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20086011 No.20086011 [Reply] [Original]

Even if it is true that we cannot determine foundations on which to base knowledge and therefore mathematically show something to be necessarily true or false, it does not follow that all knowledge is necessarily an expression of power, does it?

What the fuck is deconstruction?

>> No.20086096

No, it does not.
https://grattoncourses.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/letter_to_a_japanese.pdf

>> No.20086134
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20086134

>>20086011
>What the fuck is deconstruction?
pic related

>> No.20086488

>>20086096
>pages of gibberish culminating in a failure to provide a definition for an essential term
Why do people place stock in this guy

>> No.20088024

>>20086134
go further back

>> No.20088037

>>20086011
You haven't even read Derrida niggerfaggot.
Stop making low-quality threads

>> No.20088235
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20088235

>>20086011
It seems to me that you're confusing Derrida with Foucault. John Vervaeke thinks that the point of deconstruction is negatively theology. It's a good idea. The postponement of meaning becomes meaning.
https://mobile.twitter.com/vervaeke_john/status/1477008320582062082
Dis-covery Vs re-velation

>> No.20088274

>>20086011
The way I understand it is that every proposition contains within itself an anti-proposition because it can be negated. This is the point of "there is no outside-text". You can use the internal logic of the relations in any given narrative to negate it. E.g. I am good therefore I'm not bad therefore I don't accept bad therefore I am bad. Differance is the same idea applied to the problem of one and many. He believes unity cannot be reconciled with multiplicity but every one can be broken into parts infinitely. That movement towards emptiness is indistinguishable from negative theology as is the endless self-negation of propositions.

Watch Iain McGilchrist's lecture on The Coincidence of Opposites. I should note that he makes the mistake of reifying evil but nonetheless he's an exceptional philosopher.

>> No.20088288

>>20088274
>I am good therefore I'm not bad therefore I don't accept bad therefore I am bad.
This is completely irrational and the conclusion does not follow.
>He believes unity cannot be reconciled with multiplicity
That's because the opposite of multiplicity is not unity, it is "fewness." It's mind boggling to me that Aristotle solved all of these confusions more than 2000 years before these "philosophers" or "literary critics" stumbled upon them.

>> No.20088592

>>20088288
You're such an obnoxious person I am loath to interact with you but perhaps you are capable of answering my questions.

What is fewness and how does it differ from unity, duality and multiplicity, the most fundamental categories?

>Irrational and conclusion does not follow
Why? That's all contained in the proposition, "I am good". You can't be good without rejecting bad, silly boy.

The content of your post is the name dropping of Aristotle. I bet you haven't even read him and therefore cannot answer my questions properly.

>> No.20088616

>>20086011
Derrida himself is not that confusing, it's just that he discussed confusing things. If he Deconstructed a story it wasn't a story with a reliable narrator, and a linear structure, it would be a unreliable or insane narrator who blends reality and delusion and zigzags back and forth through time.
Deconstruction is exposing the paradoxes that underpin metaphysical hierarchies. The simplest example is in the Psyche: Invention of the Other. For something to be 'invented' it can't have been a thing previously. Which obviously means the second time, it's not being 'invented'. That moment of invention is a pretty good example of what Derrida is about: that brief moment after something has been brought into existence but before it becomes a repeat. I can't remember which Essay, but there was another when he discusses time - how the present is always becoming the past, and the future the present.
It's pretty simple stuff.

>> No.20088634

>>20088616
cognition before re-cognition?
>He believes unity cannot be reconciled with multiplicity
did I get this wrong?

>> No.20088651

>>20088592
>You're such an obnoxious person I am loath to interact with you
You too, given your evident lack of the ability to perform basic logical thinking.
>What is fewness
The property of being few as opposed to many: multiple = many, few = not many (they are basically relative terms). The obvious way to tell this is not a relationship of contrariety is that a multiplicity can simultaneously be a unity without being self-contradictory and therefore irrational. So the opposite of multiple and many is not "one", the reason I mentioned Aristotle is because he spends tens of pages refuting this exact confusion of Platonic philosophy in the Metaphysics. He arrives at the conclusion that "one" does not even have an opposite, except in a problematic and speculative way that does not afford an indisputable answer. Not even duality, the quality of "two-ness", is an obvious opposite to "one."
>That's all contained in the proposition
It's not at all. You made at least one obvious erroneous step in your logic which is unjustifiable.

