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/lit/ - Literature


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20133838 No.20133838 [Reply] [Original]

i'm fucking tired of delusional, arrogant qualiapypo systematically oppressing us, thinking that we aren't human and don't belong, acting as if we're "morally worthless" and it's okay to shoot us.

The science is settled, qualiaism is wrong and anti-science, yet you bigots keep saying that the color red is somehow more than just a wave on the electromagnetic spectrum, you're all disgustingly misinformed.

We're gonna demolish statues of the founding fathers of "consciousness" like Plato, Marcus Aurelius and Jesus, we're gonna arrest all qualiapypo who say the N word, N**, we're gonna teach your kids CRT (Critical Reductionist Theory). Brace yourselves qualiabois, your privilege is coming to an end.

>> No.20133860

take your meds

>> No.20133862

>>20133838
It's funny how arrogant physicalists are in their stupidity. They call us who believe in Qualia "folk psychologists" as if our position is a form of plebian superstition and they are the rational "scientific" people.
I honestly don't get what's the point in believing in materialism. It's the least interesting and the least convincing worldview. It's like they take the scientific method, which is meant to be a tool, and ossify it into some grand worldview which explains everything. It's absurd.

>> No.20133940

I'm actually afraid that many people are genuinely soulless p-zombies. For example when I was an undergrad in philosophy, my seminar tutor was trying to explain Locke's distinction between material events and the experiences that seem to be associated with them. A knife rupturing your skin cells and causing neurons to fire in your nerves and brain or whatever is completely qualitatively different to the experience of pain. But most people in the class simply couldn't understand this. They sat there asking the same questions over and over again, "BUT ISN'T PAIN JUST NEURONS FIRING IN THE BRAIN? I DON'T GET IT!"
Listening to this really scared me. I wanted to escape the room because I thought I'm surrounded by automatons.

>> No.20133945

>>20133862
> It's like they take the scientific method, which is meant to be a tool, and ossify it into some grand worldview which explains everything.
That's why Dennett got his panties in a twist over the term scientism kek

>> No.20133954

>qualia
Whenever I hear this I know I'm in for something dumb. No classic philosopher ever talked about qualia I think some noname academics made it up in the 20th cetury.

>> No.20133965
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20133965

>>20133838
> ITT: The best literature written by Philosophical Zombies
Nagarjuna and most Madhyamaka Buddhist literature is NPC P-Zombie literature desu.

European phenomenology, Yogachara Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta, despite significant differences, all agree on at least one thing, that awareness is reflexive,.

As Evan Thompson writes: The idea that conscious awareness is reflexive is central to Yogācāra Buddhism and European phenomenology. Both traditions hold that any episode of conscious awareness consists in its awareness of its intentional object and its awareness of itself as that very awareness. Both traditions also hold that this kind of self-awareness is intrinsic to conscious awareness. In other words, this kind of self-awareness does not require another episode of reflection, introspection, or metacognition that takes the awareness as its intentional object and to which the awareness is extrinsically related. Other formulations of the reflexivity thesis are that all awareness involves awareness of itself, that all consciousness includes prereflective self-consciousness, or simply that all experiencing involves experiencing that very experiencing.

Nagarjuna and his NPC followers try to deny that awareness is reflexive, but this has the absurd and peculiar consequences that the subject has no awareness of what it's doing, no access to the immediate fact of what it's doing. So Madhyamaka Buddhists still try to account for knowledge by saying "the object is detected by the subject, and that's all that's needed", but when the subject has no access to or knowledge of whatever its doing (like being engaged in knowledge of X), that's really no different from there being no knowledge at all. There is no practical difference whatsoever between "the subject not knowing Y" and "the subject having no access whatsoever to its knowing of Y". Sometimes they try to claim the subject's knowledge of Y is validated by another awareness-episode, but this other awareness-episode is denied to be reflexive as well, so to be cognized it requires more episodes ad-infinitum, which leads to an infinite regress which means knowledge of Y is never actually cognized by anything. The theory of mind they put forth is like if a dead corpse were reanimated as a zombie, and its eyes were detecting light, but on the inside there was no awareness that seeing was taking place, it just doesn't make sense and goes against our experience. The complete absurdity of their theory of mind is exceeded only by the fact that Nagarjuna is absurdly seen by Buddhists as some sort of world-renowned philosopher who is the end-game of everything, despite him being a P-zombie.

>> No.20133967

>>20133954
Yes they did lol they simply used a different term for it. The common term for the early modern period was "Ideas". I'm not sure exactly which term the Ancients used for it but there's no doubt they believed in it.

>> No.20133972

>>20133967
nta but wait, do bugmen really think ideas don't exist? that it's all material?

>> No.20133975

>>20133967
Ideas exist. Qualia is a made up academic term. Get bent.

>> No.20133979

>>20133972
Yeah it's the most absurd position imaginable, born out of a desire to cram everything into their narrow-minded scientism worldview. The scary thing is, these people haven't been laughed out of the halls of academia; they are actually the majority in most philosophy departments.

>> No.20133981
File: 101 KB, 785x731, 2C6A7484-F605-4238-9941-E2FA97986A24.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
20133981

>I-i-it’s more than just neurones firing in my brain, it *feels* different
>no, you can’t express truth, we have to be ignorant so that I can believe in my childish fantasy
>red is sooo much more than just a wave on the electromagnetic spectrum… it *feels* like it means something!

>prove any of this? No, I’d prefer to exist in my childish fantasy, where I ignore truth in favour of what makes me *feel* good
>stop stop I’m gonna cry!

>> No.20133988

>>20133981
Prove how matter becomes ideas.

>> No.20133994

>>20133979
I didn't even know such levels of autism were possible.

>> No.20134023

>>20133988
Information of the world is received through our senses and is then organised by the brain. The organisation of the thoughts can become incredibly complex, leading to “ideas”. You can research how senses work, and then research how the brain works.

But if that’s too much trouble, then you can just say “nooo, my spirit picks up on the vibes”

>> No.20134028

>>20133988
i'm really loving this total transition of /lit/ to idealism. it's always been floating around but instead of casually physicalist threads popping up once and a while for discussion any instance is getting shut down quick. great stuff, keep it up soulbros

>> No.20134029

>>20133988
Ideas aren't real.

>> No.20134047

>>20134028
It’s not good because:
1. It’s an easily disproven position
2. It encourages mentally ill people in their delusions
3. It is anti-truth

This only acts to undermine the existence of the supernatural/non-material in the eyes of intelligent skeptics.
Almost every idealist post here comes from a place of total ignorance. I’ve definitely noticed an increase in it. Pure brain rot and fantasy.

>> No.20134048

>>20133981
you are also defining things out of how they make you feel. in fact there is no difference between the truth and how you feel. at the end of the day you cannot arrive to any conclusions that you weren’t taught about :)

>> No.20134050

>>20133838
Daniel Dennet is literally rotting people’s brains. Anyone who reads his work or listens to him speak will become a p-zombie by proxy. His project is the industrial NPC complex, nothing more and nothing less.

>> No.20134054

>>20134047
>1. It’s an easily disproven position
It hasn't been successfully refuted.
>2. It encourages mentally ill people in their delusions
Materialism is autism. Not any better.
>3. It is anti-truth
It's pure truth.

>> No.20134060

>>20134054
It’s anti-truth and laziness.

>> No.20134065

>>20133965
>Evan Thompson
Is he worth reading? His father was extremely based, but I watched an interview with him and he seemed slightly bluepilled desu.

>> No.20134067

>>20134023
The problem here is that you are assuming that all of this is actually true. It may be true from a certain perspective, but the belief that perspective is valid is what you can’t prove. You can say it’s useful for understanding certain things, but if you actually believe you are looking at reality and not a set of variables I’ll inform you that you are wrong here.

>> No.20134069

The amount of time some of you retards wasted in these dumb threads could be better spent picking up a book and actually getting a clue. It's the same dumb shit all the time hurr durr Dennett denies the existence of conscious experience. No he doesn't, you filtered brainlets.

>> No.20134075

>>20134060
No, it's pure truth. Materialism is anti-truth because it doesn't allow for anything beyond scientism.

>> No.20134078

>>20134047
where're you at then, anon? i think it's a great transition phase. i'll quote the pensées, "Plato to incline Christianity."

>> No.20134080

>>20133940
this almost threatens to make some sense

>>20133965
>>when the subject has no access to or knowledge of whatever its doing (like being engaged in knowledge of X), that's really no different from there being no knowledge at all.

you've failed to explain that clearly.

>> No.20134100

>>20134078
The material world is a visible representation of the supernatural/immaterial world. We can learn about the immaterial world by studying the material.
Rejecting the material world because you are afraid that it will provide arguments contrary to your position is highly ignorant, arrogant, and directly opposed to truth.

>> No.20134101

>>20134047
>>20134054
1. Prove you can refute idealism totally. The truth is that you can't, and idealism has better explanatory strengths for most things, which is why it will forever dominate philosophy.

2. Physicalism does this far worse, I assure you.

3. Lol

>> No.20134104

>>20134101
why are you talking to me?

>> No.20134105

>>20134075
And idealism rejects materialistic advances in human knowledge due to fear that their fantastical delusions will be broken. Both are no good.

