articulate as yourself.

>> No.20642740

>>20642668
I'm the original anon you were replying to. I haven't read that anon's reply yet but what you're missing is that appearance CANNOT be dissected without producing more appearance. It's iterative, repetitive. You're treating it from a Kantian spook where there's an object/subject appraising appearance. In Peirce, there is no object/subject. It's all appearance (phenomenon). There is no noumenon like in Kant. Or rather, the noumenon is qualitative and not objective.
The objectivity is found inherent in the process of appearance. You cannot put it inside a microscope and experiment.

1. What is an "appearance?"
For Peirce, reality. Everything and anything is appearance. It's an experience, a process, a doing.

2. What are things in themselves?
Whatever the answer, the answer will have the same structure. And this is the thing in itself. The ongoings structure/restructuralisation of the same concept. Related to topology, reformulating.

3. What is Firstness, and how is it different from things-in-themselves based on the definition you answered for point 2
Things-in-themselves presupposes a boundary that cannot be accessed. Firstness without secondness or thirdness is something that cannot exist, cannot be referenced, cannot be of use, cannot do. It's empty theory.

4. How is an interperant (Secondness) distinct from an appearance, according to your definition stated in point 1.

It's not distinct. An interpretant only exists in relation to its firstness and thirdness.

>> No.20642762

>>20642740
>You cannot put it inside a microscope and experiment.

Rather:
You cannot put it inside a microscope and experiment without putting yourself (interpretant) in a microscope and experimenting on yourself.

>> No.20642788

>>20636705
>>20640722
>>20640916
>>20642389
All you can suck my dick and lick my asshole

>> No.20642803

>>20642740
>For Peirce, reality.
Okay... well... I meant it in the Platonic/Aristotelian sense since this thread start off mentioning Aristotle's categories. See what happens when you actually answer questions directly? People use the same words for different things, and that can cause confusion. I was using it the way Plato or Aristotle would.
I see the cause of confusion now. And I would go on but your definition of Things-In-themselves and Firstness are so lacking in particulars as to show that you have an ineffable capacity only to obscure and avoid rather than enlighten.
I will readily admit, I didn't know Pierce had a idiosyncratic use of Appearance - that's my folly.
Me no smart dat one. me not know good pierce idiosyncratic terminology.
me sad.

>> No.20642858

>>20642803
Your mistake was trying to understand a philosopher from the lens of a totally different philosopher? That's called dogma. I'm glad I could help you figure that out.

AND IT'S FUCKING PEIRCE. NOT PIERCE.

>> No.20642882

>>20642858
Uhhh... so what do you do when you want to learn something new? Do you forget literally all words, all sensory experience, crawl on all fours, forget all memories and pretend your a baby until such a point that you re-learn speech, writing, so that you can read their texts until you can understand their theory or do you leverage understanding you already have, seek to find distinctions and variations, but also redundancies and similarities. And hopefully reach a point where you have sufficient understanding of not one, but two philosophies such that you can synthesize or build from both?

>> No.20642964

>>20642803
> I will readily admit, I didn't know Pierce had a idiosyncratic use of Appearance - that's my folly. Me no smart dat one. me not know good pierce idiosyncratic terminology.
How is it idiosyncratic?

>> No.20643444

>>20642882
To answer your question, I'm legitimately a schizo. But ironically, Peirce's philosophy is a response to your questions. Peirce lays out the process we all use without any dogma. How we derive/arrive to meaning is a reflection of doing. Study the meaning to find meaning. No ego. No stigma. Just conclusions and theories.

>> No.20643593

>>20636311
lmao I read a couple of books of pragmatists on pragmatism, one of those was written by pierce. I don't remember any of that category nonsense being in there. Just straightforward, calm, analytical thinking.
But I also don't care to look it up again because I have a life.

>> No.20644808

bump

>> No.20645514

>what would be the category for revelatory knowledge?

Revelatory knowledge is all there is. How can you digest revelatory knowledge? The same as any other. What is revelatory knowledge? What is knowledge? The answer is acquired through revelatory knowledge. The process by which the repetition continues is founded on principles as old as gravity and first atom.