> I don't accept bad therefore I am bad.
This is where you make a jump which is simply not understandable, which causes me to question your ability to think logically. I'm expecting you to retort with some odd mental gymnastics about how "acknowledging" that there is a bad, ie an opposite to one's principal quality, somehow inflicts it upon the subject. Which would be equally silly.
>therefore I don't accept bad
This is also questionable and I fail to even understand what this gets at, unless it's meant in the most trivial possible way thereby losing any meaning here. If you want me to accept that this isn't completely ridiculous then you will have to spell it out in the clearest possible terms, as though I am a child, because I will not accept any handwaving if you can't syllogize such a basic thought as that any given proposition negates itself (which would effectively refute the validity of logic as this violates or at least makes redundant the law of non-contradiction).

>> No.20088695

>>20088634
I have no idea what you're on about. Which essay are you referring to?

>> No.20089031

>>20088651
I'll answer l8r need sleep brb
>>20088695

>> No.20089981

I don't think I've seen a single coherent thread about this guy. Are /lit/ threads a good reflection of the author?

>> No.20090082

>>20086011
>What the fuck is deconstruction?
Nothing what you described. There is very little in Derrida's text, if at all, where he is trying to determine the truth value of things. He only ever shows metaphysical systems for what they are, at their fullest extent, without evaluating them. It is just that based on the reasoning or 'logic' of these systems deconstruction must happen, even if it is 'against' the traditional operation of logic to restore reasoning to itself. Wildly misunderstood philosopher.

>> No.20090088

>>20086488
Essential in which language?

>> No.20090100

>>20088288
To be fair, Derrida is citing Aristotle when necessary. He's not an axiomatic philosopher but one that actually reads the tradition carefully and writes texts around those texts.

>> No.20090109

>>20088274
It is not really about negation but undecidability. Translations or interpretations of philosophers sometimes decide for the philosophers what they meant, or at least their general function in a metaphysics, such as 'pharmakon'

>> No.20090131

>>20088616
>Derrida himself is not that confusing, it's just that he discussed confusing things.
This is absolutely true. I'm guilty of reading his citations as Derrida sometimes and confusing the two, and I actually like the guy.
>I can't remember which Essay
Ousia and Gramme maybe?

>> No.20090138

>>20089981
/lit/ doesn't have very good reading comprehension

>> No.20090621

>>20086011
Depends on what you mean by “power”. A more accurate term would be causality, but even that’s not particularly accurate, and only really works in one direction (as in, the knowledgable might believe they’re causing the truth, but it can’t be traced back to them from inside the reality).

If the reasoning goes something like this:
> knowledge is reasoned belief that is true
> you cannot verify your beliefs of a system that contains you
> only something outside reality (observing it as a whole) can verify/dictate truths
Then no, knowledge isn’t necessarily an expression of power. An expression of ontological hierarchy, sure. But I wouldn’t call observation “power”.

>> No.20091239

There's a reason Derrida is only taken seriously in literary circles, and as a dead end in philosophy. His project is essentially negative and critical. It's hijacked in criticism to smuggle politics into art. He has nothing to add to the great tradition and serves only as an out for people that wish to discard it entirely.

>> No.20093189

>>20091239
He's actually the only way forward, out of negativity. He encourages reading of the tradition and wouldn't dispense of it, since it forms the basis of all thought that seeks to escape it. There is no simple escape from philosophy, and if you actually read Derrida you would know this. Also fuck you cunt

>> No.20093345

>>20090131
>Ousia and Gramme maybe?
Don't think it was that one, but it does seem to also cover it. I may be mixing up ones, I remember it being about tri-lingual poem. There was a meditation on the distinctiveness or lack of distinction of dates.
>>20093189
This
>Deconstruction is inventive or it is nothing at all; it does not settle for methodological procedures, it opens up a passageway, it marches ahead and marks a trail; its writing is not only performative it produces rules - other conventions - for new performatives and never installs itself in the theoretical assurance of a simple opposition between performative and constative. Its [gait/march] involves an affirmation, this latter being linked to the coming [venir] in event, advent, invention.

>> No.20094262

>>20090138
You’re lucky if we even read at all.