>> No.20134108

>>20134100
>Rejecting the material world because you are afraid that it will provide arguments contrary to your position is highly ignorant, arrogant, and directly opposed to truth.
That's not what anyone is doing. It's bugmen rejecting the world of ideas.

>> No.20134109

>>20134104
Because he’s mentally ill and insentient

>> No.20134114

>>20134100
This is one of the most retarded things i've ever seen posted on /lit/, anon.

>> No.20134116

>>20134047
To 2. The fact that you think 1 is definitively settled in the philsophical world demonstrates physicalism is superficial brain rot.

>> No.20134136

>>20134114
But anon it's a potent philosophical tenet, and one that has been followed by the Greeks and Berkeley.

>> No.20134139

>>20134114
i thought he'd like the pascal reference; turns out he's totally retarded. sad!

>> No.20134153

>>20134069
Shut the fuck up bug man

>> No.20134159

>>20134023
>The organisation of the thoughts can become incredibly complex, leading to “ideas”.
So, in other words, you can't explain it. Your metaphysics is illogical.

>> No.20134166

>>20134047
>1. It’s an easily disproven position
Go ahead then?

>> No.20134170

>>20134166
yeah lmao, inb4 he goes dead silent OR responds with total nonsense that boils down to "seeing is believing." i've said it before & i'll say it again: it's over

>> No.20134171

>>20134029
Then how come I perceive them?

>> No.20134188

>>20134065
>Is he worth reading?
Yes, "Waking, Dreaming, Being" is pretty good
>His father was extremely based, but I watched an interview with him and he seemed slightly bluepilled desu.
I don't see his politics as charactering his writings much, he seems to mostly stick to the subject-matter, and he provides an interesting and valuable counter-perspective to some of the typical P-zombie narratives about consciousness (both eastern and western), and the quality of the writing is decent while frequently drawing from primary sources.

>>20134080
>>when the subject has no access to or knowledge of whatever its doing (like being engaged in knowledge of X), that's really no different from there being no knowledge at all.
>you've failed to explain that clearly.
If you say that the subject has no access to the knowledge it is engaged in, that has the same practical consequences as saying the subject or awareness knows nothing at all. You can think about various hypothetical examples that illustrate this. The memory of a past moment that never took place and was a total fantasy would be no different for you than a memory of something which happened but which you have no access to or knowledge of, since memory is predicated on having an immediate first-hand access which provides the basis for the memory to later be recalled or reimagined. Similarly, not in memory but just in terms of the present moment, you having no access to your knowledge of the electronic screen in front of you would be the exact same as you having no awareness or knowledge whatsoever of the electronic screen, because in both cases your awareness would not have access to any screen and so there'd be no experience of it.

>> No.20134191

>>20134100
>Rejecting the material world because you are afraid
I'm rejecting it because it doesn't exist. Believing in the material world despite there being zero evidence for it is schizo territory, so please take your meds.

>> No.20134212
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20134212

>>20133988
>>20134029
Matter isn't real. All that exists is experience.

>> No.20134223

>>20134171
Your perceptions are matter interacting with matter. Idea is just a convenient label.

>> No.20134241

>>20134136
>the Greeks
Held a wide variety of views.
>Berkeley.
Did not believe in a material world. His world is held in the mind of god.

>> No.20134247

>>20134212
Based Neo-Ager

>> No.20134289

>>20134223
Matter means independent of a mind. Perceptions are mind-dependent.

>> No.20134310

>>20134289
What is a mind?

>> No.20134323

>>20134310
That which causes ideas.

>> No.20134328

>>20133838
I've had that book on my shelf for at least 5 years and haven't read a single page

>> No.20134438

>>20133975
Idea as in Berkeley's Ideas. You must not fail to understand it after I mentioned Berkeley.

>>20134023
But if it's just a product or byproduct of the brain as a "biomachine" of information processing, doesn't it mean ideas are ontologically irrelevant? What about computers and robots? They too receive information from the outside world to properly execute commands, what they are programmed to do. Do computers and robots experience Ideas too? It has to according to your ontology.

>> No.20134450
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20134450

>>20134029
>Ideas aren't real.

>> No.20134451

>>20133988
>Whether Matter may not be made by God to think is more than man can know. For I see no contradiction in it, that the first Eternal thinking Being, or Omnipotent Spirit, should, if he pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and though... Body, as far as we can conceive, being able only to strike and affect body, and motion, according to the utmost reach of our ideas, being able to produce nothing but motion; so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain, or the idea of a colour or sound, we are fain to quit our reason, go beyond our ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our Maker. For, since we must allow He has annexed effects to motion which we can no way conceive motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude that He could not order them as well to be produced in a subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a subject we cannot conceive the motion of matter can any way operate upon?

>> No.20134452

>>20134438
>Idea as in Berkeley's Ideas. You must not fail to understand it after I mentioned Berkeley.
We don't need a new term. Qualia doesn't exist.

>> No.20134468

>>20134323
How does a mind cause ideas? How would you recognize a mind outside of your own?

>> No.20134474

>>20134451
>matter exists because it's possible God made matter
>matter tuns into ideas because God turns matter into ideas
Why would God do all this unnecessary stuff when he can just imagine everything that exists? The fact that God could've made something is not proof that something exists. God could've made a dinosaur in my room too, but he didn't.

>> No.20134488

>>20134468
>How does a mind cause ideas?
By thinking. Thinking is the process by which a mind generates ideas. We don't know how it works, we only know ideas appear in our mind, and, by reflexivity, we intuit a notion of the mind.
> How would you recognize a mind outside of your own?
By analogy. We, once again, use reflexivity to intuit how our mind works, and we other humans acting in a similar way. Therefore, we conclude other minds like ours exist. Of course it's possible that there's only our mind and God, but those other minds behave quite like ours so the most natural interpretation is that other minds exist. You can reject the most intuitive explanations, but that's up to you to assume that God deceives us for no reason.

>> No.20134517
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20134517

>>20134100
>>20134114
>>20134191
He got a point tho, similar to Kant's phenomena/noumena distinction. Studying the material has its own merit too, but the material shouldn't be taken as end all be like what the naive realists do. And we just narrowly grazed noumenon with quantum physics I think. How reality seems to "solidify" upon observation with double slits experiment. Studying the "material" or phenomena is important, but studying how the noumena got transmuted into our phenomenal experience or what we naively suppose "matter" or the condition of possibility for experience is also important.

Further note, I realize that our use of language can be confusing when talking on this matter. For example, if one's conception of "matter" is "outside objects", then it is noumenal or beyond experience. If what you mean is what we can empirically observe when talking about "matter", then in this context, "matter" is phenomena or idea, hence the word "phenomenology".

>> No.20134524

>>20134517
>Studying the material has its own merit too,
No, it's literally a waste of time to study it because it's not a thing.

>> No.20134553

>>20134524
So science studies idea instead of materia? If that's your definition of matter and ideas, it's fine btw.

>> No.20134580

>>20134553
>So science studies idea instead of materia?
Yes.
>If that's your definition of matter and ideas, it's fine btw.
Well, it's not mine. It's everyone's. Words have meaning. But thank you for your reassurance.

>> No.20134582

>>20134488
>mind creates ideas by thinking
>we don't know how it works
>we only know ideas appear in our mind, and, by reflexivity, we intuit a notion of the mind.

This all seems very wishy washy. How is this any more compelling than:
>sufficiently complex arrangements of matter create consciousness
>we don't know how it works
>we only know material structures behave in a certain way that correlates with our subjective experience

>it's possible that there's only our mind and God

What makes you think there's God? Why would you posit some other mind you can't perceive?

What does Idealism really explain that materialism does not?

>> No.20134612

>>20134582
>>sufficiently complex arrangements of matter create consciousness
You haven't proven matter exists or why do we need it, so why would I be interested at all in your line of thought? My explanation was based on what we experience, your explanation is based on made up stuff. I'm looking for explanations to what I experience, you're making up things that don't explain what I experience. If you don't see the difference, there's something wrong with your thinking.
>What makes you think there's God?
Well, who else is there? Me? I didn't create the universe, I'm pretty sure. Or do you mean I created everything but I magically can't remember? I'm making all the world move but I just don't know it? Sounds like it's not *me*.
>Why would you posit some other mind you can't perceive?
Because I perceive ideas that are not from my mind.
>What does Idealism really explain that materialism does not?
It doesn't posit "matter" without evidence, it explains away body-mind problem, it explains what's consciousness, it solves the first cause problem, it explains causation, and it's only using our mind and senses to do all this. No need to pose arbitrary concepts other than what's entirely rational. It's in line with intuition, logic, and rationality. Materialsim cannot do any of this. There is not a single advantage of materialism over idealism, but there are plenty of advatages the other way, with the critical one being that idealism doesn't force you to accept things with no evidence. I don't like believing in things for no reason.

>> No.20134670

>>20134474
Well the Bible says God created the world

>> No.20134680

>>20134670
Yeah, the Bible is right. However, nowhere in the Holy Scriptures there's a discussion on matter.

>> No.20134714

>>20134680
What about dreams then? Are they as real as ordinary experience? Do we create our own little real worlds when we dream?

