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19833304 No.19833304[DELETED]  [Reply] [Original]

>implying that being exists

>> No.19833308

>>19833304
what can it be equal to if not itself?

>> No.19833314
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19833314

>>19833308
>self

>> No.19833319
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19833319

>>19833304
Implying that the implication I expose has no being, but I can still somehow imply it.

>> No.19833322

>>19833314
yes. that's how we defined that word.

>> No.19833326
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19833326

>>19833319
>I

>> No.19833331

>>19833304
Why Parmenides says that we cannot think of what-is-not ?

>> No.19833573

>>19833331
I’m thinking something nonexistent right now

>> No.19833639

>>19833314
>what is the law of identity

>> No.19833671
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19833671

>ummm... you just committed a fallerino

>> No.19833675

>>19833308
you presuppose that it is equal to something

>> No.19833722

>>19833573
you think a thought, not a thing

>> No.19833738

>>19833722
Exactly

>> No.19833760
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19833760

>>19833304

>> No.19833780

>>19833675
why wouldn't it be?

>> No.19834782

>Implying existence exists

>> No.19834917

>>19833675
well yeah, that's what the equals sign is for

>> No.19834927

>>19833780
Why would it be? Why do you suppose identity exists?

>> No.19835316

>>19834927
>Why would it be? Why do you suppose identity exists?
Because we encounter different types of qualitative sensations and have different kinds of thoughts etc. If these weren't possessed of differences that separated them from each other such that each sensation etc has the identity of being itself and no other, then there would be no variety in the kinds of thoughts and sensations that we have knowledge of, there being nothing distinguishing them from each other.

>> No.19835568

>>19835316
But they do not have identities until they are differentiated. It seems that difference precedes identity.

>> No.19835656

>>19835316
You can’t abstract yourself from your senses any more than you can abstract a subject from its predicate. And without an inherent subject, it would be absurd to posit the being of sensations, thoughts, knowledge, etc.

>> No.19835676

>>19835568
>But they do not have identities until they are differentiated.
Incorrect, if there were no identities already then there would be no unique features that allow them to exist as differentiated from one another to begin with, as their identity endows them with those same unique features that allows there to be differences between them.

You can subtract all difference and whatever remains is just itself that has the identity of being itself, but if you subtract all identity then there isn't any difference or differences that can remain by itself without reliance upon something that has an identity, since difference is unintelligible without identities to refer to as constituting the facts of what is differing and how.

>> No.19835701
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19835701

>>19833304
Today I will remind them
Yes it regresses infinitely

>> No.19835708

Nah, identity comes before difference. First comes its existence and qualities, then you conceptualize the difference (not sameness) of qualities.

>> No.19835714

>>19835656
>You can’t abstract yourself from your senses any more than you can abstract a subject from its predicate.
If by "abstracting from" you mean "distinguishing from", then no, that's wrong. I can distinguish myself from my senses quite easily by the evident fact that I have awareness of them and not vice versa. I am the awareness which knows them, which has steady and effortless access to specific sensations like sight or thoughts etc while not being identical with them.
>And without an inherent subject, it would be absurd to posit the being of sensations, thoughts, knowledge, etc.
Regardless of what one says about the subject, to say that thoughts and sensations belong to non-being is ludicrous when we directly experience them.

>> No.19835741

>>19835714
>I can distinguish myself from my senses quite easily by the evident fact that I have awareness of them and not vice versa. I am the awareness which knows them, which has steady and effortless access to specific sensations like sight or thoughts etc while not being identical with them.
Do you think that consciousness can persist without the body?
>to say that thoughts and sensations belong to non-being is ludicrous when we directly experience them.
No, without being there is no non-being. Nor is there some soul independent of your sensations.

>> No.19835790

>>19835741
>Do you think that consciousness can persist without the body?
I think it's probable and that we have no direct confirmation that it's not the case.
>to say that thoughts and sensations belong to non-being is ludicrous when we directly experience them.
>No, without being there is no non-being.
So what category are you positing thoughts and sensations belonging to then?
>Nor is there some soul independent of your sensations.
If by soul you mean the knowing awareness, then no, that's wrong, we have direct contradiction of your claim in our experience, due to everyone having a natural and effortless experience of being a persisting awareness that knows various sights, sounds, thoughts etc which are presented to it successively in arrangements like images flashing on a screen before an observer. It's this that allows us to describe our awareness of our own thoughts and sensory knowledge to others. Moreover, any sort of theory that attempts to explain how the disparate sensations themselves give rise to the unified experience that we possess always fail and end up being full of absurd implications and contradictions.

>> No.19835791

>>19835676
You can't take away the difference between a and b without rendering a and b indistinguishable. It becomes impossible to identify a and b.
Were you to peel away the identities of a and b, you would obviously no longer have a and b, but you would still have their real but not yet actualized difference.
For example, if a is a length of two meters and b is a length of one meter, difference in length exists regardless of the existence of a and b.

