/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.20461195]

Why does Aristotle say in his theory of the four causes that the formal cause is often identified with the final cause? By positing this, he posits an immanent character of finality in creatures that seems to me difficult to justify. I understand that the assumption is necessary from the point of view of an Aristotelian naturalism, but it is more natural to reason to assume a transcendent chain of finalities than finalities whose purpose lies in an essence, and even more so if the essence is contingent.
How should we understand the place of essence in Aristotle's metaphysical structure in order to give more coherence to his position ?

[Anonymous No.20461210]

>>20461195
>Why does Aristotle say in his theory of the four causes that the formal cause is often identified with the final cause?
The answer is actually very prosaic: the 'morphe' (form) of a chair is shaped for a legs and an ass, because the 'telos' (final) is to sit. You can make the chair out of bronze, or stone or wood, so the material causes can be different. And as such, whether the proximate cause is a smith if it's bronze, a sculptor if it's stone, or a carpenter if it's wood - the telos and the morphe remain largely the same

[Anonymous No.20461223]

It is with Epicurus and the Stoics that clearly indeterministic and deterministic positions are first formulated. Writing one generation after Aristotle, Epicurus argued that as atoms moved through the void, there were occasions when they would "swerve" (clinamen) from their otherwise determined paths, thus initiating new causal chains. Epicurus argued that these swerves would allow us to be more responsible for our actions (libertarianism), something impossible if every action was deterministically caused.

Epicurus did not say the swerve was directly involved in decisions. But following Aristotle, Epicurus thought human agents have the autonomous ability to transcend necessity and chance (both of which destroy responsibility), so that praise and blame are appropriate. Epicurus finds a tertium quid (a third option), beyond necessity (Democritus' physics) and beyond Aristotle's chance. His tertium quid is agent autonomy, what is "up to us". Here is the first explicit argument for libertarian free will.

...some things happen of necessity (ἀνάγκη), others by chance (τύχη), others through our own agency (παρ’ ἡμᾶς).

...necessity destroys responsibility and chance is inconstant; whereas our own actions are autonomous, and it is to them that praise and blame naturally attach.[10]

[Anonymous No.20461271]

>>20461210
I understand better how the final cause can be identified with the formal cause but I still have trouble grasping how in non-artificial beings the two come together. For the chair, its finality is given to it by an intelligent agent that is ontologically superior to it, but in an Aristotelian naturalism, what gives its form and its end to a natural being? Does such a form exist by itself or is it the product of nature, which must then be seen as intelligent and ontologically absolute?

>>20461223
I don't see how this relates to my question

[Anonymous No.20461286]

>>20461271
Answer is free will, which is largely an operation of the unconscious

[Anonymous No.20461300]

>>20461223
>Epicurus argued that as atoms moved through the void, there were occasions when they would "swerve" (clinamen) from their otherwise determined paths, thus initiating new causal chains
Can't believe anyone took this hack seriously.

[Anonymous No.20461303]

>>20461223
This is an obvious misunderstanding of Aristotle also. He never said free will was equivalent to chance. Exactly the opposite. He was just never dumb enough to postulate the existence of matter as atoms, so he was not forced to postulate "swerve" like an utter buffoon.

[Anonymous No.20461304]

>>20461286
The free will is a particular character proper to this or that individual, I do not see that it says much about the immanence of the finality of a general essence.

[Anonymous No.20461338]

>>20461271
>what gives its form and its end to a natural being?
It's not a simple or single answer, he never explicitly answered it. If you peruse the relevant texts De Anima, Metaphysics, the Ethics, you'll find that it's a combination of soul (first act = essence) and supreme mover (which is the "transcendent" aspect of both final and efficient cause, although this is still somehow linked to the former which I guess means your question still isn't fully answered). Soul exists in everything from plants to men. He never postulates soul in the inorganic but it's not totally out of the question as a mere difference in degree (Giordano Bruno took this position up by equating Aristotelian matter as both act and potency). Still, essence is somehow "in" matter. He would say essence is in matter proximately and not remotely, which means that essence is only in matter qua actuality, and not in matter qua potency.
>For the chair, its finality is given to it by an intelligent agent that is ontologically superior to it
The supreme mover is clearly in a position of ontological superiority, as the goal of the study of being qua being in his words. I cannot remember if he explicitly equates divine intellect with the supreme mover but it wouldn't be too surprising.

[Anonymous No.20461355]

>>20461210
>aristotelian philosophy to explain cause and effect in a third grade fashion
>>20461223
>"swerve" from their otherwise determined paths, thus initiating new causal chains
This is more accurate with modern interpretations of quantum mechanics and probabilistic arguments

[Anonymous No.20461367]

>>20461355
Exactly on second comment

[Anonymous No.20461390]

>>20461338
So the general scheme of the teleological structure for Aristotle, if I understood correctly, is that the first mover, which represents in the ontological order the transcendental absolute, gives in cascade to the beings essences which contain internally finalities, which makes it possible to found the telos in an ontological absolute while making a particular essence the only bearer of this finality by giving it an autonomy within the general harmony of the nature?

[Anonymous No.20461396]

>>20461223
my issue with both Democritus and Epicurus is they believed that atoms were the most fundamental particle of the universe when atoms are even composed of parts themselves

[Anonymous No.20461402]

>>20461304
Free will is linked to a resonance. What does Aristotle say about telepathy? Well, he seems to have seriously considered its existence, apparently as a wave. Obviously free will and telepathy would be connected. Are they one and the same? Or is telepathy a special mental instrument used by free will at times?

[Anonymous No.20461916]

>>20461390
nigger wtf are you talking about