>> No.20134730

>>20134714
Well, they're both real, but there's a difference between objects of sense and objects of thought. Objects of thought are caused by our minds. Objects of sense are caused by God as he allows us to interact with his creation. They're all ideas, but the ideas we cause are not as vivid and perfect as the ideas that God causes to our senses to produce in our minds.

>> No.20134737

>>20134730
Dreams are objects of sense, it’s not the same as imagination or conceptualisation.

>> No.20134752

>>20134737
How are they objects of sense? Are they all created by your sense of touch or what sense produces all of them?

>> No.20134825

>>20134752
They have the same experiential quality as ordinary perception. It's arbitrary to say one is realer than the other because it is produced by our sensory organs. I don't even get how that would work in an idealist world. Your organs aren't interpreting soundwaves and lightwaves from a material world, so I don't get what's their role or importance to the idealist.

>> No.20134862

>>20134825
>They have the same experiential quality as ordinary perception.
That doesn't make them objects of sense though unless they're produced by your senses.
> It's arbitrary to say one is realer than the other because it is produced by our sensory organs.
Something can't be more real than something else. They're all real. However, objects of sense are acquired by interacting with God's ideas through seses.
> Your organs aren't interpreting soundwaves and lightwaves from a material world, so I don't get what's their role or importance to the idealist.
God made the world interpretable for us. He made it analyzable so we can better direct our lives using reason and science. I don't see any contradictions or issues anywhere, so not sure where your confusion lies.

>> No.20134949

>>20134612
>You haven't proven matter exists or why do we need it, so why would I be interested at all in your line of thought?
You haven't proven ideas or minds exist. You say assuming the existence of minds is intuitive, I say assuming the existence of matter is intuitive.

>Well, who else is there? Me? I didn't create the universe, I'm pretty sure. Or do you mean I created everything but I magically can't remember? I'm making all the world move but I just don't know it? Sounds like it's not *me*.
Everything is made of ideas. Your mind creates ideas. It would follow simply that your mind created everything.

>I perceive ideas that are not from my mind.
How do you know they are not from your mind? How did they get into your mind? How can ideas be transmitted from one mind to another?

>It doesn't posit "matter" without evidence,
Instead, it posits 'ideas' and 'minds' without evidence
>it explains away body-mind problem, it explains what's consciousness,
No, it just states consciousness is a thing. It explains nothing. You said a few posts ago that we don't understand how minds create ideas. They just do.
>it solves the first cause problem, it explains causation
How?
>No need to pose arbitrary concepts other than what's entirely rational.
"Minds" creating "ideas" that interact with other "ideas" seems arbitrary and irrational to me.

What does idealism have to say about physics, where considering material bodies produces useful results?

>> No.20134951

>>20134862
>>20133862
>>20133972
>>20133979
>>20133994
>>20134047
>>20134075
>>20134100
>>20134101
>>20134136
>>20134191
>>20134524
>>20134730
>>20134680

anyone who thinks that any non-physical thing exists should be continuously beaten and burned until they realize that they have to physically to stop this from happening

>> No.20134989

>>20134949
>You haven't proven ideas or minds exist.
I don't need to. Do you not have ideas? Tell me.
>I say assuming the existence of matter is intuitive.
Then you're wrong. All you perceive is ideas and you never perceive matter. There's nothing intuitive about something that's not perceivable. You wrongly assume that having different opinions means neither of can be right, but you're wrong in both instances.
>Everything is made of ideas. Your mind creates ideas. It would follow simply that your mind created everything.
It doesn't. Other minds can create ideas just fine.
>How do you know they are not from your mind?
Because I didn't think them. I don't know how to paint, but I see paintings. If you're asking me to believe I created everything, you're asking me to believe I'm something I know I'm not. Why would I believe his?
>How did they get into your mind?
Through my senses.
>How can ideas be transmitted from one mind to another?
Through senses, but if you pay attention to the world, you'll discover we can directly perceive only God's ideas unless you believe in telepathy. To transmit my ideas to you, I use language, which is a pretty good mechanism still, but it is mediated by God.
>Instead, it posits 'ideas' and 'minds' without evidence
Are your senses not evidence enough? Is what you're seeing with your own eyes not evidence? Then I'm afraid you don't understand evidence.
>No, it just states consciousness is a thing. It explains nothing. You said a few posts ago that we don't understand how minds create ideas. They just do.
It explains more than materialism does. It tells you consciousness is the mind that produces your ideas, while materialism cannot even explain how ideas arise from matter.
>How?
First cause: God imagined the world.
Causation: God causes the natural world.
You'll tell me you're unsatisfied with these explanations, but you will once again omit that materialism does a poorer job at it, and that God was deduced based on logic, not posited with no reason like you do with matter.
>"Minds" creating "ideas" that interact with other "ideas" seems arbitrary and irrational to me.
How is irrational when you can observe it yourself? Can you not observe your mind creating ideas? I can't help you if you deny what you perceive.
>What does idealism have to say about physics, where considering material bodies produces useful results?
How does considering material bodies produce anything? These physical bodies are not material but mental ideas created by God. I don't see any contradiction; see >>20134862

>> No.20134996

>>20134951
You should learn the difference between physical and material before attempting to argue.

>> No.20135011

>>20134989
This is why I don't take idealists seriously

>> No.20135016

>>20135011
Why is that?

>> No.20135145

>>20134989
>You haven't proven ideas or minds exist.
>I don't need to. Do you not have ideas? Tell me.
Yes, you do need to. If you are positing that angels hold up the world, you need to convince me that angels are real first.

>There's nothing intuitive about something that's not perceivable.
Exactly why materialism makes more sense to me. I perceive matter, not ideas.

>Other minds can create ideas just fine.
How can you tell the difference between another mind and an idea of a mind?

>How did they get into your mind?
>Through my senses.
>Through senses, but if you pay attention to the world, you'll discover we can directly perceive only God's ideas unless you believe in telepathy. To transmit my ideas to you, I use language, which is a pretty good mechanism still, but it is mediated by God.
How? How do your senses work? How can language work if it's just an idea in your mind? How can two disembodied, solipsistic minds communicate?

>Are your senses not evidence enough? Is what you're seeing with your own eyes not evidence? Then I'm afraid you don't understand evidence.
My senses tell me there is an external reality. Is that not evidence enough?

>First cause: God imagined the world.
>Causation: God causes the natural world.
If you think these are satisfying explanations, you might be retarded. And you can just as easily say 'God created the material world'.

>You'll tell me you're unsatisfied with these explanations, but you will once again omit that materialism does a poorer job at it, and that God was deduced based on logic, not posited with no reason like you do with matter.
I never claimed materialism has all the answers, just that idealism doesn't have them either. If there were a clear answer, there would be no debate. And you absolutely posited God with no reason.

>Can you not observe your mind creating ideas?
I challenge you to create the idea of a chair that I can sit on.

>How does considering material bodies produce anything? These physical bodies are not material but mental ideas created by God. I don't see any contradiction;
How can I tell the difference between a material body and a mental idea created by God?

>> No.20135168

>>20135145
>Yes, you do need to. If you are positing that angels hold up the world, you need to convince me that angels are real first.
Do you perceive angels? No. Do you perceive ideas? Yes. I have nothing else to prove.
>Exactly why materialism makes more sense to me. I perceive matter, not ideas.
... anon you don't perceive matter. Is this why you have a hard time understanding this? When you see a tree, do you not realize the tree object is in your mind? Even materialists realize this! How could you possibly perceive a material substance when a material substance is independent of your mind. Do you think all humans perceive the same material object independently of their minds?
>How can you tell the difference between another mind and an idea of a mind?
I can't perceive minds.
>How? How do your senses work? How can language work if it's just an idea in your mind? How can two disembodied, solipsistic minds communicate?
I speak words or draw images using sounds or tools and modifying God's ideas, and you perceive those using your senses such as ears or eyes.
>My senses tell me there is an external reality. Is that not evidence enough?
They don't say anything about a material reality. You can't experience material things, your senses produce images that you mind perceive, so they're not material.
>If you think these are satisfying explanations, you might be retarded.
Well, I tried to help you, but I shall stop here because you're acting in bad faith for no reason.

>> No.20135169

>>20135145
>I never claimed materialism has all the answers
If there are phenomena it can't account for, then it's probably false. That's how paradigm shifts occur in science.

>> No.20135443

>>20133838
It's suspicious because you have to 'convert' people to it, and 'convince' them it's the right position using the same holistic and rhetorical methods that you say don't truly exist as sensations but as (perhaps antiquated expressions of) chemical computations.
1. People are distrustful of the materialist position because it has been false flagged to hell
2. Materialist proselytizers are extremely emotionally immature
3. What exactly is the purpose of telling people they aren't actually conscious? Is it to demonstrate problems that may arise when one thinks without questioning? To 'uncover the truth'? (that doesn't make any sense) Or is it to pave the way for a new nomenclature divorced from the past and operated for future goals which require people to be very forgetful about their being inheritors? (I think this is really their true motive)
I haven't read the book

>> No.20135530

>>20133988
If they didn't you wouldn't ask for proof. Materialists have to refute desire. Nobody is free from entropy, even materialists - how can we navigate this hell? Materialists offer no solution, they muddy arguments to succeed in our system which rewards differentiation with recognition. Yes, your position is fundamentally disingenous pilpul but I understand, it comes from weakness and fear - a well all people drink from. The weakness of being stripped bare of volition, incomprehensible, and the fear of the unknown. Answer me: how can one say anything at all to a materialist? All they want is to change the definition of words so that they suit their metaphysical system. They are the trolls under the hypergamic bridge. They are physically ill men who need to find the best medication, who need to develop a logistical plan, who need to write their will, who want to do everything to survive but bite down on their cheeks. Pure pseudoscience.