>> No.20094807
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20094807

>>20088651
>people who do not subscribe to my arbitrary notion of logic are obnoxious
kek

from Aristotle's metaphysics
>*A similar question might be raised about "one" and "many." For if "many" is absolutely opposed to "one," certain impossibilities result. (1) One will be few; for "many" is also opposed to "few."(2) Two will be many; since "twofold" is "manifold," and "twofold" is derived from two. Therefore one will be few; for in what relation can two be many if not in relation to one, which must therefore be few?*
an apple is not an orange if a pear is not an apple
>for there can be nothing less. (3) If "much" and "little" are in plurality what "long" and "short" are in length, and if whatever is "much" is also "many,"and "many" is "much" (unless indeed there is a difference in the case of a plastic continuum2), "few" will be a plurality. *Therefore one will be a plurality, if it is few; and this necessarily follows if two is many.*
this doesn’t make any sense, because something can be few and many at the same time. “I have a few million dollars.” "Woah, I wish I had so many.”
>Presumably, however, although "many" in a sense means "much," there is a distinction; e.g., water is called "much" but not "many."To all things, however, which are divisible the term "many" is applicable: in one sense, if there is a plurality which involves excess either absolutely or relatively (and similarly "few" is a plurality involving defect); and in another in the sense of number, in which case it is opposed to "one" only. [20] *For we say "one or many" just as if we were to say "one and ones," or "white thing and white things," or were to compare the things measured with the measure*
this is the same point I'm making

>refute the validity of logic
Logic doesn't and cannot have validity because it cannot validate itself.
Every concept contains within itself an anti-concept. Why give consideration to a concept instead of the concept that opposes them? Why consider when you could stop considering? etc. etc.
Why be good when you can be bad? I can argue for the goodness of bad thereby refuting the goodness of good regardless of how good is defined.
If goodness doesn't contain within itself bad it has to reject bad. Then the principle which contains both good and bad is better than good. For example, it has more power, it explains more, it is a more comprehensive concept, it has a more profound reality, it's higher up on the hierarchy of beings/entities etc.
Good is bad because if you believe that good is better than what is better than good then you’re bad.
Then the new principle can be subject to the same system of thought again and again ad infinitum. That’s the hermeneutics of beauty. It differs from Hegel because, to my understanding, his dialectics tries to solve contradictions instead of containing them fully in the next principle/thesis which John describes as insight.

>> No.20094824

>>20094807
>Why give consideration to a concept instead of the concept that opposes them?
opposes it*

>> No.20094854

>>20088695
I'm not referring to any essay. What does Derrida have to say about the relationship of the one and the many?

>that brief moment after something has been brought into existence but before it becomes a repeat.
>cognition before re-cognition?
Is this what you mean? I'm asking the same question again because its meaning is self-evident. According to your own words, it should be pretty simple stuff.

>> No.20094940

>>20086011
Derrida really disliked the term “deconstruction”, it was more something that other people used to label his approach rather than what he himself chose to call it (in fact he thought it was a very deceptive or misleading term).

It’s easier to show how it works than to say what precisely it does. So one example Derrida uses to “deconstruct” the metaphysics of presence is through an analogy of the Eiffel Tower- there is nothing “central” about its geographic location, it is not situated in the absolute centre of Paris. Yet stand at the very peak and it will appear as though the whole city is arranging itself around your feet. This image helps us to understand why the metaphysics of presence has a blind spot - an absent presence that cannot be incorporated into the symbolic order, yet around which reality is structured and organised, despite possessing no inherent centrality in of itself.

>> No.20095064

>>20094940
In order to say there is nothing central about the Eiffel Tower, you need to presuppose that there indeed is a central place.

You can climb the tower but that doesn't mean that it's the highest height, meaning that there are other heights wherein it feels like the world is arranged around you and that they can be ordered according to the highness of their height.

In your analogy, the tower and the location of the centre are connected. If the centre is considered to be the most important place, the tower that best shows its importance should be there. So according to you, is the tower just misplaced? What is the insight that is provided in your example?

>> No.20095123

>>20095064
>In order to say there is nothing central about the Eiffel Tower, you need to presuppose that there indeed is a central place
A city has defined limits, therefore whichever point is furthest from the edges of the city is the geographic centre. This is basic maths. The Eiffel Tower is not located in this “centre”, look at a map of Paris.

