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/lit/ - Literature


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20201405 No.20201405 [Reply] [Original]

Contemplate a little on this incredible paragraph: "I distinguish myself from myself, and in doing so I am directly aware that what is distinguished from myself is not different from me. I, the selfsame being, repel myself from myself; but what is posited as distinct from me, or as unlike me, is immediately, in being so distinguished, not a distinction for me. It is true that consciousness of an 'other', of an object in general, is itself necessarily self-consciousness, a reflectedness-into-self, consciousness of itself in its otherness."

>> No.20201443

I feel sometimes uncomfortably aware that the "I" part of myself sits upon an edifice of processes over which I have no control or awareness. I cannot control the process by which thoughts appear within my head. I can only select the ones I want. This is the way I choose to understand Hegel's auto-auto- differentiation; from the perspective of that tiny little pinprick of crystallized agency (I don't believe I can even claim ownership of my senses—they, too, are delineated to me by processes and mechanisms beyond control or intuitive examination. The agent-self versus the distinguished-self. Self and other commingling. If consciousness of an other filters through the distinguished-self into "my" awareness, therein lies the sensation of reflectedness, and of the blurring of self with other.

>> No.20201473
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20201473

Literally just Plotinus.

>> No.20201486

>>20201405
Makes no sense but I'm sure you're very excited by the big words which make you feel so smart.

>> No.20201494
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20201494

>>20201486
Oh, and this post brought to you by Schopenhauer Gang

>> No.20201525

>>20201494
Schopenhauer literally says the identical thing as regards Object's and Subject's oneness in Presentation of the Will.
Which is just basic Platonism. >>20201473

>> No.20201536

>>20201494
>>20201525
Kek niggas do not read anymore and are just here to meme

>> No.20201568

>>20201525
Oh is that what OP's post is trying to say? Wild, he should have just humbly referred everyone to Schop instead of opening his monkey mouth to say ooh ooh ah ah.
>>20201536
I have never memed in my life... a disgusting act

>> No.20201653
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20201653

>>20201405
>>20201486
it does make sense and i don't take any issue with what it's saying, my question is why is this incredible? it seems kind of obvious, like what >>20201525 says its basic platonism and the type of thought any earnest, not-retarded philosopher would have.
so op, what is so incredible about this? is it the seemingly (although not that much) contradictory language illustrating a lucid thought that impresses you? if so, try this passage from Deleuze's Nietzsche and Philosophy, which seems far more contradictory and confusing but communicates something far more profound. likely near impossible to understand without reading the book but might inspire you to read it (you should)
>From afar we can hardly see this summit. The eternal return is the being of becoming. But becoming is double: becoming-active and becoming-reactive, becoming-active of reactive forces and becoming reactive of active forces. But only becoming-active has being; it would be contradictory for the being of becoming to be affirmed of a becoming-reactive, of a becoming that is itself nihilistic. The eternal return would become contradictory if it were the return of reactive forces. The eternal return teaches us that becoming-reactive has no being. Indeed, it also teaches us of the existence of a becoming-active. It necessarily produces becoming-active by reproducing becoming. This is why affirmation is twofold: the being of becoming cannot be fully affirmed without also affirming the existence of becomingactive. The eternal return thus has a double aspect: it is the universal being of becoming, but the universal being of becoming ought to belong to a single becoming. Only becoming-active has a being which is the being of the whole of becoming. Returning is everything but everything is affirmed in a single moment. Insofar as the eternal return is affirmed as the universal being of becoming, insofar as becoming-active is also affirmed as the symptom and product of the universal eternal return, affirmation changes nuance and becomes more and more profound. Eternal return, as a physical doctrine, affirms the being of becoming. But, as selective ontology, it affirms this being of becoming as the "self-affirming" of becoming-active.