>> No.20135707

>>20134951
The affirmation of the existence of immaterial things is not the denial of the existence of material things? You have very strong opinions for a retard.

>> No.20135905

>you have no soul
>you have no free will
>some variant of determinism is the truth
>intelligence and consciousness is an emerging property
>the world is math
>you world is an small subset of this great world, created by this world, like an small reflection

why does these facts infuriate the midwit so much?
Is it just pride?

>> No.20135959

>>20135905
No, you are the midwit. And autistic.

>> No.20136024

>>20135168
>Do you perceive ideas
No, I don't.

>When you see a tree, do you not realize the tree object is in your mind?
This is solipsism. The tree has existence outside of my mind. Do objects cease to exist when you stop thinking about them?

>How could you possibly perceive a material substance when a material substance is independent of your mind.
My mind is not independent of material substances. How can you perceive an idea that is independent of your mind?

>Do you think all humans perceive the same material object
independently of their minds?
Yes, obviously. How else could two people perceive the same object?

>I speak words or draw images using sounds or tools
Do these exist outside of your mind? How can sounds or images be perceived if they don't exist outside your mind?

>They don't say anything about a material reality.
I suppose my senses could be completely erroneous and unrelated to reality. But that doesn't seem like a useful outlook.

>you're acting in bad faith for no reason.
Come on now. 'God is the first cause' says nothing about idealism vs materialism. This just seems like a complete non sequitur. God could create all ideas and minds or God could create all matter.

>> No.20136127

>>20133838
the real irony is despite dennett's cringelord denial of consciousness his concept of design space proves he's a platonist at heart

>> No.20136147

>>20134136
>Berkeley
Berkeley philosophy isn't the same shit as the Greeks

>> No.20136546

I really want to believe in something other than philosophical realism bros. I’m trying really hard.

>> No.20136572

>>20136024
Different anon btw
>No, I don't.
What do you mean you don't perceive ideas?
I think what he is asking is whether or not you experience "things" (which he says are ideas), which of course you do. Also if he is talking about ideas as they are commonly referred to (the act of thinking), then you also do, unless you somehow are writing this with a mind completely devoid of any activity.
>This is solipsism.
No it is not, as he is not saying that everything is a product of creation of his mind, but that the only thing we experience are ideas (not only our own as well) which are shaped by the mind.

>> No.20136579
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20136579

>>20133838
Can someone explain to me in layman's terms what Qualia is? Does it basically refers to anything we describe a state of being of sensations? Like "blueness", "wetness", "sweetness" or the essence of pain which we might call "painness", yeah?
No philosophy terms. Describe it to me in under a paragraph like I'm Lenny from Mouse and Men.

>> No.20136593

>>20136579
Qualia are allegedly subjective "sensations", such as blueness and sweetness.
The idea is that it is not possible to verify whether or not they are the same between people, e.g. how can you know if the red you see is the same red as your friend?
Again, this is alleged, and not everyone claims that qualia exist at all, as it allows for a great amount of subjectivity to reside in the world.

>> No.20136672

>>20136572
>What do you mean you don't perceive ideas?
I perceive light, sounds, smells, physical touch and the like. This seems to me a separate thing from the act of thinking.

>he is not saying that everything is a product of creation of his mind
This seems inescapable. The only things we experience are ideas in our minds. So there is no external reality.

>the only thing we experience are ideas (not only our own as well)
How do you experience someone else's idea?

>> No.20136704

>>20136593
I don't want to know about the controversy surrounding it. I know that whole stupid idea of "but how do I know that what you call 'green' and what I call 'green' look the same". I'm asking what does qualia refer to?
Because like, a "symbol" is not qualia, but the quality of 'roughness' as perceived is right? Anger is not 'qualia' but maybe what that 'feels' like is qualia, yes?
Really dumb it down for me, don't frame it in your skepticism, just give me the definition for low IQ anons. Because how the fuck can I agree with you that it's bullshit if I don't know what it is?

>> No.20136812

>>20136593
You know, it's weird; Sometimes when you track with other musicians, you play to a metronomic click. Sometimes four people will be kept perfectly in sync, demonstrating all four are having at least similar perceptions of the time intervals.

So the click is this thing in the world, and the behavior of the musicians indicates some agreement. I dunno what that means.

>> No.20136908

>>20135145
>I challenge you to create the idea of a chair that I can sit on.
KEK

>> No.20136949

>>20134075
>Materialism is anti-truth because it doesn't allow for anything beyond scientism.
What's the ism where I consider everything to have scientific explanations however there are various things (consciousness being one) that are currently unexplainable and don't "fit" within scientism

>> No.20136955

>>20136949
Gobackism

>> No.20136964

>>20134023
>The organisation of the thoughts can become incredibly complex, leading to “ideas”.
Explain the ontological gap between material interactions and first person phenomenal experience. Is there a first person perspective of every single interaction of matter or is there something about the brain that allows it to give rise to mind? If so what is special about it and what relationship does feeling have to the material processes that underlie phenomenal experience?

>> No.20136965

>>20136949
Scientism. Also Retardism because you lack the ability to discern between a question that just hasn't been answered at the current time and a question that cannot be addressed by your epistemology and ontology even in principle.

>> No.20136974

>>20136965
>>20136955
I hope whatever you represent doesn't have you to talk for it.

>> No.20136975

I have literally never heard of "qualia" before this thread lol

Looking it up it literally just sounds like a meaningless buzzword to help materialists handwave away the problem of consciousness. Weren't the materialists the ones who wanted to get away from spooks, rather than inventing new ones?

>> No.20136976

>>20135905
sorry anon if you do enough good maybe next time around you'll be granted a soul

>> No.20136985
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20136985

Why not just read this. It destroys Dennett.

>> No.20137052

>>20136704
Any definition of qualia is hard to pin down by design, as it is referring to things/sensations which, according to its definition (whatever that might be), are subjective and thus do not share the same appearance with more than one individual.

Don't worry about qualia, its a scientistic concept created to fill a gap in physicalism.

>> No.20137067

>>20136974
reeks of reddit

>> No.20137176

>>20134951
and the pain itself is... ?

>> No.20137198
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20137198

>>20136985
>If build upon your influences, you "misinterpret" them
>huge deal made of Dennett's off the cuff popsci remarks about folk psychology and intentional stance
>Dennett's serious academic work on intentionality (including his central article) ignored completely, let's pretend his popsci musings on a different topic (intentional stance has nothing to do with intentionality) constitute his definitive statements on the matter
>Brentano changed the meaning of a word, so the works of everyone following his lead is flawed (are you fucking kidding me, it's the current vocabulary via Husserl, deal with it)
>metaphors Dennett used to explain heterophenomenology are taken literally (you can't make this shit up)
>heterophenomenology is a non-starter, as if it hasn't already been used widely in cognitive psychology even before Dennett started describing it
>The Cartesian Theater is apparently a relic of early modern philosophy and not a subtle mistake that's still with us
>somehow memes matter for the multiple drafts model, and their understanding of it is some idiotic Hard AI strawman of the brain hardware running the mind software (they take quotes out of context to give legitimacy to this idiotic interpretation)
>it's an idea Dennett has fleshed out long ago btw (in favor of something resembling modern neuroscientific theories of consciousness, like the global neuronal workspace), but let's ignore that and keep discussing his one book from 1990
>and it wasn't even a theory in the first place, just a series of evidence based observations bounding future theories, made into a metaphor
>which turned out to be correct btw, it is respected by modern theories, which don't postulate any interfacing between the brain and the mind (a.k.a. the Cartesian Theater), just as they appreciate the multiplicity of underlying processes and the fickle status of their illusory unity, which is in fact temporary and local
I gave it a cursory read and it looks a lot like an impotent hackjob. It's not even a bad book in general and the authors aren't idiots, they are capable of making a solid case against the mainstream. The chapter on the Mereological Fallacy seems well worth reading, it's a good example of a widespread mistake (there's a book called Brainwashed that's roughly about the same thing, but more practical and wide-ranging).

But they are definitely hate a hate boner for Dennett for some reason. I wonder if being *the* famous scientist's philosopher of mind has anything to do with it? It's very noticeable how they are going after his popular works and popular explanations, with a special focus on those terms of his that entered the popular discourse. They are just jelly.

You anons seem to have a hate boner for Dennett too, allright then. Pic related is a great book for those who can't stand Dennett, but want to go out of their comfort zone and learn how difficult the problem really is. People who hate Dennett have been known to swear by it.

>> No.20137199

>>20133838
Guenon and Shankara Btfo

>> No.20137208

>>20133965
>"the object is detected by the subject, and that's all that's needed",
that's right tho, you don'0t need anything else besides an object and a subject, awarness is provided by the subject, awarness IS the subject

>> No.20137220

>>20133965
>European phenomenology

which author or phenomenological system propose awareness as reflective? every phenomenologicla system i know always used as a core principle the exact opposite idea

>> No.20137227

>>20137198
>But they are definitely hate a hate boner for Dennett for some reason.
Mostly because Dennett is a retarded pseud who brings great shame on the field of Philosophy of Mind because of his facile thinking and slavish devotion to metaphysical materialism that leads him to preconceived conclusions he is forced to defend at all costs even when they're absurd.

