/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.20035678]

Imagine being a Kantian

[Anonymous No.20035696]

Truly only a tranny or undergraduate would be a Kantian

[Anonymous No.20035715]

>>20035678
Imagine being

[Anonymous No.20035735]

Imagine being a frog poster

Or one of those tards that go on and on and on about the trannies that live in their heads

[Anonymous No.20036793]

whats wrong with kant

[Anonymous No.20036794]

>>20035735
Shut the fuck up tranny

[Anonymous No.20036816]

>>20036793
>whats wrong with kant
He was a high IQ manlet that remained a virgin. If you are a high IQ manlet, you have a duty to find the tallest most athletic woman out there, seduce her, marry her (i.e. contractually agree to exclusive use of one another's genitalia), and spawn a large brood of high IQ manlets / tall amazon women.
Chads that renounce reproduction are very based tho.

[Anonymous No.20036838]

>>20036816
ok but what's wrong with kant's ideas

[Anonymous No.20036852]

>>20036838
I guess if you want to get into that, he got btfo by Husserl.

> Categorical intuition releases Husserl from the need to keep perhaps the most implausible part of Kantian picture, the forever immutable a priori categories and forms of intuition. But it is not the intellectual intuition of Spinoza and Fichte, it captures invariances of sensuous experience, not "glimpses" of things in themselves. But with it Husserl can be more generous on what is almost a vanishing point in Kant, the unknowable X. The transcendence, as Husserl calls it, is that content of consciousness that "points beyond" consciousness itself, given to it as not its own but foreign, subject to pre-cognitive awareness as the "raw matter" of sensuous experience. The limited creative ability to perceive wholes, however weak and partial, ability that Kant denied us completely as "intellectus archetypus", allowed Husserl to remove some of the other-worldliness surrounding Kantian "supersensible substrate of experience", although as for Kant it remains beyond the reach of knowledge.

> There are many other divergences, I'll mention one of particular interest to me. In the Second Analogy Kant gives a notorious transcendental argument for the a priori status of strict causality as condition of the possibility of our forming temporal succession of events (since they come with no time labels attached). Husserl's analysis of perception shows instead that the "now", like "sense data", is an ex post facto abstraction. In perception we instead encounter the "specious present" (the idea likely coming from James, along with the "stream of consciousness"), a short but dynamic duration with markers that explicitly link it to neighboring durations in the time succession, like coming and going notes in the apprehension of a melody (this was also confirmed by empirical psychology). Thus Husserl again grants us an immediately holistic grasp, however obscure and fleeting, this time of becoming. This removes another issue that caused Kant much grief (in his theory of free will), the necessity of unbreakable causal chains.

[Anonymous No.20037025]

>>20036852
what's wrong with immutable a priori categories? and what's wrong with not knowing anything about the thing-in-itself?