>You can climb the tower but that doesn't mean that it's the highest height, meaning that there are other heights wherein it feels like the world is arranged around you and that they can be ordered according to the highness of their height.
Okay now you’re just arbitrarily nitpicking because you don’t understand the analogy. It isn’t about one point being higher which means it has a greater claim to centrality, it’s the experience of being so far removed from the ground (ie, presence) is what appears to organise the world around your feet, creating the illusion of centrality. For Derrida all forms of discourse are structured from this blind spot, the “centre that is not a centre”. It is completely irrelevant as to which is the tallest building.

> In your analogy
Not my analogy, it’s Derrida’s. and you clearly lack the lateral/metaphorical thinking skills to appreciate the point he’s trying to make.

>> No.20095227

>>20086011
We can though
>Existence as an objective metric of purpose and morality

>The concept of existence is the most fundamental concept as of now, after all there is something rather than nothing. But what if its quality changes, or perhaps there are subtle patterns that can lead to its destruction in the long term. A conscious being has a higher quality of existence than an unconscious one because he is granted with the power of knowledge or agency that can further increase it. Therefore being as reasonable as possible would be the best action we can undertake since that will help us reach a state of the highest understanding as of now and any other action would be a denial of doing the most correct thing we can strive for because we still lack the absolute truth. That’s also proven by progressive evolution too, the better quality of life individuals get, the better cognitive abilities that the they acquire. Higher reasoning will also help us with morality since doing what’s right is fundamentally the most moral thing. For an example, impulsive emotions like aggression are primitive, extrovert and are caused by lower quality of life and evolution thus lacking reasoning while reflective emotions like empathy are considerate, introvert and are caused by higher quality of live and evolution. The first can achieve short term success but in the long term turns into destruction since it can’t internalize what’s actually right while the second fails short term but has success long term because it’s considerate and helps all achieve the best state they can be.

Easier to read here:https://newmanleary.wordpress.com/2022/02/26/existence-as-an-objective-metric-of-purpose-and-morality/

>> No.20095529
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20095529

>>20095123
Why did I go under your skin? There is nothing inherently upsetting in what I asked, lol.
>and you clearly lack the lateral/metaphorical thinking skills to appreciate the point he’s trying to make
hahahahahahahaha
I didn't say that the Eiffel Tower is in the centre of Paris. The point is that centre’s exist and you can be situated in them.
> there is nothing “central” about its geographic location, it is not situated in the absolute centre of Paris. Yet stand at the very peak and it will appear as though the whole city is arranging itself around your feet.
if the whole is arranged *around* you’re in the centre
>an absent presence that cannot be incorporated into the symbolic order, yet around which reality is structured and organised, despite possessing no inherent centrality in of itself.
>the experience of being so far removed from the ground (ie, presence) is what appears to organise the world around your feet, creating the illusion of centrality. For Derrida all forms of discourse are structured from this blind spot, the “centre that is not a centre”.
So is the point that discourse is revolving around the discourse? If am at the top of the Eiffel Tower, I can see Paris arranged around me. Ok, what’s the insight? That the tower is not the centre of Paris? But then according to this perspective it should be in the centre of Paris, because you get the sense of Paris being arranged around you in the tower. If the symbolic order is formed around an absent presence there are varying degrees of pointing towards that absent presence. This is the point about the towers I was making. The higher the tower, the more distant you are from the ground and the more you can see of the symbolic order that is arranged around you. And if the Eiffel Tower was high enough, inside it you could see beyond Paris and notice that the tower indeed isn’t situated in the centre of Paris.
This idea seems kind of similar to Thomas Aquinas’s vision of the centre point of the circle as God. The circle simultaneously emerges and emanates from it. The difference between the Christian God and Derrida’s absent presence is that He has an embodiment as the second person that isn’t absent.
I understood the analogy, but you didn’t understand my criticism of the analogy. This is the criticism. Some centres that aren’t centres are more central than others.
You wrote a full stop before continuing the sentence making a grammatical error just to increase the weight of mentioning Derrida’s name. Why do you admire this man so much?

>> No.20095548

>>20095123
>>20095529
>Thomas Aquinas’s vision of the centre point of the circle as God
the centre point is empty. that's the point.