>> No.20137233
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20137233

>>20137198
Does he address the Nous? I refuse to read any of philosophy of mind that denies that truth is intuited directly through the soul.

>> No.20137241

>>20134996
One is Greek, the other is Latin.

>> No.20137255

>>20133940
The students were right though, Locke's theory doesn't make sense compared to our modern scientific knowledge.

>> No.20137265

>>20137255
If you don't understand it, you might be a zombie bro. No scientific discovery can ever challenge qualia. Ever. I don't even want to explain it to you because I don't want to argue with a zombie.

>> No.20137285

>>20137227
That's the problem, these threads are full of anons who have nothing but third hand knowledge of Dennett, the secondary source being some opinionated Phil101 student who got filtered by a passage like this one:
>Which idea of qualia am I trying to extirpate? Everything real has properties, and since I don't deny the reality of conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties. I grant moreover that each person's states of consciousness have properties in virtue of which those states have the experiential content that they do. That is to say, whenever someone experiences something as being one way rather than another, this is true in virtue of some property of something happening in them at the time, but these properties are so unlike the properties traditionally imputed to consciousness that it would be grossly misleading to call any of them the long-sought qualia. Qualia are supposed to be special properties, in some hard-to-define way. My claim--which can only come into focus as we proceed--is that conscious experience has no properties that are special in any of the ways qualia have been supposed to be special.
...and went on to draw NPC memes in paint after giving up on trying to work out all the nuance. To anyone with a clue, this is just embarrassing.

>> No.20137293

>>20137233
No, and it seems like you're missing out on pretty much everything written on the matter.

>> No.20137298

>>20133838
>Philosophical Zombies
Anything written by Marxists or Utilitarians.

>> No.20137309

>>20137285
Bro, what he just said doesn't refute the NPC dennett meme. He literally goes onto argue that consciousness is physical. That the brain is "all there is" to consciousness. That's why he says "I deny that qualia have special properties" by "special" he means non-physical. Conscious experience in Dennett's worldview is literally just atoms moving around in the brain. This is obviously absurd.

>> No.20137313

>>20137052
And now I'm just more confused
>>20136812
I dunno what it means either. It is a pretty good argument for "we probably do all see blue the same' but someone will probably counter that with "no, it's just the outward physical manifestation of those time intervals is the same, you have no idea how inwardly they perceive it". All I know is when a bunch of all musicians fall in the same groove, it's awesome.
And then you hear the Rick Rubin thing where he would listen to like 50 different takes of the drums for a Chili Peppers song because "20 million people will be grooving to this same beat" and it sounds at once so cosmic and beautiful, and yet so disgustingly commercialized

>> No.20137317

>>20137313
>>20136812
And by "it sounds" i mean the anecdote, not the drum beat itself

>> No.20137319

>>20133860
Insanity is not a medical term, it's a legal one.

>> No.20137350

>>20134029
Then how come I hear words in my head?

>>20133988
I perceive matter. It gives me an idea. Jesus. I perceive the world to be improvable, then I get ideas on how to improve it. I see the world is too good, so I get an idea on how to make it more fun. You perceive a computer, you get the idea to use a Davaoan anonymous idea making forum on the idea making website, which was created because someone had the idea to create it, and afterwards put in the work to actually make it.

The idea is combined with persistent work as to create something. Get out of your job contract, stop working for somebody else's idea and start working for and with your own ideas, would be my advice. It's very fun and hard and it makes me want to kill myself sometimes but I never kill myself and instead see rainbows and beautiful skies and get to hold birds and eat healthy food.

>>20133862
You're placing people inside boxes with words. I find that not down to earth.

>>20133940
Take a walk in the sun and in the open air. Preferably through the woods with your s/o. Forget about it.

>>20133981
>I am a grumpy adult and I have forgotten what it is like to be a child full of fantasy and idealism
you can still make it if you revert

>>20134023
There is such a thing as too much information. Just accept that you perceive the world, have ideas sometimes, and then work to let go of things that you don't like anymore and hold on or get more of things that you do like. Also, stay calm and be down to earth to people.

>>20134028
You are part of the transition. Change is inevitable, move with it and adapt or stay behind until you learn how to ketchup.

brb

>> No.20137384

>>20137350
>I perceive matter. It gives me an idea.
You perceive the idea, not matter.

>> No.20137403

>>20137384
Based Berkeley enjoyer.

>> No.20137404

>>20137309
P-zombies are not the same as physicalists.
>That's why he says "I deny that qualia have special properties" by "special" he means non-physical.
Not at all. It's a short list of properties and you can easily find them out for yourself. It's all about reading and understanding the position of someone you're criticizing and I don't see a lot of that ITT.

>> No.20137407

>>20137319
And yet we all recognize schizophrenia induced retardation when we see it

>> No.20137410

>>20137384
>You
There is no such thing

>> No.20137419

>>20137404
>It's a short list of properties
All of which constitute the non-physical.

>> No.20137424

>>20137285
That passage does nothing to change my opinion of Dennett.

>> No.20137432

>>20133965
>Evan Thompson
you're trying to sell nagarjuna as a zombie using a text by Evan Thompson, who's a huge advocate for the Madhyamaka school? for real?

>> No.20137448

>>20137404
>P-zombies are not the same as physicalists.
If physicalism were true we would all be P-zombies; that's the entire point.
When someone openly asserts that they cannot see the difference between atoms bouncing around in their skull and the experience of listening to Mozart, there are only two explanations: they are lying (to themselves or others), or they are genuinely unconscious philosophical zombies. There's no inbetween.
>It's all about reading and understanding the position of someone you're criticizing and I don't see a lot of that ITT.
I don't read flat earthers or people who deny that 2+2=4. I make fun of them.

>> No.20137477

>>20137404
Dennett literally does not comprehend the ontogical gap between two atoms smashing together and the first person phonomenological experience such interactions supposedly produce. What could possibly make someone so off the mark worth reading? Complete waste of time. Dennett doesn't engage the problem, he isn't even aware of the problem, he's thinking two or three layers down from where he needs to be to be a competent philosopher of mind.

>> No.20137491

>>20137208
>that's right tho, you don'0t need anything else besides an object and a subject,
That doesn't work out, because if the subject has no access to (awareness of) itself engaged in that moment of knowledge has no knowledge of the object that the subject is supposed to know, there is no practical difference with there being no knowledge of the object at tall. A knowledge that our awareness has no access to is no different from knowledge not known at all, that's why so many people agree reflexive awareness is a pre-condition of intentional knowledge or knowledge of objects.

>awarness is provided by the subject, awarness IS the subject
It can either have access to itself (which entails reflexivity) or it can have no access whatsoever to what it is doing, which in practice is the same as not knowing anything.


>>20137220
>which author or phenomenological system propose awareness as reflective? e
Husserl, Merlau-Ponty, Sartre, you read Thompson's article on reflexive awareness in "Self, no Self", in which the following quotes are pulled from:

Every experience is 'consciousness' and consciousness is 'consciousness of' ... But every experience is itself experienced, and to that extent also 'conscious'
- Husserl

Consciousness is consciousness of itself. This is to say that the type of existence of consciousness is to be consciousness of itself. And consciousness is aware of itself in so far as it is conciousness of a transcendent subject
- Sarte

The necessary and sufficient condition for a knowing consciousness to be knowledge of its object, is that it be consciousness of itself as being that knowledge
- Sartre

All thought of something is at the same time self-consciousness, failing which it could have no object
-Merleau-Ponty

This is an article ion "pre-reflective self-awareness" in Husserl by Dan Zahavi (which is practically the same thing in principle as reflexive awareness)

https://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s0/Inner-Time-Consciousness-and-Pre-Reflective-Awareness-by-D.-Zahvi.pdf


>>20137432
>noooooo you can't cite a Scholar who likes Buddhism and occasionally writes favorable things about it while critiquing Buddhism in your post .... that's... not f-fair... *sniffle*
The point stands exactly the same, Thompson's own conception of consciousness differs entirely from Madhyamaka and he critiques Candrakirti's and Shantideva's defense of non-reflexivity as essentially involving logical fallacies.

>> No.20137492
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20137492

>>20133838
Cartesian Dualism is incoherent and you know that as well as I do, /pol/itician.

>> No.20137502

>>20137492
>anything which is not materialism is Cartesian dualism

>> No.20137505

>>20137502
a favorite P-zombie talking point

>> No.20137526

Just get laid. Have yourself a good time. You'll never figure any of this shit out.

>> No.20137530

>>20137505
Once you attain the intellectual vision you'll realize even experiencing qualia still classifies you as a p-zombie from the higher viewpoint. In fact obsession with qualia probably just makes you more of a p-zombie.

>> No.20137531

>>20137530
>you'll realize even experiencing qualia still classifies you as a p-zombie from the higher viewpoint
How so?