>> No.20645562

>>20642964
That anon says that for Peirce appearance = reality and everything. In normal conversation appearance implies a distinction between what is seen and what is
Take the idiom
>To all appearances...
Which implies there could be a contrast between the appearance and the reality
or a sentence like
>He appears to like baseball
The word "appears" implies some doubt, that the reality may not match up to what is seen
>He's very organized but has a disheveled appearance
This makes the contrast between reality and impression even more pronounced, it is explicitly contrasting this unnamed person's organized nature with their disheveled appearance
But of course everyday terms become fraught and weird when they enter the pens and mouths of philosophers and yet Aristotle and Plato, or at least their translators, still use appearance in a way that is totally the opposite to Peirce and closer to the everyday sense. In Plato's the Sophist sophistry is described as a "magician" or illusionist
> “he makes the large appear small, and the easy appear hard”
A clear distinction is made between appearances, which are distortions and likeness which is an non-distorted representation
Elsewhere the sophist is described as:
>“imitation of the contrary speaking-producing, insincere and unknowing sort, of the appearance making kind of copy-making, the word juggling part of production that’s marked off as human not divine.”
While Aristotle in Sophistical refutations claims the sophist is one who
>makes money from an apparent but unreal wisdom
Simply put, no one but Peirce describes appearances as reality
A papyrus fragment of Protagoras apparently quotes the pre-Socratic as saying:
>To you who are present I appear to be sitting, but to someone who is not present I do not appear to be sitting. It is unclear whether I am sitting or not’
How can two incompatible and mutually exclusive appearances both be reality?

>> No.20645574
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20645574

None of them are right. There are 6 categories because 6 is a perfect number.

>> No.20646527

>>20636767
No it isn't.

>> No.20647125

boomp

>> No.20647677

>>20645562
I'm busy with work but bump and a quick reply.

Think about Hegel. Hegel thought his logic was the last because it captured itself and all others. How can logic capture itself? Where does the observer exist within this analysis? The observer is part of the analysis and the observer is defined as the analysis. Your tone presupposes certain distinctions but these distinctions are themselves dependent on the structure of analysis. There's a recursive, looping relationship. When you talk about one, you talk about the other. When you talk about something the "you" is being created in the same process.

>> No.20647704

>>20647677
From here, it's easy to establish Peirce's panpsychic pragmatism (or a modified Hegelian dialectical spirit)

>> No.20648005

>>20647677
Could you at least pretend to have read what I wrote?

>> No.20648813

boomp

>> No.20649054

>>20648005

The topic is cognition. Hegel / Peirce (and the general idea of process philosophy, including Spinoza's pantheism, Whitehead, etc) are really out there. You're free to dismiss them. But as you mentioned before, you are seeing things through Aristotle's theories.
Aristotle is fine and dandy, but mind you that we've changed our ways of speaking since his time. We have quantum theory and theory of relativity, for example.
Granted, I'm bringing pseudoschizo bullshit into the discussion by talking about quantum mechanics and all that. But you have to understand that our axioms only go so far until they breakdown into paradoxes.
Talking about cognition, we go from Aristotle's logic to Descartes. Descartes' cogito, depending on rationalism, gets us so far against empiricism. Descartes' cogito props up God as a necessity for cognition not to lead to deception. This is a good bridge between Aristotle and where we're going because Aristotle also posited God for a similar reason.
Spinoza gets rid of this God with a God that is identical (to some degree) with the process of becoming.
From here, we have Kant that focuses on noumena or "thing in itself." Hegel and Peirce reject this distinction and create something akin to Spinoza and quantum theory with a theory that captures everything without leaving anything (eg noumena) out as something different.
For Peirce, the example is the recursive sign. You are a sign insofar as you can cognize because to cognize is to bring a sign into being. And bringing a sign into being produces the next iteration of sign.
This process does not need a human being. An atom can cognize. The Sun can cognize. Everything doing cognition is how we end up with panpsychic universe. Everything is cognizing. What is being cognized is trivial.
Now, you argue that it is no trivial. If you pay me and I give you your change and the change I give you is not the right one, we can both trace our steps and see why we reached two opposing conclusions. Or we can skip this and you can punch me in the face and get your money back. The event can play out numerous ways. That's why it's trivial. It's not trivial in other respects but to the degree it's not trivial depends on processes going on.

>> No.20649114
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20649114

>>20645574
based

>> No.20650087

>>20649054
You didn't read what I wrote, so I won't read what you wrote. fuck off. We're not having a conversation.