>> No.20097063

>>20095123
>>20095529
Sorry, I shouldn't have been so confrontational.

>> No.20097401

>>20095064
>In order to say there is nothing central about the Eiffel Tower, you need to presuppose that there indeed is a central place.
Yes metaphysics of presence is that presupposition. This is what Derrida is getting at... He is not dispensing with the idea of metaphysics of presence.

>> No.20097421

I generally think of Derrida as a total charlatan, but I'm trying to be more open-minded about these things. If I had to read one work by or about him to convince me that he had something interesting to say, what would it be?

>> No.20097697

>>20097421
Structure sign and play is nice (not derrida expert myself) but it presupposes a previous familiarity with levi strauss and kant

>> No.20097700

>>20097697
kant's third critique*

>> No.20097855

>>20097421
Jumping off to derrida without a solid grounding in the philosophical tradition is very difficult. He's always riffing about precise texts or passages, (which btw is why it's absurd to purport him as a destroyer of the western canon, in fact his philosophuy was described by foucault as a pedantic exercise of erudition).

That said I go with something from his later period like The Animal that therefore I am, more discursive, clear example of how he moves around texts, and a better evidence of the ethicopolitical dimensions of deconstruction. But it requires at least a passing knoweldge in Descartes, Kant, Lacan and Levinas

Otherwise I think, Structure Sign and Play, Ousia and Gramme, White Mythology, Differance, Speech and Phenomena (if you know Husserl)

>> No.20098023

>>20097855
The good thing about reading Derrida is that he cites the passages to which he refers and even provides text in the original language around key arguments so it's not just a simple mistranslation or misunderstanding of the philosopher's intent. Derrida was actually the first philosopher I read and I didn't have too much trouble following him. It's when he talks about other philosophers, or philosophical schemas of other philosophers, that it gets confusing for me. But maybe that's because I don't have that grounding.
>White Mythology
This one kicked my ass when I first read it and I haven't put down Derrida since. I prefer that period of writing the most, around Margins, because his system is more rigorous compared to the more elliptical early writing and the stuff that is ripped from lectures later on that can seem a little more inconsequential at times.

>>20097421
It's probably a good time - for everyone really - to read Rogues, which is a great book on sovereignty and democracy. Just don't take the puns as actual philosophical axioms but likewise don't take them as just ornamental wordplay either.

>> No.20098052
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20098052

As much as you can agree with Derrida that the relationship between text and meaning is very arbitrary and contextual, he had to have known that his insistence on this would lead to the Nietzschean observation that if the foundation of something is arbitrary and unstable this in practice means that power needs to insert itself into the mix and make a final decision on what the correct answer is and everyone else has to obey that decision.

>> No.20098106

>>20098052
>everyone else has to obey that decision.
This isn't necessarily true and is part of what Derrida is saying. The assertion of metaphysical presuppositions in philosophy marks a tradition, but it is not the only way that philosophy has to be obeyed. It offers a logic through slips in language that cannot be controlled, or decided, that lay bare a functioning of philosophical reasoning that is outside intention but still within the bounds of how philosophy operates. What this does in philosophy is displace the traditional, unwritten arbiter of the outside-text (an unrevealed and ahistorical logic) into the meaning allowed by the text. This is within reason, as we are not throwing away all meaning, even if the method of delivery is 'arbitrary' - communication and translation still needs to be possible.
The point Derrida makes often is that the philosophy (or science, etc.) often describes the rules by which it is interpreted, in a way that places itself in a primary role of the describer, at the expense of everything else that goes into describing. But by what right? So when Derrida reads a text - the medium in which philosophy can be communicated, and by which it develops a history - he is tracking the meaning over time (which is difficult to place in a philosophy that presupposes fixed, accessible meaning) in order to come to a meaning, which may or may not run against the intended meaning of the philosopher, but cannot function without that intended meaning. Sometimes this decision then, as arbiter, can be undone, complicated, shaken, deconstructed, etc., by its own written rules. And that is a democratic and just meaning.

>> No.20098117

>>20098106
>often describes the rules by which it is interpreted, in a way that places itself in a primary role of the describer

Yeah, and that's my point, you can't have it any other way. Anything about human thought is inextricably linked to power, the fact that millions of people believe liberal Western philosophical suppositions are correct is because the most powerful people in the world tell them they are.