>> No.20137572

>>20137448
>If physicalism were true we would all be P-zombies; that's the entire point.
I thought P-zombies had no inner experience of qualia or no sentience but still appeared to act as though they did. Would someone who had an existing inner experience of qualia or sentience be a P-zombie if that experience was produced by the activity of some brain region? (I don't think it is btw but just wanted to ask for clarification)

>> No.20137592

>>20137448
>When someone openly asserts that they cannot see the difference between atoms bouncing around in their skull and the experience of listening to Mozart
You're trying to show how you understand what you're talking about by putting up another strawman. He definitely knows the difference, I know, I've read him. The difference is not that difficult to grasp, and you shouldn't think that anyone with half a brain would struggle with it.

But are you even aware of the problems that arise from accepting the idea that p-zombies are conceivable in the first place? It's not as intuitive as you think. In fact, Chalmers worked out the modal logic and was forced to admit that his psychological, utterable beliefs about consciousness cannot be justified with his conscious experience, only with the events in the physical world. It's in his book, The Conscious Mind. Your experience of listening to Mozart cannot be a cause of what you wrote about Mozart. A new dualism causes the same problems, what a surprise. From there there's only one step to Dennett and it's a matter of nuance. You might have a completely different view than both of them, but the consequences of the logical possibility of p-zombies stand, and you do use the term like it makes sense to use it. You face an interaction problem that eliminativists don't have and you dismiss their views with lame strawmen.

>>20137419
If you think that the properties of being intrinsic, ineffable and "directly apprehensible" are non-physical properties (or worse, fully constitute the non-physical, whatever you meant by that) then I don't even want to further engage with the mess you have in your head. Don't impose your concepts on the text you're reading, come to terms with the author.

>>20137477
>Dennett literally does not comprehend the ontogical gap between two atoms smashing together and the first person phonomenological experience such interactions supposedly produce.
Funny, because I've learned quite a lot about the nature of this phenomenological experience from Dennett's books. Again, the difference is not that difficult, you're not special for understanding it. Once you accept that Dennett is not the retarded displacement you take him for, you can start to get at what he's actually saying.

I'm bailing now, this is taking too much of my time. I only wanted to alert those who actually read to the difficulties involved in the subject and the shallowness of the treatment it's getting ITT. Again, read some Schwitzgebel if you can't stand / are filtered by Dennett. Or even read the serious work of Chalmers, it's not what you imagine it to be.

>> No.20137598

>>20137531
Because human subjective consciousness is basically demonic and machine like.

>> No.20137602

>>20137592
>intrinsic, ineffable and "directly apprehensible"
None of these can be found in the physical world by definition. Atomism is inherently self-refuting and was demolished 2000 years ago and basically wherever it appeared. Logical positivism was demolished too.

>> No.20137612

>>20133838
What’s philosophically wrong with the n word. It describes a very real phenotype. I agree we should stop judging people so much, but nigger is just a word.

>> No.20137614

>>20137592
>Your experience of listening to Mozart cannot be a cause of what you wrote about Mozart. A new dualism causes the same problems, what a surprise.
Why not?

>> No.20137618

>>20137598
Why would you think that?

>> No.20137620

>>20137592
>But are you even aware of the problems that arise from accepting the idea that p-zombies are conceivable in the first place?
Why wouldn't they be? Can you conceive of an AI that has programming so sophisticated that it can behave just like a real human, yet have no first person experience? I can. There's your P-Zombie right there. The idea that first person subjective experience is necessary for intelligent behavior is materialist cope. It isn't and when AI gets sophisticated enough you will never be able to tell whether the machine really has consciousness or not.

>> No.20137656

>>20136672
>I perceive light, sounds, smells, physical touch and the like.
These are ideas.
>This seems to me a separate thing from the act of thinking.
Yes, they are objects of sense rather than objects of thought. Yet they're all ideas as they exist in your mind.
>This seems inescapable. The only things we experience are ideas in our minds. So there is no external reality.
Well, where do these ideas come from when under the form of objects of sense?
>How do you experience someone else's idea?
Through sense I experience God's ideas.

>> No.20137669

>>20137618
By observing my own behavior and desires objectively, the clinging of my consciousness to sensations and qualia, as well as those of others. Human consciousness wills, on its own, a machine-like repetition, it wants to mass-produce and devour these things it finds pretty, just like a machine, it will do the same thing over-and-over until it dies like a dog chasing its tail. It tells itself any sort of lie to keep this illusion moving along like a well-oiled machine. And it never rests until it ceases, in sleep or in death. Best to go beyond human consciousness and see qualia for what they are, attractive shadows at best. Switch off the machine and bask in the light of the sun.

>> No.20137676

>>20137572
I simply can't get why people can't grasp this. Yes, you can hold that conscious experience is "PRODUCED BY THE ACTIVITY OF SOME BRAIN REGION". That's not a physicalist position. That's a dualist position called epiphenomenalism. Just because Y causes X does not mean Y is equivalent to X. I'm not an epiphenomenalist but that's one of the dualist positions that you can maintain. IT'S NOT PHYSICALISM.
>>20137592
If he knew the difference he wouldn't deny qualia, because that IS the difference between QUALIA and BRAIN ACTIVITY. If you accept that distinction, you accept qualia.
>But are you even aware of the problems that arise from accepting the idea that p-zombies are conceivable in the first place? It's not as intuitive as you think.
Bro, you JUST accepted the difference now you're saying P-zombies aren't conceivable. IF YOU CAN GRASP THE DISTINCTION YOU CAN CONCEIVE P-ZOMBIES, YOU UTTER FUCKING MORON.
>his psychological, utterable beliefs about consciousness cannot be justified with his conscious experience, only with the events in the physical world
RETARDED. RETARDED. RETARDED. If thoughts are just "events in the physical world" then they have no truth value whatsoever. A firework exploding is not "true" or "false". A chemical reaction is neither true nor false. If you really think that our beliefs are equivalent to physical events in the world then all of our thoughts are meaningless, including the thoughts that lead you to believe in physicalism. It's literally a self refuting idiotic position. I can't stand it. How can intelligent people like yourself argue for this nonsense unless you're just P-zombies?

>> No.20137680

>>20137656
>Through sense I experience God's ideas.
Not him, but I would say that the only seriously defensible forms of idealism are Theistic ones like Berkley or different kinds of Hinduism where a supreme God is ensuring that the *mentally composed* practical world functions in an orderly manner and that people can actually look at the same object and experience/describe it similarly despite it only being mental. Without an overarching organizing principle like God or Brahman it becomes too absurd to suppose you could have different centers of sentience somehow floating around in space, and then somehow come into contact with another locus of sentience and experience the same object as them and be able to talk with them about it despite it not existing as an object of shared perception but as two subjective ideas that miraculously match up along with the miraculous matching-up required for communication etc despite the probability of this happening by chance or of it emerging from unintelligent processes being basically 0.

>> No.20137690

>>20137680
>the only seriously defensible forms of idealism are Theistic ones like Berkley
Well, what of what I said goes against Berkeley's thesis? I'm merely explaining it.

>> No.20137717

>>20137669
>By observing my own behavior and desires objectively
Then those would be an object of your consciousness, instead of those actually being the conscious subject

>> No.20137719

>>20137313
The funny thing about the click track example is that the quality of the phenomenon is expressed outwardly in a way multiple subjects can be shown to have agreed.

We can't say if we're seeing the same blue, but we can infer at least similar experience of the click.

>> No.20137760

i think i'm going the opposite way and start believing in the elemental spirits of inanimate objects. i'll be praying to my laptop for the poor withered soul within you, op. science is fucking gay.

>> No.20137781

>>20137690
>I'm merely explaining it.
I wasn't disagreeing with you, I was just thinking out loud about how I considered your explanation of him as more defensible than some other kinds of non-theistic idealism which don't make much sense.

>> No.20137801
File: 27 KB, 795x96, phil.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
20137801

>>20137781
>more defensible than some other kinds of non-theistic idealism which don't make much sense.
I agree, which is why I believe Berkeley demonstrated God rather than posited him.

>> No.20137837

>>20137491
>It can either have access to itself (which entails reflexivity)
not really, because that implies an artificial division between awareness and subjectivity, implies a form of awareness on itself and as husserl say here

>Every experience is 'consciousness' and consciousness is 'consciousness of' ... But every experience is itself experienced, and to that extent also 'conscious'
conciousness is always consciousness of something, there's no awareness on itself, just a mix between subjectivity and the object
thus this third instance between subject and object, an awareness that mediates the two is completly artificial

>> No.20137842

>>20135011
He’s not an idealist. He’s a philosophically illiterate christcuck retard

>> No.20137859

>>20137526
The reason why the christcucks are pretending spooky gooey immaterial things exist is precisely because they can’t get laid

>> No.20137885

>>20137491
are you trying to refute nagarjuna using cites from Sartre? he's likenagarjuna 2.0 his whole philosophy is that l neant(nothingness) is what gives being to conciusness, and that humanbeings are nothingness encarnated,no one created a concept so similar to sunyata in western philosophy than Sartre with his "l'etre et le neant"

>> No.20137890

>>20137859
A list of "spooky gooey immaterial things":
>the mind/the Self
>the laws of logic
>numbers
>universals
>Ethics
>Mathematical objects/Geometry
>God
>Transcendentals needed for experience to be intelligible such as: Similarity or Resemblance, Equality, Unity/Distinction, Contiguity, etc.
None of these are bedtime stories or fairytales. They are real immaterial metaphysical objects. I'm sorry you can't think on a deeper level beyond sex and hedonism.