>> No.19835813

>>19835708
This is a circular argument. You start with the assumption that identity and existence are the same thing.

>> No.19835817

>>19835791
>You can't take away the difference between a and b without rendering a and b indistinguishable.
Yes, in which case what you are left with is ab that has the identity of being ab, not all identity is erased but you are left with something new that has its own identity
> It becomes impossible to identify a and b.
only as separate from one another, not impossible to identify them in their identity as ab
>Were you to peel away the identities of a and b, you would obviously no longer have a and b, but you would still have their real but not yet actualized difference.
The "real but not yet actualized difference" would be meaningless without the concept of something with the identity of the ab of which it is being applied to
>For example, if a is a length of two meters and b is a length of one meter, difference in length exists regardless of the existence of a and b.
and difference in length is meaningless without prior reliance upon the concept of distance or extension which have their own identities that separate them from other concepts and make them unique.

>> No.19835820
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19835820

>>19835568
yes.

>> No.19835828

>>19835701
Explain. Something something Hegel I presume?

>> No.19835834

>>19835790
>So what category are you positing thoughts and sensations belonging to then?
>being-nigger can’t function without placing things into fixed categories

>due to everyone having a natural and effortless experience of being a persisting awareness that knows various sights, sounds, thoughts etc which are presented to it successively in arrangements like images flashing on a screen before an observer.
If you want to assert that there is persistent awareness throughout time, then you should also explain how your awareness was present before you were born, continues through deep sleep, and remains after death.

>> No.19835836

>t. mindbroken dechristianized zogbots who neglect the glory of god around them

>> No.19835877

>>19835817
>Yes, in which case what you are left with is ab that has the identity of being ab, not all identity is erased but you are left with something new that has its own identity
You can't be both two meters long and one meter long. It only makes sense to say that what remains is the difference between two meters and one meter.
>The "real but not yet actualized difference" would be meaningless without the concept of something with the identity of the ab of which it is being applied to
Are you are suggesting there can be conceived an entity that is both two meters and one meter long?
>and difference in length is meaningless without prior reliance upon the concept of distance or extension which have their own identities that separate them from other concepts and make them unique.
Extension does not exist without differences in degrees of extension. Extension without differences in degrees of extension is nothing.

>> No.19835881

>>19835836
God is the changeless change. He is an active force, not a passive substance.

>> No.19835886

>>19835834
>>being-nigger can’t function without placing things into fixed categories
Nice ad hominem, I was asking a question of what YOU are saying they are, I wasnt making any statement of my own position on such things.

>If you want to assert that there is persistent awareness throughout time, then you should also explain how your awareness was present before you were born, continues through deep sleep, and remains after death.
Easily, you simply don't retain memory of its presence before birth despite it existing in prior bodies or retain memory of it being present during sleep despite it being present immutably all the same before this body and during sleep. And it continues on to other bodies or modes of existence after this one.

This is really a tangential and relatively unimportant aside though, speculating on how it exists beyond this body is unimportant when the claim that we have no awareness that is separate from our thoughts+sensations is directly refuted by our lived experience. When we have direct confirmation of it being wrong in our experience, there is not sufficient epistemic or logical grounds to overturn and reject that simply because there are differing opinions about the status of awareness before and after the life of the body or during sleep, since that's actually a different subject than the separate question of how does awareness of sensations in the waking state take place.

>> No.19835901

>>19835886
How can you be aware but not thinking/sensing?

>> No.19835904

>>19835877
>>Yes, in which case what you are left with is ab that has the identity of being ab, not all identity is erased but you are left with something new that has its own identity
>You can't be both two meters long and one meter long.
I know, a true ab that has had all difference eliminated would be neither two meters nor one meter, "difference-in-identity" is not the elimination of all difference, your objection here presumes I am talking about ab as "difference-in-identity" whereby it still retains two contradictory identities, but an ab arising from the complete removal of all difference would not be one or two meters long or both at the same time, it would be neither.
>It only makes sense to say that what remains is the difference between two meters and one meter.
This is laughable, because it purports to speak of pure difference or difference existing alone while relying upon and being inextricable from two things each having their own identity that are being juxtaposed as different, but without the prior acceptance of these identities that are implicitly assumed by you there would be no differences to speak of, so you aren't actually speaking of difference alone remaining.
>>The "real but not yet actualized difference" would be meaningless without the concept of something with the identity of the ab of which it is being applied to
>Are you are suggesting there can be conceived an entity that is both two meters and one meter long?
No, I'm saying that an ab that results from the elimination of all difference would be neither.
>Extension does not exist without differences in degrees of extension.
the very notion of 'degrees' presupposes the concept of extension and its associated identity, and is unintelligible without it