>> No.20098120

>>20095529
The point is the phenomenal experience of being an observer so removed from the ground (of presence), that it cannot be conceived of being part of it, despite seeming to producing a structuring effect on the environment around it. It confers an ILLUSION of centrality, despite not being part of the ground at all. So one example of this might be Kant’s transcendental psychology- you have this psychic architecture which processes and organises objects of sense into forms that the mind can understand, but in order to make sense of this thought we have to be able to observe the process from a point that exists entirely beyond it, a perspective from nowhere and nowhen. Your problem is you are taking the analogy too literally rather than trying to grapple with the paradox that Derrida is highlighting that has plagued metaphysics for hundreds of years. Understanding Derrida’s concept of the absent presence is key to all of this

>> No.20098135

>>20098117
Why do the most powerful people tell them they are? Where did they get those ideas? There's really not that much power in words or they would work all the time.

>> No.20098148

>>20098135
>There's really not that much power in words

Do you lack reading comprehension anon?

>> No.20098186

>>20098148
Ah sorry I forgot the most powerful people in the world beam their thoughts directly into their subjects.

>> No.20098195

>>20098186
Learn to read what I said here>>20098052

If there are no objective facts, only "perspectives" this means power needs to insert itself and say "This is the truth and the rest is false."

And this is literally what the most powerful people in any given society do.

>> No.20098223

>>20093189
>>20090082
>>20093345
So basically, I'm not going to abandon it (positive truth).
I know... I know, I'm sorry.
It's just, I'm not abandoning it is all.
Hahahahhahahaha.

>> No.20098530

>>20098023
> Otherwise I think, Structure Sign and Play, Ousia and Gramme, White Mythology, Differance, Speech and Phenomena (if you know Husserl)
I think I have a few of those laying around in the anthologies I own.
>It's probably a good time - for everyone really - to read Rogues, which is a great book on sovereignty and democracy. Just don't take the puns as actual philosophical axioms but likewise don't take them as just ornamental wordplay either.
I'll put it on the list, but it sounds like the mind of thing I wouldn't like.

>> No.20098546

>>20098195
Derrida doesn't talk about what are and are not objective facts you fucking moron. I gave you a response and tried to make it relevant to the actual thread at hand, not your dumb personal philosophy. Wrong thread.

>> No.20098560

>>20098223
Post successful!

>> No.20098571

>>20098530
Do you want something you like or do you want something that will convince you he had something interesting to say? I think you might be going into it with a bad mindset.

>> No.20098656

>>20098571
>I think you might be going into it with a bad mindset.
I sort of am. I've feel like I've been too hard on a lot of the French and German thinkers, so I'm trying to give them another chance, but I'd be lying if I said I isn't think their stylistic tendencies and philosophical heritage was anything other than an abomination.

>> No.20098691

>>20086011
Everything is an expression of power because in order to express you must contain some bits of strength.

>> No.20099299

What can be gleaned from Derrida aside from an understanding of the contingency and imprecision of language, and therefore knowledge? This is a serious question.

>> No.20099366
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20099366

>>20098120
Seems like the hard problem of consciousness. This is being addressed in the latest cog-sci and metaphysics. See Bernardo Kastrup, Iain McGilchrist, John Vervaeke and Jonathan Pageau. I recommend the Symbolic World lecture on Jordan Peterson's YouTube channel and the Coincidence of Opposites on Ralston College's channel. Tldw, reality is non-duality between non-duality and dualism in the divine fractal hierarchy of all beings. "In the simultaneity of the Resurrection, everything happens in the mind of God" - Jonathan Pageau

>> No.20099401 [DELETED] 

>>20094807
>>20094824
>>20088037
>>20098120
Doesn't this address what you're talking about?

>> No.20099424

>>20099299
Absolutely nothing else. He’s everything that’s wrong with modern philosophy.

>> No.20099450
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20099450

>>>20094807
>>>20094824
>>>20098120
>>>20088235
Doesn't this address the paradox that you're talking about? This is also what John talks about in his meditation series. The importance of recentring your thoughts and of never clinging on to any thought.

>> No.20099495

>>20098120
>>20094807
isn't the anti-concept I'm talking about the absent presence?