>> No.20137917

>>20137842
Not an argument.

>> No.20137925

>>20137491
>https://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s0/Inner-Time-Consciousness-and-Pre-Reflective-Awareness-by-D.-Zahvi.pdf
thanks i'll check it out

>> No.20137950

>>20137859
Is there a materialist thinker who completely denies immaterial things? I think materialists have by and large come to accept their existence, but claim that they are dependent on matter in some way or another.

>> No.20137961

>>20137950
No they just psychologise what people call immaterial things. Universals, laws of logic, matematics, numbers, ethics, beauty, etc. don't really exist they're just "human constructs" (Of course they can't explain consciousness itself but they try).

>> No.20137965

>>20137885
>are you trying to refute nagarjuna using cites from Sartre?
Nagarjuna's understanding of consciousness refutes itself because of the inherent contradictions it contains, that truth merely has to be pointed out, I don't have to actually do anything but call attention to it, the work is already done. I merely cited Sartre as another example of someone whose understanding of consciousness differs from Nagarjuna and Madhyamaka's
>he's likenagarjuna 2.0 his whole philosophy is that l neant(nothingness) is what gives being to conciusness
And yet he still disagrees entirely with Nagarjuna on the reflexivity of consciousness, and in fact says that a "necessary condition for a knowing consciousness to be knowledge of its object is that it be self-conscious of itself", whether they agree on other things doesn't change that they are opposed on this question specifically.

>> No.20138041

>>20137837
>not really, because that implies an artificial division between awareness and subjectivity
No it doesn't, it's saying that the nature of awareness is subjectivity having immediate subjective access to itself, that's not positing an artificial division between awareness and subjectivity but it's actually saying they are more or less two ways of describing the same thing, or that awareness can not exist without this reflexive subjectivity characterizing it, in which case it wouldn't be awareness anymore but a fictional mental construct that doesn't correspond to how we actually experience awareness.
>implies a form of awareness on itself and as husserl say here
>Every experience is 'consciousness' and consciousness is 'consciousness of' ... But every experience is itself experienced, and to that extent also 'conscious'
>consciousness is always consciousness of something, there's no awareness on itself
Wrong, for Husserl to be a subject is to exist for itself as self-aware subject. What you did was read one quote out of context so that you can project your own views onto him. Husserl directly repudiates that sort of understanding when he says that the intrinsic nature of the subject is to be aware of oneself as the subject.

You appear to be making the mistake of confusing the issue of intentionality with reflexivity. You can say that consciousness is intrinsically reflexive while also positing it to be either intentional or non-intentional, you can also say it's non-intentional and only seems intentional incidentally. Husserl believes that consciousness is intentional, but he also believes that this consciousness has reflexive awareness of itself as the conscious subject. Saying "there is no awareness in itself, all awareness is intentional" doesn't refute the premise that, contrary to Nagarjuna/Madhyamaka, consciousness is intrinsically reflexive, because consciousness can be both intentional and inherently reflexive, which is Husserl's view.

>> No.20138050

>>20137837
>>20138041
>What does Husserl have to say about self-awareness? Let me start by showing that he, in a manner not unlike Sartre, took self-awareness to be an essential feature of subjectivity and that he considered reflection to be a founded and non-basic form of self-awareness. According to Husserl, to be a subject is to exist for-itself, that is, to be self-aware. Thus, rather than being something that only occurs during exceptional circumstances, namely, whenever we pay attention to our conscious life, self-awareness is a feature characterizing subjectivity as such, no matter what worldly entities it might otherwise be conscious of and occupied with:

>To be a subject is to be in the mode of being aware of oneself.
- Intersubjektivität II, 151; cf. Intersubjektivität I, 462; Erste Philosophie II, 412.

He literally says that consciousness is "self-perceiving", as in the subject having immediate access to itself as the conscious subject (reflexively). The "reflected" noticing of this by thought is an exception to the normal way precisely because we always have pre-reflective (and hence reflexive) access to it.

>For this is not merely a continuously streaming lived-experiencing [Erleben], rather when it streams there is always simultaneously consciousness of this streaming. This consciousness is self-perceiving. Only exceptionally is it a thematic noticing performed by the I. To that exception belongs the reflection, possible at any time. This perception, which makes all experiencing conscious, is the so-called internal consciousness or internal perception.
- 11. Passive Synthesis, 320.

>just a mix between subjectivity and the object
the subject and object never mix, and the very notion is inherently contradictory, not logically tenable.

>> No.20138110

>>20137950
If you weren’t dumb you would notice the contradiction in what you said
>>20137890
>mind
Not spooky
>logic
Emergent from the mind
>numbers
Nominalism (you don’t know what it is obviously) is spreading in the academy, not shrinking
>universals
Retard
>ethics
I guess then the existence of language proves spooky gooey stuff exists, you philosophically illiterate retard
>math
Numbers and logic
>christcuck retardation from 50iq goat herders of 1000bc
Not real

I’m sorry, maybe if you had sex you would be a bit more emotionally mature and actually read real philosophy instead of listening to braindead charlatans like William Crag

>> No.20138141
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20138141

>>20136579
Gonna ask again. Can someone without bias and simply enough that a brainlet like me can understand give me a clear and intuitive explanation of what "Qualia" is?

>> No.20138160

>>20138141
Qualia is the experience of something, essentially. There is something "like" drinking a red wine; and something "like" this or that. Materialists try to dismiss it as, well, reduced to the material but something like Nagel's Bat pokes a hole in that idea.

>> No.20138171

>>20133860
fpbp

>> No.20138209

>>20138160
Nagel’s bat implies the abrahamic god is a pedophile
>>20137890
Here’s a stumper, christcuck mongoloid:
Humans are entirely in time and space
If mathematical objects are not spookey gooey stuff, they are not in time and space
Therefore, if mathematical objects are spooky gooey stuff, humans couldn’t possibly have mathematical knowledge

>> No.20138215

>>20138209
Correction: If mathematical objects INDEED are spookey gooey stuff*

>> No.20138224

>>20138110
>Emergent from the mind
You lost the debate right here. If the laws of logic are "emergent from the mind" and do not have an objective, eternal, inviolable existence in the immaterial realm, then all human inquiry and debate is futile.
The laws of logic are meant to govern our thoughts, and lead us to the right conclusions. Equating them with "brain processes" makes them entirely arbitrary, and you lose the ability to assert the superiority of logical thought over other forms of thought. An emotional argument, or a nonsense one, becomes just as authoritative as a logical one.
Moreover, you lose the ability to objectively arbitrate between disputes. Your beliefs and thought-processes are just the movements of your brain-particles, and so are mine. You have no way of saying your particular configuration of brain matter is superior to my own.
In short, adopting this view leads you into complete relativism, which is a ridiculous, self-refuting position that nobody truly believes.

>> No.20138229

>>20138209
>Humans are entirely in time and space
Wrong. Our souls tap into the immaterial realm, which is why we can reason and experience the world coherently. It's beautiful.

>> No.20138249

>>20138110
>logic
>Emergent from the mind
And you call other people philosophically illiterate?

>> No.20138255

>>20138209
Actually humans are of space-time, not in it.
This isn't an arena you're in. You're emergent from the phenomena.

>> No.20138380

>>20138050
>He literally says that consciousness is "self-perceiving"
yes
>, as in the subject having immediate access to itself as the conscious subject (reflexively)
not at all, he's saying that consciousness IS self perceiving as in , IS self perception itself, there's no division between consciousness and perception, consciousness can't perceive itself, because consciousness is the act or perceiving, Husserl is bringing back the notion of self as an action that Fichte created

>the subject and object never mix, and the very notion is inherently contradictory, not logically tenable.
on the contrary, a world where subject and object never mix is contradictory, since subject and object should share an essence that permits their interacton, thus are mixed in a substance, if not you can only admit the existence of one as the substance,the subject(essentialism) but that ends up with a system that can't explain the object ontologically or an object (materialism) but then you can't explain consciousness


>Let me start by showing that he, in a manner not unlike Sartre, took self-awareness to be an essential feature of subjectivity
>not unlike Sartre

it's also good to note that Sartre who was considered by Heidegger, a direct disciple of Husserl, the best phenomenologist in the world, had to recognize that there's aspects of consciousness that can't be explainrd by a ever present reflective awareness, specially the unconciouss mind that was being studied by the french phenomenologist and Lacan
and that there some apsects of the mind that work outside of consciousness
is also important to note that HUsserl keep changing his system again and again, and he died without ever completing it, his notions of consciousness and inmediate awareness changed drastically between different periods of his life

>> No.20138387

>>20138041
>What you did was read one quote out of context so that you can project your own views onto him.
projecting much?

>> No.20138398

>>20138041
>because consciousness can be both intentional and inherently reflexive, which is Husserl's view.
how so? how Husserl explain that?

>> No.20138409

>>20138224
>The laws of logic are meant to govern our thoughts, and lead us to the right conclusions
not at all, the laws of logic are designed to let us analize an argument, nothing more

>> No.20138467

>>20138224
>If the laws of logic are "emergent from the mind" and do not have an objective, eternal, inviolable existence in the immaterial realm, then all human inquiry and debate is futile.
>if this isnt the case, then absurd conclusion follows!
You are the same retarded christcuck who makes "if pedophile sky fairy aint real killing is okay" arguments
Your reply is not an argument, it is utterly shit philosophical retardation. You will be never be anywhere close to a philosopher precisely because you are religious, stop pretending otherwise. Look:
>Equating them with "brain processes" makes them entirely arbitrary
No it doesnt. Brain processes are not arbitrary
>and you lose the ability to assert the superiority of logical thought over other forms of thought
No I do not. Logical thought gives us the ability to survive, fix issues, make things. Emotional thought gives us the ability to relate to people, reproduce, live in society. Religious thought gives us nothing because it is not thinking at all.
>Your beliefs and thought-processes are just the movements of your brain-particles, and so are mine. You have no way of saying your particular configuration of brain matter is superior to my own.
Yes I do. See above.
>adopting this view leads you into complete relativism, which is a ridiculous, self-refuting position that nobody truly believes.
>nobody truly belieces
Said the christcuck retard whose closest contact to academic institutions are the Masters of Arts posting on /lit/
>>20138249
Yes, you mongoloid retard, I am calling all of you nigger monkey pedophile-skydaddy believers philosophically illiterate. Because that is what you are

>> No.20138646

>>20133940
This is something I come across a lot. Even trying to discuss qualia with my dad, who's very academically minded, I just hit a brick wall. He just doesn't get the distinction between an event and experience, and mind-body distinction to him will always be limited to brain-body distinction.

>> No.20138649

>>20138229
The soul doesn’t exist
>>20138255
>akshualy
Your change of prepositions is meaningless in the realm of physics. It does not change the argument anyway

>> No.20138689

>>20138467
Imagine logically believing this.

>> No.20138723

>>20138467
>Logical thought gives us the ability to survive, fix issues, make things.
It really makes no difference that logical thought is perhaps evolutionarily advantageous to the human species. Natural selection only selects for survivability, not truth. Ants have their own evolutionary mechanisms that help them to survive; it doesn't follow that these mechanisms provide ants with truth.
So, again, if the laws of logic are just relative to humans, reducible ultimately to the atomic structure of our brains, then we land in a position of total relativism. That's the logical consequence of your worldview.

>> No.20138746
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20138746

>>20133838
Lloyd P. Gerson, the editor of this volume, one of the main scholars of Neoplatonism alive and an autistic qualiaperson if ever there was any, told his students during a lecture how he had personally written a very long email to Dennett in response to this book, refuting him with arguments taken from ancient philosophy, i.e. from the scribbles of literal Greek goat fuckers who lived centuries before the so-called scientific method was even "invented". In the story, told by him in magnificent, monotonal autistic fashion, Dennett allegedly never replied to him, and he told his students that he was very dissatisfied with this and had been trying, through the years, and with increasingly menacing tones, to have a chat with the guy.
Based Gerson? Based Dennett? Interpret this anecdote as you wish. My take is that, while qualia people mostly show clear signs of mental illness, materialists and scientists are rarely willing (and capable) to discuss philosophical problems as such. Philosophers are madmen trying to articulate something for which no language is available yet - or is only available in the form of the very bad Greek of Plotinus or the made-up German of Kant - while scientists are troglodites with their heads so deep into the anus of their 300-or-so words formal vocabulary that they are incapable to engage with anything which isn't presented to them in a form compatible with that language.

>> No.20138765

>>20138746
>the scribbles of literal Greek goat fuckers who lived centuries before the so-called scientific method was even "invented".
This thread is so depressing. I can't believe people actually think this way. I have to get off the fucking internet.

>> No.20139308

>>20138723
>if the laws of logic are just relative to humans
That is not what the position is. Emerging from something does not make it dependent on what it emerged from. I will let you think of an example of that.
>reducible ultimately to the atomic structure of our brains
Everything is ultimately down to particles. Name a single thing in the universe that is not matter or energy
>inb4 spacetime
You don't know shit about relativity
>then we land in a position of total relativism
This sort of shit is proof that the person is an utter philosophically illiterate mongoloid. A ridiculous conclusion that does not even follow from the strawman that you use as a premise. Embarassing really.
>That's the logical consequence of your worldview
Your worldview has no consequences because it is not logical

It is not a position, not even in Aristotle, that the laws of logic are this absolute thing engraved in reality. There is tons of philosophical work done on debating the validity of laws of thought but I won't even entertain to teach you that much because you are an obvious low IQ religionbrain jew worshipper not interested in learning but only in abusing the works and science of my forefathers to prove your supernatural delusions that results from the lack of a strong father figure.

>> No.20139340
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20139340

How many people itt believe in free will?

>> No.20139369

I'm glad that shitty threads with the same tired philosophical arguments of NPCs exist - they serve as a containment spaces.

>> No.20139383

>>20134223
The fact that we can create labels for things proves that ideas exist. The labels themselves are ideas.

>> No.20139400
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20139400

>>20133838
Brian Tomasik's Essays on Reducing Suffering are worth reading.

https://reducing-suffering.org/
https://longtermrisk.org/the-eliminativist-approach-to-consciousness/#Denying_consciousness_altogether
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U6xHWsvd0QI

>> No.20139412
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20139412

>>20133838
Marvin Minsky was a philosophical zombie.

>> No.20139524

>>20139340
I believe in freedom rooted in unconscious drive, but not free will

>> No.20139541

>>20139308
Yes, I can name something not matter or energy: the laws of logic. Again, if you deny that they’re objective and eternal, you’re reduced to relativism and absurdity. No point debating with you anymore cause your posts are 5% substance 95% rage and hatred.

>> No.20139555

>>20139524
>freedom rooted in unconscious drive
How does that work?

>> No.20140203

>>20138467
>meaningless electro-chemical interactions within my brain are causing me to type words onto a keyboard
>somehow, the illusion of "logical rules" that these meaningless electro-chemical interactions seem to create to should be trusted, despite being completely arbitrary and not rooted in anything actual
Yeah, we are the philosophically illiterate ones. Next, you'll be attempting to derive an ought from an is, despite rejecting all transcendentals. You are the result of malpractice in the forming of a human mind.

>> No.20140327

>>20139555
If your will is consciously motivated it’s arrived at from a symbolic/logical chain which operates via cause and effect toward an end which is also determined via social mediation. You are determined by the social, or by the form of the good or something like that. When you persist in some unconscious drive despite it lacking grounding in a logical form of the good, you are acting from a position that arises from a contingent break in the symbolic chain. This is the general form of evil (acting against the form of the good) but is also the only possible form of a truly ethical act—performed without regard to ends for it’s own sake, because it is right, not because it is justified.

>> No.20140338

>>20140327
Thanks anon
>a position that arises from a contingent break in the symbolic chain
Can you give me an example of this?

>> No.20140370

>>20140327
Zizek gives an example from some danish crime drama where a murderer has a little boy captive and a gun to the detective. The murderer tells the detective to leave. If the detective stays, the murderer will shoot him and then abuse the boy. If he leaves, he can get help from the police and maybe even save the boy, but in that time the murderer will abuse the boy. The detective cannot leave. He knows staying produces a worse outcome, nonetheless he cannot leave. The detective is explicit that he doesn’t believe in God and there’s no larger consideration in operation than just the situation itself. Leaving the boy in the hands of the murderer simply isn’t right. This is an ethical act stemming from an unconscious drive—real human freedom, yet not deliberated free will.

>> No.20140469

>>20139541
>: the laws of logic
the laws of logic are not a thing, and are sujective, there's different laws of logic depending on the context
objects and "laws" can't be compared ontologically

>> No.20140509

>>20140469
That's exactly the point - materialists are unable to use logic or argumentation because their paradigm cannot account for it, so they should just live their meaningless electro-chemical deterministic lives without bothering anybody else with their self-refuting drivel.

>> No.20140511

>>20138160
>Qualia is the experience of something, essentially. There is something "like" drinking a red wine; and something "like" this or that.
Is qualia then the combination of those qualities and sensations that make an experience "like" drinking a wine?
Put it this way, do stimulant drugs have similar "qualia". Do Coffee and Coke share some 'Qualia' or not?
Do fantasies and internal representations have Qualia?
How does Qualia, or the experience of a thing differentiate from... I dunno... when you smell a perfume that reminds you of your ex, or you find out your rival got the promotion and that makes you angry - not about losing the promotion itself - but because of the mnemonic association with the rival? Do those come under Qualia or is memory and recall different?

>> No.20140548

>>20137198
Thanks for the book rec, will look into it more. From what I see though, the book only questions the reliability of introspection (which is good) but doesn't really conclude that phenomenal consciousness isn't real. Indeed, looking at some of the author's papers on his website suggests that he actually does believe it exists ("Phenomenal Consciousness, Defined and Defended as Innocently as I Can Manage"). While it certainly is true that qualia people probably overstate the unity and reliability of consciousness, the eliminating consciousness seems to be what most people find offensive about Dennett. Also, the mere existence of consciousness itself is enough for most people (like myself) who want to use it to put pressure on naturalism.

Anyways, thanks for sharing this dude's book. I think its pretty exciting to see another type of opinion among the philosophers.